On Wednesday (16 September) Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had a good day at the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that she would like to work with Mr Carney “on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the European Union", writes Dick Roche.

Prime Minister Carney was given a standing ovation by the Parliament’s Members. While it is not clear  what ‘associate EU Membership’ means, the offer from the Commission President and the welcome by MEPs was a plus, of sorts, for Mr Carney in his battle with President Trump.

A bumpy relationship

The relationship between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump was always destined to be a bumpy one. Days before President Trump was sworn in for his second term Justin Trudeau stepped down as Prime Minister of Canada. As Trudeau was leaving office the president-elect repeated comments that he had made during the 2024 US elections about Canada becoming the 51^st US State.

On 1 February 2025, as the contest to replace Mr Trudeau as the Liberal Party leader was getting underway President Trump, announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and Canada: Canadian energy exports were subject to a 10% tariff. Trump explained the tariffs were intended to address the emergency related to fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration.

Nine days later Trump announced a blanket 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminium to “protect US industry and national security.” This hit Canada the biggest foreign supplier of steel and aluminium into the US market badly.

The pain for Canada did not stop there, on 26^th March Trump announced his 25% tariff on all automobile imports into the US. Again, another bad hit on - most Canadian vehicle production is destined for the US market. The impact on Canadian auto producers was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the tariff applied only to non-US content vehicle imports from Canada.

The stream of tariff announcements from the US while hurting Canada played to Mark Carney’s advantage in the race for leadership of Canada’s Liberal Party. While a "political ingénue" never having held political office or been a Member of a Member of Canada’s Parliament Mr Carney brought deep economic experience to the contest. He won almost 87% of the votes cast in the leadership election.

Mr Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on 14^th March 2025 - seven weeks into President Trump’s second term. Six weeks after his swearing in Mark Carney was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in the General Election of 28^th April 2025.  

Placating a cranky neighbour

From the outset  Prime Minister Mark Carney invested considerable effort in improving relations with President Trump. The two leaders met in the White House on 6^th May. The meeting, reportedly, went well.

Asked at the press briefing after the meeting about Trump’s suggestions that Canada should become the 51^st US state, Carney responded humorously. He recalled that during the recent elections he had met the owners of Canada. They were not he said interested in ‘selling the property’, something that Mr Trump as a property man would understand. Smiling President Trump responded ‘never say never.’

At the G7 meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June President Trump and Mr Carney had another cordial meeting.  

The cordiality  did not last long. At the end of June the first payments on Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST) were due to be made.  The DST legislation enacted during the Trudeau Government, hit US tech companies causing fury in the White House. Trump called the tax a "direct and blatant attack on our country" and announced all trade talks with Canada would cease immediately.

Within days Carney announced that his administration would rescind the DST and halt the collection of the tax to advance negotiations with the US.

There was another flashpoint in January when President Trump reacted to reports that Canada and China were pursuing a comprehensive free trade deal. Prime Minister Carney defused the situation by explaining the talks with China were focused on adjusting existing arrangements.

While Carney faced criticism for ‘climbing down’ on the DST issue and for being too eager to placate the White House on China, his approach got US-Canada trade talks back underway.

By August 2025 there was some optimism that a breakthrough trade talks was close.  On August 18^th President Trump announced that a tentative understanding had been reached and as a result he was prepared to push back on the late August deadline for US tariff increases. 

The talks came to an abrupt halt three days later when Carney instructed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa.

That decision came as a surprise. Walking away risked incurring the wrath of President Trump. That was a risk that the Canadian PM had clearly calibrated.

When the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer sought to blame Canada for the breakdown Carney responded that it was the US United States that made last-minute demands which Canada considered unacceptable, including efforts to introduce provisions that would impact Canada's trade autonomy and sovereignty.

President Trump  reacted immediately to Canada’s decision.  Using  a section of the Tariff Act 1930 that had never been used previously Trump imposed 50% tariffs across US$20 billion worth of Canadian products exported to the US.  

Carney announced that Canada would hit US exports to Canada with “dollar for dollar” retaliatory measures. These would come into  effect immediately after Labour Day 7^th September –the day when the starting gun for US mid-term elections is ‘fired’ to get into full swing.

Asked at the press conference whether Canada was starting a trade war with the United States, Mr. Carney responded: “you’re at war when you get attacked—we got attacked.”

In a televised address, Carney acknowledged that the steps he was taking  would come at a cost but argued that U.S. actions had left him with little alternative. He characterized the measures being taken by the United States as an attempt to hurt and divide Canadians. That, he suggested, was a miscalculation. Rather than weakening Canada, U.S. pressure would, he said, bring Canadians closer together.  

Backing Carney

All of indications suggest that Prime Minister Carney was correct in his assessment.

The leader of the Conservative Party Canada, Pierre Poilievre who previously accused Carney of being too willing to concede to Trump, strongly supported the decision to walk away from those trade talks.

Mr Poilievre  was not alone, with one exception the Premiers of Canadian Provinces publicly supported Prime Minister Carney’s stance.

The Premier of Ontario Canada’s most populous province, Doug Ford, an open critic of the US President, encouraged PM Carney to respond to Trump “tariff for tariff, dollar for dollar.”

The Quebec Premier, Christine Fréchette, was particularly supportive  of Carney’s refusal to make concessions to Trump on Quebec’s cultural protections.

Other Premiers have encouraged Carney to “fight back,” praised “team Canada,” criticised US tariff threats as unjustified, promised “full support,” and urged that Canada not accept a ‘subordinate economic relationship’ to the US.  

The Premier of Alberta where a referendum on a range of questions including Alberta’s future within Canada is to be held on 19^th October was the lone outrider,  cautioning against celebrating retaliatory tariffs and expressed the hope that negotiations be resumed.

Public support in Canada for the position taken by Carney has been positive. Reuters referred to  the tariff dispute encouraging a ‘rally around Canada’ effect that will likely dampen support for Alberta separation from Canada.

Ten days after the Canadian negotiating team abandoned the trade talks in Washington Carney’s Liberal Party received a very tangible indication of voter support when it won three by-elections for seats in the Canadian House of Commons including a seat in Quebec that had previously been held by a Conservative Party Member.

Opinion polls since the Canadian team walked away from the negotiations also show strong support for the position taken the Carney government.  

An Ipsos poll taken on August 26-27 indicates support across party lines for Canada standing up to the US - even if it resulted in higher costs and job losses: 63% of those surveyed felt Canada was right to stand firm in the negotiations.  Just 18 per cent said Canada should have made additional sacrifices to get a deal.

An Angus Reid Institute poll taken on 22 and 23 August immediately after the talks were ended found that 76% supported the line taken by the Canadian government.

A third poll by Abacus Data one of Canada’s most cited polling firms found that 60% approved of how the Carney government had handled the dispute while  18% disapproved.

Negatives for Trump

In the US, unsurprisingly, positions on the trade war with Canada splits along party lines. Democrats overwhelmingly oppose the Trump’s position arguing that tariffs cost consumers and businesses.

On 9^th September a group of nine Democrat Senators from states with close business ties with Canada issued a joint statement attacking President Trump’s “senseless trade war” with a key trading partner, primary export market and most enduring defence partner, pointing out that the President’s actions would force Canada to “diversify away from the US and deepen trade ties with other countries including China.”

Republicans generally, but not universally, support Trump’s position, arguing that Trump’s tariff stance is ‘putting America first.’ Concerns have been flagged in the Republican ranks that the tariffs will be an issue in the November mid-terms, particularly in competitive Senate and House races.  

Senator Susan Collins of Maine, the US state most exposed to the tariff dispute with Canada, who is facing a tough re-election contest in November has labelled the tariffs on Canada ‘a mistake’ pointing out that Canadian retaliation could cost Maine up to $170 million in export losses.  The Republican governor of Vermont has also been openly critical.    

The position for President Trump is considerably less positive than that of Prime Minister Carney. The Canadian Prime Minister enjoys the public and political support that President Trump conspicuously lacks. As this week's appearance in the European Parliament demonstrated Mr Carney’s support is not confined to Canada; he has international support which, President Trump again conspicuously lacks.

At the moment there is no obvious ‘off ramp’ to facilitate  a return to the negotiating table. Politically and temperamentally it will be harder for President Trump to pull back from the position he has taken in the tariff war than it will be for Mark Carney. Mr Carney has more political support for his position, at home and internationally than President Trump. He has also  played an infinitely better game than Mr Trump. For the moment the ball is very much in Mark Carney’s court. 

Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs and former Minister for the Environment. 

“What stands in the way becomes the way,” Marcus Aurelius writes in Meditations. Nearly two millennia later, the idea captures Pakistan’s strategic dilemma with remarkable precision. Islamabad must convince Saudi Arabia that its defence commitment carries real weight without being drawn into another Middle Eastern war or rupturing its relationship with Tehran. That obstacle may itself have become Pakistan’s most useful instrument: strategic ambiguity, writes Dimitra Staikou.

On 10 September 2026, following Houthi attacks against Saudi targets, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan said there was no discussion of an immediate military response under the new defence agreement. Yet only a day earlier, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif had warned that continued aggression against Saudi Arabia could make the pact operational.

The contradiction may be more calculated than accidental. On 13 September, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed Pakistan’s complete solidarity with Mohammed bin Salman. Two days later, fresh missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets brought the question of collective defence closer to reality. Pakistan is trying to reassure Riyadh that it will not stand alone while avoiding any clear definition of when political solidarity becomes military involvement. At the same time, Islamabad is keeping channels with Tehran open and leaving Saudi Arabia’s adversaries uncertain about where Pakistan’s real red line lies. But September’s events suggest that the space for such ambiguity is narrowing. The central question is no longer whether Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are security partners, but how far Islamabad is actually prepared to go when deterrence is tested.

That question has become more urgent because the relationship has changed institutionally. On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, declaring that an armed attack against any one of the three would be regarded as an attack against all. On 31 August, their foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul to begin institutionalising the arrangement, agreeing to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and deepen joint defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production. This is therefore more than another declaration of political solidarity. The Makkah Alliance is beginning to acquire the machinery designed to make collective deterrence credible.

The military relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself stretches back decades. Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces, Pakistani troops have periodically been deployed in the Kingdom, and Riyadh has reciprocated with economic and political support. Yet the most important episode for understanding the limits of this relationship came in 2015. When Saudi Arabia assembled its coalition for the intervention in Yemen, Riyadh sought Pakistani military support. On 10 April, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously backed neutrality, effectively rejecting direct participation while pledging to defend Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity were threatened. The distinction was crucial: Islamabad was prepared to defend the Kingdom, but not automatically to participate in its wars. In 2026, that very red line is being tested.

The Riyadh-Islamabad rapprochement does not mean that Saudi Arabia is abandoning the United States. It does, however, demonstrate that the Kingdom no longer wants its security to depend exclusively on Washington. The limited US response following the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019, followed by Washington’s 2021 decision to end support for offensive operations in Yemen, had already exposed the limits of American protection. That uncertainty resurfaced this September. Mohammed bin Salman sought military assistance from Donald Trump against the Houthis, but the US president declined to authorise direct American strikes, with Washington instead offering intelligence-sharing and targeting support. On 12 September, Trump said Iran was probably responsible for the attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and described Mohammed bin Salman as a “good friend”. The United States remains an indispensable Saudi partner, but not always a willing combatant. Pakistan gains importance in precisely this space: not as a replacement for America, but as an additional regional pillar of Saudi security.

If the American position explains why Riyadh is seeking more strategic options, China points towards the direction in which the wider security system may be moving. Beijing is one of Islamabad’s most important strategic and military partners, while simultaneously developing an increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. In April 2026, Xi Jinping told Mohammed bin Salman that China wanted to deepen “mutual strategic trust” with the Kingdom. On 2 September, Xi argued that regional states should work towards “a new security architecture for the Middle East” and hold their future in their own hands. His remarks were not about the Makkah Agreement and should not be interpreted as Chinese endorsement of it. They do, however, reflect a broader shift: a Riyadh seeking greater strategic autonomy, an Islamabad deeply connected to Beijing, and a China seeking a greater role in shaping the regional order. The issue is not a secret trilateral alliance, but the potential convergence of Saudi capital, Pakistani military power and Chinese technological and strategic support.

There is also an unavoidable nuclear dimension. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Saudi Arabia is not a nuclear weapons state. Nothing publicly released about the Makkah Agreement establishes a Pakistani nuclear guarantee to Riyadh, and there is no evidence that Islamabad intends to deploy nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. Yet that absence of clarity is itself strategically significant. Pakistan’s nuclear capability sits behind a collective-defence commitment whose public language does not specify where conventional deterrence ends and strategic deterrence begins. For Iran, Israel, Washington and European capitals, the question is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia has suddenly acquired a Pakistani nuclear umbrella — it has not — but whether potential adversaries may now have to calculate against that possibility in an extreme crisis. Deterrence often depends as much on uncertainty as on declared doctrine.

For Europe, this shift is anything but distant. On 9 September, France expressed full solidarity with Riyadh following the Houthi attacks. In Berlin, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul assured his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan of Germany’s solidarity, while on 11 September the German Foreign Office warned that growing Houthi pressure around Bab al-Mandab could restrict oil and LNG supplies, with consequences for global markets. In Brussels, Kaja Kallas had already put “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea on the European agenda, asking publicly what more Europe could do. These concerns are tangible: energy security, maritime trade routes and regional stability are becoming intertwined in the same crisis. The attacks of 15 September have made the danger even clearer, with renewed strikes against Saudi targets adding to pressure on energy markets and further threatening the routes connecting the Gulf, the Red Sea and Europe.

There is another reason Europe cannot treat the Makkah Alliance as a distant development: Türkiye. Ankara is simultaneously a party to the new collective-defence architecture and a member of NATO. That does not mean the Makkah Agreement automatically engages NATO obligations, nor that the two systems are inherently incompatible. But it does create questions that European allies should address before, rather than during, a major crisis. What happens if Türkiye is asked to participate in collective action under the Makkah Agreement? How would Ankara manage parallel commitments if escalation involved Iran or another regional actor? And how much strategic consultation should occur within NATO before such a scenario materialises?

Brussels cannot afford to wait for the agreement to be activated for the first time before deciding how to respond. Europe needs deeper dialogue with Riyadh and Islamabad on non-proliferation and missile technologies, stronger protection for navigation in the Red Sea and a clear discussion within NATO about Ankara’s new defence commitments. It does not need to treat the emerging security architecture as hostile. But it does need to understand what happens when that architecture moves from declarations to action.

The real test of the Makkah Alliance will come when Riyadh asks Islamabad to demonstrate what it means for an attack on one to be treated as an attack on all. At that moment, the strategic ambiguity that today gives Pakistan room to manoeuvre may become the problem itself. And the question — whether Pakistan is genuinely prepared to fight for Saudi Arabia — will no longer concern Riyadh and Islamabad alone. The answer could reshape the security balance from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea all the way to Europe.

Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.

The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk.  But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.

Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.

The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.

From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.

KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.

Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.

Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.

This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new.  The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.

Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore  mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”

The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.

Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”

The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.

The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.

The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence. 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.

De Facto territorial division

The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.

Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:

• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.

More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.

The PUK–New Generation coalition

The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.

Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.

Socioeconomic fallout

With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:

• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.

• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.

• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.

Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations

The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:

1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.

2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.

3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.

Why this matters to Europe

The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.

Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.

The future of a protected wetland in Albania might seem like a local issue. In reality, it is becoming a test of the European Union's credibility, writes Besjana Guri, Albanian Environmental Activist and Founder and Director of Lumi. 

For [over] 100 days, I and thousands of citizens have been protesting unlawful developments in Vjosa-Narta, one of Albania's most important protected landscapes, at a moment when Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners for EU accession.

At these protests, I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with citizens of all walks of life: scientists, artists, students, local communities, environmental activists and public figures. What might once have been seen as a local conservation issue has become a national conversation about whether safeguards for protected areas will actually be enforced, and whether environmental safeguards mean anything when powerful development interests are involved.

The EU enlargement process works because candidate countries know that membership is earned by meeting clear conditions. Among them is a commitment to uphold environmental laws, protect vulnerable ecosystems and give citizens a meaningful voice in decisions that affect them. Vjosa-Narta is testing whether those principles still carry weight when they collide with major development ambitions.

Albania is widely regarded as a frontrunner for EU membership. If it advances while protected areas are opened up to contested development and environmental safeguards are weakened, the credibility of the enlargement process itself will be called into question.

For those of us who support Albania's European future, that is precisely why developments in Vjosa-Narta must be addressed now, not after irreversible damage has been done.

A test case of environmental safeguards

The protected Vjosa-Narta landscape is formed of wetlands, lagoons, salt marshes, dunes, forests and coastal habitats. It is an important stopover for migratory birds travelling along the Adriatic Flyway, while its wetlands support local livelihoods and help regulate water, store carbon and protect against flooding.

It forms part of the wider Vjosa landscape, which gained international recognition in 2023 when Albania declared the river Europe's first Wild River National Park, following years of campaigning by Albanian activists, local communities and international partners, including outdoor clothing brand Patagonia. For many of us who worked to secure that protection, it demonstrated that environmental leadership and economic ambition do not have to be in conflict.

Yet the debate surrounding Vjosa-Narta is no longer simply about one protected area. It has become a test of whether environmental safeguards can be weakened and developments advanced while a country continues progressing towards EU membership.

The EU has been clear that environmental protection is not an optional extra of accession. Chapter 27, covering environment and climate change, is a significant and technically demanding part of the enlargement process. Candidate countries are expected not only to align their laws with European standards, but to demonstrate that they can implement and enforce them effectively.

Albania’s progress towards meeting these requirements has been undermined by recent setbacks in the legal framework for protected areas. Amendments to Albania's Law on Protected Areas in 2024 significantly weakened environmental safeguards by opening the door to broader tourism and infrastructure development within protected areas. The European Commission and European Parliament have both raised concerns about whether those changes are compatible with EU environmental standards. At the same time, concerns around environmental impact assessments, permitting procedures and public consultation in Vjosa-Narta have turned this protected landscape into a real-world test of whether environmental commitments are being upheld.

Setting the precedent for EU accession

If Albania continues advancing towards membership without resolving these concerns, it risks sending a message that environmental conditionality can be negotiated away when powerful economic interests are at stake.

This sets a worrying precedent for the accession process and the outcome will be watched closely across the Western Balkans, where other countries such as Montenegro and North Macedonia are in accession negotiations. As one of the EU's most advanced candidate countries, Albania is helping to shape expectations of how accession standards are applied in practice.

If concerns around protected areas and environmental assessments can remain unresolved without affecting progress towards membership, future candidate countries may draw their own conclusions about the weight given to environmental commitments.

Wider implications for the bloc

Existing member states must have confidence that new members have been held to the same standards. And citizens must trust that environmental laws cannot simply be set aside when they become inconvenient.

If the EU is seen to tolerate environmental shortcuts during accession, it risks weakening its ability to defend those same standards across the bloc. The issue therefore is not simply whether Albania is meeting its obligations, but whether the EU is prepared to uphold the standards it asks others to meet.

Brussels now faces a choice

As Albania enters the final stages of accession, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental commitments have real meaning in practice, not just on paper. Addressing concerns around Vjosa-Narta would send a clear signal that enlargement remains a process built on accountability, implementation and shared standards.

That's not only important for Albania. It's important for the credibility of enlargement itself.

Concerns about the water and energy demands of data centers have become prolific in recent weeks. But debates about their impact often overlook the rapid advances in cooling technology and cleaner energy that are already having an impact.

However, data centers’ resource consumption should be front and center of the AI conversion, as it is set to grow rapidly. By 2030, data centers’ water and energy consumption will double as AI demand leads to rapid construction of the infrastructure.

But data centers will not cause the world to run out of water or energy. Water- and energy-saving technologies already in use are reducing their impact, while Shanghai’s groundbreaking underwater data center demonstrates how innovative design can limit water, energy and land use.

Data centers have underpinned the internet since its founding. Apps, email, file storage and cloud services all run through them.

Modern AI workloads, however, have transformed their power demands beyond recognition. Today a single AI data center can match the electricity consumption of 100,000 homes, making them a significant drain on local energy grids, especially if a region is susceptible to shortages.

Data centers’ energy consumption is only rising as more are built across the world. In the US, data centers could increase from 4.4% to 12% of national electricity usage by 2028 — that is equivalent to adding eight New York Cities to the American grid.

Data centers also consume large amounts of water in two main ways. Water is used directly to cool servers and storage systems, which generate considerable heat, and indirectly to produce electricity at fossil fuel power plants where it is heated into steam to drive turbines.

In the UK, data centers have been estimated to use up to eight times as much water as average on hot summer days, underlining how their impact can rise when local resources are already under strain.

As the effects of climate change intensify, the location of data centers, and methods to reduce their water and energy consumption, are becoming ever more important.

Fortunately, resource-saving measures are already being implemented. Data centers on land use closed-loop cooling systems that recycle water rather than continually evaporating it. This can reduce freshwater use by up to 70% compared to traditional open evaporative methods.

China has also pioneered a revolutionary new type of data center in Shanghai: wind-powered, and underwater. The facility, which began full commercial operations in May 2026, uses seawater as a coolant instead of using refrigerated fresh water as land-based data centers do, reducing the electricity required to cool the computers.

It uses at least 30% less electricity than traditional data centers, and offshore wind turbines reduce reliance on fossil fuels and cut the data center’s carbon emissions. Innovative solutions such as these will go a long way to reducing data centers’ resource consumption.

AI is also part of the solution to data centers’ draw on resources. AI can optimise electricity grids and shift computing workloads towards periods when cleaner energy is more efficient, making energy use more effective overall. AI can also anticipate fluctuations in demand and adjust energy consumption accordingly, reducing waste.

It might sound obvious, but some areas are just better equipped to accommodate a data center than others. For example, facilities in hot or water-stressed regions will impose a heavier burden on resources than those supplied by cleaner energy with plentiful water and located in cooler climates.

AI’s growing demand for data centers will increase electricity and water consumption, that is true. But it does not mean the technology will exhaust regional or global supplies of either resource.

The AI boom and the infrastructure buildout accompanying it are well underway. To manage its impact, the industry needs to plan ahead. Cleaner energy, efficient cooling, and sites that have significant water and energy supplies will all limit the infrastructure’s drain on resources.

Long constrained by its landlocked geography, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its position between Europe and Asia into a source of economic and geopolitical leverage. As trade disruptions and competition drive demand for diversified supply chains, Astana is investing in new transport corridors to establish itself as an indispensable transit hub and translate connectivity into diplomatic influence.

The Middle Corridor route
“Transport diplomacy has long been a pillar of economic diplomacy. Today, efficient transport and logistics networks are becoming strategic assets that shape economic competitiveness, and a country’s role in regional economic cooperation,” Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) Alexey Kuznetsov told The
Astana Times. 

Alexey Kuznetsov, Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank. Photo credit: The EDB’s press service Located between China, Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan is developing railways, roads, ports and logistics hubs while expanding connections along several international transport corridors. The scale of the sector is reflected in recent figures. Kazakhstan transported 540.5 million tons of cargo in January-July, up 0.9% from the same period a year earlier, according to the Bureau of National Statistics.

Cargo turnover increased 1%, while road freight transportation grew 6.2%. Government data shows that transit freight reached 21.7 million tons in January-June, up 24% from 17.5 million tons a year earlier. Building Eurasian connectivity Kazakhstan is seeking to strengthen its role not simply as a transit country but as a major regional connectivity hub. “For Kazakhstan, modern transport, logistics, and warehousing infrastructure are essential for addressing the challenges of a landlocked geography.

"At the same time, the country has become one of Eurasia’s most important transit hubs,” said Kuznetsov. He said international transport and logistics partnerships are central to Kazakhstan’s connectivity diplomacy, positioning the country as an influential player in shaping Eurasia’s regional agenda. According to the EDB’s Transport Projects Observatory, Kazakhstan accounts for 53% of transport corridor investments planned or under implementation in Central Asia through 2035.

“More than $32 billion is expected to be invested in 55 major transport projects, including construction of the Center-West motorway, the Uralsk-Atyrau and Kyzylorda-Saksaulsk roads, and the Moiynty-Kyzylzhar railway. These investments will strengthen East-West and North-South trade routes and further position Kazakhstan as a strategic transport crossroads linking Europe and Asia,” Kuznetsov said. Road construction, reconstruction and repairs cover around 11,000 kilometers nationwide in 2026. Kazakhstan also plans to repair 11,000 kilometers of railway tracks by 2029. International financing is supporting part of the expansion.

In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a major railway connectivity project along Kazakhstan’s section of the Middle Corridor. However, Kuznetsov emphasized that infrastructure alone cannot determine whether a transport route succeeds. “Transport connectivity depends equally on ‘soft infrastructure’: harmonized regulations, efficient border-crossing procedures, coordinated corridor development, and digitalization of transport services and documentation,” he said.

The World Bank estimates cited by Kuznetsov suggest that cutting border delays by 50% through regulatory harmonization and digital solutions could increase exports from Central Asian countries along transport corridors by an average of 18%. For Kazakhstan, this means that the competitiveness of its routes will depend not only on the number of roads, railways and terminals built, but also on how efficiently they operate.

The Middle Corridor and geopolitics At the center of Kazakhstan’s connectivity strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects China with Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Europe. For political scientist Tair Naumov, the importance of such routes extends beyond trade. “Investment in transit infrastructure requires a certain level of trust between countries, including confidence in political relations and the security of investments,” Naumov said in an interview with The Astana Times. Once a route becomes operational, however, it can also strengthen those relations by creating greater economic interdependence.

“When countries rely on the same transport routes, their interests become more closely connected. If a corridor becomes important to foreign trade, there is a stronger incentive to maintain stable relations and keep existing agreements in place,” he said. Naumov noted that this interdependence can eventually acquire a security dimension. “If a country becomes an important transit hub, its stability becomes an interest not only for the country itself but also for its neighbors and major trading partners,” he said. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law, takes a similar view, emphasizing the economic interests created by shared logistics networks.

“Good logistics creates mutual interest between countries. The more participants there are, the safer it becomes. And the more economic ties pass through Kazakhstan, the greater its role in the region,” Kayumov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor illustrates this dynamic. While it does not yet account for a dominant share of Kazakhstan’s transit flows, its rapid growth could give it greater strategic importance.

From transit to economic value
For Kazakhstan, stronger economic ties along these routes are only part of the opportunity. The bigger question is how the country can turn growing transit flows into broader economic value at home. 

“I would not reduce the transport strategy to transit alone. If a container simply passes through Kazakhstan, the country earns comparatively little. It is much more interesting when logistics centers, warehouses, manufacturing and service companies emerge alongside the route,” Kayumov said. Such an approach would allow Kazakhstan to capture more value from its position in Eurasian supply chains. “Then the transport corridor begins to work for the regions and for our industry. Kazakhstan receives much more income. The service model that develops around the entire flow allows us to earn more and create more jobs,” he said.

Kayumov noted that attracting cargo also requires competitive and predictable routes. Border delays, limited port capacity, container shortages and differences in procedures can increase costs and make a route less attractive to businesses. “A convenient route must be fast, clear and predictable. For business, it matters how long cargo remains at the border, how quickly documents are processed and how much railway capacity is available,” he said. According to Kayumov, digitalization can help address some of these challenges. Electronic document management, for example, can reduce corruption risks while speeding up operations.

TRIPP and the wider connectivity network
The development of new routes beyond Kazakhstan could expand the country’s connectivity options. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a proposed transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in the project and linking it with the Middle Corridor. “For the Trans-Caspian route, TRIPP provides an additional option for moving cargo after the Caspian Sea toward Türkiye and Europe. The more such branches there are, the more resilient and attractive the entire corridor becomes,” Kayumov said.

For Kazakhstan, the interest is largely pragmatic. As a landlocked country, it needs several reliable routes to major markets. However, Kayumov noted that the project’s value for Kazakhstan would depend on how effectively it is integrated into the country’s existing transport network. “What is more important for us is not formal participation in the project, but its integration with our existing transit hub. This means having unified tariffs, digital borders, digital document management and clear, predictable delivery times,” Kayumov said. “The more reliable routes connect Central Asia with Europe through Kazakhstan, the greater the economic and political value of our geography and our role in connecting different markets,” he added.

The UK’s trade ambitions are clear: open new markets, reduce border friction, and make it genuinely easier for small businesses to compete globally. The government’s 2025 Trade Strategy frames this as a growth priority. Yet the data tells a more sobering story, write Jose Puyana and Tom Harding.

UK goods exports to the EU have fallen by £27 billion since Brexit. Exports remain roughly 18% below pre-2019 levels. And around one in seven UK businesses have stopped trading with the EU altogether.

Large-scale surveys from the Federation of Small Businesses and British Chambers of Commerce consistently cite customs processes and compliance complexity as the leading barriers for SMEs. But surveys don’t fully capture the emotional texture of what traders describe: a persistent, low-level anxiety about whether a detail has been missed, whether the code is right, whether the rules have quietly changed since last time.

The traders understand their products, their customers, and their commercial realities. What leaves them uneasy is the web of rules, requirements, and systems governing the movement of goods across a border. We call this mindset the Nervous Trader.

The fear of getting it wrong

Consider a small business importing animal-derived products: the origin of materials, their treatment, and finishing processes can all shift how a shipment must be declared. A detail that seems minor to an outsider - whether a skin has been treated, how a component has been finished - can change the commodity code entirely. Get it wrong, and products are delayed or blocked at the border. Unexpected duties land, turning a profitable shipment into a loss. Time is consumed by questions from freight forwarders and internal scrutiny that the business cannot afford.

For a clothing importer shipping technical apparel from multiple countries, the same anxiety plays out at scale. Every declaration carries the nagging worry of a missed detail or overlooked cost. And for a manufacturer exporting specialist components, the risk doesn’t just lie with a single shipment - it scales with volume. As the business grows, so does the exposure. One overlooked requirement can have knock-on effects across the whole operation.

Rules without a map

What these businesses share is not inexperience. It is the absence of certainty. Trade is inherently consequential - financial and reputational stakes are real. But the systems around it do remarkably little to reduce the sense of exposure. Nervousness is rational in an ambiguous environment. The question is why we continue to design ambiguity into the experience.

International trade is inherently complex. Nobody who works in it would claim otherwise. The rules are numerous, the requirements specific, and the consequences of error real. Traders understand this. None of the businesses we spoke to expected the process to be simple.

What they experience, however, is complexity without context - rules and requirements presented without enough orientation to be useful. Government guidance is often comprehensive and technically accurate. The information assumes a level of prior knowledge that most small business operators simply don’t have time to develop.

More critically, guidance is almost always written around policy rather than around the person trying to follow it. That gap between what guidance says and what a trader actually needs to know in a given moment is where confidence breaks down.

When traders are nervous and the guidance around them fails to build confidence, they find other ways to manage the risk. They defer. They delegate. They pay someone else to carry the uncertainty; they were never given the tools to handle themselves.

It is a rational response to an inadequate system. The more revealing data point, though, is the informal workarounds. Traders describe turning to AI tools, online forums, and third-party platforms to fill the gap that official guidance leaves. Not because those sources are more authoritative, but because they are faster, more conversational, and more willing to engage with the specific question being asked rather than the general rule that may or may not apply.

Designing for confidence, not just compliance

If our digital services don’t actively build confidence and help manage the risks associated with trade compliance, other ecosystems will fill that gap. Intermediaries become the only translators of complexity, while traders never fully learn the language.

Trade is never static. For UK businesses, the pace of change over the past decade has been relentless: Brexit reshaping EU relationships, US tariff policy shifting unpredictably, new regulatory requirements emerging as new markets are entered. The environment that small traders are navigating today bears little resemblance to the one they trained themselves on five years ago.

The consequences are visible. Businesses that built strong European revenue streams have watched them erode as post-Brexit duties and friction increased. What had been a reliable, profitable channel became uncertain, then marginal, then unviable. The challenge wasn’t that traders didn’t see change coming - most did. The challenge was that the systems around them provided no clear guidance on what to do about it.

When those questions arise constantly, in a domain that already feels high-risk and poorly signposted, the fear of making mistakes doesn’t simply persist; it compounds. And that compounding weight is what drives traders towards avoidance - towards stepping back from unfamiliar routes, delaying entry into new markets, and, at worst, withdrawing from international trade altogether.

Change is inevitable in trade. But adaptation should not require heroic effort on the part of the trader. When our systems don’t communicate change in accessible, context-relevant ways, they transform something manageable into something exhausting.

Addressing this requires more than incremental improvements to individual services. It requires a different frame. In practical terms, it means translating policy into language that traders can act on. It means providing reassurance at the moments it is most needed, not just information. It means improving relevance - helping traders quickly understand what applies to their situation rather than leaving them to extract that signal from comprehensive but impersonal guidance. And it means fragmented government services beginning to work more deliberately across boundaries, acknowledging their shared users, shared challenges, and shared outcomes.

Confidence should be treated as a primary, measurable outcome of good service design in trade. Not a soft aspiration, but a design specification. If a service leaves traders more uncertain than when they arrived, something has gone wrong - regardless of whether the information was technically accurate.

The role of digital and service design is not to eliminate the complexity of international trade. It is to prevent that complexity from being amplified by the experiences built around it. Trade will always carry risk. The question is whether we design services that help traders manage that risk clearly, or services that make them feel exposed to it at every turn.

The political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has landed directly on the desk of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Republican Congresswoman Celeste Maloy has sent a letter to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), requesting an urgent review of the actions taken by former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Christian Schmidt and the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC) in the proceedings that led to Milorad Dodik’s removal from office as President of Republika Srpska, writes NewsEurope.

At the time, that removal was also supported by the United States under the Biden administration, although it remains unclear what external influences may have been at play and who actually made the decision. Dodik has long faced strong opposition from Bosnian movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood, in part because of his close ties with Israel.

The letter, dated 31 August 2026, and addressed to OFAC Director Bradley Smith, carries particular political significance because Maloy goes beyond simply asking for clarification. The congresswoman explicitly brings to the Treasury agency’s attention the possibility that the actions attributed to Schmidt and the CEC could fall within the scope of conduct subject to U.S. sanctions authorities.

In the letter, Maloy states that she understands that OFAC has received materials alleging that the actions of Schmidt and the Election Commission may constitute “interference with a democratic process” within the scope of existing U.S. sanctions authorities applicable to the Western Balkans. The congresswoman also makes a particularly significant reference to the Global Magnitsky sanctions program, noting that the alleged conduct could alternatively constitute sanctionable activity under that framework.

In formal terms, therefore, Maloy is directly calling on President Donald Trump’s administration to sanction Schmidt. The letter is addressed to OFAC and requests an expedited review of the materials already submitted to the agency. Politically, however, the significance of the initiative is clear: a Republican member of Congress is asking the U.S. administration to determine whether there are legal grounds for imposing U.S. sanctions on Schmidt and, potentially, on other officials involved. It is the first time such a step has been taken in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Maloy concludes by stating that she appreciates OFAC’s “expeditious review” of the matter and looks forward to learning the results of its investigation. This is therefore more than a simple political statement on Bosnia: it is a request to activate the administrative mechanism that can precede a decision on sanctions.

The initiative stems from the proceedings that ultimately led to Milorad Dodik losing his position. In February 2025, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Dodik for failing to comply with decisions of the High Representative. The ruling was subsequently upheld on appeal, resulting in a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban on serving as President of Republika Srpska.

It is precisely the nature of this political and institutional process that Maloy is now indirectly calling into question. In her letter, she refers to Dodik as the “democratically elected President of Republika Srpska” and presents Schmidt’s actions as the subject of allegations of interference with the democratic process.

The development is politically significant because it reverses the perspective that for years characterized relations between Washington and the Bosnian Serb leadership: this time, it is not the actions of the Republika Srpska authorities that are being scrutinized. Instead, a U.S. government agency is being asked to examine the conduct of the former international High Representative and the institutions involved in the process that led to Dodik’s removal from office.

The decision on how to proceed now rests with the Trump administration.

The Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska is bringing its international 'Learn About Serbian Suffering' campaign to Rome from September 7 to 13, reports NewsEurope. The initiative aims to introduce Italian and wider European audiences to the historical experience of the Serbian people and to the suffering of civilians during some of the most tragic periods of 20th-century European history.

The digital exhibition will appear on large LED screens in several central Roman locations, including Piazza della Repubblica on Via Nazionale, Castel Sant’Angelo on Lungotevere Prati, Cavour, Lungotevere Testaccio, the Trastevere area around Marconi, Monteverde, and Gianicolo, and Via Gregorio VII near the Vatican.

The campaign is founded on the belief that Serbian history should be examined beyond the political interpretations and stereotypes that have influenced parts of Western public opinion for decades.

The Serbian people have deep historical roots in Europe, including in its cultural, civilizational, and spiritual traditions. Nevertheless, much of Western European public opinion remains insufficiently familiar with their historical experience, especially with the suffering of Serbian civilians during the wars of the 20th century.

This lack of awareness is particularly evident in relation to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the conflicts of the 1990s. During that period, simplified interpretations of the role played by the Serbs became widespread in parts of Western public discourse. Complex political and historical developments were frequently reduced to a division between perpetrators and victims, while the Serbian wartime experience received limited attention. Consequently, the suffering of families who lost relatives, homes, and entire communities was often overlooked, as were the experiences of hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes and ancestral lands.

The campaign seeks to respond to this omission in Europe’s collective memory.

Its purpose is not to accuse any nation, state, or society. Instead, it invites the public to consider this part of European history from a broader perspective, using archival material, documented facts, and, above all, the firsthand accounts of people who survived war, persecution, detention camps, and the loss of family members.

According to Denis Bojić, director of the Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska (pictured), the campaign was created to bring the historical experience of the Serbian people and the suffering of Serbian civilians during different periods of the 20th century to audiences beyond the borders of the Republic of Srpska and Serbia. He said the initiative focuses on families who lost loved ones, people driven from their homes, victims of persecution and detention camps, and generations that continued their lives while carrying the consequences of those losses.

Bojić described the project as a responsibility toward both victims and future generations. He emphasized the importance of preserving their names, faces, and testimonies and making them available to people who have not yet encountered this dimension of European history. He also identified the preservation and international accessibility of this memory as one of the Memorial Center’s principal tasks.

Italy, he noted, has particular importance because it offers an opportunity to present Serbian history in one of Europe’s major centers of culture and civilization. The campaign aims to encourage a broader and more open discussion of Serbian suffering based on documentation and personal testimony.

Bojić added that the project’s objective is to ensure that Serbian victims are not remembered solely as statistics in historical accounts, but as individuals with recognizable faces and personal stories within Europe’s shared memory. In his view, preserving the memory of victims also means preserving a people’s dignity, identity, and understanding of its own history.

The decision to present the campaign in Italy, and specifically in Rome, reflects the longstanding respect among Serbs for Italian civilization and its achievements, from ancient Rome and Roman law to Italy’s broader contribution to European culture.

Rome’s historical importance and its influence on European law, institutions, and culture give the initiative additional significance. Presenting the Serbian experience in the city therefore represents an opportunity to place it within a wider European context.

The organizers also point to more recent ties that remain important in Serbian public memory. Italian KFOR units in Kosovo and Metohija contributed to the protection of the Serbian population and Orthodox cultural heritage. Their long-term role in safeguarding the Visoki Dečani Monastery and other Serbian religious sites continues to be remembered.

The organizers regard these links as a basis for strengthening relations between the two peoples. The Rome presentation is intended not only to share historical material, but also to support continued friendship and cooperation and to introduce the Serbian experience to audiences in one of Europe’s most significant cultural centers.

The Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska was founded on May 30, 2024, following a decision by the Government of the Republic of Srpska. Its mission is to collect, document, preserve, and present testimonies concerning the suffering of the Serbian people.

Oral history is central to its work. The institution gathers personal accounts from people who directly experienced war, persecution, and other forms of suffering. More than 1,500 audiovisual testimonies have so far been recorded and collected, making the project one of the largest initiatives of its kind in Southeastern Europe.

The Center seeks to ensure that these experiences are not preserved only in books, archives, or statistical records. By documenting the voices and faces of survivors, it aims to maintain a direct connection with the people who lived through these events. The testimonies are recorded in the field, archived, and incorporated into documentaries, publications, exhibitions, and educational resources.

The Memorial Center is also available to cooperate with institutions, museums, archives, researchers, and other organizations in Europe and elsewhere that work in the fields of history, oral history, and remembrance culture. The presentation in Italy forms part of a broader effort to establish links with European institutions and to make testimonies about the suffering of the Serbian people accessible to international audiences.

From L to R: WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Photo credit: Akorda.
Kazakhstan is stepping up its partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO) as part of a broader strategy to strengthen the country’s position as a key Eurasian transit hub. But while digital customs reforms could significantly reduce trade costs and border delays, experts say their long-term economic payoff will ultimately depend on infrastructure, regional coordination and the changing geography of global trade, writes Ayana BirbayevaI.

The topic came into focus during a series of high-level meetings in Astana between President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders on Sept. 8. During the meeting, Tokayev said Kazakhstan is consistently developing a “smart border” model by introducing digital solutions to optimize customs procedures and improve freight transit across Eurasia. Saunders praised Kazakhstan’s progress in customs modernization and its growing role in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor.

Customs modernization becomes part of a wider logistics strategy
Beyond the diplomatic symbolism, the meetings reflect a longer-term economic objective: transforming Kazakhstan from a transit country into an internationally competitive logistics platform. Speaking in the meeting, Bektenov emphasized that resilient transcontinental trade has become one of the key drivers of Kazakhstan’s economic development. He noted that the WCO’s 2025–2028 strategic plan, Data-Driven Customs for a Connected World, closely aligns with Kazakhstan’s own digital reform agenda.

A central element of that strategy is the rollout of KEDEN, a unified customs system integrating declarations, transit procedures and border controls, alongside the Smart Cargo platform, which combines transport services, electronic permits and cargo tracking into a single digital ecosystem. According to official data, 14.6 million tons of transit cargo passed through Kazakhstan during the first seven months of the year. Freight volumes along the Middle Corridor reached approximately 350,000 tons, with around 24,000 vehicles using the route. Why digital borders matter Farkhad Kassenov, head of the A+ Analytics research center, political scientist and international relations expert, notes that cooperation with the WCO should be viewed not as an isolated initiative but as one stage of Kazakhstan’s much broader transport and logistics strategy.

“Kazakhstan has been systematically synchronizing customs procedures, tariffs and border regulations with the countries participating in the Middle Corridor. This cooperation with the WCO is one of the stages of that much larger project,” Kassenov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor has gained strategic importance as trade between China and Europe increasingly seeks alternatives to traditional northern routes passing through Russia. At the same time, Kazakhstan is also positioning itself within the developing North–South corridor, despite temporary disruptions caused by conflicts affecting the Middle East and maritime trade. According to Kassenov, removing bureaucratic barriers may prove almost as valuable as building new infrastructure.

“Digitalization can increase the speed of cargo movement by roughly 30% while simultaneously reducing logistics costs. When paperwork is synchronized and businesses use a single digital window, goods spend less time waiting at borders or in dry ports,” he said. Digital gains cannot replace physical infrastructure Yet customs reform alone will not solve every bottleneck. Kassenov notes that the Middle Corridor still faces structural constraints that digital systems cannot eliminate, including different railway gauges between China, Kazakhstan and Europe, as well as the natural limitations of crossing the Caspian Sea. “There are real physical barriers. Different railway gauges require cargo transfers, while navigation across the Caspian is limited during storms and seasonal ice. Digitalization improves efficiency, but it must be accompanied by major investment in transport infrastructure,” he said. Kazakhstan has already begun expanding ports in Aktau and Kuryk, while negotiations continue with Azerbaijan, Türkiye and China on improving rail connectivity across the corridor.

A changing geopolitical map of trade The renewed attention to Kazakhstan’s transit role is also being driven by geopolitical shifts beyond Central Asia. According to Kassenov, growing strategic competition between China and the United States has increased Beijing’s interest in secure overland trade routes. “The Middle Corridor was once viewed as an alternative route. By the end of this decade, it may become one of the principal land connections between East and West,” he said. That evolution creates opportunities extending beyond transit fees. Kazakhstan is seeking to develop domestic manufacturing, processing industries and exports of higher value-added products, including critical minerals and industrial goods, that can move along the same logistics network. A customs dilemma inside the EAEU At the same time, Kazakhstan’s customs policy faces another question that is less visible in discussions about digitalization: whether the existing distribution of import customs duties within the Eurasian Economic Union reflects the current structure of regional trade. Aidar Kurmashev, head of the Asian Studies Department at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, recently highlighted the issue in his Telegram channel.

According to him, under the EAEU system, duties collected on imports from outside the union are distributed among the five member states according to predetermined shares. Kazakhstan’s share is 6.955%, compared with 85.065% for Russia, regardless of where the duties are actually collected. “After 2022, trade flows changed significantly, the role of Kazakhstan in trade with China and other directions of foreign imports increased, while our share remained 6.955%,” Kurmashev wrote. He argued that the issue raises a broader question about whether the formula still corresponds to the current structure of trade within the EAEU. “If Kazakhstan previously benefited from the system, but now has been losing hundreds of billions of tenge for the third consecutive year, perhaps it is time to at least recalculate the economics of the existing mechanism,” Kurmashev said, highlighting that the figures refer specifically to distributed import customs duties and do not include import VAT. Trade routes are changing faster than institutions The EAEU perspective illustrates a broader challenge facing Kazakhstan as it tries to reposition itself within changing Eurasian trade networks.

The geography of imports and transit has shifted since 2022, while Kazakhstan is simultaneously trying to deepen direct trade links with China, expand the Middle Corridor and strengthen its position as a logistics hub between Asia and Europe. That makes customs policy increasingly relevant not only as an administrative function but as an element of economic strategy. Digitalization can make the movement of goods faster and more predictable. International standards can improve interoperability. Infrastructure investment can remove physical bottlenecks. But the economic payoff ultimately depends on whether these elements develop together. As Kassenov put it, the Middle Corridor is moving from being an alternative route from the global lens toward becoming a potentially central Eurasian connection. 

The great temptation for left-wing forces to fish in the waters of the new antisemitism in search of votes is nothing new. It costs little; the Jews pay the price. In Rome, there is an eagerness to cast aside the common sense demonstrated by the Italian government, in coordination with Germany, and embrace this easy and politically rewarding line—this time by following Britain in imposing sanctions against Israel. Ignorance and double standards provide the backdrop. The ambition to embrace a new crusade against Israel emerged immediately after British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband, announcing sanctions concerning Judea and Samaria, told Parliament that Israel is engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and attempting to erase the two-state solution, writes Fiamma Nirenstein.

This, of course, ignores repeated Palestinian rejections of peace proposals and the reality created by the 7 October 2023 Hamas massacre. At the same time, British politicians have presented themselves as champions of human rights while ignoring monstrous violations committed by Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Now that Britain has announced sanctions on products from Judea and Samaria, and has been followed by a procession of European countries driven by the pursuit of left-wing votes and fear of their growing Muslim populations, the parliamentary group leaders of Italy’s Democratic Party (PD), Five Star Movement (M5S) and Green and Left Alliance (AVS) on the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Committee have demanded urgent consideration of legislation imposing similar sanctions.

Angelo Bonelli, co-leader of AVS; Elly Schlein, leader of the Democratic Party; Giuseppe Conte, leader of the Five Star Movement and a former Italian prime minister, and others have signed on. Indeed, they consider it “shameful” that Italy, of all countries, is missing from this campaign. The document speaks of “illegal occupation” and offers other banal examples of the ignorance of those who wrote it. It also demonstrates the irresponsibility of a move whose primary consequence will be to further fuel mass antisemitism. We have already seen another demonstration of this phenomenon at a protest against legislation addressing antisemitism, where Hamas and Hezbollah flags were brought into Parliament. Only ISIS was missing.

Why is the path of sanctions wrong? First, those responsible for violent acts should be punished. But contrary to the propagandist image being presented, they constitute a fraction of the roughly 500,000 Israelis living in Judea and Samaria, a population representing a wide variety of cultural and social backgrounds. Most condemn violent extremists and are themselves the targets of thousands of Palestinian terrorist attacks each year. Israel prosecutes its own criminals. Some are in prison; others are standing trial. But Judea and Samaria are not territories “illegally occupied” by Israel. The area was occupied by Jordan, whose annexation received almost no international recognition, until Jordan attacked Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and was defeated. After repeated Israeli attempts to exchange land for peace, the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 divided Judea and Samaria into Area A, under Palestinian control; Area B, under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C, under Israeli control. Israel has the right under those agreements to build in Area C, which also includes the E1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim.

Some of the greatest conflicts arise when Palestinians attempt to expand into Area C. Expelling Jews from Judea and Samaria would risk producing the same disastrous result as Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip—the creation of the conditions that eventually produced Yahya Sinwar and Oct. 7. There is another British mistake. It concerns the safety of Britain’s own citizens. Israel has helped protect Britain from serious terrorist threats. In 2015, for example, British authorities discovered three tons of ammonium nitrate stored by Hezbollah-linked operatives in London after receiving information from Israel. On the basis of what unfounded prejudices should a relationship encompassing security, science and culture be dismantled? Associating Israel with “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” is a lie.

Forcing Israel to surrender is unthinkable. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, with Israel’s decision to close the British Consulate in eastern Jerusalem, has delivered the first clear response. But the larger answer must be equally clear. Neither Miliband nor Schlein will draw the borders of a Palestinian state. It is absurd to imagine that they can. Only Israelis and Palestinians can negotiate those borders; they cannot be imposed from London, Rome or anywhere else. And no sanctions campaign can erase a fundamental historical truth: The Jewish people are not strangers in Judea and Samaria. Their roots there reach back thousands of years. Whatever the future of this land may be, it cannot be decided over the heads of the Jews whose history, identity and destiny are bound to it.

The European Commission wants to cut the EU’s public procurement rulebook from around 900 pages to 200, in a sweeping reform that aims to simplify tendering while giving governments greater scope to favour European economic and security interests, writes Catherine Feore.

Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné held up the existing body of rules alongside its much slimmer replacement, to illustrate his point. 

“These here are the European rules which currently govern public procurement in Europe: 900 pages,” he said. “And this is what we are proposing today… down to 200 pages.”

The proposed Public Procurement Act would replace three EU procurement directives with a single regulation, with a view to simplifying procurement provisions spread across 26 sectoral laws and cutting the number of procedures from five to three.

The Commission estimates the changes could save businesses and public authorities €650 million a year in administrative costs.

The reform matters because of Europe’s massive purchasing power involved. EU public procurement exceeds €2.5 trillion annually, around 15% of EU GDP, covering everything from trains and hospitals to energy infrastructure, schools and IT systems.

From lowest price to strategic purchasing

The proposal is not just about cutting red tape. Brussels wants governments to use their purchasing power more strategically.

The Best Price-Quality Ratio would become the standard method for awarding contracts, with quality normally accounting for at least 30% of the assessment and 50% for labour-intensive contracts. Authorities could consider environmental and social performance, innovation, security and resilience alongside price.

The commitment to a so-called European preference has been tempered by the EU’s international commitments, but access can be restricted when a country doesn’t reciprocate market access. Restrictions could also be imposed where reliance on foreign suppliers creates security-of-supply dependencies or threatens EU economic security.

“European public money should, wherever possible, create jobs, investment and opportunities in Europe rather than filling the order books of our competitors,” Séjourné said.

Five procurement procedures would become three: open, dynamic and innovation procedures. Each would allow negotiation between buyers and bidders.

The Commission also plans an integrated EU digital procurement marketplace connecting national e-procurement platforms. A company registered through one connected system should be able to bid elsewhere in Europe without repeatedly submitting the same documentation. This is intended to reduce bureaucracy and tackle one of the current system's weaknesses: too little competition, particularly from SMEs and companies bidding across borders.

National, regional and local priorities may appreciate this flexibility in theory, but constrained budgets often mean that price will remain the bottom line for many. This legislation offers greater freedom in determining needs, but it remains to be seen what its impact will be.

PHOTO CREDIT: European Commission Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné says the rules reduced from 900 pages to 200 pages © European Union

The Kazakh Government has announced the formation of a pool of 215 investment projects totaling 78.6 billion US dollars, marking the start of a new investment cycle, Qazinform News Agency cites the government’s press service.

Kazakhstan is launching a new investment cycle with a strong focus on manufacturing, deep processing, high-tech industries, and localization.

The country has a three-tier investment attraction system in place, where regions compile priority projects and conduct targeted investor searches.

Fast Track procedures were launched to accelerate approvals along with the National Digital Investment Platform.

The next step is to develop Kazakhstan Investment House on the basis of Kazakh Invest, following a “one-stop shop” principle.

66 investment agreements worth 17.8 trillion tenge in investments have been signed. 

Since early 2026, 25 agreements worth 4.4 trillion tenge were concluded in pharma, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, infrastructure, and healthcare. Capital investment rose to 23.5 trillion tenge, nearly doubling since 2019.

In manufacturing, investments tripled to 3 trillion tenge, now accounting for 12.7% of total investment.

Foreign direct investments reached 20.5 billion US dollars in 2025, up 14.4%, with capital increasingly directed to non-resource sectors like manufacturing, finance, and communications.

173 billion US dollars invested in four new projects to localize 356 medicines and expand domestic production.

To note, agro-industrial projects by Dalian Hesheng Holdings, Fufeng Group, and Tiryaki Agro focus on deep processing of wheat, corn, and legumes for food, pharma, and biotech.

In Ekibastuz, a Data Center Valley is being developed near GRES-1, with 30 billion US dollars in planned investment and energy capacity from 300 MW to 1 GW. The project will integrate infrastructure for cloud services, processing capacities, and AI.

Earlier Qazinform reported Kazakhstan and Germany aim to implement new joint investment and industrial projects.

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The EU will not be able to take on tech juggernauts like the US and China if it relies solely on Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm. It must start treating Eastern Europe as a strategic partner if it wants to become a global technological power, writes Cristian Gherasim.

The image of a global superpower is no longer synonymous with swarms of soldiers armed to the teeth. Modern wars are fought as much online as they are on the battlefield. Nations that will have a say in tomorrow’s world now must keep innovation might at the top of their priorities.

Draghi’s warnings

The 2024 report by former ECB president Mario Draghi on EU’s economic competitiveness included warnings directed at Europe’s tech ambitions. Mario Draghi’s report highlights the need to grow digital connectivity and reduce the gaps between Europe and the world’s tech powerhouses.

The European Union has been in a less than flattering position, even when it comes to the most basic infrastructure. A few years back, the European Court of Auditors said EU members should step up efforts to deploy 5G, given how the next big leap in mobile networking has been lagging in some member states. Though improvements have been made, there is still a long way to go. The Commission reacted with its Competitiveness Compass – which places tech infrastructure as the cornerstone of future economic development.

In order to meet the digital target for 2030, Brussels needs to revamp the old infrastructure and, more importantly, create a better and newer one.

Eastern Europe’s ignored strength

Rich countries no longer hold the monopoly over connectivity and innovation. Eastern Europe – though economically not yet on par with its Western counterparts - has put technology front and center, building its communication infrastructure at great speed.

Romania demonstrates that top connectivity is not limited to Europe’s Western economies. Today, almost nine in ten Romanian households have internet. The country ranks high among the world’s fastest countries for broadband speeds, according to Ookla. Over a ten year period (2025 versus 2015), Romania saw a 28% increase in household access to the internet. The country is becoming one of Europe’s most vital internet hubs, which also explains Romania’s growing importance as a cybersecurity player on the continent. Romania hosts the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre, crucial to Europe’s defense. Countries in Eastern Europe have gained significant firsthand expertise in dealing with such threats.

Further north, Estonia is also a clear example of Eastern Europe’s technological influence. The country built one of Europe’s most advanced digital public sectors, whose technological clout far exceeds its population size and geography. Estonia offers the rest of the European Union valuable lessons in digital government, cybersecurity and online public services.

Poland – a former Warsaw Pact member - gives yet another example of Eastern Europe’s growing technological influence. Poland has been tackling hate speech and disinformation on the internet and with the help of its AI companies it has aggressively been monitoring social media content.

The country is positioning itself as Central and Eastern Europe’s leading AI hub, investing heavily in the tech sector. The Polish digital economy market is currently estimated to be around 40 billion EUR and expected to develop exponentially over the coming years.

Digital Networks Act

Strength lies in unity, hence a unified telecom market would help Europe grow its tech influence relative to that of China and the US. This unified EU digital market should unmistakably include the Eastern European nations. The Digital Networks Act looks to reduce market fragmentation, encourage fiber and 5G investment. It remains to be seen whether Europe’s nations can form a single digital market.

That is where the Digital Decade comes in. The program is set up by the European Union to improve digital skills, upgrade digital infrastructure and get more businesses and public services online. If the EU is to build a unified digital market, investments and the decision making process should not exclude Eastern Europe.

Europe needs to learn how to pool resources from every member state just as much as it needs to unify its regulations and make long term infrastructure investments a must.

Cybersecurity and digital sovereignty

The past few years have shown that making Europe digitally strong is a matter of security and survival. Mobile communications, fiber networks and data centers are now seen as essential infrastructure, alongside energy grids and transport networks.

Cyber attackers have been targeting Europe’s critical infrastructure. Countries on the eastern flank of EU and NATO such as Romania have become important digital security actors. Sitting in Russia’s crosshairs, their resilient communication infrastructure is now essential for Europe’s wider defense.

Eastern Europe brings not only cybersecurity expertise to the table, but also infrastructure and human resources that will help the EU compete globally.

Digital sovereignty should not bring about isolation. Europe needs to keep on working with the US on matters of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence instead of being at odds with each other. At the same time, the EU should be strengthening its own infrastructure, investing heavily in research and development and creating a single digital market.

Europe’s digital future will not be built exclusively in Western Europe. It will also be built in Bucharest, Warsaw, Tallinn and across EU’s eastern frontier.

If Brussels is indeed serious about closing the gap with the US and China, it can’t leave its eastern member states out. Romania and Eastern Europe are no longer part of Europe's digital periphery, and their infrastructure is there to prove it. Now what they need is a seat at the table.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are facing fresh accusations of employing chemical weapons in the ongoing conflict against the Rapid Support Forces(RSF), with the latest reports coming from US media outlets, writes Mohsin Osman.

On Saturday (5 September), The New York Times and The Washington Post published dual investigative reports based on leaked intelligence materials. The files include approximately 150 documents, photographs, video clips, and intercepted communications, alongside thousands of text messages retrieved from the phones of Sudanese officers.

The evidence points to an alleged program established in 2024 to manufacture chlorine-based munitions. It details bomb design blueprints, testing operations, and a coordinated cover-up strategy initiated after the plot was uncovered by the United States. The records also outline plans to siphon chlorine gas from a civilian water treatment facility that had originally received the chemical from international aid agencies.

These revelations reignite long-standing allegations of chemical weapons usage that have shadowed SAF leadership since last year, significantly heightening international pressure on the military command.

The United States previously imposed sanctions on Sudan in May 2025 over allegations that the military deployed chemical weapons during the conflict in 2024. The sanctions took effect on July 20, 2025. Authorities in Port Sudan have consistently rejected these accusations, maintaining that they do not produce, stockpile, or use chemical weapons, and emphasizing their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

A covert programme amid escalating pressure

According to The New York Times, the SAF turned to chemical weapons early in 2024 to break a strategic stalemate, as RSF fighters held firm control over most of the capital, Khartoum.

Leaked records show that Brigadier General Tariq Hussein emerged as a central figure in July 2024, orchestrating the design, planning, and execution of the program. Intercepted messages reveal that Hussein proposed using chlorine to give army forces a tactical edge in the battle for Khartoum. He distributed prototype schematics for an explosive warhead integrated with roughly 33 pounds of chlorine gas, with production commencing that same month.

In messages published by the Times, Hussein noted that the hybrid munitions were designed to maximize lethality—either by shrapnel fragmentation or chlorine gas poisoning—asserting that the explosion would destroy all chemical traces of the attack.

On July 22, an Antonov cargo plane took off from Merowe Airport, roughly 200 miles north of Khartoum, to conduct a test launch. Following the trial, Hussein reported that the experiment was a "100 percent success," attaching a video of a desert explosion and confirming that the munition "hit the target and released the gas."

Brigadier General Amir Idris, identified in records as the supervisor of military drone operations, responded with a single directive: "Top Secret."

Technical hazards and signs of lethality

The communications reveal that the program faced severe technical flaws. Chemical leaks were a recurring issue; on one occasion, workers found dead insects and scorpions on the floor of a hangar after overnight exposure to leaking gas.

The incident underscored the volatile nature of the agent being handled long before it reached the battlefield. Concurrently, the program faced a critical challenge in securing a steady supply of chlorine.

Diverting humanitarian chlorine supplies

According to The New York Times, 20 cylinders of chlorine gas were smuggled across the border from a neighboring country in late August 2024. Hussein calculated that this batch would yield roughly 1,100 bombs.

Hussein subsequently sought internal sources, turning to local civilian infrastructure in violation of international norms. He admitted to sourcing additional chlorine from the Al-Manara water treatment plant in Omdurman—one of the few remaining operational facilities amid the war.

"Al-Manara has some of those cylinders, and we took them from there," Hussein stated in an August 26 voice message to Idris.

The diversion of these supplies carries significant gravity, as the chlorine at the plant was intended for emergency water purification during cholera outbreaks rather than military application.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed to the Times that it had donated 30 chlorine cylinders to the plant in 2023, while CARE reported delivering 35 cylinders across 2024 and 2025. A UNICEF spokesperson added that the organization supplied chlorine to six treatment plants in Khartoum, including Al-Manara, between 2023 and 2025.

By October 2024, Hussein reported manufacturing approximately 300 chemical munitions, most of which were stored at Merowe Airport.

Earlier in September, Hussein sent a notable message to a colleague stating, "They drank the gas," describing an attack on RSF fighters at the Al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum. This account aligns with claims made by the RSF on September 13, when the paramilitary group issued a statement accusing the army of firing "toxic" missiles at the refinery. Footage circulated online at the time showed men in civilian clothing inside the facility wearing oxygen masks.

Command responsibility and cover-up efforts

The New York Times indicates that the program was likely shuttered once U.S. officials detected its existence and moved to apply targeted sanctions.

Intercepted communications reveal that the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, instructed Hussein to "erase all traces" of the operation. The response back was: "The operation was completed a month ago."

During a subsequent round of measures in June, the U.S. sanctioned Hussein for importing explosives for bomb production, though that specific designation did not explicitly cite chemical weapons.

By that time, Burhan had established an internal committee to investigate the U.S. allegations. According to documents in the file, Hussein himself—the architect of the program—was appointed as an advisor to the panel.

The intelligence indicates that General Burhan was not merely informed after the fact, but was directly involved in overseeing the chemical weapons program. His direct knowledge was a primary factor in the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on him in January 2025.

While proving chemical weapons usage in conflict zones remains complex, arms experts consulted by The New York Times concurred that available evidence strongly points to their deployment in the Sudanese conflict. However, they stressed the necessity of an independent field investigation.

Addressing the findings, the Emergency Lawyers group, a Sudanese legal advocacy organization, issued a statement calling for a transparent international probe. The group urged that "international experts be granted safe, unconditional access to targeted sites, enable the physical examination of munitions fragments and delivery systems, and be permitted to interview witnesses and victims independently and securely."

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called on nuclear-armed states to engage in negotiations and accelerate efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, reaffirming Kazakhstan’s commitment to the global anti-nuclear movement, Qazinform News Agency cites Akorda. 

Tokayev made the remarks in a statement marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests, established by the UN General Assembly at Kazakhstan’s initiative.

The president noted that exactly 35 years ago, amid a difficult international situation, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. For decades, the testing ground caused irreversible damage to people’s health and the environment, leaving a painful legacy for the Kazakh people, he said.

“Thirty-five years later, this date will serve as a reminder to all humanity of the tragic consequences of nuclear tests and as a call to prevent them from ever happening again,” Tokayev said.

He also highlighted Kazakhstan’s decision to voluntarily give up the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal following the country’s independence.

“By voluntarily renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, Kazakhstan made a historic choice in favor of peace, security and sustainable development. This decision fulfilled the aspirations of the people of Kazakhstan and demonstrated our state’s responsibility for the fate of future generations,” Tokayev said.

According to the president, Kazakhstan’s commitment to peace and friendship with all states, enshrined in the preamble of the country’s new Constitution, remains an unwavering principle of its foreign policy.

“Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged. We call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use,” Tokayev said.

The president also stressed that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful and constructive purposes.

He noted that the Kazakhstani people had firmly supported the country’s course toward developing nuclear energy in a nationwide referendum, laying a solid foundation for Kazakhstan’s economic, scientific and technological progress for decades to come.

Tokayev said this strategic choice forms an important part of the country’s transformation and opens a new stage in its sustainable development. He added that large-scale reforms across all areas of public life are aimed at building a Just, Progressive and Clean Kazakhstan.

“I am confident that together we will achieve this ambitious goal,” the president concluded.

Earlier, Qazinform reported President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had offered condolences over passing Norway’s King Harald V. 

The European Commission calls it the Affordable Housing Act and says it can “truly bring a change in people’s lives”. But how much will it actually do to make housing more affordable, asks Catherine Feore? 

The tension at the heart of the proposal is that Brussels is making ambitious claims about tackling the housing crisis while simultaneously making clear that it is not imposing new housing policies on governments or cities.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen says the measure fulfils a promise to tackle housing affordability, describing it as “one step in this direction” and declaring: “Today, we are delivering for all Europeans.” Housing Commissioner Dan Jørgensen went further, saying the Act gives governments and cities tools to “make more affordable homes available”.

Yet the proposed legislation itself is considerably more cautious.
The Commission acknowledges that insufficient housing supply is the structural cause of the affordability crisis. Short-term rentals, second homes and other non-primary uses are not the root problem, although they can exacerbate shortages and push up prices in already constrained markets.

Housing stress test

The Act principally delivers a common legal framework for authorities that choose to intervene.

Central to this is a new EU test for housing stress. An area would normally qualify where an average home costs at least eight years of disposable per-capita income, that ratio has increased over the previous decade, and pressures are unlikely to ease over the next three years. At a ratio of ten or more, the historical deterioration test is dropped. Population dynamics, housing supply and demand must also be assessed.

Authorities could then restrict short-term rentals outside a host’s primary residence or tackle second homes, prolonged vacancy and certain other non-primary uses. But there is no obligation. They must also demonstrate that the activity has significantly harmed housing affordability or availability for at least three years, and any restriction must be targeted, necessary and proportionate. This seems to set a high bar of evidence for most local authorities.

Currently, local authorities must notify the Commission of short-term rental restrictions under the Services Directive. That notification requirement will no longer be required. Cities can use the new framework without seeking prior Commission approval, although measures must be published and remain open to legal challenge. Officials argue this will remove a burdensome procedure and make intervention easier.

But the Commission is equally explicit about what it is not doing. The Act does not regulate rents, harmonise housing policy, give Brussels new housing competences, dictate taxation, inheritance or planning, or require, recommend or encourage authorities to impose restrictions. Housing policy choices “remain national, regional and local”.

Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera says that when markets fail to provide affordable homes, “public authorities have a responsibility to act”. But the Act does not compel that action; it provides a stronger legal framework if authorities choose to act independently.

Its impact could be real in tourist hotspots where non-primary housing use is demonstrably worsening shortages. But it cannot itself build a home or lower a rent. The question is whether a clearer legal toolbox matches the expectations created by the Commission’s promise to tackle Europe’s housing crisis. When asked to quantify how much of a difference the new provisions could make, the Commission couldn’t give precise figures, saying that it would depend on the measures adopted.

PHOTO CREDIT: Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition, and Dan Jørgensen, European Commissioner for Energy and Housing, give a press conference on the affordable housing Photographer: Jennifer Jacquemart © European Union

Israel’s embassy  in Belgium stated that the Israeli team ”is an example of coexistence in Israeli football. The team includes three Arab-Israeli players: Muhammad Abu Rumi, Mohammed Kna’an and Zahi Ahmed. Politics should never be allowed to interfere with sports,” writes Yossi Lempkowicz.

The ban, imposed by the mayor of the Belgian city of Leuven on the soccer match  between a Brussels-based team and an Israeli one ”is an expression of antisemitism” said the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium (CCOJB).

The match between Union Saint Gilloise and Hapoel Be’er Sheva is scheduled to take place on 22 October as part of the Europa League. Since Union’s stadium in Brussels does not meet UEFA standards, the club cannot play there. For the European competition, it  had to turn to the Leuven stadium for all its home games.

However, last Tuesday (1 September), the mayor of Leuven, Mohamed Ridouani, ordered the cancellation of the match for ‘’security reasons’ due to the risk of unrest linked to the visit of an Israeli club, against the backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The mayor is a member of the Flemish Socialist party Vooruit.

The CCOJB condemned the reasons cited by the mayor of Leuven for prohibiting the match, particularly those related to security. “It is the mayor’s responsibility to ensure public safety and it is irresponsible to shirk that responsibility,” states the organization. adding that the decision was driven more by “hatred of Israel.”

A spokesperson for the embassy of Israel in Belgium stated that the Israeli team ”is an example of coexistence in Israeli football. The team includes three Arab-Israeli players: Muhammad Abu Rumi, Mohammed Kna’an and Zahi Ahmed. Politics should never be allowed to interfere with sports.”

Israeli players “should be judged by their professional abilities, not by politics or political views. Sport should remain sport, free from political agendas”, the embassy said on X.

The spokesperson offered that Israel’s Ambassador-designate to Belgium David Saranga meet with the Leuven mayor.

An Antwerp-based group, JID vzw – Stop Antisemitism,  has formally filed a complaint against the mayor  decision of the mayor of Leuven.

”We request that the decision and the complete accompanying administrative and security file be obtained without delay and that the decision be reviewed in light of the law and the public interest. If the required legal, factual, and proportional basis is lacking, we request that the supervisory authority annul the decision,” it said.

On 30 August, the world marked the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, a date intended to rescue the missing from oblivion and remind states that no human being should simply vanish into the machinery of power. In Balochistan, however, remembrance carries the cruelty of the present tense. On July 24, 2026, Jiand Baloch, a student leader and chairman of the Baloch Students Organization, disappeared after being taken away under circumstances that, according to Amnesty International, amounted to an enforced disappearance. For eleven days, his family did not know where he was. He returned home on 3 August. It was not the first time. Amnesty says Jiand had previously been forcibly disappeared for nine months in 2018 and again for about a month in 2024, linking the repeated targeting to his peaceful activism. As the international community prepares to commemorate the disappeared, one man in Balochistan has already had to return from disappearance three times. Therein lies the cruel paradox of 30 August: elsewhere, it is a day for remembering an atrocity; in Balochistan, families continue to experience it in the present tense, writes Dimitra Staikou.

Jiand Baloch is one name in a much larger ledger of absence. According to the Human Rights Council of Balochistan, 105 cases of enforced disappearance were documented in July 2026 alone, alongside 59 killings; 47 of those reported missing later returned, while the fate of others remained unresolved. The figures come from a Baloch human-rights organisation and must be attributed as such, but the phenomenon itself has long drawn scrutiny from United Nations experts and international rights groups. Behind every number lies the peculiar violence of enforced disappearance: no grave at which to mourn, no prison to visit, often no official account to challenge — only a photograph carried from protest to protest and a question repeated until it becomes part of a family’s daily life: Where are they? The United Nations has described enforced disappearance not merely as a violation against the person who vanishes, but as a practice capable of spreading terror throughout society. That definition exposes the bitter contradiction at the heart of Balochistan: while the language of counterterrorism grants the state extraordinary powers in the name of protecting society from fear, families of the disappeared describe living inside another kind of terror — the terror of not knowing whether the person they love is imprisoned, tortured, alive or dead.

The tragedy of Balochistan is not that the world does not know. It is that it has known for years. Pakistan itself established a Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances in 2010, while UN mechanisms have repeatedly raised concerns over disappearances, impunity and the treatment of those who demand answers. In April 2026, the UN Committee against Torture went further, expressing concern over reports that human rights defenders, journalists, political opponents, civil society activists and protesters — as well as members of their families — had faced reprisals ranging from intimidation and arbitrary detention to enforced disappearance and extrajudicial execution. UN experts have also examined allegations arising from counterterrorism operations in Balochistan, including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, as well as alleged reprisals against peaceful protesters seeking information about the missing. The contradiction is difficult to escape: a state cannot treat disappearance as serious enough to warrant its own commission of inquiry while allowing families to spend years asking the most elementary question a state should be able to answer — where are they?

For those families, enforced disappearance creates a form of punishment with no defined sentence and no identifiable end. A prisoner has a place of detention; a person confirmed dead can be mourned. The disappeared inhabit the space between the two, leaving their relatives trapped there with them. The United Nations recognises this explicitly: the victims of enforced disappearance are not only those who vanish, but also those who suffer as a direct consequence, while families can face economic hardship, intimidation and reprisals simply for searching for the truth. A mother does not know whether to wait or mourn. A wife may not know whether she is a wife or a widow. A child can grow up without knowing whether a father is imprisoned, hidden somewhere beyond the reach of the law, or dead. Enforced disappearance does not take one person hostage; it holds an entire family hostage to uncertainty. And when information itself is withheld, absence becomes more than the consequence of repression — it becomes an instrument of power.

But enforced disappearance requires something else to endure: silence. And in Balochistan, some of the most persistent challenges to that silence have come from those who refuse to let the missing become merely numbers. Mahrang Baloch, one of the most prominent voices of the Baloch protest movement, knows that absence intimately: her father, Abdul Ghaffar Langove, was forcibly disappeared and later found dead. On 22 March 2025, she was herself arrested following protests in Quetta, alongside other activists demanding accountability over disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings; UN experts later called for the release of Baloch human-rights defenders and warned against the criminalisation of peaceful protest. But the pressure does not end with the families and activists who demand answers. It reaches those whose profession is to record their testimony. On August 18, 2026, journalist Danish Irshad learned through social media that he had been placed on the Fourth Schedule, an anti-terrorism watchlist in Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir, under an order issued on July 29. No criminal conviction preceded the listing, and the publicly available order did not identify a specific terrorist act attributed to him. Irshad had spent nearly a decade reporting on Kashmir and had recently interviewed families who said their children had been killed by Pakistani forces. Three days later, he asked the question that connects the fate of the witness to that of those whose stories he records: “How did a journalist’s speaking and writing become an act of terrorism?” Enforced disappearance removes a person from public view; intimidating those who search for them, speak for them or document state violence threatens to remove the story as well.

Pakistan has every right to fight terrorism — and, after years of bombings, militant attacks and thousands of lives lost, a duty to protect its citizens from it. As recently as August 2, 2026, a suspected suicide bombing in Swat killed civilians and police officers alike, another reminder that the threat confronting the country is neither rhetorical nor imagined. But precisely because terrorism is real, the word cannot be allowed to mean everything. An armed militant is not a peaceful activist; an activist is not a journalist; and a reporter who interviews the families of victims does not become a terrorist by recording what they have to say. This is where the language of counterterrorism collides with the reality of enforced disappearance. The United Nations warns that enforced disappearance has itself frequently been used as a strategy to “spread terror within society,” while identifying as a particular concern the use of counterterrorism activities by states as an excuse for breaching their human-rights obligations. The contradiction is difficult to escape. When a journalist such as Danish Irshad can be placed on an anti-terrorism watchlist without a publicly identified terrorist act attributed to him, while families elsewhere in Pakistan describe years spent searching for relatives who vanished without answers, the language of security begins to turn against itself. Counterterrorism is supposed to protect society from fear. But when its boundaries become elastic enough to encompass the journalist asking questions, the activist demanding answers and the family searching for the missing, we must ask a far more uncomfortable question: what happens when the instruments invoked to protect a society from terror begin themselves to produce fear?