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NATO Faces Biggest Challenge in Years: Military Power Grows, Political Consensus Shrinks — Threatening the Alliance

OPED by Wg Cdr J P Joshi (Retd)

For nearly eight decades, NATO has been the most successful military alliance in modern history. Created in 1949 to deter Soviet expansion and defend Western Europe, it prevented a major conflict on the continent, survived the Cold War, adapted after the collapse of the USSR, expanded from the founding 12 to 32 members, and regained strategic relevance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Yet NATO’s success has produced an unexpected dilemma.

The Alliance has never been militarily stronger. European Allies and Canada are assuming greater responsibility for their security, defense spending is increasing, defense industries are expanding, and capabilities are improving. But military strength alone does not determine the effectiveness of an alliance.

The more fundamental question is political: For what purpose should that military power be employed?

The challenge confronting NATO today is no longer merely building stronger armed forces. It is achieving a common political understanding among 32 sovereign democracies about when, where and why those forces should be used.

The NATO Summit held in Ankara in July 2026 brought this paradox into sharp focus.

President Donald Trump described the summit as a “tremendously successful summit.”

The statement was significant because the meeting took place amid considerable political turbulence. In the period preceding the summit, President Trump had criticized Allies over defense spending, questioned burden-sharing, described Spain as a “terrible partner” and a “wasted cause,” and adopted a more transactional approach towards alliance relationships.

Yet the institutional message from NATO was one of confidence.

Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized that the Alliance had delivered: increased defense investment, improved capabilities, expanded defense-industrial production and greater responsibility being assumed by European Allies and Canada. “We are rebalancing our security for the better, and that is what NATO 3.0 is all about,” he stated.

The Ankara Summit Declaration reaffirmed the traditional foundation of the Alliance by stating, “We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Ankara to reaffirm our ironclad commitment to our collective defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond.” Thus, measured against immediate objectives, Ankara was a success. NATO demonstrated unity. It strengthened deterrence. It accelerated military adaptation. However, beneath the declarations of unity lies a deeper question.

Has NATO’s military adaptation proceeded faster than its political adaptation? The Ankara summit answered the question of capability. It did not fully answer the question of purpose.

US President Donald Trump meets Ukraine’s President (not pictured) on the sidelines of the NATO Summit at Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, on July 8, 2026. The summit comes at a fraught time for the 77-year-old transatlantic alliance, with the US President demanding members make good on a pledge to ramp up defence spending as Washington takes a step back from Europe. (Photo by SAUL LOEB / AFP)

The Original NATO Compact

To understand the current dilemma, it is necessary to return to its origins.

When the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949, the strategic environment was fundamentally different from today. The threat was identifiable, geography was defined, and the nature of conflict was understood.

The Soviet Union represented the principal military challenge. NATO was created to answer a straightforward question: What should the Alliance do if the Soviet Union attacked Western Europe?

The answer was Article 5, which stated, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Article 6 further defined the geographical scope of this commitment.

The original NATO framework rested on three assumptions: a defined geographical theatre; a clearly identifiable adversary; a conventional understanding of armed attack.

These assumptions created strategic clarity.

However, another feature of Article 5 was equally important: ambiguity.

The Article did not create an automatic declaration of war by all members following an attack. Instead, it stated that each Ally would take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

This ambiguity was deliberate. The architects of NATO understood that an alliance of sovereign democracies could not function if governments surrendered independent control over decisions involving war and peace. The United States Senate would not have accepted an unconditional commitment to fight in every possible circumstance. European democracies would not have accepted such a structure either. The compromise was thus carefully designed.

Article 5 created deterrence by assuring adversaries that an attack against one Ally would involve all. At the same time, it preserved political sovereignty by allowing each member to determine the nature and scale of its response. The ambiguity was not a weakness. It was the political innovation that made NATO possible. During the Cold War, this formula worked because the political compass and the military instrument were aligned: The adversary was clear, the geography was clear, and so was the purpose.

Today, the challenge is not that Article 5 has become irrelevant. The challenge is that the world in which Article 5 operates has changed from one threat to multiple challenges.

The first major test of NATO’s traditional understanding of collective defense came not from a conventional military adversary, but from terrorism. The attacks of 11 September 2001 transformed the strategic environment. For the first, and only, time in NATO’s history, Article 5 was invoked.

The United States had suffered an attack on its territory, but the attacker was not another state. It was Al Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization, operating from Afghanistan. The invocation demonstrated political solidarity. However, the military response revealed an important distinction. NATO could agree that an attack had occurred.

Achieving agreement on the objectives, duration and methods of response proved far more difficult. The operations in Afghanistan were supported by individual Allies according to national decisions and domestic political processes. The United Kingdom joined the United States in military operations against the Taliban. Germany’s participation required parliamentary approval. Other Allies faced their own political constraints.

The lesson was significant. Collective defense and collective action were not necessarily the same. This distinction became even clearer during the Iraq War. Although Iraq was not an Article 5 operation, the conflict produced deep divisions among Allies. Some supported the intervention; others opposed it.

Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that even close allies may agree on the existence of a security challenge while differing on the appropriate response. The ambiguity built into Article 5 remained intact. But the political consensus required to employ military power became more difficult to achieve.

 A Larger Alliance, A More Complex Consensus

The post-Cold War period transformed NATO in ways its founders could not have anticipated. The disappearance of the Soviet Union removed the adversary around which the Alliance had been organized.

Some questioned whether NATO had a future. Instead, it adapted: It expanded; it developed partnerships; it undertook crisis-management operations; it addressed new forms of conflict. This adaptability became NATO’s greatest strength.

However, it also introduced a fundamental challenge: the broader the Alliance became, the more difficult it became to maintain a single strategic perspective. NATO’s expansion from 12 founding members to 32 members today represents one of the Alliance’s greatest achievements.

For countries that had experienced Soviet domination, membership represented not merely a military commitment but a historic political transformation. It brought former adversaries into a community built around democratic values and collective security. Yet enlargement also changed the internal dynamics of NATO.

The original members largely shared a common understanding of the Soviet threat. Today, Allies do not necessarily perceive security challenges in the same way. For countries on Russia’s flank, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow remains the immediate and existential concern.

For southern European members, instability in the Middle East and North Africa, terrorism and migration pressures remain significant security challenges.

For the United States, strategic competition with China increasingly defines the long-term challenge.

These differences do not indicate a failure of Alliance solidarity. They reflect the reality that a larger alliance of sovereign democracies will naturally contain different national priorities. The challenge is to convert these different priorities into a common strategic purpose.

It is not only the different priorities; the strategic environment has also transformed over the years.

A Changing Definition of Attack

In 1949, geography largely defined security; an attack meant military forces crossing borders; aircraft striking territory or naval forces threatening allied nations.

Today, conflict increasingly occurs across multiple domains. Cyber operations can disable critical infrastructure without conventional military action. Attacks on satellites can affect military capabilities and civilian systems.

Sabotage of undersea cables can disrupt communications and economic activity. Disinformation campaigns can weaken democratic institutions. Economic coercion can become a strategic weapon. The question facing NATO is therefore more complex than it was during the Cold War.

What constitutes an attack serious enough to trigger collective defense? Would a major cyberattack qualify? Would destruction of critical infrastructure? Would sustained hybrid operations designed to destabilize an Ally?

These questions do not make Article 5 obsolete. They make political interpretation more important. The ambiguity that strengthened deterrence during the Cold War now requires greater clarity among Allies about how emerging forms of aggression should be addressed.

In 1949, geography defined the threat and military force defined the attack. In 2026, neither assumption remains sufficient.

The China Question

The rise of China represents perhaps the most significant debate about NATO’s future role. The United States increasingly views China as the principal long-term strategic competitor. Washington has encouraged European Allies to recognize that economic, technological and military competition with Beijing has implications beyond the Indo-Pacific.

However, European perspectives remain more cautious. Many European countries recognize China’s growing military capability and strategic influence, but do not view Beijing as a direct military threat to European territory in the same way as Russia. To them, China represents an economic partner, a technological competitor, and a strategic challenge simultaneously. This complexity makes consensus difficult.

The limited emphasis on NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships at the Ankara Summit reflected this unresolved debate. The fundamental question remains: Should NATO remain primarily a Euro-Atlantic defense alliance, or should it evolve into a broader organization addressing global security challenges?

Both approaches carry risks. An alliance that expands its mission excessively risks strategic overreach. An alliance that refuses to adapt risks strategic irrelevance.

Iran and the Limits of Military Solidarity

Iran illustrates another dimension of NATO’s challenge. Most Allies recognize concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities, regional influence, and support for proxy groups. Yet recognizing a threat does not automatically create agreement on the use of force.

The US-Israel military operation against Iran highlighted this distinction. The decision for military action was primarily a US-Israel decision. However, expectations that NATO Allies would support secondary tasks, including maritime security operations in the Strait of Hormuz, revealed differing political perceptions.

The issue was not simply whether Allies possessed the capability. The issue was whether they possessed the political mandate. Military power is ultimately a tool to achieve political ends. Without political consensus, even the most capable alliance faces limitations.

Ukraine: Unity With Boundaries

The war in Ukraine has been the most significant test of NATO’s post-Cold War relevance. The Alliance demonstrated remarkable unity. Members provided weapons, intelligence, training, financial assistance and political support. However, Ukraine did not receive NATO membership or the security guarantee of Article 5. This reflected a difficult balance.

NATO wanted to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and resist Russian aggression. At the same time, Allies sought to avoid direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia. Ukraine therefore illustrates both NATO’s strength and its restraint. The Alliance possesses enormous military capability. However, political decisions determine how that capability is employed.

The Trump Factor: An Accelerator, Not the Cause

President Trump’s transactional approach to alliances has intensified debates within NATO. His criticism of defense spending, questioning of burden-sharing and expectations of greater Allied support have brought existing tensions into sharper public view.

However, these challenges did not originate with one individual or one administration.

Differences over defense priorities, Russia, China, European strategic autonomy and the global role of NATO have existed for years. President Trump has acted less as the cause of NATO’s uncertainty than as an accelerator, forcing Allies to confront unresolved questions.

Ankara: A Stronger Sword, But an Uncertain Compass

The Ankara Summit should therefore be viewed in context. It was a success in terms of military adaptation. Defense spending commitments increased. Capabilities improved.

Industrial capacity expanded. NATO demonstrated that it could sharpen its sword. But the summit also highlighted the continuing challenge of political purpose.

Disagreements over defense commitments, China, Iran, Ukraine and the future role of NATO indicate that the Alliance’s central challenge is not military weakness.

It is strategic convergence.

The Political Compass: Article 2 and Article 5

The future of NATO depends not only on Article 5 but also on Article 2. Article 5 is the sword. Article 2 is the compass.

The Washington Treaty’s Article 2 commits members to “strengthening free institutions”, by “promoting conditions of stability and well-being”, maintaining consultation among Allies. During the Cold War, political consultation created the shared understanding necessary for collective defense.

Today, NATO’s military commitment remains strong. The greater challenge is maintaining the political consensus required to determine when that commitment should be employed.

The present dilemma is therefore not primarily an Article 5 problem. It is an Article 2 problem. The Alliance does not lack a collective defense commitment.

It faces a more difficult question: Can thirty-two democracies maintain a shared strategic understanding of the threats they face and the circumstances under which military power should be used?

Conclusion: NATO’s Sharper Sword Needs a Clearer Strategic Compass

NATO has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to adapt. It adapted after the Cold War. It adapted after 9/11. It adapted after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Ankara Summit demonstrated another phase of military adaptation. Defense spending is rising. Capabilities are improving. The defense industrial base is expanding.

NATO has sharpened its sword. But history shows that military power alone does not determine the success of alliances.

The effectiveness of an alliance depends on the relationship between capability and purpose. The ambiguity of Article 5 was not a weakness in 1949. It was a carefully designed political achievement that allowed sovereign democracies to unite while preserving national decision-making. The question today is whether that same flexibility can continue to provide strategic clarity in a world where threats are increasingly complex and perceptions increasingly diverse.

NATO’s future will not be determined solely by defense budgets, weapons systems or military readiness. It will depend on whether its members can sustain a shared political purpose that provides direction to their collective power. The challenge confronting NATO is no longer merely building stronger armed forces. It is achieving a common understanding of when, where and why those forces should be employed.

NATO has sharpened the sword. Whether it also possesses a shared political purpose that can serve as a reliable strategic compass remains the defining question confronting the Alliance.

  • Wg Cdr J P Joshi is a veteran of the IAF, a regular contributor, who has commanded a front-line fighter squadron; is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, USA; and has been a Directing Staff at the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington.
  • Contact the author at: jpjoshiindia (at) yahoo.co.in

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“This is Ultimately Iran’s War to Lose”: Ex-Indian Ambassador on Tehran’s Dangerous Hormuz Strategy

OPED by Raghu Gururaj, Retired Ambassador and former Indian diplomat

The Gulf crisis has crossed the boiling point. As Donald Trump bombarded key Iranian infrastructure targets this week to force a negotiation, defiant Tehran promptly retaliated, killing three US soldiers at a military base in Jordan and attacking a desalination plant and an oil facility in Kuwait

Few wars in recent history have threatened to inflict such enduring damage on the global economy while offering so little strategic payoff.  Until recently, one of the world’s busiest and most critical maritime corridors, Hormuz, had been a theatre for geopolitical confrontation.

Prosperous Gulf economies, long regarded as islands of stability, now find themselves under the constant shadow of missile strikes.

Irrespective of the eventual military outcome, the economic costs of the ongoing Gulf war will far outlive its battlefield gains. Even if one accepts that Israel and the United States initiated the military confrontation, Iran is now compounding that error by widening the battlefield to Gulf states.

Iran is playing a dangerous game and may have crossed a strategic Rubicon. There are many reasons why this war is working against Tehran’s long-term interests.

Iran cannot change its location

Firstly, Iran’s decision to militarily attack Gulf countries is strategically perplexing. Even those Gulf states that had sought a pragmatic modus vivendi with Iran now view it through a harsher security lens. Israel has the backing of the United States.

The Gulf monarchies possess enormous financial reserves and can rebuild damaged infrastructure. Global shipping will eventually find alternative routes. But Iran cannot change its geography. It will remain surrounded by the very Gulf states whose trust it is now eroding.

Throwing away painstaking regional diplomacy

Secondly, Iran may well remember where it was only a few years ago. Ironically, it entered this decade with an opportunity to escape years of isolation. The restoration of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia (brokered by China), improved relations with the UAE and a broader desire for regional deescalation offered Tehran a chance to re-enter Gulf politics as a legitimate regional stakeholder.

By widening the conflict, Iran now risks throwing away years of diplomatic rehabilitation.

Iran’s structural economic weakness

Third, Iran’s own economy cannot sustain permanent confrontation. It entered the conflict from a position of structural weakness. Years of sanctions, inflation, currency depreciation and under-investment have left little margin for prolonged regional confrontation. Every additional crisis further discourages investment, accelerates capital flight and youth unemployment, and delays economic recovery.

Iran’s ability to influence regional disparities is a double-edged sword

Fourth, a strategic advantage which Iran possesses is that it derives influence from regional divisions. But any future reconciliation between Israel and an Arab neighbor, every settlement in Yemen or Lebanon, every alternative trade and energy corridor to the Strait of Hormuz reduces Tehran’s strategic relevance.

The most effective response to Iranian coercion is therefore not more coercion, but making Iran gradually less central to the region’s security and commerce.

Motorists drive past a large billboard pledging revenge against US President Donald Trump along Jomhouri Street in central Tehran on July 27, 2026. Iran’s foreign ministry said on July 27 that the US was not involved in recent talks with Oman over the administration of the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Traffic through the vital global shipping route has been under Iranian control since the outbreak of war with Israel and the United States on February 28. (Photo by AFP) /

Iran’s control over Hormuz is not absolute

Fifth, Iran is possibly making a strategic mistake forcing the rest of the world to find a sustainable and structural solution to get around the Hormuz problem. No doubt, Hormuz gives Iran leverage that cannot simply be wished away overnight.

The question, then, is how to reduce Iran’s ability to weaponize that leverage? This disruption has already compelled many Gulf States to launch or revitalize alternate energy infrastructure corridors. The UAE’s construction of a new pipeline and a new deep-water port on its east coast in Fujairah aims to reduce dependence on Hormuz.

A pipeline project to connect Iraq to Jordan to provide Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar alternative outlets for their energy exports is under serious discussion. If the India-Middle East-European Economic Corridor (IMEC) takes off, it will boost Gulf corridor connectivity.

During the Cold War, the West never tried to eliminate the Soviet Union’s strategic advantages overnight. Instead, it invested in alternatives until those advantages mattered less. The same logic could apply to Hormuz.

Iran’s post-war diplomacy faces challenges

Iran will find its post-war diplomacy challenging as long as it continues to threaten the security of the Gulf nations. India’s interests are already directly harmed through attacks affecting Indian nationals, shipping, or energy security.

The USA, Europe,and Israel remain firmly opposed to Tehran anyway. In this scenario, Iran’s diplomatic options narrow considerably. It would increasingly depend on China for energy purchases and investment and Russia for military, diplomatic, and technological cooperation.

It could also depend on a limited network of partners such as Iraq, Syria (contingent on developments), and some non-state allies. That is not an enviable position to be in. Excessive dependence on China and Russia also weakens Iran’s strategic autonomy because Beijing and Moscow will prioritize their own interests over Tehran’s in the long run.

What US strategy can alter Iran’s incentives?

 Whatever one’s assessment of how this conflict began, the United States also has choices to make to create an acceptable off-ramp for the major stakeholders. It has many levers, but only some are likely to change Iran’s strategic calculus. Iran’s economic reintegration is the strongest positive lever.

Iran desperately needs sanctions relief (even though it has lived under sanctions for decades), foreign investment, access to international banking, and modernization of its oil and gas sector. The US cannot offer these unconditionally, but it can make them contingent on Iran ending attacks on Gulf shipping, proxies, and regional infrastructure.

Iran wants recognition as a legitimate regional power. The US can either facilitate or block Iran’s entry into regional security dialogues and international economic forums. This matters because Iran has long argued that it deserves a seat at the regional table. The implicit bargain is that Iran can either remain isolated and economically stagnant or become a normal regional power. That is probably the most powerful long-term incentive.

The paradox is that Washington need not defeat Iran to change Iranian behavior. It only needs to convince Tehran that every attempt to exploit geography accelerates the world’s search for alternatives, weakens Iran’s regional standing and leaves it increasingly dependent on a shrinking circle of partners.

For that to happen, the US will have to find ways to gain some trust with the Iranian leadership. Iran will most likely dismiss American pressure with hostility, but may find it harder to ignore simultaneous pressure from a coalition comprising India, Japan, South Korea, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the EU and others that have traditionally tried to maintain working relations with it.

A coalition in defense of freedom of navigation and regional stability would appear more reasonable to Iran than a coalition against itself.  China’s influence is often overlooked. It buys Iranian oil in bulk and wants uninterrupted Gulf trade. If Iran keeps threatening Hormuz, Beijing eventually has an incentive to pressure Tehran because instability hurts Chinese energy security.

A key insight for Iran

The key insight for Iran is that it can weaponize Hormuz only so long as the world remains highly dependent on it. Every missile that threatens the Gulf accelerates investments that reduce Iran’s leverage.

Every attack on shipping strengthens international resolve to diversify away from Hormuz. Every strike on a neighboring state diminishes the diplomatic goodwill Tehran will desperately need once the guns fall silent.  Iran can hold the world hostage for a while, but cannot build its future by doing so.

is the strategic paradox Tehran has to consider. That is why this is ultimately Iran’s war to lose.

  • Raghu Gururaj is a former Indian foreign service officer. He last retired from the post of Ambassador of India. His diplomatic assignments include Yemen, Singapore, Argentina, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, and the Republic of Saotome and Principe. He has a master’s in economics and political science and a diploma in journalism. 
  • This is an Opinion Article. Personal views of the Author
  •  He can be reached on X: @Rgururaj7

The post “This is Ultimately Iran’s War to Lose”: Ex-Indian Ambassador on Tehran’s Dangerous Hormuz Strategy appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

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