The Commission has just confirmed that it is suspending certain payments under Cohesion funding and the European Regional Development Fund to the Czech Prime Minister’s company Agrofert, due to the apparent conflict of interest surrounding Andrej Babiš' (pictured) role as PM and his business holdings. The Czech Prime Minister is the owner of the massive agribusiness, for which he set up a ‘trust’ ahead of becoming Prime Minister for the second time. The Greens/EFA Group have long highlighted the conflict of interests surrounding the Czech Prime Minister.  

Daniel Freund MEP, Greens/EFA Group Coordinator in the Budgetary Control Committee said:  “The Commission has recognized that Czech PM Andrej Babiš is likely in conflict of interest and we applaud that the Commission has finally taken action here. It is totally unacceptable for a prime minister to be negotiating the EU’s next long term budget, when he decides how large a chunk of that money could end up in his own pockets. The trust fund that Babiš set up in no way is enough to prevent a conflict of interest and it’s welcome that the Commission has acknowledged this.  “However, the Czech people should not have to suffer due to the dodgy dealings of their prime minister. It is time that the Commission and Council forces Czechia to ensure that Babiš is not involved in any negotiations around the EU’s long term budget, which may benefit him or his family directly. Either Babiš is head of Agrofert or he’s Czech PM, he can’t have it both ways.” 

Markéta Gregorová, Greens/EFA MEP and Czech Pirate Member of the Committee on International Trade said: “I am glad that the European Commission has finally started addressing Andrej Babiš’ conflict of interest, as it promised in its response to my inquiry. This confirms that we were right to raise the alarm: Babiš has not resolved his conflict of interest, and, frankly, he never genuinely intended to do so. The Commission must now ensure that the rules are enforced and that European taxpayers’ money is protected from any misuse.”

Sovereign wealth is typically measured by the size of reserves that allow a country to weather periods of crisis. However, for future generations, it is not only the amount left in financial accounts that matters. Of equal importance is the state of the country they inherit alongside these savings: the quality of its schools and hospitals, the condition of utility networks, roads, energy, and other core infrastructure.

For Kazakhstan, this question holds special significance. Revenues from natural resources enable the country to build a substantial financial cushion. The National Fund accumulates a portion of commodity revenues and serves two primary functions: a savings function aimed at preserving assets for future generations, and a stabilization function designed to reduce the state budget's vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity markets. It should be noted that by mid-2026, the fund's foreign-currency assets reached $65.5 billion. (1)

Sovereign wealth operates differently

There is no single global model for managing sovereign wealth funds. States strike different balances between intergenerational savings, fiscal stabilization, and deploying accumulated capital for development. However, international experience demonstrates that these goals are not inherently contradictory.

Norway adheres to one of the most disciplined models of sovereign wealth management. Its fiscal rule aligns withdrawals with the expected real return of the Government Pension Fund, while preserving the flexibility to use fiscal policy in response to major economic shocks. (2)

The stabilization function is even more pronounced in Chile. Funds from the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund have been drawn upon repeatedly during periods of economic stress. In 2009, withdrawals reached nearly $9.28 billion, with significant funds also deployed in 2019–2021. (3)

Other countries also utilize commodity revenues not only as a source of long-term savings, but as a catalyst for economic development. The experience of Kuwait is illustrative, where these responsibilities are divided between the Future Generations Fund, focused on preserving capital for future generations, and the General Reserve Fund, whose investment portfolio encompasses energy, industry, transport and logistics, healthcare, and infrastructure. This model allows Kuwait to preserve a portion of national wealth for upcoming generations while transforming another portion into assets that expand the country's economic potential today and build the foundation for long-term growth. (4)

Azerbaijan, whose sovereign wealth origins closely mirror Kazakhstan's, has utilized resources from the State Oil Fund to finance major projects of national importance, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water supply system, and equity participation in major oil and gas transport initiatives. (5)

None of these models can be mechanically copied by another country. Together, however, they demonstrate that sovereign wealth management does not boil down to a binary choice between "saving" and "spending." What matters far more is the form in which national capital can deliver the greatest long-term return for the nation.

From financial capital to national capital

Savings from the National Fund are already being utilized directly in the interests of future generations. Since 2024, Kazakhstan has operated the "National Fund for Children" program: every young citizen of Kazakhstan is annually allocated a portion of the fund's investment income, and upon reaching 18 years of age, the accumulated funds can be used for education or housing improvement. This program has already entered the phase of practical asset utilization. Between February 2024 and August 1, 2026, payouts were received by more than 338,000 young Kazakhstanis, totaling approximately $67.8 million. Meanwhile, the funds belonging to minors remain within the National Fund's assets and continue to be invested until they reach adulthood. (6)

At the same time, Kazakhstan faces a challenge familiar to many economies that have accumulated significant revenues from natural resources: what portion of national wealth should remain in financial assets, and what portion makes sense to convert into capital working domestically.

Soon, Kazakhstan plans to deploy a portion of the National Fund's assets to finance major infrastructure projects of nationwide significance. In 2027, over $4 billion is planned for these purposes, followed by slightly over $3 billion annually in 2028 and 2029 (7).

According to several experts, the economic rationale for such a decision extends beyond mere financing. When funds are directed into long-term social and engineering infrastructure, national wealth does not disappear. The form in which it exists simply changes.

Money allocated to current consumption expires alongside the budget cycle. A school, hospital, utility network, road, or energy facility remains in the economy and operates for decades.

This is precisely why infrastructure investments differ fundamentally from covering operational expenses. A portion of financial capital is effectively transformed into physical and human capital within the country.

Such an approach yields economic benefits right from the project implementation stage. Construction generates demand for materials, equipment, transport, design, and installation work, providing orders for domestic enterprises and creating added value within the country. Once facilities are operational, another, far more sustained effect begins. Modernizing heating and water supply systems increases their reliability, reduces losses, and diminishes the need for costly emergency repairs. Roads enhance regional connectivity. Energy infrastructure removes bottlenecks for expanding existing production and launching new industrial capacity.

Investments in healthcare and education occupy a special place. Modern hospitals, clinics, and educational institutions represent both social infrastructure and direct investments in human capital. The accessibility of medical care, public health status, quality of education, and workforce qualifications are directly tied to labor productivity and the long-term potential of the economy. All social infrastructure is as much an element of national capital as transport or energy infrastructure, and its returns and effectiveness extend far beyond the construction timeline of any individual project.

The cost of deferred development

Utilizing accumulated capital carries an opportunity cost. However, delaying investments carries an opportunity cost as well. Insufficient capacity of transport networks, energy shortages, worn-out utility systems, and a deficit of schools or medical facilities impose costs today. The longer modernization is postponed, the longer the economy and population bear these costs.

Therefore, the pace of infrastructure development carries clear economic value. If a necessary facility opens today rather than ten years from now, the country gains additional years of its economic and social returns.

Moreover, the social and economic effects of infrastructure are largely inseparable. Reliable utility networks, modern healthcare, education, transport, and energy simultaneously elevate the quality of life and create an environment in which private economic activity can thrive.

A reserve that has already worked

Using the National Fund's resources to address strategic priorities is not a new practice for Kazakhstan. The fund's ability to provide supplementary resources when the economy needs them most has repeatedly served as a key factor in the country's economic resilience.

During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, $10 billion was directed to stabilize the financial sector, support real estate, small and medium enterprises, and the agribusiness sector (8). In 2015–2017, an additional $9 billion was withdrawn (9). During the pandemic in 2020–2021, transfers from the National Fund helped preserve economic stability and support citizens. Thus, having an accumulated reserve allowed the state to act proactively—promptly directing additional resources where they were required to prevent more severe economic repercussions.

The existence of a large financial reserve enabled Kazakhstan to navigate periods of external shocks with an additional funding source without relying exclusively on current budget revenues.

Today, it is not the principle of using the fund that is changing, but the nature of the task. Previously, accumulated resources primarily served to mitigate the impact of global shocks. Now, a portion of the capital is intended to eliminate infrastructural bottlenecks that could constrain long-term development.

This expands the sovereign fund's role: resources accumulated during favorable periods are used not only after a crisis arises, but also to build assets that enhance the resilience and potential of the economy for years to come.

The account of future generations

Ultimately, the success of this strategy will be measured not by the volume of funds withdrawn from the National Fund, but by the value of the assets created with them and the overall effect they deliver to the economy and citizens.

This fundamentally shifts the evaluation criteria. If a financial asset worth one dollar is transformed into infrastructure that enhances productivity, lowers business costs, elevates human capital quality, and fosters conditions for new private investment over decades, the very structure of national wealth undergoes a qualitative transformation.

Therefore, the central question for the coming years is not whether to utilize National Fund resources, but the quality of the assets Kazakhstan creates in return. For future generations, this exact balance between preserved financial capital and the value of the domestic economy built in its place will stand as the primary legacy of today's decisions.

1. National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Report to the President dated June 4, 2026: Foreign Currency Assets and Investment Income for 2025.

2. AI-CIO, "Norway to Withdraw Record Amount from Sovereign Wealth Fund": https://www.ai-cio.com/news/norway-withdraw-record-amount-sovereign-wealth-fund/

3. The Market Value of the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF): https://www.hacienda.cl/english/work-areas/international-finance/sovereign-wealth-funds/economic-and-social-stabilization-fund/financial-situation/market-value

4. Kuwait Investment Authority, "Investments" (General Reserve Fund and Future Generations Fund overview): https://www.kia.gov.kw/investments/

5. oilfund.az, State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan - Question and Answer (mandate); naturalgasworld.com, "SOFAZ financing Azerbaijan's share in TANAP project": https://oilfund.az/en/fund/press-room/question-and-answer
   
6. Target Savings Payments under the "National Fund for Children" Program: https://www.enpf.kz/ru/press-center/news/282547/
   
   Foreign-Currency Assets of the National Fund to Increase to USD 70.6 Billion by 2029: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/economy/press/news/details/1279482?lang=en
   
   Concept of Formation and Use of Resources of the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Decree of the President of RK dated Dec 8, 2016, No. 385): https://cdb.kz/sistema/pravovaya-baza/o-kontseptsii-formirovaniya-i-ispolzovaniya-sredstv-natsionalnogo-fonda-respubliki-kazakhstan/
   
   Concept of Formation and Use of Resources of the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1600000385
   

Six months into the US-Iran war, and as Europe grapples with finding a solution to a crisis that has spread across the region, Iranian activists across the Islamic Republic risked their lives last week by taking part in demonstrations, impromptu parades and acts of disobedience to mark the 62nd anniversary of the founding of Iran’s leading pro-democracy opposition group. What makes this particularly relevant for Brussels is that Europe is examining ways not only to contain the immediate crisis, but also to address the broader question of what political forces inside Iran could ultimately shape the country’s future. Meanwhile, members of the same movement in exile held an election to choose a new occupant of the organisation’s highest office.

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) was originally established to promote revolution against the hereditary dictatorship of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. But after that revolution came about in 1979, it quickly stood up against the theocratic faction that seized power in its wake and began cultivating a reputation as the primary voice for a democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic. It has since been targeted for annihilation by the regime on several occasions but has invariably rebounded and assumed leading roles in major, collective challenges to the regime’s hold on power.

Those challenges include independent media campaigns, mass protests and an armed assault in February on Tehran’s Motahari Complex, which contains offices belonging to several leading officials and institutions, including that of the supreme leader. That incident threatened to decapitate the regime just days before the United States began the bombing campaign that has left it mired in a grinding war with the Islamic Republic more than six months later.

The PMOI has also been credited with leading roles in each of four successive uprisings that spread across the entire country in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2026. The last of these, which took place mostly in January, was ruthlessly suppressed, with the death toll reaching into the thousands. This was soon followed by a new escalation in Iran’s world-leading use of the death penalty, particularly against political detainees.

Since the start of the Iranian calendar year in March, 40 such prisoners have been hanged, many of them for participating in the January uprising or for affiliation with the PMOI. The trend has led many of the organisation’s supporters to warn that the regime could be setting the stage for a massacre akin to that which took place in the summer of 1988, primarily targeting the PMOI, when 30,000 political prisoners, the overwhelming majority of them affiliated with the PMOI, were massacred within a few months.

Those warnings, and that history, illustrate the danger that Iranian activists were taking on when they coordinated demonstrations last week with the express purpose of promoting the PMOI. This, in turn, points to the resilience that the Iranian people have demonstrated both in the early days of the Islamic Republic and in recent clashes between protesters and regime authorities.

That resilience is arguably reflected in the PMOI’s choice of Mahnaz Maimanat (pictured) as its new Secretary General on Sunday (6 September). Like most of her colleagues, Maimanat has suffered great personal losses in her fight against the ruling system. Her brother Massoud was killed by firing squad in 1983, and her brother Mahmoud was hanged during the 1988 massacre, the same year that their mother was killed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Since joining the PMOI at the age of 20 in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Maimanat has remained steadfastly committed to the organisation, joining its Leadership Council in 1993 and its Central Council in 2014, before becoming co-Secretary General in 2021. After she secured 56 percent of the votes from fellow members of the Central Council, a statement from the PMOI described Maimanat’s election as a means for the organisation to declare “its firm determination to topple the ruling religious fascism.”

The statement also quoted Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political coalition of which the PMOI is a member organisation, as saying that Maimanat “has combined dynamism and a defiant spirit with an even deeper sense of commitment and responsibility for the freedom of the Iranian people and her homeland.”

Rajavi has been designated by the NCRI to oversee a transition to democratic governance following the mullahs’ overthrow. She has also authored a Ten-Point Plan for Iran’s future in the wake of that transition, guaranteeing free and fair elections, separation of religion from the state, equal rights for women and minorities, and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries and the West, backed by the dismantling of the outgoing regime’s nuclear weapons programme.

In recent years, thousands of lawmakers across Europe and North America, including cross-party members of the European Parliament, have openly endorsed that plan while also recognising the NCRI as a viable, democratic alternative to the current ruling system.

Commission adopts EU Guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance

New figures from member states show that businesses are increasingly using the simplified VAT rules for cross-border e-commerce.

New figures from member states show that businesses continue to make increasing use of the simplified VAT rules for online sales. Five years after the EU’s VAT e-commerce rules entered into force, the latest figures also show continued growth in VAT declared through the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes.

The VAT e-commerce package, which entered into force on 1 July 2021, marked a major step in modernising the EU VAT framework. Since then, member states have collected more than €125 billion in VAT revenue through the EU’s VAT e-commerce schemes.

In 2025 alone, more than €38 billion in VAT revenue was collected, an increase of 17% compared with the previous year. The number of businesses using the EU’s simplified VAT schemes has also continued to grow. By the end of 2025, more than 193,000 businesses have registered to account for VAT on online sales through the schemes, reflecting the continued uptake of the EU’s VAT reforms, which help simplify VAT compliance, reduce red tape, and ensure VAT collection. 

E-commerce VAT reform: Progress and future direction

With the continued rapid growth in e-commerce activity and an increasingly digital global marketplace, the EU’s VAT rules for online transactions have continued to evolve to meet the needs of cross-border trade.

As we move into the next phase of reforms under the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package, the EU is on track towards a fairer and more efficient VAT framework.

Following the adoption of the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) package in 2025, its phased implementation over the coming years is expected to build further on the success of the e-commerce VAT reforms. By expanding the scope of the OSS to cover more business-to-consumer transactions and introducing a new special scheme for the transfers of own goods, the ViDA package is likely to lead to even greater uptake of the OSS schemes, moving towards a single VAT registration in the EU. 

More information

Through a single registration in one member state, the One Stop Shop (OSS) and Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) schemes allow businesses to declare and remit VAT for cross-border sales of goods and services within the EU, as well as for imports of low-value goods.

This report is the latest in a series of annual reports on the application of the e-commerce package and is based on 2025 statistics from member states. It sets out details of the total number of registrations in all three One-Stop Shop (OSS) schemes, namely, the Union OSS, the non-Union OSS and the Import OSS, as of 31 December 2025. It also provides details on the total amount of VAT declared in each of these schemes in 2025. In addition, it describes how these registrations and declaration figures have evolved since the introduction of the VAT e-commerce rules in July 2021.

• Read the 2025 Report on the Application of the EU’s VAT E-Commerce Package 
• VAT for e-commerce 
• VAT in the Digital Age 

The EU energy label, as provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, aims at promoting the uptake of more efficient energy-related products. It aims to help consumers make informed choices by facilitating comparisons of product alternatives with different features. The label focuses on the energy efficiency of the product during the use phase, but can also include other environment-related aspects.

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• Publication details

• Published: 2026
• Corporate author(s): Directorate-General for Energy (European Commission) , Centerdata , Ipsos NV
• Themes: Energy policy
• Subject: computer equipment , consumer information , energy consumption , energy efficiency , EU energy label , EU energy policy , maintenance , product life , regulation (EU)

• Released on EU publications website: 2026-09-03

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As families across Nepal face the human toll of one of the country's deadliest floods in decades, the EU is adding to the relief effort led by Nepalese authorities and humanitarian partners. A first EU humanitarian air bridge flight is delivering 82 tonnes of essential supplies, while the European Commission is providing a further €500,000 for response and coordinating further help offered by European countries.

Organized with UNICEF, the Air Bridge flight has landed this morning carrying supplies for nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter, education and protection from EU stocks. The additional €500,000 will be channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' disaster response emergency fund, allowing local teams to cover urgent needs. Separately, through the EU civil protection mechanism, Luxembourg, Germany, Latvia and Norway are sending equipment including life jackets, hygiene and kitchen kits, blankets, medical supplies, protective equipment and emergency energy equipment.

This further assistance builds on the EU response already underway. On 28 August, the Commission allocated €2 million in emergency humanitarian aid, on top of almost €3 million already allocated to Nepal in 2026 for disaster preparedness. EU-funded partners have been providing assistance on the ground, while Copernicus emergency satellite mapping has been activated and the EU Rapid Response and Logistic Coordinators for Asia are deployed.

Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib said: 

"In a single night, rivers of mud and water swept away what generations had built: homes, schools, entire communities. Nepal has suffered a devastating loss of life, and thousands of families are facing the unimaginable. The grief is only beginning to sink in. Europe stands with the Nepalese people. We are supporting emergency responders and getting emergency aid to those who need it: clean water, medicine for hospitals, shelter for families sleeping in the open, and psychological support for the grieving. European solidarity crosses oceans. We will help Nepal not just survive this tragedy, but rebuild. Stronger and never alone."

Background

The European Commission's emergency response co-ordination centre operates 24/7; it ensures rapid deployment of emergency support and acts as a coordination hub between all EU member states, the 10 additional participating states, the affected country, and civil protection and humanitarian aid experts.

On 4 September, the Commission proposed extending the annual winter closure in the Bay of Biscay into winter 2027 for fishing vessels over eight metres to help prevent catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans - which are strictly protected species under the EU Habitats Directive. For the fourth consecutive year, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have requested this closure, making use of the regionalised approach under the common fisheries policy. 

The Delegated Act will now be sent to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU for scrutiny before entering into force  

As proposed by the group of EU member states, the closure should run for a period of 30 consecutive days, to be taken between 15 January and 27 February 2027. Fishers will be able to notify their preferred closure period to their national authorities. 

This proposed new closure aims to increase operational flexibility for the fishing sector and reduce its economic impacts, while protecting dolphins during the period when bycatch risk is higher. This new flexible approach responds to a direct request from the fishing sector to better align the timing of the closure with fishing activities. 

In the absence of notification about their preferred dates to their national authorities, fishing vessels will be subject to the fixed closure period running from 22 January until 20 February 2027.   

Efforts to reduce common dolphin bycatch should continue, as advised by science and required under the Habitats Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, in line with the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the European Ocean Pact.  

Success in reducing dolphin mortality   

Since 2024, fishing closures in the Bay of Biscay have been effective in reducing incidental catches of dolphins. According to a report from the French observatory PELAGIS, dolphin mortality due to incidental catches in 2025 appeared significantly lower than those estimated prior to the closure (2017-2023).  

Financial support for fishing vessels  

Around 300 EU vessels are expected to be impacted by the proposed closure. Financial compensation is available through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) or through state aid by member states. The EU offers financial support to fishers to acknowledge their efforts towards marine conservation and to protect their livelihoods, ensuring a sustainable and prosperous future for both ecosystems and fishing communities.  

Measures to reduce incidental catches  

During the selected closure period, vessels - pelagic and demersal trawls, seiners and netters - will be required to remain in port to avoid incidental catches of common dolphins and other small cetaceans. Scientists have identified this period as a high-risk for bycatches (unintentional capture of dolphins during fishing operations).  

Background  

All cetaceans, including common dolphins, are strictly protected under the Habitats Directive. Member states must establish a system to monitor their incidental capture and killing. Considering the information gathered, they must take further research or conservation measures to ensure that incidental capture and killing does not have a significant negative impact on the species concerned.   

The EU Biodiversity strategy for 2030 aims to eliminate or minimise by-catch so as not to threaten the conservation status of protected species. In line with these objectives, the European Ocean Pact sets out the Commission's commitment to support member states in protecting and restoring marine ecosystems. 

Winter strandings of dolphins and small cetaceans on the coasts of the Bay of Biscay have been a recurring challenge for the fishing sector and marine ecosystems. Contributing factors to these strandings include incidental catches in fishing nets, natural mortality, diseases, and disorientation.  

As part of efforts to reduce interactions between small cetaceans and fishing vessels, the fishing sector and Member States are investing in research and technical trials to develop and test new devices. Ongoing research projects on new devices and interaction with cetaceans include PIFIL, DolphinFree, Licado, Delmoges, iNOVPESCA and VaradaC. 

Westminster is the most unaffordable city for local homebuyers, according to a September 2026 real estate report. While home price growth across the UK slowed to 2% a year, a new study by Everest Mortgages looked at the cities where house prices and mortgage requirements are still too high for their own residents. Westminster makes it the most difficult for residents to buy a home, with locals needing to earn over 3 times more than they do currently. Salaries and mortgage requirements don’t match each other the most in England, as the region takes all top 10 spots.Chichester stands out with the lowest local salaries, and full-time workers there earn only £35.2K annually.

For each of 75+ UK cities, the study focused on two key numbers: the salary local workers would need to afford a home versus what they earn now. The first figure was calculated using the average house price without the deposit (15%) and what lenders usually limit for mortgage applications, taken as 4.5 times the salary. The aimed salary is then compared to the actual median salary in the region, highlighting the affordability gaps in the UK housing market. Here’s how the top 10 most unaffordable housing markets for locals.

In Westminster, residents need to earn over 3 times more than they do now to afford a home. This is the largest difference in the country between real income and what lenders are looking for when approving mortgages, and, in raw numbers, it’s a gap of £108K annually. Right now, Westminster workers take home around £52.6K a year if they’re working full time, but with house prices at £854K, they need to triple their earnings. Chichester Chichester is the second most unaffordable market for residents, with local salaries requiring a 2.3 times increase to match the mortgage conditions. In 2026, workers here earn only £35.2K annually, the lowest median salary in the top 10, but the house prices in Chichester are still higher than in Bath, Bristol, or Brighton and Hove.

To pay off a mortgage on a £430K house, residents need to earn £81.2K, more than double their current paychecks. London In third place is London, where the median earnings of £46.4K still need to be more than doubled (x 2.25) to fit the mortgage payment schedule. The average house in London is actually cheaper than one in Westminster or in St Albans, with a price tag of £554K, but local salaries need to reach at least £104.6K, the third-highest required paycheck on the list. St Albans St Albans follows closely, with a 2.14 times salary increase required. Local workers already make the most on the list, bringing home £57.4K, over £10K more than in London, but these salaries are still not enough for a safe mortgage.

With house prices sitting at £651.4K on average, St Albans homebuyers are looking for a salary of £123K. Oxford Oxford also makes the list of the cities where it’s the hardest to buy a home on local salaries. In 2026, the gap between the actual paychecks and what lenders are looking for is £44.9K, which is already more than a median Oxford salary. Currently, the income for one full-time worker amounts to £43.3K annually, so future homebuyers need to look to double their earnings. A housing expert from Everest Mortgages commented on the study: “Many first-time buyers spend years saving a deposit, only to discover their salary still disqualifies them for a mortgage on the property they've been saving toward. Having a big enough deposit is only half the story, and a stable, sufficiently large income is equally important. In Westminster and Chichester, the deposit hurdle is real, but the income gap is the wall most buyers never get over.”

The German government has announced plans to terminate the agreement governing the activities of the Russian House in Berlin and to close Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn by September 18. The German Foreign Office has cited security concerns as the reason for the decision.

The announcement follows the discovery of an unidentified drone carrying explosives near Leipzig Airport. The device was reportedly found in an area close to transport aircraft used in connection with weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Moscow has rejected the allegations, describing them as unsupported by evidence.

Against the backdrop of this latest deterioration in diplomatic relations, three politicians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have spoken out in favor of keeping the Russian House open. They argue that the institution should primarily be regarded as a venue for cultural exchange rather than as an arena for political confrontation.

Ulrich Singer, chairman of the AfD parliamentary group in the Bavarian State Parliament, criticized the approach taken by Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In Singer’s view, sanctions are placing an additional burden on the German economy. He also considers the proposed closure of both the Russian House and the consulate in Bonn to be based on allegations of suspected subversive activity that are being used as a pretext.

Singer stressed that for decades the Russian House has provided opportunities for people to learn about the Russian language, culture and history. Any potential violations of the law, he argued, should be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted through the courts. Suspicions, Singer said, “cannot replace proceedings conducted under the rule of law,” while assessments made by foreign intelligence agencies “must not lead to political prejudgment.”

Precisely because relations between Germany and Russia are strained, Singer believes there should be more dialogue rather than less. In his assessment, dismantling cultural bridges would only deepen the breakdown in communication.

He also called for sanctions to be reviewed, arguing that they should not become an end in themselves. According to Singer, they impose costs on German companies and, when directed against individuals, must comply with the principles of legality, transparency and proportionality.

Singer additionally warned of possible reciprocal measures. Closing the Russian House could have consequences for German cultural institutions operating in Russia, particularly the Goethe-Institut. Commentators cited by klamm.de have noted that the two institutions are connected through a longstanding reciprocal arrangement.

Singer concluded that “the true strength of a state” does not lie in constant escalation but in its ability to prevent wars. In his words, peace is achieved not by closing doors, but by keeping them open.

Andreas Jurca, another AfD member of the Bavarian State Parliament, expressed a similar position. He argues that during a period of worsening relations between Berlin and Moscow, channels for cultural, social and humanitarian exchange are particularly important and should be preserved.

“If such places of encounter disappear, the distance between the two societies will continue to grow,” Jurca said.

He also maintained that allegations concerning possible intelligence activities should be based on evidence that can be verified and publicly scrutinized rather than solely on political assessments. New-facts.eu notes that Jurca’s statements, like those made by Sahra Wagenknecht, represent political assessments rather than the findings of official investigations.

AfD Bundestag member Rainer Rothfuß, who has previously organized so-called “peace trips” to Moscow, also criticized the planned measures. He described the proposed closure of the Russian House and the consulate in Bad Godesberg as “disastrous.”

Rothfuß claimed that “the government is carrying out an agenda dictated by globalists” and is taking steps that, in his view, “were avoided even during the Cold War.”

“Good and peaceful relations between Germany and Russia are in Germany’s interest,” Rothfuß said.

According to him, the AfD has defended this position for years. He also criticized mainstream media outlets, accusing them of contributing to the further “destruction” of German-Russian relations.

Klamm.de and new-facts.eu have also reported criticism voiced by Sahra Wagenknecht. She argues that Merz is intensifying tensions with Russia while failing to demonstrate the same determination in his approach toward Ukraine. In this context, she pointed to the arrests of Ukrainian citizens suspected of involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.

“Merz is bringing us ever closer to a war with Russia,” Wagenknecht wrote on her blog.

The future of the Russian House and the Russian consulate in Bonn now rests with the German government and the diplomatic process. Singer, Jurca and Rothfuß are calling for a clear distinction between suspected violations of the law—which, they argue, should be investigated and dealt with through the courts—and cultural channels, which they believe should remain open.

The German government, meanwhile, has linked the planned closures to national-security concerns following the incident near Leipzig. Moscow continues to reject the allegations.

Dear Mark, it is always a pleasure to welcome you.

We meet today to discuss Russia's attack in Leipzig. The German government has identified Russia as behind an attempt to attack cargo planes at Leipzig/Halle Airport. Had this attack succeeded, this would have resulted in enormous damage and possibly even loss of life. So I want to be very clear about what this was. This was an attack using military-grade material, carried out by Russian operatives on EU soil. And we will not tolerate it. We stand in full solidarity with Germany. And If the intention was to make us think twice about supporting Ukraine, I can tell you, it has only strengthened my resolve. Intimidation will not work. And this is why I am meeting with NATO's Secretary-General today. We are united. Europe and NATO will not just maintain our pressure on Russia. We will increase it. And we will not stop. Not until Russia stops bombing and killing innocent children, men and women in Ukraine.

Leipzig marks a new escalation on European soil, directly attributed to Russia. But it is part of a broader pattern of increasingly dangerous incidents. Repeated incursions into our airspace. Drones that paralyse our airports. Interference with our critical infrastructure. Europeans are faced with a hard truth that this is the new normal. We have to step up. And that means being ready to respond to Russia's recklessness faster and better. We must treat our everyday infrastructure as frontline targets and protect it accordingly. And we will support any Member State - Russia targets. Europe already has Rapid Response Teams which can respond to these styles of attacks whether they occur inside or outside our Union. Our strength, our preparedness, our resolve, is our deterrence.

We also do this by using the power of our Single Market. Our sanctions have weakened Russia's economy. We can use more sanctions and have them ready to impose, as soon as such dangerous, life-threatening acts are attributed. Every loophole Russia exploits, is one we must close. In Ireland today, European foreign affairs ministers are discussing new listings. At the Commission, we are looking at ways to cut even deeper into Russia's war chest.

My second point today regards our support for Ukraine. Today I can confirm that we have received a new payment request. It is worth several billion euros and would cover Ukraine's air defences, including the highly advanced PAC-3 Patriot air defence systems. Member States are currently looking at Ukraine's request, but I can say that it is going in the right direction. At the same time, we in Europe are working on FREYA with Ukraine. This is a European project to build our own anti-ballistic missile defences. All of this is on top of the ‘90 billion euro support loan' for Ukraine that is already at work. Since June, we have issued 8.5 billion EUR for drones and missiles for Ukraine. And this money would also buy fighter jets from European industry.

Finally, my third point. We do all of this together with NATO. Mark and I have repeatedly stood side by side to express this solidarity, and we do so today to show that Europe is united. And that Europe must mobilise its defence surge even sooner. Air defences are critical. We need a faster, more integrated alert system across Europe. And then we must intercept the threats faster. This is why we have put forward an 800 billion euro defence investment plan. Including 150 billion euro through SAFE, so we can invest more, but together and therefore smarter.

Mark, last time we met was at the NATO summit in Türkiye where we discussed these topics. As you said, the EU and NATO reinforce each other. And today our message is very clear. We are in a new era of European security. And European investment in defence strengthens NATO and re-energises our industrial base. We will continue; we will prevail; and we will deter anyone who attacks our freedom and security.

As the European Commission considers its final response to the Fur Free Europe European Citizens’ Initiative, The Lancet Regional Health – Europe has published a commentary by leading zoonotic disease experts and academics warning that fur farming poses a preventable public health threat. The authors argue that if the Commission is serious about One Health – the principle that the health of people, animals and wider environment are interconnected – it must propose a ban on fur farming rather than welfare standards.

Lead author Dr Joanna Swabe, senior director of public affairs at Humane World for Animals Europe, says: “Fur farming is an unnecessary and preventable public health threat. The EU cannot claim to champion One Health while allowing a declining fur industry to continue cruelly breeding susceptible species, such as mink, foxes and raccoon dogs, in intensive conditions where dangerous viruses can spread, adapt and potentially spill over to people. Surveillance and spurious welfare tweaks will not remove that risk. The Commission must act decisively and ban fur farming.” 

Dr Neil Vora, director of Preventing Pandemics at the Source Coalition, adds: "Caging wild species, like mink, is dangerous to our health. These animals are like viral sponges under these awful conditions: They can contract respiratory viruses from us, incubate them, then pass them back to us in mutated form. It does not make sense to take wild species and confine them in small cages for their entire lives, only to be gassed or electrocuted, solely to produce fur for fashion. Aside from the animal abuse, the risk to our health is too great. It’s long past time to phase this industry out. The EU should ban fur farming, as many of its citizens want, and show the world what true prevention looks like."

The European Commission was due to respond to the Fur Free Europe ECI by the end of March 2026, but its decision has been delayed by apparent disagreement within the College (the EU’s executive leadership body) over whether to ban fur farming or introduce welfare standards. A document leaked to the media in March suggested the Commission was leaning towards standards. This came despite an unequivocal EFSA opinion by independent EU science agency, the European Food Safety Authority, that the most serious welfare problems for mink, foxes, raccoon dogs and chinchillas cannot be prevented or substantially mitigated in the cage systems used for fur farming.

The Lancet piece argues that the EU’s commitment to One Health is undermined by its hesitation to ban fur farming, despite clear zoonotic disease risks and strong public support for action. It highlights how fur farms create ideal conditions for pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 and H5N1 to spread, adapt and potentially spill over to humans, with past outbreaks in the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Spain demonstrating the danger. The authors note that the fur industry is in steep economic decline, imposes wider public health and environmental costs, and cannot resolve its core welfare or disease risks through minimum standards. They conclude that an EU ban on fur farming would be a practical, preventive One Health measure and a clear example of upstream pandemic prevention.

• The Lancet commentary entitled If the EU is serious about One Health, it must ban fur farming was co-authored by Dr. Joanna Swabe (Humane World for Animals), Prof. dr. Chris Walzer (University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna/WCS), Dr. Benjamin Roche (MIVEGEC, Université Montpellier/ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)), Prof. dr. Arnaud Fontanet (Institut Pasteur, Université Paris-Cité), Prof. dr. Thijs Kuiken (Erasmus University Medical Centre, Rotterdam), Dr. Manon Lounnas ((MIVEGEC, Université Montpellier), Prof. dr. Andrea S. Winkler (Technical University of Munich, Germany/University of Oslo), Prof. dr. Sarah Cleaveland (University of Glasgow), Prof. dr. Dirk U. Pfeiffer (Royal Veterinary College, London/ City University of Hong Kong),  Prof. dr. Latiffah Hassan (University of Missouri), Prof. dr. Raina K. Plowright (College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University), Dr. Neil M. Vora (Preventing Pandemics at the Source Coalition).
• The European Food Safety Authority published its scientific opinion on the Welfare of American mink, red and Arctic foxes, raccoon dog and chinchilla kept for fur production in 2025.

About Humane World for Animals

Together, we tackle the root causes of animal cruelty and suffering to create permanent change. With millions o supporters and work happening in over 50 countries, Humane World for Animals—formerly called Humane Society International—addresses the most deeply entrenched forms of animal cruelty and suffering. As the leading voice in the animal protection space, we work to end the cruelest practices, care for animals in crisis and build a stronger animal protection movement. Driving toward the greatest global impact, we aim to achieve the vision behind our name: a more humane world.
humaneworld.org

Great Wi-Fi, affordable rent and a laptop-friendly café have long been the checklist for the perfect digital nomad city. But they say little about what it is actually like to live there. Look beyond the usual rankings and a different picture begins to emerge. New research from Holafly finds that 32.2% of frequent and long-stay travellers have experienced burnout linked to their travel lifestyle. 32.3% have felt isolated from their usual social or emotional support network. And even some of the most ordinary parts of daily life — sleeping well, exercising regularly or eating healthily — become harder to maintain when home keeps changing.

Digital nomads are clear about what gets in the way. 33.7% point to unpredictable schedules or changing time zones as their main challenge, 18.8% to the cost of gyms, classes or healthy food, and 20.7% simply to not knowing what is available around them. That led Holafly to examine a question largely missing from traditional digital nomad rankings: which popular nomad destinations actually make it hardest to live well? Holafly analysed 25 established digital nomad hubs across eight wellbeing factors, including community, noise, green space, exercise, healthy food, daylight, cost of living and healthcare.

Using data from official public sources, the World Health Organization, Mercer and Google Maps, each city received a deficit score from 0 to 100. The resulting Holafly Plans Wellbeing Index 2026 reveals how differently some familiar nomad hotspots perform once the laptop closes. The research is part of Holafly's broader focus on the growing number of people living across borders for longer. Holafly Plans, its global eSIM subscription, is designed specifically for frequent travellers and digital nomads, giving them one plan they can use across destinations rather than starting again every time they move.

Lima, Hanoi and Cusco emerge as the three most challenging cities for digital nomad wellbeing in 2026. 1. Lima, Peru 2. Hanoi, Vietnam 3. Cusco, Peru 4. Bogotá, Colombia 5. Da Nang, Vietnam 6. Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 7. Cancún, Mexico 8. Medellín, Colombia 9. Tbilisi, Georgia 10. Buenos Aires, Argentina

Lima ranks as the toughest city for digital nomad wellbeing, with a deficit score of 85.3/100. The Peruvian capital records the lowest levels of daylight among all 25 destinations analysed, alongside high noise levels and limited green space. Hanoi follows at 82.7/100, ranking worst for noise and exercise access and tying for the weakest green space, while Cusco takes third place at 76.3/100, largely because it has the weakest social and community network in the study. The ranking also uncovers a broader pattern: six of the eight worst-performing cities — Lima, Hanoi, Cusco, Bogotá, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City — are classic budget-friendly nomad destinations.

It points to a trade-off rarely captured in traditional nomad rankings: a city can be cheap and easy to move to without necessarily being easy to live well in. About Holafly Holafly is the global leader in eSIMs for travellers, offering coverage in over 200 destinations. With a 4.7/5 rating on Trustpilot and more than 25 million eSIMs sold, it has become a preferred choice for international travellers. Its unlimited data and built-in backup data ensures total peace of mind anywhere in the world.

An international sports camp bringing together nearly 100 young Ukrainian athletes from ten different sports has concluded in France.

The camp was held at the initiative and with the support of Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, in partnership with the Ukrainian side. The Kyiv City State Administration, “The Future for Children” Charitable Foundation with its Olympic Dreams project, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine with the nationwide multisport project “Path of Champions” also contributed to the organization of the camp.

This year, the camp brought together athletes representing ten sports: rhythmic gymnastics, volleyball, judo, sport climbing, boxing, basketball, athletics, rowing, taekwondo, and floorball.

The young Ukrainian athletes had the opportunity to train in safe conditions, take part in sports and team activities, relax, and discover France. The camp programme included a mountain hike, a trip to the seaside, a visit to an oceanarium, and attendance at a football match.

“For us, it is very important to see more and more people in different countries coming together to support Ukrainian sport, with France becoming a systemic partner. Camps like this give Ukrainian children an opportunity, at least for a while, to return to a normal childhood: to train in safe conditions, make new friends, and see a world without borders,” said Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.
 

: Anatoliy Boyko, Philippe Lamblin, Olena Hovorova, Vadym Omelchenko, Yasmina Merzi

An important highlight of the programme was the official reception for the camp participants at Paris City Hall on 21 August.

The meeting was attended by Vadym Omelchenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the French Republic; Yasmina Merzi, Deputy Mayor of Paris responsible for child welfare and protection; Olena Hovorova, Deputy Head of the Kyiv City State Administration, Adviser to the Office of the President of Ukraine and Olympic bronze medallist; Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League; and Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.

The meeting at Paris City Hall provided an opportunity to thank the French partners for their support of Ukrainian athletes and to discuss the importance of international sports cooperation amid the full-scale war.

The organizers and Ukrainian partners also express their gratitude to the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, the regional prefecture, the City of Lille, the management of Parc d’Olhain, as well as all French partners and patrons who contributed to the organization of the camp.

For Olympic Dreams, a project launched in 2022, participation in such international initiatives is part of its ongoing efforts to provide Ukrainian athletes with opportunities for safe training, athletic development, and international preparation during the full-scale war.

Photos by Roman Horbun

This year has proved that the era of the strongman is undoubtedly upon us. Littered throughout the highest offices across government and international organisations, they have proved time and again that due process is for suckers and that you, too, can bribe your way to the desired outcome.

Take Gianni Infantino who is seeking to sell off 20% of the world’s most cherished football tournament. He, like Trump, has dug in his heels, choosing to strategically dole out favours, and then use their power to pit people against each other, rather than following the rules. Having leveraged their positions to fulfil their agenda, no matter the cost, they deny anything they don’t wish to confront, deflect questions they don’t like, and gaslight anyone who dares to call them out.

Whilst Infantino and Trump have dominated headlines of late, the actions of the world’s health agency head have - despite years of alarm bells - received comparatively little scrutiny; a concern when you consider how instrumental effective healthcare is to our everyday lives.

Like Infantino, Dr Tedros wedges countries and leaders apart in order to defy institutional processes and push through his agenda. In 2025, Dr Tedros pared down his leadership team by nearly 30%. Most recently, the WHO’s top scientist, Dr Jeremy Farrar, was replaced with a highly “controversial” and apparent confidant of Dr Tedros. The pattern of replacing officials with faithful advisers is a classic move of the strongman and underlines how institutional structures can be leveraged to advance personal aims.

One of those aims appears to be purging WHO of those who challenge the opaque bureaucratic functions that Dr Tedros oversees. Dr Farrar’s surprise resignation was said to have been due to increasing frustrations with the WHO’s internal politics. Curiously, in an all-staff email, Dr Tedros reframed Dr Farrar’s departure as a retirement and, in communications with the press, the organisation refused to comment on

r’s relationship with (read: criticisms of) the WHO. 

Now, Dr Tedros is allegedly bulldozing through the replacement of the WHO’s Regional Director for its South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), Saima Wazed. Ms Wazed has been on administrative leave for over a year following unfounded allegations made against her by Bangladesh’s Interim Government. As the nation roiled under an intense period of political unrest, Ms Wazed was falsely accused of absconding from the country when, in reality, she was stationed in New Delhi, acting in her capacity as the SEARO Regional Director. The WHO knew this but put her on administrative leave without pay anyways. In that time other, unfounded allegations bubbled up, including claims Ms Wazed requested reimbursement from WHO for personal travel to China, which, it would appear, was an entirely fabricated allegation.

The WHO’s handling of Ms Wazed’s leave has been deeply flawed and discussed at length by top-level jurists and a UN Special Rapporteur. Since the allegations were made, a new Bangladeshi government has been elected and two of WHO’s Officers-in-Charge have been appointed to “temporarily” oversee the SEARO. Still, no information about the veracity of the allegations against Ms Wazed have been made public despite the fact that WHO’s own guidelines explicitly say that administrative leave is not a punishment. If allegations are not verified in a reasonable timeframe, WHO has a duty to end the leave.

For her part, Ms Wazed has called for an investigation into Dr Tedros, alleging that he or his office leaked confidential documents, provided false or misleading information to Member States, and breached confidentiality requirements and the WHO’s Code of Conduct by directly engaging with the former government of Bangladesh.

While the WHO has the responsibility to investigate allegations against its staff, claims from a national authority should not automatically be treated as proven fact for a supposedly apolitical organisation. It has now been over a year since Ms Wazed was put on leave. This, combined with the absence of any apparent independent investigation into the allegations points to a fast and loose approach to proper administrative processes, one in which the attempt to hold Ms Wazed in administrative purgatory exists as a vehicle to quietly remove her from the organisation.

Just as Infantino is leveraging greater funding for African nations to gather support for his upcoming presidential bid, Dr Tedros is using what amounts to an uncosted holiday jaunt to the South Pacific to bring a forced-end to this saga. Reports suggest that the Director General is directing SEARO nations to do away with due processes and install Ms Wazed’s successor. For their trouble, fielty, and feigned ignorance to standard administrative practices, Dr Tedros is organising a regional meeting, spending at least €163k to fly in the SEARO directors and staff for a face-to-face meeting in Timor Leste. Despite years of cutting the WHO to the bone and a record budget shortfall, for Dr Tedros no expense is too great to push through his agenda.

Ultimately, this is a clear attempt by Dr Tedros to circumvent proper levels of scrutiny about this crucial decision, and to hide his undermining of the WHO’s standard procedures by sweetening the deal for other regional staff. Pulling directly from the Infantino playbook, Dr Tedros has escaped public outcry which would hold him responsible. But his treatment of Saima Wazed, what many would call an organised witch-hunt, should concern us all, as yet another international organisation sees the erosion of due processes.

31 August marks an important milestone for the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU, as member states reach the final implementation deadline for the reforms and investments set out in their national recovery and resilience plans. This is a defining moment for the EU's unprecedented common response to two major crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As NextGenerationEU enters its final phase, the focus now turns to completing the remaining steps for a successful conclusion of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In this context, the Commission greenlighted today Sweden's final payment request, who successfully completed 100% of its investments and reforms linked to its recovery and resilience plan, shortly after Denmark.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: “NextGenerationEU helped protect our citizens and economies at a time of profound uncertainty. It accelerated the clean and digital transitions, cutting Europe's reliance on imported energy exactly when that reduction was needed most. The reforms we enabled and the resilience we have built together will continue to benefit Europe for generations to come.”

Member States have until 30 September 2026 to submit their final payment requests under the RRF, together with all supporting evidence, while the Commission will complete all payments by 31 December 2026.

NextGenerationEU supported economic activity at a critical time, helped keep unemployment at record-low levels, and accelerated strategic investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean technologies. It has also demonstrated an important lesson for Europe's future: public investment has a particularly strong impact when paired with structural reforms. Above all, NextGenerationEU has shown the strength of European unity. It proved that when Europe acts quickly, ambitiously and together, it can rise to exceptional challenges

As of today, €440 billion has been disbursed, with up to a further €133 billion to be paid by the end of 2026. The months ahead offer an opportunity to build on this momentum and deliver the full potential of NextGenerationEU.

A press release is available online.

Bronisław Kawęcki (pictured), a Polish anti-communist activist who devoted much of his life to preserving the memory of the workers’ uprising in Radom in 1976, died on 29 August 2026, aged 72.

For many, his name was inseparable from Radom and from one of the defining chapters in Poland’s long struggle against communist rule. But Kawęcki’s legacy extends beyond one Polish city. His life was a reminder of the role that ordinary citizens played in the political transformation that eventually brought democracy to Poland and helped reshape Europe.

Born in Sandomierz on April 29, 1954, Kawęcki moved to Radom as a young man. He initially worked as a carer at a state children’s home before joining the medical supply company Cezal. It was there that he became increasingly involved in the civic and political ferment that would define his life.

The turning point came with the events of June 1976.

Workers in Radom took to the streets following sharp government-announced increases in food prices. The demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the communist authorities. Hundreds of workers were dismissed, prosecuted or subjected to beatings by security forces. The protests in Radom and nearby Ursus would later be recognized as an important precursor to the emergence of the Solidarity movement.

Kawęcki understood early that the struggle was not only about what had happened, but about whether Poland would remember it.

He began collecting the testimonies of workers who had been beaten, dismissed or persecuted. What started as an effort to document the events of 1976 became a mission that would occupy him for decades.

When Solidarity emerged in 1980, Kawęcki joined the movement and helped establish its organization at Cezal. He subsequently became involved in the regional leadership of Solidarity and, in 1981, was selected as a delegate representing the Radom region at the union’s first national congress in Gdańsk.

He was also at the center of an effort to build a monument to the victims of the 1976 protests. A foundation stone was laid in 1981, but the monument itself was never completed.

Then came martial law.

On December 13, 1981, the communist authorities banned Solidarity and launched a nationwide crackdown on its activists. Kawęcki was arrested and interned. He was moved between detention facilities and a prison hospital before being released in July 1982. He lost his job almost immediately afterward.

Yet imprisonment and repression did not end his activism.

During the 1980s, Kawęcki participated in the distribution of underground publications, including the clandestine newspaper Wolny Robotnik, which he later helped edit. He remained under surveillance by the communist security services while continuing to work within the opposition movement.

The foundation stone of the unrealized Radom monument acquired a significance of its own. It became a place of remembrance, where laying flowers could itself be treated by the authorities as a political act.

For Kawęcki, memory was never simply historical.

It was political, civic and ultimately European.

When communism began to collapse in 1989, he helped establish the Citizens’ Committee of the Radom region and participated in the first free electoral campaigns. But unlike many activists who subsequently moved into formal political life, Kawęcki continued to concentrate on documenting and preserving the history of those who had challenged the communist system.

He worked as a consultant and assistant director on documentaries about the 1976 protests and the life and death of Father Roman Kotlarz, whose death was widely associated with his alleged beating by the security services. He also became one of the central figures in the documentary Kamień (The Stone), which explored the history of the unfinished monument and Kawęcki’s own role in preserving the memory of Radom’s workers.

His contribution was eventually formally recognized by the Polish state. In 2018, he received the Cross of Freedom and Solidarity for his opposition activities and contribution to Poland’s independence. He was also awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

But perhaps the most fitting description of his achievement was one that required no official decoration: he became a custodian of memory.

The importance of that role is particularly clear from a European perspective.

The democratic Europe that exists today was not created solely through treaties, institutions and political leaders. It was also built by workers, dissidents, journalists, religious figures and civil society activists who challenged authoritarian systems long before the political structures of a free Europe could take shape.

Poland’s experience was central to that transformation. The protests of 1976, the emergence of Solidarity in 1980, the repression of martial law and the democratic breakthrough of 1989 formed part of the chain of events that ultimately helped bring an end to communist rule across Central and Eastern Europe.

Kawęcki was a participant in that history, but also one of its chroniclers.

He spent decades ensuring that the experiences of those who had suffered would not disappear from public memory. His work reflected a simple conviction: that political freedom has little meaning if societies forget the sacrifices through which it was achieved.

Late in his life, when asked whether the years of internment, professional reprisals and unpaid work devoted to preserving the memory of Radom’s June 1976 uprising had been worth it, his answer was characteristically direct.

“Yes. It was worth it.”

Bronisław Kawęcki’s death marks the passing of one of the generation that experienced Poland’s struggle for freedom firsthand. His legacy, however, belongs to a much larger European story.

It is the story of how democracy is defended before it becomes inevitable, and how the preservation of memory can itself become an act of resistance.

Kawęcki spent his life making sure that Poland remembered.

Europe should remember him as well.

While the country queues for petrol, import licences are being given to the network behind Mongolia’s largest corporate fraud. Mongolia spent August rationing petrol, as the country faces an ‘unprecedented’ fuel crisis. In response, the Government has made importing fuel more profitable, and has sped up the process for issuing new licences.[1]

By opening the gates, the government has allowed existing networks to exploit the crisis, including the one connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren, the disgraced Mongolian businessman reportedly as being allegedly responsible for the $1.1 bn fraud scheme operated through Lex Oil, the fuel importer that was run by his aunt.[2]

Mongolia is heavily reliant on foreign oil, primarily from Russia. To import it, businesses need an ‘all-types fuel import licence’, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, which decides through paperwork checks.[3] Foreign businesses cannot import directly — they must sell through a Mongolian-licensed entity.[4]

Some 164 companies hold an import licence. Of these, 34 have been granted since 2025.[5] The number of companies licensed to import fuel has more than doubled in under five years.[6]

They have also become considerably more valuable. Duty and excise on fuel have been zeroed, importers offered preferential loans and subsidised storage for reserves, and the customs service has been told to expedite clearance of petrol consignments.[7]

A number of companies granted all-types fuel import licences in 2025 and 2026 are connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren and the Lex Oil network behind his $1.1bn scheme. That scheme was executed through the very exploitation of import licences.

None of these importers are required to disclose the amount of oil they import. Only 11 of the 164 licence holders imported fuel in the first days of August. When asked which 11, and how much each imported, the Customs General Administration refused to answer, citing customs law.

Lex Oil’s network is growing

Since 2025, two former Lex Oil CEOs have taken positions in dormant companies that then received fuel licences. In one case, the licence was obtained the same day the shareholding was registered.

Following five years of inactivity,[8] Standard Oil Gas appointed a new Director, Erdenebat Indra, in December 2025. Indra ran Lex Oil from January 2019 until February 2024 – nearly the whole period in which the losses accrued.[9] Six weeks later, Standard Oil was granted an import licence. Indra became a shareholder that same day.[10]

The pattern was replicated by Indra’s successor at Lex Oil, Banzragch Batdavaa.[11] Batdavaa bought into Best Dragon, a company with no prior fuel operations, in July 2025. It was granted import permits just two months later.[12] Batdavaa remains in business with both Mongolian and offshore entities linked to the scheme,[13] amongst them two Dubai entities – Peak Solutions (co-managed with Jononbayar’s mother)[14], and his own APEXPP commodities.[15]

Two other companies, granted licences in the spring of 2025, were already owned by individuals in the network. Tod Oil received its first licence in April 2025, although the company was incorporated six years earlier by entities closely tied to Jononbayar.[16] Its founder, Tod Petroleum, was co-founded by Lex Oil and former VS Oil CEO Bataa Anarchuluu.[17] Bataa continues to operate within the network, serving as the Executive Director of the helicopter business linked to both the scheme and the son of former Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene.[18]

Another, Apex Petroleum, was incorporated in October 2024 – the month the $1.1bn provision was made public.[19] Three of the five founding shareholders had previously founded businesses with Jononbayar himself.[20] These three include Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (son of a licensed importer linked to the Government)[21] and Jononbayar’s rumoured mistress, Yalaltbayar Khongorzul.[22]

Three further entities — ABR Eco Trans, Petro Spark and Standard Energy and Oil — have links to Jononbayar’s network. ABR was incorporated in October 2024 and licensed to import fuel in April 2025.[23] It has since taken on the founder of BID Energy, Bold Luvsandagva, as its shareholder and executive director.[24] In February 2026, ABR moved into the same unit BID Energy had occupied until that December.[25] BID Energy is Indra's other licensed importer. It was granted import licences in 2024, 11 weeks after Indra left Lex Oil.[26] Indra bought into the company and is now its ultimate beneficial owner.[27]

Another, Petro Spark, was licensed on the same day as Apex Petroleum.[28] Its owner, Yadamsüren Dorjchanga, holds a network of businesses with Yondon Uuganbayar.[29] Uuganbayar bought shares in Jononbayar’s family’s meat business, Erdenet Makh Market, two weeks after the Lex Oil scheme was disclosed in October 2024.[30]

The seventh company, Standard Energy and Oil, was licensed in 2025.[31] In May 2026, it was taken over by N. Monsor.[32] Monsor is a reported close contact of Jononbayar.[33] He was director of a Mongolian company, Sky Professional Logistics,[34] when it received over $7.5 million from an offshore entity called Class Trading Limited,[35] and distributed it the same day among nine recipients. These included Jocondy, a company owned by Jononbayar’s aunt, the founder of Lex Oil.[36] Jocondy was reportedly directed by Jononbayar at the time.[37] It is reported that Jononbayar had previously made transfers into Class Trading.[38]

These are not the network's first import licences. Nine companies linked to Jononbayar, the first being Lex Oil itself in 2019, were granted import licences before 2025,[39] meaning at least 16 of the 164 importers are connected to his network.

New Licences, Existing Networks

Even outside that seven, what distinguishes a successful candidate is often the individual owner, as opposed to the company profile. One grantee, TES Petroleum Trade,[40] is owned by the reported son of Baagaa Battömör,[41] a sitting MP who had previously run both Mongolia’s tax and customs administrations.[42] Two licences went to companies owned separately by partners in an existing fuel business.[43] Four more went to Chinese-controlled businesses, two of them on the same day. None was set up as a fuel business, and three were still unregistered for fuel activity when they were licensed.[44]

Of the 34 companies granted import licences by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources in 2025 and 2026, 14 had been incorporated less than two years before the award.[45] Eight more of the organisations granted licences changed hands shortly before they were licensed.[46]

The Government’s Response

On 17 August, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources warned that importers who failed to keep filling stations supplied could lose their licences. The Minister admitted that some importers were holding stock and not selling it.

Revoking a licence removes a registration but has no bearing on the individuals behind the businesses. With fewer regulatory checks, and more demand than ever, the doors are being left open to actors who previously exploited Mongolia’s fuel import regulations.

Mongolia scored 31 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 124th of 182 countries, its worst score on record. In September 2025 the US State Department reported that businesses in Mongolia face "substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at every level", with officials across ministries and agencies routinely contravening existing law and regulation. Unless the country creates laws transparently and implements them predictably, it warned, "investors may find Mongolia too risky and opt for more competitive countries."[47]

The victim of Jononbayar’s fraud scheme, Trafigura, used to be one of the most important importers of oil into Mongolia.[48] The fraud orchestrated by the playboy,[49] which personally enriched both himself and his family,[50] put that to an end. Now, the individuals involved are being allowed back in to exploit the crisis at the expense of ordinary Mongolians.

The crisis was a chance to show that direction had changed. Instead, the Government zeroed duty, offered importers preferential loans and subsidised storage, and issued 34 new licences — leaving at least 16 of the 164 with one network.  Now agents known to have exploited the same system previously, are being allowed in again.

Photo by Zbynek Burival on Unsplash

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[1] Government’s announcement that fuel import licence applications should be processed quickly and the licences granted, reported: https://ikon.mn/n/3pep and https://sonin.mn/newsDetail/18284

[2] Lex-Oil LLC granted fuel import licence in 2019: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979. Owned through his aunt, Dorjgochoo Erdenetul.

[3] In order to gain these, an applicant must produce its registration documents, prove membership of the relevant professional association, and file its contract with the fuel supplier in original: https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail?lawId=208190

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss

[5] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://license.mn/  (official electronic licence system)

[6] 80 companies Eighty companies held a licence to import fuel into Mongolia on 1 January 2022, recorded in the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry's register of petroleum products special licences, 22 March 2022: https://mmhi.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ГТБ-тусгай-зөвшөөрлийн-жагсаалт-2022.03.22.pdf. 164 currently hold licences, per license.mn, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources official register, as of September 2026: https://license.mn/.

[7] Tax and lending measures: https://mmhi.gov.mn/2026/08/06/. Expedited customs clearance: E. Oyun-Erdene, GoGo.mn, 17 August 2026, https://cmsm.mongolcontent.mn/r/6k9g8

[8] Standard Oil Gas LLC’s fuel import licence expired in 2020, and it recorded no other activity in the intervening period: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954  

[9] CEO of Lex Oil 2019-224: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979

[10] 6 February 2026: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954

[11] Batdavaa sat as Executive Director of Lex Oil from Feb-April 2014: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979

[12] Best Dragon, incorporated 2020, dormant until 2025 when ownership was transferred to Batdavaa. Fuel import licence granted 26 September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6574246

[13] B.Batdavaa is currently a shareholder of Diamond Oil and Energy alongside Oyunbileg Sainbileg https://opendatalab.mn/search/6552544. Sainbeleg is known to a key actor alongside Jononbayer, and remains director of one of the family’s  companies, Zuunnaim Oil: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378  

[14] Cedar Rose UAE corporate data accessed via Sayari, 21 August 2026: PEAK SOLUTION DMCC, commercial register DMCC194234, licence DMCC-855346, incorporated 5 August 2022;

[15] Offshore link reported in https://www.eureporter.co/world/mongolia/2026/08/13/the-helicopter-that-helped-topple-mongolias-prime-minister-linked-to-lex-oil-scheme/, Batdaava’s Linkedin states him as CEO of APEXPP Commodities: www.linkedin.com/in/batdavaa-banzragch-46120115a

[16] Tod Oil, incorporated 2019 by Tod Petroleum, granted licence 23 April 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6415636

[17] Tod Petroleum, founded Lex Oil and Bataa Anarchuluu https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. Bataa served as VS Oil CEO https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/6225578.

[18] Listed as UBO of Alpha Aurora Aviation: https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/8376344

[19] Apex Petroleum was incorporated 17 October 2024 (https://opendatalab.mn/search/7078633). Trafigura’s statement on losses 30 October 2024: https://www.trafigura.com/news-and-insights/press-releases/2024/statement-re-trafiguras-petroleum-products-business-in-mongolia/

[20] Three founders:  Bayardalai Erdenezaya (founded Kem Tek with Jononbayar in 2016, and Commodity Trans with his mother in 2019); Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (registered at the same two businesses, alongside Diamond Oil and Energy), Yalaltbayar Khongorzul (co-founded Khongorfinance with Jononbayar in 2015),

[21] Reported to be the brother in-law and former campaign manager for the Minister of Economic Development: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/singile/40012

[22] Archived article: https://web.archive.org/web/20241113103634/https://www.reelnews.mn/a/1225 and X: https://x.com/miigaasbntv/status/1852208500715459004

[23] ABR Eco Trans LLC, incorporated 15 October 2024; wholesale permit 0016 from 20 March 2025 and all-types fuel import licence 0015 from 25 April 2025; https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609

[24] Luvsandagva registered as ABR shareholder and joint beneficial owner on 24 November 2025 and as executive director on 29 January 2026; he founded BID Energy on 13 December 2023 with Baterdene Lkhagvadulam and was its first executive director: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485

[25] BID Energy moved from Bayanzürkh, 3rd khoroo, 12th microdistrict, Tsendgüni 30b, unit 53 on 1 December 2025; ABR moved into that unit on 2 February 2026, from Tokio 24a, unit 134 in the same microdistrict: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609

[26] BID Energy LLC, import licence 0015 granted 24 April 2024; https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485. Indra was executive director of Lex Oil from January 2019 to February 2024: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979.

[27] Indra registered as BID Energy shareholder and executive director on 16 August 2024 and as sole ultimate beneficial owner on 1 December 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485

[28] Petro Spark LLC, incorporated 8 May 2024, sole shareholder and beneficial owner Yadamsüren Dorjchanga; import licence 19 May 2025, the same date as Apex Petroleum: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7025169

[29] Joint holdings with Yondon Uuganbayar: Mongolian Truck Union Group LLC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6840175; Novel Development Union LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6894402; and the Gobi Genetics, https://opendatalab.mn/search/3646203  

[30] Uuganbayar owns Mon Beef Cattle: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8324328 . Mon Beef Cattle acquired Erdenet Makh Market LLC, from Dorjgochoo Erdenetuyaa 24 October 2024, days before the scheme was disclosed.

[31] Standard Energy and Oil, received wholesale permit in June, the import licence that September:  https://opendatalab.mn/search/6754244

[32] Monsor became the director of Standard Energy and Oil on 5 May 2026. It was acquired the same day by an investment fund, then owned by Dorj Enkhtuya (renamed KK Real Estate private fund two days later): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6607829. Mansor was the previous manager of that fund, and founded it himself through another vehicle he still owns and manages, Ulaanbaatar Asset Management: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5493498 . He became the CEO of Standard Energy and Oil on the day it was taken over by KK Real Estate.

[33] Reported in https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193/ and in https://www.polit.mn/a/69636

[34] Monsor is reported to have run Sky Professional Logistics: https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193. Court records state the executive director of Sky Professional Logistics concluded a wagon-transport agreement with the head of Ulaanbaatar Railway on 28 July 2017, naming him as Н.Монсов: https://shuukh.mn/single_case/19024

[35] Reporting states that US$7,545,900 was transferred from Class Trading Limited to Sky Professional Logistics on 8 August 2017 https://gogo.mn/r/5292y. Class Trading Limited was incorporated in the Turks and Caicos Islands and registered a Hong Kong place of business on 13 May 2015: Hong Kong Companies Registry, Company Particulars, BRN 64752427.

[36] Jocondy was founded by Dorjgochoo Erdenetuul, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5247632. She is Jononbayar's maternal aunt and the owner of Lex Oil LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979 and https://zuv.mn/n/16a3.

[37] Reporting records US$612,400 paid to Jocondy and describes Jononbayar as its director at the time: https://gogo.mn/r/5292y and https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970

[38] Reported that Jononbayar sent $500,000 to Class Trading in 2014: https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970

[39] 2019: Lex Oil, 2019 https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979,Tod Petroleum, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. 2020: ICIC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5288193 VS Oil, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6225578, Zuunnaim Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378. 2022: Argal Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/6309011. 2023: Alpha Aviation Fuel https://opendatalab.mn/search/8403473. 2024:  BID Energy https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 · Interasia Energy Mongolia, 2024 https://opendatalab.mn/search/6902987. Register of all 164 holders: https://opendatalab.mn/licences/15

[40] Tes Petroleum Trade, licenced 21 February 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6373135

[41] Paternity reported in: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/single/40012

[42] Battömör has sat in the State great Khural since 2016, he was deputy head, then head of the State Customs General Administration from 2008-11 and Head of the Tax General Administration from 2011-13: https://www.24tsag.mn/a/227052  

[43] Greenjob, owned by Batsukh Baigalmaa, granted licence in October 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5645867; and Gobi Petroleum GPT, owned by Onurbat Ragchaa, granted a licence September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7121913. Together they are exclusive owners and directors of Green Oil Trade since incorporation in 2020: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6528716 

[44] Tana Khiimori Oil - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025

: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7080033; Talnutgiin Ayalal - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5887488; 

Achit Güür MS - received import licence 14 Jan 2026, Remains unregistered for any kind of fuel-related activity (registration codes are for freight, agriculture, tourism and motor vehicle sales): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6891802; Söüd Mont Forest - received import licence 11 December 2025, Registered for fuel wholesaling 6 December 2025,  (previous registration codes are for motor vehicles, freight, automotive sales and machinery),  https://opendatalab.mn/search/7058649.

[45] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://licence.mn/  (official electronic licence system)

[46] Data as of https://licence.mn/ checked against https://opendatalab.mn/search/[registration number]. “Changed hands” to mean change of shareholder, director or beneficial owner within twelve months on either side of grant.

[47] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/638719_2025-Mongolia-Investment-Climate-Statement.pdf

[48] Trafigura supplied around a third of the region’s oil products, particularly diesel: https://eulerpool.com/news/markets/trafigura-in-crisis-mongolian-oil-credit-causes-million-loss; deals undertaken through the scheme said to account for around 80% of Mongolia's imported oil products: https://eguur.mn/556936/

[49] Jononbayar known for “parties he threw for friends and contacts” per Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss; reported to have thrown some of the “most expensive parties in Mongolia” https://eguur.mn/556936/

[50] https://zuv.mn/n/16a3; https://itoim.mn/a/2024/07/22/news-break/ugg

They asked for a Circular Economy Act that goes beyond waste management to focus on using resources more efficiently, among other things. European Commissioner Jessica Roswall met on Monday (31 Aug) with 16 young people who helped shape the European Commission's Youth Check on the upcoming Circular Economy Act (CEA).

The meeting with the Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy was part of the participatory process launched earlier this year to ensure that young people's views help guide the Commission's flagship initiative for Europe's circular economy. 

It followed her first exchange with young participants at the annual conference of the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (ECESP) in April. Since then, a team of youth representatives has worked to develop a Youth Position Paper setting out their recommendations. 

At the meeting, the group presented their main messages and discussed with Commissioner Roswall the opportunities and challenges of Europe's circular transition. They called for a Circular Economy Act that goes beyond waste management to focus on using resources more efficiently, making products easier to repair and reuse, ensuring safe, high-quality secondary materials, keeping the transition affordable and fair, investing in circular skills, and maintaining meaningful youth involvement throughout implementation.

The discussion also allowed the Commissioner to respond to the youth recommendations, reflect on the contribution of the Youth Check to the policy-making process and reaffirm the Commission's commitment to effective youth involvement. 

“Young people are not only stakeholders in Europe’s circular transition; they are essential partners in shaping it. We need young people to voice their ideas and be part of the change that will make Europe’s circular economy a reality. I am happy to receive their ambitious recommendations today, which will help inform our work as we prepare the Circular Economy Act.”

Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy Commissioner Jessika Roswall

"In the last few months we have seen what effective and tangible youth input can look like in policy-making. We appreciate the opportunity to openly share our recommendations with Commissioner Roswall and DG Environment to shape the Circular Economy Act. This is a significant step forward for meaningful youth participation in environmental policy. The Act will set the framework for a future that we, as young people, will feel the effect of, and we are ready to continue contributing to it with our ideas."

Representatives of Generation Climate Europe and Academics for a Circular Economy

Background

The CEA, due to be adopted before the end of 2026, aims to accelerate the transition to a more circular economy, increasing the EU’s economic security, resilience, competitiveness and decarbonisation.

It is intended to improve the business case for circularity by facilitating the cross-border movement of recycled products, materials, and waste across Europe. It will also increase the supply of high-quality recycled materials and stimulate demand for these materials in the EU. 

The Youth Position Paper on the CEA was coordinated by the youth organisations Academics for Circular Economy (ACE) and Generation Climate Europe (GCE).  

The CEA Youth Check combined a targeted online consultation of young people aged 15 to 29, a dedicated youth session during the ECESP Annual Conference, and additional exchanges with youth stakeholders. It will also inform the Impact Assessment prepared for the Circular Economy Act in line with the Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines.  

More information 

Youth Perspectives on the EU Circular Economy Act: A Youth Assessment of Ambitious, Gaps and Implementation Conditions | European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform

Summary of the online Youth Consultation | European Commission

Summary of the ECESP Conference | European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform

Youth Check | European Youth Portal

Circular Economy Act | European Commission

On 10–11 June 2026, the European Commission hosted a thematic workshop of the EU Network against Corruption in Brussels to support the preparation of the first EU Anti-Corruption Strategy, as announced in the Commission Work Programme 2026.

The workshop brought together representatives of member states, EU institutions and bodies, civil society organisations, and academia to discuss how to develop a more coherent and comprehensive EU approach to combating corruption.

The future Strategy builds on the 2023 Joint Communication on the fight against corruption and aims to bring together prevention, enforcement, institutional integrity, and international cooperation within a single strategic framework.

Day 1, dedicated to Member States and EU bodies, was opened by Marie-Hélène Boulanger, Acting Director for Rule of Law, Fundamental Rights and Democracy. Discussions focused on the key elements of an overarching EU anti-corruption approach, including the implementation of Directive (EU) 2026/1021. Participants highlighted the importance of preventive measures, particularly risk assessment, as a cornerstone of effective anti-corruption policies. The workshop also examined the enforcement dimension of the EU anti-corruption framework, with discussions covering the effective criminalisation, detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption offences, as well as the role of cross-border cooperation and information exchange.

Day 2, which expanded participation to include civil society organisations and academia, was opened by Irena Moozová, Deputy Director-General of DG Justice. Discussions centred on the development of a whole-of-society approach to combating corruption, recognising the important role of education, research, civil society, the media and other stakeholders in fostering a culture of integrity across society. It also looked at better use of data to detect corruption risks and analyse gaps. 

The workshop formed part of the Commission’s broader consultation process for the preparation of the Strategy. This process also includes a Call for Evidence, an Open Public Consultation, and targeted stakeholder consultations.