The 2026 Asian Games in Japan drew to a close on October 4 following two weeks of competition between 45 countries and territories across 43 sports. Despite the official slogan “Imagine One Asia,” fragmented regional politics came to the fore as the event unfolded. Just days before the games officially began, tensions between Japan and […]
The post How geopolitical tensions tainted the 2026 Asian Games appeared first on Asia Times.
Recently, during the 5th Halla Bolle Conclave held at the Radisson Collection in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, the same separatist discourse once again found space.
The conclave brought together mainstream political leaders and a former separatist figure, with discussions focusing on issues such as restoring statehood, Article 370, autonomy, political rights, governance, youth aspirations, reconciliation, and India-Pakistan relations.
Many of the questions asked and answers given reflected narratives that have long been nurtured in the Valley and closely resemble Pakistan’s longstanding propaganda on Kashmir.
The participation of mainstream political leaders alongside former separatist figures also showed how some of these old narratives still find space in Kashmir’s contemporary political discourse.
Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, the National Conference Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Srinagar Lok Sabha constituency, who behaves like some philosopher-king, is systematically promoting Pakistan’s propaganda and narratives.
He tries his best to hurt India whenever he gets the chance.
For instance, when asked to state his position on the situation in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), he said that he would not talk about it until people in the Valley were ‘empowered’, deflecting by declaring, ‘Return our dignity & we will talk about Muzaffarabad’. He then went on to claim that Kashmiris face the status of ‘second-class citizens’ in the Valley, asserting that ‘our reality is that we are disenfranchised as second-class citizens.’
This is exactly the problem. He avoids questions concerning PoJK but remains extremely vocal when criticizing India.
He is actually misusing his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression and using Indian democracy as a shield while promoting narratives that are completely in line with Pakistan’s interests. He actually doesn’t want to hurt his masters sitting in Rawalpindi.
He also claims that there is no freedom of speech, frequently protesting that, “as a Kashmiri Muslim voice, I was denied the opportunity to speak.” Yet his actions contradict this narrative. He himself makes the most noise, using every available platform to speak publicly, give interviews, address gatherings, speak in Parliament, and criticize India regularly.
If he is supposedly not allowed to speak, then how is he able to constantly and systematically spread venom and engage in anti-India propaganda repeatedly?
There is a clear difference between legitimate democratic criticism of a government and repeatedly using the democratic space available in India to promote narratives that portray India itself as the source of Kashmir’s problems while giving Pakistan a free pass for its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians in J&K and the rest of the country.
Then, an audience member asked National Conference president Farooq Abdullah why Kashmir had aligned with ‘Hindu-majority India’ in 1947. The very framing of the phrase ‘Hindu-majority India’ exposes the toxic ideology behind the question.
However, those who push such narratives desperately need to look at what actually happened to the regions that joined Pakistan in 1947, as well as those parts of the subcontinent that were forcibly taken by Pakistan, and the misery their people endure today.
Look at Balochistan. Look at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Look at the political and institutional failures that ultimately led to the secession of Bangladesh, demonstrating that a shared religious identity alone could not keep Pakistan united. Most importantly, look at the disaster that is Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) today.
For years, the people of PoJK have taken to the streets to protest Islamabad over basic political, economic, and social rights. The recent protests have faced deadly crackdowns, reportedly leaving more than 150 people killed, while the brutal authorities have even gone so far as to restrict the supply of essential goods, including food, flour, medicines, and fuel, during periods of unrest.
Yet Pakistan’s propaganda machinery has repeatedly played its cards well in Kashmir. Its influence remains deeply entrenched in the Valley, allowing narratives about Pakistan and India to persist regardless of what happens inside Pakistan.
Pakistan can have Imran Khan in jail, political repression, a deeply constrained democratic system, and an army that continues to exercise enormous influence over the country’s politics, elections, government formation, policymaking, and even the broader political system, yet people in Kashmir are repeatedly told that Pakistan’s problems are somehow the result of an Indian conspiracy.
Even when Pakistan itself is burning, its failures are deflected towards India rather than examined as the consequences of its own political and institutional failures.
This should force Indian authorities to rethink their approach and ask why such narratives continue to resonate in the Valley. Simply dismissing them as propaganda will not be enough. There needs to be a serious effort to understand the channels through which they spread, the political actors who amplify them, and the reasons they continue to influence public discourse.
Certain mainstream political parties and leaders in Jammu and Kashmir have also played a major role in keeping this discourse alive. They have repeatedly used the blood and suffering of Kashmiris for their own political objectives. Rather than challenging narratives promoted by Pakistan, they have often sustained and magnified them.
Take PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti, for example. She has advocated opening the Line of Control in Kashmir so that trade can take place with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and other regions, invoking the old Silk Route and China’s connectivity. One has to ask: what world is she living in?
Does she not understand the region’s geopolitics? Does she not understand the cross-border terrorism and terrorist infrastructure operating from Pakistan-occupied territory? Does she not understand the India-Pakistan dispute over PoJK? Does she not understand China’s illegal territorial claims against India in Jammu and Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, the recent Galwan clashes, and China’s broader geostrategic interests in the region?
It is not simply a matter of opening India’s borders and assuming that will solve everything. Other players have their own interests and nefarious designs, and they too have agency. Besides, extra-regional powers have their own interests. The region is not operating in a geopolitical vacuum.
The problem with Kashmir’s political leadership is that they rarely talk about the issues that actually matter to the people, for which they were elected, and instead think that by playing separatist politics, they can secure their votes and political future.
They rarely talk about how to improve the living standards of common people, eliminate corruption, generate employment, improve infrastructure, attract investment, or make governance more accountable and responsive.
Instead, they have often tried to frame the relationship between the people of Kashmir and the central government in colonial terms, as a master-slave relationship. They repeatedly use words such as “Delhi,” while saying that Kashmiris have to “fight Delhi.” They rarely speak about constructive engagement with the central government.
They now say that Kashmiris have been “disempowered” after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. But what happened before 2019? Were Kashmiris not being described as “alienated” and “disempowered” before 2019 as well? Were these same political leaders not making exactly the same arguments then?
If they were making the same arguments before 2019, then what exactly did they do for the people of Kashmir when they had the political power they now claim to have lost?
This is something that needs to be asked.
Moreover, the words “alienation” and “disempowerment” are not being used accidentally. They carry a specific political meaning and fit into a particular narrative. The problem is that these leaders have never really looked at the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and the central government in the same way that political leaders in other parts of India look at their relationship with the Center.
The current noise over statehood also needs to be understood in this context. They present the demand for statehood as though it is entirely about the interests of the common people. But is it?
Of course, statehood is important, and people can legitimately demand its restoration. But it also involves political interests. These political parties want more political power and greater control over the administration.
After losing statehood, they feel they lost a significant part of their political authority. They also want statehood because it would give them greater political control and a shield from the scrutiny and accountability they currently face from different agencies and institutions. In this sense, the demand for statehood is also about restoring their own political power and reducing accountability.
But the common people have other priorities. They want good governance. They want corruption to be eliminated. They want development, employment, better infrastructure, better public services, and an improved standard of living.
The question is: when there was statehood before 2019, what did they do to improve the lives of common people?
If the mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir had pursued positive, constructive, forward-looking, and pragmatic politics instead of sustaining and magnifying narratives that have served Pakistan’s interests, the Valley could have been very different.
Political parties have every right to criticize the government. They have every right to demand statehood, greater powers, development, and political representation. But when criticism of India becomes constant while questions concerning Pakistan are systematically avoided, and when every issue is presented through the prism of alienation and disempowerment, it becomes necessary to ask whose interests this politics is ultimately serving.
The mainstream political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir needs to understand that the people of Kashmir cannot be kept permanently trapped in the politics of grievance, alienation, and victimhood. The people deserve politics that focuses on their future, not politics that continuously recycles past narratives.
The post Kashmir’s ‘Halla Bolle’ Conclave: Old Script, New Venue. Venom Against India But Mum on Pakistan: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
After years of lobbying by Riyadh, the United States recently greenlit a potential sale of F-35 fighters to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Turkey is looking to rejoin the F-35 program and is aggressively pursuing the Trump administration to approve the sale of stealth jets.
Another interesting case is India, which is hosting Exercise Tarang Shakti, where six F-35 jets are participating. Indian experts call it a unique opportunity for the IAF to evaluate US stealth jets and see how Indian ground and airborne radars detect them.
Notably, this is the first time F-35s are participating in drills with Indian jets on Indian soil.
Many see this as an historic opportunity to train alongside arguably the world’s best jets and give real-time exposure to the IAF’s Rafale, Su-30MKI and Tejas aircraft. Even IAF critics who don’t favor a potential F-35 sale to India see this as a historic opportunity.
Earlier, a EurAsian Times report said the US State Department announced the proposed sale of F-35 Lightning II and related equipment to Saudi Arabia on September 17, 2026. The proposed sale is expected to cover 48 F-35 aircraft and 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, along with communications gear, training, spare parts, and other support as requested by Riyadh.
The approval followed years of lobbying by the Saudi kingdom to procure the highly sought-after stealth fighters. Earlier, the Obama administration explicitly ruled it out in late 2015, stating that Israel would remain the sole F-35 recipient in the region to preserve its qualitative military edge (QME).
Later, the Biden administration explored linking a potential F-35 deal to Saudi-Israeli normalization, but talks stalled after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.
The US State Department’s proposed sale still requires congressional approval, and analysts believe Saudi’s purchase of the F-35 could hit a roadblock amid concerns about Riyadh’s ties with China and Israel’s opposition to the deal.
Despite being a founding member of the F-35 program and making a significant financial investment, the US expelled Turkey from the consortium and sanctioned it under CAATSA for purchasing the S-400 despite repeated warnings.
Ankara has been actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400 and sell it off to a potential third-party buyer.
Earlier, the US President similarly responded to questions about lifting CAATSA sanctions on Turkey by saying, “I’ll always speak to President Erdogan. He is a friend of mine, as you know. And I’ll always make him happy.”
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For now, Turkey’s path to obtaining the F-35s is still full of hurdles that both Washington and Ankara may find hard to remove, including Israel’s stiff opposition, as the EurAsian Times has explained before.
Like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, several countries have made unsuccessful attempts to obtain the F-35, widely regarded as the leading fifth-generation multirole fighter thanks to its advanced low-observable stealth and groundbreaking sensor fusion.
Functioning as a highly networked airborne command node—often described as the “quarterback of the skies”—it shares data seamlessly across friendly platforms. In fact, analysts believe that it is the most capable fifth-generation fighter in service anywhere in the world.
Despite this, India — a country that faces the dual threat of China and Pakistan along its borders — has been somewhat indifferent to what many consider the world’s best jets.
Donald Trump unofficially pitched the F-35 to India during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February 2025. “Starting this year, we will be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We are also paving the way to provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters ultimately,” he said at the time.
The F-35s were also displayed at Aero India 2025 the same month, where they met the Russian Su-57 on the tarmac for the first time.
During his April 2025 visit to India, US Vice President J.D. Vance appeared to reiterate the offer.
“We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is the best in class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before,” he said, making a more direct appeal.
Although the US never made an official offer, the verbal F-35 pitch and the prospect of acquiring a cutting-edge stealth fighter looked great on paper, particularly since China operates two fifth-generation aircraft (the J-20 and J-35A) and is allegedly exporting the J-35A to Pakistan.
However, India’s defense community and Indian Air Force (IAF) veterans seemed unimpressed by the F-35 offer despite acknowledging the aircraft’s potent capabilities, a stance recently reiterated as six F-35s made their debut in India-hosted “Exercise Tarang Shakti 2026” in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
First, Indian analysts and experts believe that buying an expensive stealth fighter off the shelf from the United States would be a liability, since it would do nothing for the Indian defense manufacturing sector and come with an enormous price tag.
Each F-35 is expected to cost $80 to $120 million, with even higher life cycle costs. Therefore, a fleet of F-35s would impose a heavy financial burden that the Indian Air Force would rather allocate to indigenous programs and more flexible and diverse acquisitions.
Second, analysts and veterans have argued that the US would never part with its technology, eliminating domestic manufacturing. They reckon the F-35 procurement would run counter to the “Make in India” and “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” policies.
Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retd), the former Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), earlier stressed that even with approval of limited technology transfer and local manufacturing, significant challenges would remain. At the time, he highlighted production risks arising from the F-35’s complex global supply chain, noting that Lockheed Martin sources components from multiple countries. He cautioned that any disruption or delay in delivering these parts could halt the entire manufacturing process.
Air Marshal Khosla further noted that India’s continued reliance on foreign suppliers would constrain genuine localization, and the IAF would struggle to manage such disruptions.
Notably, this concern takes on greater significance as delivery of Tejas Mk-1A fighter jets to the Indian Air Force has been delayed due to delays in delivery of F404-IN20 turbofan engines, affecting the service’s preparedness.
Third, there is concern that diverting resources to acquiring the F-35 would inevitably affect India’s own fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), which aims to deliver a fifth-generation platform with advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and networked combat features while fostering a domestic aerospace industrial base.
Experts have urged the IAF to focus on its indigenous programs rather than getting trapped in another round of imports.
Fourth, analysts have also cited logistical challenges and operational incompatibility with India’s diverse air force fleet comprising a mix of Russian Su-30MKIs, French Rafales and Mirage 2000, and Tejas. They believe that adding another fighter type would further complicate maintenance, training, and logistics for an already varied inventory.
Fifth, India operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, which previously caused friction between the US and Turkey.
“An F-35A deal would likely come with strings attached—most notably, a U.S. demand that India abandon its Russian S-400 air defense systems in favor of the American THAAD,” IAF veteran and commentator Squadron Leader Vijainder K. Thakur earlier stated.
The S-400 is deeply embedded in India’s layered air defense network, and New Delhi has been considering an additional order, meaning it would inevitably become a point of contention in any potential deal.
Sixth, the US has been flagged as an unreliable partner.
“Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable US basket will also be an issue. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to putting sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support,” IAF veteran and aviation analyst, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), earlier wrote in a detailed EurAsian Times article.
Adding the repeated threat of sanctions by the US and a rapidly changing geopolitical scenario further complicates the purchase.
Seventh, the F-35 is embedded in the US-controlled networks, including the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), which sends information back to American servers. Indian experts view this as a breach of operational independence.
Furthermore, they have cautioned that the US imposes stringent operational restrictions on its system and could try to limit the F-35’s use in combat, particularly against Pakistan.
Critics worldwide have also stressed that an unpredictable US administration could restrict free F-35 operations by limiting hardware and software supplies, commonly referred to as a kill switch. In fact, this is the reason why countries like Canada and Portugal decided to look for an alternative to the American stealth fighter.
Indian strategic discussions generally prioritize accelerating Tejas production, advancing the AMCA, and exploring local manufacturing options for platforms such as the Rafale. If a foreign fifth-generation fighter is ultimately considered, many experts have indicated a preference for the Russian Su-57 because of the technology transfer, local production, and twin-seat variant.
The post Saudi & Turkey Chase F-35 Jets, Heavy Skepticism in India. Why IAF Veterans are Not Too Keen on F-35s? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
During his interaction with the press ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, 2026, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) stated that, in the near future, the Indian Air Force would have a “healthy mix” of LCA Tejas Mk 1A, LCA Mk 2, the French Rafale and the indigenous fifth-generation AMCA.
On the face of it, there is little to quarrel with what the CAS stated.
These aircraft will undoubtedly constitute important elements of the IAF’s future fighter fleet. However, the projection has some infirmities that are difficult to overlook.
The first question is what the CAS meant by the “near future”.
If the statement is intended to describe the fighter fleet that the IAF will field over the next decade or so, the mix is understandable. But if it projects the force structure into the 2040s—and beyond—it raises a more fundamental question.
How far into the future was the CAS extrapolating current procurement plans to arrive at the projected “healthy mix”?
Based on the past record of Indian fighter aircraft development projects, I would think at least 15 years from now, well into the 2040s.
By then, Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2, Rafale and AMCA could indeed form the backbone of the IAF’s manned combat-aircraft fleet. But describing that combination alone as a “healthy mix” ignores a major transformation already underway in air warfare.
The manned fighter is no longer the whole equation
There is little doubt that the IAF will continue to depend predominantly on the 4th-generation fighters named by the CAS, quite possibly for the next 20 to 30 years. Fighter aircraft have long service lives, and India’s continuing dependence on legacy and contemporary 4th-generation platforms is therefore likely to persist well into the 2040s and perhaps beyond.
But the fighter force of the 2040s cannot be assessed merely by counting manned fighters across different generations.
The changing character of air warfare will demand a mix of manned and unmanned platforms, with different levels of survivability, autonomy and weapons heft.
This matters because the most dangerous missions in a future conflict will likely involve penetrating increasingly dense and sophisticated air-defense networks. A manned 4th-generation fighter, however capable, is not necessarily the most appropriate platform for every such mission.
The IAF’s future force structure will therefore need an increasing proportion of unmanned combat aircraft.
At one end of the spectrum would be relatively inexpensive unmanned systems able to perform reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy and weapons-truck functions. At the other end would be sophisticated unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside manned fighters as loyal wingmen.
The latter could substantially increase the effectiveness of a manned fighter formation. An unmanned aircraft could carry additional weapons, extend the formation’s sensor coverage, perform electronic attack or act as a decoy, while exposing no pilot to the risk of a mission in heavily defended airspace.
There is also an important economic dimension. An unmanned platform does not necessarily have to replicate the capabilities, complexity, or cost of a manned fighter. A future air force could therefore field far more expendable or attritable unmanned combat aircraft than it could afford to field manned fighters.
This would fundamentally alter the arithmetic of air combat.
The “healthy mix” the CAS referred to was therefore, in my view, probably intended primarily for mainstream media consumption.
That is not necessarily a criticism of the CAS.
Mainstream reporting tends to operate at shallow depths and gravitates towards readily understood narratives. In India’s case, the Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) narrative is particularly attractive.
Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA fit neatly into that narrative, while Rafale provides the foreign component of the mix.
But the full spectrum of capabilities that the IAF will require in the 2040s is considerably more complicated.
It would include manned 4th-generation fighters, 4.5-generation fighters, 5th-generation VLO aircraft and an expanding family of unmanned combat aircraft ranging from relatively inexpensive attritable systems to sophisticated loyal wingmen.
I suspect that the IAF leadership understands this reality.
India’s indigenous technological capability in unmanned combat aircraft is still far short of what it would take to develop and field the full range of systems a future air force will need.
The problem is not simply the airframe. Autonomous operation, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, secure communications, distributed sensing, electronic warfare and the ability to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment all present formidable challenges.
MoD bureaucrats are unlikely to be unaware of these limitations either.
Under the circumstances, articulating the full range of what a truly “healthy mix” would entail would perhaps serve little purpose in a public interaction with the media.
But that does not make the issue any less important.
The real challenge is not recognizing that India needs a mix of manned and unmanned combat aircraft. It is developing the technologies and industrial ecosystem needed to field them in meaningful numbers.
The IAF of the 2040s will almost certainly still contain large numbers of 4th-generation fighters. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. The question is what surrounds them.
If the future force consists predominantly of today’s manned fighter concepts, supplemented by a relatively small number of AMCA aircraft, it may represent a healthy mix of India’s current procurement programs.
It may not, however, be a healthy mix for the wars India could have to fight in the 2040s and beyond.
The distinction is important. A force structure should not be called “healthy” merely because it contains a balanced selection of aircraft India can build or procure today.
It should be judged against the operational environment in which that force will actually have to fight.
The post Rafale, Tejas & AMCA: IAF’s “Healthy Mix” of Fighter Jets Leaves Out The Aircraft That May Matter The Most appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
OPED by Mahendra Ved
Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi has conveyed a few home truths to his host country, Bangladesh.
They seem to have been forgotten while demanding that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina be returned: on August 5, 2024, she was “not brought by the Indian Air Force or the Indian Army.”
India had “hardly any choice” and was “unprepared” when she arrived.
Now a diplomat, the politician avoided stating the obvious: she was brought from Dhaka to India on a Bangladesh Air Force aircraft.
Another reminder: “At that point in time, Hasina was still the prime minister of Bangladesh.”
He said that legal procedures were ‘underway’ for her extradition, and that they take time.
Of course, he didn’t mention Hasina’s repeated announcement in December that she would return of her own discretion.
How times have changed! Once considered the ‘friendliest’ in South Asia, India’s relations with Bangladesh have become complex, even delicate.
Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India and her proposed return have added another layer of complexity to an already extraordinarily complicated relationship.
Addressing the media and her Awami League cadres through audio calls, she has repeated that she will return home, despite knowing that arrest and prosecution await her.
Seeking international support from lawmakers and human rights organizations, she has addressed seminars in London and Geneva via audio.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government expressed ‘outrage’ at her audio address in Delhi and has banned domestic media from reporting it. It did not respond to India’s twin invitations, one bilateral and the other for the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
A brief update is essential.
Following Hasina’s ouster, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sustained itself on anti-Hasina and, since she was in India, anti-India sentiment.
Since this year’s February elections, a party with a history of problematic relations with India has been in power. The elections also brought to power an opposition force of Jamaat-e-Islami and students who worked to oust Hasina and see India as an adversary.
As India tries to rebuild bilateral ties under totally changed circumstances, hosting Hasina has complicated them. Rahman’s possible visit in November has been discussed at different levels, but exploring dates and announcing final dates are different.
To anyone unversed in India-Bangladesh ties, the two issues—Hasina’s return and Tarique’s visit—may appear separate. In reality, they are closely intertwined.
The government in Dhaka wants Hasina back, convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to death. Since it involves a bilateral extradition treaty, India cannot simply hand her over.
As Rahman faces pressure, especially from the opposition, he must weigh in on Hasina’s presence while visiting India. His government’s grievance, also used as leverage, affects ties with Delhi.
Delhi, meanwhile, has a larger strategic interest: building a workable relationship with the government in Dhaka, whoever leads it. Bangladesh is too important to India to let the relationship remain permanently hostage to a former prime minister’s fate.
That is why the proposed Tarique visit matters. But it is also why it is difficult. There is a certain diplomatic stalemate.
Dhaka cannot easily separate Hasina’s presence in India from its own domestic politics. It wants Delhi to accept the new political reality. Yet the Hasina question remains the most emotionally and politically charged issue between them.
Both neighbors want a relationship based on mutual interests and reciprocity. But neither wants to be seen conceding on Hasina to facilitate Rahman’s visit. Any ‘understanding’ with India on this would expose Rahman at home to the charge of having surrendered.
This explains why Rahman’s visit in November is possible, but not certain.
Because after November comes December.
Assuming Hasina returns, another question becomes unavoidable: what happens to her safety?
If the Rahman government arrests and prosecutes her, it is also duty-bound to protect her.
It may regard her as responsible for grave political and human-rights abuses. It may even seek to establish her responsibility through courts. But it cannot allow her fate to be decided by an assassin, a mob or an extremist organization.
With several past attempts on her life, Hasina herself has acknowledged that she could face death if she returns. The Bangladesh government has responded by saying that she would receive full security and legal protection.
The world witnessed the assassination of another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, in 2007. It reminds us that government protection does not make an extremist threat disappear. A politically prominent person can remain a target even when the state has formally undertaken to protect her.
One would not like to push the Benazir angle too far. Nothing so far suggests a conspiracy or that Hasina is destined to meet the same fate. But religious extremism has deep roots in Bangladesh. It also witnessed killings of people in jail in 1975. Hence, the threat to Hasina’s life cannot be dismissed.
That creates a paradox for Rahman’s government. It is not just a political gesture to an adversary; Hasina’s protection is a state obligation.
Indeed, this matters because Hasina is not merely another former prime minister. She is the daughter of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and has been at the center of Bangladesh’s political life for decades. To her supporters, she represents a political tradition that is now under assault. To her opponents, she represents a period of authoritarian rule for which she must answer.
If she returns and faces trial, Bangladesh will certainly be under an international microscope. If the proceedings are conducted peacefully and in accordance with the law, the government can argue that the country has chosen the judicial route.
If she is imprisoned, the government will have to show that imprisonment is not an excuse for political revenge.
And if, despite state protection, she were killed by extremists, the political consequences could be enormous—even if the government itself had nothing to do with the assassination.
Hasina could become a martyr. The now-banned Awami League could acquire a powerful new symbol. The new government’s credibility could be damaged. And Bangladesh’s already polarised politics could become even more dangerous.
Both must consider the wider strategic considerations.
India cannot build its Bangladesh policy entirely around Hasina.
Her nearly 16-year rule created a close relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka, particularly on security and connectivity. But governments change. India has to deal with the Bangladesh that exists, not simply the Bangladesh it would prefer to see.
That means engaging Tarique Rahman’s government. It means rebuilding political contacts and restoring economic and commercial links. It means addressing border security, connectivity, water, the Northeast, and China’s growing influence. It means recognizing that the new Bangladesh will have its own political priorities.
But normalization does not require India to forget Hasina. Nor does it require Bangladesh to abandon its demand for justice.
Perhaps the two countries can eventually learn to separate these questions.
Tarique Rahman can visit India.
The post Hasina’s Return to Bangladesh is the Price of PM Tarique Rahman’s Visit to India. Are Delhi & Dhaka Both Stuck appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
As India hosts Tarang Shakti 2026 multinational drills, one learns not only from large-force engagements or one-on-one combat debriefs, but also from peculiar approaches, mannerisms, body language, and professional conduct.
The Americans have long followed the dictum of stating capabilities as they evolved, and in a way intimidating and making the opponent subservient with their larger-than-life persona.
Americans have led and driven military technologies and used never-ending conflicts to test weapons and doctrines. This gave them confidence and sometimes overconfidence in their approach.
Also, after the end of the Cold War, they chose to be global policemen and thought they would dictate all geopolitical outcomes, although they burned their fingers in most cases, at great cost to American lives and the exchequer.
The Soviet Union invested heavily in military, space, and nuclear power in the four decades after WW II and was a major competitor to the USA and the West. But the Soviet communist economy was otherwise hollow, and geopolitical power ultimately became unsustainable.
For long, the Russians, and their Soviet predecessors, believed in secrecy that kept the opponents guessing, and often being unsure, were frightened of the unknown capabilities.
The French have long worried about a possible Soviet juggernaut overwhelming and running over Europe, and have traditionally not trusted the Americans for their security. They just chose to have their own independent aircraft industry.
Indian military aviation gained valuable experience in WW II and, immediately after independence, began seeing air combat action that continued as recently as Op Sindoor. India benefited from exposure to British, Russian, American, and French aerial platforms and learned operational employment concepts from each.
It is worth understanding each one’s peculiarities.
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) operations approach has traditionally focused on integrating airpower across all domains to deter, compete, and win in contested environments. They believe in the “Competition Continuum” and view operations through a continuous framework of cooperation, competition, and conflict as part of their core operational concepts.
They believe that you are either with them or against them.
USA has long tried to use its technological edge to overwhelm its opponents. But that did not always work. American air power achieved tactical and operational successes in Vietnam, but it ultimately failed to accomplish its primary strategic and political objectives.
Coercion may not break the “Will” of a determined enemy.
The strategic bombing campaigns, such as “Operation Rolling Thunder” (1965–1968), failed to break the resolve of the North Vietnamese leadership or stop the continuous flow of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Political constraints of employment prevented air power from delivering a decisive blow. Heavy conventional bombing can be counterproductive against an asymmetric, rural insurgency, as was the case in Vietnam, often alienating the local population instead of winning “hearts and minds”.
US air power worked well in uncontested campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to achieve worthwhile political objectives. More recently, in “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran, the massive air campaign combined high-altitude dominance with sustained heavy bomber strikes against Iranian infrastructure.
They used stealth platforms (B-2 and F-35) and heavy bombers (B-52) to strike command centers, air defenses, and missile sites simultaneously across Iran. The B-52 missions were meant to target deeply buried, fortified military installations.
The US air power largely achieved its technical objectives, degrading conventional Iranian military production, force projection, and air defense networks. But the air dominance failed to force an unconditional surrender or collapse the regime.
Iran adapted by ceding high skies and shifting focus downward to the lower airspace over the Strait of Hormuz using low-cost drones and missiles, disrupting global shipping and raising transit costs for the U.S. Navy. Iranian missile and drone counter-attacks successfully struck regional forward bases in countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, damaging U.S. ground infrastructure and support aircraft.
The U.S. has been focusing on Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), synchronizing air, space, cyberspace, land, and maritime capabilities seamlessly across services. NATO has shifted to Agile Combat Employment (ACE), moving operations away from large, centralized bases to dispersed, makeshift locations to increase survivability.
New approach to “Point Defense” requires integrated systems to protect critical base infrastructure from drone and missile threats. USAF is now preparing for “Force Generation” by restructuring how combat-ready forces are presented, trained, and sustained for high-end peer conflicts with China in the Indo-Pacific.
USAF continues to prepare for global vigilance, global reach, and global power. US air warriors are highly professional and focused on leading the world in technology employment, doctrine, and tactical concept development.
Russia fields the world’s second-ranked military power. Russia possesses the largest nuclear weapons stockpile globally, estimated at over 5,400 warheads.
Russia operates the world’s third-strongest air force, backed by a massive total inventory of over 4,000 military aircraft. Production lines for key tactical aircraft like the Su-34 strike fighter and Su-35 air superiority jet have continued, helping offset operational attrition.
The integration of ultra-long-range air-to-air armaments, such as the R-37M missile, allows Russian jets to threaten targets at extended stand-off ranges.
Advanced 4.5-generation aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-35S feature thrust-vectoring engines for high maneuverability, powerful phased-array radars, and robust electronic warfare suites, alongside early-production fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighters. Large stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles allow for persistent strategic and tactical bombardment.
Russian forces maintain advanced, dense electronic warfare systems that can disrupt enemy communications and neutralize incoming drones. The highly sophisticated integrated air defense systems feature long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) platforms like the S-400 and S-500.
During the Cold War, the Soviet air arm was designed for long-range, high-altitude interceptions under close ground control. Aircraft were supplemented with long-range air-defense missiles.
Aircrews train extensively in extreme post-stall maneuvers such as the “Cobra,” using vectored engine thrust to maintain control at near-zero airspeeds. For long, Russia treated airpower as an army-centric, ground-support extension, or flying artillery, rather than an independent offensive strike force.
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was not designed to execute independent, deep-penetration air campaigns like NATO doctrine. Russia lacks comprehensive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities for wide offensive dominance.
Russia prioritizes layered defense against adversary aerospace threats using advanced mobile SAMs integrated closely with fighter aviation. Lessons from Ukraine have made them switch to stand-off attacks.
Fighters like the Sukhoi Su-34 release glide bombs from 35 to 50 kilometers away to mitigate the risk of entering dense adversary air defenses. They are switching to high-volume usage of tactical and long-range attack drones, along with synchronized cruise missile strikes.
Integration of domestic and foreign-supplied drone technology has expanded real-time reconnaissance and strike coordination on the front lines.
The French approach to air operations relies on centralized command and control, rapid global power projection, and a strategic doctrine focused on using precise, minimal necessary force. France has combined air and space into a single force, as the domains are considered contiguous.
The National Air Operations Center (CNOA) at Lyon-Mont Verdun acts as the core command node. This setup allows France to control domestic airspace defense and international expeditions simultaneously.
The French Air and Space Force (FASF) emphasizes rapid responses. French aircraft are designed for agile response. They can project global power, such as deploying multiple Rafale fighters and multi-role tanker transports within hours.
FASF believes in “precision over mass,” using high-tech advanced sensors and specialized platforms like the Rafale. By maintaining very small fleets, they can handle technological upgrades and logistics better.
France favors swift, lethal, targeted actions over extended, nation-sapping campaigns. France is also actively pushing for longer-range air-to-air missiles to counter advanced peer competitors.
The FASF is participating in joint global deployments like Mission Pégase and multinational exercises like Tarang Shakti in India. They also regularly study partner experiences and the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) operational insights to refine modern combat tactics.
France is one of the few countries that builds entire aircraft domestically, reducing dependence and arm-twisting from larger powers like the USA.
French aircrews are heavily trained in dynamic, austere tactical approaches designed to operate in high-threat or completely unprepared environments.
French transport aircrews regularly qualify for tactical approaches onto unprepared surfaces like grass, dirt, and raw Arctic sea ice. French tactical air traffic controllers work alongside aircrews to coordinate stealthy, steep tactical descent profiles to avoid ground fire.
During transits, crews do not fly standard civilian airline tracks, instead simulate full tactical engagements, utilizing low-altitude terrain masking, defensive manoeuvring, and variable cockpit configurations.
The French take some of the most intensive approaches to joint crew mission debriefs, structured around a meticulous three-pronged framework: a specialized learning mode, learning structure, and learning culture. The goal is to seamlessly blend individual pilot progression with overall collective squadron performance, capitalizing directly on individual tactical mistakes to systematically update institutional knowledge.
The “Pégase” doctrine trains to rely less on massive permanent foreign bases and to demonstrate its aircrews’ ability to deploy multi-role Rafale fighters, A330 MRTT tankers, and A400M transports anywhere in a short time. FASF prioritizes decentralized command and empowering junior aircrew leaders with high autonomy to execute missions quickly inside an adversary’s OODA loop without waiting for centralized approvals.
From years of real combat experience and exercises with major global air forces, the Indian approach to air operations has fundamentally transformed, evolving from a traditional tactical army-support instrument into a highly lethal, multi-domain, strategic aerospace power.
Documented across successive IAF doctrines, India’s operational philosophy is dictated by unique regional geopolitics, primarily the two-front challenge of Pakistan and China, both with nuclear arms.
The IAF operates on a refined Western-style command philosophy tailored for high-tempo operations. IAF believes in centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution. While headquarters handle macro-level operational decision-making and resource allocation, local commanders retain execution autonomy to ensure flexibility, agility, and rapid responsiveness in highly dynamic environments.
Historically restrained, India’s modern operational blueprint emphasizes strategic coercion and escalation dominance through its “No-War-No-Peace” strategy. The IAF acknowledges a grey-zone interregnum between total peace and overt war. India mandates using air power as a deterrent instrument of statecraft, with selective tactical application to manage cross-border crises, without inevitably triggering full-scale escalations.
Unlike Western concepts that envision protracted air campaigns, the Indian leadership focuses on intense, precise, and swift achievement of objectives to decisively penalize an aggressor before international political pressures force a ceasefire. A clear plan for quick action and conflict termination.
Faced with advanced missile networks and drone saturation, India has fused its defensive and offensive architectures. IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is the backbone of India’s air operations. IACCS aggregates data from satellites, AWACS, ground radars, and fighter sensors into a single, real-time digital picture. Systems like the indigenously developed Akashteer (Army) seamlessly mesh with the IAF’s IACCS.
This enables autonomous low-level airspace tracking and swift coordination between ground-based systems (like the S-400 and Akash missiles) and interceptor aircraft.
Air operations depend heavily on space for targeting, navigation, and early warning. This evolution has driven an official push to rename the service the Indian Air and Space Force (IASF) to solidify its cross-domain mandate.
Through large multilateral exercises like Exercise Tarang Shakti, the IAF tests its ability to plan and communicate alongside global air assets (such as the F-35, Rafale, and Su-30MKI), building the plug-and-play capability needed for coalition frameworks.
Driven by the national Make in India initiative, India is transitioning from “threat-based” procurement to a “capability-demanded” force structure. Operational planning actively favors indigenously produced platforms (like the Tejas fighter, Light Combat Helicopter, and SkyStriker loitering munitions) alongside advanced electronics, AI-driven sorting algorithms, and electronic warfare suites to ensure technological self-reliance during a prolonged crisis.
Indian aircrew balance high-stakes strategic execution with advanced technological adaptation across diverse geographical environments. Indian military aircrews operate in some of the world’s most unforgiving geographies, requiring specialized tactical approaches. Modern aircrew treat the air and space domains as a single continuum. Crew maintains readiness for both kinetic, punitive precision strikes and non-kinetic shaping operations.
Aircrew train for complete tri-service integration and multi-domain synergy. IAF and Army Aviation crews continuously practice high-tempo combined maneuvers, such as combat para-drops, fast-roping troops from Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH Dhruv), and deploying heavy underslung artillery via Chinook helicopters. Exercises like Yudh Abhyas and tri-service operations (Kargil, Operation Sindoor) train crews to blend air assets seamlessly with ground-based precision weapons, air defense grids, and electronic warfare units.
Indian crews train in agile combat employment, practicing approaches, controlled landings, and rapid departures from dual-use public infrastructure, such as national highway emergency landing strips. India’s aircrew approach leans heavily on simulation and advanced technical upgrades. Indian military crews have traditionally excelled in international air exercises and earned wide recognition.
The American personal and professional networking culture relies heavily on a mix of proactive communication, authenticity, and a “give-first” mindset.
They listen more than they speak, following a two-ears-to-one-mouth ratio to understand others’ needs.
They are sincere and unpretentious, avoid feigned interest, and build trust quickly. Successful professionals share resources, insights, and introductions freely without keeping an immediate score. They exhibit an upbeat, approachable demeanor and act as a social magnet.
They turn brief chats into long-lasting bonds. Once friendly, they enjoy drinks and laughs.
Russian networking culture relies heavily on deep, trusted inner circles and the traditional exchange of mutual favors, contrasting sharply with more superficial or transactional Western networking styles.
Initially, Russians are naturally suspicious or reserved toward strangers and people outside their immediate circle. Trust is not given automatically. It must be earned over time through repeated, honest interactions.
Once you are accepted into a Russian’s inner circle, the relationship becomes a deeply loyal, enduring bond marked by mutual support and strong personal generosity.
Russians value blunt honesty, clarity, and directness over polite small talk or excessive smiling, which they may view as insincere. They are open to leveraging personal connections to bypass bureaucratic hurdles or solve complex problems.
They love Indians and have watched portrayals of the underprivileged’s carefree, happy-go-lucky demeanor in Hindi movies from the 1950s to the 1980s. They will dance over shots of vodka, singing Hindi songs. Long “Hindi-Russi Bhai Bhai” speeches are always punctuated with shots of neat Vodka.
French personal networking relies on building deep, long-term trust, intellectual engagement, and strict boundaries between professional and personal life.
So don’t expect to be invited to someone’s home or meet their family until you’ve built a deep, multi-year relationship.
Unlike the transactional and rapid-fire approach often seen in Anglo-Saxon business cultures, the French value quality over quantity. First impressions are heavily anchored in respect and hierarchy.
The French value critical thinking and logic. Conversations with the French often turn into a discussion about industry trends, philosophy, or culture. Politely challenging ideas is not seen as rude.
The French love long lunches, paired with wine and cheese. They have a subtle sense of humor. With Indian aviators, they find common ground in the Mirage-2000 and Rafale.
Indians befriend everyone quickly. They can be loud. But they are great hosts and may overdo gifting.
A hug is a very natural way of greeting in India. Handshakes can be firm.
Finally, aviation has its own language. Aviators can get together and drive each other crazy with jokes, fun, laughter and mirth. In a bar, one can see all aviators ending up scissoring and locking their arms into combat maneuvers. Socializing is no less exciting than the air combat they did earlier in the day.
Tarang Shakti is about all this and more.
The post U.S. vs Russian vs French Air Force: How IAF Reads American Confidence, Russian Caution & French Autonomy appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
As nations worldwide race to bolster air defenses against missiles and one-way attack drones, India’s indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile system—proven in combat against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor in May 2025—is rapidly gaining popularity in the export market.
India’s Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently disclosed that the Akash air defense system has been exported to three countries.
Although Armenia’s purchase of the system is already known, this is the first time a high-ranking Indian official has revealed that the AD system has been acquired by two other countries in Central Asia: Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
“The first customer was Armenia, which has taken multiple batteries. Thereafter, we’ve also exported it to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Production has stabilized. We have additional orders for our own services, and I’m sure there will be many more from various parts of the world, including some of the areas that you mentioned,” the Defense Secretary told ANI on Oct 1, 2026, in an exclusive interaction.
Describing Akash as a milestone in self-reliance, Singh said, “Akash, I would say that it is one of our success stories. It shows the maturing of our indigenous missile design and production system. It is effective in dealing with high-velocity aerial targets.”
He also noted that production of the Akash missile system has stabilized, and orders from other nations are growing even as procurement for the Indian Armed Forces continues.
A mobile short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Akash provides area air defense against multifarious air threats to mobile, semi-mobile, and static vulnerable forces and areas. The missile has a range of 25–30 kilometers, can intercept targets at altitudes of about 18–20 kilometers, and carries a 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead.
“The real-time multi-sensor data processing and threat evaluation enables simultaneous engagement of multiple targets from any direction. The entire system is flexible, upscalable, and can be operated in group and autonomous modes. It employs command guidance and relies on phased array guidance radar to guide the missile till intercept,” states BEL, the manufacturer of the system.
With this export, India appears to have gained a foothold in Central Asia, where the countries have historically relied on Russian arms, but are now diversifying arms supplies as Moscow remains embroiled in a protracted conflict with Ukraine.
Notably, China has emerged as the biggest beneficiary of this vacuum left by Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, as previously explained in depth by the EurAsian Times. In fact, both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan already operate a host of air defenses sourced from Beijing, making India’s Akash purchase an even more noteworthy development.
The decision to acquire Akash possibly stems from its strong combat performance during the conflict with Pakistan as part of Operation Sindoor.
Earlier, former DRDO scientist Ravi Kumar Gupta told EurAsian Times: Akash’s versatility gives it an edge over other systems. He said that unlike other surface-to-air missiles that work only at particular altitudes and in specific climates, Akash’s biggest advantage is that it can work “all places.”
“The systems are developed for diverse conditions and can withstand extreme conditions anywhere in the world, which makes them ‘most reliable and sturdy.’ Since the system is fully indigenous, India can fine-tune it to any buyer’s requirements cost-effectively with a high degree of effectiveness against the adversary,” Gupta told EurAsian Times.
On May 7, 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched attacks on terror sites located deep within Pakistan as part of “Operation Sindoor.” Pakistan retaliated with “Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.”
Following the first round of strikes by the IAF, Pakistan started to attack India’s western sector with waves of drones, including Chinese and Turkish-origin drones, missiles, rockets, and other aerial threats targeting Indian military installations and civilian areas. At one point, more than 600 drones were fired simultaneously across India’s western front.
The Akash AD—part of a layered air defense network that also included S-400, Barak-8/MRSAM, older systems like Pechora and OSA-AK, counter-UAS grids, and the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) or Akashteer—showcased resilience in the face of these attacks, ensuring that none of the Pakistani drones and missiles hit any targets.
At the official press briefing on Operation Sindoor, Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, the Director General of Air Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Air Force, specifically praised the Akash AD for thwarting Pakistani attacks.
“Another highlight has been the stellar performance of the indigenous air defense weapon system like the Akash system,” he stated. The sentiment was echoed uniformly across the board, with Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, who later became the Deputy Army Chief, saying, “BrahMos, Akash and many other homegrown platforms and weapons played a decisive role in Operation Sindoor.”
Notably, small drones made up the majority of Pakistan’s projectiles during the conflict, which were mainly used to scan Indian defenses and overwhelm the air defense network, although a few kamikaze drones, missiles, and aircraft-launched munitions were also used.
Akash operated as a key hard-kill layer against these low-to-medium altitude threats, as its indigenous design, mobility, multi-target capability, and cost-effectiveness suited it well for the threats that characterized much of Pakistan’s response.
According to reports from the time, the Akash intercepted multiple drones and loitering munitions, disrupted swarm attempts, and even helped down guided missiles mid-flight at low altitude.
Akash interceptors helped protect higher-value, longer-range assets by keeping drone-saturation attacks out of the S-400 envelope. However, defense officials cited by Indian media said Akash, which has an interception range of 25 kilometers, played a major role in countering all kinds of threats, including aircraft, armed attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the Turkish Byker Yiha III kamikaze drones.
“It has been very effective against aircraft and other systems. This is the first time we saw it in active conflict. We hear that Akash has been used, and it has brought down a couple of aircraft. The whole team of scientists who have worked on the project is very, very happy. A great moment for all of them,” former DRDO chairman, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, said in an interview with NDTV days after the ceasefire was announced on May 10, 2025.
The most compelling commentary on Akash came from Gaddamanugu Chandramouli, the former Akash project director and DRDO scientist, who spent his entire career developing the system.
“Akash, which was indigenously built from scratch, was used in a combat zone for the first time and has proved to be robust and effective. The automated missile system caught the other countries by surprise,” Chandramouli told The Hindu in May 2025.
The Akash Weapon System can simultaneously engage Multiple Targets in Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. It has built-in Electronic Countermeasures features. The entire weapon system is mounted on mobile platforms. It can effectively engage helicopters, jets, and UAVs at ranges of 4-25 kilometers. It is fully automatic and has a quick response time from target detection to kill.
DRDO claims it is the first system in the world capable of engaging four aerial targets simultaneously at a range of 25 kilometers by command guidance using a single firing unit.
The post “Akash is The Limit”: India’s AD System Reaches Turkmenistan & Tajikistan: Here’s What Makes It Lethal appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
More than a year after Donald Trump unofficially offered the F-35 to India, the fighter jet debuted in India’s multinational exercise Tarang Shakti 2026.
For the first time, six US F-35 Lightning II fighter jets and more than 200 airmen joined the Tarang Shakti multinational drills in Jodhpur, western India.
Photos of the jets appeared on social media ahead of their participation in tactical exercises alongside the Indian Air Force’s stalwarts, including the Rafale, the Su-30MKI, and indigenous Tejas fighters in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force published a video on September 29, 2026, showing an F-35 and Tejas flying together.
The @usairforce F-35A Lightning IIs are making their exercise debut in India at Tarang Shakti.
Combining stealth, advanced sensors, and information-sharing capabilities, the F-35s bring new opportunities to train with the Indian Air Force and other partners, strengthening… pic.twitter.com/wGfT6OxtAc
— U.S. Embassy India (@USAndIndia) September 29, 2026
The exercise comes more than a year after US President Donald Trump offered the F-35 to India during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February 2025. So, while the deployment is meant to provide the IAF practical exposure to the aircraft’s operations and sensor integration in a multinational setting, it has inevitably sparked questions about whether the US is signaling its intent to sell the fighter.
“Starting this year, we will be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We are also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters,” Trump told reporters in February 2025.
Vice President J.D. Vance reiterated the offer during his visit to India in April 2025, saying, “We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is the best in class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before.”
These pitches took many by surprise, but there was a catch: they were merely verbal pitches, not official offers accompanied by formal discussions.
So, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, chief of the Indian Air Force, ultimately told reporters that India was not considering the F-35 option, adding that it had not received a formal offer. A fervent supporter of augmenting Indian air power, the IAF top boss emphasized that purchasing a fighter jet was not like “buying a washing machine or refrigerator,” implying that the appropriate process must be followed. “We haven’t examined it [F-35].”
Later that year, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Kirti Vardhan Singh, told Parliament that it had held no formal discussions with the US about acquiring F-35 fighter jets.
However, more than a year later, the deployment of the F-35s for Tarang Shakti gives the impression that the exercise may be an attempt by Washington to keep the door open or provide useful exposure that could entice the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Meanwhile, the Russian envoy to India praised the F-35 fighter jet in a rare move while arguing that it was not suitable for India.
Speaking at the NDTV Defense Forum 2026, Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov said, ”The US is welcome to promote its product. It’s a good aircraft, no doubt about that. But way too expensive. If India goes for that, well, that would be India’s sovereign decision. But we are offering a much better deal. Next year we are going to see hopefully many firsts at the Bengaluru air show.”
It appears the Russians might be smelling the US offer.
Russia has also been aggressively pursuing to sell India its fifth-generation Su-57, which Moscow positions as a competitor to the F-35.
It has offered New Delhi a host of options, including an off-the-shelf purchase of Su-57 fighters, full licensed production in India, technology transfer, a “two-seat variant,” and help with India’s own fifth-generation aircraft, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
"Good Product But…": Russian Envoy Compares American F-35 With Su-57 Fighter Jethttps://t.co/vUTjeKPq63 pic.twitter.com/4e9n8ufmGx
— NDTV (@ndtv) September 27, 2026
IAF veteran and commentator, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retd), told the EurAsian Times, “IAF has trained alongside the F-35s in the past, such as in the Pitch Black exercise. The deployment is likely meant to test the waters by enticing the IAF, and probably to create conjecture, considering that no official offer was ever made. They could also be creating a deliberate distraction for India, particularly since the Russians have sustained their Su-57 campaign and expanded the scope of the initial offer to make it more and more appealing.”
“As for the cost factor mentioned by the Russian envoy, everything we buy is expensive. The Su-57 may be cheaper than the F-35 initially when looking at per-unit price, but it wouldn’t be cheap in the long term,” Chopra added.
That said, since both Su-57 and F-35 offers were made to India around the same time, the two jets have been viewed as competitors in the context of India’s acquisition of a fifth-generation fighter to augment its airpower.
As Air Marshal Chopra added: India may need a fifth-gen fighter as a stopgap solution till the AMCA arrives. If the US makes an enticing offer and meets India’s core requirements, American jets offered to the IAF are “quite possible”, but India should best avoid letting the USA get into its fighter aircraft ecosystem.
Although India is developing its own fifth-generation stealth aircraft, the AMCA, it is unlikely to be delivered to the IAF before the mid-2030s. Defense Secretary R.K. Singh recently said the first flight is targeted for September 2028, but the aircraft may take time to become operationally available to the IAF.
This means waiting for the AMCA would leave India with a glaring capability gap vis-à-vis adversaries China and Pakistan. China already operates two different fifth-generation stealth fighters: the J-20 and J-35A, and is currently testing two sixth-generation fighter prototypes. Meanwhile, Beijing could export its 5th-gen J-35A to Pakistan.
However, Air Marshal Chopra had earlier told the EurAsian Times that the decision not to show any interest in the Su-57 and the rhetoric about focusing on AMCA is meant to keep American ire and sanctions at bay.
For now, India’s path to bolstering its airpower includes accelerating Tejas production, advancing work on AMCA, and signing a deal for 114 Rafale fighters with France.
Observers have noted that India’s sustained disinterest in buying the F-35, arguably the best fifth-generation stealth fighter on the market, stemmed mainly from American unreliability, including painful delays in delivering F404-IN20 turbofan engines for Tejas Mk-1A jets.
So far, the US has not been able to break into the Indian fighter jet ecosystem, and has pitched multiple warplanes to the IAF, including F-15EX, F-21 (modified F-16), and F/A-18 Super Hornets. However, none of them appears to have lured the Indians. Can the F-35 do? Only time will tell.
Indians are reportedly also concerned about operational costs linked to the F-35, anxiety over introducing a complex Western platform to its fleet, Washington’s unwillingness to transfer the technology and allow local manufacturing, and potential operational restrictions on F-35 use.
Skeptics have noted that the sale may never go through, given that India operates the Russian S-400 air defense system and has integrated it into its layered air defense network.
Earlier, the US expelled Turkey from the F-35 consortium for buying the S-400 and has not yet approved the F-35 sale to it, despite Ankara’s assurances that it would never activate the system.
Meanwhile, India is also aggressively evaluating the French 6th-gen FCAS program.
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Southeast Asia’s growth next year will be decided at meetings its finance ministers won’t attend. A few executives in California will soon settle next year’s spending on data centers. Their decisions will do more to shape growth in Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines than any budget those governments pass. The World Bank has just […]
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Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. While operational planners in the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan have made historic strides institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation, the credibility of deterrence ultimately hinges on a more punishing variable: wartime sustainment. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have expanded joint exercises, real-time missile […]
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At dawn on Monday, October 5, Israeli forces destroyed the martyrs’ memorial at Birzeit University.
Basil Farraj, an assistant professor of philosophy and cultural studies at Birzeit University, told BreakThrough News that the Israeli forces came to the campus around a week ago to capture photos of the memorial, sparking suspicions that they may attempt to destroy it.
Farraj suggests that the removal of the memorial came as part of Israel’s broader efforts to erase the Palestinian people’s collective memory and entrench cultural, social, and political hegemony over them, specifically at Birzeit University, due to its pioneering role in the Palestinian struggle against occupation.
“The assault on the memorial constitutes a cowardly attempt that will never defeat the resilience of the Palestinian collective memory. It also reflects the failure of the Zionist project in the face of the Palestinian people’s struggle,” he emphasized.
Meanwhile, the Right to Education Campaign issued a statement, condemning the offensive, and clarifying that it was carried out on the first day of the new academic year.
“The destruction of a memorial to student martyrs is an assault on our collective memory, and our right to remember, preserve our history, and honour those who are part of Birzeit’s story,” the statement reads.
“This attack comes within a broader pattern of scholasticide on Palestinian universities and the systematic disruption of academic life,” it continued.
The campaign urged “universities, academics, students, human rights organizations, and governments worldwide to demand accountability, protect Palestinian educational institutions, and take concrete action to defend the right to education and academic freedom.”
In recent years, the Israeli forces have intensified their crackdown campaign on Palestinian universities across the occupied West Bank. There has been a particular focus on Birzeit University in northern Ramallah due to its pioneering role in the Palestinian prolonged struggle against the occupation.
Not only have prominent scientists, political leaders, artists, and journalists graduate from the renowned Palestinian institution, but it has also long been called the “University of Martyrs” because dozens of its students and graduates have been killed at the hands of the Israeli military.
Countless students have been arrested and the university campus has faced frequent military raids since 2002.
As one advocate warned India’s Supreme Court on Monday that “this country will burn” unless action is taken to stop what thousands of protesters have denounced as an illegal purge of voters by the head of the Election Commission of India, the court demanded accountability from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Chief Justice Surya Kant […]
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The withdrawal of the remaining US troops from Iraq is a victory for the Iraqi nation and the resistance force in the region, Iran claimed on Thursday, October 1, also calling for greater cooperation between both the countries to achieve complete sovereignty for Iraq.
“The US, despite possessing vast resources and equipment, has been expelled from Iraq, and the Iraqi people are celebrating this victory,” head of Iran’s Quds’ forces Esmail Qaani said during a program held in Tehran to mark the second anniversary of the Israeli assassination of Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah.
He thanked the “resistance of the Iraqi nation and the heroes of the Resistance Front” for making the end of the US occupation a reality.
The US withdrew all its remaining forces from Iraq on September 30, as per the 2024 understanding between both the countries marking the conclusion of over a decade-long military presence in the country.
The news of the withdrawal led to widespread celebrations in Baghdad and other parts of the country on Wednesday.
The US occupied Iraq during the 2003 war which lasted until 2011 when it publicly stated that it withdrew all its forces. They were then re-deployed in 2014 as part of the international coalition fighting against the Islamic State or ISIS.
Iraqi people, as well as the resistance groups in the country, have been demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country for years now. Their presence is seen as undermining the country’s sovereignty.
Due to popular resistance, most of the foreign troops left the country by 2019 after a victory was declared over ISIS. Remaining US troops were redeployed to some bases in Baghdad and Erbil.
In 2020, the Iraqi parliament adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all remaining foreign troops from the country following popular protests over the US assassination of Qassem Solemani during a visit to Baghdad. Soleimani was the head of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) and key military strategist.
Qaani claimed that the US withdrawal from Iraq is also a victory for Iran which has been in support of the call on the ground that the presence of foreign troops in the region undermines regional security and stability.
Qaani also linked the withdrawal to the setbacks the US faced in its war with Iran in the last seven months. Contrary to its expressed wish to force Iranians to surrender within days of the war launched on February 28, “they encountered a reality vastly different from their calculations,” he said.
The US had used its military presence and the bases in Iraq to launch attacks across the border in Iran in the past and also during the ongoing war. This has prompted Iranian retaliations causing destruction and death of some of its servicemen.
Iran has also accused that the US military’s presence in Iraq has been used by Israel for its clandestine operations inside the country.
Reacting to US withdrawal from Iraq, IRGC said on Thursday that it is the beginning of its withdrawal from the entire region.
Qaani expressed hope that in the aftermath of US troop withdrawal there will be increased coordination between the governments in Iraq and Iran for purging the remaining US influences on the country and creating a secure and sovereign Iraq.
Though the US has withdrawn militarily, the legacy of its occupation still remains in Iraq. It continues to control Iraq’s economy by controlling the payments to its oil exports which are routed through the American Central Bank.
Oil revenues made up 90% of the Iraqi government’s total budget and over 40% of its national GDP.
Qaani accused that banning the Iranian airlines to Iraq and other countries in the region is a distraction used by the US to undermine the significance of its military defeat.
Iraq and several other countries in the region complied with the US sanctions on Iranian airlines last month following Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s threats of secondary sanctions.
Hydrogen-powered passenger cars have been left far behind by electric vehicles and hybrids, but the hydrogen truck market is growing and new technology developed for auto racing is keeping hopes for hydrogen cars alive. Toyota and its European partners are in the vanguard of these developments. On September 26 and 27, at the FIA World […]
The post Behind in EVs, Toyota powering ahead with hydrogen vehicles appeared first on Asia Times.
United Airlines has been sending military hardware to Israel on passenger flights, right under your feet.
A new report from the People’s Embargo for Palestine, the Palestinian Youth Movement, and others documents 2,761 shipments of military cargo to Israeli weapons manufacturers and military institutions, including Elbit Systems, Lockheed Martin Israel, Nevatim Airbase, and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Belal Elsiesy, organizer with the PYM and the People’s Arms Embargo, joins Zoe Alexandra to break down the findings.
With cargo including F-35 bomb release units used to drop 2,000-pound bombs on Gaza, Merkava tank sights, and “hunter-killer” machine gunner sights destined for Elbit, Elsiesy argues civilian airports are a critical point of intervention. He also discusses what’s behind Elbit’s US rebrand as 26 Defense, how campaigns against Maersk and FedEx have targeted the weak links in Israel’s weapons supply chain, and why the airline’s silence on the #NoWeaponsOnUnited campaign is a good reason to act now.
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Two years after Israel’s pager attacks on Lebanon killed dozens and maimed thousands, Lebanese investigative journalist Radwan Mortada’s new two-part Al Jazeera documentary, The Trap (Al-Mesyada), goes inside the September 2024 Mossad operation more than a decade in the making.
Mortada joins Rania Khalek to trace the web of front companies stretching from Taiwan to Bulgaria that enabled Israel to infiltrate Gold Apollo, a supplier Hezbollah had trusted for decades.
As a new Israeli propaganda film Paging Hezbollah heads for US theaters, Mortada reveals that Israel’s goal to kill as many as 20,000 Hezbollah fighters with booby-trapped walkie-talkies, in fact, fell far short. He also breaks down Hezbollah’s own fatal mistakes, and the lasting psychological toll of a terrorist attack that, contrary to US and Israeli narratives, was far from “precise” or “targeted,” destroying the lives of children, families, and medical workers.
“Hezbollah’s biggest mistake was forgetting Israel’s capabilities – forgetting how bloody and cruel they can be.”
Watch The Trap Part 1: aljazeera360.com/video/1017661
Part 2: aljazeera360.com/video/1017626
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Rough transcript follows:
[Rana:] And joining me to discuss this two-part investigative deep dive into the pager attacks is the producer himself, Redwan Mortada. Redwan, welcome to Breakthrough News Live.
[Redwan Mortada:] Thank you, Rana. Thank you for having me.
[Rana:] Well, it’s a real pleasure, and I got a chance to watch the documentary. I encourage everybody to go check it out. It’s available online. It’s also available with English subtitles, and it’s really worth the watch. I mean, you expose so much new information we didn’t know before. But before we get into some of the specifics, Redwan, I want to ask you, you’ve called this one of the most complex cases that you’ve ever worked on as an investigative journalist. And we have all watched Israel commit so many atrocities across Lebanon that have killed far more people than the pager attacks did. Yet, in your film, you call this the most devastating blow that Hezbollah has taken since its founding. So, two years on from this attack, why does this operation still loom so large that you felt it warranted a two-part investigative series?
[Redwan Mortada:] You’re right, Rania. Israel killed tens of thousands of Lebanese over the years. But in fact, this operation is different—the pager attack. I mean, because it came from a place Hezbollah thought was secure for years and years, for decades, if you want. There has been an intelligence war between the resistance, mainly between Hezbollah and Israel, in Lebanon and in the region. Israel assassinated several senior commanders of Hezbollah, carried out several operations against it, killing Abbas al-Musawi, the ex-secretary-general, and at the same time, Hezbollah carried out several operations against Israel. But this pager operation was different because it was one of the biggest blows to Hezbollah—an attack that only Mossad could imagine. No one could imagine this kind of operation and this kind of killing, because it didn’t only affect Hezbollah fighters. It affected tons of children and women, and it breaches all international and humanitarian rules across the world.
[Rana:] Yeah. And just for everybody who’s watching Breakthrough News and your organization, Blue House Films, you produced a documentary on the pager attacks and how they impacted civilians specifically that came out last year. People who are probably watching this have seen that documentary, and it shows the toll specifically on children and other civilians caught up in it—their faces totally maimed, destroyed, and blinded for those who did survive. I mean, just a horrific attack. But your documentary, this two-part series, really dives deep into the timeline of Israel plotting this attack. I mean, Israel spent years on this; it started back in 2015. And in your documentary, you lay out how Mossad built these front companies spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong, Hungary, and Bulgaria. They infiltrated the pager company that Hezbollah had grown to trust, they manipulated the Hezbollah representative that was dealing with that company, and they rigged the devices with small amounts of this powerful explosive substance hidden in the batteries that was so hard to detect, and then they detonated them at a moment of their choosing. I mean, the way you lay it out, it plays like a movie thriller. So walk us through some of that Israeli timeline—how did they pull this off?
[Redwan Mortada:] It is a long story. You have to watch the film and go deep into the details, the exclusive information, the exclusive data, and the interviews, because it also presents the story of Hezbollah. We post in the film the email communications between the company called Gold Apollo and Hezbollah. But in fact, if I want to go back to how this started, after the 2006 war, Israel started looking for ways to penetrate Hezbollah, especially its network and communication, because you know the result of the war in 2006 was that Hezbollah beat Israel, and Israel wanted revenge. So they started trying to penetrate Hezbollah. They tried to recruit the sales representatives in Taiwan; they failed. They tried to sell pagers to Hezbollah through several front companies, but they failed. And the story they distributed in the media about a blonde girl that manipulated a representative to sell him the pagers was not true. The truth is that they penetrated a trusted company that had a relation with this company over 20 years, starting in the 2000s—Gold Apollo. So they penetrated Hezbollah through this company. They recruited Teresa, the employee in the company, and through recruiting Teresa, they penetrated Hezbollah, and they sent these pagers. And it was not just one plan for Mossad; there was a Plan A and a Plan B. Plan A was to explode the walkie-talkies, and this operation started in 2014. I am not saying that Israeli officials declared that, but they succeeded in sending 15,000 walkie-talkies to Hezbollah. But these walkie-talkies were in storage, and Hezbollah did not decide to go into battle in full power, so they did not distribute all the walkie-talkies; they distributed around 800 walkie-talkies. So Mossad moved to the second plan, which is Plan B—detonating the pagers. This operation started in 2020, and they succeeded in sending 500 pagers to Hezbollah at the beginning, in 2023. Because of the necessity of the battle at the beginning, Hezbollah refused these pagers because this model—the new model—was different; he had ordered the old model. Gold Apollo sent Hezbollah the new model, and the representative of Hezbollah whose name was Mike said, “We don’t want to deal with you because we ordered the old version.” But because of the necessity of the battle and the urge of what was going on after October 7, it forced Hezbollah to receive 4,200 pagers, and they distributed around 3,000, of which only 1,850 exploded.
[Rana:] Yeah. And people really need to go watch this documentary, because you also lay out how the Israelis would find out that Hezbollah was on to them, and then they would stop scanners from Iran from coming to Lebanon that could have detected the substance by bombing a warehouse and another warehouse, and then claiming they were bombing this to kill somebody when it was really to stop Hezbollah from finding out about the pagers. I mean, it’s just really wild stuff. But I want to talk about Hezbollah’s mistakes here, because the attack did expose how deeply Hezbollah had been penetrated, which is what you’re talking about. And you mentioned 2006. After 2006, Hezbollah did build its own communications network, and you described in the documentary how this is precisely because Lebanon’s telecoms were so compromised by the Israelis. And then the war in Syria turned Hezbollah into a much larger and more exposed army that allowed for more penetration. At the same time, these failures come off as so shocking, because Hezbollah did have guardrails in place to try to detect if anything was messed with. What were some of Hezbollah’s mistakes? Again, people really should go watch the documentary because you go into deep detail on what those mistakes were. But if you had to give a brief explanation, what were Hezbollah’s mistakes, and could this have been prevented? And I guess I’d also add to that, has Hezbollah reckoned with this internally?
[Redwan Mortada:] I said it in the film, and I will repeat it: the biggest mistake was forgetting Israeli capabilities and forgetting how bloody and cruel they can be. This is one of the biggest mistakes Hezbollah committed. In fact, you’re right, the war in Syria exposed Hezbollah, and the capabilities and advanced technology Israel had also helped them to do this operation. But in addition to that, they used a new kind of technology, which is CL-20—a new kind of US explosive material manufactured by the United States of America. This kind of explosion is not detectable, and also when Hezbollah gave the pagers that did not explode to the Lebanese army, when they detected it… I put in the film that report that mentions this is an unknown material; it’s not listed in the explosive library. That’s why the airport scanners in Hong Kong, Turkey, and Lebanon couldn’t detect it.
[Rana:] That’s so scary. It’s so scary to think what else they’ve infiltrated.
[Redwan Mortada:] Especially, Rana, these pager devices are civilian devices; they are not military devices.
[Rana:] Yeah. Well, you also—I thought it was super interesting—mentioned in the documentary that Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh used to cut open screws when he would take apart devices to make sure the screw hadn’t been messed with. I mean, one of the biggest mistakes that was mentioned was that Hezbollah operatives were asking questions—there was something weird about these pagers and walkie-talkies, and they were taking them apart and looking at the different pieces to see what was wrong with them, but they never cut open the batteries because…
[Redwan Mortada:] Okay, that shows a lot, by the way. That shows a lot, because even us at the time, when this happened, our question was: where was Hezbollah? Where was the protocol for experimenting on all of these? In fact, I mentioned in the film that there was like a mind race between Hezbollah and the Mossad officer, and it was one step… I mentioned two names in the film, and Jibril Jibril is a nickname for Hussein Bazi, an engineer inside Hezbollah. He was an officer who had doubts, and when he started to remove these pagers from small groups, Israel knew about that and decided to start the operation instead of losing the element of surprise.
[Rana:] So that they could do at least some damage, even though they didn’t get to kill as many people as they wanted. I wanted to ask you, though, obviously this did not destroy Hezbollah because they were able to go on and fight the war in 2024, but it did do a lot of damage to the organization. So can you explain, in terms of manpower, command, morale, and trust in their own systems, what was the damage of this operation to Hezbollah?
[Redwan Mortada:] For me, I think the biggest impact was psychological. The Israelis started this war by exploding the pagers. The first day they exploded the pagers; the second day they exploded the walkie-talkies. Then they carried out over 1,400 airstrikes on Lebanon in one day. After that, they assassinated the special forces commanders—the Radwan Force in Hezbollah—until they assassinated Hassan Nasrallah. For around 10 days, Hezbollah and Lebanese society experienced and went through one of the hardest days in our history. The goal and target for Israel was to destroy Hezbollah. But in fact, Hezbollah survived, and you can tell that if you do a comparison between the war in 2024 and the war in 2026, the level of assassination and the level of penetration wasn’t the same at all.
[Rana:] I want to ask you also, Redwan, you talked about this in your documentary, and I covered it in the documentary that I did with Blue House: Israel and its supporters continue to celebrate this as a marvel of precision. They call it surgical, targeted, and clean. And actually, I don’t know if you’ve seen, but the Israelis also have a movie coming out called Paging Hezbollah.
[Redwan Mortada:] A propaganda film, you mean? The propaganda film where they started swimming and they are at the beach, and you will hear another voice: “We are in a special area, but in fact, we are in a hostile environment where everyone wants to destroy us”? They are justifying why they went into a major operation.
[Rana:] Yeah. So this is going to be in American theaters on October 30th. It’s called Paging Hezbollah, an Israeli propaganda film that celebrates this attack. I encourage people, instead of watching that, to go watch Redwan’s documentary, which we’ll include a link to in the description. But I wanted to ask you, what was the actual impact of what Israel did on civilians? Israel and the US celebrate the pager operation as a major achievement, calling it precise and targeted. But they are lying. They are liars, because really it was a terrorist attack, a war crime, because it also hit civilians. And you met tons of civilians, women and children, in your documentary. But in fact, this is not just my word; Human Rights Watch said it was a war crime. Booby-trapped pagers used by civilians on a daily basis—when they exploded, they didn’t target only Hezbollah fighters, because you know they are a part of Lebanese society, and they chose a peak time when families were gathered, when children came back from school. So when they exploded, they targeted, killed, and injured children, women, families, doctors, nurses. They are not all military; part of them are civilians.
[Redwan Mortada:] And the injuries—I mean, just so people understand the injuries from this explosion. It exploded in people’s faces, so it was destroyed eyeballs, destroyed facial structure and bones, missing fingers. Really, really horrific stuff. I think you experienced—my colleague told me that when you wanted to give a neck mic to one of the children to start the interview, he ran away a bit because it was similar to the pager.
[Rana:] No, they were scared. Yeah, the kids I spoke to were scared, of course. They have PTSD from this device because it looked similar. It’s just horrible. And the other thing, too, is people blinded. If you’re blind, you usually learn to read with your fingers, with Braille, but the pager—the way it exploded, people were holding it, so it also cut off people’s fingers in addition to taking away their sight, so they can’t even learn to read Braille. There are just so many layers of horror that this has impacted, and people are still getting surgeries two years later to fix their faces, if they can ever be fixed. It’s just horrifying and should not be celebrated. But you noted—and again, I encourage people to go watch the documentary because it goes into detail—Israel’s real aim was to have these exploding walkie-talkies kill as many as 20,000 fighters, and it didn’t manage to do that. So obviously they did a lot of damage to Hezbollah, but their ultimate operation failed. But connected to all this: yes, Hezbollah was able to demonstrate it survived, especially watching it fight in 2026. Like you mentioned, there weren’t major assassinations because Israel doesn’t even really know who’s in charge anymore, and they were able to fight the Israelis. However, Israel has managed to occupy a huge portion of Lebanon, and right now Hezbollah is not really responding to Israel’s daily attacks, killings, and bombings—it’s blown up like 60 villages at this point. So where does the battle stand today? Hezbollah has lost ground, Israel is expanding its occupation, and people are wondering why Hezbollah is not responding right now. What, in your opinion, is Hezbollah’s real capability as it stands today, and is there any deterrence left against Israeli aggression?
[Redwan Mortada:] This question should be addressed to Hezbollah, but I will tell you my evaluation of how I’m looking at what’s going on now. In fact, the war did not finish yet. The war is still going on, and the war is not only in Lebanon—the war is in the region, the war between the United States of America and Iran, between Iran and Israel, between Hezbollah and Israel. We are part of this big war in this region. Until now, there are rules of engagement, and the last agreement is still going on, because if you can see in Lebanon, Israel doesn’t dare to target Beirut, to target the Beqaa, to target the Dahieh, because there are rules of engagement between the United States of America and Iran. I think we have to wait and see. During the past 15 months, if you remember, everyone went out and said Hezbollah is done, Hezbollah is finished. But when the battle erupted, we saw another equation on the ground. So I think we are still in the middle of the war; we cannot expect what will go on, whether there will be another round—and that’s what we think, there will be another round, the third round. And we hope that we can survive, we hope that we can kick the Israelis out of our country, because you know that they believe in their myth of Greater Israel, and they believe that and declared that they can take part of Lebanon and part of Syria to fulfill their dream and their myth. So we are fighting with these psychopaths who are now destroying our houses, destroying our lands, killing anyone in that yellow zone in the south of Lebanon. And the United States of America, unfortunately, is backing them and covering them, and our government is involved in this betraying. So let’s wait and see how things will go on.
[Rana:] Well, Redwan, I want to thank you so much for this incredible two-part documentary that you put together. Again, we’ll include a link to it in the description for people to watch, and also for all of the incredible work you do. You really are one of the best journalists we have here in Lebanon. So thank you for all of the wonderful work you do, and hopefully we can have you on again soon.
[Redwan Mortada:] Thank you. Thank you so much.
In late September, Israeli media reported that Netanyahu’s government intends to adjust access to key routes in the central West Bank. It plans to reopen Route 463 to settler-only traffic in the governorate of Ramallah and Al-Bireh.
Yisrael Gantz, the leader of the Yesha Council (an umbrella organization representing Israeli municipal councils across Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley) confirmed that plans to reopen the road received preliminary approval and funding.
Preparations are also underway by the Israeli military to complete “the security, legal, and logistical” steps required to reopen the route (also known as Wallerstein Road).
The road was paved in 1994 under the directions of Pinchas Wallerstein, a founder of the settlement movement, to connect the illegal settlements of Beit El (north-east of Ramallah and Al-Bireh) and Dolev (north-west of Jerusalem).
However, following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the Israeli army barred Israeli people from using the road for security reasons. They also placed a locked iron gate on its end near Ein Qiniya village, northwest of Ramallah.
Experts argue that Israel’s move will impact not only the governorate itself, but the entire occupied West Bank because of its central location, major metropolitan status, and role as a commercial hub.
To understand the repercussions of the route reopening, BreakThrough News spoke with Jamal Jumaa, a Palestinian activist, expert on Israeli settlement and apartheid-related issues, and coordinator of the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall).
Aside from dividing the governorate’s northern and southern halves, Jumaa noted that reopening the road is dangerous because it will block the center of Ramallah and Al-Bireh from two-thirds of its villages, which are situated to the west.
The prominent Palestinian activist added that when Israel builds such roads for settler traffic, it fences them off on both sides and prohibits the use of adjacent lands. The Israeli authorities consider those lands a buffer zone, citing the security of the settlers as their reason.
“This entails setting up military towers and checkpoints. The road will cut off continuously inhabited Palestinian villages north-west and south-west of Ramallah. Therefore, we are talking about the establishment of roughly four military checkpoints along the road,” he continued.
Jumaa pointed out that the road will complicate the life of Palestinians by restricting their access to vital healthcare and education facilities, including the Istishari Arab Hospital, Birzeit University, and the Arab American University.
He also noted that the intended reopening of the road “is part of dividing and dividing more Palestinians from each other.”
On the political level, Jumaa suggested that the road “hits the heart of the West Bank, which gives a clear signal to the Palestinian Authority that it has no sovereignty over anything.”
It is worth noting that since its establishment, the Palestinian Authority has designated Ramallah and Al-Bireh as a de facto administrative capital. Yet, this has not prevented the Israeli authorities from fragmenting and isolating the governorate by establishing illegal settlements, military outposts, checkpoints, and gates.
In July, India tested two new interceptors meant to destroy missiles at ranges up to 5,000 kilometers, the latest step toward one of the few layered missile shields in the world. New Delhi calls the program defensive. But a neighboring rival rarely sees a shield that way. India’s expanding defenses could embolden its leaders in […]
The post India’s missile shield invites a false sense of security appeared first on Asia Times.
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