According to the ‘70s anarchist slogan, ‘No matter who you vote for, the government always gets in’. That’s certainly true for the election in Israel this month (27 October), even if the winner is not Prime Minister Binyamin (‘Bibi’) Netanyahu himself. All the other party leaders, says Israeli journalist Anshel Pfeffer, are just ‘wanna-Bibis’.
Or rather, all the rest except one. Former general Gadi Eisenkot, the main opposition candidate, is the ‘anti-Bibi’, says Pfeffer. He’s a working-class hero who joined the army as a private and worked his way up to chief of staff of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). He retired and went into politics only four years ago, he’s modest and honest, what’s not to love?

Eisenkot certainly stands out among the party leaders in terms of style, but not so much in terms of actual policies. He was realistic enough to realise ‘total victory’ over Hamas was not likely, but his ‘Dahiya’ strategy of causing “immense damage and destruction” (in Lebanon in the 2006 war) foreshadowed the cataclysm that the IDF has inflicted on Gaza since 2023.

He supports Jewish settlement in the occupied Palestinian territories and he opposes the ‘two-state solution’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (as do all the wanna-Bibis). He wants a full investigation of the intelligence failures that enabled Hamas to commit the massacres of Jewish civilians on 7 October 2023, like every other party leader (except Netanyahu himself).

Moreover, even if Eisenkot won the largest number of seats in the Knesset (parliament) and was asked to form a government, he would have to form a coalition with other parties that are farther to the right than his own Yashar Party is. The next Israeli government will probably be just as expansionist, and just as willing to go to war again, as the present one is.
How did it come to this? How did ‘gallant little Israel’ turn into the militaristic ‘dwarf superpower’ that torments the Middle East today? I don’t usually have recourse to ‘great man’ theories of history, and I don’t think that Binyamin Netanyahu is a great or even a good man, but he has had a huge influence on Israel and the entire Middle East.

You could make the shallowest dive possible into the past and explain Israel’s brutal current behaviour (see, for example, the recent revelations about killing Palestinian civilians in Gaza) as vengefulness for the massacres of Israelis by Hamas three years ago.

You could dig a little deeper and blame the deepening ethno-nationalism of the younger generation of Israelis, driven by their experience of many long, small, indecisive wars rather than the brief, infrequent and triumphant wars of their parents’ generation. (Their extremism often shocks their parents.)

Or you could go all the way back to the turning point of 1995, when unspoken collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian hard-liners, both opposed to the two-state solution, managed to kill the peace deal at a time when it really was within reach.
And every time Netanyahu is there, making sure that the fear never fades (he has been warning that Iran is on the brink of getting a nuclear weapon for 34 years now) and the threat of war always seems close. That’s his ticket to power, and it has made him prime minister of Israel for more than half of the past twenty-five years.

Incredibly, he is still in the running for prime minister in the current election campaign despite the fact that all the ugly details about his failure to foresee Hamas’s 2023 attack have been spilling out in the media.

He was given warnings about it well beforehand, with specific details, by Egypt’s intelligence chief Abbas Kamel and by Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyanian, the President of the United Arab Emirates. Kamel even flew to Israel to emphasise the urgency of the matter. Netanyhu did nothing about it, nor did he pass any of the warnings on to the IDF or Israeli intelligence.

Did he want the attack to happen (presumably underestimating its scale) in order to exploit it for some domestic political purpose? Did he just forget to mention it? There are many possible explanations, but none of them show him in a good light.

Yet Netanyahu is still there, trailing Eisenkot’s Yashar Party by a bit in the polls but definitely still in the race. The Israeli public knows about his little lapse of memory, but a great many of them don’t care. 46 per cent of Israeli voters think Netanyahu is best suited to be prime minister, compared to 29 per cent for Eisenkot.

And 80 per cent would like to restart the war in Lebanon.

Gwynne Dyer’s new book is ‘Intervention Earth: Life-Saving Ideas from the World’s Climate Engineers’. The previous book, ‘The Shortest History of War’, is also still available.

The renewed effort to complete the Vasiliko LNG import terminal is entering a critical phase. Eight companies have expressed interest in Etyfa’s (natural gas infrastructure company) tender, estimated at €180 million. DEFA’s (natural gas public company) management has welcomed the response, saying lessons have been learned from the previous failure.

The response is encouraging, but does not guarantee success. The real questions are which companies will be shortlisted, how many have the necessary experience, and how many will remain in the competition once they fully understand the technical, financial and legal risks involved.

Cyprus cannot afford to repeat the failure of the previous contract.

The prequalification criteria

Under tender E.013-2026, applicants must demonstrate average annual turnover of at least €300 million over the previous three years. They must also show experience in two natural gas engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) projects during the past decade, including one exceeding €100 million, and two marine projects, including one exceeding €50 million. Compliance with European safety standards is also required.

These criteria appear low given the complexity of the project. Excluding the Prometheas FSRU, the project could cost around €300 million, and likely more, yet the reference-project thresholds are only €50–100 million.

Furthermore, qualifying gas projects may involve pipelines or other facilities rather than LNG terminals. A reference project can count as completed when at least 80 per cent has been implemented, even without successful commissioning. For consortia, the lead contractor needs independently to satisfy only one of the two principal experience requirements: gas EPC or marine construction.

These criteria broaden competition, but do not necessarily ensure that the eventual contractor is suitable for the task.

No ordinary construction project

The successful contractor will not inherit a clean construction site, complete engineering documentation and new equipment. It will take responsibility for unfinished facilities left by the previous consortium, with substantial technical uncertainties.

Technip Energies’ assessment following termination of the earlier contract identified gaps in documentation, concerns about the condition of materials and the need to revisit elements of the design. The new contractor must inspect existing structures, verify equipment, address deterioration, complete documentation and update safety studies.

It must also establish compatibility between the onshore facilities, the jetty and Prometheas. All components must be tested, certified and operated safely together.

The obligation should be to deliver an integrated, safe and fully functioning LNG terminal, not merely to finish outstanding works. Directly relevant experience and the quality of the proposed project team matter more than company turnover.

Who can actually deliver?

At least three of the interested companies have substantial international experience in major energy or marine infrastructure projects. Others may also be capable, particularly through well-structured consortia.

But formal compliance with the low eligibility requirements is not proof of the ability to rescue a distressed LNG project. Evaluation must examine the proposed team, comparable experience, engineering approach and commissioning record.

For meaningful competition, ideally at least three technically credible contractors should remain through the final bidding stage. Otherwise, Etyfa could end up with a sizeable shortlist but very few genuine choices.

The next stage is decisive

Defa aims to complete prequalification by the end of 2026 and award the contract before summer 2027, with work expected to begin in the second half of 2027.

During the next stage, shortlisted contractors receive the detailed technical specifications and contractual terms needed to price the job. Only then will it become clear which are genuinely prepared to undertake the project.

Experienced international contractors are unlikely to accept unlimited liability for unknown defects inherited from another company. If Etyfa attempts to transfer excessive, unquantifiable risks, credible bidders may seek contractual protections, include substantial contingencies in their prices or withdraw altogether.

That risks fewer bidders, higher costs and disputes. Etyfa must insist on safety, performance and quality, while distinguishing defects that can reasonably be assessed from legacy liabilities that cannot. Clear responsibility for surveys, remedial works, design changes and unforeseen conditions is essential.

Transparent evaluation

The contract will be awarded using the best price-quality ratio. A cheap but incapable contractor could prove extraordinarily expensive. Yet quality scoring can become subjective unless the criteria and weightings are clear, objective and documented.

The detailed balance between technical and financial scores has not yet been made public. Technical capability, specific LNG experience, the proposed personnel, commissioning expertise and the credibility of the completion schedule should carry substantial weight.

An unrealistically low bid could later become a succession of claims for additional money and time. The previous failure demands transparent scoring, clarifications and exclusions, not just a low headline price.

Who will supervise?

Technip Energies was appointed in 2025 to provide project management services and has helped assess the existing facilities and prepare the new tender. However, its precise role in evaluating bids has not been publicly clarified. Nor is it clear whether its remit covers full construction supervision, certification of completed works and commissioning oversight.

Etyfa’s Evaluation Committee is responsible for the tender process and reports to the Board. But the contracting authority also needs independent, technically authoritative support throughout this process and contract execution. Following the end of Hill International’s involvement, these responsibilities should be explicitly defined before a new contract is awarded.

Costs continue to rise

Published estimates suggest approximately €300 million has already been spent without producing an operational terminal. Adding the new tender estimate of €180 million brings the indicative total to €480 million. This is not a reliable final-cost forecast: additional works, financing, Prometheas-related expenses and international arbitration could alter the outcome.

On 12 October, Finance Minister Makis Keravnos confirmed that Vasiliko features among the state’s fiscal risks, citing project guarantees and the unresolved arbitration. Meanwhile, the absence of gas continues to burden electricity generation and consumers.

When will gas reach EAC?

Even if a contract is awarded before summer 2027 and construction proceeds without major problems, the planned building period is two years. Testing, certification, commissioning and the arrangements needed to connect to and supply gas to the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) must follow.

Consequently, gas-fired electricity generation cannot realistically be considered assured before 2030.

The decisive milestone is not contract signature, construction completion or even the terminal’s formal handover. It is the reliable delivery of gas to EAC and its actual use in power generation.

Cyprus needs the terminal, but not another troubled contract. Success will be measured by the selection of a capable contractor, effective independent supervision, an accountable contracting authority, control of final costs and, above all, when natural gas finally reaches EAC.

That is the real lesson from the failure of the previous contract.

The critical September White House summit between the US and Chinese presidents yielded a complex mix of relative market stabilisation and unresolved geopolitical tensions. Despite intense competition, the two leaders attempted to bridge their deep geopolitical differences, if only temporarily, given that structural fractures remain unresolved.

The most immediate relief for markets came with the leaders’ decision to grant a two-month extension of the trade truce until January 10, 2027. By avoiding, for the time being, tariff escalations, at least until after the US midterm elections, both governments shielded global supply chains from an additional shock.

According to details released by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, this two-month window serves as a vital “compliance period” intended to test whether Beijing will fully honour its previous agricultural purchase quotas.

The extended truce also safely carries the global logistics sector through the peak Q4 holiday shipping season by temporarily suspending a heavily disputed hike on Section 301 shipping fees.

Concurrently, the activation of the newly established Trade Council led to mutual tariff reductions on commercial goods, worth $30 billion. These cuts are restricted to non-security sectors, affecting around 14.5 per cent of bilateral trade, based on 2025 data.

The US relief primarily targets Chinese consumer goods, such as small electrical appliances and toys, providing temporary breathing room for American consumers.

To balance the trade deficit, Beijing committed to increasing purchases of US agricultural products, timber and seafood, while also importing at least 10 million metric tons of US coal annually in 2027 and 2028.

It should be noted that the reciprocal tariff cuts by Beijing intentionally left out American soybeans, indicating that China is strategically holding back a key agricultural import lever for future negotiations. A specialised working group will be tasked with finalising the details before the end of 2026.

Notably, a Trade Council and an Investment Council were established. These bodies establish permanent channels of communication, aimed at resolving day-to-day trade friction and preventing low-level disagreements from escalating into large-scale confrontations.

Furthermore, the summit witnessed significant presence from elite American tech executives, including Apple’s Tim Cook, Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Tesla’s Elon Musk. Their attendance at the White House state dinner underscored the intense corporate lobbying taking place to safeguard American technology investments and corporate operations located inside mainland China.

However, core conflicts in the security sphere remain deadlocked. The summit yielded no progress on the issue of rare earth elements. China maintained its monopoly over these supply chains, leaving Western industries exposed to export restrictions.

Correspondingly, the US refused to negotiate its strict semiconductor embargoes and advanced technology export controls.

Furthermore, no progress was made on the sensitive issue of Taiwan, as Beijing pressed unsuccessfully for a shift in Washington’s official diplomatic terminology.

Disagreements were equally sharp on the digital front. Although a dialogue on Artificial Intelligence was announced to establish safety boundaries, substantive policy alignment failed.

Washington strongly opposes international regulatory frameworks that could threaten the American competitive advantage against Chinese firms.

Even as both presidents publicly agreed that AI systems should remain “under human control,” the actual bilateral talks scheduled for late November are largely viewed by analysts as a basic crisis-management channel rather than a step toward genuine technological cooperation.

In conclusion, the aftermath of the summit resembles a temporary bandage. Short-term measures averted an immediate trade war and stabilised trade flows until the end of the year.

However, by leaving the structural pressures of technological decoupling and mineral monopolies intact, the summit postponed the economic showdown until 2027.

In essence, the two leaders appear to have kept the peace just long enough to ensure mutual attendance at the upcoming APEC summit in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in Miami later this year.

Not unexpectedly, the fragility of the truce became clear immediately after the summit when, at a campaign rally, President Trump revived threats of horizontal tariffs of up to 300 per cent on countries that do not shift their production to American soil.