France and Germany Seek New EU Power to Cut Market Access Over Trade Distortions
France and Germany have proposed giving the European Commission powers to respond within days to serious trade distortions, including the possibility of restricting access to the EU single market. The initiative comes as European concern grows over Chinese subsidies, industrial overcapacity and dependence on critical imports.
French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have called for a new European Union trade instrument capable of acting rapidly against countries whose economic practices cause serious disruption to the European market.
In a joint initiative sent to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Monday, the two governments proposed strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to what they describe as systemic market distortions, including dumping, widespread subsidies and restrictions affecting access to critical supplies.
The Franco-German proposal does not formally identify China as its target. However, many of the practices it describes correspond directly to long-standing European concerns over Chinese industrial policy, including excess manufacturing capacity, state support and restrictions on exports of critical minerals.
The initiative represents a further development in a harder European approach towards Beijing. EU Today reported last week that China had warned it would respond if the EU introduced new restrictions against Chinese companies or products.
Macron and Merz are proposing two additional instruments.
The first would be intended to reduce European companies’ dependence on single suppliers for strategically important products and raw materials. The second would allow the EU to restrict access to its internal market when a third country uses political or economic measures that seriously undermine fair competition.
Under the proposal, the Commission could initiate countermeasures unless a qualified majority of EU governments voted to block them. That would reverse the normal political dynamic in which Brussels must first secure sufficient support before acting.
German officials have argued that the EU needs powers comparable in effect to the United States’ Section 301 trade measures or China’s ability to restrict exports of critical raw materials.
The Commission has welcomed the Franco-German intervention as a contribution to its work on economic security and global trade imbalances. Any new instrument would, however, require legislation and approval by both EU governments and the European Parliament before it could be used.
The proposal comes amid growing concern in both Paris and Berlin over the effect of subsidised Chinese production on European manufacturers.
Germany’s position is particularly significant. Berlin has traditionally been more cautious than Paris about measures that could restrict trade with China, reflecting the importance of the Chinese market to German carmakers, engineering companies and chemical producers.
That position has shifted as German industry faces increased competition from Chinese electric vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods.
EU Today has previously examined the emerging Franco-German alignment on tougher China trade defences and demands from German manufacturers for broader European action rather than product-by-product investigations.
The new proposals go considerably further by seeking a mechanism capable of dealing with entire sectors and acting much more quickly than conventional anti-dumping proceedings.
Chemicals, PET plastics and hybrid vehicles are among sectors identified in the Franco-German document as areas where additional action may be required.
The timing is also significant. EU leaders are due to discuss trade relations with China at their summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, while Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is expected to hold talks with Chinese officials beforehand.
The Commission is already attempting to balance two objectives: maintaining Europe’s access to the Chinese market while reducing strategic dependencies that could be used as political leverage.
The Franco-German plan would give Brussels another instrument at the more coercive end of that policy. Its eventual importance will depend on whether governments agree to create it and how readily they would permit the Commission to use it against a major trading partner.