In Judaism, circumcision, known as Brit Milah, is a religious ritual where a male infant's foreskin is removed on the eighth day after birth. ''Circumcision has been shown throughout decades of medical research to not be harmful to baby boys. In fact it has medical benefits - which is why so many people choose to circumcise their children outside of religion. ''Attacking circumcision in this manner - only when it relates to Jewish babies, is an attack on Jewish life in Europe,'' the Jewish leaders said in their open letter, writes European Jewish Press.
First program of its kind outside Israel will provide qualified Mohalim with advanced medical and safety training, practical assessment and certification under the supervision of an international network of urologists, paediatricians, physicians and medical scientists.
Against the backdrop of growing legal and political challenges to Jewish religious circumcision in Belgium and other European countries, the European Jewish Association (EJA) and the Rabbinical Centre of Europe (RCE) announced Tuesday the establishment of the Centre of Excellence for Religious Male Circumcision (CERM) and the launch of what is believed to be the first comprehensive medical and professional certification program of its kind for qualified Mohalim outside Israel.
Health and Animal Welfare Commissioner Oliver Várhelyi commended EJA for their efforts and stated: “Jewish life and Jewish religious practice belong in Europe. Our responsibility is to ensure that longstanding traditions can continue in a framework that meets the highest standards of child welfare, medical safety and professional responsibility, in line with European standards. The Centre of Excellence for Religious Male Circumcision offers a constructive and credible model for doing exactly that.”
Based in Brussels, CERM will provide already-qualified Mohalim – trained Jewish religious practitioners who perform Brit Milah – with structured supplementary medical and safety training, practical assessment and certification. The program will operate under the supervision of an international network of urologists, paediatricians, physicians and medical scientists, with a Medical and Scientific Council responsible for reviewing and approving its clinical protocols, certification assessments and professional standards. The program aims to work with health authorities across Europe to build confidence in qualified Mohalim as the practitioners best placed to perform religious circumcision, ensuring their competence is recognized through rigorous medical standards and independent supervision – rather than becoming a matter of political debate.
The curriculum covers the medical and safety framework surrounding the procedure, including newborn assessment, hygiene and infection prevention, infant welfare, bleeding and wound care, recognition of complications, emergency response and infant basic life support, medical referral and aftercare. Certification will include practical assessment, realistic clinical scenarios and emergency simulations, with particular emphasis on recognising warning signs, understanding the limits of competence and knowing when to postpone a procedure or seek medical assistance.
Brit Milah, traditionally performed on the eighth day after birth, is one of Judaism’s oldest and most fundamental religious practices.
Rabbi Menachem Margolin, Chairman of the European Jewish Association and the Rabbinical Centre of Europe, said: “Brit Milah has been at the heart of Jewish life for thousands of years. Faced with growing challenges to the practice and, in particular, to the ability of trained Mohalim to perform it in parts of Europe, we decided that our response must go beyond defending our religious freedom.”
”We are creating the highest possible professional framework to support it. For the first time outside Israel on this scale, our trained Mohalim will have access to a comprehensive program combining medical and safety training with practical assessment, certification and clear professional standards.” We deliberately called this a Centre of Excellence. When it comes to the welfare and safety of a child, our ambition should never simply be to meet a minimum standard. We want excellence – and we want that excellence to be transparent, documented and capable of being independently demonstrated,” he added.
CERM’s launch follows a period of repeated legal and political challenges to religious circumcision in Europe. Belgium has become a particular focal point, with the status of non-physician Mohalim subject to significant legal and political uncertainty, while debates and attempts to impose restrictions have also arisen in other European countries.
The Centre has been established as a practical response: to strengthen medical safeguards, professional standards and oversight surrounding Brit Milah, while helping safeguard the ability of Jewish communities to continue practising an essential element of Jewish life in Europe.
“Our members were asking us for a serious and sustainable answer,” Rabbi Margolin added. “We listened. For the first time outside Israel on this scale, qualified Mohalim will have access to a comprehensive program combining medical and safety training with practical assessment, certification and clear professional standards.”
CERM builds on the existing training and experience of qualified Mohalim by adding a documented, standardised and independently assessed medical and professional layer. Its “Recognise, Prevent, Stop, Refer” safety model is designed to ensure practitioners can identify warning signs, prevent avoidable risks, act within clearly defined limits and promptly refer an infant to medical professionals when required.
The program draws on established medical and scientific guidance and will be subject to continuing medical review. Its Medical Officers and Advisory Board bring together expertise from Belgium, the United Kingdom, Israel, Italy and Germany, including specialists with direct experience of Israel’s formal system for the certification and supervision of Mohalim. Among them are Brussels-based urologist Dr. Sas Bar-Moshe; British physician and veteran Mohel Dr. Joseph Spitzer, Medical Officer of the UK’s Initiation Society since 2003; and Dr. Michael Ben Akon, Director of the Children’s Division at Laniado Hospital in Israel, a certified Mohel and a Ministry of Health representative on Israel’s inter-ministerial committee responsible for the certification and supervision of Mohalim.
The medical and scientific framework is intended not only to establish standards at the point of certification, but to provide ongoing professional oversight, with protocols and assessment standards reviewed as medical guidance and professional practice evolve. CERM ultimately aims to become a European reference centre for religious male circumcision, promoting evidence-based medical and professional standards and facilitating ongoing cooperation between Mohalim, medical professionals, Jewish communities, policymakers and public authorities.
Rabbi Margolin said: “The debate in Europe is too often presented as a choice between religious freedom and the welfare of the child. We reject that premise. The two are not in conflict. The stronger and more transparent the professional standards surrounding Brit Milah, the stronger the case for protecting the freedom of Jewish families to practise it. Europe cannot claim to protect Jewish life while repeatedly placing one of its most fundamental practices in doubt. CERM offers a constructive European answer: preserve religious freedom, demand excellence and make that excellence transparent.”
CERM official Website: www.britmilah.eu
Brussels/Copenhage (enr) – Increasing the uptake of renewable energy is key to safeguarding Europe’s energy security as the EU seeks to heavily reduce CO2 emissions and become independent from imported fossil fuels, European Environment Agency (EEA) Executive Director Leena Ylä-Mononen said.
“Shifting to the sustainable future by improving our circular economy, uptake of renewables, improving energy efficiency – all this is central to Europe’s push to reduce our dependency and reliance on energy imports, fossil fuels, and imports of natural resources,” she said in an interview with the European Newsroom (enr) published Tuesday.
Following a summer leaving Europe scarred by heatwaves, drought and wildfires across the continent, the EEA chief renewed calls to speed up the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate “the increasing magnitude of climate-related disasters and related losses.” She argued that breaking away from fossil fuels and accelerating the transition to renewable energy is a crucial piece of the puzzle.
At the same time, she pointed to the typical increase of gas prices during “a period of cold weather.” Ylä-Mononen called for for “flexibilities” when it comes to energy storage, “so that we would have a bit of more buffer for the citizens when the hard times come.”
In a report published in July, the EEA warned that the EU “remains vulnerable to external fossil fuel supply shocks, as gas prices still drive EU wholesale electricity prices.” The report said gas price fluctuations in early 2026 cost the EU 13 billion Euro by mid-April while consumers saved 29 billion Euro thanks to renewable energy, making it “the system’s most effective shock absorber.”
Ylä-Mononen said that “many aspects and solutions are needed indeed to protect also the most vulnerable households.” She cited innovative solutions such as using electric vehicles’ batteries to power homes “as a specific reserve then to feed back in electricity when the prices are high.”
The EEA chief pointed out that ramping up local renewable energy sources was particularly difficult for cities. “Cities in particular have a challenge because their whole energy and also the mobility infrastructure is based very much still on the fossil economy.”
Cities had “limited possibilities to have individual windmills,” she said. However, she added, solar panels are “a feasible option, especially if the city or the national authorities are supporting that type of investment.”
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is the EU agency that provides independent environmental data, assessments and analysis to support policymaking in Europe.
Heat, drought and water scarcity could fundamentally change agriculture in parts of Europe, with some crops no longer viable in the driest areas of the Mediterranean, European Environment Agency (EEA) Executive Director Leena Ylä-Mononen said.
“Some crops will not grow anymore, especially in the most arid Mediterranean, southern European area,” Ylä-Mononen said in an interview with correspondents of the European Newsroom (enr) published Tuesday. More intensive irrigation would not necessarily provide a solution because of water possible water scarcity. Some land currently used for farming might therefore no longer be suitable for agriculture in some regions in Europe, she said.
This summer gave the “clearest possible illustration” of what Europe is facing, she told the enr. “Severe droughts have disrupted agriculture, our transport, and even energy infrastructure. And we have seen intense heatwaves across many parts of Europe that have had huge impacts on the infrastructure, health and well-being of people.” Harvests were coming in late and smaller, “so we may have even food security issues this winter,” Ylä-Mononen warned.
The effects are spreading beyond Europe’s traditional dry zones, according to Ylä-Mononen. She pointed to drought in Ukraine and Hungary, as well as unusually dry conditions in the United Kingdom and her home country, Finland. Although northern Europe could become suitable for some additional crops, it was unlikely to compensate for recurring losses caused by drought, floods and extreme weather elsewhere, she added.
Ylä-Mononen urged European politicians to look beyond the next election and plan for the climate risks already foreseeable over the next decade. “This kind of short-termism is not going to help us,” she said, arguing that infrastructure and agricultural investment decisions needed to take account of ten-, 20- and 50-year time horizons.
The warning comes as the EU’s Joint Research Centre reports drought conditions across half of the EU and the United Kingdom, with low river flows and deteriorating conditions for some crops in several parts of Europe.
In an assessment released in March – ahead of this year’s summer heatwaves – the EEA said “at present, drought (54%), heavy rain (21%), frost (16%), and hail (9%) together account for 80% of agricultural losses in the EU.”
Ylä-Mononen said Europe could no longer treat climate adaptation as an optional policy to be addressed when budgets allow. Heat and drought are already affecting agriculture, water resources, transport and energy systems, and some damage could have been avoided through earlier investment, she said.
The EEA chief stressed that adaptation must complement, not replace, mitigation: Europe needs both to reduce emissions and to prepare for climate impacts that will continue even under ambitious emissions cuts. But the costs of both action and inaction are rising.
Estimates of adaptation costs in the sectors transport, energy and agriculture cited by the EEA range from 53 billion Euro to 137 billion Euro per year until 2050, depending on the scenario of temperature rise above pre-industrial levels.
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is the EU agency that provides independent environmental data, assessments and analysis to support policymaking in Europe.
In response to the massive flash flood that has caused over 300 deaths in Nepal, the European Union has allocated €2 million in humanitarian aid to support affected communities. This emergency funding will help address immediate needs including as food, healthcare, clean water and sanitation. EU-funded partners are already providing help on the ground.
This assistance comes in addition to the almost €3 million in humanitarian aid allocated at the start of the year for Nepal for disaster preparedness. EU-funded partners in the country started to provide help immediately after the disaster, with prepositioned shelter and distribution of relief items. The EU is also deploying its Rapid Response Coordinator for Asia to help coordinate the EU's response.
To support the local response, the EU activated the Copernicus satellite service to provide maps of the affected area.
Preparedness and Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib said:
"Roads washed away. Villages cut off. Families searching for missing loved ones. The flash floods in Nepal have shattered communities already rebuilding from past disasters. The EU stands with them, allocating €2 million to bring urgent healthcare, food, water & shelter."
The EU agri-food sector expanded its positive trade balance in the first six months of 2026, with a trade surplus of €23.9 billion, €1.4 billion higher than in the same time period in 2025. Cumulative exports for January–June totalled €117.2 billion, down by 2% compared with 2025, mainly due to declines in values of exports of cocoa products, pigmeat and olive oil.
Cumulative exports to Egypt increased by €278 million (+28%) year-on-year, driven mainly by wheat, while exports to Ukraine rose by €247 million (+12%) and those to India by €174 million (+26%). Trade with Gulf countries was impacted by the disruption to maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz, with exports to the United Arab Emirates falling by €395 million (-25%). Among product categories, exports of spirits and liqueurs increased by €405 million (+10%) while exports of coffee, tea, cocoa and spices fell by €1.1 billion (-16%).
Cumulative imports reached €93.4 billion, down €3.6 billion (-4%) year-on-year. Despite this, imports from Brazil increased by €425 million (+5%), mainly due to higher soya bean imports, while imports from Argentina and Guatemala also rose. Among product categories, imports of coffee, tea, cocoa and spices fell by €3.6 billion (-17%), while cereal imports declined by €715 million (-15%). By contrast, imports of fruit and nuts increased by €503 million (+3%), while sunflower seed imports doubled following two poor EU crop years.
The widening EU agri-food trade surplus underlines the sector's continued competitiveness and ability to adapt to changing market conditions.
More insights as well as detailed tables are available below in the latest edition of the monthly EU agri-food trade report.
MEPs return to business from their summer vacation to a packed programme this week. An assortment of committee meetings awaits the deputies when they get back to their offices in Brussels. First up will be the issue of the devastating wildfires this summer and EU preparedness to handle such evens. Today (1 September), MEPs from the Climate, Environment and Food Safety Committee will quiz Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management Commissioner Hadja Lahbib on the EU’s response to the summer wildfires across the continent, and discuss lessons learnt. Mental health at work is another issue that will confront MEPs during the coming week.
In a vote on Wednesday (2 September), the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is set to demand the Commission propose legislation to protect the mental and physical health of workers. The aim is also to prevent, eliminate or reduce work-related psychosocial risks and ensure safe and dignified working conditions. Childhood cancer is another item on the agenda. Together with a 10-year-old survivor and sectoral experts, on Wednesday MEPs in the Public Health Committee will discuss aspects of paediatric cancer. This includes innovation, public investment, and policy recommendations.
Parliament’s President Roberta Metsola will open the debate. Greenland, which has come under the spotlight during President Trump’s 2nd term, is also up for debate. The Development and Foreign Affairs committees will host Greenland’s minister for foreign affairs, business and minerals, Múte Bourup Egede, on Wednesday. The meeting takes place in the context of ongoing discussions on updating the rules governing the EU’s relationship with Greenland, and other overseas countries and territories (OCTs), and future financial support for Greenland under the EU’s next long-term budget. Another issue in Brussels will be that of Afghanistan/refugees and asylum seekers.
On Thursday (3 September), MEPs in the Subcommittee on Human Rights will discuss the return of refugees and asylum seekers from the EU to Afghanistan following Commission meetings with Taliban-appointed representatives and in the light of the human rights situation in the country. Ireland has taken over the rotating presidency and Irish presidency priorities also come under the spotlight next week. Ireland’s ministers will continue to present their priorities in meetings with the relevant parliamentary committees. Ireland holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU until the end of 2026. On Tuesday morning,meanwhile, Roberta Metsola will host an informal breakfast with the permanent representatives of the governments of the member states to the EU.
The Meteosat Third Generation Imager 2 satellite (MTG-I2) has successfully passed its first critical post-launch milestones, completing the first full Meteosat Third Generation constellation in orbit.
MTG-I2 lifts off on board an Ariane 6 rocket from Europe’s Spaceport in French Guiana on 27 August 2026. Credit: Arianespace livestream.
The imager satellite MTG-I2 is safely in orbit and operating as expected following its successful launch today at 22:11 CEST on board an Ariane 6 rocket from Europe’s Spaceport in French Guiana.
Our teams have established communication with the spacecraft, which has also deployed its solar panels to ensure its autonomous production of energy. MTG-I2 is in perfect shape to start its Launch and Early Operations Phase that will bring it to a higher orbit, 36 000km above Earth over the following two weeks, where a longer period of calibration and validation of its instruments will begin.
This summer’s extreme weather and wildfires have underlined the importance of timely observations for weather monitoring and emergency response. MTG-I2 will provide more rapidly updated observations over Europe through EUMETSAT’s rapid scan service, refreshing imagery every 2.5 minutes. This will give forecasters a much timelier view of fast-developing weather systems, helping national meteorological services identify hazardous developments sooner and support timely warnings for severe storms, hail, damaging winds and flash floods.
Its dedicated fire-detection channels will also help identify and characterise active fires, while the frequent imagery will support closer monitoring of how fires and associated smoke develop.
MTG-I2 joins Meteosat-12, the first imager launched in December 2022, and MTG-S1, which was launched in July 2025 and is expected to become operational before the end of 2026. Together, the two imagers and the sounder satellite will form the first full operational MTG constellation.
Phil Evans, Director-General of EUMETSAT, said: “With MTG-I2, we are unlocking the complete capabilities of this extraordinary European system.
“In particular, MTG-I2 will enable much more frequent observations over Europe, giving forecasters a more continuous view of rapidly developing weather and helping national meteorological services provide timely and reliable warnings.
“The Meteosat Third Generation system is the most sophisticated and innovative geostationary meteorological system in the world, and a major European achievement. It is already delivering huge benefits to forecasters and users. At its heart is EUMETSAT, working with ESA and European industry to deliver this new generation of weather satellites and the services built around them. EUMETSAT will operate and maintain the full system throughout its lifetime, delivering reliable data and services to its Member States and users worldwide.”
More frequent, higher-resolution observations
As the second imaging satellite in the constellation, MTG-I2 will use its Flexible Combined Imager (FCI) to deliver EUMETSAT’s rapid scan service over Europe and Northern Africa, alongside the 10-minute full disc scan service provided by Meteosat-12.
The instrument will provide state-of-the-art observations twice as frequently as the rapid-scan service of the previous satellite generation. Combined with four high-resolution channels providing detail down to 500 meters, this will allow forecasters to track fast-developing weather in greater detail and at much shorter intervals.
With power and communications established, EUMETSAT teams will now guide the satellite towards its operational position, activate its systems and begin preparations for commissioning and operational service.
For further updates on MTG-I2, visit EUMETSAT’s launch hub, which features news, interviews, and insights into the satellite’s journey.
Find all relevant information, biographies of speakers, videos and testimonials on our press kit.
About EUMETSAT – Trusted in Space. Essential on Earth.
Since 1986, EUMETSAT, Europe’s meteorological satellite agency, has monitored weather and climate from space. From its headquarters in Darmstadt, Germany, it operates a fleet of satellites observing the Earth system and delivers real-time data and imagery to its 30 member states to help protect communities and support critical sectors. Four Meteosat satellites in geostationary orbit provide continuous observations of fast developing weather events, while two polar-orbiting Metop satellites deliver data critical for forecasts up to 10 days ahead. EUMETSAT also supports European sovereignty policies, operating services under the Copernicus programme and leading development and management of the data lake for the Destination Earth initiative. For more information, visit the EUMETSAT website.
The Durban Conference in South Africa in September 2001 was not just an event; it was a turning point. It was the modern-day Wannsee that planned the contemporary destruction of the Jewish people. I was there for the Italian newspaper, La Stampa. The stench of something rotten was already emanating from the preparations for the great gathering “against racism” convened by the United Nations, with the participation of an enormous number of NGOs—some 3,000—all of them with knives between their teeth, determined to demonstrate that, under the banner of human rights, the real enemy was Israel, writes Fiamma Nirenstein.
It was there, even more than with the U.N.'s “Zionism is racism” resolution of 1975, that Stalin’s path was resumed. In 1952-53, he had initiated and theorized a new great hunt against the Jews, inventing the blood libel of the “Jewish doctors’ plot” and staging the Slánský trial. The systematic murder and deportation of Jews were interrupted by the dictator’s death in 1953. But with theorists such as Maxime Rodinson and Francis Crémieux, the premises were laid for declaring Israel the new enemy of humanity.
The positions that ultimately led to Durban maintained that “the Israeli government has long been simply an agent of American imperialism.” The supposed proof lay in the malign role of Jews in the world. The doctors accused in the so-called conspiracy—all innocent, their confessions extracted under torture—became “identical to the Nazi doctors of Dachau,” in the pay of the Americans. The inversion begins This was the beginning of the inversion that, on Oct. 7, 2023, led to Israel and the Jews being accused of genocide instead of the evident intentions of Hamas and its barbaric determination being condemned. At Durban, the death sentence against Israel went hand in hand, for the first time, with the preemptive legitimization of terrorism, now carried out by “freedom fighters” rather than the terrorists of Munich or Fiumicino.
At a demonstration along the battered streets on the outskirts of Durban, just days before Sept. 11, the crowd marched behind portraits of its mastermind, Osama bin Laden. Along the dusty road, young NGO activists called—as their documents did—on “all of civil society,” from the Maya to the Tibetans, everyone oppressed by racism, to embrace the struggle against Israel and transform it into the fundamental human-rights struggle. When I told the editors at my newspaper, La Stampa, they replied that I had an obsession with that poor Saudi shepherd. The conference was organized by a United Nations that had by then been captured by the great Third World and Islamic blocs that had reliably provided the Soviet Union with a majority. “Zionism is racism,” the 1975 resolution, was an addendum to the death sentence against Judaism following Hitler’s attempt to eliminate it from the planet.
Israel was the new target of antisemitism, invariably linked to anti-Americanism and viewed as the spearhead of the colonial and imperialist West. Every truth was erased. Israel’s almost desperate attempts to share the territory and make territorial concessions to the Arab world were rejected time and again. In 2000, after Arafat had been brought back despite his appalling embrace of terrorism, the Second Intifada erupted. By the time Durban took place, we were in the midst of the Intifada—a preliminary 7 October.
Its preparatory documents had been written and discussed in Strasbourg, Santiago and, astonishingly, Tehran, where since 1979 an Islamist regime had ruled whose foundational principle was the destruction of the State of Israel. Israel as absolute evil In Durban, Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat and Robert Mugabe converged, and the Jewish question was inserted into the heart of demands for billions in reparations for slavery. Israel obviously had nothing to do with this history, but it was portrayed as absolute evil. The Palestinianism of Durban held that Israel was racist, imperialist, colonialist and genocidal—and therefore even a slave-owning power. All these adjectives are meaningless when applied to a country that represents the miraculous return home, disarmed and hungry, of the people indigenous to that land, armed only with hoes and books.
They armed themselves only when, awakening from the dream, they realized that their lives were once again at risk. And even then, Israel continued to surrender large pieces of territory in the search for peace. I was there In Durban, I rented a room inside a compound surrounded by high walls. I shared it with a journalist from the Italian left-leaning daily, La Repubblica, who was thrilled by the opportunity to encounter Castro and the other idols of the era in the corridors—and, with a little luck, perhaps Nelson Mandela as well. There was the official conference, the domain of Mary Robinson, who purported to moderate the international proceedings and restrain them from excessively harsh resolutions that had in fact been planned from the beginning.
Then there were the stadium and other NGO gathering places, where antisemitic hatred was expressed in every possible way: leaflets, speeches, songs and actual physical hunts for Jews. Several times I had to run away and seek refuge in a building belonging to the local Jewish community, where one could also find something to eat. Thousands of NGO members wore T-shirts bearing the image of Mohammed al-Dura alongside the conference logo. The production of leaflets about Palestinian suffering was endless. Jews were depicted with missiles and knives, blood dripping from their mouths and murdered children. The word “genocide” was already commonplace. From the podium, in a crowded, darkened hall, Fidel Castro, while demanding financial reparations for entire continents for slavery and colonialism, spoke of “the terrible genocide being perpetrated today against our Palestinian brothers” by Israel’s then-prime minister, Ariel Sharon, whom he described as a far-right leader acting in alliance with the “hegemonic superpowers.” Arafat celebrated the universal acceptance of his worldview, describing the situation as the “expression of the racist colonial conspiracy” to uproot the Palestinians and conquer their land. In short, the troops of that global war had finally assembled—a war that only days later would find its expression in the attack on the Twin Towers. That was the true meaning of Durban.
And the Palestinian cause, together with the destruction of Israel, was baptized as the indispensable prerequisite for every revolutionary struggle. The astonishment and disbelief in Israel and the United States were enormous. After everything the Jews had endured, and while they were suffering through the Intifada, finding themselves once again facing such a broad and senseless assault on their right to self-determination and self-defense, their right to return home and the very liberal-democratic nature of their country seemed like a nightmare. The two delegations under attack took days to decide to leave. Israel continued to insist, as Diaspora Affairs Minister Michael Melchior said, that racism—the supposed subject of the conference—was so important to Jews that the country wanted to participate in the discussion and the decisions. In the end, the United States and Israel had to walk out. Canada and Europe remained, but the European position sought an impossible compromise. It proposed restoring the Holocaust to the final documents as the worst expression of racism.
The interventions by Italy’s Renato Ruggiero, Germany’s Joschka Fischer and, in the corridors, the excellent Margherita Boniver—the only one who understood fully, to the point of tears—were hesitant and moderate. Fischer had the strength to say that the right of the Jews to their own state was indisputable. But he returned to the Palestinians’ right to a state and once again forgot that Israel had never called that right into question since 1948, despite its countless offers. ‘Did not happen in a vacuum’ By contrast, the denial of the Jews’ right to have their own state like every other people reached its paroxysm on Oct. 7. And once again the United Nations lined up against Israel, as it had at Durban. So it was with the words of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who, instead of expressing horror and condemnation, responded with his infamous statement that the 7 October attacks “did not happen in a vacuum”. It is true: They did not happen in a vacuum. Durban is a milestone in the antisemitic catastrophe that once again torments the world today, and the United Nations is its prophet.
Measures adopted by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to address unsustainable Russian mackerel fishing in the North-East Atlantic officially enter into force. Initiated by a proposal from the European Union, these measures aim to protect mackerel stock currently under severe conservation pressure due to years of overfishing.
In 2026, Russia unilaterally increased its quota to 67,548 tonnes, or 22.5% of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), nearly five times its 2004 quota.
The NEAFC measure sets a limit for Russian mackerel catches in international waters of 1,495 tonnes. Despite Russia’s objection, the measure prohibits other NEAFC members from facilitating Russia’s unsustainable fishing of mackerel in international waters in excess of that limit. Vessels from other NEAFC members may not tranship from, nor provide refuelling services to fishing vessels with Russian mackerel catches on board that exceed that 1,495 tonnes limit.
In addition, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Iceland are applying these restrictions within their respective national jurisdictions. Fishing vessels carrying Russian mackerel quantities above the agreed limits are barred from entering their ports.
The European Union decided to apply these NEAFC measures since 3 July 2026. As a result, this summer, the Union has already denied entry into its ports to fishing vessels with Russian mackerel on board caught in excess of the 1,495 tonnes limit.
While today's measures mark crucial progress, the European Commission emphasises that further steps are required to ensure the recovery of the mackerel stock. The Commission calls on all like-minded NEAFC partners to:
The North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is the regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) responsible for ensuring the long-term conservation and optimum utilisation of fishery resources in the North-East Atlantic. Its contracting parties are the European Union, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.
An anti-corruption investigation reaching from Ukraine's Presidential Office into the management of state-owned Sense Bank has raised questions far beyond the alleged laundering of UAH 150 million. At stake are the governance of nationalised assets, the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, a planned bank privatisation, an international arbitration worth more than $1 billion and Kyiv's credibility as it moves deeper into EU accession negotiations.
A week after Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators unveiled an operation carrying the improbable codename “Forrest Gump”, the affair has developed into one of the most consequential governance scandals to hit wartime Ukraine.
At its center is a deceptively simple question: Where did UAH 150 million — approximately $3.4 million — used to secure the release on bail of former Justice and Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, a centerpiece of the biggest corruption scandal of Zelensky government, actually come from?
The answer alleged by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau, NABU, and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, SAPO, is extraordinary.
Investigators say criminal proceeds under the supervision and manual management of deputy head of the Office of the president of Ukraine Iryna Mudra were converted into apparently legitimate funds through a series of companies and bank accounts. The source of the money is linked with the main suspect of another corruption scandal Timur Mindich, a close ally of president Zelensky, and the goal was to post bail for a suspect in the Operation Midas investigation into alleged corruption surrounding the state nuclear company Energoatom.
NABU's official account says members of a criminal organisation, acting with representatives and officials of a state-owned bank, arranged the laundering of UAH 150 million during June 2026. The cash was allegedly introduced into the legitimate financial system through accounts belonging to shell companies before being used for bail.
The most revealing evidence released by NABU is not just a bank transfer but Mudra’s own confessions, which give wider picture. In one recorded exchange, a female voice attributed to her says: “Corruption should be systematised and controlled… There is no need to fight it.” A male interlocutor adds: “And lead it.” This is said by one of the highest Ukrainian official in charge of judicial reform. Yet her own words are arguably more disturbing, presenting corruption not as an abuse to be eliminated but as a system to be organised and kept under political management.
Other recordings portray Mudra discussing state owned Sense Bank, where this money-loundering operation took place, as an asset to be under direct political control and used for enrichment. She recounts a proposed arrangement under which political figures politicians from Zelensky party Servant of the People would refrain from attacking the bank while “Sense Bank has to pay them”, and quotes an instruction she received from above to “take over the bank” because it contains “serious flows”. She then describes its managers as compliant figures who would carry money wherever a senior Presidential Office official instructed them, adding that they had “crawled” to her “like kittens” asking to be taken under protection.
NABU’s published recording also appear to show Mudra discussing protection from the institutions supposed to investigate such conduct. She asks how to mobilize votes for “our” candidates to NABU’s Public Oversight Council and describes SAP chief Oleksandr Klymenko as “not one of ours,” warning that if he secured a second term, “we’ll all be fucked.” Taken together, these phrases suggest something broader than participation in a single suspicious transaction: an alleged attempt to control a state-owned bank while influencing the bodies capable of investigating that control. If authenticated and confirmed in context, they would provide unusually direct evidence of political capture and consciousness of wrongdoing. Mudra denies criminal conduct and says the excerpts were released selectively and without their full context.
Revelations are shocking in many dimension and will have influence for years to come. One of the most striking revelation is usage of the state-owned Sense Bank as systemic money-laundering machine.
Sense Bank carries unusual political and legal baggage. Until 2022 it was known as Alfa-Bank Ukraine and was owned through corporate structures associated with ABH Holdings. Among the beneficial shareholders were Russian businessmen including Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven.
Ukraine subsequently imposed sanctions and, in July 2023, the government took Sense Bank into state ownership. Ukraine's Ministry of Finance says the measure was intended to maintain financial stability and protect depositors after sanctions were imposed on significant shareholders. The state today owns 100% of the bank.
It was therefore no ordinary commercial bank allegedly being exploited. It was an asset that Ukraine had taken into public ownership during wartime, in considerable part because of national-security concerns surrounding its previous ownership.
The source material examined by EU Reporter describes this as a crucial feature of the scandal: after nationalisation, the allegation is not simply that corrupt actors conducted transactions through Sense Bank, but that political influence was progressively established over the institution's governance.
That allegation remains contested and has not been established by a court. But documents released by NABU and widely reported by the Kyiv Independent and other leading Ukrainian media raise questions that are difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to ignore. The Kyiv Independent reported on 22 August that internal Nomination Committee records showed attempts to shape Sense Bank's supervisory board following nationalisation. The paper reported that Iryna Mudra, then deputy head of the Office of the President and chair of the committee involved in selecting supervisory-board members, strongly promoted Mykola Hladyshchenko for a place on the board despite objections concerning competence, potential conflicts of interest and previous employment. Hladyshchenko subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board.
The investigation also cited earlier leaked conversations in which prospective board candidates were allegedly described as “our guys”. Six people reportedly discussed in that context were subsequently appointed. EU Reporter has not independently authenticated those recordings or the leaked committee minutes, so their contents must remain attributed to the publications that obtained them.
However, now the anticorruption agencies established with support and guidance of the EU provide their findings suggesting that the bank was deliberately captured for criminal purposes. NABU says that by early June 2026 the alleged organisers had obtained de facto control of Sense Bank, enabling them to use accounts of controlled businesses in the laundering scheme. That allegation has now triggered action at the highest levels of financial regulation.
The alleged mechanics of the operation read more like a crime thriller than a banking-compliance investigation. According to the investigative material compiled in the source document and subsequent Ukrainian reporting, cash was allegedly concentrated through businesses associated with former MP and developer Maksym Mykytas before being exchanged or routed through companies capable of putting apparently legitimate non-cash funds into the banking system.
The source describes alleged deliveries of cash in bags and boxes, routing through companies including Metrobud and other entities, and discussions about how transactions could pass financial-monitoring controls.
Ukraine's anti-money-laundering regime establishes a UAH 400,000 statutory threshold for certain financial-monitoring obligations, alongside wider risk-based requirements. It would be inaccurate to suggest that every payment above UAH 400,000 is automatically prohibited; rather, banks are expected to identify, scrutinise and where necessary report transactions according to statutory and risk criteria.
The significance of the NABU allegation is therefore not simply the size of the payment. Investigators allege that people involved in the transaction were actively discussing how to overcome or circumvent compliance barriers. Published recordings attributed to members of the alleged group include discussion of a Sense Bank compliance official who could prevent the transaction. Mudra in one recording says that she received demand “from above” to fire a bank official who refuse to clear transaction. The scheme released by NABU paint a shocking picture: to make the transfer the bank's automated monitoring arrangements were temporarily taken out of operation during the transaction.
Those are NABU allegations presented to the court. But the Ukrainian government has already treated them seriously enough to take immediate action. This confirms that NABU accusations are well grounded.
On 19 August, the Cabinet suspended supervisory-board chairman Mykola Hladyshchenko for six months and initiated the suspension of management-board chairman Oleksii Stupak. The Finance Ministry explicitly said that its intervention was designed to address risks including the possible use of Sense Bank for money laundering and inadequate oversight of AML procedures.
The following day, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Andriy Pyshnyi went further. The NBU concluded that Hladyshchenko no longer satisfied the statutory independence requirements for membership of the supervisory board and opened proceedings to examine the collective suitability of the entire board. On 21 August, the government terminated Hladyshchenko's powers altogether. This regulatory reaction matters because it turns the episode from an allegation concerning individual criminal behaviour into a potential failure of corporate governance and banking supervision.
Sense Bank itself has said it is cooperating with the authorities. Following the NABU searches, the bank said it wanted the circumstances established “fully and objectively” and was providing investigators with the information required under legal procedures.
But the key question is different. There have been already multiple accusations of usage of nationalised Sense bank for allegedly corrupt or shadow schemes. NABU revelation did not come from nowhere and were not a separate incidental case. In previous NABU and journalistic investigations shocking facts of how bank has been used were presented. How was it possible that in time of war after nationalisation of one of the biggest banks it could turn into money-laundering machine?
The highest-profile suspect is Iryna Mudra. Mudra served as deputy head of the Office of the President and held responsibility for major legal and judicial-policy issues, including international mechanisms concerning Russian aggression and frozen Russian assets. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed her on 19 August. Presidential Decree No. 734/2026 confirms the dismissal but does not give a reason. NABU and SAPO served Mudra with a notice of suspicion. On 25 August, Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court ordered her held in custody for 60 days while allowing release if UAH 20 million bail is posted. Prosecutors had requested considerably higher bail.
Mudra denies criminal wrongdoing. She has argued that the published recordings have been presented selectively and out of context. Through her lawyers, she has said that she is cooperating with investigators and is prepared to answer their questions through the proper legal process. The underlying source document expressly records those objections and cautions concerning the provenance and quality of some recordings.
On 24 August President Zelenskyy said the anti-corruption bodies had “no questions” for him regarding the investigation.
There is another legal dimension. Former shareholder ABH Holdings commenced ICSID arbitration against Ukraine after the 2023 nationalisation, seeking more than $1 billion and alleging unlawful expropriation. UNCTAD records the dispute as ABH v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/24/1, concerning the former ownership of Alfa-Bank/Sense Bank. A separate proceeding, EMIS v Ukraine, also concerns alleged unlawful expropriation of Sense Bank.
The government's 2023 decision was taken in the context of sanctions and financial-stability considerations. Whether it complied with the relevant investment treaties is a matter for international tribunals, not for a criminal investigation conducted three years later. Nevertheless, evidence about how the asset was governed after nationalisation could become relevant contextual material in those proceedings.
ABH's case alleges that the taking of Sense Bank was unlawful. Ukraine will defend the nationalisation on its own legal and national-security grounds. A subsequent allegation that politically connected actors exploited the nationalised institution does not answer that legal dispute, but it could make the factual history of the asset considerably more uncomfortable for Kyiv. The source analysis supplied to EU Reporter correctly identifies this potential intersection. Forrest Gump can raise a question about bad faith in the original nationalisation and the consequences might go much further than a bail for one allegedly corrupt official.
And the cherry on the top: Mudra was also one of the officials responsible for formulating and publicly defending Ukraine’s position against ABH Holdings, the former owner of Sense Bank, in its more than $1 billion ICSID claim over the bank’s nationalisation; she later chaired Ukraine’s delegation in other major international proceedings. This creates a particularly damaging contradiction: an official who defended the takeover as a lawful national-security and financial-stability measure is now accused of helping place the same bank under political control and use it to launder criminal proceeds. The allegations do not by themselves prove that the 2023 nationalisation was unlawful, but they seriously undermine the factual and moral credibility of Ukraine’s case and offer ABH a powerful argument that the bank was not transferred into genuinely independent state management, but into a system vulnerable to political capture.
Forrest Gump is not an isolated investigation. Its roots reach into Operation Midas, NABU's investigation into alleged large-scale corruption at state nuclear operator Energoatom. NABU says Midas uncovered a criminal structure involved in substantial corruption and subsequent money laundering. Later investigative developments have continued into 2026.
The Forest Gump allegations concern money ultimately used as bail for an individual implicated in that wider investigation. This changes the character of the alleged conduct. If prosecutors prove their case, it would mean that money generated through criminal activity was not merely hidden or spent. It was allegedly recycled back into the criminal-justice system itself to secure the liberty of another suspect.
And here we come to the point vitally important for Brussels.
Ukraine formally opened negotiations on the EU's Fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. That cluster includes the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement and financial control. Crucially, it is the first cluster opened and the last to close, and the European Commission has made clear that progress under it determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.
Ukraine is simultaneously receiving extraordinary financial support from the European Union. The Ukraine Facility provides up to €50 billion between 2024 and 2027, and support is tied to democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, sound financial management, anti-corruption safeguards and reform commitments.
The issue for Brussels is therefore not whether corruption exists in Ukraine. No serious accession process operates on the assumption that candidate countries are free of corruption.
The more important test is whether institutions can discover it, investigate it, prosecute it and correct the governance failures that allowed it without political obstruction. Viewed from that perspective, Forrest Gump presents two competing narratives. The negative interpretation is obvious: people occupying some of the highest positions in the Ukrainian state are alleged to have manipulated a nationalised bank and circumvented controls to launder criminal proceeds.
The more positive institutional interpretation is that Ukraine's own anti-corruption agencies investigated them, published evidence, served suspicion notices, triggered removals at a state bank and brought one of the country's most senior former presidential officials before an independent anti-corruption court.
Which narrative ultimately prevails will depend heavily on what happens next.
Brussels is tightening its grip on some of the internet’s fastest-growing services, designating ChatGPT, Reddit and Roblox for heightened scrutiny under the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA), writes Catherine Feore.
The European Commission said all three services meet the 45 million average monthly users threshold in the EU, triggering the DSA rules reserved for digital players considered large enough to pose systemic risks to European society.
“These new designations mean that ChatGPT, Reddit and Roblox will now be held to a higher standard of scrutiny and accountability in the European Union,” said Henna Virkkunen (pictured), the Commission’s executive vice-president for tech sovereignty, security and democracy.
The move puts the companies firmly in Brussels’ regulatory crosshairs. They must assess and mitigate risks ranging from illegal content and harm to minors to threats to fundamental rights, elections, public security, and users’ physical and mental well-being. Importantly, the designation also gives the Commission investigative powers to scrutinise relevant features and systems underpinning the services.
ChatGPT has been designated a Very Large Online Search Engine (VLOSE), while Reddit and Roblox are now Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs). They have until the end of January 2027 to comply with the DSA’s tougher obligations.
ChatGPT’s inclusion is particularly significant. The Commission considers the AI service a hybrid product that qualifies as an online search engine because it can search the web when answering users’ queries, bringing a major generative AI service into the DSA’s toughest tier of oversight for the first time.
The Commission will supervise compliance with the DSA, in cooperation with Coimisiún na Meán (Ireland’s media regulator) for ChatGPT and Reddit, and the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) for Roblox.
With the latest additions, 28 platforms and search engines have now received the EU’s “very large” designation.
Photo credit: Commissioner Virkkunnen Photographer: Lukasz Kobus © European Union
The profile of social activism in North Africa is changing. Young people in the region shifted away from demanding regime change after the thwarted hopes of the 2011 Arab uprisings and the 2019 Hirak movement in Algeria. Now, they tend to seek practical improvements in their social and economic conditions rather than wholesale political reform.
Many of these new social movements focus on environmental concerns, and increasingly on the impact of global warming. North Africa is among the regions in the world most affected by climate change. But its countries are also some of the most promising sites for renewable energy generation, given their abundant sunshine and proximity to the European market. Activists have targeted some renewables projects, testifying to a feeling that authorities are failing to ensure energy transitions are fair and meaningful.
These trends in activism in North Africa match a recent turn in European engagement with the region, away from support for political reform and towards socioeconomic issues. This includes cooperation on clean energy projects. But Europeans should bear in mind that cooperation with North African governments on projects that ignore local interests will fall short of the objective of promoting greater opportunity and long-term stability in the region. This underlines the importance of including local businesses and civil society representatives in initiatives from the very start.
The Arab uprisings and Hirak protests were driven in large part by social and economic concerns, and sought a political remedy by calling for a change of government. But hopes for better politics have since foundered across North Africa. The region’s protests and social movements now tend to focus on practical and often locally based demands for a more effective state and better services for communities. The 2025 Gen Z protests in Morocco, for example, began as a response to failings in maternity health care before swelling into wider calls for social justice. The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions. These include anger at poor governance and the strain rapid urbanisation puts on jobs and housing.
The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions
But climate change is also encroaching ever more on North Africans’ quality of life. Historically a water-scarce region, North Africa is now experiencing extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, drought and desertification. Once-fertile agricultural land is becoming barren, and flooding from extreme weather events exacerbates the problems for farmers and food supplies. Climate change is also contributing to power cuts and water shortages, as well as catastrophes from flash floods to wildfires. One opinion poll in 2024 showed that one in six people in North Africa had experienced harm from climate change in the previous two years (or knew somebody who had), and that 71% of North Africans saw it as a threat.
With governments often failing to implement policies to mitigate climate impacts, social movements have adopted an environmental focus. These movements sometimes blend protest with community self-help initiatives, and are often local rather than national. Their less explicitly political nature brings them a measure of tolerance by authorities, as does the fact that the movements often pursue environmental objectives that governments also embrace. But activists still face similar restrictions to all civil society movements in North Africa, at times drawing surveillance and repression.
Such climate-related movements have sprung up across North Africa. In Morocco, a group of Tangier-based NGOs and unions halted a building development that would have involved deforestation, and they now publish an annual report on local environmental issues. Youth for Climate Tunisia trains young people to mobilise on climate issues and organises digital campaigns. The Egyptian group Greenish promotes climate education and capacity building for local communities. Algeria has several community-based groups that work on improving access to water and countering desertification.
Other groups focus on wider environmental concerns. Egypt’s VeryNile pioneered efforts to work with local fishers to collect and recycle plastic pollution from the Nile. In Tunisia, local protests against the impact of phosphate processing in Gabès snowballed after a series of toxic gas leaks in October 2025, becoming a mass movement that continues almost a year later.
But North African social movements also mobilise when green transitions disadvantage local communities and marginalised groups. As North African countries increasingly seek foreign investment in renewable energy projects, some communities worry that land and water resources will be diverted to benefit wealthy elites and foreign investors. In Tunisia, solar projects have aroused local opposition because they take land out of community use and reinforce regional inequalities. In Morocco, solar megaprojects such as the plant in Ouarzazate have prompted anger in nearby communities because of the amount of water they consume.
One thing that unites these disparate movements is that activists seek concrete improvements in quality of life, as well as a bigger role in determining their countries’ futures. This aligns with an increasing sense in Europe that the best way for the EU and member states to promote rights and opportunity in North Africa is through a focus on socioeconomic development.
As the EU’s 2025 Pact for the Mediterranean showed, European policymakers aim to cooperate with North African partners on tangible initiatives that match local government priorities, including in green energy and water management. But the environment-focused social movements should remind European policymakers that working only with governments is not enough to ensure progress on economic and social rights, as I argued in an ECFR policy brief last year. The EU must frame its projects in a way that gives local populations as much agency as possible, by breaking down barriers for small businesses and including civil society in project design and planning.
The EU must also ensure that the projects it supports genuinely offer mutual benefit. In climate policy, the pact’s logic of “a partnership of equals” means European support for renewable energy projects including solar and wind power and the production of green hydrogen. Such projects would then supply clean energy for Europe and promote North African development as well as reduce local energy costs. In turn, greater opportunities and lower prices in the region could help promote the stability that European policymakers also seek.
But not all climate and environmental projects meet these goals—as the local criticisms show. To fulfil the promise of clean energy projects for both sides, Europeans must complement their investment in power generation with other measures to limit environmental trade-offs and to help benefits to flow to local communities. These should include infrastructure development and technology transfer to build up a local clean energy ecosystem. That is the best way for Europe to help ensure that the aspirations expressed in North African environmental movements are met.
The Gripen fighter jet came in low over the medieval rooftops of Visby, stood on its tail and climbed vertically out of sight. Hundreds of hands went up holding phones. Every late June, all Swedish party leaders gather for Almedalen Week in this town on Gotland, the Baltic Sea’s most strategic island. This year, the military display drew the only unanimous reaction of the week.
Sweden holds a general election on September 13th, but defence has barely featured in the campaign. All parties take the Russia threat seriously, and all want to face it as one. The election is being fought instead over welfare, migration, crime, climate and the economy—and on many of those, the government parties are losing.
Ulf Kristersson’s centre-right Moderates have held the prime minister’s office for four years, after an agreement in 2022 secured them the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats in exchange for a hard line on migration and crime. The so-called Tidö agreement—named after the castle where it was negotiated—broke a taboo: for the first time the Sweden Democrats had formal influence over a government, though it stopped short of joining the cabinet. Now the four parties supporting Kristersson’s government are trailing the opposition in the polls. The Liberal Party, currently in government, has suffered the most from the cooperation with the Sweden Democrats and is now polling below the 4% threshold to get into parliament.
Many analysts therefore expect Magdalena Andersson of the Social Democratic Party to return as prime minister. Her party governed Sweden for most of the 20th century and again between 2014 and 2022, when the country abandoned centuries of military non-alignment to join NATO. What would an Andersson government mean for Sweden’s foreign policy and its role in the EU? Based on several conversations with key people in the opposition parties, in Almedalen and elsewhere: not a dramatic change. But look closer and the differences start to show.
The political course will partly depend on the majority Andersson can assemble. A deal with the formerly communist Left Party, which is still formally committed to leaving NATO, would create a different government from one built with the market-liberal Centre Party and perhaps the Christian Democrats—and getting all them into the same majority would require political magic. The Green Party is likely to be part of the coalition either way, although senior figures say the case for being in government is still hotly debated internally.
The most likely outcome is that Andersson will lead a red-green coalition, assembled over months of difficult negotiations. The Greens and the Left would push for a less restrictive migration policy than the Social Democrats are ready to accept, having themselves tightened asylum rules when they were in power. For its part, the Centre Party would press for deregulation and other market liberal reforms Swedish business wants—against the trade unions as well as the Greens and the Left.
If Andersson struggles to hold a red-green government together, a grand coalition between the Social Democrats and the Moderates also cannot be ruled out. But that would require a serious external crisis and a significant change within the Moderates.
Names circulating for foreign ministers or “sherpa” for the prime minister are Paula Carvalho, Morgan Johansson, Ylva Johansson, Ann Linde, Kerstin Lundgren, and Oscar Stenström. Peter Hultqvist is likely to return as defence minister.
On many key issues, a government led by the Social Democrats would continue Sweden’s current course, regardless of coalition partners. Support for Ukraine is strong across the Riksdag. NATO membership will not be reopened: the security situation and strong public support for NATO membership discourage the Left Party from pushing its formal position, and the Social Democrats would refuse if it tried.
Sweden rejected the euro in a referendum in 2003 and will not revisit it in the coming four years unless there is a deep economic crisis, although the Centre Party may extract a report on the topic. The country’s dependence on exports keeps every party in favour of open trade. Sweden will also remain one of the EU’s most frugal members in negotiations of the next Multiannual Financial Framework.
Elsewhere, the change will be real. A centre-left government will focus more on relations with the global south and gradually increase aid spending. The Social Democrats have a long tradition of cooperating with countries such as South Africa and Brazil and have deepened those ties while in opposition. If Lula da Silva is re-elected, Andersson will be well-placed to strengthen EU-Brazil engagement. The Social Democrats also want closer relations with African states and OECD countries such as Canada, where Andersson has built a strong rapport with Mark Carney.
This agenda includes climate politics—all red-green parties want greater ambition at home and in Europe. For the Social Democrats, green industrial policy is the way to keep workers on side in the green transition, a view shared by trade unions and many industrial leaders. The Green Party might get the development and environment portfolios back, but they would have to fight with the Centre Party for climate and energy.
Middle East policy would also shift. In 2014, a Social Democratic-led government recognised Palestine, the first EU member state in Western Europe to do so, to loud criticism by the centre-right. An Andersson-led government is more likely to criticise Israel’s actions while also condemning terrorism. The complication is Ebba Busch: her Christian Democrats are strongly pro-Israel, and if they join the coalition, Middle East policy will become more complicated.
Andersson would champion a strong UN and revive the “feminist foreign policy” of Margot Wallström and Ann Linde. But in an EU dominated by the European People’s Party, she would find few allies for traditional social democratic causes. The Nordic and Baltic countries are her natural bloc. Beyond them, only a re-elected Pedro Sánchez in Spain—a big if—would give the Party of European Socialists a large member state. However, leading Social Democrats are keen to avoid comparisons with Sánchez or Denmark’s Mette Fredriksen. “Magda will be Magda”, says one. On other topics, such as support to Ukraine, Sweden will continue to be part of coalitions of the willing.
A rapid increase of defence spending would continue with either Kristersson or Andersson as prime minister, with the Social Democrats also advocating additional resources for civil defence.
The consensus on security policy runs deep. In the all-party Defence Commission’s report this summer, the Social Democrats fully agreed with the government’s assessment of the security situation. A rapid increase in defence spending would continue with either Kristersson or Andersson as prime minister, with the Social Democrats also advocating additional resources for civil defence.
However, a centre-left coalition could face internal conflicts over the envisaged rotating presence of French nuclear-capable aircraft in Sweden or cooperation with Turkey on intelligence and anti-terrorism, both of which the Left Party would resist. Rather than fight it, the coalition might just pay them off. “Magda will buy them out,” says a prominent Social Democrat, comparing to how Fredriksen made a deal with the left-ish Enhedslisten in Denmark, giving them social reforms in exchange for staying out of her cabinet.
And while the Social Democrats accept the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, they press harder than the Moderates on global non-proliferation.
Although senior Social Democrats are highly critical of US president Donald Trump in private, and Andersson expressed solidarity with Denmark when he threatened Greenland, the party will not pick a public fight. It agreed with the conclusions of the Defence Commission, such as the importance of the American security partnership, and even in background talks Social Democrats decline to discuss alternatives to NATO command structures for large military operations. “We presume that SACEUR is responsible”, says one senior figure, referring to NATO’s commander in Europe, who has always been an American. Sweden’s reliance on American aircraft, interceptors and satellites in the sensitive Baltic Sea area leaves Andersson far less room than Sánchez has in Madrid.
None of this is settled. ECFR’s New Politics research shows how volatile European electorates have become, and a late swing could leave Kristersson in office—this time with Sweden Democrats in ministerial posts, as the Moderates have promised.
That would hand the far-right party real power this time. Given its size, it will likely take influential portfolios, such as representing Sweden in EU negotiations on migration policy and home affairs, and perhaps finance and competitiveness too, like the Finns Party in Finland.
Even more importantly, the Sweden Democrats would fully participate in foreign and security policy decisions. In Sweden, ministers make government decisions collectively and are briefed on sensitive intelligence matters at cabinet meetings. While the party has been vocal in criticising Vladimir Putin since its links to Moscow were exposed, the opposition still sees them as a security risk.
***
A new government will bring more of a tilt than a dramatic change in Sweden’s foreign and European policy. This will be important in the decisive year of 2029, when a new president of the European Commission will be chosen—and in a political landscape that might include far-right leadership in France, Italy and Poland. The Gripen will keep flying over Visby whoever wins in September. What changes is Sweden’s place in an EPP-dominated Europe.
Four of CQUR’s five original directors came from VTB Capital or RCB Bank, a Cypriot lender then 46.29 per cent owned by VTB. After the Russian bank sold its stake in May 2022, two senior figures from that network remained as chairman and chief executive and later appeared in CQUR’s disclosed ownership chain. Public records show institutional continuity — but not who financed the sale or whether VTB retained any rights.
On 16 May 2022, less than three months after the United States and Britain imposed blocking sanctions, VTB announced that it had sold its 19 per cent stake in Qatar’s CQUR Bank. It disclosed neither the buyer nor the price.
On paper, VTB’s involvement ended there. The corporate record tells a more complicated story.
CQUR was established in the Qatar Financial Centre in 2019. The five directors named in contemporaneous reports citing the QFC were Makram Abboud, Ziad Al-Amin, Vladimir Zrazhevsky, Vladimir Ostrovsky and Nicolas Neophytou. Abboud and Al-Amin came from VTB Capital. Zrazhevsky and Ostrovsky came from RCB Bank in Cyprus, in which VTB then held 46.29 per cent. Four of CQUR’s five disclosed directors therefore came from VTB Capital or a bank nearly half-owned by VTB.
The board later changed substantially: four of its five current members were not on the 2019 list. But continuity remained at the top. Abboud, now CQUR’s chairman, previously ran VTB Capital’s Middle East and Africa business and sat on the board of VTB Capital plc. Al-Amin, CQUR’s chief executive, worked at VTB Capital and later headed RCB’s Dubai office.
Both men have since appeared inside CQUR’s ownership chain. Abboud is a director of Quince Holding, the bank’s current direct shareholder, and the disclosed significant shareholder of Quince Tree, one of the companies above it. Al-Amin is another director of Quince Holding. They did not simply remain employed by CQUR after VTB’s exit; they later took positions in the companies through which the bank is owned.
There was a striking precedent inside the same network. On 24 February 2022, the day VTB was sanctioned, its 46.29 per cent stake in RCB was acquired by Cypriot shareholders representing RCB’s management. Less than a month later, S&P suspended RCB’s ratings, saying it could not assess either the full effect of the management acquisition or the remaining links between RCB and VTB.
Large assets were also moving back towards the Russian bank. In 2020, VTB assigned CQUR rights to a RussNeft loan and a $100 million Kazchrome tranche. CQUR returned both in February 2022, when their reported value was about $1.18 billion. A month earlier, RCB had returned $1.7 billion in Kazchrome claims.
Audited company accounts therefore establish nearly $2.9 billion in transfers from CQUR and RCB back to VTB in January and February 2022. They do not disclose the price or purpose of those transactions. The transfers demonstrate intensive coordination before VTB’s exit from CQUR; they do not, by themselves, prove control after the sale.
Who bought VTB’s stake remains unclear. An archived CQUR page shows that the other 81 per cent of the bank was held by Amathus Investment Fund SPC, a private fund in the British Virgin Islands. After VTB’s departure, Amathus was the only significant shareholder named by the bank. But no public transfer document reviewed for this investigation identifies it as the buyer of VTB’s shares.
CQUR later said that it had been acquired by Middle Eastern private investors led by management. That wording was absent from the bank’s pages archived in November 2022 and February 2024; it appeared by January 2025. The statement does not reveal who paid VTB, how much was paid or where the money came from.
The ownership structure now recorded in Qatar took shape later. As of 25 August 2026, the QFC register named Quince Holding, incorporated four months earlier, as CQUR’s significant shareholder.
Its disclosed shareholders include Quince Tree, linked to Abboud, and MHF Holding, owned by the established Emirati group Al Hail. That offers a plausible independent explanation for the present structure. But all three vehicles were created after VTB’s exit. They show who sits in the chain now, not who bought the stake in May 2022.
CQUR also retained a clear capacity to serve Russia-linked business. Its latest published terms set a 1pm cut-off for payment orders in Russian roubles. Fix Price’s audited accounts show balances with CQUR worth RUB1.65 billion at the end of 2023 and RUB3.87 billion at the end of 2024. Those amounts are rouble equivalents used in Fix Price’s reporting, not proof that the account itself was denominated in roubles. They do, however, document substantial post-sanctions business with a group focused on the Russian market.
None of this proves sanctions evasion. Rouble payments and service to Russian companies are not illegal in themselves. Such a finding would require evidence of a transaction involving a blocked party, a concealed beneficiary or end user, false trade documents, or a regulator’s action. No such public record involving CQUR was found. The bank says it screens customers, beneficial owners and transactions against UN, Qatari, EU and US sanctions lists.
The evidence supports a firm but bounded conclusion. VTB’s departure did not produce a demonstrable institutional break. CQUR had been built around VTB Capital and RCB personnel; large credit assets returned to VTB shortly before the exit; senior alumni remained at the top and later appeared in the ownership chain; and the bank continued to contemplate rouble payments and serve Russia-linked business.
What the evidence does not establish is whether VTB financed the acquisition, retained voting or economic rights, or issued instructions after the sale. The documents that could answer that question remain undisclosed: the 2022 sale agreement, the identity of the original buyer, proof of funds, voting agreements, pledges, options and any nominee arrangements.
Until those records emerge, VTB’s exit from CQUR can be verified as a change of registered ownership — but not as a clean institutional separation.
Berlin; late August: when politics normally stirs into life after the holiday lull. But this year, the lull never came.
German chancellor Friedrich Merz is beset by approval levels plumbing the depths of the depleted Rhine and Danube. His governing conservative CDU party spent the summer at war with itself over pension reform (not helped by a botched cabinet reshuffle). Some of the chancellor’s staunchest supporters are even openly wondering whether he is still up to the job. To get out of the hole they are in, Merz and his ministers now want to project a sense of Aufbruchstimmung—a feeling of renewal and restart.
Whether they succeed will determine Europe’s future.
Germany’s economy has endured six years of paltry growth. Its traditionally strong industries are screaming for protection against China, US tariffs and energy price shocks (and against their own past decisions). Strong end-of-the-republic vibes suffuse dark political commentary, “mainstream” parties oscillate between panic and despair, and resignation has set in among voters. What until recently seemed little more than a media talking point on an “Andy Burnham moment”—meaning the possibility of Hendrik Wüst, North Rhine-Westphalia’s minister-president, succeeding Merz as chancellor this autumn—could yet become reality.
For decades, Germany was Europe’s byword for political stability and predictability. Today, it is hard to overstate how little is now unthinkable in German politics. All bets are off. Decision-makers elsewhere in Europe should get ready for the possibility of a new kind of Germany: no longer boring, no longer stable—and no longer rich.
Germany is days away from elections in three eastern states which could shake the government in Berlin to its foundations. First up is Saxony-Anhalt, where on September 6th the far-right populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) could rewrite German post-war history and turn the decades-long mantra of “never again” into “actually, maybe”. Polling suggests even an absolute majority for the party is within reach. The AfD, the CDU and the Left could be the only parties to clear the 5% threshold for the state parliament. Two weeks after that possible momentous result, the states of Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will also elect new parliaments.
While the situation for the political centre looks a little less dire in the latter two places, complicated three-party coalitions are the likely outcome in both. This will have a compounding effect on the stability of the federal government. The CDU leadership under Merz remains adamant that the “firewall” must hold, ruling out any coalition or cooperation with the AfD. Yet this position is increasingly being questioned by local politicians and by conservative thinkers within and around the party. Many in the CDU are frustrated by what they see as the strategic price of the firewall. With their preferred coalition partner, the liberal Free Democrats, now struggling to clear the 5% threshold almost anywhere, ruling out the AfD leaves the CDU ever-more dependent on centre-left coalitions. In critics’ view, this deprives the party of options and leaves it hostage to the remaining potential coalition partners.
An AfD minister-president would be a brutal demonstration of the political establishment’s inability to provide a convincing vision for the country
An AfD minister-president in one of Germany’s states would be more than a striking political development. It would be a brutal demonstration of the political establishment’s inability to provide a convincing vision for the country’s economic, political and social future. In recent years, German leaders have made more reform announcements than actual reforms. The previous government tried to adapt to the Zeitenwende without imposing any hardship on Germans—and failed. Now, the Merz government seems equally unable to muster the political strength for major reform.
Instead, it has too often looked to the past for answers: back to the combustion engine, back to looser labour rights, back to family values. The only policy area where the government now seems readier to change course is on China, where it has said it will push through a more active European position on protecting markets and punishing China’s predatory economic behaviour. In a revealing commentary, however, Merz himself announced this was enabled, not by his decisive political leadership, but by the altered posture of the German car industry.
This vacuum in dealing with the implications of the changing global environment leaves huge room for the political fringes, especially from the far-right. The AfD’s offer is revisionist—drastically curb immigration and asylum, reverse key elements of the energy transition, challenge European integration, end the euro and pursue a distinctly nationalist approach to foreign policy. All this is deeply unsettling to the political establishment, but resonates with a growing constituency of voters united by restrictive stances on migration and cultural issues.
The strength of the AfD is a symptom, not a cause. It did not rise to prominence overnight and has been part of Germany’s political landscape now for more than a decade. But the party is now within striking distance of actual political power at a time when the country’s political and economic foundations are starting to crumble. The war in Ukraine, volatility in America and conflict over the Strait of Hormuz are stretching the limits of German leaders’ attention as well as the country’s fiscal space. Germany’s long-term trade relationship with China is now a liability and an epic drought has shrivelled what little hope remained for Germany’s economic recovery. Berlin is not only forced to reckon with the failures and missed opportunities of the past decade on everything, everywhere, all at once; but the politicians seem unprepared either to put up a real fight for survival or even adjust to this new reality in a form of managed decline.
Germany is hardly the first European country to experience a radical reshaping of its party system and the rise of the far-right; Italy and France have been through similar upheavals. And Germany itself, amid deep economic problems, was called “the sick man of Europe” back in 1999, only to recover and to become the continent’s exporting powerhouse. Why should the rest of Europe now worry so much about Germany’s malaise?
The answer is: because a German crisis is a European crisis. Germany is too economically and politically important to fail. Its economic weight, role at the heart of the EU and position as Europe’s most populous member state mean this would be more than just another episode of national political turbulence. A Germany that is oozing 15,000 industrial jobs each month, becoming even more dependent on technology imports and increasingly incapable of internal reform risks dragging Europe towards fragmentation and exploitation.
Unless political leaders come up with something new, a German pall will blot all major items on the EU’s agenda: the next multiannual financial framework; the future of the bloc’s industrial policy; European efforts to rearm and build resilience; a more autonomous capacity on emerging technologies and the economic muscle to create international leverage behind a new global trading agenda. That is not to mention the serious consequences of a German disengagement for Europe’s continued support for Ukraine.
“German leadership is not optional”, Sweden’s defence minister said at a public event this month, attended by one of the authors. German political elites seem to disagree. Theirs is the third largest economy in the world, sitting at the core of the world’s largest single market, boasting leading international companies and building up one of the largest defence budgets anywhere. Yet they appear to lack any sense of their own domestic, let alone global, agency. The three upcoming state elections may give them their last chance and some momentum to turn things around. But if Berlin becomes entirely enfeebled under the ensuing political fallout, the rest of Europe is likely to suffer in the same way.
The US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to allow 20 ZYN nicotine pouch products to carry a specific reduced-risk claim has created a striking contrast with the direction of European Union policy, as Brussels prepares new product rules and proposes EU-wide taxation of nicotine pouches.
The United States Food and Drug Administration has authorised 20 ZYN nicotine pouch products to be marketed with a statement informing adult smokers that completely replacing cigarettes with the pouches can reduce the risk of several serious diseases.
The decision, issued on 30 June 2026, represents the first time that the FDA has granted Modified Risk Tobacco Product orders to nicotine pouches.
“Using ZYN instead of cigarettes puts you at a lower risk of mouth cancer, heart disease, lung cancer, stroke, emphysema, and chronic bronchitis.”
The orders cover ten varieties of ZYN, each sold in nicotine strengths of 3mg and 6mg. The products include Chill, Cinnamon, Citrus, Coffee, Cool Mint, Menthol, Peppermint, Smooth, Spearmint and Wintergreen.
The manufacturer, Swedish Match USA, is owned by Philip Morris International. The products had already received FDA authorisation to remain on the US market in January 2025, but the new decision goes considerably further by permitting a specific comparative health claim.
The FDA said its decision followed an extensive scientific review and was intended to give adult tobacco users accurate information about differences in risk between products.
“FDA’s review of modified risk products is intended to ensure that adult users have clear, science-based information about the relative harms of tobacco products, so they can make informed choices,” said Bret Koplow, acting director of the FDA’s Centre for Tobacco Products.
The ruling does not mean that ZYN is harmless, nor does it approve the products as medicines or smoking-cessation treatments. Nicotine is addictive, and the FDA continues to advise people who do not currently use tobacco or nicotine not to begin.
The significance of the decision lies instead in the regulator’s formal recognition that nicotine products can present very different levels of risk.
A crucial qualification is contained in the phrase “instead of cigarettes”. The authorised claim applies to smokers who replace cigarettes with ZYN. It does not promise the same reduction in risk to consumers who use nicotine pouches while continuing to smoke.
Cigarettes burn tobacco, creating smoke containing toxic substances responsible for most smoking-related cancers, cardiovascular disease and respiratory illness. Nicotine pouches deliver nicotine through the lining of the mouth without burning tobacco or producing smoke.
This difference is central to the principle of tobacco harm reduction: smokers who cannot or do not wish to stop using nicotine may nevertheless reduce their health risks by moving away from combustible products.
The FDA’s decision therefore recognises an important distinction that is frequently blurred in political debate. A product can be addictive and unsuitable for non-users while still being substantially less dangerous than smoking.
UK-based public health commentator Clive Bates, a former director of Action on Smoking and Health, has argued that nicotine pouches could deliver benefits comparable to those associated with the use of Swedish snus in Scandinavia.
“Tobacco-free nicotine pouches with a consumer acceptable nicotine content have the potential to benefit public health in the same way that is documented for Swedish snus in Scandinavia, that is, by serving as a low-risk alternative to cigarettes”, Bates said.
“The European Commission should pay close attention to FDA’s exhaustive process and extensive reasoning. It’s unusual to have anything good to say about the Federal government these days, but this is an important exception, where the right answer has been reached for the right reasons”, he added.
Bates has also argued that poorly designed regulation, including excessively low nicotine limits, could make pouches less effective as substitutes for cigarettes and unintentionally protect the market for combustible tobacco.
The American ruling comes at a particularly important moment for the European Union.
The European Commission is simultaneously advancing a formal proposal to overhaul tobacco taxation (TED) and preparing a broader revision of the EU legislation governing tobacco and nicotine products, their presentation, sale, advertising and promotion.
Nicotine pouches are not comprehensively regulated at EU level under the current Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Because they contain nicotine but no tobacco, they fall outside many of the harmonised provisions that apply to cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, heated tobacco and electronic cigarettes. The result is a fragmented European market.
Some member states permit nicotine pouches subject to national restrictions. Others have introduced nicotine limits, packaging and warning requirements or advertising controls, while France has pursued a prohibition.
Different national rules create uncertainty for consumers and manufacturers and complicate enforcement across the EU’s internal market.
The Commission’s April 2026 evaluation of the European tobacco-control framework identified the rapid growth of nicotine pouches, electronic cigarettes and heated tobacco products as one of the main challenges that existing EU legislation is no longer adequately equipped to address.
The evaluation concluded that EU rules had contributed to falling smoking rates and smoking-related deaths but were failing to keep pace with changes in products, marketing practices and consumer behaviour.
The EC is particularly concerned about the use of novel nicotine products among children, adolescents and young adults. However, the FDA decision introduces an additional issue that EU policymakers will now find difficult to avoid: whether new EU rules should recognise differences in risk between combustible cigarettes and smoke-free nicotine products.
The emerging difference between Washington and Brussels is not simply that one jurisdiction is permissive and the other restrictive.
The FDA subjects nicotine products to an exceptionally demanding premarket review. Products must receive authorisation before they can legally be marketed, and separate evidence is required before a manufacturer may make a modified-risk claim.
The FDA can impose marketing conditions, require post-market surveillance and withdraw an order if later evidence shows that the product no longer benefits public health.
Its approach nevertheless accepts that consumers should be told when credible evidence shows that completely switching from one product to another reduces disease risk.
The Commission’s current approach places greater emphasis on reducing the overall attractiveness and consumption of tobacco-related and nicotine products. Its taxation proposal explicitly presents nicotine pouches as products that can prolong addiction or act as substitutes for cigarettes, especially among young people.
The EU could impose age controls, marketing restrictions, ingredient standards and proportionate nicotine limits while still recognising that adult smokers may benefit from switching completely away from cigarettes.
It could also prohibit unsubstantiated commercial claims while creating an evidence-based process through which manufacturers could apply for permission to communicate verified differences in risk.
The alternative would be to impose increasingly similar taxation, warnings and advertising rules on products with significantly different health consequences.
The EC ran a public consultation on revisions to both the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) and the Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD) from 22 May to 14 August this year. The consultation, is intended to inform a revision of the legislative framework planned before the end of 2026.
It creates an opportunity to consider evidence that was not available when the current Tobacco Products Directive was adopted in 2014.
Nicotine pouches were then a marginal product. They now represent a rapidly expanding category, and national governments are adopting increasingly divergent responses.
The FDA decision does not compel Europe to follow the US model. The EU has different legal structures, public-health priorities and attitudes towards commercial nicotine.
One of the world’s most influential public-health authorities has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to tell adult smokers that completely switching to specified nicotine pouches reduces their risk of mouth cancer, heart disease, lung cancer, stroke, emphysema and chronic bronchitis.
That finding sits uneasily with any policy or public communication suggesting that cigarettes and smoke-free nicotine products are essentially equivalent.
The issue is particularly relevant to the Commission’s tax proposal. Taxation affects consumer behaviour partly by changing the relative prices of products. If pouches are taxed so heavily that the economic advantage over cigarettes is substantially reduced, smokers may have less incentive to switch.
Conversely, setting taxes too low could increase affordability and use among young people who have never smoked.
The task for EU legislators is therefore not simply to choose between regulation and deregulation. It is to develop a framework that calibrates restrictions, taxation and consumer information according to evidence about risk, behaviour and population-level effects.
While Washington is recognising that adults deserve accurate information about lower-risk alternatives, Brussels is looking for ways to restrict, tax or ban them.
Meanwhile, the EU is failing to control illegal disposable vapes, banned flavours, excessive nicotine levels and unauthorised devices moving through black-market channels. Regulated products are demonised, while illegal and unregulated products keep reaching consumers, including young people.
The forthcoming EU debate will test whether Brussels can reconcile its tobacco-free objective with the potential role of lower-risk alternatives.
The FDA decision makes three points that are likely to shape that discussion.
First, nicotine pouches are not harmless and should not be promoted to children or people who do not use nicotine.
Second, the absence of combustion means that their risks can differ substantially from those associated with cigarettes.
Third, the greatest potential benefit arises when smokers switch completely rather than using pouches alongside continued smoking.
The Commission is right to address gaps in the existing legislation and fragmentation between member states. Common product standards, youth protections and enforcement rules may be necessary for the Single Market to function properly.
But regulation that fails to acknowledge relative risk could also have unintended consequences.
Clive Bates and other harm-reduction advocates argue that treating all nicotine products as though they are similarly dangerous can preserve smoking by discouraging consumers from moving to safer alternatives. European health campaigners respond that the growth of commercially marketed nicotine products could create a new generation of dependent users.
As the EC completes its consultation and develops its legislative proposal, the American decision gives European policymakers a concrete case study rather than a theoretical argument.
The question is no longer whether a regulator could authorise a carefully limited reduced-risk claim for a nicotine pouch. The FDA has now done so.
The question for Europe is whether its forthcoming legislation will allow comparable scientific evidence to influence regulation, taxation and communication — or whether nicotine pouches will be treated principally as another product to be restricted, irrespective of their potential role in moving smokers away from cigarettes.
Adilet wins 110 seats in the 145-member Kurultai, while four smaller parties share the remaining 35, writes Georgi Gotev.
Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission announced final results on 25 August confirming a decisive victory for the Adilet party in the country’s first elections to the new unicameral Kurultai. Adilet won 71.17 percent of the vote and 110 of the 145 seats, establishing a dominant position in the legislature created under the constitution that took effect on 1 July.
Adilet is the recently formed pro-presidential party in Kazakhstan created months before the elections as the successor after the long-ruling Amanat party dissolved into it.
Final figures show 9,351,539 ballots cast from an electoral roll of 12,623,289, for a turnout of 74.08 percent. Five parties cleared the 5 percent threshold required for representation:
Adilet: 6,528,948 votes (71.17 percent) — 110 seats
Auyl People’s Democratic Patriotic Party: 574,621 votes (6.26 percent) — 10 seats
Respublica: 509,631 votes (5.56 percent) — 9 seats
Aq Zhol Democratic Party: 478,083 votes (5.21 percent) — 8 seats
Nationwide Social Democratic Party: 469,058 votes (5.11 percent) — 8 seats
The People’s Party of Kazakhstan (3.11 percent) and Baytaq Green Party (1.07 percent) fell short. A further 2.51 percent of voters chose the “against all” option.
The Kurultai replaces the former bicameral parliament and is elected entirely by proportional representation from party lists in a single nationwide constituency. The 23 August vote was the first parliamentary election held under the new constitutional framework approved in a March referendum.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has signed a decree convening the inaugural session of the Kurultai for 28 August at 11 a.m. The opening will formally launch the work of the new 145-member legislature and mark the next stage in implementing the institutional changes introduced by the constitution.
Once the Kurultai begins its work, the sitting government is required to resign. Under the new rules, the president will nominate a candidate for prime minister after consultations with the party factions represented in the chamber. The appointed prime minister then has ten days to propose the structure and composition of the cabinet; ministers are appointed by the president following further consultations with the Kurultai.
The constitution also creates the office of vice president. Tokayev has indicated that an appointment — “a well-known person you all know” — would be announced within days of the election and must receive Kurultai approval within two months of the first session. The vice president may not serve as a lawmaker or belong to a political party and would assume presidential powers if the head of state leaves office early.
At an expert discussion organised by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS) on 24 August, analysts said the vote raises the stakes for political parties, the functioning of the new parliament, and Kazakhstan’s positioning amid growing geopolitical interest in Central Asia.
KazISS Director Zhandos Shaimardanov highlighted the combination of high turnout and a dominant party alongside four smaller ones as features likely to shape the legislature. “The task now is to understand how this electoral choice will translate into the work of the new Kurultai, its legislative priorities and the parties’ day-to-day activities,” he said.
Italian Asia expert Domenico Palmieri stressed that the election itself is only the beginning. The real test of the institutional reform will come in the months ahead as deputies begin legislating. He noted the relatively high turnout compared with many European countries and described the voting process as technically smooth.
Political scientist Andrey Kazantsev cautioned against reading the strong participation solely as enthusiasm for party politics. In a period of international uncertainty, many voters appeared more concerned with the country’s overall direction and the future for their families. Because deputies are now elected exclusively from party lists, parties face greater responsibility for translating public expectations into concrete policy. “The demand is high. Now the parties have to provide the supply side,” he said.
Ken Moriyasu of the Hudson Institute placed the transition in a wider regional and global context. Interest in Central Asia has risen in both Washington and Beijing as the United States seeks to diversify critical mineral supplies away from China and Beijing looks to overland Eurasian routes less vulnerable to maritime disruption. “Both China and the U.S. are trying to escape each other, and they’re meeting each other in Central Asia,” Moriyasu observed. Greater clarity and stability in Kazakhstan’s domestic institutions, he argued, could strengthen Astana’s ability to maintain its multi-vector foreign policy and contribute to gradual regional consolidation.
With final results certified and the first session scheduled for 28 August, attention turns to the practical launch of the new system: formation of the government, the appointment of a vice president, and the early legislative agenda of a chamber in which one party holds a commanding majority while four others retain a formal presence.
The high turnout and orderly conduct of the vote have been widely noted. Whether the new Kurultai delivers more responsive and effective governance – and how the dominant Adilet faction works with the smaller parties – will determine if the constitutional redesign of 2026 translates into lasting political change.
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