Cette semaine, Caroline De Camaret reçoit Luc Frieden, Premier ministre luxembourgeois et président du Parti populaire chrétien-social, membre du Parti populaire européen (PPE). Présent à Paris pour le premier Sommet international sur l'espace organisé par le président français Emmanuel Macron, il évoque l'importance d'une autonomie stratégique de l'Europe, la nécessité de s'unir face à un monde de plus en plus menaçant, mais aussi certains chantiers à venir au sein de l'Union.
Cover image: picture alliance / AP Photo/Virginia Mayo
Despite her diminutive stature, Emma Bonino was a giant of European foreign policy. She made a critical difference on a bewildering range of causes. She was a master at operating in a diverse array of settings: protesting on the streets, mobilising NGOs, shaping the agenda of the European Commission, creating unlikely coalitions in the European Parliament and chairing the Italian Senate. She managed to make such a difference in all these places because, wherever she found herself, she was always an activist fighting for civil rights, for justice, for equality.
Emma was also a rebel. She used her charm, humour and honesty to puncture pomposity and force people into a real conversation. She embraced controversy, both in her advocacy for challenging causes like women’s rights, abortion access and drug legalisation, and in her methods such as protests and hunger strikes.
She knew how to translate lofty goals into concrete steps which had some hope of being implemented, whether it was setting up the European Commission’s humanitarian office, campaigning for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, advocating to ban female genital mutilation, or working to change Italian electoral law. She had a sense of history and understood how to use crises to shift the agenda—as she did when she moved to Cairo after 9/11, deciding to learn Arabic and to push for a better understanding between Europeans and the Muslim world. And she was willing to assemble and work with unlikely coalitions to advance her causes, from joint projects with the Egyptian former president’s wife Mrs Mubarak to campaigns with the Pope.
Emma was a founding member of ECFR and helped turn it into the organisation it has become. We assumed when she became Italian foreign minister in 2013 that she would step down as a member, but instead she wanted to stay involved and constantly drew on ECFR’s ideas, expertise and pan-European networks to shape the Italian and European agenda. When she stepped down as foreign minister she became a co-chair of the organisation, and we felt her sense of urgency, ambition and pro-Europeanism in every board meeting.
Emma helped shape the DNA of ECFR. She encouraged us to be courageous, not to be afraid of controversy and to challenge conventional wisdom. She pushed us to be as pragmatic about how to make a difference as we were principled about our goals. Always inspiring others, Emma was a friend and a role model to so many of us—but she didn’t do small talk or make time for idle fun. When the substantive discussions were finished, she would say “va bene” and move on to the next fight (or go out to smoke a cigarette). Her death leaves Europe a greyer and less vital place. We need more Emmas.
Cover image: picture alliance / NurPhoto | Daniel Gnap
On September 30th, the European Commission is expected to unveil a comprehensive document on EU enlargement, which will be used as a basis for discussion by the European Council in October. The paper is likely to confirm that Montenegro and Albania could finish negotiations soon. But it should also propose ideas on how other countries in the region without this perspective can move forward in their own EU accession journeys.
Any Western Balkan country that joins the EU after waiting over 20 years deserves to be celebrated; the two frontrunners should be commended for making best use of this opportunity and supported to make it over the finish line. But by focusing on these two countries, the EU has prioritised quick wins. Montenegro and Albania have demonstrated commitment to reform, but also have no major bilateral issues to resolve or difficult neighbours to reconcile with.
Montenegro in particular, given its small size and its lack of significant outstanding issues with neighbours, seems ideal for making the case for enlargement as a low-cost and problem-free geopolitical gain. Indeed, commission officials recently compared the annual cost of Montenegro’s entry to the EU per EU citizen to that of a cup of coffee.
However, going for low-hanging fruit must not serve as cover for the EU not achieving its core responsibility in the Western Balkans. It should use its leverage to promote reform and the resolution of bilateral issues, thereby strengthening stability in a region still struggling to overcome its difficult past. The recent funeral of convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladic demonstrates how important this task remains: the presence of senior Serbian state representatives at his commemoration has caused shock and dismay across the region and within the EU, as well as among many Serbian citizens.
A regional perspective
At the end of the wars of the 1990s, the EU adopted a regional framework towards the Western Balkans. The idea was simple and appealing: improving relations between the Western Balkan countries would go hand in hand with closer ties to the EU. Two decades on, this had led to many challenges and some successes, but only Croatia has become a fully fledged EU member state. While the stagnation in the enlargement process is partly due to a lack of commitment from regional governments, it is also a result of internal EU blockages and a lack of urgency while it dealt with a series of pressing crises.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, enlargement suddenly became a priority again. The EU understood that it needed to prevent a grey area emerging between itself and Russia. Ukraine and Moldova obtaining candidate status in 2022 revived member-state interest in the dormant case of the Western Balkans enlargement process; Montenegro and Albania recognised the geopolitical opportunity, accelerated their reform efforts and have arrived at a point where EU accession is a realistic possibility.
But the main impetus for this new momentum towards enlargement is dramatically different from what originally drove Western Balkans integration. While the eventual integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the EU aims to strengthen European defences in the face of a common threat, Western Balkan enlargement was meant to foster regional stability and reconciliation among countries that had been at war with each other.
The successful accession of a Western Balkan country may signal to the rest of the region that EU membership is possible and that enlargement is truly a merit-based process, which rewards those advancing reform and making the right geopolitical choices. However, neither the EU nor the Western Balkans can ignore the fact that Kosovo is stuck due to unresolved status issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina carries the burden of a dysfunctional constitution imposed by the international community and North Macedonia is held back by bilateral issues with its EU neighbours.
Focusing on the countries facing fewest obstacles to accession might suit the geopolitical needs of the moment, but it risks losing sight of the original regional dimension of Western Balkans enlargement
Focusing on the countries facing fewest obstacles to accession might suit the geopolitical needs of the moment, but it risks losing sight of the original regional dimension of Western Balkans enlargement.
Towards a new European approach
The European Commission is aware that it needs to provide incentives for countries without an early accession perspective. It is planning to present new proposals on gradual integration in its forthcoming communication on September 30th. A more ambitious and flexible framework for gradual integration, aiming to include countries in parts of the internal market, would encourage reforms and allow the EU to develop a more intelligent and honest approach to conditionality. This is especially necessary for advancing the rule of law and democratic standards, which are all too often neglected in favour of the broader geopolitical picture. This has contributed to the diminished transformative power of the accession process and negatively impacted regional stability.
In addition to exploring options for gradual integration, the EU should revive the diplomatic processes at the heart of what its regional approach was originally meant to achieve. This requires redoubling efforts on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, progressing state reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and engaging with member states to clear the blockages holding North Macedonia back. This would contribute to regional stability and advance Europe’s geopolitical agenda by reducing opportunities for Russia, China and other actors to exert influence in the region.
The generations that lived through the good and the bad of the regional past are getting older. They might not live to see the European future promised to them at the turn of the century. Many would, however, still remember a line from an old Italian comic book Alan Ford, much loved in former Yugoslavia: “It is much better to be rich and beautiful than to be poor and ugly”. If the EU does not redouble its efforts to close remaining unresolved issues, its membership criteria would effectively follow the same logic. This would be a sad case of the EU abandoning its own ambition and responsibility.
A drone strike on the protective structure at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant could have endangered the safety of millions of people, UN Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator Alexander De Croo told reporters via video link from Kyiv on Thursday.
The Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska is bringing its international 'Learn About Serbian Suffering' campaign to Rome from September 7 to 13, reports NewsEurope.The initiative aims to introduce Italian and wider European audiences to the historical experience of the Serbian people and to the suffering of civilians during some of the most tragic periods of 20th-century European history.
The digital exhibition will appear on large LED screens in several central Roman locations, including Piazza della Repubblica on Via Nazionale, Castel Sant’Angelo on Lungotevere Prati, Cavour, Lungotevere Testaccio, the Trastevere area around Marconi, Monteverde, and Gianicolo, and Via Gregorio VII near the Vatican.
The campaign is founded on the belief that Serbian history should be examined beyond the political interpretations and stereotypes that have influenced parts of Western public opinion for decades.
The Serbian people have deep historical roots in Europe, including in its cultural, civilizational, and spiritual traditions. Nevertheless, much of Western European public opinion remains insufficiently familiar with their historical experience, especially with the suffering of Serbian civilians during the wars of the 20th century.
This lack of awareness is particularly evident in relation to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the conflicts of the 1990s. During that period, simplified interpretations of the role played by the Serbs became widespread in parts of Western public discourse. Complex political and historical developments were frequently reduced to a division between perpetrators and victims, while the Serbian wartime experience received limited attention. Consequently, the suffering of families who lost relatives, homes, and entire communities was often overlooked, as were the experiences of hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes and ancestral lands.
The campaign seeks to respond to this omission in Europe’s collective memory.
Its purpose is not to accuse any nation, state, or society. Instead, it invites the public to consider this part of European history from a broader perspective, using archival material, documented facts, and, above all, the firsthand accounts of people who survived war, persecution, detention camps, and the loss of family members.
According to Denis Bojić, director of the Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska (pictured), the campaign was created to bring the historical experience of the Serbian people and the suffering of Serbian civilians during different periods of the 20th century to audiences beyond the borders of the Republic of Srpska and Serbia. He said the initiative focuses on families who lost loved ones, people driven from their homes, victims of persecution and detention camps, and generations that continued their lives while carrying the consequences of those losses.
Bojić described the project as a responsibility toward both victims and future generations. He emphasized the importance of preserving their names, faces, and testimonies and making them available to people who have not yet encountered this dimension of European history. He also identified the preservation and international accessibility of this memory as one of the Memorial Center’s principal tasks.
Italy, he noted, has particular importance because it offers an opportunity to present Serbian history in one of Europe’s major centers of culture and civilization. The campaign aims to encourage a broader and more open discussion of Serbian suffering based on documentation and personal testimony.
Bojić added that the project’s objective is to ensure that Serbian victims are not remembered solely as statistics in historical accounts, but as individuals with recognizable faces and personal stories within Europe’s shared memory. In his view, preserving the memory of victims also means preserving a people’s dignity, identity, and understanding of its own history.
The decision to present the campaign in Italy, and specifically in Rome, reflects the longstanding respect among Serbs for Italian civilization and its achievements, from ancient Rome and Roman law to Italy’s broader contribution to European culture.
Rome’s historical importance and its influence on European law, institutions, and culture give the initiative additional significance. Presenting the Serbian experience in the city therefore represents an opportunity to place it within a wider European context.
The organizers also point to more recent ties that remain important in Serbian public memory. Italian KFOR units in Kosovo and Metohija contributed to the protection of the Serbian population and Orthodox cultural heritage. Their long-term role in safeguarding the Visoki Dečani Monastery and other Serbian religious sites continues to be remembered.
The organizers regard these links as a basis for strengthening relations between the two peoples. The Rome presentation is intended not only to share historical material, but also to support continued friendship and cooperation and to introduce the Serbian experience to audiences in one of Europe’s most significant cultural centers.
The Memorial Center of the Republic of Srpska was founded on May 30, 2024, following a decision by the Government of the Republic of Srpska. Its mission is to collect, document, preserve, and present testimonies concerning the suffering of the Serbian people.
Oral history is central to its work. The institution gathers personal accounts from people who directly experienced war, persecution, and other forms of suffering. More than 1,500 audiovisual testimonies have so far been recorded and collected, making the project one of the largest initiatives of its kind in Southeastern Europe.
The Center seeks to ensure that these experiences are not preserved only in books, archives, or statistical records. By documenting the voices and faces of survivors, it aims to maintain a direct connection with the people who lived through these events. The testimonies are recorded in the field, archived, and incorporated into documentaries, publications, exhibitions, and educational resources.
The Memorial Center is also available to cooperate with institutions, museums, archives, researchers, and other organizations in Europe and elsewhere that work in the fields of history, oral history, and remembrance culture. The presentation in Italy forms part of a broader effort to establish links with European institutions and to make testimonies about the suffering of the Serbian people accessible to international audiences.
From L to R: WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Photo credit: Akorda. Kazakhstan is stepping up its partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO) as part of a broader strategy to strengthen the country’s position as a key Eurasian transit hub. But while digital customs reforms could significantly reduce trade costs and border delays, experts say their long-term economic payoff will ultimately depend on infrastructure, regional coordination and the changing geography of global trade, writes Ayana BirbayevaI.
The topic came into focus during a series of high-level meetings in Astana between President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders on Sept. 8. During the meeting, Tokayev said Kazakhstan is consistently developing a “smart border” model by introducing digital solutions to optimize customs procedures and improve freight transit across Eurasia. Saunders praised Kazakhstan’s progress in customs modernization and its growing role in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor.
Customs modernization becomes part of a wider logistics strategy Beyond the diplomatic symbolism, the meetings reflect a longer-term economic objective: transforming Kazakhstan from a transit country into an internationally competitive logistics platform. Speaking in the meeting, Bektenov emphasized that resilient transcontinental trade has become one of the key drivers of Kazakhstan’s economic development. He noted that the WCO’s 2025–2028 strategic plan, Data-Driven Customs for a Connected World, closely aligns with Kazakhstan’s own digital reform agenda.
A central element of that strategy is the rollout of KEDEN, a unified customs system integrating declarations, transit procedures and border controls, alongside the Smart Cargo platform, which combines transport services, electronic permits and cargo tracking into a single digital ecosystem. According to official data, 14.6 million tons of transit cargo passed through Kazakhstan during the first seven months of the year. Freight volumes along the Middle Corridor reached approximately 350,000 tons, with around 24,000 vehicles using the route. Why digital borders matter Farkhad Kassenov, head of the A+ Analytics research center, political scientist and international relations expert, notes that cooperation with the WCO should be viewed not as an isolated initiative but as one stage of Kazakhstan’s much broader transport and logistics strategy.
“Kazakhstan has been systematically synchronizing customs procedures, tariffs and border regulations with the countries participating in the Middle Corridor. This cooperation with the WCO is one of the stages of that much larger project,” Kassenov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor has gained strategic importance as trade between China and Europe increasingly seeks alternatives to traditional northern routes passing through Russia. At the same time, Kazakhstan is also positioning itself within the developing North–South corridor, despite temporary disruptions caused by conflicts affecting the Middle East and maritime trade. According to Kassenov, removing bureaucratic barriers may prove almost as valuable as building new infrastructure.
“Digitalization can increase the speed of cargo movement by roughly 30% while simultaneously reducing logistics costs. When paperwork is synchronized and businesses use a single digital window, goods spend less time waiting at borders or in dry ports,” he said. Digital gains cannot replace physical infrastructure Yet customs reform alone will not solve every bottleneck. Kassenov notes that the Middle Corridor still faces structural constraints that digital systems cannot eliminate, including different railway gauges between China, Kazakhstan and Europe, as well as the natural limitations of crossing the Caspian Sea. “There are real physical barriers. Different railway gauges require cargo transfers, while navigation across the Caspian is limited during storms and seasonal ice. Digitalization improves efficiency, but it must be accompanied by major investment in transport infrastructure,” he said. Kazakhstan has already begun expanding ports in Aktau and Kuryk, while negotiations continue with Azerbaijan, Türkiye and China on improving rail connectivity across the corridor.
A changing geopolitical map of trade The renewed attention to Kazakhstan’s transit role is also being driven by geopolitical shifts beyond Central Asia. According to Kassenov, growing strategic competition between China and the United States has increased Beijing’s interest in secure overland trade routes. “The Middle Corridor was once viewed as an alternative route. By the end of this decade, it may become one of the principal land connections between East and West,” he said. That evolution creates opportunities extending beyond transit fees. Kazakhstan is seeking to develop domestic manufacturing, processing industries and exports of higher value-added products, including critical minerals and industrial goods, that can move along the same logistics network. A customs dilemma inside the EAEU At the same time, Kazakhstan’s customs policy faces another question that is less visible in discussions about digitalization: whether the existing distribution of import customs duties within the Eurasian Economic Union reflects the current structure of regional trade. Aidar Kurmashev, head of the Asian Studies Department at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, recently highlighted the issue in his Telegram channel.
According to him, under the EAEU system, duties collected on imports from outside the union are distributed among the five member states according to predetermined shares. Kazakhstan’s share is 6.955%, compared with 85.065% for Russia, regardless of where the duties are actually collected. “After 2022, trade flows changed significantly, the role of Kazakhstan in trade with China and other directions of foreign imports increased, while our share remained 6.955%,” Kurmashev wrote. He argued that the issue raises a broader question about whether the formula still corresponds to the current structure of trade within the EAEU. “If Kazakhstan previously benefited from the system, but now has been losing hundreds of billions of tenge for the third consecutive year, perhaps it is time to at least recalculate the economics of the existing mechanism,” Kurmashev said, highlighting that the figures refer specifically to distributed import customs duties and do not include import VAT. Trade routes are changing faster than institutions The EAEU perspective illustrates a broader challenge facing Kazakhstan as it tries to reposition itself within changing Eurasian trade networks.
The geography of imports and transit has shifted since 2022, while Kazakhstan is simultaneously trying to deepen direct trade links with China, expand the Middle Corridor and strengthen its position as a logistics hub between Asia and Europe. That makes customs policy increasingly relevant not only as an administrative function but as an element of economic strategy. Digitalization can make the movement of goods faster and more predictable. International standards can improve interoperability. Infrastructure investment can remove physical bottlenecks. But the economic payoff ultimately depends on whether these elements develop together. As Kassenov put it, the Middle Corridor is moving from being an alternative route from the global lens toward becoming a potentially central Eurasian connection.
The mayor of Albania’s capital city says he has “not lost hope” despite being held in detention for over 18 months.
Erion Veliaj (pictured) has remained nominally in office as mayor of Tirana despite being held in what is known as pre-trial detention (PTD) since February 2025.
He is accused of corruption and money laundering but strongly denies any wrong doing.
The latest, and arguably most significant, in a protracted series of court cases takes place on 15 September when his case will be reviewed by Albania’s Supreme Court.
This comes after the country’s Constitutional Court called for a review.
In a dramatic new twist, the jailed mayor has now written a letter from prison in which speaks of a “political persecution” being waged against him.
It is thought to be the first time the hugely experienced official has spoken directly to the media in what has been a protracted legal case.
In the letter, dated 8 September, he says it has now been 19 months that he had been held in what is known as “pre-trial detention”.
He points out that his continued detention is “without being sentenced.”
He goes on, “Despite having won twice in the constitutional court the system is endlessly dragging its feet and delaying beyond reason my detention review despite the two constitutional court decisions.”
The Constitutional Court of Albania has issued two landmark rulings in favour of Veliaj, protecting his elected mandate and ordering a a fresh review of his pretrial detention.
The court first overturned the Tirana Municipal Council's decision to dismiss Veliaj following his detention in February 2025 on corruption and money laundering charges.
In a second ruling in July the court annulled a Supreme Court decision upholding Veliaj's continued pretrial detention and remanded the matter back for a renewed review.
The constitutional court found that lower courts failed to properly evaluate the necessity and proportionality of keeping a democratically elected mayor in prison, or to weigh less restrictive alternatives against his constitutional duties and the rights of voters.
The letter by Veliaj addresses his continued detention for over 18 months, saying that the “delays alone is, in itself, a punishment for the citizens of Tirana too, not only for me and my family.”
“They too are being deprived of the right to be served by their democratically elected mayor.”
He continues, “Albania’s democracy has, thus, been sentenced without a court order, much like my friend Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul.”
This is a reference to Ekrem İmamoğlu, the main political rival of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
İmamoğlu was arrested in March 2025 and remains in pre-trial detention at Marmara Prison.
He faces charges including bribery and extortion but denies any wrong doing.
Turkey’s opposition leader has said the charges were intended to prevent İmamoğlu running for president in the 2028 election.
His arrest was met with outrage from the CHP and prompted demonstrations across Turkey.
In his letter,Veliaj states, “In December 2024 I had my last meal with İmamoğlu hopeful that the future would be brighter for our democracies, citizens and countries.”
He concludes, “We were wrong – the demise of local democracy will be a stain for both our countries. We have exchanged letters from jail and still have not lost hope.”
He says that his legal team have been refused permission to meet with him to prepare his appeal to the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights, "without providing a reason."
Although it has naturally received a lot of publicity within Albania itself the case has remained largely under the radar outside the country. But international interest is now starting to grow with highly respected publications and media outlets running articles about it.
The local lawyer acting for Veliaj, who has regularly appeared in court with him, told this site, “The decision on September 15 is highly significant. The Constitutional Court overturned the Supreme Court’s decision because it had failed to adequately address and justify the proportionality of pre-trial detention—the most restrictive security measure—in relation to Erion Veliaj’s constitutional mandate.
“He could potentially be released on the 15th. Our view is that the Constitutional Court has already settled the key legal issues, providing a basis for his release. However, that outcome is not guaranteed and will depend on the court’s decision that day,” said the Tirana-based lawyer.
This website reached out to the Albanian authorities for comment on the case.
Ida Vodica, director of the Public, Media and Foreign Relations Directorate for the Supreme Court, said, “I can confirm that the case concerning Mr. Erion Veliaj has been registered in the Supreme Court and is currently scheduled for 15 September 2026.
“The appeal (cassation) will be considered by the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, in consultation room, sitting as a panel of three judges, in accordance with the applicable procedural rules.
“At this stage, no further comments can be provided regarding the merits of the case or the outcome of the proceedings.”
Albania itself is a leading front runner to join the EU, possibly as soon as 2030, and has been consistently praised by the EU for its ongoing efforts to introduce reforms seen as necessary for it to become the EU’s next member. But some fear ongoing issues with its judiciary may slow progress towards accession.
European Democratics, a pan European body, recently posted a statement on the case, adding that Albania’s Constitutional Court had overturned a Supreme Court decision and ordered a new review of his detention, “questioning its proportionality in light of his mandate as Tirana’s democratically elected mayor.”
European Democratics called on the Albanian authorities to “uphold the rule of law, the presumption of innocence and the principle of proportionality.
“We will keep the spotlight on it (the case), because Albania deserves a European future — one that is fully democratic, transparent and firmly committed to fighting corruption, while guaranteeing that justice is always exercised with fairness, independence and respect for fundamental rights.”
The case has also shed a light on the general use of pre trial detention.
On January 30, a joint letter was issued by the “B40 Balkan Cities Network” calling for an end to PTD. The letter calls PTD a “dangerous trend.”
The network promotes local democracy, sustainable development, and regional cooperation among Balkan cities.
Member mayors signed a joint solidarity letter addressing the pretrial detention of key figures, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and Erion Veliaj.
The European Commission has put forward the European Radioisotope Valley Initiative (C/2026/6132) a new strategic framework to strengthen Europe’s leadership in the production of medical radioisotopes. It aims to reinforce EU security of radioisotope supply, guiding investment in the sector and reducing strategic dependencies on third countries, in particular Russia.
With more than 10 million medical procedures using radioisotopes performed in the EU every year, mainly in oncology and cardiology, an impressive EU-wide production and distribution network has been developed to supply radioisotopes to patients across Europe daily. The EU has become the world’s leading producer of medical radioisotopes, exporting about half of its production overseas. However, critical parts of the European supply chain are exposed to dependencies on foreign suppliers, ageing production facilities, and competition from alternative suppliers, thereby creating the risk of investment displacement and higher costs. Furthermore, the global demand for medical radioisotopes, as well as the pace of innovation in this area, are increasing. Today’s ERVI communication responds to these challenges by defining a coordinated approach to supporting investments in research and development, bringing innovation to market, addressing value chain dependencies, and increasing production capacity. It also provides a direct contribution to the REPowerEU Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports.
The Communication establishes five strategic priorities and 10 actions.
Research & Development and bringing innovations to market
The Commission will support research and innovation into the next-generation medical radioisotopes, radiopharmaceuticals and production technologies. A Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA) - as used in other sectors - will help better connect research with market needs and patients. Instruments such as the emerging IPCEI for innovative nuclear technologies, the European Innovation Council, and new European partnerships can help mobilize public and private investment to accelerate innovation deployment.
Investments in production facilities to ensure security of supply
The initiative aims to guide and support Member States and industry investments across the medical radioisotope value chain to strengthen the resilience and localisation of EU supply. Priorities include the development of EU-based metallic High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) capacity and production of stable isotopes currently imported from Russia, as well as upgrades of existing reactors and construction of new production facilities. Member states should make use of theEU Startup and Scaleup Strategy, the SGEI State aid framework and the recent Critical Medicines Act for which thepolitical agreement was achieved this year to support these efforts, while the Commission will explore ways to better combine public and private financing.
Market Monitoring and Forecasting
The Commission will act to improve the visibility of supply and demand trends and assess the investment needs of the European market for radioisotopes. This work will build upon the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Radioisotopes and rely on continuing involvement of Member States and stakeholders, while making full use of the new EU mechanisms for tackling shortages of essential medicines.
Developing strategic international partnerships
ERVI will support cooperation with trusted international partners to diversify supply chains, strengthen resilience and promote scientific and industrial collaboration. In particular, the continuing cooperation with our partners in the UK and US is crucial for developing a resilient supply chain for metallic High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU).
Supporting an evolving regulatory framework
The Commission will cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to support reliable international transport of medical radioisotopes and explore further measures to facilitate transport between Member States. A further step will be to pursue the streamlining of EU and national procedures for radiation protection and waste management in nuclear medicine to support patients’ access to innovative treatments.
Background
In June 2024, the Councilcalled on the Commission to seek to maintain Europe’s global leadership role in the supply of medical radioisotopes and make tangible and swift progress on developing ambitious ‘building blocks’ for specific actions.
In order to define the objectives and architecture of ERVI, the Commission carried out extensive consultations involving stakeholders and member states and published a feasibility study in March 2026.
The initiative also builds on the Strategic Agenda for Medical Ionising Radiation Applications (SAMIRA), adopted by the Commission in 2021 to strengthen the secure supply of medical radioisotopes, improve quality and safety in radiation medicine, and support innovation in nuclear medicine technologies.
In May 2025, theREPowerEU road map further highlighted the need to increase EU production capacities, reduce dependency on Russia and strengthen the resilience of the European medical radioisotope supply chain. The establishment of ERVI was identified as one of the roadmap’s key actions.
The Circular VAT consultation seeks stakeholder input on how VAT rules can be adapted to better support circular business models. The focus will be on three key areas: the treatment of second-hand goods, the destruction of viable goods, and the VAT deduction rules for passenger cars used for business purposes.
The consultation is part of a broader evaluation and impact assessment process, which will run in parallel and is expected to conclude in early 2027. The findings from this process will inform a legislative proposal aimed at amending the VAT Directive to better align with the objectives of the circular and low emission economy.
The consultation is open for eight weeks and will be accessible via the Commission's 'Have your Say' portal. Stakeholders, including business federations, SMEs, trade associations, national tax authorities, academics, and the general public, are encouraged to participate and share their views.
This initiative is a crucial step towards creating a more coherent VAT framework that supports the circular economy and contributes to the EU's environmental sustainability objectives.
Businesses, tax experts & sustainability advocates – share your views by 4 November 2026.
Home to 5 million people, the EU's outermost regions - French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, Saint-Martin (France), the Azores, Madeira (Portugal), and the Canary Islands (Spain) – are its most remote territories. They extend the EU’s presence across the globe and play a key geostrategic role. The Commission has put forward a new strategy that will ensure these remote regions can fully realise their potential, with stronger support, greater resilience and fairer opportunities for their people.
The Commission has also proposed targeted adaptations to EU laws to better reflect the outermost regions' unique realities and constraints. Tailored to the needs of the regions concerned, the proposals cover areas such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, migration, and taxation.
The strategy is built around four objectives:
Harness geostrategic potential and strengthen regional integration: better align EU internal and external policies to deepen cooperation with neighbouring countries.
Increase competitiveness and access to the single market: support smart specialisation in local competitive areas, such as the blue economy, renewable energy, biotechnology, research and space.
Improve resilience and preparedness: improve climate adaptation and tackle environmental challenges while better protecting biodiversity. Strengthen disaster response, support energy autonomy, protect critical infrastructure like ports and submarine cables, and reinforce food security and self-sufficiency.
Promote social fairness and support people: help create jobs, improve access to education, affordable housing, clean water and healthcare, reduce poverty, while supporting people's right to stay in the place they call home – particularly for young people.
At a broader level, the EU is also ensuring its support to the outermost regions is more coherent overall. For instance, the Commission's proposal to review the EU Emissions Trading Systemincludes several important provisions for these regions. As does the proposedPublic Procurement Actthat allows for the tailoring of certain procurement rules to the outermost regions' specificities.
In future, the Commission will take the specific situation of the outermost regions into account when preparing future initiatives. It aims to foster a robust partnership between these regions, EU countries and the Commission, including through a yearly structured dialogue and a dedicated portal.
The great temptation for left-wing forces to fish in the waters of the new antisemitism in search of votes is nothing new. It costs little; the Jews pay the price. In Rome, there is an eagerness to cast aside the common sense demonstrated by the Italian government, in coordination with Germany, and embrace this easy and politically rewarding line—this time by following Britain in imposing sanctions against Israel. Ignorance and double standards provide the backdrop. The ambition to embrace a new crusade against Israel emerged immediately after British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband, announcing sanctions concerning Judea and Samaria, told Parliament that Israel is engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and attempting to erase the two-state solution, writes Fiamma Nirenstein.
This, of course, ignores repeated Palestinian rejections of peace proposals and the reality created by the 7 October 2023 Hamas massacre. At the same time, British politicians have presented themselves as champions of human rights while ignoring monstrous violations committed by Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Now that Britain has announced sanctions on products from Judea and Samaria, and has been followed by a procession of European countries driven by the pursuit of left-wing votes and fear of their growing Muslim populations, the parliamentary group leaders of Italy’s Democratic Party (PD), Five Star Movement (M5S) and Green and Left Alliance (AVS) on the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Committee have demanded urgent consideration of legislation imposing similar sanctions.
Angelo Bonelli, co-leader of AVS; Elly Schlein, leader of the Democratic Party; Giuseppe Conte, leader of the Five Star Movement and a former Italian prime minister, and others have signed on. Indeed, they consider it “shameful” that Italy, of all countries, is missing from this campaign. The document speaks of “illegal occupation” and offers other banal examples of the ignorance of those who wrote it. It also demonstrates the irresponsibility of a move whose primary consequence will be to further fuel mass antisemitism. We have already seen another demonstration of this phenomenon at a protest against legislation addressing antisemitism, where Hamas and Hezbollah flags were brought into Parliament. Only ISIS was missing.
Why is the path of sanctions wrong? First, those responsible for violent acts should be punished. But contrary to the propagandist image being presented, they constitute a fraction of the roughly 500,000 Israelis living in Judea and Samaria, a population representing a wide variety of cultural and social backgrounds. Most condemn violent extremists and are themselves the targets of thousands of Palestinian terrorist attacks each year. Israel prosecutes its own criminals. Some are in prison; others are standing trial. But Judea and Samaria are not territories “illegally occupied” by Israel. The area was occupied by Jordan, whose annexation received almost no international recognition, until Jordan attacked Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and was defeated. After repeated Israeli attempts to exchange land for peace, the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 divided Judea and Samaria into Area A, under Palestinian control; Area B, under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C, under Israeli control. Israel has the right under those agreements to build in Area C, which also includes the E1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim.
Some of the greatest conflicts arise when Palestinians attempt to expand into Area C. Expelling Jews from Judea and Samaria would risk producing the same disastrous result as Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip—the creation of the conditions that eventually produced Yahya Sinwar and Oct. 7. There is another British mistake. It concerns the safety of Britain’s own citizens. Israel has helped protect Britain from serious terrorist threats. In 2015, for example, British authorities discovered three tons of ammonium nitrate stored by Hezbollah-linked operatives in London after receiving information from Israel. On the basis of what unfounded prejudices should a relationship encompassing security, science and culture be dismantled? Associating Israel with “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” is a lie.
Forcing Israel to surrender is unthinkable. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, with Israel’s decision to close the British Consulate in eastern Jerusalem, has delivered the first clear response. But the larger answer must be equally clear. Neither Miliband nor Schlein will draw the borders of a Palestinian state. It is absurd to imagine that they can. Only Israelis and Palestinians can negotiate those borders; they cannot be imposed from London, Rome or anywhere else. And no sanctions campaign can erase a fundamental historical truth: The Jewish people are not strangers in Judea and Samaria. Their roots there reach back thousands of years. Whatever the future of this land may be, it cannot be decided over the heads of the Jews whose history, identity and destiny are bound to it.
Renew Europe MEPs met in Paris on Tuesday and Wednesday (7-8 September) this week to set the group’s political priorities ahead of President Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union address next week. During the two days of meetings, Renew Europe MEPs were received at the Élysée Palace by the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, for an exchange on the major challenges facing Europe.
President Macron reminded MEPs that Europeans should remain proud of what they have achieved. Europe is a continent of opportunity and talent, which can continue to flourish with the right policies. Discussions focused on strengthening European competitiveness and innovation, protecting strategic industries, lowering energy costs, reinforcing Europe’s security and defence capabilities, safeguarding democracy and advancing Europe’s interests on the global stage.
The meeting was underpinned by a message of optimism: Europe has the capacity to shape its own future if it acts with unity, confidence and ambition. MEPs also discussed the next EU budget and the investment Europe needs to match its ambitions, including in clean and affordable energy, modern electricity grids and greater European energy independence.
Renew Europe President Valérie Hayer said: “Europe faces a clear choice: act together or accept decisions being taken for us by others. The alarming election result in Saxony-Anhalt is a warning that Europe’s political centre must answer with delivery, confidence and a credible vision of a better future. Europeans want a continent that is stronger, more united and capable of shaping its own destiny. Our task is to show them how we get there. We must protect our strategic interests, invest in our industries and innovators, secure affordable and reliable energy, and build the European defence capabilities needed to guarantee our security. Europe must also prove its relevance in people’s daily lives.
"That means lowering energy bills for families and businesses, tackling the cost of living and increasing the supply of affordable homes. We cannot allow the far right to sell an imagined past as the answer to today’s problems. Europe’s story is unfinished, and it is our responsibility to write its next chapter with optimism and ambition. President von der Leyen’s State of the Union address must provide a credible path from European ambition to delivery. Renew Europe will judge the Commission on its willingness to act with the urgency and determination this moment demands.”
The Paris meeting marks the beginning of Renew Europe’s political work following the summer break. The group will now take these priorities into the European Parliament’s State of the Union debate, calling for a stronger, more competitive and more sovereign Europe capable of protecting its citizens and defending its democratic values.
Renew Europe welcomes the 10 September vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee, marking a new chapter in EU-Switzerland relations and delivering concrete gains for citizens and businesses. The committee backed two elements: a recommendation for Parliament to approve the agreements with Switzerland, and an accompanying political resolution explaining its position.
Renew Europe was at the forefront of negotiations on this resolution, securing a broad majority for a balanced and ambitious approach. After years of uncertainty, the message is clear: Europe and Switzerland are ready to move forward together. Signed on 2 March 2026, these agreements modernize cooperation on air transport, land transport, free movement of persons and mutual recognition of conformity assessments. They also establish new co-operation on electricity, food safety and health, alongside Switzerland’s contribution to EU cohesion and its participation in the European Union Agency for the Space Programme.
For businesses, this means clearer rules, simpler procedures and fewer duplicate checks when trading products such as food and medical devices. For people living and working across the EU-Swiss border, it means greater legal certainty, better recognition of qualifications and fewer obstacles in their daily lives.The electricity agreement will connect Switzerland more closely to the EU’s internal electricity market, strengthening security of supply and making Europe’s energy system more resilient. Cooperation on health and food safety will also improve our ability to respond collectively to cross-border risks.
Renew Europe MEP Christophe Grudler (MoDem, France), Parliament’s rapporteur, said:“For people who cross the border between the EU and Switzerland every day, these agreements are not abstract. They are about getting to work more easily, having qualifications recognised and facing fewer administrative obstacles. They will make people’s daily lives simpler. That is what Renew Europe fought for - and that is what Europe should deliver.”
At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and growing economic competition, Europe must strengthen ties with trusted democratic partners. These agreements with Switzerland do exactly that.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Cary Fowler, founder and president of the Food Security Leadership Council and former US global food security envoy, and Jim O’Brien, ECFR distinguished visiting fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.
As conflict, climate change and geopolitical fragmentation converge, there is a growing risk of a global food crisis. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to disrupt grain exports, the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is restricting fertiliser shipments, and a potentially severe El Niño threatens drought and falling harvests across parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
These overlapping pressures will impact hundreds of millions of people who are already food insecure. While mechanisms are in place to mitigate the impact of food insecurity—for example, in 2022, the UN, the US, the EU and regional actors worked together to keep grain flowing from Ukraine and avert a broader catastrophe—many of the conditions that enabled cooperation then are weaker today. This has created a dangerous gap in global leadership.
Together, Mark, Cary and Jim explore how a new international coalition could prevent millions more people from falling into hunger. They discuss the roles of Europe, the UN and major powers such as China, India and Russia; the case for humanitarian ceasefires covering grain exports and fertiliser shipments; and why food security should be treated as a central pillar of global security.
Can governments overcome geopolitical rivalry to address a crisis that no one wants? How severe could the impact of El Niño become in already vulnerable regions? What would a ceasefire covering grain and fertiliser look like in practice? And can Europe coordinate a global response when other leaders are absent?
This podcast episode was recorded on September 9th 2026.
Ukraine is fighting for survival against Russia while its democracy faces a second battle at home. Ukrainians show extraordinary trust in the Armed Forces, family and civic networks—but far less in politicians, government and bureaucrats. Now, high-level corruption scandals, calls for wartime elections, roadblocks to EU accession and possible peace talks with Russia are raising a hard question: can the trust that has helped Ukraine survive the war be turned into a state people believe in?
In this episode, Jessica Hendrick welcomes Roman Petrov, honourable president of the Ukrainian European Studies Association, professor of EU law at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and one of Ukraine’s leading experts on EU accession and EU-Ukraine relations working on the RE-ENGAGE project; and Svitlana Zalishchuk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Sweden and former civil-society activist, member of parliament and government adviser, now working at the centre of Ukraine’s wartime defence and European security partnerships. Roman warns that major decisions on peace could be challenged later if Ukraine’s elections remain suspended. Svitlana pushes back on the picture of low public trust, arguing that the war has actually increased trust in the state—just unevenly—and that public trust itself is part of Ukraine’s national defence capability.
RE-ENGAGE conducted nearly 600 interviews with Kyiv residents last year, at times even moving them into air-raid shelters as alarms sounded across the city. Drawing on the findings, Jessica, Roman and Svitlana discuss how a society can distrust the state so deeply and still defend democracy; what recent corruption scandals reveal about whether the system actually works; and if fast-tracking EU membership risks turning reform into a superficial “copy-paste” of European laws.
How is the far-right AfD’s historic landslide in eastern Germany viewed by those working on EU accession in Kyiv? Why might Ukraine now be better described as a contributor to European defence than a recipient of military aid? And what does Ukraine need to do differently to make its post-war vision last?
A major new investment commitment announced during President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s (pictured) state visit to Berlin signals a deeper economic relationship between two countries looking for reliable partners in an increasingly uncertain world.
The United Arab Emirates has announcedplans to invest an additional €40 billion in Germany, one of the most substantial signals yet that the economic relationship between Europe’s largest industrial economy and the Gulf state is entering a new phase.
The commitment, announced during President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s state visit to Germany, will target sectors including industry, advanced technology, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and energy. Of the total, €10 billion is set to be invested in the German state of Bavaria.
The headline figure is striking. But its significance goes well beyond the amount involved.
The UAE has already invested around €34 billion in Germany. The new commitment therefore represents not simply another large capital allocation, but an attempt to deepen a relationship increasingly built around the industries and technologies that both countries see as central to their future competitiveness.
As Dr Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Germany,put it:“The UAE invests for the long term and builds partnerships that endure.”
For Germany, the fresh injection of long-term capital arrives at an important moment.
The country has formidable strengths in engineering, manufacturing, chemicals, industrial technology and applied research. Yet maintaining that industrial position is becoming ever-more expensive. Artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, energy systems and industrial decarbonisation all require substantial investment at a time when German companies are also confronting higher costs, geopolitical uncertainty and growing international competition.
The UAE brings a different set of strengths: investment capacity, energy expertise, digital infrastructure and commercial connections across the Gulf, Asia and Africa. The logic of the partnership is therefore not simply that one country has money while the other needs investment. It is that their economic capabilities are increasingly complementary.
This synergy is reflected in the sectors identified for the new commitment. Rather than focusing narrowly on established assets, the investment is intended to support areas expected to shape industrial competitiveness over the coming decades.
Al Jaber said the intention was to support “the industries, technologies and skilled jobs that will drive future growth and competitiveness”, while strengthening energy security and supply chains and helping German companies continue to grow internationally.
That last point matters because the relationship works in both directions.
Germany gives Emirati investors access to one of the world’s deepest industrial and technological ecosystems. German companies, meanwhile, increasingly see the UAE not simply as a domestic market but as a platform from which to reach faster-growing economies across the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
The two countries’ economic relationship has already strengthened significantly in recent years, with a number of notable examples of cooperation. Emirati investment has reached sectors including chemicals and offshore wind, while leading German companies have become increasingly embedded in the UAE economy, with bilateral trade worth more than €13 billion last year, an increase of 15% compared to the previous year.
The new €40 billion investment marks a significant new phase of this deepening relationship, and the timing of the announcement also gives it a wider geopolitical significance.
German President Frank-Walter Steinmeiercapturedthe mood during the state visit when he observed that “the world has become a more turbulent place; old certainties are crumbling.” Against that backdrop, he argued that reliable and rational partners mattered more than ever, telling Sheikh Mohamed: “Germany is that kind of partner for you; you are that kind of partner for us.”
Those comments go to the heart of why Germany and the UAE’s economic relationship now matters far beyond the balance sheet.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the risks created by concentrated energy dependencies for Germany and countless other countries in Europe and around the world. Conflict in the Middle East has again demonstrated the vulnerability of trade routes, energy markets and supply chains. Global competition over AI and other critical technologies has made industrial capacity a highly strategic question as well as an economic one.
Both Germany and the UAE have reasons to diversify their partnerships in response.
Germany needs capital, energy relationships, technology partnerships and access to growing markets. The UAE is seeking to diversify an economy historically built around hydrocarbons while deepening its position in advanced technology, industry and global investment.
The €40 billion investment is a powerful statement of intent and a reaffirmation of a long-standing partnership between the two countries that could transform their industrial and technological strategies for years to come.
Cover image: picture alliance / TASS | Sergei Bulkin
Summary
The Kremlin is promoting Ukraine war veterans and, in so doing, cultivating a proto-elite to fill future vacancies and reinforce Russia’s militarised course.
Through programmes such as “Time of Heroes”, and through elections, at least several thousand actual and nominal veterans now already hold political or government posts.
The new preference for war credentials has supplanted the earlier trend of hiring technocrats. Russian cadre policy has shifted towards “making loyal people competent”, as in other consolidated autocracies. Technocrats will remain important, but their declining influence will gradually reduce the state’s economic and administrative adaptability.
The Kremlin is dispersing veterans across institutions and deliberately mixing combatants with regular officials who have acquired veteran status. This will likely constrain the emergence of a coherent political veterans grouping.
Nevertheless, the 2026 State Duma election is likely to bring around 50 nominal and actual veterans into parliament. Their presence could become an institutional brake on foreign policy moderation after a ceasefire or even future change of the top leadership in Russia.
European governments should remain cool in the face of enhanced rhetoric from the new elite; maintain informal contact (where possible and safe) with less confrontational sections of Russia’s governing class; and keep mobility options open to young Russians, while taking necessary precautions.
Cadres in khaki
Like much else in wartime Russia, the United Russia line-up for the September 2026 State Duma election was settled only at the eleventh hour and with Vladimir Putin personally involved. The five names placed at the top of the ruling party’s nationwide list made for a revealing mix: foreign minister Sergei Lavrov; Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin; Yevgeny Poddubny, one of Russia’s best-known pro-war military correspondents; Maria Lvova-Belova, who is subject to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant alongside Putin for her role in the deportation of Ukrainian children; and Vladislav Golovin, a young veteran who lost a leg during Russia’s assault on Mariupol.
This choice offers a snapshot of a broader shift already under way within Russia’s bureaucracy, and one that is likely to accelerate in the coming years. Lavrov represents the old guard bureaucracy; Sobyanin, the mid-2010s class of capable managers with appeal among urban Russians; the other three owe their newfound political prominence largely to the war in Ukraine. Technocrats and qualified administrators, like Sobyanin, whose presence within the elite expanded in the years preceding the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, are receding into the background. They will not disappear altogether, because their expertise remains crucial to keep the Russian economy functioning. But they are no longer a rising force. The war is producing a new elite cohort whose careers and status are inseparable from the war. Like any elite group in other post-Soviet authoritarian systems, this cohort has its own set of functions and tasks, which it performs in the interests of the ruling circle or—in the highly personalist Russian system—for the ruler himself.
Putin set out his intention to create a new group within the Russian bureaucracy most explicitly in his February 2024 annual address to senior officials. In it, he announced the launch of the “Time of Heroes” programme to retrain military personnel and prepare them for appointments to civilian posts. In particular, Putin said a “genuine elite” should be drawn from contract soldiers and mobilised servicemen who had fought in Ukraine and, after further training, take up positions “across education…, in state-owned enterprises [and] business, in state and municipal administration”. They would replace parts of the old elite, particularly those who had “lined their pockets in the 1990s”. Ultimately, he suggested, they could become the generation to which “Russia might one day be entrusted”.
Between February 2024 and July 2026, Putin returned to this idea at least 22 times based on the Kremlin.ru record of his official and public activities (calculations undertaken by the author). Some of these remarks came during dedicated meetings with officers or their wives. But Putin also raised the subject in less obvious settings, including a forum with municipal leaders and his most recent televised Direct Line, a regular event where he responds to questions from citizens and journalists. During the latter, he repeatedly gave the floor to a specially invited officer and even asked his advice; the officer was later killed at the front.
Putin’s de facto promise to “entrust” Russia to people who had fought in the war, his repeated references to a new elite and the constant emphasis on his personal oversight of the Time of Heroes programme have prompted several explanations.
The most common is that the initiative is meant to support military recruitment by showing that fighting in Ukraine can lead to substantial career opportunities after a return to civilian life. The second sees it as a means of political control: the Kremlin can identify ambitious veterans, bind their careers to the state and absorb them before they organise independently or become political rivals. The third assigns veterans a larger political role. In this reading, Putin is seeking to push aside established business and bureaucratic elites in favour of ideologically conformist loyalists, including veterans, with the supposition that Russia could turn into a closed, North Korean-style militarised autocracy over the next 6-10 years.
Without dismissing any of these three explanations, this paper shows that the Kremlin’s integration of war veterans into the government system is part of a structural, long-term project. The state is creating a new recruitment pool of people tied directly to the war. It is selecting and training them for gradual promotion into positions of power. This marks a genuine shift in Russian cadre policy, away from a “make competent people loyal” model, associated with competitive authoritarianism, to a “make loyal people competent” logic, which is more typical for consolidated dictatorships. In his forthcoming book, “Autocratic Intelligence: How Modern Dictatorships are Getting Smarter”, George Washington University political scientist David Szakonyi identifies a broader tendency across regimes. Despite a steady trend between 2000 and 2020 towards increasing the share of technocrats in government, in more recent years dictators have found it less expensive to build up the competence of those already considered loyal (largely because securing the loyalty of competent officials has become more costly).
The paper maps this new recruitment pool by using a dataset including a named roster of federal Time of Heroes participants, their biographies, actual combat participation and post-programme appointments. These data were supplemented by three interviews with programme lecturers undertaken by the author and by publicly available information on applications and enrolment in regional equivalents of the Time of Heroes programme. The paper also draws on a named roster of 2026 Russian State Duma candidates who identified themselves as war participants, including their biographies and actual combat participation. This is supplemented by aggregate data on serving deputies with military experience elected to all regional and selected municipal legislatures between 2022 and 2025.
The data allow us to test whether two forms of loyalty appear to be rewarded via these programmes. It is assumed, first, that most veterans promoted through the system will owe their careers to Putin personally. The second assumption is that they will have an ideological coherence and loyalty intimately bound up with Putin’s decision to wage war against Ukraine and to a broader clash with NATO.
The findings of the paper confirm that the Russian regime is placing veterans in the middle and upper-middle ranks of the bureaucracy and state-linked structures. It seems to be integrating them into existing elite structures without fully displacing the other main elite groups, including siloviki (individuals with a background in the security services), technocrats and state company managers. The paper further suggests that veterans’ presence will place pressure on bureaucratic and business elites to demonstrate their loyalty to the military by extending tangible support for the war. Over time, these developments have the potential to create a vocal, embedded constituency for a militarised foreign policy orientated towards preparing society and the bureaucratic system for wider confrontation with the West; or protecting Putin’s wartime legacy if the regime weakens or pursues a partial rapprochement with Europe and America.
Putin’s need for new recruitment pools
In democracies, governing elites are renewed through channels such as competitive elections, party turnover and entry from business or civil society. In contrast, autocracies close these channels off. Personnel appointments are thus instrumental to helping the winning coalition in authoritarian regimes reward allies, co-opt rivals and remove potential challengers. Yet regime survival also depends on having competent officials to do the work of running things. This creates what political economists Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (drawing in part on evidence from Russia) call the “loyalty-competence trade-off”: capable subordinates improve state performance but may gain the networks and authority to threaten the ruler; yet safer loyalists may lack the skills to govern.
The practical challenge for leaders like Putin is to build recruitment pools that provide competence without allowing rivals to emerge. Party-based autocracies can manage this risk through internal career ladders and controlled competition. The ruling party screens, trains and monitors candidates. This gives the leadership a broad pool of officials whose performance it can observe and whose careers it can control. In more personalistic regimes like Russia, capable outsiders have little incentive to build a career in politics or state service and are unlikely to make their abilities more widely known. So the ruler must draw on groups already within reach—or create new recruitment pools by establishing dedicated programmes.
During his first two presidential terms, Putin drew senior personnel from two main recruitment pools. One consisted of his childhood friends, former KGB colleagues and associates from St Petersburg city hall; the other was siloviki. Personal acquaintance was enough to advance members of the first group. Siloviki could gain posts without a direct connection to Putin because they came from a professional and ideological milieu he knew and trusted. The model worked partly because some longtime associates brought genuine economic or administrative expertise along with their loyalty.
By around 2016, the first pool was running dry: most available figures had already received positions while others had fallen out of favour. Although people with a silovik background held around 20% of key posts by 2008, their progression into senior civilian roles later slowed. Instead, the security agencies gained broader powers as the regime grew more repressive.
At the same time, the Kremlin’s need for capable managers increased. The return of gubernatorial elections in 2012 created particular demand for candidates who were loyal, independent of regional elites and able to manage an administration and run a public campaign. Such people were difficult to find, especially as by that time governors in Russia had lost autonomy and faced a growing risk of prosecution.
Putin initially responded by recycling personnel. His third and fourth terms brought frequent rotations of the same figures between senior posts in the bureaucracy and state-owned companies, while some officials remained in place for decades. This produced a personnel bottleneck and left mid-ranking officials with few routes to the top.
A more successful approach emerged after the current supervisor of domestic politics, Sergei Kiriyenko, joined the presidential administration in 2016. He turned previously marginal personnel reserves into an important source of appointments. Kiriyenko created the “School of Governors”, “Leaders of Russia” and other specific cadre programmes, combining competitive selection and training with visible presidential sponsorship. Participants met Putin and were presented as young, effective technocrats. This gave the Kremlin candidates who appeared competent but remained dependent on the regime for advancement. The technocratic turn peaked with Mikhail Mishustin’s appointment as prime minister in 2020 and the subsequent reshaping of the government.
These programmes, together with recruitment into Mishustin’s government, formed a new technocratic pool for mid-to-senior level federal officials (ministers, deputy ministers and departmental directors), as well as senior regional officials. As a result, between 2017 and 2024, almost 400 people were trained through the School of Governors, and 52 graduates went on to become heads of regions. The Leaders of Russia programme produced similar results, with more focus on the federal level. Szakonyi’s biographical database of 1,578 senior Russian officials shows that roughly one in six top officials serving in 2024 was a technocrat, nearly three times the share in 2000.
Yet the prolonged war in Ukraine may have eroded the confidence of Putin and his circle in the technocratic recruitment pool. Technocrats appeared insufficiently committed to the war, while some failed on tasks central to it, including the construction of fortifications in the frontline Kursk region. Russia’s technocratic turn is now losing momentum, and Putin’s relationship even with key figures in this group, such as central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina, appears to be changing. This has made the creation and expansion of a new, more reliably loyal recruitment pool increasingly urgent.
Federal “heroes”: Filling the bureaucracy’s middle ranks
The Time of Heroes programme announced by Putin in February 2024 is the main vehicle for building the recruitment pool needed for his new “elite”. It is run by the Higher School of Public Administration of RANEPA (the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration). The programme follows the model of earlier cadre initiatives, combining lectures and team building with practical placements. In 2025, it effectively supplanted the technocrat-orientated School of Governors, whose next intake was postponed. (The next section in this paper discusses the regional Time of Heroes variants, which were set up later.)
Time of Heroes is open only to participants in Russia’s war against Ukraine, including contract soldiers and mobilised servicemen with a university degree. Official figures show more than 65,000 people applied online and underwent initial testing for the programme’s two federal cohorts in 2024 and 2025. Just under 170 progressed to in-person training.
Both in-person cohorts began the programme with a two-week voyage aboard a nuclear-powered icebreaker from Murmansk to the North Pole and back. The journey was symbolically important, given the place of the Arctic in the worldview of Russia’s ruling elite. But it also served a political purpose: two weeks of isolation from the outside world provided an intensive opening exercise in cohort-building for participants.
Overall, however, Time of Heroes devotes relatively little time to such activities. Instead, it focuses on honing participants’ hard skills and giving them practical administrative experience. In contrast, School of Governors puts the trainee technocrats through numerous team building, patriotic and sometimes extreme exercises, including jumping into water from a 7-metre-high cliff and lying beneath a moving tank. Hard skills and practical administrative work account for 68% of Time of Heroes compared with 34% of the School of Governors. Team building and activities intended to foster horizontal ties make up just 11% against 35%. For all these differences, the programmes devote a similar share of 11-13% to “political information”: talks by senior stateofficials and propagandists on national priorities and patriotism.
The contrast between the two programmes suggests a shift from the “make competent people loyal” cadre model to “make loyal people competent”. School of Governors appears to have selected recruits for their administrative ability and then worked to bind them more closely to the regime. By contrast, Time of Heroes treats participation in the war as proof of ideological loyalty and concentrates on turning those already trusted by the Kremlin into capable administrators.
Early expert and media commentary questioned whether the Time of Heroes programme was genuine. It suggested that serving officials and politicians might simply use it to advance their careers without experiencing real combat. But the author’s research of all 169 participants in the two Time of Heroes cohorts (see detailed methodology of data collection and analysis in the appendix) suggests it does provide a genuine route into civilian career for military personnel who have fought in Ukraine.
Of the participants, 84% have exclusively military backgrounds. Another 9% moved between military and civilian work, either joining the armed forces after a brief civilian career or returning to them following the full-scale invasion. Junior officers—from lieutenant to captain—and senior officers—from major to colonel—together account for around 90%; only a handful are generals. Participants’ average age is 40. The programme includes 159 men and 10 women, most of the latter medical officers who worked as critical-care specialists or surgeons, likely close to the frontline.
Drawing on official Russian sources, independent media investigations and Ukrainian projects, we found strong evidence of actual combat participation for 94% of the 156 participants whose records we could assess (out of the 169 in total). Moreover, almost 40% of the recruits have been awarded major combat decorations, with recipients concentrated in the second cohort of the programme. In addition, at least 13 have been accused of war crimes, including involvement in some of the most notorious crimes committed in the Kyiv region in spring 2022. Public records or participants’ interviews indicate that almost half were seriously wounded. Some, including participants later appointed to senior government posts, applied to the programme directly from hospital after sustaining severe injuries.
One lecturer on the programme summed up the participants as “very simple, well-drilled Russian blokes”. Another said that after a trial class on a very specific economic topic, he had to simplify an already adapted syllabus even further to accommodate participants who “could not focus for even half an hour”, which he thought might be a consequence of their injuries.
Progression
Nevertheless, by July 2026, 108 of the 169 participants in the two Time of Heroes cohorts had been appointed to posts at different levels of government or in state-owned companies. Another four had continued working in the government posts they held before entering the programme, although one was later killed in an explosion after returning from the front. Yet none of the biographical or service-related characteristics described above is a statistically significant predictor of receiving an appointment. This confirms thatthe programme appears to genuinely serve as a route for upward mobility and starting point into a civilian career for participants.
Although Time of Heroes is a federal programme, only just over half entered federal-level bodies. The remainder secured appointments on the regional or municipal level.
For this analysis, all appointments were grouped by their primary function into four categories. “Management” covers posts carrying substantive responsibility for running a particular sector, organisation or segment of the economy, mostly in the form of heading a ministry department or state-company division. “Ideology” includes youth policy, patriotic education and state messaging, including posts in Yunarmiya, Znanie and Movement of the First—state-sponsored organisations for patriotic education, revived from its Soviet predecessors. “Veteran liaison” covers non-security roles supporting veterans and their families. “Security liaison” refers to civilian posts coordinating with the security services in regional government or at strategically important enterprises.
Management is the largest category at both federal and regional levels, accounting for 47-54% of appointments. These posts frequently place veterans in sectors in which they have no relevant education or training. Such mismatches are not unprecedented in the Russian bureaucracy, but they had become less common at federal level as technocratic recruitment gained ground from the mid-2010s. Veteran appointments therefore represent a partial departure from that recent trend.
For roughly the other half of appointees, the Kremlin has found three more clearly defined uses: of ideology, veteran liaison and security liaison, as outlined above. These narrower remits better fit veterans’ profiles, require less general administrative expertise and serve the Kremlin’s immediate and medium-term needs.
Ideological roles are concentrated at the federal level, where they make up 35% of appointments. They turn veterans into public advocates for the war and use them as an additional tool for the ideologisation of primary and secondary education. Golovin, mentioned earlier as the fifth-placed candidate on United Russia’s election list, now heads Yunarmiya’s Main Staff; the youth movement operates through schools and cadet classes. Meanwhile, the federal education ministry department responsible for pupils’ moral and patriotic upbringing is headed by Igor Yurgin, who previously commanded an assault unit of convicts and mobilised soldiers notorious for high-casualty “meat assaults”.
The smaller security liaison category supports security coordination in the regions and at strategically important industrial facilities. Typically, a veteran becomes the civilian institution’s interlocutor with the military and siloviki. Their background is expected to help them understand security requirements while negotiating how these are applied, so that civilian administration or operations are not unduly disrupted. Examples include a deputy governor overseeing public safety and relations with the police and security agencies, or an adviser to the head of the federal civil aviation agency handling relations with the defence ministry.
Veterans’ career trajectories suggest that appointments usually build on existing connections. In 88% of cases in which a veteran received a regional post, it was in their home region (defined as a place of birth, education or extended previous military service). In around 45% of cases, the appointment also matched the institution or region of the participant’s first or second internship in Time of Heroes.
Together with the division of appointments among the four categories, these patterns point to a practical approach adopted by the programme’s supervisors in the presidential administration. On the one hand, their objective is to find managerial posts for as many participants as possible across a wide range of sectors and regions. This gives the Kremlin a pool of loyal candidates who have acquired relevant experience, available for when Putin later calls for a veteran to fill a particular and more high-ranking vacancy. On the other hand, it seems that the supervisors are also using veterans to address medium-term political aims for the regime. This is producing a group that promotes militarised values in education and youth policy, a second group that mediates between the state and dissatisfied servicemen and their families, and a third that connects civilian institutions with the security apparatus.
At this stage, veterans’ longer-term prospects do not appear to differ substantially according to the function of their first appointment. The exception is with the municipal posts, which carry the least status and appear unlikely to provide a route to significant promotion. Across federal and regional appointments, subsequent advancement may depend more on performance and the appointee’s relationship with their senior supervisor than on the initial brief.
The timing and sequencing of appointments support this interpretation. Initial batches follow Russia’s electoral calendar, peaking around the annual voting day in September. Veterans who perform well in their posts can then be fast-tracked from regional to federal ministry; from deputy director to director of a state organisation; from deputy governor to governor; or some receive a symbolic but higher-status seat on a presidential commission alongside more managerial appointments. For at least 10 veterans, the September 2026 State Duma election is likely to be the next step, giving them a second or third appointment.
One programme lecturer described a similar logic with reference to the project’s length and multiple stages: all the “capable” and “more or less healthy” veterans had already received government posts. Meanwhile, those “in good standing” with their current senior supervisors were being lined up for promotion.
Yet Time of Heroes also serves a third, more immediate political function. When the programme was launched, analysts ofteninterpreted it chiefly as a publicity instrument: by showcasing veterans entering prestigious civilian careers, the Kremlin could present wartime service as a route to social mobility, encourage contract enlistment and reassure servicemen that their participation in the war would be rewarded after their return to civilian life. How far the appointments perform this function becomes clearer when the substantive authority they confer is considered alongside the recipients’ previous careers.
By July 2026, no war veteran had reached the highest state offices, such as federal minister, head of a federal agency or deputy prime minister. Only four of the 108 appointees had reached the next tier down in the nomenklatura hierarchy, which includes governors and presidential envoys.
Of these, only Alexander Shuvaev, appointed governor of Belgorod region in spring 2026, had pursued an exclusively military career before 2022. His promotion illustrates the career ladder envisaged by the programme: after gaining short civilian experience as deputy governor in another region, he was selected when Putin called for a veteran to fill the more senior vacancy, becoming governor of a region bordering Ukraine where his frontline background seems more relevant.
However, the remaining three senior appointees entered the programme with prior political or bureaucratic experience. Artyom Zhoga, among the programme’s first appointees, went straight into the post of presidential envoy to the Urals Federal District. He had fought in Ukraine since 2014 but began building a political career in the occupied territories from 2023. The other two, Yevgeny Pervyshov and Maria Kostyuk, already had bureaucratic careers before 2022; the war and the programme accelerated their advancement into governorships. Kostyuk offers the clearest example of this political function. Formally the programme’s head rather than a participant, she nevertheless appeared on the participant lists supplied to us. The programme’s official website also regularlypresents her governorship as one of the promotions produced by Time of Heroes. Kostyuk has not seen combat, but after her son was killed in 2022, she developed a nationally prominent pro-war media project and moved into veteran policy roles, helping her advance from a senior regional administrative post to governor.
These four senior appointments provide the Kremlin with highly visible examples of the social mobility promised by the programme. But they remain exceptions within its broader record. Ninety-two of the 108 appointments (85%) have settled in the middle and upper-middle ranks. Career military personnel hold most of these posts, which carry real but bounded authority, from heads of departments, units and public organisations to deputy ministers and senior managers in state-linked companies. Another 12 received positions such as advisers and project officers; nine of these came from military backgrounds and the remaining three had held only junior civilian roles before 2022.
Taken together, the appointments reveal a managed career pipeline. Time of Heroes supplies visible success stories for the Kremlin’s recruitment campaign, deploys veterans to meet immediate wartime needs and endows a broader cohort with the civilian experience needed for possible promotion. Advancement remains selective and dependent on existing patrons. This allows the presidential administration to build a reserve of war-linked officials while retaining control over when and how far they rise.
Regional “heroes”: Managing the return from war
In December 2024, Putin again invoked the idea of a new elite and ordered Russia’s regions to set up their own versions of Time of Heroes. Their purpose, he said, was to bring into “regional teams” people for whom “a sense of duty and service to society and the country come first”. Five months later, the Kremlin issued a requirement for Russia’s regions to train up 30-60 veterans each year. (This requirement joined metrics including poverty levels, access to healthcare and demographic trends.) In effect, the shift in federal cadre policy was extended to the regions, to be led largely by technocratic governors appointed under the previous recruitment model.
During 2025, every Russian region except Moscow launched its own equivalent; the capital apparently treated hosting the federal programme as sufficient. Regional programmes largely replicate the federal scheme: they recruit locally rooted combat veterans for posts in their home administrations, combine classroom instruction with practical placements and mentoring by serving officials, and are often delivered through regional RANEPA campuses. Federal Time of Heroes graduates serve as mentors or sit on their public councils.
The authoritarian dynamic in Russian centre-region relations rewards governors for demonstrating zealous, often excessive, compliance with Moscow’s demands. This existing dynamic is now also shaped by the Kremlin’s wartime priorities and thus produced the usual bureaucratic competition among regions over meeting the new veteran-training target. This saw governors attempt to give their own programmes maximum publicity, devise inventivenames such as “The Call of Stalingrad” and “Valour of the Mountains”, and try to exceed the targets set by Moscow. By September 2026, one region had already run three separate, consecutive cohorts, more than the federal analogue; 31 (out of more than 80 regions) had formally enrolled more than 60 participants in a single cohort.
According to official regional figures, almost 44,000 people have applied to these programmes since 2024, with nearly 4,500 admitted. This puts the acceptance rate at around 10%, well above the 0.26% acceptance rate for the federal programme. But around 1,200 of those formally admitted to regional programmes remained in a deferred pool because they were still deployed. Both the use and size of this pool grew after the Kremlin introduced a rule preventing programmes from taking personnel away from the front.
In absolute terms, large regions with major military garrisons lead the number of enrolled veterans on their programmes. Moscow oblast received 2,400 applications, followed by Bashkortostan with 2,026 and Krasnodar region with 2,000. Formal enrolment followed a different pattern. Among regions with more than one million residents, Tula recorded the highest rate, with 130 admissions, or 8.93 per 100,000 residents, followed by Kursk (8.19) and Kaliningrad (6.78).
There is no statistically significant relationship between enrolment and either basic regional socioeconomic indicators or confirmed military deaths. Among regions with more than one million residents, the 10 with the highest per capita enrolment together recorded 8.2 confirmed military deaths per 10,000 residents, below the national rate of 9.05. Higher wartime losses therefore did not systematically translate into larger regional training cohorts.
Instead, the scale of regional programmes highly likely depends on an administrative and political choice by governors. The outliers are often regions whose governors have personal reasons to overperform. The Jewish Autonomous Region received almost 11 times the median number of applications, while Tambov enrolled as many participants as Moscow region despite having one-ninth of its population. As noted, governors Kostyuk and Pervyshov took part in the federal Time of Heroes programme and have a personal stake in making the model work. The Republic of Altai accepted 28% of applicants, more than twice the median, and has among the largest number of participants appointed to government posts. Following his demotion from senior federal politics to head of the poor, remote region of Altai, governor Andrei Turchak has strong incentives to regain Moscow’s trust. In Samara region, 93% of the first cohort found posts, while the second intake doubled to 90 participants, exceeding the KPI by 50%. This likely reflects governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev’s conservative, outspokenly pro-war populism.
The architecture and public image of the regional Time of Heroes reproduce the federal political demand of elite building. However, the programme supervisors in the presidential administration have reportedly also insisted on prioritising short-term administrative function for the veterans in regions. They expect to see them serving as credible intermediaries with other returnees, who might dismiss an ordinary official who had not fought, but would be more willing to engage with a fellow veteran.
This search for intermediaries appears to reflect concern that regions have started to feel the pressure of the ever-growing population of returnees. An estimated 170,000–400,000 people have already come back from the war. Many are struggling to find work and are facing social deprivation, fuelled partly by crimes committed by returnees, with some with previous criminal records and PTSD.
The regions are already feeling this burden, but the pattern of how Russia’s central-regional relations are structured overall is also evident in the context of work with veterans. As recent studies by political scientist András Tóth-Czifra show, federal measures for the integration of veterans are inadequate, and overall the Kremlin is reverting to a familiar tactic: delegating responsibility for returning servicemen without providing regions with additional resources.
The intermediary function envisaged by the Kremlin, together with this shortage of resources, helps explain why regional appointments differ from those produced by the federal programme. Although information on appointments from regional programmes remains fragmentary, veteran-liaison roles appear to account for 44% of regional appointments. This compares with 18% among graduates of the federal programme, while only 22% enter general management, against 50% federally. Ideological posts are also slightly more common, at 30% compared with 26%.
Regions are not simply filling vacancies, as was largely the case under the federal programme: 31% of all appointments went to newly created or repurposed veteran support posts, including units in regional ministries, agencies and advisers to governors. Six per cent of ideology-related appointments have the samelogic. This is a regional strategy for adapting the federal elite-building model to scarce resources: create a limited administrative infrastructure around the new cohort and use its members to manage the much larger veteran population and social discontent regarding the war.
The shift in cadre policy is thus generating a new regional personnel pool of politically approved veterans, even if most are unlikely to reach senior office. With Moscow demanding their integration but leaving regions to manage the social costs, governors have little choice but to use this cohort to draw a visible line between “good” veterans who serve the state and “bad” returnees associated with crime and disorder, while buffering the tensions that mass demobilisation could bring.
Elected veterans: Blurring the boundaries of veteran status
Elections have become the third and final main route for integrating veterans into elite structures. This was not a significant feature in the first years of the war but became more common following Putin’s 2024 call for a “new elite”.
Russia’s 2026 State Duma election will be the first federal parliamentary contest since the full-scale invasion. The data suggest that a trend of promoting veterans into regional and municipal legislatures is set to continue at the federal level. That being said, (semi-official) ambitions in this regard appear to have tempered over time. In 2025, Kremlin-aligned experts predicted that veterans could take 40% of the Duma’s 450 seats. The estimate later fell to 20%, or 100 seats, and with the final confirmed number of candidates we now know this is yet lower. This retreat may reflectconcerns within the presidential administration that a large veteran bloc would be harder to manage than the existing parliamentary factions.
The main route into the Duma mirrors the pattern seen in regional elections. All parliamentary parties are fielding veterans in this election, but the overwhelming majority of those set to win represent United Russia. Analysis of the 2025 regional election results suggests that United Russia veteran candidates enjoyed an electoral premium, aided by stronger administrative mobilisation as regional officials sought to meet a Kremlin priority. Veterans standing for other parties faced an electoral penalty, reflecting broader public unease and suspicion towards those returning from the war.
Of the 546 veterans who entered United Russia’s 2026 primaries for the State Duma election, the party ultimately registered 83 as candidates, or 15% of the total. Twenty-eight individuals had completed the federal Time of Heroes programme, 17 of whom secured a job following the programme. For 11 participants, election would be their first public post. The remaining 55 presented themselves as war participants but had not taken part in the federal or regional Time of Heroes programme. One federal Time of Heroes lecturer said that programme organisers explained the absence of a third cohort by describing the Duma election as “the real third cohort”.
Unlike the federal Time of Heroes programme, whose participants and appointees were mostly career military personnel with actual combat experience, United Russia’s veteran candidates for the State Duma have a markedly different profile. Analysis of their biographies found that at least 31 of the 83 are unlikely to have seen combat, despite presenting themselves as “SVO participants” (“special military operation” candidates) on the party’s primary website and during the election campaign. Twenty of these candidates were already politicians or officials before 2022, including serving Dumadeputies, regionallegislators, sectoral lobbyists and former Ukrainianofficials who sided with Russia. Most of the 31 claim war participant status through special “volunteer battalions” set up by officials, which independent mediainvestigations have found generally operate far from the frontline.
The filtering out of combat veterans began at the primary stage. Our calculations suggest that 427 of the 463 war-linked contenders excluded from United Russia’s final slate had probably seen combat; even a 25% bonus added to veterans’ results could not overcome the party’s tightly managed selection process. In one single-member district, the bonus produced an apparently unplanned victory for a combat veteran over a three-term Duma deputy. The veteran withdrew two weeks later, allowing party managers to return the nomination to the incumbent.
Based on list positions and the dynamics in single-member districts, our projection suggests 47 likely veteran winners, 25 of whom are career military personnel, with 19 already officials or politicians before 2022, and three from civilian careers without prior public office (who were drafted and participated in the war). Enrolment in Time of Heroes is the clearest marker of favourable electoral prospects: 19 of the programme’s 28 candidates are projected to win—68%, against 51% for the remainder of the list. With only four of the 48 veteran candidates fielded by other parliamentary parties in potentially winnable positions, the next Russian State Duma is likely to contain no more than 50 self-declared war veterans, making up around 11% of its 450 deputies.
The same pattern appears in regional legislatures: veterans remain a limited presence, and confirmed combatants sit alongside politicians who have acquired the label. Although officials claim that hundreds or even thousands of war participants became deputies in elections in 2024 and 2025, most hold unpaid seats on municipal councils. According to our data, by July 2026 in more consequential legislative bodies, such as regional parliaments and the city councils of regional capitals, veterans generally occupy only 6-10% of seats. Beyond the least populous regions, higher veteran representation is found mainly in territories with high confirmed military losses, such as Republic of Tuva, where veterans hold five of 32 seats (16%), and Komi, with five of 30 (17%), as well as annexed territories: in occupied Sevastopol, veterans hold five of 24 seats (21%).
Across the Duma contest and recent regional elections, the evidence points to the same logic as Time of Heroes. The “new elite” is not replacing established groups, although the project is clearly more than a mere publicity exercise. The Kremlin is building a recruitment pool through controlled routes, testing entrants for discipline, competence and political reliability, and reserving higher-status posts for those who are confirmed as loyal and having performed well.
This strategy also has room for nominal veterans. Recent media reports suggest that short, carefully managed trips to the war zone, followed by a return to the same job or a modest promotion, account for a significant share of officials now presented as war participants. Some experts believe that this path to the elite is coordinated and even overseen by the presidential administration, which is also responsible for integrating actual military personnel into government structures.
The profile of the Duma candidates and the wider use of nominal military service demonstrate how the bureaucracy is adapting to a new political fashion. Where officials once joined Leaders of Russia or the School of Governors to present themselves as technocrats, some now acquire a military credential through nominal service. Mixing officials who have briefly donned khaki with career soldiers in executive bodies and legislatures would dilute any “combat brotherhood”, making it harder for veterans to coalesce into a coherent political bloc and allowing the system to absorb them gradually.
The Kremlin has reason for such caution: over the past 30 years, even military figures and combat veterans once regarded as entirely loyal have repeatedly unsettled Russia’s central authorities. Lev Rokhlin tried to mobilise officers against Boris Yeltsin in the late 1990s; Igor Strelkov went from a leading figure in Russia’s 2014 war against Ukraine to an imprisoned Kremlin critic after the full-scale invasion started; and Wagner’s 2023 mutiny exposed the risks posed by an armed network with its own leadership and loyalties.
What Europe should expect and how it should prepare
The routes into the wartime recruitment pool examined in this paper—federal and regional cadre programmes, elections at different levels and officials’ short deployments with “volunteer battalions”—do not capture every group whose influence has grown through Russia’s war against Ukraine. Nearly five years of war have also elevated previously marginal ultraconservative actors such as Konstantin Malofeev, an Orthodox nationalist financier; propagandists and Z-war correspondents, including Poddubny, now placed third on United Russia’s federal list; and officials who have served in Russian occupation administrations in Ukraine.
Two very recent publications help establish both the scale and the institutional significance of this wider wartime reshaping of Russia’s political class. The latest journalistic count, from summer 2026, puts the lower-bound estimated at more than 1,300 formally recognised veterans in government bodies, with their number continuing to rise rapidly year by year. What could still be dismissed in 2024 as Kremlin PR strategy aimed mainly at supporting military recruitment is now harder to treat as merely symbolic. Recent research by Joris Van Bladel interprets this expansion as part of a deeper institutional transformation: Russia is redistributing war experience through political, educational, patriotic and coercive institutions, with veterans becoming the human infrastructure of a state reorganising itself around permanent mobilisation for the war.
The present paper adds an empirical cadre-policy dimension to Van Bladel’s broader argument. Drawing on original data on participants’ backgrounds and subsequent appointments, it shows the Kremlin is embedding both actual and nominal veterans across the state through federal and regional programmes and elections. The previous preference for technocrats is giving way to people whose political credentials derive from the war. Their gradual entry into government at different levels, and into Putin’s personal recruitment pool, suggests that Moscow is staffing the state for a prolonged period of active conflict.
This cadre shift forms part of the wider normalisation of war within the regime’s operation. There is little to suggest Putin is likely to end the war. If anything, increasingly damaging Ukrainian strikes during 2026 appear to have strengthened his resolve to continue, provoking anger and retaliation rather than greater willingness to compromise.
The promotion of veterans, of course, should not be read as evidence that Russia is moving inevitably towards a military regime resembling the classic dictatorships of Latin America or Africa. The system may remain highly personalist even as veterans acquire a larger place within it. Still, their incorporation into the bureaucracy, including in the form of a mixture of actual and nominal veterans and the veterans’ varied presence across different regions, will have medium-term consequences for Russia’s internal evolution. European policymakers should bear this evolution in mind as it considers the possibility of further escalation.
Stay cool in the face of sharpening rhetoric
The Kremlin’s shift in its cadre policy means the number of pro-war voices emanating from within the Russian elite will continue to grow. This will heighten the anti-Western—and especially anti-European—rhetoric. The regime’s controlled recruitment system will usher in the more regular articulating of hardline positions once associated mainly with siloviki and radical conservatives. For instance, career officers with real combat experience have publicly rejected a ceasefire along the current frontline. Nominal veterans, whose political capital depends even more directly on issuing pro-war rhetoric, have campaigned on promises to continue “destroying the enemy’s manpower”.
Up to 50 war veterans may enter the State Duma in September. Even if the current Duma—which mixes federal powerbrokers, sidelined regional leaders, and industry (including military-industrial complex) lobbyists and scattered celebrities—already provides reliable support for aggressive Kremlin initiatives. The veterans cohort in the new assembly will matter chiefly as a source of further self-orientated militarist, repressive and anti-Western proposals and as a parliamentary amplifier of the most aggressive positions.
However, European governments should not read too much into the bombast likely to follow September’s election. Instead, they should take care to monitor the more gradual consequences as veterans ascend the broader power vertical: the Kremlin-centred top-down chain of federal, regional and state-linked institutions, held together by presidential control over appointments, resources and political advancement. These will emerge over the next 4-6 years as today’s mid-ranking appointees move upward and form a constituency whose careers depend on preserving the war as an affirmative political myth. Such a cohort could narrow the scope for normalisation after a ceasefire, during elite turnover or with a future change of leadership.
Still, the bark of elite rhetoric is likely to remain worse than its bite.
Throughout the full-scale war, hawks within the Russian elite have steadily escalated their rhetoric, using increasingly extreme threats and predictions to command attention abroad. Dmitry Medvedev’s recurrentwarnings of nuclear escalation, Nikolai Patrushev’sprediction that Ukraine might cease to exist in 2025 and repeated claims by the SVR (Russia’s foreign intelligence service) of imminent Westernfalse-flag operations illustrate the pattern. Such statements attract international headlines and seek to intimidate policymakers and shape wider public debate, although the dramatic events they threaten or predict have rarely materialised.
European planning should therefore assume considerable continuity in Moscow’s (already highly) confrontational course. Governments should weigh any new railings against observable changes in force posture and operational preparations. They should avoid amplifying them in ways that allow Moscow to set the European public debate.
Prepare for a more polarised post-Putin elite
For now, veterans’ prospects for further advancement depend on their performance in their current (usually first) appointment and on the relationship they build with their immediate superior, whether a senior federal official or regional governor, and with the programme’s curators in the presidential administration. They are dispersed across institutions, placed under the mentorship of incumbent officials and mixed with nominal veterans. This will dilute any shared identity based on combat experience. Most owe their new careers to presidential programmes or individual officials. They have stronger incentives to cultivate these relationships than to organise among themselves.
The September election could weaken this system of controlled distribution. Bringing up to 50 veterans into the State Duma—most with real combat experience—means they will soon be rubbing shoulders with one another day to day. They will also have parliamentary staff whose work can amplify their profile, as can their committee work. It is not too hard to see how a shared agenda around veterans’ benefits, appointments and the commemoration and legacy of the war could bring them together (and help them forge ties with veterans and other supporters outside the Duma).
A formal veterans caucus would not be necessary for them to nevertheless gain in importance. Joint legislation, coordinated public campaigns and informal support for one another’s appointments could gradually turn a shared political credential into an organised interest. Such a network will remain loyal to the Kremlin while its members bargain collectively for budgets, positions, legal privileges and political protection. The opportunity exists to acquire influence within the governing coalition without becoming an autonomous challenger to it.
European governments should not expect the impact of this network to emerge only over time. Its political weight is likely to become apparent during an eventual transformation, when an organised veteran fraction could polarise the post-Putin elite and raise the domestic cost of normalising ties with the West. Such a more organised fraction would strengthen the position of those committed to confrontation with the West against comparatively pragmatic technocrats such as Mishustin or business tycoons cautiously loyal to the Kremlin, such as Andrey Melnichenko.
European leaders, working with other Western governments, should preserve (where possible and safe) informal channels to less confrontational parts of the Russian elite, for whose members the prospect of restoring external ties could become an important source of leverage during a future transition. The point is not to naively hope that these groups can overthrow the current leadership, but to understand and identify those whose positions might be strengthened if a verifiable de-escalation in Ukraine and with the West takes place. This is as opposed to the more hawkish elites, now reinforced by the organised veteran voice.
Expect strains on the regional level
The fashion for technocrats in the Russian government has now given way to a tendency towards khaki. At the federal level, the controlled integration of veterans will leave much of the technocratic group in place because its expertise remains essential to the system. Even so, its influence and share of senior posts will continue to decline. As war credentials and loyalty acquire greater weight in appointments, the economy and bureaucracy will gradually lose some of their capacity to manage the mounting pressures created by the war.
The effects will be more pronounced in the regions, where veteran appointments are expanding faster and Moscow has delegated reintegration without providing adequate resources. The early replacement of technocrat regional governors by veterans alreadypoints to declining managerial standards. Other veteran officials on the regional and local levels have also proved poorly equipped to handle social discontent. In some instances, they have met complaints with military habits of command or open aggression.
Overall, regional systems for employment, rehabilitation and social support for veterans are unlikely to cope with a larger wave of demobilisation. Many returnees will remain marginalised, while public attitudes towards them will continue to be shaped by news of violent crimes perpetrated by veterans and other highly publicised incidents. This will deepen local polarisation and leave some veterans with a strong sense of grievance.
The Kremlin’s response to this is likely to preserve the distinction between small numbers of “good” veterans, rewarded with training, positions and public recognition, and the bulk of the rest: “bad” veterans, whose complaints or political activity are met with repression. This social group may direct its discontent against the authorities while remaining nationalist, militarist and revanchist. They could outlast Putin and create political problems for future Russian governments.
European policymakers should expect disputes over employment and unpaid benefits, crimes involving returnees and local protests to become early signs of strain. These pressures are more likely to produce a prolonged pattern of local violence, repression and administrative failure than any immediate challenge to the federal regime. Scenarios for how to deal with post-war Russia should therefore account for an uneven and potentially violent demobilisation whose destabilising effects will accumulate gradually, without necessarily encouraging liberalisation or opposition to the war.
Keep routes open to younger Russians
As this paper shows, a substantial share of veterans entering government structures are being placed in youth policy and patriotic education. These appointments add a new cadre of wartime loyalists to the ideological infrastructure already embedded in schools and universities. Their importance lies mainly in the institutional authority they acquire. But there are reasons to doubt that veterans will prove persuasive public speakers, especially when addressing younger audiences.
The broader ideological campaign developed in Russia since 2022 has struggled to win over younger Russians. Efforts to recruit university and college students into the new drone forces have increasingly relied on large payments and pressure from university administrations. These exposed the limits of patriotic appeals, and eventually failed. The removal of Yabloko, the only party campaigning for peace, from the 2026 election prompted an unusually young wave of online support, protests and detentions outside the Supreme Court. These episodes do not necessarily mean that younger Russians are broadly anti-war. But they show the state has failed to secure their automatic support, particularly in larger cities where alternative sources of information remain accessible.
Nevertheless, veteran appointments can still reshape the institutions in which this contest takes place. Officials controlling curriculums, grants, promotions and youth organisations can pressure teachers and university administrators to pursue more militarised priorities, while marginalising those who resist. Their careers also present military service and public association with the war as routes to status and advancement. A possible outcome of all this is a growing divide between an educational system imposing wartime values from above and young people who remain sceptical of them.
European governments should make use of this by widening educational and professional mobility for Russians who remain inside the country, without compromising on their own security. This year the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) suspended selection inside Russia after being designated an “undesirable organisation” by the Kremlin. However, some European mobility programmes should remain open to Russian-based students and researchers. Security risks for both students and recipient institutions and countries may be addressed by providing remote or third-country selection, individual vetting, secure communications and tailored protection protocols. European governments should also continue funding independent Russian-language media, accredited online education and tools that provide ways to circumvent censorship.
Maintaining these routes would give younger Russians alternatives to state institutions, draw students, teachers and researchers away from an increasingly militarised system, and preserve an educated community with experience outside Kremlin control.
Methodology for data collection and analysis
This paper draws on three linked datasets covering the federal Time of Heroes programme, its regional equivalents and war veteran candidates in the 2026 State Duma election. The coding rules developed for the federal dataset were reused where relevant in the other two; the collection, verification and analysis of each dataset are described separately below.
The analysis of the federal Time of Heroes programme in this paper draws on a participant-level dataset covering the biographies, military service, previous and/or subsequent careers of all participants in its first two in-person cohorts. Built incrementally through OSINT collection, it combines official programme materials with media reports, specialist databases and investigative lookup tools, as detailed below:
Since Time of Heroes publishes no participant roster, complete lists for its two in-person cohorts were initially obtained from a programme lecturer interviewed for this research. The public figures relating to cohorts’ enrolment are 83 and 85 participants. But the first cohort list, which we obtained, also included programme head Maria Kostyuk as an attendee. Although she did not participate in actual combat, after her son was killed in the war in 2022 she developed a nationally prominent pro-war media project and later became head of the programme and the governor of the Jewish Autonomous Region. The programme’s official website cites her governorship in typicalpublications about appointments received by participants. She was therefore included, bringing the dataset to 169 people.
Collecting information on each participant started with a complete scrape of the programme’swebsite andTelegram channel, using the Telegram API and web-scraping tools. It was then expanded through manual search of participants in Russian news agencies and outlets; participants’ own interviews with programme organisers or with regional media; Russian governors’ Telegram channels,earlier investigations by Russian independent media and specific war-related Russian websites and Ukrainian databases.
For a narrow set of indicators that public sources rarely report (participants’ year of birth, military rank and unit and so on), we supplemented this with lookup tools common in Russian-language investigative practice, including caller-ID aggregators such as GetContact and commercial search services indexing leaked and aggregated personal records, such as Himera Search.
Collected biographical, career and service information was cross-checked across multiple sources and converted into standardised analytical variables. Pre-war careers were coded into four categories: career military personnel, security-service commanders, junior civilian employees and senior political or managerial figures. Combat experience was confirmed only where evidence identified a unit and area of operations, provided a first-person account of frontline service, or linked a decoration to a specific episode. Participants documented solely in staff or rear roles, or as volunteers or mobilised servicemen without an identifiable unit or area of deployment, were coded as non-combat. Wounds required direct evidence, such as hospitalisation, amputation, an explicit biographical statement or admission through the programme’s medical track. Where evidence pointed in none of these directions, the relevant indicator was coded as unknown rather than zero.
Participants’ internship and appointment were verified through an official announcement, a news report or the appointing institution’s personnel page. Posts were coded by institutional level, primary function, a five-tier seniority scale and sequence, allowing repeated appointments to be traced as career trajectories. Four participants had already held their posts before entering the programme; these cases were excluded from counts of programme outcomes.
Statistical analysis of this dataset was used to test whether participants’ observable characteristics affected their likelihood of receiving an appointment. Appointees and non-appointees were compared using a two-sample t-test for age and chi-squared tests for categorical variables, including career background, civilian experience, rank tier and so on. A multivariate logistic regression then tested all factors jointly. Wound status approached significance in the bivariate analysis (p≈0.05), but because it was known for around half of participants, no conclusion was drawn from this result.
To supplement the OSINT dataset, the author conducted three semi-structured, in-depth interviews with lecturers who delivered courses or individual modules to one or both federal cohorts of Time of Heroes. The interviews took place online between January and April 2026. To allow the respondents to speak freely, their identities have been withheld.
The analysis of regional Time of Heroes programmes draws on a dataset covering 83 Russian regions, excluding the occupied Ukrainian territories. All data are current to September 1st 2026. A programme was identified in every region except Moscow. As no federal register exists and no region publishes a complete participant roster, the dataset was assembled from open sources through automated collection followed by manual verification:
An initial inventory of websites, Telegram channels and other resources associated with regional programmes was compiled using an LLM-based agent with web-search and browsing tools, which queried Russian-language search engines and followed references from regional government portals. Every link the agent returned was checked by hand for validity, correct regional attribution and actual relevance to the programme.
All accessible material was scraped from the relevant sections of these websites: news feeds, official documents, descriptions of the selection stages and eligibility criteria, and the composition of programme public councils. From this corpus, an LLM-generated set of regular expressions extracted messages containing the numerical parameters, such as number of applications, candidates passing selection, enrolment, reserve enrolment, graduates, appointments and cohort dates. Every extracted figure was then checked manually against its primary link, and corrected where the automated extraction had misattributed a value. In 14 programmes, some of the individual participants were also named on these websites; that information was extracted as well.
Using the Telegram API, the channels of regional governors were downloaded in full, together with a set of further official channels in which mentions of the programmes had surfaced during initial collection. An LLM applying regular expressions identified and extracted messages referring to participants in regional programmes, and from these the fact of a post-programme appointment and any available biographical information. The results were verified manually, and biographical data were supplemented through the same OSINT procedures used for participants in the federal programme. This yielded 436 documented appointments across 79 of the 83 regions.
Enrolment and application counts were normalised per 100,000 residents and tested against basic regional socioeconomic indicators using Spearman rank correlation, followed by partial correlation controlling for population. Each test was recomputed with the smallest-population regions excluded, as their per capita rates are unstable. Raw counts correlate with casualties (ρ = +0.49 for enrolment, +0.62 for applications), but this reflects region size: once population is controlled for, the association between casualties and the number of participants selected falls to near zero and reverses direction relative to the raw correlation (ρ = −0.08 to −0.15), while the association with the number of applications remains weakly positive throughout (ρ = +0.17 to +0.20). The same pattern was found between the number of selected participants and the regional socioeconomic indicators tested.
The analysis of war veterans contesting the September 2026 State Duma election draws on a candidate-level dataset covering nominees whom parties or candidates publicly presented as war participants, with more detailed biographical coding for candidates from the ruling United Russia party. It was assembled through automated collection from party platforms followed by manual verification:
Official sources give different numbers of United Russia candidates with war experience. The United Russia leadership spoke of 76 war participants; the head of the Central Election Commission put the figure at 52. Neither body publishes the criteria behind its figure. By our count, the certified United Russia lists contain 83 such candidates. Our figure comes from a complete download of United Russia’s primary election website, which offered all candidate profiles in machine-readable form. We collected all regional lists, totalling 18,976 people, and filtered them with the “svo”: true (special military operation) field, United Russia’s own marker for war participants. That yielded 1,273 candidates, 546 of whom were running for the State Duma. Each was then matched by full name against the United Russia’s certified list (613 entries: 388 on the federal list and 225 in single-mandate districts). This produced 83 matches.
Individual primary profiles were collected for all candidates carrying United Russia’s war-participant marker. Where available, these provided date and place of birth, education, current employment and position, and a free-text biography. Information on the 83 registered Duma candidates was supplemented through the same OSINT procedures used for the federal Time of Heroes dataset. Cross-matching identified 28 programme participants, whose previously verified biographical records were carried over.
The information was converted into standardised variables using the federal programme’s coding rules. Combat experience required evidence identifying a unit and area of operations, a first-person account of frontline service or a decoration linked to a specific episode. Candidates documented solely in rear, staff or medical-support roles, or in officially sponsored short-deployment formations within the BARS system, such as Kaskad, were coded as non-combat unless separate evidence placed them at the front. Cases with insufficient evidence were coded as unknown rather than zero.
Pre-war careers were divided into five tracks: career military personnel without public office; career military personnel appointed to public office after 2022; civilians without public office; civilians entering public office after 2022; and candidates who already held political or administrative office before 2022. The final category took precedence over all others, while elected and civil service positions were treated equivalently.
For nominees from other parliamentary parties, published candidate lists and biographies were reviewed manually to identify those presented as war participants. This produced 48 additional veteran candidates from the other parliamentary parties.
Likely outcomes were modelled under the most recent reported assumed United Russia party-list result of approximately 45% at around 50% turnout. Projections for single-member districts incorporated the 2021 State Duma election results in the same constituencies and documented cases of informally negotiated districts left by United Russia to candidates from other parties. This allocation placed 47 of United Russia’s 83 veteran candidates in winning positions. Applying the same criteria to the other parliamentary parties placed only four of their 48 war veteran candidates in potentially winnable positions.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank ECFR’s editorial and programme teams, especially Jana Kobzova, Adam Harrison and Jeremy Cliffe, above all for the patience that working with him on this policy brief required. Their substantive comments and careful editing greatly improved how the research and its findings are presented.
He is also grateful to political scientists András Tóth-Czifra, Ekaterina Shulmann, Nikolai Petrov and David Szakonyi, as well as journalists Andrey Pertsev, Olesya Shmagun and Tatiana K., for thoughtful discussions of the early findings of this research in settings both formal and less so. Several former Russian officials, who understandably prefer to remain anonymous, also helped the author test his hypothesis that technocrats are gradually going out of fashion in Russia’s wartime bureaucracy.
The author’s deepest thanks go to the (also anonymous) respondents who taught on the federal Time of Heroes programme and generously shared their knowledge and materials.
The author would especially like to thank his wife, Dr Viktoria P., and his friend Mr Churchill the Dog, for their patience, support and very different but equally effective forms of encouragement throughout the project.
All opinions and any remaining errors are the author’s alone.
About the author
Mikhail Komin was a visiting fellow with the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations and now is a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. His analyses and commentaries have featured in international and Russian independent outlets, including The Economist, the New York Times, Politico, EUobserver, El Mundo, Meduza, TVRain and others. Komin is listed as a foreign agent by the so-called Russian Ministry of Justice.
The European Commission has proposed an overhaul of the European Capitals of Culture programme beyond 2033, aiming to make it easier for cities to join forces, involve more young people and turn a year in the cultural spotlight into a lasting legacy.
The plans draw on more than 40 years of experience and would simplify selection and open the door wider to joint bids, including cross-border partnerships. Inclusive and sustainable urban development would also play a bigger role.
“A city holds the European Capital of Culture title for one year, but the community and its people should feel the benefits for a generation,” said Roxana Mînzatu, Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness. “Our proposal puts that lasting legacy at the heart of the initiative.”
Glenn Micallef, Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport, said the new framework would bring “broader territorial participation, stronger youth involvement, new horizons for artists and creative industries, and greater attention to long-term legacy”.
Surge in visitor numbers
A Commission-funded study found that host cities staged an average of 1,000-1,200 cultural activities in their title year, drawing 38.5 million audience attendances and visitor numbers jumped by an average of 30–40%.
The investment impact was also significant: a modest EU investment of €3-5 million helped per year had leveraged around €900 million in cultural investment across Europe between 2013 and 2022.
Long-term benefits
The benefits can stretch well beyond the title year. The evaluation points to urban regeneration, increased cultural budgets, stronger creative sectors and greater civic participation. It also highlights the programme’s European added value in fostering international cultural cooperation, cultural diplomacy and a shared European identity.
Launched in 1985, the initiative has had 85 title-holders. Oulu and Trenčín hold the title in 2026, followed by Évora and Liepāja in 2027.
Under the proposal, third countries participating in or associated with Creative Europe could compete from 2034. The European Parliament and Council will now negotiate the plans, with a final agreement targeted for mid-2027.
Rugby spent its first century as an amateur game run by national unions that answered to nobody but themselves, then three decades of professionalism have changed that. Players sign contracts across borders, clubs compete in cross-border leagues, and private capital owns stakes in its biggest competitions. That places rugby inside the reach of European Union law, which treats an athlete as a worker and a governing body as an undertaking.
Competitions and the European sport model
In December 2023 the EU's top court ruled in football's Super League case that a governing body can only block a rival competition if its rules for doing so are clear, applied equally and no stricter than necessary.
In October 2025, eight national rugby unions declared that anyone joining the proposed R360 franchise league would lose eligibility for Test rugby. If that ban is challenged, unions would likely keep the power to say no, but they will have to publish rules for saying it, as UEFA did after its defeat.
Grassroots, Inclusion and the Emerging Nations
Below the regulated professional game, the EU's influence comes through money rather than courts. Erasmus+ has asport budgetaimed at grassroots participation and equality, and rugby has already used it for women's projects, some built around sevens, where the calendar of rugby sevens fixturesgives newer unions a realistic way into international competition.
The Parliament wants that budget increased from 2028, which matters most to unions outside the Six Nations and its broadcast deals.
Workers who happen to play rugby
A rugby player is a worker in the eyes of EU law, and that has shaped who clubs can sign for thirty years. Bosman in 1995 stopped leagues capping the number of EU players in a squad, and Kolpak later gave the same rights to players from countries with EU trade deals, including South Africa.
Brexit ended both for clubs in England, Wales and Scotland while Ireland's provinces kept them, so one league now recruits under two sets of rules.
The next shift is about conditions rather than passports. In October 2025 the European Parliamentbacked treating athletes as employeeswith full labour rights and player unions having a say on calendars and welfare.
Autonomy on condition
Rugby's governing bodies still write their own laws, calendars and eligibility rules, but what has changed is that those choices are now reviewable by courts and shaped by policy that treats sport as an economic activity first. Autonomy remains, but only on condition of compliance, and the exceptions keep narrowing.
The European Commission has adopted a Communication on a new Strategic Approach to Research and Innovation for competitive, resilient and sustainable agriculture, forestry, rural areas and food systems. This strategic document brings together two closely interlinked frameworks, to guide future research, innovation, deployment and uptake across the entire agri-food sector. These frameworks are AgRI 2040, focusing on agriculture, forestry and rural areas, and Food 2040, focusing on food systems, including fisheries and aquaculture.
The Communication aims to strengthen the agri-food innovation ecosystem from early-stage research and innovation to deployment and market uptake, and to accelerate the uptake of knowledge and innovation across the entire sector. It puts greater emphasis on users’ challenges and needs and on the delivery of real impact on the ground by bringing together multiple actors including end users, researchers and businesses, to co-create, test and demonstrate solutions in real-world settings. This will also help startups, scaleups and SMEs to move promising innovations closer to the market.
The Communication will help turn Europe’s scientific excellence into practical solutions for farmers, foresters, rural communities, researchers, food businesses and consumers, for a more competitive, resilient and sustainable agri-food sector. It contributes to the objectives of the Vision for Agriculture and Food and the Strategy for European Life Sciences and complements the EU Bioeconomy Strategy by supporting innovation and sustainable value creation.
By developing the AgRI 2040 and Food 2040 frameworks, a common strategic approach for EU-funded R&I that enables competitive, sustainable, resilient and fair agri-food systems will be ensured. Both frameworks will be deployed under Horizon Europe 2028-2034 and relevant parts of the European Competitiveness Fund.
Agriculture and Food Commissioner Christophe Hansen said:
"Research and innovation can make a real difference to how we farm and manage our rural areas: from crops that can better withstand drought and extreme temperatures, to faster ways of detecting plant diseases, more sustainable crop protection and digital tools for smarter use of resources like water. Our task is to make sure these ideas do not stay in the laboratory, but are tested, adapted to local conditions and turned into practical solutions that can be used and scaled up. In this way, research can have a real impact on the ground, helping farmers and foresters respond to new challenges and build a more competitive, resilient and sustainable agri-food sector."
Startups, Research and Innovation Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva said:
"Europe is leading in science and research, but too many breakthrough solutions still struggle to reach consumers and markets. The ultimate goal is to help innovators, start-ups and businesses turn bold ideas into innovative solutions that boost competitiveness, strengthen food security, food safety, sustainability and resilience, and deliver real benefits for people and the planet. Europe can lead with confidence, unity and ambition."
The next major milestone will be the EU AgRI 2040 Conference – “Future-proofing EU Agri-Food through research and innovation”, taking place in Brussels on 24 and 25 September. Christophe Hansen, Commissioner for Agriculture and Food, and Ekaterina Zaharieva, Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation, will open the conference, which will bring together key stakeholders from across the agri-food sector and the research and innovation community to contribute to shaping future EU research and innovation priorities.
Background
Vision for Agriculture and Food and Life Sciences Strategy
The new Strategic Approach brings the Vision for Agriculture and Food and the Strategy forEuropean Life Sciences together to cover agriculture, forestry, rural areas and food systems, providing long-term policy direction without prejudging the next EU budget negotiations.
The agri-food sector is strategically important for Europe’s food safety and security, jobs and skills, competitiveness and strategic autonomy. It faces increasing challenges from climate change, resource constraints, geopolitical instability, labour and skills shortages, changing consumer attitudes and global competition.
AgRI 2040 and Food 2040
AgRI 2040 will focus on agriculture, forestry and rural areas. Its eight preliminary areas of action will cover soils and agri-ecosystems, cropping and livestock systems, the bioeconomy, multifunctional forests, rural areas and stronger agri-food value chains, as well as digitalisation, artificial intelligence and robotics.
Food 2040 will focus on food systems, including fisheries and aquaculture. Its six areas of action will address place-based food systems; healthy and sustainable diets; resource efficiency and zero pollution in food systems; food environments and consumer empowerment; scaling innovations, business models and fair food systems solutions; and aquatic food.
The two frameworks are guided by six shared priorities: competitiveness, startups and scaleups; food security, resilience and preparedness; natural resources and circularity; food and feed safety, nutrition and health; fairness; and global cooperation. Common enablers include governance, technologies, and territories and communities.
Evidence and stakeholder engagement
The Commission Staff Working Document accompanying this Communication provides the evidence base for the new approach. It assesses the achievements, investments, results and implementation experience of the 2016 strategic approach to agricultural research and innovation, and the Food 2030 framework.
Stakeholder consultations highlighted the need for stronger links between research, deployment and market uptake, better alignment with users’ needs, improved monitoring and governance, and greater attention to competitiveness, resilience, sustainability, strategic autonomy, health, circularity, fairness and public trust. Their engagement will continue as AgRI 2040 and Food 2040 are implemented.
Future-proofing EU agri-food through research & innovation
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