Le carburant coûte de plus en plus cher en France : 2,68 euros le litre de diesel et 2,49 euros pour l'essence. La guerre au Moyen-Orient et les blocages du détroit d'Ormuz, où transitait 20 % du gaz et du pétrole mondiaux, et du détroit de Bab El-Madeb, expliquent ces augmentations. Parallèlement, la demande française pour le diesel n'a pas baissé, ce carburant étant utilisé par la moitié des véhicules particuliers et dans l'industrie, de la pêche au transport routier, en passant par l'agriculture.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu presents Fair Labour Mobility package © European Union

The European Commission has unveiled what it calls an ambitious “Fair Labour Mobility” package aimed at making it easier for people to work across EU borders while strengthening protections against exploitation and fraud.

The proposals would allow workers to prove social security and health insurance entitlements digitally and make qualifications easier to understand and recognize. The Commission estimates the measures could generate €6 billion in benefits by 2040.

Central to the package is a European Social Security Pass, or ESSPASS, enabling people to request and receive documents such as the European Health Insurance Card and the A1 certificate for posted workers online. Documents could be stored in the EU Digital Identity Wallet and verified by national authorities.

Brussels is also proposing faster recognition of professional qualifications. Procedures for regulated professions, including doctors and nurses, with the aim of reducing the target processing time from three months to five weeks.

Recognition of qualifications obtained outside the EU would also be streamlined, with common standards intended to cut average processing times from 14 months to four months.

The European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) has welcomed the Commission’s plans for recognising qualifications from outside the EU, arguing that they bring greater transparency to a labour market already heavily reliant on internationally recruited healthcare professionals.

EFN Secretary General Paul De Raeve said recruitment from third countries was already well established and frequently organised through bilateral arrangements between governments. Denmark, he noted, has gone considerably further, establishing a school in Delhi to prepare Indian nurses for work in Denmark, including Danish-language training.

“This is going on,” De Raeve said, arguing that international mobility cannot simply be prevented when European health systems need staff and qualified professionals want to move. In the short term, he said, overseas recruitment is also difficult to avoid given that educating a nurse takes around four years.

For De Raeve, an important improvement in the Commission proposal is therefore not simply facilitating recruitment, but putting it within a clearer European framework. The proposed directive would establish common rules for recognising qualifications obtained outside the EU, including aligned documentation requirements.

It would also provide stronger mechanisms for checking whether qualifications are genuine and meet European standards. Training programmes and institutions seeking access to automatic recognition would undergo EU-level assessment, potentially including independent review, site visits and direct examination of training environments.

De Raeve particularly welcomed this approach, pointing to the risks of fraud in diploma accreditation. Having universities and training institutions formally assessed and certified would give regulators and employers greater confidence that somebody arriving with a qualification has been trained by a legitimate institution to an appropriate standard.

He also welcomed plans to reduce administrative delays for individual professionals.

For nursing, De Raeve argued, faster recognition and stronger verification could help Europe recruit internationally without lowering professional standards, while replacing opaque bilateral arrangements with more consistent EU-level rules.

The proposals still require approval by the European Parliament and EU governments. Key measures would then be phased in over several years, with improvements to the Labour Authority expected during 2028–2030.

In an underground classroom in Sumy, Ukraine, children sit quietly at their desks, busy with the day’s lessons. For the moment they are shielded from the horrors of nearly five years of war, but just barely.

Problem

The BRICS summit concluded in New Delhi on Sunday, with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi having hosted the two-day gathering as chair. As with many meetings of the group of emerging economies, this edition brought together the leaders of China, India and Russia and featured plenty of anti-Western rhetoric. This was also Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s first visit to India for more than six years, in the latest example of Sino-Indian normalisation following a sustained period of tensions.

New Delhi’s normalisation with Beijing over the last year looks like more of a tactical de-escalation than a realignment. Nevertheless, India has over that time begun to agree more measures to provide greater access to Chinese investment in manufacturing and climate technology, both areas important for India’s development. This should act as a warning for Europeans. If India cannot source technology and capital from partners in Europe, it will seek to do so from China even while remaining suspicious of Beijing from a security point of view.

Solution

New Delhi continues to view Beijing as a threat and seeks deeper security and economic ties with Brussels, as well as with Washington, despite the difficulties President Donald Trump presents. Modi has thus worked to prevent the BRICS from tipping into a purely anti-Western vehicle, since this would run against India’s interests.

Europeans also see India as an increasingly vital partner, following the EU-India trade deal agreed earlier this year, as Europeans diversify geopolitically in the face of tense transatlantic relations. But India’s bilateral agreements with China, including on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting, show that the EU must not take the mutual benefits of closer ties for granted.

Ahead of Modi’s anticipated visit to Brussels later this year, the EU should accelerate its plans further to strengthen Europe-India ties. For instance, it should enhance the existing Trade and Technology Council to drive cooperation in areas like AI, while also moving forward cooperation on defence and security, and making faster progress on India’s plans to join the Horizon Europe funding programme for research and innovation.  

Context

The EU and India signed a landmark free-trade agreement in New Delhi in January, alongside a new security and defence partnership. Both sides aim to build on these with wider cooperation initiatives to encourage greater cooperation and investment in areas like semiconductors, AI and clean-tech supply chains.

India supported moves at the 2023 BRICS summit to agree on a major membership expansion. The group began as a much smaller coalition of just Brazil, Russia, India and China, and South Africa—hence “BRICS”—but has since grown to eleven members, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as a wider grouping of observer and partner countries that attend summits and align themselves loosely with the bloc’s agenda. The group is internally divided, and not just in terms of China and India. Both Iran and the UAE are members, for instance, despite longstanding regional tensions. This year’s summit produced a limited declaration including vague promises to enhance cooperation.

Source

The reported detention of Somali soldiers in Ethiopia's Somali Region has drawn attention to a Saudi-backed military training programme in central Somalia and raised the question of whether the initiative is intended solely to rebuild Somalia's national army or could serve a wider regional purpose, writes Mohsin Osman.

Somali authorities have confirmed that troops trained at the Xananbuure camp in Galmudug crossed into Ethiopia. Somalia's National Security Adviser, Aways Haji Yusuf, said on 1 September that the soldiers had permission to visit their families, that the federal government knew they were in Ethiopia's Somali region, and that they took the route through Ethiopia to avoid insecure areas inside Somalia. He added that any further developments would be shared with the media.

That explanation has not settled the number of soldiers involved, the circumstances of their detention or the wider purpose of a foreign-funded programme that has trained thousands of Somali recruits with the help of foreign instructors. Regional outlets have also linked the programme to allegations that Saudi Arabia is supporting recruitment for Sudan's war, with indications that it was designed to supply fighters to the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The crossing and the detention

The incident emerged in late August, when reports placed newly trained Somali soldiers in the custody of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State. Garowe Online reported that some accounts described the men, numbering about 300, were detained and transferred to Jijiga, the regional capital. Sunatimes, citing Somali intelligence sources, pegged the number at 316 but said it had not confirmed that number with Ethiopian authorities.

The soldiers who were said to be travelling in a convoy of hired vehicles were reportedly intercepted and held by regional police. The reports say the detained soldiers had been recruited from Ethiopia's Somali Regional State before joining the Somali federal programme, which Yusuf's statement did not address. Neither Addis Ababa nor the Somali regional government has given a public reason for the detention, according to WardheerNews.

The Saudi-backed military programme in Somalia

The soldiers belong to a class of roughly 3,000 who graduated from Xananbuure, in the Galgaduud region of Galmudug, on 16 August after nearly a year of training. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presided over the ceremony, which The Defense Post described as the largest cohort trained inside Somalia since the collapse of the central government in 1991, with Saudi military representatives in attendance and instructors from Ukraine, Romania and Sudan delivering the course.

The programme follows a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation that Somalia's Defence Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, signed with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh on 9 February 2026. Somalia's Ministry of Defence said the agreement covered multiple areas of common interest, and neither government released further details, Al Jazeera reported. Horn Review reported that the initiative aims to train up to 5,000 recruits over nine months, and July reports placed enrolment at 5,107 across two camps in the Guri El area, including about 2,000 recruits from Puntland.

While Saudi Arabia financed the military training programme under the February agreement, there is no evidence that Saudi officials control the recruits' deployment or decide where they serve.

How Sudan entered the story

The Sudan allegation comes from a separate set of reports, not from anything established about the soldiers held in Ethiopia.

Kenya's Standard reported on 24 July that Saudi Arabia was overseeing a programme in Galguduud involving more than 5,000 Somali recruits, run by contractors from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia, and that recruits were being prepared for later deployment alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces. The report described the Somali programmes as Saudi-funded and had raised the possibility that some trainees would be sent to Sudan's battlefronts. Ethio Negari also made the same claims three days earlier. However, none of the parties named had commented.

The presence of Sudanese instructors at Xananbuure presents the strongest documented link between the camp and Sudan, although it predates the Saudi agreement. Geeska reported in February, citing Africa Intelligence, that a team of Sudanese military personnel had trained roughly 1,000 recruits in Galmudug over the preceding months without public announcement, under the oversight of Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency.

The Jijiga case also sits alongside a distinct allegation from Ethiopia's north. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told the House of Peoples' Representatives on 7 July that young people from Tigray, including minors, were being forcibly recruited and smuggled to fight in Sudan's war, and that they were dying in a conflict they neither understood nor had any connection to, according to Addis Standard and other outlets that covered the session. The Tigray People's Liberation Front rejected the substance of his remarks days later, according to a situation report by Europe External Programme with Africa.

A new report titled “The Hidden Cost of EU Regulation: Why Policy Design Matters for Growth, Competitiveness, and Investment,” published on 14 September, estimates that EU regulations could reduce GDP by €159 billion per year and threaten 419,000 jobs between 2026 and 2030.

Published by the European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC), the report examines the “hidden” costs of European policies. These include not only bureaucratic burdens but also regulatory uncertainty, poorly planned transitions, and overlapping obligations. According to the report, these factors can slow investment, limit innovation, and ultimately undermine the policies’ intended goals.

Europe risks imposing substantial economic costs on itself if a new generation of EU regulation is introduced without greater attention to competitiveness, proportionality and the cumulative burden on businesses, according to a new study from the Brussels-based European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC).

The report, estimates that five major areas of regulation currently facing European policymakers could, under its more restrictive scenarios, be associated with €159 billion in foregone EU GDP each year between 2026 and 2030.

It estimates an accompanying annual investment shortfall of approximately €36 billion, with around 419,000 jobs potentially at risk.

But the report's central argument is not that regulation itself is economically damaging. Rather, it contends that poorly sequenced, insufficiently differentiated or unpredictable regulation can impose costs which more carefully designed policies could avoid.

EPIC calculates that what it calls a "better regulation" approach could make a difference of approximately €125 billion in GDP each year, while supporting around €28 billion more annual investment and improving the projected employment outcome by some 241,000 jobs.

The analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the EU, where improving competitiveness has moved rapidly up the political agenda following Mario Draghi's landmark report on the future of European competitiveness.

EPIC examined artificial intelligence regulation, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, biotechnology and novel food, and the forthcoming revision of the EU's Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).

TPD emerges as the largest potential shock

The study identifies the TPD revision as potentially the biggest avoidable economic shock, but says smarter regulation could protect growth, investment and public health

EPIC estimates that a highly restrictive approach to the forthcoming TPD revision could be associated with an annual GDP loss of approximately €48 billion, including around €24 billion in lost tax revenues.

The same scenario would put roughly 120,000 jobs at risk and produce an estimated annual investment shortfall of about €11 billion.

By contrast, under EPIC's alternative scenario — based on a more differentiated regulatory treatment of products according to risk and greater emphasis on maintaining legal-market innovation — the organisation calculates an annual GDP gain of €32 billion.

The difference between the two regulatory approaches is therefore almost €80 billion in GDP each year, according to the modelling, alongside an improvement of more than 182,000 jobs and approximately €18 billion in investment.

These are significant numbers, but they require an important qualification.

They are scenario-based projections rather than forecasts of losses which have already occurred or inevitably will occur. EPIC itself stresses that its prospective figures are estimates based on alternative regulatory assumptions and should not be interpreted as guaranteed outcomes.

In the tobacco case in particular, the restrictive scenario assumes a major relocation of manufacturing outside the EU, with only part of wholesale and retail activity retained and some demand migrating into illicit channels. That is a substantial modelling assumption and is central to the scale of the estimated economic impact.

Nevertheless, the study raises a broader policy question which Brussels may find harder to dismiss: whether the economic consequences of the next TPD are being examined with the same intensity as its health objectives.

From COP11 to the next TPD

EPIC bases part of its TPD scenario on measures discussed in connection with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's COP11, held in 2025.

The report identifies proposals including flavour restrictions across tobacco and nicotine products, tighter sanctions, additional restrictions affecting newer nicotine and heated tobacco products and possible limitations on particular product components, including filters.

That debate exposed significant disagreements among EU member states.

According to the report, countries including Italy, Greece, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Czechia raised concerns about applying broadly similar restrictions to combustible cigarettes and alternative nicotine products despite differences between product categories.

Those disagreements became sufficiently pronounced that the EU was unable to maintain a common position during important parts of COP11, according to the EPIC analysis.

The significance for Brussels is that decisions taken at an FCTC Conference of the Parties do not automatically become EU law.

However, EPIC argues that COP priorities have historically influenced European tobacco policy and could feed into the Commission's forthcoming revision of the TPD.

The report points in particular to EU-funded tobacco-control initiatives which incorporate FCTC and COP priorities into their work and to a 2025 Council working document which raised a possible cigarette-filter ban.

EPIC therefore warns against what it sees as the potential importation of an international tobacco-control agenda into EU legislation without first undertaking sufficiently detailed economic, enforcement and proportionality assessments.

The illicit-market question

Another significant element in the study is illicit trade.

EPIC argues that restrictions which significantly reduce the availability of products for which consumer demand continues to exist can transfer trade away from regulated businesses rather than eliminate consumption.

The EC and EU agencies are simultaneously attempting to combat illegal tobacco and nicotine markets, yet, according to EPIC, some regulatory measures could make illegal supply comparatively more attractive.

According to the report, younger consumers are not necessarily insulated from such markets merely because products disappear from legal retail channels, pointing to concerns surrounding illicit e-cigarette distribution and sales through social media.

This is an issue with implications beyond the tobacco industry. Lost legal sales can mean lost VAT and excise revenues, while enforcement costs increase and legitimate retailers face competition from operators which pay neither tax nor compliance costs.

Not an argument for deregulation

Importantly, EPIC does not present its report as a case for abandoning European health, environmental or consumer-protection objectives. Instead, it advocates what it describes as "Stability-by-Design".

The principle is relatively straightforward: policymakers should analyse economic effects, implementation capacity and differences between sectors and technologies before regulatory choices become politically fixed.

It calls for predictable rules, earlier stakeholder involvement, differentiated regulation where risks differ and implementation schedules which take account of infrastructure, supply chains and enforcement capabilities.

It also argues that regulations should increasingly be assessed collectively rather than individually.

Businesses do not experience the TPD, taxation measures, packaging requirements, environmental legislation and other compliance obligations separately. They experience their accumulated cost simultaneously.

For tobacco, this is particularly relevant because the TPD revision is taking place against the backdrop of parallel debates over tobacco excise taxation, packaging and sustainability rules.

The combined economic impact could therefore be greater than examining each initiative separately would suggest.

For the next regulatory wave, it calculates annual GDP impacts of around €48 billion from its restrictive TPD scenario, €24 billion from the AI framework, €42 billion from packaging regulation, €44 billion from CBAM and €1.6 billion from slower biotechnology and novel-food approvals.

The figures will inevitably be debated, particularly because economic models depend heavily on the assumptions placed into them.

But the policy issue raised by the report is harder to reduce to a dispute over individual numbers.

At a time when European leaders are repeatedly warning that the Union must close its productivity and investment gap with the US and China, EPIC is effectively asking whether Brussels subjects the economic consequences of regulation to the same level of scrutiny as the objectives regulation is intended to achieve.

Summary

• The Democrats could win big in the US midterm elections. This won’t matter much for constraining Trump, but it will start to establish what politics comes after him.
• Our research finds three camps of Democrats, all with different diagnoses of America’s problems: the revolutionaries see the system as unjust and needing structural change; the renovators see it as corrupt and needing reform; and the revivalists blame right-wing populism for breaking a system of bipartisan cooperation.
• What these camps see as broken in American domestic politics translates to how they view US foreign policy and Europe’s place in it.
• No matter which camp goes on to determine the future of Democratic foreign policy, it will be a far cry from the transatlanticism of previous Democratic administrations. This year’s midterm candidates have barely mentioned Europe, Russia or Ukraine in their campaigns.
• Europeans need to engage early and help shape their relationship with the party now, lest they be overlooked if and when Democrats do come to power.

What comes after Trump

This summer, the FIFA World Cup turned the world’s attention to America while America turned on much of the world. As Iran was due to play Egypt in Seattle, the US launched new strikes in its four-month war with the country. On semi-final day, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social an AI-doctored image of a map showing Canada, Greenland, Mexico and Venezuela covered with an American flag. And just days after Trump handed the World Cup trophy to the Spanish national team, his administration announced sweeping 10% baseline tariffs on 80 countries. The juxtaposition of tournament host and wartime belligerent reflects the position America now occupies in European strategic thinking: too central to ignore and too disruptive to rely on.

Europeans hoping that a midterm victory for Democrats in November will bring a reversal of this foreign policy should not hold their breath. If the party wins a majority of seats in one or both chambers of Congress—which is looking likely—they may be able to attach provisions to bills, launch investigations, issue subpoenas and lambast some of Trump’s poor foreign policy choices. But the second Trump administration has shown it will route around Congress and confront it with delays, hostility and vitriol, limiting any capacity for oversight. Having spent its first 18 months in power ignoring a friendly Republican Congress, one with a Democratic majority has even slimmer chances. In other words, little will change until the occupant of the White House does.

For now, the Democrats’ real power resides not in stopping the current administration but in shaping what comes next. Democratic candidates competing across the US—for both primaries and generals—have a wide ideological range, from “democratic socialists” to “centrists”. While they all heavily criticise Trump and his administration, they have different diagnoses for where the dysfunction began, what sustains it and what needs to be done about it. Engaged in party primaries across the country, Democratic candidates are putting forward competing answers to the two central questions Americans are asking themselves: “What went wrong?” and “How do we fix it?”  Based on these answers, we have identified that Democrats tend to cluster into three camps—the “revolutionaries”, the “renovators” and the “revivalists”—each with distinct proposals for the future of America.

The revolutionaries argue that the political and economic system that drives America has always been unjust and was built to concentrate wealth at the top. Therefore, the way to fix America is to enact large, structural change. The renovators argue that the democratic system of government was largely built to benefit all Americans but has been corrupted by money and captured interests. Their proposed remedy is to root out large-scale corruption, rebalancing the economic and political systems to the benefit of middle- and working-class Americans. The revivalists argue that increased partisanship, fuelled by Trump and the MAGA-aligned right, has divided the country and undermined the collaborative bipartisanship that is necessary for the functioning of the system and its institutions. They are focused on reinvigorating those institutions, reviving the post-war international order and rebuilding political bridges, all of which they see as the path back to peace and prosperity.  

The revolutionaries, renovators and revivalists are ideal types, not formal factions. They emerge from our analysis of over 50 high-profile Democratic primaries and general election campaigns throughout the 2026 midterm cycle. We also researched campaign platforms, stump speeches, debates and candidate interviews with local news, and interviewed various pundits, current and former staff, officials and pollsters in Washington. In doing so, we found that sorting candidates by their messages about the underlying cause of what has gone wrong in America proved to reliably predict how a candidate discusses domestic and global problems. For example, revolutionaries support Europe’s strategic autonomy but would dislike a Europe defined by militarisation and austerity; renovators see Europe as a potential partner on anti-corruption, taxation and democracy, as long as Europeans provide for their own security; and revivalists remain attached to the NATO alliance but are still unlikely to restore the old division of labour.

The ideological battles between Democrats will matter more than the arithmetic of the Senate or the House for the next two years. One of these three camps will lead the party’s ideological charge for the next presidential race, if not the next presidency. Leaders across Europe should not wait to see which will prevail. Rather, they should engage with these camps well before the presidential race gets under way. They may then be able to shape the thinking and policy proposals that Democrats put on the table between now and 2028, and beyond.  

The Democratic camps

Democrats—from New York democratic socialists to staunch Iowa moderates—have more in common than not. Practically everyone in the party believes Trump is a problem and that he and the MAGA movement have fundamentally changed American democracy for the worse. Many view widespread corruption as an issue and some say corruption is encouraged by the system itself.

But while the policy views of the three Democratic camps overlap, there are a few key points of difference. To illustrate these characteristics more clearly, this paper focuses on key individuals who have gained national attention, are running in close races, or are largely representative of what other ideologically aligned candidates say. It is rare for a candidate to be a perfect “revolutionary” or “revivalist” because they must answer to constituencies with divergent interests and disparate views of American and global affairs. Some candidates will even recognise themselves across different camps. Nevertheless, these three camps represent sensitivities that are bound to clash in the primaries until one of them breaks through and is championed by the 2028 Democratic nominee for president. Understanding them helps anticipate the direction of US policy in the brouhaha of its politics.

The revolutionaries maintain that the political and economic order in the US is functioning as designed: to serve concentrated wealth rather than the American people. The enemy, in revolutionaries’ rhetoric, is not necessarily any one person or party (such as Trump or the Republicans) but the economic and political system that consistently benefits the ruling class. Only a structural transformation of the system would finally make it work for the people.

Michigan Democratic Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed in his primary victory speech put the thesis as such: “It turns out that the reason so many of us ain’t got is because of the system that has corrupted our politics to take it away from us. That is the thing we are taking on now”. El-Sayed, who is a former public health official in Detroit, focuses his entire campaign on big structural goals: getting corporate money out of politics, and, like Kentucky Senate candidate Charles Booker, passing Medicare for All, a proposal for universal healthcare. Often revolutionaries’ critiques take a moral tone, such as when Senate candidate Angie Nixon of Florida talks about cruelty out of Washington, or denounces the “liars” and “cheaters” in office.

Because the revolutionaries diagnose the political system as in need of a complete overhaul, reforms aimed at constraining the actions of individuals miss the point. Their signature domestic proposals—nationalising big American corporations, adding seats on the Supreme Court, establishing Congressional term limits, overhauling campaign funding and raising taxes on the ultra-wealthy—aim to fundamentally change the US political system rather than simply elect better leaders.

Their theory of power follows: winning office is useful, but only insofar as it can be used to structurally change power dynamics between a ruling corporate class and average working Americans. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, when asked about a potential run for president in 2028, responded: “My ambition is way bigger than that. My ambition is to change this country. Presidents come and go. Senate, house seats, elected officials come and go. But single-payer healthcare is forever. A living wage is forever. Workers’ rights are forever.”

On foreign policy, the revolutionaries argue that the current political system led America on an inevitable path of hyper-militarisation, threat inflation, an over-extension of its financial and human resources in military adventurism, and the reproduction of domestic systemic racism into foreign policy. They view the American relationship with Israel as the seminal example of everything wrong with this approach; Palestine being “one the great moral questions of our time” as New York congressional candidate Claire Valdez puts it.

Their diagnosis abroad is largely parallel to the one at home, viewing the pitfalls of US foreign policy as a metastasis caused by the American corporate class. As Valdez asserts:

“For decades, we have been sold a lie: that the US empire defends freedom, advances democracy, and protects human rights…In reality, the bipartisan war machine has delivered immense suffering around the world while doing little to improve the lives of working people here or abroad. The military-industrial complex doesn’t just enrich arms manufacturers—it has become our de facto industrial policy, sustaining enough jobs and political constituencies to make endless war challenging to stop.”

Their fixes to US foreign policy largely follow their domestic proposals: if you fix the system and its incentives for prioritising the financial gains of the wealthiest class, all else will follow.[1] This is rooted in banning corporate political action committee spending on campaigns which they believe will ultimately diminish the influence of defence contractors and foreign interest groups—namely the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC)—over candidates’ races, and therefore, diminish their influence on policy. In the short term, the revolutionaries aim to cut defence spending, bolster humanitarian aid and preference diplomacy in the American foreign policy toolkit. They also believe that the Biden administration’s foreign policy officials must be held accountable for continuing to supply Israel as its war on Gaza intensified.

Unsurprisingly, many in this camp represent overwhelmingly blue districts, call themselves “progressives” and some belong to the Democratic Socialists of America or the Working Family Party.

In these midterms, some of the revolutionary firebrands include Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed, Kentucky Senate candidate Charles Booker, Florida senate candidate Angie Nixon, Representative Chris Rabb of Pennsylvania, House candidates Melat Kiros in Colorado, and New York congressional candidates Claire Valdez and Darializa Avila Chevalier. Disgraced Maine Senate candidate Graham Platner also used that same rhetoric.

The renovators believe the system is imperfect, but largely worth keeping. In their view it has been co-opted and corrupted by money and corporate greed and upheld by a leadership class that is either corrupt themselves or out of answers. As James Talarico, Democratic Senate candidate in Texas, explains: “I think we’re living in an era of corruption, and I don’t just mean illegal activity… I’m talking about corruption in the deeper sense, the rotting of our systems from the inside out…” In his telling, strengthened by his moral standing as a middle school teacher and Presbyterian seminarian, the issue with the American political system is not the institutions themselves, but the way in which they are weaponised and perverted.

While the revolutionaries name the ruling class as the enemy, the renovators see the villain as a narrower collection of groups who have captured institutions that were otherwise built to work for the American people. This distinction yields a different theory of power: with the right rules in place, the existing machinery can be trusted to function again. Therefore, instead of demolition, this group aims to renovate.

Senator Jon Ossoff spoke to this message at a campaign rally in June when he mused about what the founding fathers of America would see if they came to the US today:

“They’d see a pluralist democracy, people of all colours descended from every point on earth, stitched together from out of many nations into one. But they’d also see a nation, that at its height of wealth and power, fell into the very traps they most feared. Devouring itself in bitter conflict between warring factions, captured by special interests. And they’d see a faithless president exploiting this rot to pursue the absolute power they overthrew.”

House candidate Daniel Biss has voiced a similar critique, stating that: “While our families struggle to get ahead, politicians in Washington line their own pockets and special interests and wealthy donors flood our political system with money to protect their own power and access.”

Because renovators share the same anger towards an entrenched leadership class, the remedy they prescribe overlaps somewhat with that of the revolutionaries, including stock trading bans for Congress, term limits and campaign finance reform. However, the renovators are more likely to clean out and reform an agency—namely the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—that the revolutionaries would call to abolish. The renovators also view the Democratic party as a vehicle worth trying to steer rather than run against.

On foreign policy, the renovators argue that the same corruption that is eroding domestic institutions has been exported, and that this is primarily corroding America’s credibility. Ossoff made this connection explicit when he criticised the financial gains Jared Kushner has made while carrying out US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Senator Chris Murphy, a leader in this camp, has also described Trump’s acceptance of gifts and business arrangements from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as corruption with “no precedent in American history”. Thus, the fix renovators recommend is twofold: root out the graft of those currently running foreign policy so American leadership abroad can function as intended, and then fix the political system such that future administrations cannot replicate the corrupt schemes of the current one.

Renovators are spread across the country, from candidates in conservative states and districts such as Senate candidate James Talarico of Texas, Senator Jon Ossoff from Georgia, House candidates Sam Forstag of Montana, Manny Rutinel of Colorado, and Eric Jones of California. There is also a cluster of midwestern candidates including House candidate Daniel Biss from Illinois, Senate candidate Peggy Flannagan of Minnesota, and former Senator and current candidate Sherrod Brown from Ohio.

The revivalists are firm believers in American exceptionalism and credit American liberalism for the peace and prosperity of the past 80 years. They see Trump and the MAGA-aligned right as the primary threat to that inheritance and to American democracy and values more broadly.

Their diagnosis is that Donald Trump and the MAGA movement behind him have steeped the country in hyper-partisan vitriol and driven it into a spiral of polarisation. Revivalists argue that these divides drive dysfunction in Washington and make it impossible to worth within the political system. They often celebrate a prior era of bipartisanship and showcase their own capacity to work across the aisle.

Their theory of power follows from that diagnosis. Democrats must defeat Trump, the movement behind him and the polarisation that produced both. Then competent, experienced hands will make the system function as intended again. They believe collaborating with reasonable, non-MAGA Republicans to build bridges and pass longer-lasting legislation will show Americans how a working government can operate. In turn, they think a government that delivers will earn back trust on its own merits. Revivalist candidates centre their electoral pitches around defeating Trump, restoring institutional norms and bipartisan collaboration. Senator Chris Coons, who is running for re-election in Delaware, made an appeal to voters saying as much:

“At some point [Trump’s] chaos, corruption, and cruelty will come to an end. And a lot of work will be needed to pick up the pieces, to clean up the mess he’s made, to fix a system that’s still broken and not delivering results for the folks I serve in Delaware. I’m running for reelection because the job’s not done.”

Coons emphasises the damage that Trump has caused and his desire to restore normality to the halls of Congress. Additionally, many revivalists stand closest to the Democratic party leadership and often treat experience as a credential rather than a liability. In her unsuccessful race for Michigan’s Senate seat, Congresswoman Haley Stevens emphasised her time in the Obama administration, for example, and Roy Cooper spotlights his accomplishments as evidence of his policy chops from his time as North Carolina’s governor.

On foreign policy, the revivalists argue that American military alliances, trade relationships and institutions are integral pieces of the liberal world order. In their view, the post-war structures are worth defending, US leadership is needed and Trump’s destruction of these institutions is actively harming American global power. They mostly believe that the backlash against these institutions, whether it be NATO or the WTO, is a failure of messaging. Americans were never told what the post-war order gave them, so they have had no reason to defend it.[2]

Where revivalists identify a problem abroad, they frame it as they frame problems at home: the result of a specific bad actor’s conduct or of partisan divisions. For example, they blame Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Russia’s Vladimir Putin for their countries’ strained relationships with the US. Change the leadership and you can restore the relationship, which is an argument for patience both at home and abroad. They argue too that foreign adversaries purposely widen American divisions, and that Americans should fight back by recognising those efforts and working across the aisle, a case New York representative Tom Suozzi made recently during a hearing on foreign influence:

“The biggest factor causing division in our country is our foreign adversaries…They are feeding division in our country. They cannot defeat us economically. They cannot defeat us militarily. So they want to take what they see as being our biggest weakness which is our diversity. And they fuel dissent in our country…”

Revivalists comprise the largest cross-section of the party and are represented from coast-to-coast, including Senator Chris Coons from Delaware, Senator Chuck Schumer from New York, Senator John Hickenlooper from Colorado, Representative Tom Suozzi from New York, Representative Maggie Goodlander from New Hampshire, Senate candidate Chris Pappas of New Hampshire, Senate candidate Roy Cooper from North Carolina, House candidate Rebecca Cooke from Wisconsin, former Senate candidates Janet Mills from Maine and Angie Craig from Minnesota.

The five foreign policy issues

Primaries have at times led to tense disputes among Democrats. When it comes to foreign policy, our analysis shows where the camps divide on five key issues that will matter to Europeans: affordability and trade; the use of military force; China and great power competition; Israel; and Europe and European security.

1. Affordability and trade

Since Zohran Mamdani’s New York mayoral victory in November 2025, affordability has defined this election cycle’s messaging. Candidates across the board focus on policies that would help the affordability crisis and frame other issues as perpetuating it.[3] The focus is so singular that the headline messages are often interchangeable across the party: Abdul El-Sayed is running for “Money out of politics, money in your pocket, Medicare for all” while Roy Cooper’s prevailing message is “Make stuff cost less.”

In terms of foreign policy, trade is affordability gone global. And as all Democratic candidates see it, Trump’s tariffs raise the price for Americans while enriching himself and his allies. But this consensus is an objection to these specific tariffs, not to all tariffs.

Revolutionaries remain sceptical of the old free-trade order itself: Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez at the Munich Security Conference called for “a recognition of NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] as a failed policy for many rural and working class communities,” and Abdul El-Sayed called NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership a disaster for the American worker. Moreover, this camp sees small, strategic tariffs as legitimate tools of job protection.

Renovators, on the other hand, believe current trade agreements can be improved. Senator Jon Ossoff, for example, sent a letter to the Trump administration urging them to use the US-Mexico-Canada agreement (USMCA) review to police Mexican labour and environmental practices to ensure American growers have a chance to compete fairly on the global market.

Revivalists remain closely aligned to the old free-trade consensus. In April of this year, for example, senators in this camp asked the US trade representative to “strengthen and renew” the USMCA. They believe that trade tools like tariffs or export controls should only be used for national security issues, akin to the “small-yard, high-fence” policies of the Biden administration. Amid the Trump administration’s trade wars, they suggest focusing on a narrow trade agenda that directly serves the interests of both sides, such as deals on critical minerals, new technologies or other pieces of critical supply chains.

2. The use of military force

America’s two latest military operations—Trump’s war in Iran and the operation to remove Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro—have sparked debate among Democrats over what role the US military should play in foreign policy. Nearly every Democrat criticised the Iran war and many voiced reservations about Venezuela, but the extent to which Democrats are comfortable using the military as a foreign policy tool differs.

Revolutionaries read Trump’s use of force in Iran and Venezuela as a natural continuation of an overly militarised foreign policy and advocate for that to change. El-Sayed called the Iran war “dumb and illegal”, but argued that the real issue was the cost of a war America did not need to fight. Colorado’s Melat Kiros makes this structural claim directly, “It’s time to reimagine our global role: not as a militarised empire, but as a champion of diplomacy, human rights, and peacebuilding. We need to end the blank checks for endless war and reallocate that funding towards diplomacy abroad and housing, education, and healthcare here at home.” New York candidate for congress Darializa Avila Chevalier puts it similarly.

The revolutionaries, if in office, would work to cut the military budget broadly in the name of keeping the money at home. For them, the deeper fix to a foreign policy driven mainly by military action is upstream: end the corporate and defence contractor lobbies that supports these wars in the first place.

The renovators view the most recent use of force as domestic corruption running through foreign policy. They are not necessarily opposed to using military force, but uncomfortable with the corrupt forces that push the military to be a tool of first resort. Chris Murphy’s office headlined his remarks on the money: “This president’s foreign policy, the invasion of Venezuela, the ouster of Maduro, is about making his crowd filthy rich. It has nothing to do with American national security.”

James Talarico likewise described the transaction as follows: “Trump promised the biggest oil executives in this country a ‘great deal’ if they gave him a billion dollars for his re-election campaign, and then he turned around and gave them a gift. He gave them the nation of Venezuela, home to the largest oil reserves in the world. Billionaires don’t just run our economy. They don’t just run our government. Now they run our foreign policy.” Corruption, in this telling, drives how Trump uses force. As with domestic concerns, the way to “fix” the incentives to use military force is largely the same as the revolutionaries: reign in defence contractor graft, lobbying and campaign spending.

Revivalists press hardest on legality and cost, but the argument underneath is about what these operations do to America’s standing in the world. Chris Coons admonished the administration’s decision to launch strikes on Iran in February for their method and legality: “President Trump’s military campaign against Iran and call for regime change are the beginning of a reckless new war of choice with no clear strategy and no clear endpoint. This is not how a democracy goes to war.”

Revivalists levelled similar critiques at the military operation in Venezuela. Representative Maggie Goodlander responded to the capture of Maduro by asking: “What is the legal justification for such an action? The US Constitution entrusts the US Congress with war powers for very good reasons. The Trump Administration must immediately and truthfully answer questions about the motivation and legality of this unilateral military action, the potential for any further escalation, and the plan for peace.”

For this camp, how a country goes to war is a sign of its strength. Authorisation, a stated objective, and allies consulted in advance are what gives a war public support and partners willing to help in the effort. According to revivalists, a democracy that goes to war via unilateral decision is weaker afterward, because that decision erodes the constitutional system of checks and balances. So, Trump’s lack of consultation widens a divide between Republicans and Democrats, between the branches of government and diminishes the public image of the US military.

3. China and great power competition

China is generally understood by all on the left as a strategic challenge. Yet Democrats disagree on just how big the threat is, whether to commit troops to the defence of Taiwan, and just how much the US should orient its economic and security policy around the strategic competition with China.

Revolutionaries fear a full-throated strategic competition with China would subvert domestic priorities. When Ocasio-Cortez was asked at the Munich Security Conference if she would commit to sending US troops to defend Taiwan, she said: “We want to make sure we never get to that point and we want to make sure that we are moving in all of our economic, research, and our global positions to avoid any such confrontation.”

This camp’s scepticism of the use of force and relentless focus on domestic framing is clearly seen when hot-button issues in the strategic competition discussion arise. For example, this camp would rather support limits on AI development to protect jobs, workers and the environment, than to push forward on AI research in order to compete with China. Likewise, they are more likely to focus the conversation of US-China strategic competition on manufacturing gaps, lags in research and education and trade deficits, thus bringing the focus back to the working class and economic issues.

At the other end, revivalists treat China as the defining national security issue and, therefore, AI, space and weapon development are part of an arms race that the US must win. All tools are on the table, whether it be an export-control regime, import controls on Chinese electric vehicles, sanctions on Chinese Communist Party officials or even bans on TikTok.

Renovators sit in the middle. Hawkish enough to want to compete but unwilling to let strategic competition swallow the agenda. They are focused on economic fairness with China and competing beyond military means alone, but also willing to place domestic guardrails on AI and the tech race. They believe competition is important, but that it should not overtake all domestic needs. For example, they would advocate for the need for data centres to be energy and water self-sufficient, or even call for moratoriums on data centres, even if that threatens frontier model development.

4. Israel

Israel is where the three camps separate most cleanly along a single question: what, if anything, should America sell or give to Israel?

This is a central issue for the revolutionaries, who maintain that Israel’s actions in Gaza amount to genocide. This camp has concluded that conditioning aid to Israel, the previous progressive position, is no longer a viable measure to ensure any meaningful end to the conflict or long-term peace. Their preferred policy is a full arms embargo on Israel, including defensive systems.

This distinction has already defined a few primary elections. New York’s Darializa Avila Chevalier, who won the congressional primary against Representative Adriano Espaillat, ran on “babies not bombs”, promising to vote to halt arms sales to Israel. Melat Kiros, who unseated nearly-30-year incumbent Diana DeGette in Colorado, called for a full arms embargo to Israel and closed her victory speech leading a “Free Palestine” chant. El-Sayed takes this same position: “I support an immediate arms embargo on Israel and reject the false differentiation between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ weapons.”

The renovators often make that distinction and are primarily focused on the need for change in the US-Israel relationship. Their belief that the system must be reformed is clearly reflected in their positions towards Israel. James Talarico, for example, has said he would work to ban the sale of offensive military weapons to Israel while still supporting Israel’s defensive systems. Talarico has declined to call it a genocide but has called the destruction in Gaza a “moral disaster”. Senator Jon Ossoff similarly told constituents that he voted against sending rifles to Israel because of the “extreme mass deprivation of civilians in Gaza”, and defended his vote for air-to-ground missiles because of Israel’s need to be able “to strike those who would launch missiles and rockets at Israeli civilians.” Senator Murphy, likewise, voted with Bernie Sanders’s resolution disapproving of the sale of offensive weapons in 2024, but has since moved even further, calling for a halt of US military aid altogether. But most in this camp have stopped short of demanding a total embargo. Instead, they try to thread the needle between respecting America’s long-standing special relationship with Israel and combatting the structure that has allowed Israel’s abuse of military force.

Revivalists support the US-Israel relationship but blame the two leaders, Trump and Netanyahu, for souring the once-mutually beneficial of defence relationship. In their view, Netanyahu and Trump’s actions have exacerbated US public opinion of the relationship, rather than the structure of the relationship itself. Chris Coons has reiterated that his “commitment to Israel remains ironclad” while directly placing the blame on Netanyahu for the declining American sentiment towards the country. Similarly, Representative Chris Pappas, running for Senate in New Hampshire, articulates support for Israel and criticism of Netanyahu’s government. Roy Cooper, meanwhile, has flatly rejected efforts to block aid to Israel.

The revivalists’ view on America’s relationship with Israel is perhaps best expressed in Chuck Schumer’s March 2024 Senate floor speech, where he called Netanyahu “an obstacle to peace” who has “lost his way by allowing his political survival to take precedence over the best interests of Israel.” In other words, just as Trump and the rise of the MAGA right have degraded the American political system, Netanyahu and the far-right in Israel have degraded the US-Israel relationship. The solution, then, is to try to change the behaviour of Netanyahu since they cannot change that he and Trump are in power. Therefore, this camp tends to treat US-Israel arms sales on a case-by-case basis, usually agreeing to send weapons, but reserving the right to condition those arm sales based on how Israel uses them. As Governor Janet Mills, who failed to win the Democratic primary for Maine’s Senate, said while criticising Netanyahu’s conduct she would evaluate any bill to halt arms shipments “on the specifics.”

5. Europe and European security

Nearly all Democrats see the value of the transatlantic relationship beyond the Trump administration’s idea of a “shared cultural heritage”. For the president, this is often a thinly veiled way to value the continent for its whiteness and colonial past and lambast it when he sees this as changing. Democrats, on the other hand, value the relationship for its shared rules and norms—whether these are liberal internationalism or workers’ rights.

A Democratic congressional majority will certainly not have the same disdain for Europe as many in the Trump administration do, but the Democratic party is certain to present its challenges. Some in the Democratic coalition would like to see a renewed American role in NATO, for example, while others want a European partner that can stand on its own. One challenge is for certain: the US-European relationship will be on the back burner. In the midterm campaigns you would be hard pressed to find a single Democratic candidate talking about the transatlantic relationship with voters.

Ukraine

On the war in Ukraine, all camps are firmly behind Kyiv but divide over the specifics of what America should do in support. Revolutionaries are wary of a militarised US foreign policy and an economic statecraft whose costs fall to the American taxpayers. Leaders in this camp voted against seizing Russian oligarch’s assets in 2022, and signed, then retracted, a 2022 letter urging Biden to use negotiation and diplomacy. Much of the motivation to write that letter four years ago still exists within this camp today.[4]

The revolutionaries are most eager to push for peace and they remain somewhat doubtful that additional weapons for Ukraine benefit Americans, viewing an open-ended war as another entry in the long book of American over-extension. However, they are not outright against supporting Ukraine. Even Abdul El-Sayed, who was extremely vocal against sending weapons to Israel, said: “When it comes to Ukraine, I think we are involved in a righteous struggle from being invaded by their neighbour.”

Those in the renovator and revivalist camps both support Ukraine’s independence and the use of American military aid to secure it with varying intensity. Their divergence is on the use of sanctions on Russia. Renovators Chris Murphy and Jon Ossoff expressed some scepticism of the efficacy and knock-on effects of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which would authorise an increase of tariffs up to 100% for the top-five foreign purchasers of Russian energy supplies. Murphy ultimately voted for the bill, and Ossoff against. Senators Mark Kelly and Ruben Gallego, both revivalists, on the other hand, vocally supported the bill from the beginning. These are arguments about how much to spend and how hard to squeeze, not about whether Ukraine should survive. The sharper disparities appear when the question turns from the war to the US-European relationship itself.

US-European relationship

Revolutionaries are interested in a transatlantic relationship that is not centred around NATO or any military alliance. As revolutionaries believe in creating an American foreign policy that is not solely centred on military force, they also see that as a goal in the European context. Hence, they accept European strategic autonomy and might even welcome it. They are the camp most open to structural boldness and the least likely to campaign for returning any troops Trump withdraws from the continent. This camp has shown a proclivity for supporting a move towards burden-shifting, but are sceptical of a European relationship achieved only through rearmament.[5] Rather, they will seek an affirmative agenda as sketched by Ocasio-Cortez and Representative Jason Crow at the 2026 Munich Security Conference: a new transatlantic relationship re-centred on combatting authoritarianism on both continents and advancing labour standards, rather than one singularly obsessed with NATO and continued US security commitments.

Renovators would likely treat Europeans first and foremost as partners on the agenda they care about—corruption, taxation and democratic resilience.[6] They would also push for Europe to continue to take an increased responsibility for its own security. Murphy explained as much during a Senate foreign relations subcommittee hearing in September 2025: “I believe in that NATO treaty, I believe in Article 5, but I also think it is absolutely time for the members of NATO on the other side of the Atlantic to take more responsibility for their collective defence.” The renovators are therefore keen on the idea of increased burden-sharing within NATO since they often view foreign policy issues through the lens of “where is the money going?” Correspondingly they view European governments as natural allies in the pursuit of tax enforcements, financial transparency, AI and digital platform regulation.

Revivalists remain the most attached to the alliance and the most likely to defend NATO. Coons released a joint statement with Senator Mitch McConnell in April of 2026 reaffirming their support for the alliance: “Americans are safer when NATO is strong and united. It is in our interest for all allies to tend this unity with care…The Senate will continue to support the alliance for the peace and protection it provides America, Europe, and the world.” The revivalists also credit European allies with responding to American pressure by committing 5% of GDP to military spending, and with this they treat burden sharing as a question already answered.

Any structural change, in their eyes, is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive to continued US leadership. Rather, they see European rearmament as vindication of the alliance and reason for the US to stay committed. Even if the old division of labour and spending is not coming back, they would restore the old processes within the alliance: consultation before decisions, allies told in advance and an obligation to commitments.[7]

The uncertain road ahead

It is too early to know which of the three camps will be the most successful with voters. Democratic primaries in the spring and summer 2026 have offered mixed lessons. Quite a few revolutionary firebrands, such as Abdul El-Sayed and Angie Nixon, have won their primaries in widely covered upset victories. Meanwhile, some renovators like Jon Ossoff and James Talarico are running particularly strong campaigns while revivalists continue to fare strongly across the board. In other words, Europeans could be facing any of the foreign policy positions described above, and should engage with all three camps long before the American public decides which should come out in front.

Recommendations for Europe

Trump’s frenzy of disruptions too often clouds European judgement on long-term evolutions. If Democrats return to power, they will not revert to “back to normal”. Instead, Europeans need to engage with them on a new agenda; whether they be a far cry from the previous Democratic administration, like the revolutionaries, or a fair bit closer, like the revivalists. To anticipate what they may be dealing with in less than three years, Europeans should engage with all Democrats—from the familiar to the uncomfortable—even when disagreements abound, and start thinking of a common agenda to help shape Democratic policy while it is still being formed.

Expect the unexpected

European governments took a long time to accept that MAGA is durable and not a deviation from the norm. To be better prepared this time around, the debates on the American left deserve early attention, especially as they too could cause surprises. The populist energy emanating from the revolutionaries may prove to be a winning electoral strategy for Democrats in the midterms, and could well be mobilised by the next presidential candidate.

One thing is for certain: the Democratic party has entered a post-Obama, post-Biden era where questions over leadership mark more than a change of personnel. They signal the passing of the generation shaped by the Iraq war, the global financial crisis, the rise of ISIS and the return of great-power rivalry with Russia and China. Strategic competition with China is no longer the modus operandi as it was under Biden. International trade is no longer taken as an unqualified good. The American left is not returning to the internationalism of the 2010s. A new cohort of Democratic leaders is emerging with different political instincts and foreign-policy priorities.

Many Democrats no longer see the transatlantic relationship as an inheritance that they have a duty to preserve. If and when they return to power, their expectations of burden-sharing will have hardened, historical attachment to the Atlantic alliance will have faded and Europe will no longer occupy the central place it once did in Democratic foreign policy debates. Younger Democrats in particular approach alliances through the lens of effectiveness and narrow shared interests and values, rather than a long-standing historical solidarity. Europeans need to pay attention to the debates taking place inside the Democratic party in order to engage the party of tomorrow.

Engage with every Democrat

As Europeans navigate the new American left, the biggest hurdle they will face is that they are increasingly viewed as at best as irrelevant and at worst as complicit. Europeans are not the focus of any of the three camps’ foreign policies. In fact, throughout our analysis, Europe was hardly mentioned in any television interviews, stump speeches or posts on X. Even the war in Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid challenges have lost prevalence in foreign policy debates consumed with China, Iran, Israel and Venezuela, to name a few.

When they do pay attention to Europe, Democrats across the board are beginning to regard European leaders who have spent nearly two years currying Trump’s favour as part of the problem—whether that is because Democrats view them through the lens of upholding an oligarchy, enabling gross corruption or being pathetic in the face of a global bully. Even if European leaders are pragmatically flattering the president with paternal references or golf rounds, they should remember that there are still a lot of democrats (not the party, the philosophy) on the other side of the Atlantic who would like to see in Europeans a standard-bearer and not an enabler.

Likewise, behind closed doors European leaders espouse a disappointment in Democratic politicians for losing to Trump twice and failing to put up decent opposition so far.[8] Democrats, too, are acting pragmatically. The options they currently have to mount a significant opposition are few and ineffective.

Which is all to say, engagement and re-building bridges across the left now will be essential for building a transatlantic relationship fit for the post-Trump world. European leaders and all three camps want America to play a constructive, trusted and peaceful role in the world—they just differ on what exactly that looks like.

In particular, Europeans have to start meeting and engaging with revolutionaries, even if their positions appear furthest outside the norm. This camp, for its provocations and innovation, is feeding most of the political conversation and fires up the base. Engagement would make Europe’s concerns and assets more prevalent to their thinking, while ignoring them only guarantees tension if they come to power.

Shape the next transatlantic agenda

As Democrats are not paying any attention to Europe, the burden of revitalising the transatlantic relationship lies with Europeans. There are significant areas—like tech regulation, corruption reform, taxation, trade and security—where European leaders will find partners in the American left if they so choose. They should not be surprised, however, if they must make the first move. Indeed, if Democrats win the midterms, the next two years will see Trump weak and the Democrats not yet strong. In that time, no policy idea will come from Washington that imagines the future of collaborations with Europe. It is up to Europeans to propose them.

Europeans’ experience of the Biden administration illustrates why relying on American leadership is insufficient. Although Biden championed alliances rhetorically, several defining decisions were taken with limited European consultation. The Inflation Reduction Act prioritised domestic reindustrialisation through measures many Europeans regarded as discriminatory. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was poorly coordinated with allies. The AUKUS agreement advanced Indo-Pacific strategy but came at the expense of French interests. These episodes reflected a broader shift towards a US that increasingly pursues its strategic objectives unilaterally, even under an avowedly pro-NATO administration. Europeans’ continued acquiescence towards the Trump administration has only made unilateral foreign policy more appealing.

To avoid facing a Democratic majority which operates alone, Europeans must think through what they would like to propose to Democrats. That agenda should be capable of appealing across the Democratic coalition, from revolutionaries to renovators to revivalists.

In setting an agenda, Europeans should connect with Democrats from all three camps, but there are specific opportunities to build stronger coalitions with the camps that are naturally aligned with European interests. For example, on Israel policy and a new US role in the Middle East, the revolutionaries and the renovators could find alignment with many European governments. On a framework for competing with China and derisking, Europeans should collaborate with renovators and revivalists. All three camps will be in favour of a rebalanced NATO, but should Europeans seek more structural changes, they would find allies in the renovator and revolutionary camps. On all issues, Europeans should make the case that they can be a practical partner in solving some of the international problems around which the next Democratic coalition will organise itself. In so doing, Europeans and the US Democrats can build a new, more balanced and stable alliance.

A renewed transatlantic programme should therefore include:

• A “fair trade” agenda that combines openness with stronger labour protections, coordinates responses to Chinese industrial overcapacity, establishes minimum wage requirements and climate standards. All three camps could be interested in such an agenda: revivalists for competitiveness, renovators for reestablishing ethical rules and revolutionaries for climate and labour rights progress. For Europeans, it is important to move away from the logic of indiscriminate tariffs and negotiated exemptions. Instead they should put forward a logic of fair competition and sustainable industrial development on both sides. The European Commission should start by identifying partners with whom to discuss these goals.
• A joint framework for AI that strengthens consumer protections, ensures fair taxation of digital platforms, promotes open access to AI for public goods such as healthcare and education, and aligns technological innovation with climate objectives. The renovators would be most in favour of such a proposal, and elements of the revolutionaries and revivalists would be a natural coalition. France, which promotes international cooperation for responsible AI governance, as well as Britain, which will host the G7 in 2028, should reach out to Democrats interested in tackling the issue and working on a regulatory framework for AI and other technologies.
• A rebalanced NATO in which European allies assume greater responsibility for force generation, command structures and regional deterrence, allowing the US to reduce its military footprint without weakening collective defence. All three camps would find favour in stronger European allies, although revivalists are probably more comfortable in the conversation. Nevertheless, Europeans should also spend time engaging with revolutionaries and renovators, who do not see the same value in alliances, and show that collective defence can be cost-effective and a guarantee of long-term security. Transatlanticist networks in staunch US allies such as Germany, the Netherlands or Poland should start suggesting concrete transformations of the alliance to be discussed with Democrats.
• A substantial expansion of transatlantic educational, research and cultural exchanges, including easier access to European universities for American students, expanded researcher mobility and new funding for joint academic networks. Revivalists would applaud a greater cultural exchange and such a vision for renewed American leadership. Revolutionaries and renovators would also welcome the opportunity to centre education, research and culture in the transatlantic relationship, rather than military. The EU could help promote such a “Community of friendship for Europeans and Americans”, which a lot of Europeans may embrace, that de-emphasises trade and defence as the only pillars of the transatlantic relationship, and put democracy, innovation and human rights at the centre. Such an initiative would, above all, help cushion Europe’s fall towards irrelevance on the American left.

These proposals would resonate differently across the Democratic coalition. Revivalists would view them as a means of modernising American leadership rather than abandoning it. Renovators could see them as evidence that Europe is assuming greater responsibility for its own security while contributing to domestic American priorities on labour, industrial policy and technological governance. Revolutionaries may find opportunities to advance an ambitious climate and social agenda beyond their shores. In all cases, the objective should be the same: demonstrate that Europe can be an asset rather than a burden for the next generation of Democratic policymakers.

Methodology

The revolutionaries, renovators, and revivalists are ideal types that emerged from our analysis of 42 high-profile Democratic primaries and general election campaigns throughout the 2026 midterm cycle and of 63 individual Democratic candidates. We exhaustively researched campaign platforms, stump speeches, debates and candidate interviews with local news, and interviewed various pundits, current and former staff, officials and pollsters in Washington DC from April to August 2026.

The Democratic primary races and candidates studied include: Senate races in Alaksa, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio and Texas; Governor races in Iowa, New Jersey, Virginia and Wisconsin; and Congressional races in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.

About the authors

Célia Belin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office. Her research focuses on transatlantic relations.

Chris Herrmann is the US programme coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Washington, DC. His research focuses on US domestic and foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship.

Nevada Joan Lee is a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Washington office. Her research focuses on European security and defence, US foreign policy, the transatlantic relationship and NATO.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the many people who helped with this paper. First and foremost, thank you to all the Democratic politicians, staffers, pollsters and pundits who met with us for our research. A big thanks to Portia Kentish, whose thoughtful and thorough editing greatly sharpened the piece. Jeremy Shapiro and Jim O’Brien provided sage wisdom and multiple rounds of considered feedback. Majda Ruge offered generous comments and advice on earlier drafts. Chris Eichberger gave this piece its visual life through his extraordinary visuals. Martin Tenev worked tirelessly to bring the paper to its final form—life on the web.

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[1]  ECFR conversations with current and former progressive congressional staffers, Washington DC, July and August 2026

[2] Author’s conversations with congressional staffers, Washington DC, July 2026

[3] ECFR conversation with Democratic pollsters, Online, May 2026

[4] Conversations with progressive and moderate Democratic congressional staffers, Washington DC, July 2026

[5] ECFR Conversation with former and current progressive congressional staff, Washington DC, July and August 2026

[6] Authors’ conversations with politicians, March 2026, Washington DC and conversation with Tim Walz, ECFR annual council meeting, Vienna, June 2026

[7] Author’s conversations with congressional staffers, Washington DC, July 2026

[8] ECFR private workshop with European officials, Berlin, February 2026

Source

The third edition of EU TalentOn closed with the announcement of its winning teams on 11 September in Brest, France. Over five days, 100 early-career researchers aged 21 to 35 of 43 different nationalities, worked in teams to develop concrete responses to some of Europe's most pressing challenges, based on the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe.

The participants competed for a share of an €80,000 prize pool. First and second prizes were awarded in each of the five categories, alongside an Alumni Prize, a Special Jury Prize and the overall Grand Jury Prize.

The teams winning the 1^st prize were:

• Adaptation to climate change: Alejandro Roman, Marie Johanna Univer, Edoardo Kimani Bellotto and Florin Miron won with IMPRREST - from big data to decisions, a tool that gives responders one verified assessment of climate emergencies and evidence for adaptation.
• Cancer: Xhilda Dhamo, Oliwia Kosecka and Jafar Gura won with CogniVoice - a patient centered speech monitoring platform for post-treatment surveillance of Brain Cancer.
• Restore our Ocean and Waters Mission: Gabriel Tejero, Siddhanth Shishodia, Dominika Czekanowska and Gjylije Hoti won with Mission PFASSible – a solution that helps with pollution removal into verified risk reduction: sensing, capturing, concentrating, and proving water safety. 
• Climate-neutral and smart cities: Lucia Petronio, Samar Momin, Samira Huber and Imen Kaabachi won with Block2City - turning building data into renovation choices, funding guidance and expert handoff, while helping cities map local demand.
• Soil: Natasha Waris, Ilaria Bertolini, Felipe Quiroz, and Victoria Boycheva, won with RhizoSentinel – a solution that turns plants into living soil biosensors that reveal hidden soil biological threats before they cause crop losses, enabling earlier intervention and smarter soil management.
• The Grand Jury Prize of €12,000 for the best overall project went to RhizoSentinel, while the Special Jury Prize of €3,000 was awarded to Marion Le Meur, Narjes Yazdi, Suresh Ajmeera, and Alberto Galindo Caballero with their project Colospy - a rapid, saliva-based molecular test detecting colorectal-cancer-miRNA signature, designed as a stool-free screening option.

The projects were assessed by a jury of experts from academia, business and government on both scientific merit and market potential – the ability to become real innovations that would contribute to Europe's competitiveness.

Startups, Research and Innovation Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva (pictured) said:

“Congratulations to the winners of EU TalentOn 2026. The solutions you have put forward show what European talent can achieve when it is given room to think differently. Results like these underline that Europe's most important asset are its brightest minds.”

Background

EU TalentOn brings together early-career researchers to develop solutions to major societal challenges linked to the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe. By bringing science closer to citizens and building new connections between science and society in open, playful and engaging ways, it supports the objectives of the ERA Policy Agenda. 

EU TalentOn is a flagship event of Science Comes to Town, the Commission's year-long initiative bringing research and innovation closer to citizens across three host cities in 2026: Kiel (Germany), Brest (France) and Split (Croatia). With over more than 1,000 activities and with more than 70 partners, Science Comes to Town 2026 is connecting scientific institutions, innovation ecosystems and the public throughout the year.

The programme continues later this month, when Kiel hosts the 36th EU Contest for Young Scientists (EUCYS 2026) from 22 to 27 September, before Science Comes to Town 2026 draws to a close with a joint Closing Event and Ceremony on 14–16 December.

Science Comes to Town will return for a second edition in 2027, hosted by four new cities: Aarhus (Denmark), Genoa (Italy), Kaunas (Lithuania) and Oeiras (Portugal). EU TalentOn 2027 will be held in Kaunas, while EUCYS 2027 will take place in Genoa.

Women accounted for 54% of participants in the 2026 edition, reflecting the growing contribution of female talent to Europe’s research and innovation landscape.

More information

• EU TalentOn 2026
• Science Comes to Town

Towns and cities from around the Arctic took part in the launch of an EU-funded Arctic co-operation initiative that will enable more municipal leaders, Indigenous representatives and youth to work together.

The European Union has launched a new initiative gathering 21 towns and cities from across the Arctic to work together on shared priorities. BRIDGE, Building Resilient International Dialogue and Governance for Arctic Engagement, is led by the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF), building on the foundations of the Arctic Regional and Urban Cooperation network (AURC).    

“At a time of ever-increasing environmental and geopolitical change, cooperation among Arctic communities is more important than ever,” said Peter M. Wagner, Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, speaking at the EU Arctic Forum 2026 in Brussels. “We are proud to launch a new phase of EU support to Arctic cities forging connections across borders, building local capacity, and delivering tangible benefits for their residents.” 

“A safe, resilient and inclusive Arctic isn't a side interest for the EU, it's a shared project,” said Patti Bruns, AMF Secretary General. “I’m excited about our work over the next four years, bringing together communities from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland to strengthen cooperation between local governments who face increasing challenges – and opportunities.”

More cities co-operating in a permanent structure

BRIDGE integrates AURC’s approaches and methods into AMF’s permanent structure, extending the cooperation to more Arctic mayors and urban practitioners. 

Despite variations in size and governance structures, Arctic communities share a surprising range of challenges. Building on AURC achievements, these cities are now identifying common themes for the next four years of peer learning, exchanges, study visits, and collaborative problem-solving.

AURC sparked positive changes in Arctic communities 

In 2024, AURC gathered 15 Arctic local authorities from Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Alaska in the United States for the first time to work together on sustainable development. After two years of structured cooperation with expert support, positive local results were already visible. 

“Whether it was learning from Tromsø’s approach to community hubs or troubleshooting heavy equipment with our Canadian neighbours, AURC provided us with a roadmap for growth,” says Assisaun Toovak, Mayor of Utqiaġvik, the northernmost town in the United States. “We aren’t just a remote town in Alaska: we’re a key player in a global Arctic community.”

From new international welcome houses and services in Rovaniemi (Finland), Gällivare and Luleå (Sweden) and Tromsø (Norway) to plans for a new Youth Commission in Fairbanks North Star Borough (USA) inspired by peers in Sweden, Norway, Iceland and elsewhere, AURC sparked an array of positive local changes across the Arctic. These span citizen engagement and youth participation; attracting and retaining talent; sustainable tourism; culture and inclusive economic development; and resilience and emergency preparedness.

Arctic connections supporting resilience and sustainability

Beyond these tangible changes on the ground, trusted exchanges between mayors and staff of Arctic local authorities are boosting knowledge, capacity to adapt, and new initiatives. So far, these include cross-border cultural exchanges, focused workshops for sustainable Arctic tourism professionals, and best-practice sharing on wildfire preparedness. 

Another major result is a new Interreg Aurora project TALENT NORTH, Attracting and Anchoring Global Talent in the Arctic, developed by the Arctic Six universities alliance and AMF, along with administrations and universities of several Arctic cities.

Erkki Parkkinen, Mayor of Salla, Lapland (Finland), said: “It was the best thing for Salla to join AURC: I can now exchange good practices with friends across the Arctic. It’s very important for our municipalities to stay in touch with each other, for the future of the Arctic, for resilience.”

Read more about positive changes EU-funded cooperation has sparked in Arctic towns and cities. 

BRIDGE is funded by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), working closely with the European External Action Service, the diplomatic wing of the EU, and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE).

Arctic Mayors’ Forum is pan-Arctic forum representing the voices of Arctic Peoples through elected leaders at the municipal and community level. They provide an open, collaborative platform for their members, including Indigenous Peoples from around the Arctic.

The European Commission has approved a €52 million (RON 277 million) Romanian state aid scheme for cattle farmers facing increased fuel and fertiliser prices due to the Middle East crisis.

The scheme was approved under the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF) adopted by the Commission on 29 April 2026.

The Romanian scheme

Romania notified to the Commission a €52 million scheme to support companies active in the cattle farming sector. The scheme, which will run until 31 December 2026, aims to mitigate the impact of the increase in agricultural fuel and fertiliser prices.

The aid will take the form of direct grants, with a maximum of €50,000 per company.

The Commission assessed the scheme under EU state aid rules, in particular Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which enables member states to support the development of certain economic activities subject to certain conditions, as well as Sections 1 and 2.1 of the METSAF.

The Commission found that the scheme is in line with the conditions set out in the METSAF. In particular, the aid will be granted based on a scheme with a clear estimated budget and will be provided to temporarily support the development of companies active in the primary production of agricultural products. The Commission concluded that the scheme is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to facilitate the development of an economic activity and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

On this basis, the Commission approved the Romanian scheme under EU State aid rules.

Background

On 29 April 2026, the Commission adopted the METSAF to enable member states to support the EU economy in the context of the Middle East crisis. The METSAF is a targeted and temporary framework to address the effects of the crisis on some of the most exposed sectors of the economy: agriculture, fishery, transport and energy-intensive industries. The METSAF will be in place until 31 December 2026. During its period of application, the Commission will keep the content, scope and duration of the framework under review in the light of developments in the Middle East and of the general economic situation.

While the transition towards a clean economy remains the long-term solution to shield EU companies from the effects of global energy shocks, the METSAF allows Member States to act immediately to make sure that the growth of the most exposed companies is not irreparably hampered by the current crisis.

To this end, support can take various forms for companies active in the agriculture, fishery and transport sectors. This includes aid based on actual consumption to cover part of the price increases for fuel or fertilisers, and a simplified approach for small amounts of aid.

The METSAF also includes a temporary adjustment to the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework allowing for further flexibility and higher aid intensities to address electricity price spikes.

More information on the METSAF can be found online.

For more information

The non-confidential versions of today's decisions will be made available under case number SA.124647, in the state aid register on the Commission's competition website. New publications of state aid decisions on the internet and in the Official Journal are listed in the Competition Weekly e-News.

Related topics

Competition

State aid

Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.

The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk.  But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.

Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.

The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.

From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.

KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.

Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.

Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.

This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new.  The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.

Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore  mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”

The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.

Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”

The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.

The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.

The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence. 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.

De Facto territorial division

The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.

Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:

• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.

More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.

The PUK–New Generation coalition

The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.

Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.

Socioeconomic fallout

With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:

• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.

• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.

• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.

Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations

The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:

1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.

2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.

3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.

Why this matters to Europe

The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.

Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.

The future of a protected wetland in Albania might seem like a local issue. In reality, it is becoming a test of the European Union's credibility, writes Besjana Guri, Albanian Environmental Activist and Founder and Director of Lumi. 

For [over] 100 days, I and thousands of citizens have been protesting unlawful developments in Vjosa-Narta, one of Albania's most important protected landscapes, at a moment when Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners for EU accession.

At these protests, I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with citizens of all walks of life: scientists, artists, students, local communities, environmental activists and public figures. What might once have been seen as a local conservation issue has become a national conversation about whether safeguards for protected areas will actually be enforced, and whether environmental safeguards mean anything when powerful development interests are involved.

The EU enlargement process works because candidate countries know that membership is earned by meeting clear conditions. Among them is a commitment to uphold environmental laws, protect vulnerable ecosystems and give citizens a meaningful voice in decisions that affect them. Vjosa-Narta is testing whether those principles still carry weight when they collide with major development ambitions.

Albania is widely regarded as a frontrunner for EU membership. If it advances while protected areas are opened up to contested development and environmental safeguards are weakened, the credibility of the enlargement process itself will be called into question.

For those of us who support Albania's European future, that is precisely why developments in Vjosa-Narta must be addressed now, not after irreversible damage has been done.

A test case of environmental safeguards

The protected Vjosa-Narta landscape is formed of wetlands, lagoons, salt marshes, dunes, forests and coastal habitats. It is an important stopover for migratory birds travelling along the Adriatic Flyway, while its wetlands support local livelihoods and help regulate water, store carbon and protect against flooding.

It forms part of the wider Vjosa landscape, which gained international recognition in 2023 when Albania declared the river Europe's first Wild River National Park, following years of campaigning by Albanian activists, local communities and international partners, including outdoor clothing brand Patagonia. For many of us who worked to secure that protection, it demonstrated that environmental leadership and economic ambition do not have to be in conflict.

Yet the debate surrounding Vjosa-Narta is no longer simply about one protected area. It has become a test of whether environmental safeguards can be weakened and developments advanced while a country continues progressing towards EU membership.

The EU has been clear that environmental protection is not an optional extra of accession. Chapter 27, covering environment and climate change, is a significant and technically demanding part of the enlargement process. Candidate countries are expected not only to align their laws with European standards, but to demonstrate that they can implement and enforce them effectively.

Albania’s progress towards meeting these requirements has been undermined by recent setbacks in the legal framework for protected areas. Amendments to Albania's Law on Protected Areas in 2024 significantly weakened environmental safeguards by opening the door to broader tourism and infrastructure development within protected areas. The European Commission and European Parliament have both raised concerns about whether those changes are compatible with EU environmental standards. At the same time, concerns around environmental impact assessments, permitting procedures and public consultation in Vjosa-Narta have turned this protected landscape into a real-world test of whether environmental commitments are being upheld.

Setting the precedent for EU accession

If Albania continues advancing towards membership without resolving these concerns, it risks sending a message that environmental conditionality can be negotiated away when powerful economic interests are at stake.

This sets a worrying precedent for the accession process and the outcome will be watched closely across the Western Balkans, where other countries such as Montenegro and North Macedonia are in accession negotiations. As one of the EU's most advanced candidate countries, Albania is helping to shape expectations of how accession standards are applied in practice.

If concerns around protected areas and environmental assessments can remain unresolved without affecting progress towards membership, future candidate countries may draw their own conclusions about the weight given to environmental commitments.

Wider implications for the bloc

Existing member states must have confidence that new members have been held to the same standards. And citizens must trust that environmental laws cannot simply be set aside when they become inconvenient.

If the EU is seen to tolerate environmental shortcuts during accession, it risks weakening its ability to defend those same standards across the bloc. The issue therefore is not simply whether Albania is meeting its obligations, but whether the EU is prepared to uphold the standards it asks others to meet.

Brussels now faces a choice

As Albania enters the final stages of accession, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental commitments have real meaning in practice, not just on paper. Addressing concerns around Vjosa-Narta would send a clear signal that enlargement remains a process built on accountability, implementation and shared standards.

That's not only important for Albania. It's important for the credibility of enlargement itself.

Under Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh saw a tense period where the recourse to justice was curtailed, the banking sector crippled, and foreign investment virtually evaporated. As the country tries to build a brighter future, the authoritarian nature of Yunus’s interim administration - its series of endless legal witch hunts and laser-focus on political retribution - echoes on with questions building over the ‘reformer’ image Yunus worked to foster.

Rocketed to power off the back of a student-led revolution, Muhammad Yunus promised accountability and access to justice. Instead, he turned his sights on a series of political scores needing to be settled, using his temporary power to establish a firm, authoritarian rule.

Incredibly, Yunus himself knew what it felt like to be the victim of witch hunt, having become embroiled in a dispute with Sheikh Hasina whilst she was in power. He could have taken the opportunity to set a new path for Bangladesh; one where the courts no longer operated as a space of political persecution. Instead, he doubled down and drew on popular resentment for the Hasina administration to foster a culture of political retribution while leveraging the judicial system to target his enemies.

During his tenure, Human Rights Watch repeatedly raised the alarm about the number of political opponents that were being held in indefinite detention. His administration also pursued the death penalty for all those it associated with the former regime, discarding due processes in favour of stacking benches with unqualified judges who were likely to return harsher verdicts. Undeterred, the contradictions grew. Here was a founding member of Nelson Mandela’s Council of Elders, locking up vast numbers of political opponents and doing nothing to protect journalists.

Yunus also spearheaded a smear campaign against almost a dozen of the country’s leading business groups, dissolving boards and installing favored (and corrupt) advisers, the result has left the country’s economy in dire straits and the current government attempting to salvage the wreckage. Through a series of endless legal witch hunts and targeted campaigns, Yunus saddled the eleven business groups with hundreds of criminal and commercial charges, while doing precious little to support the wider economy. The attacks scared off would-be investors, concerned they may earn the ire of Yunus’s government and have left the economy with a rolling investment crisis.

To maximise this campaign’s impact, Yunus leveraged a court system which requires people to appear in-person before the court or face harsher, in-absentia sentences. In drumming up hundreds of legal claims Yunus effectively nullified the business groups from any effective response by making it virtually impossible for them to meet the claims in court. To ensure this would be as difficult as possible, Yunus strategically empowered the students who brought down Hasina, bringing them into his fold.

By withholding any repercussions for the attacks on Hasina’s residence or the fires started at government buildings during the uprising, Yunus tacitly permitted a general sense of lawlessness and attacks on perceived enemies of the state to spread. Former ministers, on their way to essentially sham trials, would be mobbed - including one minister who was assaulted by lawyers - by crowds calling for their execution. One former Justice even had to undergo surgery as a result of the violent injuries he suffered following a mob attack. Lawyers have even reported that they were prevented from carrying out their work if it involved representing people with ties to the former regime. In all, the government's permissiveness of vigilante justice, combined with a targeted campaign of lawfare against its perceived enemies undermined any hope for fair trials and it is little wonder businesses remain reticent to engage with Bangladesh.

Despite a rhetoric of justice and accountability, Yunus’ actions proved these were never truly on the table. In order for the country to move forward, Bangladesh needs a pathway to reconciliation, which cannot coexist with the legal witch hunts instigated by Muhammad Yunus. The new government needs to change course if it wants to bring the country on the path to a prosperous and fairer future.

À partir du 15 septembre, la Thaïlande durcit sa réglementation pour l'accueil des touristes, dont les séjours sans visa ne pourront excéder 30 jours contre 60 précédemment. Une nouvelle mesure concernant au moins 60 pays, dont ceux de l'UE, a notamment pour but de lutter contre la criminalité associée aux séjours prolongés.   

Les dirigeants de l'Union européenne se sont réunis lundi dans le nord de la Finlande pour discuter de quelle façon renforcer la présence du bloc dans l'Arctique, une région où les tensions géopolitiques ont atteint des sommets ces derniers mois. 

Emma Bonino understood early on that Europe could not afford to turn inwards. For her, Europe was meant to be much more than a common market. She believed that Europe’s role in the world was inseparable from its defence of freedom, democracy and human rights, and that its foreign policy was ultimately about the people behind the decisions made by states. She also helped make European politics a wider space for women, opening paths and challenging expectations along the way. Her legacy is not only in the causes she championed, but in the courage with which she pursued them. The voices of women like Emma, who always fought for our rights, mattered enormously in shaping the Europe we know today. At a time when that Europe is being tested once again, and when civil liberties can no longer be taken for granted, her example matters more than ever.

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President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for deeper practical co-operation between Kazakhstan and BRICS countries in trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and water security, positioning the format as a platform for broader economic ties amid growing geopolitical fragmentation.

Speaking at the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13, Tokayev said Kazakhstan sees cooperation with the group as an opportunity to expand access to new markets, attract investment, strengthen transport links and advance technological development. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13.

Tokayev described the current global environment as an era of “great fragmentation,” a term used in the 2026 Global Peace Index to characterize geopolitical confrontation, rising militarization, weakening multilateral institutions and growing trade barriers. He noted that BRICS, representing nearly half of the world’s population and around 40% of global GDP, has both the capacity and responsibility to help overcome global divisions and deliver concrete results. “Peace and strategic stability are necessary conditions for economic and sustainable development,”

Tokayev said, calling for a shift from the de-escalation of individual conflicts toward long-term stability based on political dialogue and diplomacy. Against this backdrop, Tokayev positioned BRICS as a platform for practical cooperation rather than an alternative to the existing international system. 

“As a partner country, Kazakhstan views BRICS as an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the multilateral system with the central role of the United Nations and connects peoples, regions and markets,” he said. He added that Kazakhstan always seeks to find a “common ground on every difficult issue,” describing the approach as consistent with the country’s “balanced, goal-oriented foreign policy.”  Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel, said the approach reflects BRICS’ broader focus on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, priorities that have gained greater relevance amid rising geopolitical tensions.

Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel. said closer cooperation among BRICS members could help address shared challenges while giving partner countries such as Kazakhstan greater access to the bloc’s growing trade, investment and technological opportunities. “BRICS gives much support to each other. So, from this point of view, for Kazakhstan, it’s a prosperous future, in my opinion,” Golyakova told The Astana Times.

Ayanangsha Maitra, an editor and a geopolitics specialist, echoed this view, saying Kazakhstan’s BRICS partnership could open new opportunities for economic cooperation and market access. “Although Kazakhstan is not a full BRICS member, its partnership with the grouping adds value at a time of growing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty,” Maitra told The Astana Times.

“BRICS could offer Kazakhstan additional avenues for cooperation with countries beyond its traditional economic and political partners,” he added. Expanding trade and investment The economic dimension of Kazakhstan’s BRICS engagement was central to Tokayev’s address. According to him, trade between Kazakhstan and BRICS members and partners was around $72 billion in 2025.  “Having significant industrial, transit and technological potential, we intend to diversify trade, economic and investment ties with all BRICS countries.

As chairman of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kazakhstan supports the expansion of economic cooperation with BRICS and the advancement of work on concluding a free trade agreement with India,” Tokayev said.

Tokayev also called on the New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank established by the group, to consider financing commercially viable projects in BRICS countries, including Kazakhstan.

Maitra identified critical minerals, jewelry, fashion and textiles as areas with potential to expand Kazakhstan-India trade. “Despite Kazakhstan’s relatively modest population of around 20 million, the country has a strong entrepreneurial spirit and growing commercial links with India,” he said, pointing to increasing connectivity between the two countries.

Turning geography into connectivity Transport connectivity was another central element of Tokayev’s vision. “Last year, transit cargo volumes through Kazakhstan approached 40 million tons. Our long-term goal is to increase that figure to 100 million tons annually. Overall, our transit network already handles up to 85% of overland freight between China and Europe,” he said.

As part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan serves as a link between Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea. Tokayev called for greater synergy between the Trans-Caspian route, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Maitra highlighted that Kazakhstan’s position within the EAEU, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides access to major regional markets. Its participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor adds another layer of connectivity.

“BRICS could expand that network beyond Kazakhstan’s traditional regional partners. The partnership adds another dimension by opening access to markets across a wider group of countries,” he said. AI as a new layer of cooperation AI represents another area where Kazakhstan sees room for practical BRICS cooperation.

Tokayev said Kazakhstan is ready to use its computing infrastructure and national and UN digital centers to expand cooperation in AI and proposed establishing a BRICS Plus Partnership in Artificial Intelligence. The initiative, he said, could connect national AI centers, facilitate access to laboratories and research projects and support the development of multilingual AI solutions.

For Maitra, AI could also become an important area of Kazakhstan-India cooperation because the two countries bring complementary strengths. “India has a strong IT sector and a large pool of software engineers and technology professionals, while Kazakhstan has established connections across the CIS and wider Eurasian markets. That combination could help Indian technology companies reach markets where language and regional expertise remain barriers,” he said. Water security broadens the agenda Tokayev also linked sustainability to one of the country’s longstanding international priorities: water security. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish an International Water Organization as a specialized UN agency, arguing that global water governance remains fragmented and requires stronger international coordination.

“I invite the BRICS member states and partners to join the international consultations initiated by our country,” Tokayev said. Meeting with Narendra Modi On the sidelines of the summit, Tokayev also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, highlighting India’s growing economic and technological weight and the expanding relationship between the two countries. Modi highlighted the potential for closer ties in high technology and the creative industries, including cooperation between Astana Hub and Hyderabad’s Cyberabad technology ecosystem. He also invited Kazakh representatives, particularly young people, to take part in the WAVES creative industries summit in Mumbai next year.  The two leaders also discussed prospects for expanding economic ties between India and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Tokayev said Kazakhstan, as the current chair of the EAEU, supports negotiations on a free trade agreement between the bloc and India and is ready to help advance the process. Tokayev said around 600 companies with Indian capital operate in Kazakhstan, while nearly 150,000 Indian citizens visited the country last year. He also cited the large number of Indian students studying in Kazakhstan and cooperation between Astana and New Delhi within international organizations.

This year's European Society of Cardiology (ESC) Congress showed just how quickly cardiology is changing. Late-breaking trials, new scientific data and major guideline updates all pointed to a field that is becoming both more crowded and more complex.

A central question the conference sought to address was how effectively the two main types of ATTR-CM treatment work. Stabilizers are designed to prevent the transthyretin protein from breaking apart, while silencers reduce its production. The debate centered on whether silencers offer enough additional benefit over established stabilizers in this significant rare disease market.

One of the clearest lessons was that the challenge is no longer simply bringing more treatments to market. It is increasingly about finding the right patients earlier, understanding how different therapies compare and deciding where each option fits as standards of care improve. ATTR-CM was one of the strongest examples of that shift, with the conference data sharpening the debate over whether silencers offer enough additional benefit over established stabilizers. The same pattern could also be seen in new guidelines and in the growing role of digital monitoring.

Alnylam ($ALNY) faces new questions over Amvuttra in ATTR-CM

Alnylam Pharmaceuticals came to ESC looking to strengthen the case for Amvuttra in ATTR-CM, but the data arguably leave some important questions unanswered. While the drug is already approved, the estimated benefit appeared more modest than many investors and clinicians may have hoped, particularly given the growing expectation that newer therapies will need to demonstrate clear advantages over established treatments. The key question is whether ATTR-CM silencer treatments offer enough additional benefit on top of stabilizers that are already delivering meaningful clinical outcomes.

In light of this, there remains uncertainty around the extent of Amvuttra's value and whether it will be sufficient to secure a strong position in an increasingly competitive market. The FDA's decision earlier this year to challenge Alnylam's survival claims based on an open-label extension of HELIOS-B only adds to the need for caution. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that Alnylam's share price has come under pressure and that questions are being raised about the long-term commercial viability of Amvuttra in ATTR-CM.

Rather than definitively strengthening the case for Amvuttra, Alnylam's participation at ESC suggests that important questions remain about the true scale of its advantage and whether the evidence is sufficient to establish a clear benefit over existing treatments.

AstraZeneca ($AZN) casts further doubt on silencers in ATTR-CM

In perhaps a similar spirit, AstraZeneca and Ionis used ESC to revisit the results of the Phase 3 CARDIO-TTRansform trial of Wainua (eplontersen), another potential treatment for ATTR-CM. They faced a somewhat different challenge, however, as the trial had already failed its primary endpoint, with Wainua unable to significantly reduce cardiovascular mortality and recurrent cardiovascular events in the overall study population.

The companies sought to contextualize the findings, but the presentation arguably highlighted one of the trial's central challenges. If the apparent benefit is less clear among patients already receiving stabilizer therapy, the data raise broader questions about how much additional value silencers can deliver beyond treatments that are already producing meaningful clinical outcomes. The broader question, however, is what this means for an ATTR-CM market that is becoming increasingly competitive. As new treatments emerge, should attention shift towards newer therapies, or remain focused on established stabilizers that may already be providing much of the available benefit?

New ESC guidelines and Huawei point to a prevention first approach

ESC also saw the release of new guidelines that could change how cardiovascular patients are identified and managed. The updated heart failure guidance simplifies how patients are classified and puts more focus on prevention and earlier intervention. In practice, that means clinicians may be looking for risk earlier and across a broader group of patients, rather than waiting until disease is more advanced.

That change is creating more room for digital tools. Huawei used ESC to preview its Watch D3, a wrist-based ambulatory blood pressure monitor designed to track blood pressure in everyday settings. It is one example of how wearables are moving beyond basic wellness tracking and towards data that could help identify risk earlier, monitor patients more closely and support treatment decisions.

Reflecting on ESC 2026, ATTR-CM emerged as a key area of focus. The AstraZeneca and Alnylam data raised questions about whether silencers can offer enough benefit over established stabilizers, while new guidelines and digital tools highlighted the importance of identifying risk earlier and monitoring patients more closely. The key question now, arguably, is which approaches can genuinely improve on what is already available, and which patients are most likely to benefit.