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Russia is seeking support for its war effort abroad – and threatening retaliation beyond Ukraine. Reports of foreign labor in drone factories, proposals to counter Starlink, and allegations of overseas recruitment show different ways Moscow could sustain its military effort and put pressure on its opponents.

Nowhere Far Enough

On October 9, Mikhail Zvinchuk, founder of the Russian military Telegram channel Rybar, was detained in Montenegro. Montenegrin authorities accused his team of using media work to interfere in the country’s politics. Rybar said they had come legally to film at Cetinje Monastery and had submitted an official filming request. Moscow’s response explains why this matters: Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, suggested replenishing an “exchange fund” with Europeans and Americans to recover detained Russians. One arrest became a warning about others to come.

Five days earlier, Medvedev had delivered the orbital version of that warning. If Russia’s Rassvet constellation were destroyed, American Starlink satellites would “come tumbling down like ornaments from a dried-up Christmas tree.” “Space is a very crowded place,” he added. “We need to be mutually courteous.” Kiev had sought sanctions and restrictions, not announced a satellite attack. Moscow was putting a military threat behind its demand that Russian communications infrastructure be left alone.

The link is not between a blogger and a satellite. It is between two threats of retaliation: damage our network and yours becomes a target; detain our people and yours may become bargaining chips. Moscow is challenging the assumption that pressure on Russia can remain a one-way transaction.

Partners Behind the Front

The space threat has a practical backdrop. Leaked documents published in July describe a closed Russian-Chinese military forum in Guangzhou in November 2023. Chinese researchers proposed several ways to counter Starlink, from legal pressure and jamming to cyberattacks and destruction. Their hardest problem was also the simplest: how to disable satellites more cheaply and quickly than SpaceX could replace them. They do not show that these systems were built or deployed.

Russia and China have different strengths to offer. Moscow brings battlefield experience and air-defense knowledge; Beijing brings electronics, artificial intelligence, and manufacturing capacity. Russia can show what works under fire. China can help turn those lessons into equipment made at scale. A sixth closed forum was reportedly planned for the fall in St. Petersburg.

This is why repeated technical meetings matter more than dramatic threats. A shared design, tested and improved over several years, could outlast the war that first made it useful. For Moscow, the goal is to weaken an American advantage. For Beijing, Russian experience offers lessons without having to fight the same war.

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Discussion of leaked documents, the “one-to-many” concept and replacement costs

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But destroying satellites is not a clean solution. Russia’s 2021 antisatellite test forced both astronauts and Russian cosmonauts to shelter aboard the International Space Station, according to NASA. Debris threatens more than the intended target. Jamming can offer a narrower response; smashing entire networks risks damaging the same orbital space Russia and China also need.

The factory floor shows another side of this partnership-building. A September report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team says North Korean workers are employed at Alabuga in Tatarstan, where Russia produces Geran-2 drones, and describes workers entering Russia as students. Pyongyang rejected the report as fabricated. If the findings are accurate, the bargain is straightforward: Russia gains workers, North Korea gains income. Foreign support does not have to arrive as a finished missile; it can help keep the assembly line moving.

September 2026 sanctions-monitoring report.  Pages 31-32 discuss Alabuga and drone production. Pyongyang rejects the report

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The Underground Price List

Recruitment abroad serves a different purpose. A September 15 U.S. indictment alleges that a Russian intelligence-linked network used Cuban and Venezuelan intermediaries to recruit inside America. Prosecutors describe payments of $1,000-$1,500 for surveillance and a $40,000 offer to kill a Russian dissident believed to be near Washington. Another alleged offer promised an American $25,000 to kill a target in Lithuania. These remain accusations, not court findings or proof of an officially declared bounty program.

Original U.S. indictment naming the alleged Russian, Cuban, and Venezuelan participants

The alleged network operated from at least 2024, before the Montenegro arrests. Its importance lies in the method: foreign intermediaries and local recruits, rather than an obvious Russian team. If substantiated, the charges would show Moscow reaching inside America through people who do not carry Russian passports.

The October 9 threat to expand the “exchange fund” signals that consular protests may no longer be Moscow’s only answer. It suggests foreign detainees could become leverage for recovering Russians. The warning to European and American governments is pointed: the detention of a Russian abroad may create a problem for their own citizens elsewhere.

Russia’s partners help it build weapons; alleged overseas networks extend its reach; threats against satellites and foreign detainees aim to raise the cost of confrontation. These are different tools, not proof of one master plan. But October’s warnings carry a common message: Moscow wants the other side to feel exposed too. Medvedev closed his latest message with a Russian proverb: “If you live among wolves, you must howl with them.”

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• Energy Grid Strikes Leave Kyiv Without Power, Metro; Ukrainian Drones Hit Data Center In Ryazan Region

The post NO SAFE REAR: Moscow’s Shadow War From Starlink to Prison Cells appeared first on South Front.

• Russian strikes destroyed targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, Volyn, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy regions, and the DPR;
• According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 142 strike UAVs;
• Russian forces struck warehouses and an electrical substation in Vyshhorod and a pharmaceutical plant in the Kyiv region;
• Russian forces struck a critical infrastructure facility in the Kharkiv region;
• Russian forces struck Martynovka airbase in the Mykolaiv region;
• Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,550 troops over the past 24 hours.

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• Russian forces took control of Annopolye.

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• Russian forces regained control over most of Piskunovka;
• Ukrainian forces captured Ray-Alexandrovka;
• Russian forces advanced towards Zapovednoye and reached its outskirts.

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• During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 399 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
• Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Volgograd, Voronezh, Kursk, Lipetsk, Oryol, Orenburg, Penza, Rostov, Ryazan, Samara, Saratov, Smolensk, Tambov, Tula, and Ulyanovsk regions, the Moscow region, the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Crimea, and the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as over the Black Sea;
• Ukrainian drones targeted the Gazprom Neftkhim Salavat plant in Bashkortostan;
• Ukrainian drones targeted the Sasta machine-building plant in Ryazan;
• A child was killed during an attack by Ukrainian forces in the Valuysky district, Belgorod region;
• Over the past 24 hours, three people were killed and eight were injured in the DPR.

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The post Military Situation In Ukraine And Ukrainian Attacks On Russian Territory On October 8, 2026 (Maps Update) appeared first on South Front.

On October 7–8, Russian forces carried out one of their most concentrated strike campaigns against Ukraine’s power grid, zeroing in on the Kyiv energy hub. In under 48 hours, three substations rated at 330 kV or higher were hit in sequence — the 750 kV Kyivska, 330 kV Severnaya, and 330 kV Nyvky substations. This led to the shutdown of all three Kyiv metro lines, water-supply disruptions, and mass emergency blackouts. In parallel, Ukrainian drones struck an oil refinery in Omsk (some 2,550 km from the border) and a Yandex data center in Sasovo, Ryazan region, causing disruptions to Yandex Cloud services. 

Russian Strikes on Ukraine

Kyiv Energy Hub

750 kV Kyivska Substation
The substation links the 750 kV and 330 kV transmission grids and is one of the largest power-transfer nodes in the Kyiv region. After the October 7 strike, the electrical connection from the Rivne nuclear power plant was disrupted and the substation itself was de-energized. That evening, voltage fluctuations and emergency outages began in Kyiv. Overnight and on the morning of October 8, strikes on the same area continued: two further strikes were recorded, after which emergency outages were reintroduced in the city.

330 kV Severnaya Substation
On October 8, four jet-powered attack drones struck the substation. As a result, autotransformer AT‑2 was damaged.

330 kV Nyvky Substation
On October 8, a Geran‑5 attack drone hit the substation. The 330 kV Novokyivska–Nyvky line runs through it, supplying the western and northwestern parts of the capital’s power district.

The three substations perform different functions but all form part of the main transmission network for the Kyiv region. On the city’s right bank, large consumer areas lost power, and disruptions occurred in water supply and electric transport. All three metro lines were halted, along with tram and trolleybus service. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko urged residents to leave the city.

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Other Targets

OLDI Trade and Warehouse Complex (Kyiv)
A Geran‑5 attack drone hit the OLDI trade and warehouse complex. A large-scale fire broke out after the strike. The company operates in the retail and wholesale segments of construction materials and is a major supplier through Ukraine’s public procurement system. Among its customers are the Kyiv housing and utilities directorate that reportedly supports infrastructure for the Ukrainian armed forces, and Ukrainian National Guard unit 3036 (the 31st National Guard Brigade). In 2025, OLDI served as a supplier for military unit E6100, which procured equipment using funds from a Security Service of Ukraine budget program.

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ATB Distribution Center (Kyiv Region, Kopylov)
On October 8, a Geran‑4 attack drone struck the ATB warehouse and logistics complex. A large fire broke out after the strike. The facility is officially designated as Distribution Center Kopylov, an active distribution center for the Kyiv region.

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Sumy Thermal Power Plant (Sumyteploenergo LLC)

Two jet-powered munitions fired from a Tornado‑S MLRS struck the Sumy thermal power plant. The plant’s operation was halted. Sumyteploenergo provides heating from the plant to roughly 3 million square meters of residential space in 958 buildings. The plant had already been heavily damaged in a strike on June 30, 2026. On September 24, the Cabinet of Ministers allocated UAH 107.07 million (approximately $2.6 million) for urgent restoration work. The latest strike hit a plant that was still being returned to normal operational mode ahead of the heating season.

Sbornash LTD LLC (Kramatorsk)

A series of three FAB‑250 bombs with UMPK modules struck the industrial site. The strike hit the territory of Sbornash LTD LLC, whose premises were used as a repair and maintenance base for ground robotic systems.

Etal Research and Production Association (Alexandria)

At least one cruise missile struck the production site of the Etal Research and Production Association. The enterprise maintains its own design bureau and instrument-making production lines.

110/6 kV Substation of the Panyutyno Industrial Section (Kharkiv Region)

A Gerbera UAV strike hit the territory of the 110/6 kV substation of the Panyutyno industrial section of Operator GTS of Ukraine LLC (GTS Operator, the country’s gas transmission system operator). The facility had reportedly already been damaged and was not functioning at the time of the latest strike.

Dergachi Traction Substation (Kharkiv Region)

On the night of October 7, the Dergachi traction substation was hit. Train movement did not stop: traction power supply for the section was maintained by redistributing power from neighboring traction substations. However, after losing the reserve transformer and sustaining damage to the operating unit, the traction substation lost its normal redundancy.

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Strikes on Russia

Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Petrochemical Complex (Bashkortostan)

UAVs attacked industrial facilities in Bashkortostan. The target of the strike was once again the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat petrochemical complex. The enterprise is one of Russia’s largest petrochemical complexes.

Omsk Oil Refinery (Omsk Region)

Ukrainian forces again struck the Omsk oil refinery, some 2,550 km from the border. The enterprise is one of Russia’s largest oil refineries.

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Sasta Machine Tool Plant and Yandex Data Center (Sasovo, Ryazan Region)

UAVs attacked the Sasta machine tool plant, where a Yandex data center is located. Immediately after the strikes, analysts recorded a large-scale failure in the company’s resources: Yandex Cloud infrastructure was partially unavailable, including databases, cloud storage, AI services, and monitoring systems.

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Belgorod Region

A total of 156 UAVs were shot down over the past day. During the Ukrainian attack in Valuysky district, a child was killed. Six residents of the region were wounded.

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Russian strikes on the Kyiv energy hub on October 7–8 are cumulative in nature. Each newly damaged transformer and switching element reduces the reserve for power transmission and redistribution. Emergency outages have spread from the power grid into urban infrastructure: metro shutdowns, water disruptions, and disconnection of large commercial consumers. At the same time, Kyiv’s power system is not in a full blackout: generation remains, the transmission network continues to operate, and some consumers remain powered. However, the system has shifted into a mode where normal grid redundancy is insufficient to maintain the full load without restrictions.

Ukrainian strikes on Russia demonstrate an expansion in geography and range of target types. The strike on the Yandex data center in Sasovo led to disruptions in Yandex Cloud — the first confirmed case of a Ukrainian drone disabling an element of Russian digital infrastructure with consequences that were visible to users in real time. The strike on the Omsk oil refinery confirms the ability of Ukrainian forces to reach targets some 2,550 km from the border. Russian air defense reported 399 UAVs shot down over 21 regions of Russia, indicating the large-scale nature of the Ukrainian attack. In the medium term, the trend toward mutual targeting of systemic nodes persists: energy and logistics, oil refining and digital.

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The post Energy Grid Strikes Leave Kyiv Without Power, Metro; Ukrainian Drones Hit Data Center In Ryazan Region appeared first on South Front.

Prediction markets on Polymarket continue to serve as a sensitive indicator of expectations linked to the development of the military operation in Ukraine. While at the beginning of 2026 investors’ attention was focused on Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, by autumn the epicentre of bets had shifted to Kostiantynivka, Dobropolye, Orikhiv and the Slavyansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. Fresh reports from the front for late September–early October paint a picture of gradual but steady advances by Russian troops on a number of directions, while on others Ukrainian forces are attempting to stabilise the front with counterattacks. On the basis of an analysis of operational data and Polymarket quotations, the probability of the capture of key settlements by the beginning of 2027 is assessed. Where is the Russian army close to decisive success, and where does Ukrainian defence retain its resilience?

Kostiantynivka 

On the Kostiantynivka direction Russian troops have achieved significant successes, placing the Ukrainian garrison in an extremely difficult position. After prolonged street fighting the greater part of the city has come under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, and Ukrainian units have been split into isolated centres of resistance. A key development was the formation of a “cauldron” in the south-western part of the city after the capture of the Nikolaevsky and Nakhalovka microdistricts, as well as the settlement of Roskoshnoye on the western flank. Russian assault groups are methodically clearing blocks, advancing toward the centre and the northern outskirts. Ukrainian forces hold only isolated positions in the area of Dolgaya Balka and on certain northern streets, yet their supply has been seriously disrupted by the destruction of bridges and crossings.

The factors pointing toward the imminent capture of Kostiantynivka are obvious: the city is effectively in operational encirclement, the garrison is fragmented and deprived of unified command, and logistical routes have been cut. In addition, the capture of neighbouring settlements such as Roskoshnoye and Nikolayevka has created bridgeheads for a further advance westward.

Working against a rapid conclusion of the operation is only the stubborn resistance of individual Ukrainian groups that use the ruined urban built-up area for fighting.

Dobropolye 

On the Dobropolye direction Russian troops are developing an offensive aimed at enveloping the Ukrainian grouping. Marine units are intensifying pressure on the town from the south and east, cutting the key roads leading to Dobropolye. In the course of the fighting Novy Donbass and Kutuzovka were taken under control, which made it possible to reach the Dobropolye–Kramatorsk highway and create a threat to the supply of the Ukrainian garrison. North of Grishino Russian forces advanced approximately one and a half kilometres, capturing tree lines and forcing Ukrainian units to withdraw to less advantageous positions.

Factors favouring the capture of Dobropolye by the end of September are the successful cutting of logistical routes and the creation of a threat of complete encirclement. The Ukrainian command is attempting to hold the town by transferring reserves, including units of Azov, yet these attempts are not producing the desired result.

Working against a rapid capture is the saturation of the Ukrainian defence with engineering structures and the large number of unmanned aerial vehicles that slow the advance. Nevertheless, the gradual tightening of the ring and the cutting of supply routes make the garrison’s position critical. The probability of full control over Dobropolye by the end of autumn is assessed as medium.

Orikhiv 

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops continue to develop the offensive, seeking to cut the key logistical routes of the Ukrainian grouping. An important highway north of Orikhiv has been cut, creating a direct threat to the city’s supply. Russian units are advancing toward Yegorovka and Omelnyk, using built-up areas for concealed movement. Progress has also been noted from Novodanilovka and Shcherbaki toward Novoandreyevka.

Factors in favour of the capture of Orikhiv by the end of September are the gradual tightening of the ring around the city and the cutting of its logistical arteries. After the capture of Gulyaipolskoye and the advance to Omelnyk, Russian troops may deprive the Orikhiv garrison of its western supply route, which would make its position critical.

Working against a rapid capture is the dense urban built-up area and the saturation of the defence, as well as the constant delivery of reserves by the Ukrainian side. Orikhiv is an important symbol of resistance, and its loss will be a serious blow to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the current dynamics suggest that the city will come under the control of Russian troops no earlier than the beginning of 2027.

Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka 

The Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka direction is closely linked to the fighting for Kostiantynivka and Druzhkovka. Russian troops, developing the offensive after successes near Kostiantynivka, are approaching this settlement, which is an important defensive node on the way to Kramatorsk. The capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will allow Russian forces to emerge into operational space and create a direct threat to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration from the south.

Factors favouring the capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka in the coming months are the successes of Russian troops near Kostiantynivka and the overall advance on the Kramatorsk direction. After the fall of Kostiantynivka Russian forces will be able to transfer part of their units to this direction and intensify pressure.

Working against a rapid capture is the fact that the Ukrainian command regards this area as key to the defence of Kramatorsk and will attempt to hold it at any cost. Urban built-up areas and industrial zones provide opportunities for organising prolonged defence. The probability of full control over Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka by the beginning of 2027 is assessed as medium-to-high, provided that the offensive on Kostiantynivka is completed successfully and frees the necessary reserves.

Stepnogorsk 

The situation in the area of Stepnogorsk remains tense. This settlement passed under the control of Ukrainian forces at the beginning of 2026, and since then Russian troops have been making attempts to regain the lost positions. So far, however, they have not achieved success. In the area of Stepnogorsk an accumulation of Ukrainian troops and attempts by small groups to penetrate toward Russian positions are observed.

Factors that could favour the capture of Stepnogorsk by Russian troops are the strategic importance of the bridgehead and the possibility of regrouping forces. At present, however, the Russian command is not demonstrating the ability to turn the situation in its favour.

Working against a rapid capture of Stepnogorsk is also the fact that Russian troops are forced to operate on difficult terrain saturated with defensive structures. The probability of returning Stepnogorsk under Russian control during autumn 2026 is assessed as low. This would require a radical change in the operational situation on the entire Zaporozhye direction, including a successful offensive on Orikhiv and the elimination of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the Konka River.

Krasny Liman 

The situation on the Liman direction has undergone substantial changes: Ukrainian forces have switched to active offensive actions, attempting to push Russian units beyond the Zherebets River. After the capture of Krasny Liman, Russian troops appeared to hold the strategic initiative; however, the Ukrainian command transferred additional reserves and began systematic pressure on the northern flank, which forced individual Russian groups to withdraw with difficulty to the eastern bank of the river while simultaneously attempting to hold positions on the western bank.

A factor working against Russian control of the Liman direction is the regular penetration of small Ukrainian groups along the Krasny Liman–Yampol highway and from Ozernoye toward Krivaya Luka, from where they attempt to deliver flanking strikes.

Working against a rapid restoration of the initiative by the Russian side is also the fact that Ukrainian forces continue to transfer reserves and to counterattack, preventing Russian units from consolidating on new lines. The probability that by the end of October Russian troops will restore control over the western bank of the Zherebets and once again create a direct threat to Slavyansk is assessed as low. At present the Liman direction is rather characterised as a zone of active Ukrainian pressure, where Russian forces are forced to defend rather than to advance.

Conclusion 

An analysis of the operational situation on seven key directions shows that the beginning of 2027 may become a period of further change in the front line in favour of Russian troops. Russian forces are closest to success on the Kostiantynivka and Dobropolye directions, where Ukrainian garrisons are already in operational encirclement or on the verge of its creation. The capture of these towns will open the road to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration and will make it possible to free reserves for other sectors.

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops have also achieved successes by cutting key highways, yet the city itself remains a powerful fortified area, and its fall is likely no earlier than October–November. Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will probably be taken by the beginning of 2027 if the offensive on adjacent directions continues. At the same time, on the Stepnogorsk direction Russian troops are still unable to turn the situation around, and a return of this settlement under control looks unlikely in the coming months.

Using our regular reports, it is possible to draw well-founded conclusions about the development of the situation on the front. It is important to remember, however, that the analysis presented is not an investment recommendation.

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The post Blitzkrieg or Protracted Siege? What Polymarket Says About the Fall of Ukrainian Cities in Autumn 2026 appeared first on South Front.

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in Kiev on October 4 for an unannounced visit, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a delegation of German defense and energy executives. Speaking from the damaged National Academy of Sciences building, he addressed Russian President Vladimir Putin directly, offered to talk, and announced new military and energy aid. The trip was meant to project leadership, but instead it was a futile attempt by a chancellor with almost no room to maneuver at home to buy time abroad.

Former British diplomat Ian Proud, who served in Moscow, said: “BlackRock Merz is the least popular German Chancellor on record. He doesn’t know what German self-interest is. Only his own self-interest. Political survival. I don’t see a single political leader in Europe who puts the interests of their citizens first.” Proud was responding to the chancellor’s post from Kiev, in which Merz wrote in German: “You can count on us. Germany’s own security depends on the outcome of this war. We help out of our own interest.”

An INSA poll for Bild, published on October 3, put Merz’s CDU/CSU bloc at 18%, its lowest rating in the pollster’s records, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) reached 30%, its highest, widening the lead to 12 points. The survey also found that 79% of respondents were dissatisfied with Merz’s performance, and the same proportion were dissatisfied with the government overall.

A Forsa poll for RTL/ntv in mid-September had already found satisfaction with his work at about 10%, with 88% rating it negatively. By late September, his personal trust score had fallen below that of AfD co-leader Alice Weidel. The CDU lost Saxony-Anhalt on September 6 and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20, a result Merz himself called a disaster, with the AfD finishing first in both.

Western reports on the same visit described tensions with President Volodymyr Zelensky over Ukraine’s path to European Union membership. Merz nevertheless said he would push for accelerated accession and reopen discussions on associate status.

Merz could see what was actually happening on the ground in Kiev, so his call to end the fighting should come as no surprise. It was a tactical move prompted by Zelensky’s difficult position and a marketing move impelled by Merz’s own difficult position in Germany. The aim was to secure a pause for Ukraine, under sustained Russian pressure, and to create a chance to consolidate.

“We are ready for talks, we are ready to discuss bringing this war to an end, but these barbaric attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine must stop. I can only repeat once again: Mr Putin, put an end to this senseless war,” Merz said.

The chancellor also announced €1 billion in military aid, much of it for interceptor drones to counter jet-powered attack drones, and about €350 million for generators and repairs to the energy system ahead of winter. Zelensky said the new package included 15 agreements worth more than €8.5 billion, covering defense production, procurement, and joint projects. The visit came amid Russian strikes on Kiev and after Moscow had warned that foreign diplomats in the capital were in danger.

In essence, Merz’s statement offers no peace—only political survival. Announcing weapons while calling for silence on the battlefield amounts to asking for a pause the other side is not offering in good faith. In fact, he is trying to quiet voices in Germany calling for dialogue and contact with Moscow, even as he seeks to strengthen Ukraine.

Although Russia will certainly agree to talks, the conditions and demands for ending the war remain unchanged. The Kremlin’s terms for an actual end to the war have been consistent since Putin set them out in June 2024, and spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated in June 2026 that they have not changed. Ukraine’s forces would have to withdraw from all four regions Moscow claims as its own — Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye — including parts the Russian army does not hold, and Kiev would have to publicly renounce NATO membership, not merely offer a private assurance.

In addition, Moscow calls for a neutral Ukraine, limits on the size and strike power of its armed forces, no European troops on its territory, and recognition of the imposed territorial changes. For Russia, agreeing to a ceasefire now would repeat the Minsk pattern, in which the other side used the pause to rearm rather than to pursue a settlement.

Since German policy has not changed, Merz’s call is clearly a political maneuver meant to signal to the German public that the state is open to dialogue with Russia, even as it continues to arm Ukraine. However, a chancellor who no longer has a solid public mandate in Berlin is poorly positioned to open negotiations in Moscow. Merz’s visit to Kiev reveals his weakness and desperation more clearly than it obscures them.

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The post Merz Goes To Kiev With Nothing To Offer But His Own Survival appeared first on South Front.