European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu presents Fair Labour Mobility package © European Union

The European Commission has unveiled what it calls an ambitious “Fair Labour Mobility” package aimed at making it easier for people to work across EU borders while strengthening protections against exploitation and fraud.

The proposals would allow workers to prove social security and health insurance entitlements digitally and make qualifications easier to understand and recognize. The Commission estimates the measures could generate €6 billion in benefits by 2040.

Central to the package is a European Social Security Pass, or ESSPASS, enabling people to request and receive documents such as the European Health Insurance Card and the A1 certificate for posted workers online. Documents could be stored in the EU Digital Identity Wallet and verified by national authorities.

Brussels is also proposing faster recognition of professional qualifications. Procedures for regulated professions, including doctors and nurses, with the aim of reducing the target processing time from three months to five weeks.

Recognition of qualifications obtained outside the EU would also be streamlined, with common standards intended to cut average processing times from 14 months to four months.

The European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) has welcomed the Commission’s plans for recognising qualifications from outside the EU, arguing that they bring greater transparency to a labour market already heavily reliant on internationally recruited healthcare professionals.

EFN Secretary General Paul De Raeve said recruitment from third countries was already well established and frequently organised through bilateral arrangements between governments. Denmark, he noted, has gone considerably further, establishing a school in Delhi to prepare Indian nurses for work in Denmark, including Danish-language training.

“This is going on,” De Raeve said, arguing that international mobility cannot simply be prevented when European health systems need staff and qualified professionals want to move. In the short term, he said, overseas recruitment is also difficult to avoid given that educating a nurse takes around four years.

For De Raeve, an important improvement in the Commission proposal is therefore not simply facilitating recruitment, but putting it within a clearer European framework. The proposed directive would establish common rules for recognising qualifications obtained outside the EU, including aligned documentation requirements.

It would also provide stronger mechanisms for checking whether qualifications are genuine and meet European standards. Training programmes and institutions seeking access to automatic recognition would undergo EU-level assessment, potentially including independent review, site visits and direct examination of training environments.

De Raeve particularly welcomed this approach, pointing to the risks of fraud in diploma accreditation. Having universities and training institutions formally assessed and certified would give regulators and employers greater confidence that somebody arriving with a qualification has been trained by a legitimate institution to an appropriate standard.

He also welcomed plans to reduce administrative delays for individual professionals.

For nursing, De Raeve argued, faster recognition and stronger verification could help Europe recruit internationally without lowering professional standards, while replacing opaque bilateral arrangements with more consistent EU-level rules.

The proposals still require approval by the European Parliament and EU governments. Key measures would then be phased in over several years, with improvements to the Labour Authority expected during 2028–2030.

The reported detention of Somali soldiers in Ethiopia's Somali Region has drawn attention to a Saudi-backed military training programme in central Somalia and raised the question of whether the initiative is intended solely to rebuild Somalia's national army or could serve a wider regional purpose, writes Mohsin Osman.

Somali authorities have confirmed that troops trained at the Xananbuure camp in Galmudug crossed into Ethiopia. Somalia's National Security Adviser, Aways Haji Yusuf, said on 1 September that the soldiers had permission to visit their families, that the federal government knew they were in Ethiopia's Somali region, and that they took the route through Ethiopia to avoid insecure areas inside Somalia. He added that any further developments would be shared with the media.

That explanation has not settled the number of soldiers involved, the circumstances of their detention or the wider purpose of a foreign-funded programme that has trained thousands of Somali recruits with the help of foreign instructors. Regional outlets have also linked the programme to allegations that Saudi Arabia is supporting recruitment for Sudan's war, with indications that it was designed to supply fighters to the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The crossing and the detention

The incident emerged in late August, when reports placed newly trained Somali soldiers in the custody of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State. Garowe Online reported that some accounts described the men, numbering about 300, were detained and transferred to Jijiga, the regional capital. Sunatimes, citing Somali intelligence sources, pegged the number at 316 but said it had not confirmed that number with Ethiopian authorities.

The soldiers who were said to be travelling in a convoy of hired vehicles were reportedly intercepted and held by regional police. The reports say the detained soldiers had been recruited from Ethiopia's Somali Regional State before joining the Somali federal programme, which Yusuf's statement did not address. Neither Addis Ababa nor the Somali regional government has given a public reason for the detention, according to WardheerNews.

The Saudi-backed military programme in Somalia

The soldiers belong to a class of roughly 3,000 who graduated from Xananbuure, in the Galgaduud region of Galmudug, on 16 August after nearly a year of training. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presided over the ceremony, which The Defense Post described as the largest cohort trained inside Somalia since the collapse of the central government in 1991, with Saudi military representatives in attendance and instructors from Ukraine, Romania and Sudan delivering the course.

The programme follows a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation that Somalia's Defence Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, signed with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh on 9 February 2026. Somalia's Ministry of Defence said the agreement covered multiple areas of common interest, and neither government released further details, Al Jazeera reported. Horn Review reported that the initiative aims to train up to 5,000 recruits over nine months, and July reports placed enrolment at 5,107 across two camps in the Guri El area, including about 2,000 recruits from Puntland.

While Saudi Arabia financed the military training programme under the February agreement, there is no evidence that Saudi officials control the recruits' deployment or decide where they serve.

How Sudan entered the story

The Sudan allegation comes from a separate set of reports, not from anything established about the soldiers held in Ethiopia.

Kenya's Standard reported on 24 July that Saudi Arabia was overseeing a programme in Galguduud involving more than 5,000 Somali recruits, run by contractors from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia, and that recruits were being prepared for later deployment alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces. The report described the Somali programmes as Saudi-funded and had raised the possibility that some trainees would be sent to Sudan's battlefronts. Ethio Negari also made the same claims three days earlier. However, none of the parties named had commented.

The presence of Sudanese instructors at Xananbuure presents the strongest documented link between the camp and Sudan, although it predates the Saudi agreement. Geeska reported in February, citing Africa Intelligence, that a team of Sudanese military personnel had trained roughly 1,000 recruits in Galmudug over the preceding months without public announcement, under the oversight of Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency.

The Jijiga case also sits alongside a distinct allegation from Ethiopia's north. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told the House of Peoples' Representatives on 7 July that young people from Tigray, including minors, were being forcibly recruited and smuggled to fight in Sudan's war, and that they were dying in a conflict they neither understood nor had any connection to, according to Addis Standard and other outlets that covered the session. The Tigray People's Liberation Front rejected the substance of his remarks days later, according to a situation report by Europe External Programme with Africa.

A new report titled “The Hidden Cost of EU Regulation: Why Policy Design Matters for Growth, Competitiveness, and Investment,” published on 14 September, estimates that EU regulations could reduce GDP by €159 billion per year and threaten 419,000 jobs between 2026 and 2030.

Published by the European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC), the report examines the “hidden” costs of European policies. These include not only bureaucratic burdens but also regulatory uncertainty, poorly planned transitions, and overlapping obligations. According to the report, these factors can slow investment, limit innovation, and ultimately undermine the policies’ intended goals.

Europe risks imposing substantial economic costs on itself if a new generation of EU regulation is introduced without greater attention to competitiveness, proportionality and the cumulative burden on businesses, according to a new study from the Brussels-based European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC).

The report, estimates that five major areas of regulation currently facing European policymakers could, under its more restrictive scenarios, be associated with €159 billion in foregone EU GDP each year between 2026 and 2030.

It estimates an accompanying annual investment shortfall of approximately €36 billion, with around 419,000 jobs potentially at risk.

But the report's central argument is not that regulation itself is economically damaging. Rather, it contends that poorly sequenced, insufficiently differentiated or unpredictable regulation can impose costs which more carefully designed policies could avoid.

EPIC calculates that what it calls a "better regulation" approach could make a difference of approximately €125 billion in GDP each year, while supporting around €28 billion more annual investment and improving the projected employment outcome by some 241,000 jobs.

The analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the EU, where improving competitiveness has moved rapidly up the political agenda following Mario Draghi's landmark report on the future of European competitiveness.

EPIC examined artificial intelligence regulation, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, biotechnology and novel food, and the forthcoming revision of the EU's Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).

TPD emerges as the largest potential shock

The study identifies the TPD revision as potentially the biggest avoidable economic shock, but says smarter regulation could protect growth, investment and public health

EPIC estimates that a highly restrictive approach to the forthcoming TPD revision could be associated with an annual GDP loss of approximately €48 billion, including around €24 billion in lost tax revenues.

The same scenario would put roughly 120,000 jobs at risk and produce an estimated annual investment shortfall of about €11 billion.

By contrast, under EPIC's alternative scenario — based on a more differentiated regulatory treatment of products according to risk and greater emphasis on maintaining legal-market innovation — the organisation calculates an annual GDP gain of €32 billion.

The difference between the two regulatory approaches is therefore almost €80 billion in GDP each year, according to the modelling, alongside an improvement of more than 182,000 jobs and approximately €18 billion in investment.

These are significant numbers, but they require an important qualification.

They are scenario-based projections rather than forecasts of losses which have already occurred or inevitably will occur. EPIC itself stresses that its prospective figures are estimates based on alternative regulatory assumptions and should not be interpreted as guaranteed outcomes.

In the tobacco case in particular, the restrictive scenario assumes a major relocation of manufacturing outside the EU, with only part of wholesale and retail activity retained and some demand migrating into illicit channels. That is a substantial modelling assumption and is central to the scale of the estimated economic impact.

Nevertheless, the study raises a broader policy question which Brussels may find harder to dismiss: whether the economic consequences of the next TPD are being examined with the same intensity as its health objectives.

From COP11 to the next TPD

EPIC bases part of its TPD scenario on measures discussed in connection with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's COP11, held in 2025.

The report identifies proposals including flavour restrictions across tobacco and nicotine products, tighter sanctions, additional restrictions affecting newer nicotine and heated tobacco products and possible limitations on particular product components, including filters.

That debate exposed significant disagreements among EU member states.

According to the report, countries including Italy, Greece, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Czechia raised concerns about applying broadly similar restrictions to combustible cigarettes and alternative nicotine products despite differences between product categories.

Those disagreements became sufficiently pronounced that the EU was unable to maintain a common position during important parts of COP11, according to the EPIC analysis.

The significance for Brussels is that decisions taken at an FCTC Conference of the Parties do not automatically become EU law.

However, EPIC argues that COP priorities have historically influenced European tobacco policy and could feed into the Commission's forthcoming revision of the TPD.

The report points in particular to EU-funded tobacco-control initiatives which incorporate FCTC and COP priorities into their work and to a 2025 Council working document which raised a possible cigarette-filter ban.

EPIC therefore warns against what it sees as the potential importation of an international tobacco-control agenda into EU legislation without first undertaking sufficiently detailed economic, enforcement and proportionality assessments.

The illicit-market question

Another significant element in the study is illicit trade.

EPIC argues that restrictions which significantly reduce the availability of products for which consumer demand continues to exist can transfer trade away from regulated businesses rather than eliminate consumption.

The EC and EU agencies are simultaneously attempting to combat illegal tobacco and nicotine markets, yet, according to EPIC, some regulatory measures could make illegal supply comparatively more attractive.

According to the report, younger consumers are not necessarily insulated from such markets merely because products disappear from legal retail channels, pointing to concerns surrounding illicit e-cigarette distribution and sales through social media.

This is an issue with implications beyond the tobacco industry. Lost legal sales can mean lost VAT and excise revenues, while enforcement costs increase and legitimate retailers face competition from operators which pay neither tax nor compliance costs.

Not an argument for deregulation

Importantly, EPIC does not present its report as a case for abandoning European health, environmental or consumer-protection objectives. Instead, it advocates what it describes as "Stability-by-Design".

The principle is relatively straightforward: policymakers should analyse economic effects, implementation capacity and differences between sectors and technologies before regulatory choices become politically fixed.

It calls for predictable rules, earlier stakeholder involvement, differentiated regulation where risks differ and implementation schedules which take account of infrastructure, supply chains and enforcement capabilities.

It also argues that regulations should increasingly be assessed collectively rather than individually.

Businesses do not experience the TPD, taxation measures, packaging requirements, environmental legislation and other compliance obligations separately. They experience their accumulated cost simultaneously.

For tobacco, this is particularly relevant because the TPD revision is taking place against the backdrop of parallel debates over tobacco excise taxation, packaging and sustainability rules.

The combined economic impact could therefore be greater than examining each initiative separately would suggest.

For the next regulatory wave, it calculates annual GDP impacts of around €48 billion from its restrictive TPD scenario, €24 billion from the AI framework, €42 billion from packaging regulation, €44 billion from CBAM and €1.6 billion from slower biotechnology and novel-food approvals.

The figures will inevitably be debated, particularly because economic models depend heavily on the assumptions placed into them.

But the policy issue raised by the report is harder to reduce to a dispute over individual numbers.

At a time when European leaders are repeatedly warning that the Union must close its productivity and investment gap with the US and China, EPIC is effectively asking whether Brussels subjects the economic consequences of regulation to the same level of scrutiny as the objectives regulation is intended to achieve.

The third edition of EU TalentOn closed with the announcement of its winning teams on 11 September in Brest, France. Over five days, 100 early-career researchers aged 21 to 35 of 43 different nationalities, worked in teams to develop concrete responses to some of Europe's most pressing challenges, based on the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe.

The participants competed for a share of an €80,000 prize pool. First and second prizes were awarded in each of the five categories, alongside an Alumni Prize, a Special Jury Prize and the overall Grand Jury Prize.

The teams winning the 1^st prize were:

• Adaptation to climate change: Alejandro Roman, Marie Johanna Univer, Edoardo Kimani Bellotto and Florin Miron won with IMPRREST - from big data to decisions, a tool that gives responders one verified assessment of climate emergencies and evidence for adaptation.
• Cancer: Xhilda Dhamo, Oliwia Kosecka and Jafar Gura won with CogniVoice - a patient centered speech monitoring platform for post-treatment surveillance of Brain Cancer.
• Restore our Ocean and Waters Mission: Gabriel Tejero, Siddhanth Shishodia, Dominika Czekanowska and Gjylije Hoti won with Mission PFASSible – a solution that helps with pollution removal into verified risk reduction: sensing, capturing, concentrating, and proving water safety. 
• Climate-neutral and smart cities: Lucia Petronio, Samar Momin, Samira Huber and Imen Kaabachi won with Block2City - turning building data into renovation choices, funding guidance and expert handoff, while helping cities map local demand.
• Soil: Natasha Waris, Ilaria Bertolini, Felipe Quiroz, and Victoria Boycheva, won with RhizoSentinel – a solution that turns plants into living soil biosensors that reveal hidden soil biological threats before they cause crop losses, enabling earlier intervention and smarter soil management.
• The Grand Jury Prize of €12,000 for the best overall project went to RhizoSentinel, while the Special Jury Prize of €3,000 was awarded to Marion Le Meur, Narjes Yazdi, Suresh Ajmeera, and Alberto Galindo Caballero with their project Colospy - a rapid, saliva-based molecular test detecting colorectal-cancer-miRNA signature, designed as a stool-free screening option.

The projects were assessed by a jury of experts from academia, business and government on both scientific merit and market potential – the ability to become real innovations that would contribute to Europe's competitiveness.

Startups, Research and Innovation Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva (pictured) said:

“Congratulations to the winners of EU TalentOn 2026. The solutions you have put forward show what European talent can achieve when it is given room to think differently. Results like these underline that Europe's most important asset are its brightest minds.”

Background

EU TalentOn brings together early-career researchers to develop solutions to major societal challenges linked to the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe. By bringing science closer to citizens and building new connections between science and society in open, playful and engaging ways, it supports the objectives of the ERA Policy Agenda. 

EU TalentOn is a flagship event of Science Comes to Town, the Commission's year-long initiative bringing research and innovation closer to citizens across three host cities in 2026: Kiel (Germany), Brest (France) and Split (Croatia). With over more than 1,000 activities and with more than 70 partners, Science Comes to Town 2026 is connecting scientific institutions, innovation ecosystems and the public throughout the year.

The programme continues later this month, when Kiel hosts the 36th EU Contest for Young Scientists (EUCYS 2026) from 22 to 27 September, before Science Comes to Town 2026 draws to a close with a joint Closing Event and Ceremony on 14–16 December.

Science Comes to Town will return for a second edition in 2027, hosted by four new cities: Aarhus (Denmark), Genoa (Italy), Kaunas (Lithuania) and Oeiras (Portugal). EU TalentOn 2027 will be held in Kaunas, while EUCYS 2027 will take place in Genoa.

Women accounted for 54% of participants in the 2026 edition, reflecting the growing contribution of female talent to Europe’s research and innovation landscape.

More information

• EU TalentOn 2026
• Science Comes to Town

Towns and cities from around the Arctic took part in the launch of an EU-funded Arctic co-operation initiative that will enable more municipal leaders, Indigenous representatives and youth to work together.

The European Union has launched a new initiative gathering 21 towns and cities from across the Arctic to work together on shared priorities. BRIDGE, Building Resilient International Dialogue and Governance for Arctic Engagement, is led by the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF), building on the foundations of the Arctic Regional and Urban Cooperation network (AURC).    

“At a time of ever-increasing environmental and geopolitical change, cooperation among Arctic communities is more important than ever,” said Peter M. Wagner, Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, speaking at the EU Arctic Forum 2026 in Brussels. “We are proud to launch a new phase of EU support to Arctic cities forging connections across borders, building local capacity, and delivering tangible benefits for their residents.” 

“A safe, resilient and inclusive Arctic isn't a side interest for the EU, it's a shared project,” said Patti Bruns, AMF Secretary General. “I’m excited about our work over the next four years, bringing together communities from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland to strengthen cooperation between local governments who face increasing challenges – and opportunities.”

More cities co-operating in a permanent structure

BRIDGE integrates AURC’s approaches and methods into AMF’s permanent structure, extending the cooperation to more Arctic mayors and urban practitioners. 

Despite variations in size and governance structures, Arctic communities share a surprising range of challenges. Building on AURC achievements, these cities are now identifying common themes for the next four years of peer learning, exchanges, study visits, and collaborative problem-solving.

AURC sparked positive changes in Arctic communities 

In 2024, AURC gathered 15 Arctic local authorities from Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Alaska in the United States for the first time to work together on sustainable development. After two years of structured cooperation with expert support, positive local results were already visible. 

“Whether it was learning from Tromsø’s approach to community hubs or troubleshooting heavy equipment with our Canadian neighbours, AURC provided us with a roadmap for growth,” says Assisaun Toovak, Mayor of Utqiaġvik, the northernmost town in the United States. “We aren’t just a remote town in Alaska: we’re a key player in a global Arctic community.”

From new international welcome houses and services in Rovaniemi (Finland), Gällivare and Luleå (Sweden) and Tromsø (Norway) to plans for a new Youth Commission in Fairbanks North Star Borough (USA) inspired by peers in Sweden, Norway, Iceland and elsewhere, AURC sparked an array of positive local changes across the Arctic. These span citizen engagement and youth participation; attracting and retaining talent; sustainable tourism; culture and inclusive economic development; and resilience and emergency preparedness.

Arctic connections supporting resilience and sustainability

Beyond these tangible changes on the ground, trusted exchanges between mayors and staff of Arctic local authorities are boosting knowledge, capacity to adapt, and new initiatives. So far, these include cross-border cultural exchanges, focused workshops for sustainable Arctic tourism professionals, and best-practice sharing on wildfire preparedness. 

Another major result is a new Interreg Aurora project TALENT NORTH, Attracting and Anchoring Global Talent in the Arctic, developed by the Arctic Six universities alliance and AMF, along with administrations and universities of several Arctic cities.

Erkki Parkkinen, Mayor of Salla, Lapland (Finland), said: “It was the best thing for Salla to join AURC: I can now exchange good practices with friends across the Arctic. It’s very important for our municipalities to stay in touch with each other, for the future of the Arctic, for resilience.”

Read more about positive changes EU-funded cooperation has sparked in Arctic towns and cities. 

BRIDGE is funded by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), working closely with the European External Action Service, the diplomatic wing of the EU, and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE).

Arctic Mayors’ Forum is pan-Arctic forum representing the voices of Arctic Peoples through elected leaders at the municipal and community level. They provide an open, collaborative platform for their members, including Indigenous Peoples from around the Arctic.

The European Commission has approved a €52 million (RON 277 million) Romanian state aid scheme for cattle farmers facing increased fuel and fertiliser prices due to the Middle East crisis.

The scheme was approved under the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF) adopted by the Commission on 29 April 2026.

The Romanian scheme

Romania notified to the Commission a €52 million scheme to support companies active in the cattle farming sector. The scheme, which will run until 31 December 2026, aims to mitigate the impact of the increase in agricultural fuel and fertiliser prices.

The aid will take the form of direct grants, with a maximum of €50,000 per company.

The Commission assessed the scheme under EU state aid rules, in particular Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which enables member states to support the development of certain economic activities subject to certain conditions, as well as Sections 1 and 2.1 of the METSAF.

The Commission found that the scheme is in line with the conditions set out in the METSAF. In particular, the aid will be granted based on a scheme with a clear estimated budget and will be provided to temporarily support the development of companies active in the primary production of agricultural products. The Commission concluded that the scheme is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to facilitate the development of an economic activity and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

On this basis, the Commission approved the Romanian scheme under EU State aid rules.

Background

On 29 April 2026, the Commission adopted the METSAF to enable member states to support the EU economy in the context of the Middle East crisis. The METSAF is a targeted and temporary framework to address the effects of the crisis on some of the most exposed sectors of the economy: agriculture, fishery, transport and energy-intensive industries. The METSAF will be in place until 31 December 2026. During its period of application, the Commission will keep the content, scope and duration of the framework under review in the light of developments in the Middle East and of the general economic situation.

While the transition towards a clean economy remains the long-term solution to shield EU companies from the effects of global energy shocks, the METSAF allows Member States to act immediately to make sure that the growth of the most exposed companies is not irreparably hampered by the current crisis.

To this end, support can take various forms for companies active in the agriculture, fishery and transport sectors. This includes aid based on actual consumption to cover part of the price increases for fuel or fertilisers, and a simplified approach for small amounts of aid.

The METSAF also includes a temporary adjustment to the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework allowing for further flexibility and higher aid intensities to address electricity price spikes.

More information on the METSAF can be found online.

For more information

The non-confidential versions of today's decisions will be made available under case number SA.124647, in the state aid register on the Commission's competition website. New publications of state aid decisions on the internet and in the Official Journal are listed in the Competition Weekly e-News.

Related topics

Competition

State aid

Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.

The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk.  But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.

Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.

The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.

From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.

KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.

Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.

Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.

This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new.  The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.

Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore  mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”

The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.

Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”

The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.

The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.

The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence. 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.

De Facto territorial division

The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.

Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:

• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.

More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.

The PUK–New Generation coalition

The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.

Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.

Socioeconomic fallout

With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:

• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.

• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.

• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.

Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations

The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:

1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.

2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.

3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.

Why this matters to Europe

The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.

Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.

The future of a protected wetland in Albania might seem like a local issue. In reality, it is becoming a test of the European Union's credibility, writes Besjana Guri, Albanian Environmental Activist and Founder and Director of Lumi. 

For [over] 100 days, I and thousands of citizens have been protesting unlawful developments in Vjosa-Narta, one of Albania's most important protected landscapes, at a moment when Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners for EU accession.

At these protests, I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with citizens of all walks of life: scientists, artists, students, local communities, environmental activists and public figures. What might once have been seen as a local conservation issue has become a national conversation about whether safeguards for protected areas will actually be enforced, and whether environmental safeguards mean anything when powerful development interests are involved.

The EU enlargement process works because candidate countries know that membership is earned by meeting clear conditions. Among them is a commitment to uphold environmental laws, protect vulnerable ecosystems and give citizens a meaningful voice in decisions that affect them. Vjosa-Narta is testing whether those principles still carry weight when they collide with major development ambitions.

Albania is widely regarded as a frontrunner for EU membership. If it advances while protected areas are opened up to contested development and environmental safeguards are weakened, the credibility of the enlargement process itself will be called into question.

For those of us who support Albania's European future, that is precisely why developments in Vjosa-Narta must be addressed now, not after irreversible damage has been done.

A test case of environmental safeguards

The protected Vjosa-Narta landscape is formed of wetlands, lagoons, salt marshes, dunes, forests and coastal habitats. It is an important stopover for migratory birds travelling along the Adriatic Flyway, while its wetlands support local livelihoods and help regulate water, store carbon and protect against flooding.

It forms part of the wider Vjosa landscape, which gained international recognition in 2023 when Albania declared the river Europe's first Wild River National Park, following years of campaigning by Albanian activists, local communities and international partners, including outdoor clothing brand Patagonia. For many of us who worked to secure that protection, it demonstrated that environmental leadership and economic ambition do not have to be in conflict.

Yet the debate surrounding Vjosa-Narta is no longer simply about one protected area. It has become a test of whether environmental safeguards can be weakened and developments advanced while a country continues progressing towards EU membership.

The EU has been clear that environmental protection is not an optional extra of accession. Chapter 27, covering environment and climate change, is a significant and technically demanding part of the enlargement process. Candidate countries are expected not only to align their laws with European standards, but to demonstrate that they can implement and enforce them effectively.

Albania’s progress towards meeting these requirements has been undermined by recent setbacks in the legal framework for protected areas. Amendments to Albania's Law on Protected Areas in 2024 significantly weakened environmental safeguards by opening the door to broader tourism and infrastructure development within protected areas. The European Commission and European Parliament have both raised concerns about whether those changes are compatible with EU environmental standards. At the same time, concerns around environmental impact assessments, permitting procedures and public consultation in Vjosa-Narta have turned this protected landscape into a real-world test of whether environmental commitments are being upheld.

Setting the precedent for EU accession

If Albania continues advancing towards membership without resolving these concerns, it risks sending a message that environmental conditionality can be negotiated away when powerful economic interests are at stake.

This sets a worrying precedent for the accession process and the outcome will be watched closely across the Western Balkans, where other countries such as Montenegro and North Macedonia are in accession negotiations. As one of the EU's most advanced candidate countries, Albania is helping to shape expectations of how accession standards are applied in practice.

If concerns around protected areas and environmental assessments can remain unresolved without affecting progress towards membership, future candidate countries may draw their own conclusions about the weight given to environmental commitments.

Wider implications for the bloc

Existing member states must have confidence that new members have been held to the same standards. And citizens must trust that environmental laws cannot simply be set aside when they become inconvenient.

If the EU is seen to tolerate environmental shortcuts during accession, it risks weakening its ability to defend those same standards across the bloc. The issue therefore is not simply whether Albania is meeting its obligations, but whether the EU is prepared to uphold the standards it asks others to meet.

Brussels now faces a choice

As Albania enters the final stages of accession, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental commitments have real meaning in practice, not just on paper. Addressing concerns around Vjosa-Narta would send a clear signal that enlargement remains a process built on accountability, implementation and shared standards.

That's not only important for Albania. It's important for the credibility of enlargement itself.

Under Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh saw a tense period where the recourse to justice was curtailed, the banking sector crippled, and foreign investment virtually evaporated. As the country tries to build a brighter future, the authoritarian nature of Yunus’s interim administration - its series of endless legal witch hunts and laser-focus on political retribution - echoes on with questions building over the ‘reformer’ image Yunus worked to foster.

Rocketed to power off the back of a student-led revolution, Muhammad Yunus promised accountability and access to justice. Instead, he turned his sights on a series of political scores needing to be settled, using his temporary power to establish a firm, authoritarian rule.

Incredibly, Yunus himself knew what it felt like to be the victim of witch hunt, having become embroiled in a dispute with Sheikh Hasina whilst she was in power. He could have taken the opportunity to set a new path for Bangladesh; one where the courts no longer operated as a space of political persecution. Instead, he doubled down and drew on popular resentment for the Hasina administration to foster a culture of political retribution while leveraging the judicial system to target his enemies.

During his tenure, Human Rights Watch repeatedly raised the alarm about the number of political opponents that were being held in indefinite detention. His administration also pursued the death penalty for all those it associated with the former regime, discarding due processes in favour of stacking benches with unqualified judges who were likely to return harsher verdicts. Undeterred, the contradictions grew. Here was a founding member of Nelson Mandela’s Council of Elders, locking up vast numbers of political opponents and doing nothing to protect journalists.

Yunus also spearheaded a smear campaign against almost a dozen of the country’s leading business groups, dissolving boards and installing favored (and corrupt) advisers, the result has left the country’s economy in dire straits and the current government attempting to salvage the wreckage. Through a series of endless legal witch hunts and targeted campaigns, Yunus saddled the eleven business groups with hundreds of criminal and commercial charges, while doing precious little to support the wider economy. The attacks scared off would-be investors, concerned they may earn the ire of Yunus’s government and have left the economy with a rolling investment crisis.

To maximise this campaign’s impact, Yunus leveraged a court system which requires people to appear in-person before the court or face harsher, in-absentia sentences. In drumming up hundreds of legal claims Yunus effectively nullified the business groups from any effective response by making it virtually impossible for them to meet the claims in court. To ensure this would be as difficult as possible, Yunus strategically empowered the students who brought down Hasina, bringing them into his fold.

By withholding any repercussions for the attacks on Hasina’s residence or the fires started at government buildings during the uprising, Yunus tacitly permitted a general sense of lawlessness and attacks on perceived enemies of the state to spread. Former ministers, on their way to essentially sham trials, would be mobbed - including one minister who was assaulted by lawyers - by crowds calling for their execution. One former Justice even had to undergo surgery as a result of the violent injuries he suffered following a mob attack. Lawyers have even reported that they were prevented from carrying out their work if it involved representing people with ties to the former regime. In all, the government's permissiveness of vigilante justice, combined with a targeted campaign of lawfare against its perceived enemies undermined any hope for fair trials and it is little wonder businesses remain reticent to engage with Bangladesh.

Despite a rhetoric of justice and accountability, Yunus’ actions proved these were never truly on the table. In order for the country to move forward, Bangladesh needs a pathway to reconciliation, which cannot coexist with the legal witch hunts instigated by Muhammad Yunus. The new government needs to change course if it wants to bring the country on the path to a prosperous and fairer future.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for deeper practical co-operation between Kazakhstan and BRICS countries in trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and water security, positioning the format as a platform for broader economic ties amid growing geopolitical fragmentation.

Speaking at the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13, Tokayev said Kazakhstan sees cooperation with the group as an opportunity to expand access to new markets, attract investment, strengthen transport links and advance technological development. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13.

Tokayev described the current global environment as an era of “great fragmentation,” a term used in the 2026 Global Peace Index to characterize geopolitical confrontation, rising militarization, weakening multilateral institutions and growing trade barriers. He noted that BRICS, representing nearly half of the world’s population and around 40% of global GDP, has both the capacity and responsibility to help overcome global divisions and deliver concrete results. “Peace and strategic stability are necessary conditions for economic and sustainable development,”

Tokayev said, calling for a shift from the de-escalation of individual conflicts toward long-term stability based on political dialogue and diplomacy. Against this backdrop, Tokayev positioned BRICS as a platform for practical cooperation rather than an alternative to the existing international system. 

“As a partner country, Kazakhstan views BRICS as an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the multilateral system with the central role of the United Nations and connects peoples, regions and markets,” he said. He added that Kazakhstan always seeks to find a “common ground on every difficult issue,” describing the approach as consistent with the country’s “balanced, goal-oriented foreign policy.”  Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel, said the approach reflects BRICS’ broader focus on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, priorities that have gained greater relevance amid rising geopolitical tensions.

Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel. said closer cooperation among BRICS members could help address shared challenges while giving partner countries such as Kazakhstan greater access to the bloc’s growing trade, investment and technological opportunities. “BRICS gives much support to each other. So, from this point of view, for Kazakhstan, it’s a prosperous future, in my opinion,” Golyakova told The Astana Times.

Ayanangsha Maitra, an editor and a geopolitics specialist, echoed this view, saying Kazakhstan’s BRICS partnership could open new opportunities for economic cooperation and market access. “Although Kazakhstan is not a full BRICS member, its partnership with the grouping adds value at a time of growing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty,” Maitra told The Astana Times.

“BRICS could offer Kazakhstan additional avenues for cooperation with countries beyond its traditional economic and political partners,” he added. Expanding trade and investment The economic dimension of Kazakhstan’s BRICS engagement was central to Tokayev’s address. According to him, trade between Kazakhstan and BRICS members and partners was around $72 billion in 2025.  “Having significant industrial, transit and technological potential, we intend to diversify trade, economic and investment ties with all BRICS countries.

As chairman of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kazakhstan supports the expansion of economic cooperation with BRICS and the advancement of work on concluding a free trade agreement with India,” Tokayev said.

Tokayev also called on the New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank established by the group, to consider financing commercially viable projects in BRICS countries, including Kazakhstan.

Maitra identified critical minerals, jewelry, fashion and textiles as areas with potential to expand Kazakhstan-India trade. “Despite Kazakhstan’s relatively modest population of around 20 million, the country has a strong entrepreneurial spirit and growing commercial links with India,” he said, pointing to increasing connectivity between the two countries.

Turning geography into connectivity Transport connectivity was another central element of Tokayev’s vision. “Last year, transit cargo volumes through Kazakhstan approached 40 million tons. Our long-term goal is to increase that figure to 100 million tons annually. Overall, our transit network already handles up to 85% of overland freight between China and Europe,” he said.

As part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan serves as a link between Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea. Tokayev called for greater synergy between the Trans-Caspian route, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Maitra highlighted that Kazakhstan’s position within the EAEU, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides access to major regional markets. Its participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor adds another layer of connectivity.

“BRICS could expand that network beyond Kazakhstan’s traditional regional partners. The partnership adds another dimension by opening access to markets across a wider group of countries,” he said. AI as a new layer of cooperation AI represents another area where Kazakhstan sees room for practical BRICS cooperation.

Tokayev said Kazakhstan is ready to use its computing infrastructure and national and UN digital centers to expand cooperation in AI and proposed establishing a BRICS Plus Partnership in Artificial Intelligence. The initiative, he said, could connect national AI centers, facilitate access to laboratories and research projects and support the development of multilingual AI solutions.

For Maitra, AI could also become an important area of Kazakhstan-India cooperation because the two countries bring complementary strengths. “India has a strong IT sector and a large pool of software engineers and technology professionals, while Kazakhstan has established connections across the CIS and wider Eurasian markets. That combination could help Indian technology companies reach markets where language and regional expertise remain barriers,” he said. Water security broadens the agenda Tokayev also linked sustainability to one of the country’s longstanding international priorities: water security. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish an International Water Organization as a specialized UN agency, arguing that global water governance remains fragmented and requires stronger international coordination.

“I invite the BRICS member states and partners to join the international consultations initiated by our country,” Tokayev said. Meeting with Narendra Modi On the sidelines of the summit, Tokayev also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, highlighting India’s growing economic and technological weight and the expanding relationship between the two countries. Modi highlighted the potential for closer ties in high technology and the creative industries, including cooperation between Astana Hub and Hyderabad’s Cyberabad technology ecosystem. He also invited Kazakh representatives, particularly young people, to take part in the WAVES creative industries summit in Mumbai next year.  The two leaders also discussed prospects for expanding economic ties between India and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Tokayev said Kazakhstan, as the current chair of the EAEU, supports negotiations on a free trade agreement between the bloc and India and is ready to help advance the process. Tokayev said around 600 companies with Indian capital operate in Kazakhstan, while nearly 150,000 Indian citizens visited the country last year. He also cited the large number of Indian students studying in Kazakhstan and cooperation between Astana and New Delhi within international organizations.

This year's European Society of Cardiology (ESC) Congress showed just how quickly cardiology is changing. Late-breaking trials, new scientific data and major guideline updates all pointed to a field that is becoming both more crowded and more complex.

A central question the conference sought to address was how effectively the two main types of ATTR-CM treatment work. Stabilizers are designed to prevent the transthyretin protein from breaking apart, while silencers reduce its production. The debate centered on whether silencers offer enough additional benefit over established stabilizers in this significant rare disease market.

One of the clearest lessons was that the challenge is no longer simply bringing more treatments to market. It is increasingly about finding the right patients earlier, understanding how different therapies compare and deciding where each option fits as standards of care improve. ATTR-CM was one of the strongest examples of that shift, with the conference data sharpening the debate over whether silencers offer enough additional benefit over established stabilizers. The same pattern could also be seen in new guidelines and in the growing role of digital monitoring.

Alnylam ($ALNY) faces new questions over Amvuttra in ATTR-CM

Alnylam Pharmaceuticals came to ESC looking to strengthen the case for Amvuttra in ATTR-CM, but the data arguably leave some important questions unanswered. While the drug is already approved, the estimated benefit appeared more modest than many investors and clinicians may have hoped, particularly given the growing expectation that newer therapies will need to demonstrate clear advantages over established treatments. The key question is whether ATTR-CM silencer treatments offer enough additional benefit on top of stabilizers that are already delivering meaningful clinical outcomes.

In light of this, there remains uncertainty around the extent of Amvuttra's value and whether it will be sufficient to secure a strong position in an increasingly competitive market. The FDA's decision earlier this year to challenge Alnylam's survival claims based on an open-label extension of HELIOS-B only adds to the need for caution. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that Alnylam's share price has come under pressure and that questions are being raised about the long-term commercial viability of Amvuttra in ATTR-CM.

Rather than definitively strengthening the case for Amvuttra, Alnylam's participation at ESC suggests that important questions remain about the true scale of its advantage and whether the evidence is sufficient to establish a clear benefit over existing treatments.

AstraZeneca ($AZN) casts further doubt on silencers in ATTR-CM

In perhaps a similar spirit, AstraZeneca and Ionis used ESC to revisit the results of the Phase 3 CARDIO-TTRansform trial of Wainua (eplontersen), another potential treatment for ATTR-CM. They faced a somewhat different challenge, however, as the trial had already failed its primary endpoint, with Wainua unable to significantly reduce cardiovascular mortality and recurrent cardiovascular events in the overall study population.

The companies sought to contextualize the findings, but the presentation arguably highlighted one of the trial's central challenges. If the apparent benefit is less clear among patients already receiving stabilizer therapy, the data raise broader questions about how much additional value silencers can deliver beyond treatments that are already producing meaningful clinical outcomes. The broader question, however, is what this means for an ATTR-CM market that is becoming increasingly competitive. As new treatments emerge, should attention shift towards newer therapies, or remain focused on established stabilizers that may already be providing much of the available benefit?

New ESC guidelines and Huawei point to a prevention first approach

ESC also saw the release of new guidelines that could change how cardiovascular patients are identified and managed. The updated heart failure guidance simplifies how patients are classified and puts more focus on prevention and earlier intervention. In practice, that means clinicians may be looking for risk earlier and across a broader group of patients, rather than waiting until disease is more advanced.

That change is creating more room for digital tools. Huawei used ESC to preview its Watch D3, a wrist-based ambulatory blood pressure monitor designed to track blood pressure in everyday settings. It is one example of how wearables are moving beyond basic wellness tracking and towards data that could help identify risk earlier, monitor patients more closely and support treatment decisions.

Reflecting on ESC 2026, ATTR-CM emerged as a key area of focus. The AstraZeneca and Alnylam data raised questions about whether silencers can offer enough benefit over established stabilizers, while new guidelines and digital tools highlighted the importance of identifying risk earlier and monitoring patients more closely. The key question now, arguably, is which approaches can genuinely improve on what is already available, and which patients are most likely to benefit.

Concerns about the water and energy demands of data centers have become prolific in recent weeks. But debates about their impact often overlook the rapid advances in cooling technology and cleaner energy that are already having an impact.

However, data centers’ resource consumption should be front and center of the AI conversion, as it is set to grow rapidly. By 2030, data centers’ water and energy consumption will double as AI demand leads to rapid construction of the infrastructure.

But data centers will not cause the world to run out of water or energy. Water- and energy-saving technologies already in use are reducing their impact, while Shanghai’s groundbreaking underwater data center demonstrates how innovative design can limit water, energy and land use.

Data centers have underpinned the internet since its founding. Apps, email, file storage and cloud services all run through them.

Modern AI workloads, however, have transformed their power demands beyond recognition. Today a single AI data center can match the electricity consumption of 100,000 homes, making them a significant drain on local energy grids, especially if a region is susceptible to shortages.

Data centers’ energy consumption is only rising as more are built across the world. In the US, data centers could increase from 4.4% to 12% of national electricity usage by 2028 — that is equivalent to adding eight New York Cities to the American grid.

Data centers also consume large amounts of water in two main ways. Water is used directly to cool servers and storage systems, which generate considerable heat, and indirectly to produce electricity at fossil fuel power plants where it is heated into steam to drive turbines.

In the UK, data centers have been estimated to use up to eight times as much water as average on hot summer days, underlining how their impact can rise when local resources are already under strain.

As the effects of climate change intensify, the location of data centers, and methods to reduce their water and energy consumption, are becoming ever more important.

Fortunately, resource-saving measures are already being implemented. Data centers on land use closed-loop cooling systems that recycle water rather than continually evaporating it. This can reduce freshwater use by up to 70% compared to traditional open evaporative methods.

China has also pioneered a revolutionary new type of data center in Shanghai: wind-powered, and underwater. The facility, which began full commercial operations in May 2026, uses seawater as a coolant instead of using refrigerated fresh water as land-based data centers do, reducing the electricity required to cool the computers.

It uses at least 30% less electricity than traditional data centers, and offshore wind turbines reduce reliance on fossil fuels and cut the data center’s carbon emissions. Innovative solutions such as these will go a long way to reducing data centers’ resource consumption.

AI is also part of the solution to data centers’ draw on resources. AI can optimise electricity grids and shift computing workloads towards periods when cleaner energy is more efficient, making energy use more effective overall. AI can also anticipate fluctuations in demand and adjust energy consumption accordingly, reducing waste.

It might sound obvious, but some areas are just better equipped to accommodate a data center than others. For example, facilities in hot or water-stressed regions will impose a heavier burden on resources than those supplied by cleaner energy with plentiful water and located in cooler climates.

AI’s growing demand for data centers will increase electricity and water consumption, that is true. But it does not mean the technology will exhaust regional or global supplies of either resource.

The AI boom and the infrastructure buildout accompanying it are well underway. To manage its impact, the industry needs to plan ahead. Cleaner energy, efficient cooling, and sites that have significant water and energy supplies will all limit the infrastructure’s drain on resources.

On 11 September, the Commission presented its proposal on the EU-Ecuador Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA) to the Council for its signature and conclusion.  

This is the first SIFA negotiated with a Latin American country and will help promote further EU investment in Ecuador. The EU-Ecuador SIFA aims to make it easier for EU companies to invest and expand their operations in Ecuador. It benefits both EU and local investors.  

It will facilitate investment across the whole economy by supporting efforts to address challenges such as bureaucratic hurdles and regulatory uncertainty, which is especially relevant in sectors with untapped potential, such as renewable energy. For the first time in a SIFA, the agreement with Ecuador contains specific provisions which aim to deepen cooperation and facilitate investment in sustainable energy and raw materials - sectors of particular interest for EU investors and Ecuador. The SIFA is closely aligned with the EU's Global Gateway strategy in Ecuador, which supports investments and sustainable infrastructure in sectors such as energy, water sanitation, and waste management. 

The EU is a leading trade and investment partner for Ecuador, with the EU's FDI stock in the country reaching €9.1 billion in 2024. The sectors receiving the most EU foreign direct investment include construction, business services, transport, storage, communications, and manufacturing. 

Pursuing SIFAs is among the objectives set out in the EU's Competitiveness Compass, which highlighted the need to seek new ways of deepening partnerships and creating benefits for EU businesses. 

Next steps 

With its proposals for the signature and conclusion of the SIFA, the Commission is seeking the Council’s approval to sign the agreement. Once the Council gives its agreement it will be sent to the European Parliament for consent. Following approval, the deal can enter into force. 

For more information 

Commission proposals for Council decisions on the signature and conclusion of the EU-Ecuador Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA) 

EU and Ecuador conclude negotiations for a SIFA  

EU-Ecuador trade relations 

On 11 September, the European Commission has put forward its proposals to the Council for the signature and conclusion of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India, seeking authorization for its signature and conclusion. If authorized by the Council, this will be the largest trade agreement ever concluded by both the EU and India.

Once adopted and entered into force, the agreement will improve market access, reduce tariffs, tackle unnecessary barriers to trade, as well as provide predictable rules for trade and investment between the EU and India. The EU and India already trade over €180 billion worth of goods and services per year, supporting close to 800,000 EU jobs. This deal will eliminate or reduce tariffs on 96% of EU goods exports to India. Overall, the tariff reductions will save around €4 billion per year in duties on European products. It will make it easier for European companies to access the Indian market and compete on a more level playing field, while it will ensure consumers can benefit from increased choices and more competitive prices.

The proposal put forward today represents a key step towards ensuring that consumers and businesses can start reaping the benefits of this deal as soon as possible. This is in line with the fast-track procedure laid out by Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič earlier this year. The procedure aims at speeding up the implementation of FTA's, which is crucial at a time of geopolitical uncertainty and growing pressure on the global trading system.

The EU-India FTA reflects the EU's commitment to strengthen economic ties with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region. With its proposals, the Commission is seeking Council's approval to sign the agreements which will then require European Parliament's consent, before conclusion and entry into force. The Indian authorities are in parallel going through their own internal ratification procedures.

For more information

Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Questions and answers on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement

Europe has plenty of world-class research, talent and creativity. However, too often ideas originating in Europe are turned into economic success by others, elsewhere. This is because European innovators face barriers here and find it difficult to bring their ideas to life. As a result, the Commission proposed a new European innovation act to help Europe's most innovative ideas be developed, financed and scaled up in Europe.

To strengthen the EU innovation system, the proposal will address two main challenges. Firstly, it will help innovative companies access financing by

• promoting a common EU framework to value intellectual property
• creating a digital marketplace connecting buyers and sellers of intellectual property
• offering expert support to help companies bring their ideas to the market

This can unlock €10.2 billion per year in additional financing and generate around €35 million in administrative cost savings.

Second, it will establish a common approach for research and development procurement that

• will provide greater legal certainty 
• help new technologies reach the market faster
• make it easier for public buyers from different EU countries to jointly carry out Research and Development procurements. 

With this, companies could expect €25.92 billion in additional annual profits, while public buyers could save €1 billion per year.

The European innovation act is an element of the competitiveness compass, to strengthen the EU's long-term competitiveness, prosperity and technological sovereignty. In parallel, the Commission will help innovators accelerate the transformation of innovative ideas into market solutions through a specific proposal on regulatory sandboxes.

For more information

Press release - Commission proposes new European Innovation Act to help innovative European ideas grow and compete globally

Questions and answers on the European Innovation Act

Factsheet on the European Innovation Act

The European Innovation Act

Long constrained by its landlocked geography, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its position between Europe and Asia into a source of economic and geopolitical leverage. As trade disruptions and competition drive demand for diversified supply chains, Astana is investing in new transport corridors to establish itself as an indispensable transit hub and translate connectivity into diplomatic influence.

The Middle Corridor route
“Transport diplomacy has long been a pillar of economic diplomacy. Today, efficient transport and logistics networks are becoming strategic assets that shape economic competitiveness, and a country’s role in regional economic cooperation,” Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) Alexey Kuznetsov told The
Astana Times. 

Alexey Kuznetsov, Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank. Photo credit: The EDB’s press service Located between China, Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan is developing railways, roads, ports and logistics hubs while expanding connections along several international transport corridors. The scale of the sector is reflected in recent figures. Kazakhstan transported 540.5 million tons of cargo in January-July, up 0.9% from the same period a year earlier, according to the Bureau of National Statistics.

Cargo turnover increased 1%, while road freight transportation grew 6.2%. Government data shows that transit freight reached 21.7 million tons in January-June, up 24% from 17.5 million tons a year earlier. Building Eurasian connectivity Kazakhstan is seeking to strengthen its role not simply as a transit country but as a major regional connectivity hub. “For Kazakhstan, modern transport, logistics, and warehousing infrastructure are essential for addressing the challenges of a landlocked geography.

"At the same time, the country has become one of Eurasia’s most important transit hubs,” said Kuznetsov. He said international transport and logistics partnerships are central to Kazakhstan’s connectivity diplomacy, positioning the country as an influential player in shaping Eurasia’s regional agenda. According to the EDB’s Transport Projects Observatory, Kazakhstan accounts for 53% of transport corridor investments planned or under implementation in Central Asia through 2035.

“More than $32 billion is expected to be invested in 55 major transport projects, including construction of the Center-West motorway, the Uralsk-Atyrau and Kyzylorda-Saksaulsk roads, and the Moiynty-Kyzylzhar railway. These investments will strengthen East-West and North-South trade routes and further position Kazakhstan as a strategic transport crossroads linking Europe and Asia,” Kuznetsov said. Road construction, reconstruction and repairs cover around 11,000 kilometers nationwide in 2026. Kazakhstan also plans to repair 11,000 kilometers of railway tracks by 2029. International financing is supporting part of the expansion.

In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a major railway connectivity project along Kazakhstan’s section of the Middle Corridor. However, Kuznetsov emphasized that infrastructure alone cannot determine whether a transport route succeeds. “Transport connectivity depends equally on ‘soft infrastructure’: harmonized regulations, efficient border-crossing procedures, coordinated corridor development, and digitalization of transport services and documentation,” he said.

The World Bank estimates cited by Kuznetsov suggest that cutting border delays by 50% through regulatory harmonization and digital solutions could increase exports from Central Asian countries along transport corridors by an average of 18%. For Kazakhstan, this means that the competitiveness of its routes will depend not only on the number of roads, railways and terminals built, but also on how efficiently they operate.

The Middle Corridor and geopolitics At the center of Kazakhstan’s connectivity strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects China with Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Europe. For political scientist Tair Naumov, the importance of such routes extends beyond trade. “Investment in transit infrastructure requires a certain level of trust between countries, including confidence in political relations and the security of investments,” Naumov said in an interview with The Astana Times. Once a route becomes operational, however, it can also strengthen those relations by creating greater economic interdependence.

“When countries rely on the same transport routes, their interests become more closely connected. If a corridor becomes important to foreign trade, there is a stronger incentive to maintain stable relations and keep existing agreements in place,” he said. Naumov noted that this interdependence can eventually acquire a security dimension. “If a country becomes an important transit hub, its stability becomes an interest not only for the country itself but also for its neighbors and major trading partners,” he said. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law, takes a similar view, emphasizing the economic interests created by shared logistics networks.

“Good logistics creates mutual interest between countries. The more participants there are, the safer it becomes. And the more economic ties pass through Kazakhstan, the greater its role in the region,” Kayumov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor illustrates this dynamic. While it does not yet account for a dominant share of Kazakhstan’s transit flows, its rapid growth could give it greater strategic importance.

From transit to economic value
For Kazakhstan, stronger economic ties along these routes are only part of the opportunity. The bigger question is how the country can turn growing transit flows into broader economic value at home. 

“I would not reduce the transport strategy to transit alone. If a container simply passes through Kazakhstan, the country earns comparatively little. It is much more interesting when logistics centers, warehouses, manufacturing and service companies emerge alongside the route,” Kayumov said. Such an approach would allow Kazakhstan to capture more value from its position in Eurasian supply chains. “Then the transport corridor begins to work for the regions and for our industry. Kazakhstan receives much more income. The service model that develops around the entire flow allows us to earn more and create more jobs,” he said.

Kayumov noted that attracting cargo also requires competitive and predictable routes. Border delays, limited port capacity, container shortages and differences in procedures can increase costs and make a route less attractive to businesses. “A convenient route must be fast, clear and predictable. For business, it matters how long cargo remains at the border, how quickly documents are processed and how much railway capacity is available,” he said. According to Kayumov, digitalization can help address some of these challenges. Electronic document management, for example, can reduce corruption risks while speeding up operations.

TRIPP and the wider connectivity network
The development of new routes beyond Kazakhstan could expand the country’s connectivity options. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a proposed transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in the project and linking it with the Middle Corridor. “For the Trans-Caspian route, TRIPP provides an additional option for moving cargo after the Caspian Sea toward Türkiye and Europe. The more such branches there are, the more resilient and attractive the entire corridor becomes,” Kayumov said.

For Kazakhstan, the interest is largely pragmatic. As a landlocked country, it needs several reliable routes to major markets. However, Kayumov noted that the project’s value for Kazakhstan would depend on how effectively it is integrated into the country’s existing transport network. “What is more important for us is not formal participation in the project, but its integration with our existing transit hub. This means having unified tariffs, digital borders, digital document management and clear, predictable delivery times,” Kayumov said. “The more reliable routes connect Central Asia with Europe through Kazakhstan, the greater the economic and political value of our geography and our role in connecting different markets,” he added.

Hardware and software products are increasingly exposed to cyberattacks. From baby monitors and smartwatches to apps and computer programmes, products with digital elements are part of our daily lives. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) strengthens the cybersecurity of these products and better protects consumers and businesses from cyber threats.

As of 11 September 2026, manufacturers must report any actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents that have an impact on the security of their products. They must submit an early warning within 24 hours, followed by a full notification within 72 hours. A final report must then be submitted no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available for an actively exploited vulnerability, and within 1 month for a severe incident. 

In practice, this means consumers can rely on faster notifications and stronger protection for their connected devices, such as door locking systems, keeping their home safe and secure in the event of a cyberattack. 

The reporting obligations apply to all products with digital elements made available in the EU, including those already on the market. Manufacturers will submit their notifications through the CRA Single Reporting Platform, established and maintained by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity.

The Commission published practical guidance to help manufacturers, developers, and businesses meet their obligations. National market surveillance authorities will ensure enforcement of the rules. 

The Cyber Resilience Act builds on the EU cybersecurity strategy and the EU security union strategy. It aims to strengthen the EU approach to cybersecurity. The new rules require products with digital elements to be designed, updated, and maintained to protect users from security risks. The CE marking will help them identify products that comply with the CRA requirements. 

The main obligations introduced by the Act will apply from 11 December 2027, while the reporting obligations apply from 11 September 2026. 

For more information

Cyber Resilience Act

Protecting your digital life

ENISA - FAQ

Digital economy and society

The UK’s trade ambitions are clear: open new markets, reduce border friction, and make it genuinely easier for small businesses to compete globally. The government’s 2025 Trade Strategy frames this as a growth priority. Yet the data tells a more sobering story, write Jose Puyana and Tom Harding.

UK goods exports to the EU have fallen by £27 billion since Brexit. Exports remain roughly 18% below pre-2019 levels. And around one in seven UK businesses have stopped trading with the EU altogether.

Large-scale surveys from the Federation of Small Businesses and British Chambers of Commerce consistently cite customs processes and compliance complexity as the leading barriers for SMEs. But surveys don’t fully capture the emotional texture of what traders describe: a persistent, low-level anxiety about whether a detail has been missed, whether the code is right, whether the rules have quietly changed since last time.

The traders understand their products, their customers, and their commercial realities. What leaves them uneasy is the web of rules, requirements, and systems governing the movement of goods across a border. We call this mindset the Nervous Trader.

The fear of getting it wrong

Consider a small business importing animal-derived products: the origin of materials, their treatment, and finishing processes can all shift how a shipment must be declared. A detail that seems minor to an outsider - whether a skin has been treated, how a component has been finished - can change the commodity code entirely. Get it wrong, and products are delayed or blocked at the border. Unexpected duties land, turning a profitable shipment into a loss. Time is consumed by questions from freight forwarders and internal scrutiny that the business cannot afford.

For a clothing importer shipping technical apparel from multiple countries, the same anxiety plays out at scale. Every declaration carries the nagging worry of a missed detail or overlooked cost. And for a manufacturer exporting specialist components, the risk doesn’t just lie with a single shipment - it scales with volume. As the business grows, so does the exposure. One overlooked requirement can have knock-on effects across the whole operation.

Rules without a map

What these businesses share is not inexperience. It is the absence of certainty. Trade is inherently consequential - financial and reputational stakes are real. But the systems around it do remarkably little to reduce the sense of exposure. Nervousness is rational in an ambiguous environment. The question is why we continue to design ambiguity into the experience.

International trade is inherently complex. Nobody who works in it would claim otherwise. The rules are numerous, the requirements specific, and the consequences of error real. Traders understand this. None of the businesses we spoke to expected the process to be simple.

What they experience, however, is complexity without context - rules and requirements presented without enough orientation to be useful. Government guidance is often comprehensive and technically accurate. The information assumes a level of prior knowledge that most small business operators simply don’t have time to develop.

More critically, guidance is almost always written around policy rather than around the person trying to follow it. That gap between what guidance says and what a trader actually needs to know in a given moment is where confidence breaks down.

When traders are nervous and the guidance around them fails to build confidence, they find other ways to manage the risk. They defer. They delegate. They pay someone else to carry the uncertainty; they were never given the tools to handle themselves.

It is a rational response to an inadequate system. The more revealing data point, though, is the informal workarounds. Traders describe turning to AI tools, online forums, and third-party platforms to fill the gap that official guidance leaves. Not because those sources are more authoritative, but because they are faster, more conversational, and more willing to engage with the specific question being asked rather than the general rule that may or may not apply.

Designing for confidence, not just compliance

If our digital services don’t actively build confidence and help manage the risks associated with trade compliance, other ecosystems will fill that gap. Intermediaries become the only translators of complexity, while traders never fully learn the language.

Trade is never static. For UK businesses, the pace of change over the past decade has been relentless: Brexit reshaping EU relationships, US tariff policy shifting unpredictably, new regulatory requirements emerging as new markets are entered. The environment that small traders are navigating today bears little resemblance to the one they trained themselves on five years ago.

The consequences are visible. Businesses that built strong European revenue streams have watched them erode as post-Brexit duties and friction increased. What had been a reliable, profitable channel became uncertain, then marginal, then unviable. The challenge wasn’t that traders didn’t see change coming - most did. The challenge was that the systems around them provided no clear guidance on what to do about it.

When those questions arise constantly, in a domain that already feels high-risk and poorly signposted, the fear of making mistakes doesn’t simply persist; it compounds. And that compounding weight is what drives traders towards avoidance - towards stepping back from unfamiliar routes, delaying entry into new markets, and, at worst, withdrawing from international trade altogether.

Change is inevitable in trade. But adaptation should not require heroic effort on the part of the trader. When our systems don’t communicate change in accessible, context-relevant ways, they transform something manageable into something exhausting.

Addressing this requires more than incremental improvements to individual services. It requires a different frame. In practical terms, it means translating policy into language that traders can act on. It means providing reassurance at the moments it is most needed, not just information. It means improving relevance - helping traders quickly understand what applies to their situation rather than leaving them to extract that signal from comprehensive but impersonal guidance. And it means fragmented government services beginning to work more deliberately across boundaries, acknowledging their shared users, shared challenges, and shared outcomes.

Confidence should be treated as a primary, measurable outcome of good service design in trade. Not a soft aspiration, but a design specification. If a service leaves traders more uncertain than when they arrived, something has gone wrong - regardless of whether the information was technically accurate.

The role of digital and service design is not to eliminate the complexity of international trade. It is to prevent that complexity from being amplified by the experiences built around it. Trade will always carry risk. The question is whether we design services that help traders manage that risk clearly, or services that make them feel exposed to it at every turn.