Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and MEP Dirk Gotink (EPP, Netherlands) Photographer: Mathieu Cugnot © European Union

The European Parliament has approved a major overhaul of the EU’s customs system, tightening requirements on e-commerce platforms, introducing a new handling fee for goods ordered from outside the bloc and creating a central EU customs authority.

“This is the biggest reform of European customs since 1968, supporting trade and the enforcement of EU rules,” said MEP Dirk Gotink, (EPP, Netherlands) who steered the legislation through Parliament. Gotink said European customs authorities had been overwhelmed by a “tsunami of Chinese parcels” and that the reform would give customs officers stronger tools to enforce EU standards.

Under the new rules, e-commerce platforms and sellers shipping goods directly from non-EU countries to European consumers will be treated as importers. That will make them responsible for providing customs data, handling applicable charges and ensuring products comply with EU law.

The reform also introduces an EU-wide handling fee on goods ordered directly from non-EU countries, with member states required to begin collecting it no later than 1 November, 2026. The European Commission will determine the amount and review it every two years.

Companies that repeatedly breach EU customs rules could face fines ranging from at least 1% to as much as 6% of the value of goods they imported into the EU during the previous 12 months.

The overhaul will also establish an EU Customs Data Hub, designed to replace at least 111 existing customs IT systems. A new EU Customs Authority, based in Lille, France, will manage the hub and coordinate customs cooperation and risk management across the EU.

The Council has already given the reform its final formal approval, making Parliament’s vote the final step in the legislative procedure.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the podium Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her State of the Union address on Wednesday (16 September) to make the case for a more independent Europe, confronting war, economic competition, AI disruption and climate change — while proposing Canada become the EU’s first associate member.

Opening her #SOTEU speech with Charles Dickens’ “best of times, worst of times”, von der Leyen described a Union stronger but also more exposed to external threats.

“The state of our Union is the strongest it has ever been,” she said, while acknowledging it could feel “as precarious as it has ever been”. “Europe has chosen to forge its own path. And a stronger, independent Europe is now emerging.”

Competitiveness and energy

Von der Leyen called kickstarting Europe’s economy her “number one priority”, promising faster permitting, less red tape and further integration of the Single Market.

The Commission will propose a new Banking Package and create a European Corporation on Critical Raw Materials to secure supplies needed for chips, batteries, clean technology and defence.

With high energy costs weighing on European industry, von der Leyen called for faster electrification and investment in grids, renewables and nuclear power to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Climate after a 'summer of truth'

After a summer of fires, drought and extreme heat, von der Leyen promised a climate resilience framework focused on 100 of Europe’s most vulnerable territories, alongside a Climate Insurance Alliance, European Heatwave Plan and Water Initiative.

She also floated a future European Firefighting Fleet, declaring that Europe “can, must and will stay the course” on its climate targets.

AI: Opportunity and threat

AI was presented as both an economic opportunity and an emerging security threat. Von der Leyen warned that advanced models could enable hacking “on a level we never thought possible” and pledged closer cooperation with Canada, the UK and others on AI security.

At the same time, Europe will expand computing capacity and push AI into health, transport, agriculture, manufacturing, defence and space. “Above all, we want AI with human agency,” she said.

Jobs, housing and social rights

The Commission plans a Quality Jobs Act before the end of the year and a European Care Deal, alongside measures tackling housing pressures.

Von der Leyen said technological change must benefit workers, while strongly defending women’s rights and Europe’s social model.

PHOTO  European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the podium Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union

Canada moves closer

One of the biggest surprises came with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in the chamber.

Von der Leyen proposed an “Alliance for the Future” spanning technology, defence, energy, critical minerals, AI and the Arctic — before going further.

“I would like to work with you on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the EU,” she told Carney. “We share one ocean, one set of values, one way of seeing the world.”

Security, defence and Ukraine

With drone incursions, cyberattacks and sabotage raising security concerns inside the EU, von der Leyen proposed a new European security strategy and an Emergency Security Protocol for incidents falling below the threshold of armed aggression.

She also wants to establish a European Security Council and strengthen joint European defence capabilities.

Ukraine faces what von der Leyen called the “toughest winter of the war”. She promised humanitarian and energy support, stronger air defences and deeper defence-industrial cooperation with Kyiv.

Borders, democracy and children online

The Commission will propose an Emergency Response Framework for exceptional migration crises and strengthen Frontex, while launching a Mediterranean Youth Skills and Jobs initiative.

Von der Leyen also announced an EU KIDS ACT, including no social media for under-13s and restrictions for children under 15, followed by a broader Digital Fairness Act.

Political groups draw battle lines

EPP leader Manfred Weber backed the focus on AI, defence and competitiveness but pushed against restrictive climate policies. “Climate change is a reality,” he said, arguing Europe needed “innovation and not bans.”

S&D leader Iratxe García Pérez demanded that von der Leyen turn “words into action”, backing climate investment, housing and worker protections while warning that simplification must not become deregulation.

Renew Europe leader Valérie Hayer made a pointed appeal for the Parliament’s pro-European majority, as the EPP has increasingly worked with parties further to the right on some legislation. “There’s only one possible majority. It’s our pro-European majority,” she said. “We need to do more. We need more Europe, and we need it more quickly.”

Greens/EFA co-chair Terry Reintke accused EU leaders of failing to respond urgently enough to extreme heat and wildfires. “We are in the middle of a climate emergency,” she said, demanding stronger Green Deal implementation while insisting: “We are not powerless. Europe is strong, and Europe can be even stronger.”

ECR co-chair Patryk Jaki struck a sharply different note, attacking the Commission over bureaucracy, energy costs and industrial competitiveness. Europe, he argued, was “as weak as it’s ever been.”

Von der Leyen closed on the central theme running through the speech: European sovereignty in an increasingly hostile world.

“The fate of Europe,” she said, “must remain in the hands of Europeans.”

MEPs give overwhelming backing to a new EU cardiovascular strategy, placing alcohol, food and tobacco policy at the heart of a wider drive to tackle Europe’s biggest killer

The European Parliament has given overwhelming backing to a new EU cardiovascular diseases strategy, with 545 MEPs voting in favour of a report that places prevention at the centre of Europe’s response to its biggest cause of death.

The vote marks a significant political endorsement of a broader approach to cardiovascular health, addressing not only diagnosis and treatment but also the major lifestyle and consumer-related risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease.

Three sectors feature prominently in that debate: alcohol, food and tobacco and nicotine products.

Rather than relying on a single regulatory approach, Parliament’s position points towards a combination of education, consumer information, prevention, proportionate regulation and measures targeted at clearly identified health risks.

Cardiovascular diseases remain the leading cause of mortality in the European Union, accounting for around 1.7 million deaths every year. Around 62 million people are living with cardiovascular disease in the EU, while close to 13 million new cases occur annually.

An estimated 80% of cardiovascular disease, including many cases of heart disease and stroke, is considered preventable.

Those figures have transformed cardiovascular disease from primarily a healthcare issue into a much broader European policy challenge.

The adopted report therefore addresses prevention alongside screening, early detection, treatment and care.

Alcohol: focusing on harmful consumption

Alcohol is one of the major modifiable risk factors identified in cardiovascular prevention.

A central issue in the European debate is how to distinguish between policies aimed at harmful alcohol consumption and measures that treat all drinking patterns in essentially the same way.

That distinction matters in a European Union where national traditions, consumption patterns and regulatory approaches vary considerably.

Measures under discussion include greater public awareness of alcohol-related health risks and better consumer information.

The cardiovascular debate consequently reinforces a wider movement towards giving consumers clearer information about the possible health consequences associated with excessive alcohol consumption.

At the same time, Parliament’s approach leaves room for the principle of proportionality.

The policy challenge is not simply whether alcohol consumption can contribute to cardiovascular risk — the scientific relationship is well established — but which regulatory measures are most effective in reducing harmful consumption without imposing measures that are disproportionate to the objective.

That distinction is likely to remain important as the EU develops its wider strategy on non-communicable diseases.

Food: healthier choices rather than simplistic classifications

Food and nutrition represent another major strand of cardiovascular prevention.

Obesity, excessive salt intake, poor diet and high consumption of certain highly processed foods can all contribute to cardiovascular risk.

That has inevitably placed the food industry at the centre of the debate.

But regulating food is fundamentally different from regulating products whose consumption is inherently associated with health risk.

Individual foods form part of much broader diets, while quantity, frequency of consumption, nutritional composition and lifestyle all influence health outcomes.

The Parliament report therefore places considerable emphasis on enabling Europeans to make better-informed choices.

Public-health education and clearer nutritional information are among the principal tools available.

Front-of-pack food labelling is also part of the wider European discussion over how consumers can be given easily understandable nutritional information.

However, that issue remains politically sensitive.

Any European system must operate across very different national diets and food traditions while avoiding labels that oversimplify nutritional science or inadvertently discourage otherwise balanced eating patterns.

The economic implications are equally significant.

Europe’s food and agricultural sectors are major employers and central components of the Single Market.

Future cardiovascular policy therefore has to reconcile public health, consumer information, agricultural interests, competitiveness and Europe’s diverse food cultures.

Tobacco and nicotine: prevention alongside risk differentiation

The third major area covered by the cardiovascular debate is tobacco and nicotine.

Smoking is a significant preventable contributor to cardiovascular disease, and Parliament’s report supports measures aimed at reducing smoking and preventing young people from beginning to use tobacco and nicotine products.

There is particularly strong emphasis on protecting minors.

The report supports effective enforcement of minimum-age-of-sale requirements and appropriate identification checks whether products are purchased in physical shops or online.

At the same time, Parliament has introduced an important element of differentiation into the debate.

The adopted approach recognises that different nicotine products may have differentiated risk profiles, rather than automatically treating every tobacco and nicotine product as presenting an identical risk.

The supplied policy material also records Parliament’s support for appropriate and differentiated excise taxation between different product categories.  It combines calls for tighter rules with an explicit nod to the idea that regulation need not be one-size-fits-all across the nicotine market.

That distinction could have consequences beyond cardiovascular policy.

The European Commission is already examining the future of the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) and Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD), meaning EP’s approach to differentiated risks is likely to be closely watched as the EU considers regulation of cigarettes, heated tobacco products, electronic cigarettes, nicotine pouches and other products.

But the cardiovascular report simultaneously makes clear that protecting children and young people remains an overarching objective irrespective of the particular product involved.

The question of consistency

The debate will not end with the cardiovascular vote.

Parliament is simultaneously considering other major health-policy files, particularly those associated with Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan (BECA).

That creates an important question of policy consistency.

Alcohol, food and tobacco appear repeatedly in European strategies dealing with non-communicable disease.

Positions adopted in one parliamentary report will inevitably therefore be compared with those adopted in another.

The briefing accompanying the cardiovascular debate already highlights this issue, arguing that potentially contradictory approaches between the cardiovascular and cancer files could create uncertainty about Parliament’s wider regulatory direction.

That discussion is likely to intensify as Parliament and the Commission move from broad public-health strategies towards individual regulatory measures.

For the alcohol, food and tobacco sectors alike, the key question will be whether Europe develops policies that are evidence-based, proportionate and tailored to the particular risks involved, rather than attempting to impose identical regulatory solutions across fundamentally different industries.

After two clear defeats, the TED opinion and the CVD Report, the EC is seeking a comeback through BECA, despite the EP's opposition to extreme prohibitionist measures. With EP’S SANT Committee vote due on 28 September, BECA is rapidly becoming the next political battleground.

Prevention becomes mainstream EU policy

Cardiovascular disease imposes immense human and economic costs on Europe through premature deaths, long-term illness, disability, hospital treatment and lost productivity.

Reducing that burden will require healthcare systems to diagnose and treat disease earlier.

But Parliament’s vote also sends a wider message.

Improving cardiovascular health will require action long before people reach hospitals or doctors’ surgeries.

The debate over alcohol, food and tobacco is therefore part of a much larger European question: how public authorities can help citizens reduce preventable health risks while preserving proportionality, informed consumer choice and regulatory coherence.

Kazakhstan is developing Alatau City near Almaty as a new regional centre for manufacturing, logistics, technology and finance. Its investment pipeline has expanded to 67 projects worth nearly $6.9 billion, with the potential to create around 55,000 jobs. Projects involving PepsiCo, Sunny Paper, Mars Petcare KZ and several logistics companies are already at different stages of implementation. The project is supported by a special legal regime, but experts say its long-term success will depend on sustained investment, effective governance and the development of a competitive economic ecosystem.

https://astanatimes.com/2026/09/alatau-city-can-kazakhstan-build-regional-economic-hub-from-scratch

Between the first and the second quarter of 2026, 3.1 million unemployed persons aged 15-74 in the EU moved into employment, representing 23.2% of all unemployed in the first quarter of 2026. During this period, 7.0 million (52.8%) remained unemployed and 3.2 million (24.0%) moved out of the labour force.

These figures are taken from recently published data on labour market flows in the second quarter of 2026. The article presents a handful of findings from the more detailed Statistics Explained article on labour market flows.

Click to enlarge

Source dataset: lfsi_long_q

The visual and the table give an overview of all changes in labour market status. In the visual, the figures for employment, unemployment and out of the labour force refer to the number of people remaining in each status between the 2 quarters, while the arrows indicate the number of people moving from one status to another.

Click to enlarge

Source dataset: lfsi_long_q

Of all people in employment in the first quarter of 2026, 2.5 million (1.2%) became unemployed in the second quarter of 2026, and 4.8 million (2.3%) moved out of the labour force.

Of all people recorded as out of the labour force in the first quarter of 2026, 4.2 million (3.7%) entered employment in the second quarter of 2026 and 3.9 million (3.4%) became unemployed.

For more information

• Statistics Explained article on labour market flow statistics in the EU
• Thematic section on employment and unemployment (LFS)
• Database on the employment and unemployment (LFS)
• Metadata on labour market transitions

Methodological notes

• The labour market flows published from 2021 onwards are based on the EU Labour force survey (EU-LFS) carried out under Regulation (EU) 2019/1700 on European statistics relating to persons and households, using individual-level data collected from samples. Further information on the Regulation is available in the Statistics Explained article.
• The figures are based on seasonally adjusted data.

13.7% of the people in the EU aged 25 to 64 state having received formal or non-formal education and training in the last 4 weeks in 2025, rising from 10.1% in 2015. This growth has been steady, except for a temporary decline in 2020, likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related contingency measures.

Among EU countries, Sweden (38.2%), Denmark (31.0%) and Finland (28.1%) had the highest shares of adult learning in 2025. In contrast, Greece (5.2%), Bulgaria (6.1%) and Croatia (6.5%) recorded the lowest shares. 

Compared with 2015, adult learning grew in almost all EU countries, most notably in Malta (+12.3 percentage points (pp)), Estonia (+11.9 pp), Belgium (+11.1 pp), and Slovenia (10.9 pp). The only exceptions were France (-3.1 pp), Luxembourg (-0.6 pp), and Denmark (-0.5 pp). 

Click to enlarge

Source dataset: sdg_04_60

In 2025, the share of adults participating in education and training was 2.5 pp higher among women than among men (14.9% compared with 12.4%, respectively). Women’s participation rate also increased faster, rising by 4.0 pp between 2015 and 2025, compared with 3.2 pp for men.

Participation in adult learning also differs by degree of urbanization. Adults living in cities were more likely to participate in learning (16.8%) than those living in towns and suburbs (12.3%) or rural areas (10.3%).

SDG 4 – quality education

Tertiary educational attainment is one of the indicators used to monitor the Sustainable development goal (SDG) 4 – quality education. SDG 4 seeks to ensure access to quality education for all at all stages of life, as well as to increase the number of young people and adults who have the relevant skills for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship. Monitoring SDG 4 in an EU context focuses on basic education, tertiary education, adult learning and digital skills.

For more information

• Publications on the sustainable development goals
• Database on sustainable development goals
• Visualization tool SDG EU progress tracker
• Visualization tool SDGs & me
• Visualization tool SDG country overview
• UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Methodological note

Adult participation in learning measures the share of people aged 25 to 64 who stated they received formal or non-formal education and training in the 4 weeks before the survey, which was carried out to monitor it. For definitions of formal and non-formal education and training, see the reference metadata. Data stem from the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS).

In 2025, the EU rail freight transport performance fell by 1.8%, declining from 375.1 billion tonne-kilometres (tkm) in 2024 to 368.2 tkm, and marking the fourth consecutive year of decline. 

Germany remained by far the largest contributor to rail freight transport performance in the EU, with one third of the EU total (33.5%; 123.5 billion tkm). Poland was the second-largest contributor (14.7% of the EU total; 54.3 billion tkm), followed by France (9.3%; 34.4 billion tkm).

This information comes from data on railway freight transport published by Eurostat on 14 September. The article presents a handful of findings from the more detailed Statistics Explained article on railway freight transport. 

Compared with 2024, rail freight transport performance measured in tonne-kilometres decreased in 16 EU countries, while 8 countries recorded an increase. The largest decreases were recorded in Ireland (-35.2%), Latvia (-18.8%) and Estonia (-17.3%). By contrast, the highest increases were recorded in Greece (+9.3%), Portugal (+8.4%) and France (+6.6%). 

Click to enlarge

 Source dataset: rail_go_typepas

Freight per capita: from 0.03 tonnes in Ireland to 10.7 in Luxembourg

Relative to the country’s population, the volume of rail freight transported per capita was highest in Luxembourg (10.7 tonnes), Austria (10.5) and Lithuania (8.5). The lowest rates were observed for Ireland (0.03 tonnes per capita), Greece (0.06) and Spain (0.5).

Click to enlarge

 Source datasets: rail_go_typepas and demo_gind

For more information

• Statistics Explained article on railway freight transport
• Thematic section on transport
• Database on transport 
• Webinar on transport statistics
• Podcast episode on glossary for transport statistics
• Key figures on European transport – 2025 edition

Methodological notes

• The data presented in this article include only main railway undertakings. In order to meet the main undertaking threshold, the railway undertaking must achieve a total volume of goods of at least 200 million tonne-kilometres or at least 500 000 tonnes of total weight.
• There are no railways in Cyprus and Malta. 

In 2025, young people in the EU left their parents’ home at an average age of 26.3 years, up slightly from 26.2 years in 2024. 

Since 2002, this average age stayed close to 26 years.

The highest average ages for leaving the parental home, at 30 years or above, were recorded in Croatia (31.5 years), Greece and Slovakia (both 30.9), and Spain and Italy (both 30.2). By contrast, the lowest average ages were registered in Finland (21.4 years), Denmark (21.8) and Estonia and Lithuania (both 22.7). 

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/d/products-eurostat-news/age

Source dataset: yth_demo_030

In 2025, the employment rate in the EU among young people aged 20-29 years was 65.5%. 

In most countries where the age at which young people leave the parental home is below the EU average, the employment rate for 20-29-year-olds is above EU average.

For example, in countries where young people tend to leave the parental home sooner, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Sweden the employment rate for young people tends to be higher.

In countries where young people leave the parental home later, such as Greece, Croatia, Spain and Italy, the employment rate was lower than the EU average.

Click to enlarge

Source dataset: lfsa_ergaed

For more information

• Thematic section on children and youth
• Database on children and youth
• Thematic section on employment and unemployment
• Visualization tool on young Europeans

Methodological notes

The average age at which young people leave the parental home is an approximate measure based on whether respondents of the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and their parents live in the same household. The calculation covers each single year of age from 15 to 34. It takes into account, separately for male and female categories, the share of respondents living in households without their parents in the total population. An ‘exit probability’ for each single year of age from 15 to 34 is calculated for the total, male and female populations. The indicator shows the age at which 50% of the population no longer live in a household with their parent(s). 

Centre right MEPs say they want the EU to give itself the tools and resources to protect European democracies from foreign interference, disinformation and hybrid threats.

The assertion comes just ahead of a parliamentary vote on the EU Parliament’s recommendations on the issue.

EPP MEP Tomas Tobé, speaking on Tuesday, has called for a Democracy Shield “with the power to act.”

The deputy, the Parliament’s negotiator on the European Democracy Shield dossier, stated, "Protecting democracy from foreign interference must be a European priority.

“We must respond with greater determination and reinforce the European Democracy Shield. 

"Russia remains the most serious threat to the integrity of our democracies. 

"Its continued attempts to influence elections and manipulate the information space show that the Kremlin sees democratic resilience as a threat to its own interests," says Tobé MEP, EPP Group Vice-Chair.

The EPP Group said it wants the Democracy Shield “to be more than just a name.”

A spokesman said, “Europe needs stronger coordination and real operational capacity to protect elections, defend democratic institutions and counter foreign interference.

“The European Centre for Democratic Resilience must have the powers and resources to respond effectively to threats.”

Tobé added, "With this report, the European Parliament sends a clear message: we will not be passive while our democracies are under threat.

“We must now turn the European Democracy Shield into effective action to protect our elections, defend our institutions and counter foreign interference," said Tobé. 

Meanwhile, the European Parliament will this week also debate the devastating impact of this summer’s extreme weather.

The focus will be on the human and economic cost which MEPs say “is impossible to ignore.”

Extreme heat has resulted in at least 35,000 excess deaths across Europe and up to €180 billion in lost GDP.

The Socialist group, in a statement on Tuesday, said, “Europe has a choice.

“We can continue to react to each disaster separately, send firefighters when the flames are already spreading, repair the damage afterwards and hope that next summer will be less severe. Or we can prepare for the Europe we know is coming. This summer has made clear that the climate crisis is no longer a future risk.”

Further comment comes from Christophe Clergeau, S&D vice-president, who said he will call for a “healthy planet, healthy people and a sustainable food ecosystem.”

He said: "Europe is paying a devastating price for extreme heat.

“Tens of thousands of people have lost their lives, while extreme weather has caused enormous economic damage. We cannot treat this as the new normal.

“Every fraction of a degree of additional warming means more frequent and severe heatwaves, wildfires, floods and droughts. That is why mitigation, adaptation and protection must be treated as the same fight. 

"We need to phase out fossil fuels, which are driving the climate crisis, while investing much more in identifying and reducing vulnerabilities, adapting our cities and regions, and protecting people from extreme heat and drought.”

The MEP went on, “Our first priority must be protecting those most vulnerable. Cities and regions are on the front line and need stronger support to prepare for and manage crises, while populations must also be better informed and prepared. We must ensure that firefighters and civil protection services have the equipment and resources they need, and support the recovery and repair of territories devastated by fires and other disasters. Civic engagement and volunteers also have a vital role to play in prevention, preparedness and response.

"Europe must also build the industrial capacity needed to protect its citizens. We should produce Canadairs and other firefighting aircraft in Europe, develop a European plan to support the equipment needs of firefighters, and establish a clear R&D roadmap for civil protection technologies. And we need to do much more to prevent wildfires in the first place. When our forests are increasingly exposed to heat, drought and fires, the rejection of a European forest monitoring law by the right and the far right last year was a serious mistake. We need better information and better prevention, not fewer tools to protect our forests and citizens.

"This vote on the forest monitoring law is part of a wider pattern. While the climate crisis is becoming more dangerous, the right and far right keep attacking the Green Deal and downplaying the need for climate action.”

The deputy continued, “Yet there is no fair society if people are left exposed to devastating heat, no competitive economy without decarbonisation, and no energy sovereignty while we remain dependent on imported fossil fuels.”

"The Union Civil Protection Mechanism alone is not enough: its budget is insufficient given the scale of the risks we face. We need an ambitious European adaptation and resilience package focused on anticipation, preparedness and protection. Europe must strengthen the Green Deal and invest in prevention and recovery, rather than give in to climate denial and political obstruction,” added Clergeau.

Ahead of National Curry Week in the UK (5-11 October) MPs are being urged to revive the Parliamentary Tiffin Cup. 

The Tiffin Cup was an annual competition where MPs (advised by their constituents) nominated the Best South Asian Restaurant in their area.

One restaurant from every region was then shortlisted and invited to participate in the Grand Final cook-off event held in the House of Commons in London, and judged by MPs and guest celebrities, with the proceeds going to charity.

The Tiffin Cup was last won in 2019 by Kuti’s Restaurant in Southampton, where former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak says he worked shifts “just for fun” as a student.

The competition was created by a group of MPs with Keith Vaz as its chairman to celebrate quality South Asian food. The trophy was usually presented by the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Demands for its return are led by George Shaw, editor of the respected Good Curry Guide.

He told this site “These are challenging times for the hospitality sector, with both restaurants and customers being hard hit by rising costs.  The Tiffin Cup will help to promote what is a vital part of our economy. 

“Most curry houses are small independent businesses – not a ubiquitous chain which sucks cash away from the local area, funnelling profits to a corporate headquarters many miles away, or to an offshore bank account.

“Curry is a firmly established part of British history and culture. 

“Queen Elizabeth I granted the first charter in 1600 allowing London merchants to trade with the “East Indies”, hoping to break the Dutch monopoly on the spice trade.”

The earliest surviving curry recipe in English was published in 1747.

The first Indian restaurant in London, the Hindoostane Coffee House, was opened in 1810 by Sake Dean Mahomed, a former captain in the British East India Company.

He went on to become ‘personal shampooing surgeon’ to George IV and William IV.

British appetites for spice became entrenched during the British colonial era in India, from 1600 to 1947.

Queen Victoria, ‘Empress of India’ was introduced to Indian cuisine by her ‘Munshi’, Abdul Karim. 

Thereafter she ate curry every day, with great relish and in considerable quantities, until the end of her life, 25 years later.

The ritual of enjoying a refreshing lager with Indian food was introduced by Prince Axel of Denmark. 

The Prince attended the British Empire Exhibition in 1924. 

During his visit he discovered the cuisine of Veeraswamy (London’s first high end Indian restaurant and still in existence), which ran a “pop-up” at the Exhibition.  

The Prince brought a barrel of Carlsberg with him and continued to send one each Christmas.

Shaw is urging restaurant curry fans to write to their MPs asking them to reestablish the Tiffin Cup competition as an annual fixture in Parliament, with their own nominations.

Spice lovers can find the email address of their MP via https://www.mysociety.org/wehelpyou/who-is-your-mp

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu presents Fair Labour Mobility package © European Union

The European Commission has unveiled what it calls an ambitious “Fair Labour Mobility” package aimed at making it easier for people to work across EU borders while strengthening protections against exploitation and fraud.

The proposals would allow workers to prove social security and health insurance entitlements digitally and make qualifications easier to understand and recognize. The Commission estimates the measures could generate €6 billion in benefits by 2040.

Central to the package is a European Social Security Pass, or ESSPASS, enabling people to request and receive documents such as the European Health Insurance Card and the A1 certificate for posted workers online. Documents could be stored in the EU Digital Identity Wallet and verified by national authorities.

Brussels is also proposing faster recognition of professional qualifications. Procedures for regulated professions, including doctors and nurses, with the aim of reducing the target processing time from three months to five weeks.

Recognition of qualifications obtained outside the EU would also be streamlined, with common standards intended to cut average processing times from 14 months to four months.

The European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) has welcomed the Commission’s plans for recognising qualifications from outside the EU, arguing that they bring greater transparency to a labour market already heavily reliant on internationally recruited healthcare professionals.

EFN Secretary General Paul De Raeve said recruitment from third countries was already well established and frequently organised through bilateral arrangements between governments. Denmark, he noted, has gone considerably further, establishing a school in Delhi to prepare Indian nurses for work in Denmark, including Danish-language training.

“This is going on,” De Raeve said, arguing that international mobility cannot simply be prevented when European health systems need staff and qualified professionals want to move. In the short term, he said, overseas recruitment is also difficult to avoid given that educating a nurse takes around four years.

For De Raeve, an important improvement in the Commission proposal is therefore not simply facilitating recruitment, but putting it within a clearer European framework. The proposed directive would establish common rules for recognising qualifications obtained outside the EU, including aligned documentation requirements.

It would also provide stronger mechanisms for checking whether qualifications are genuine and meet European standards. Training programmes and institutions seeking access to automatic recognition would undergo EU-level assessment, potentially including independent review, site visits and direct examination of training environments.

De Raeve particularly welcomed this approach, pointing to the risks of fraud in diploma accreditation. Having universities and training institutions formally assessed and certified would give regulators and employers greater confidence that somebody arriving with a qualification has been trained by a legitimate institution to an appropriate standard.

He also welcomed plans to reduce administrative delays for individual professionals.

For nursing, De Raeve argued, faster recognition and stronger verification could help Europe recruit internationally without lowering professional standards, while replacing opaque bilateral arrangements with more consistent EU-level rules.

The proposals still require approval by the European Parliament and EU governments. Key measures would then be phased in over several years, with improvements to the Labour Authority expected during 2028–2030.

The reported detention of Somali soldiers in Ethiopia's Somali Region has drawn attention to a Saudi-backed military training programme in central Somalia and raised the question of whether the initiative is intended solely to rebuild Somalia's national army or could serve a wider regional purpose, writes Mohsin Osman.

Somali authorities have confirmed that troops trained at the Xananbuure camp in Galmudug crossed into Ethiopia. Somalia's National Security Adviser, Aways Haji Yusuf, said on 1 September that the soldiers had permission to visit their families, that the federal government knew they were in Ethiopia's Somali region, and that they took the route through Ethiopia to avoid insecure areas inside Somalia. He added that any further developments would be shared with the media.

That explanation has not settled the number of soldiers involved, the circumstances of their detention or the wider purpose of a foreign-funded programme that has trained thousands of Somali recruits with the help of foreign instructors. Regional outlets have also linked the programme to allegations that Saudi Arabia is supporting recruitment for Sudan's war, with indications that it was designed to supply fighters to the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The crossing and the detention

The incident emerged in late August, when reports placed newly trained Somali soldiers in the custody of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State. Garowe Online reported that some accounts described the men, numbering about 300, were detained and transferred to Jijiga, the regional capital. Sunatimes, citing Somali intelligence sources, pegged the number at 316 but said it had not confirmed that number with Ethiopian authorities.

The soldiers who were said to be travelling in a convoy of hired vehicles were reportedly intercepted and held by regional police. The reports say the detained soldiers had been recruited from Ethiopia's Somali Regional State before joining the Somali federal programme, which Yusuf's statement did not address. Neither Addis Ababa nor the Somali regional government has given a public reason for the detention, according to WardheerNews.

The Saudi-backed military programme in Somalia

The soldiers belong to a class of roughly 3,000 who graduated from Xananbuure, in the Galgaduud region of Galmudug, on 16 August after nearly a year of training. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presided over the ceremony, which The Defense Post described as the largest cohort trained inside Somalia since the collapse of the central government in 1991, with Saudi military representatives in attendance and instructors from Ukraine, Romania and Sudan delivering the course.

The programme follows a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation that Somalia's Defence Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, signed with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh on 9 February 2026. Somalia's Ministry of Defence said the agreement covered multiple areas of common interest, and neither government released further details, Al Jazeera reported. Horn Review reported that the initiative aims to train up to 5,000 recruits over nine months, and July reports placed enrolment at 5,107 across two camps in the Guri El area, including about 2,000 recruits from Puntland.

While Saudi Arabia financed the military training programme under the February agreement, there is no evidence that Saudi officials control the recruits' deployment or decide where they serve.

How Sudan entered the story

The Sudan allegation comes from a separate set of reports, not from anything established about the soldiers held in Ethiopia.

Kenya's Standard reported on 24 July that Saudi Arabia was overseeing a programme in Galguduud involving more than 5,000 Somali recruits, run by contractors from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia, and that recruits were being prepared for later deployment alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces. The report described the Somali programmes as Saudi-funded and had raised the possibility that some trainees would be sent to Sudan's battlefronts. Ethio Negari also made the same claims three days earlier. However, none of the parties named had commented.

The presence of Sudanese instructors at Xananbuure presents the strongest documented link between the camp and Sudan, although it predates the Saudi agreement. Geeska reported in February, citing Africa Intelligence, that a team of Sudanese military personnel had trained roughly 1,000 recruits in Galmudug over the preceding months without public announcement, under the oversight of Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency.

The Jijiga case also sits alongside a distinct allegation from Ethiopia's north. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told the House of Peoples' Representatives on 7 July that young people from Tigray, including minors, were being forcibly recruited and smuggled to fight in Sudan's war, and that they were dying in a conflict they neither understood nor had any connection to, according to Addis Standard and other outlets that covered the session. The Tigray People's Liberation Front rejected the substance of his remarks days later, according to a situation report by Europe External Programme with Africa.

A new report titled “The Hidden Cost of EU Regulation: Why Policy Design Matters for Growth, Competitiveness, and Investment,” published on 14 September, estimates that EU regulations could reduce GDP by €159 billion per year and threaten 419,000 jobs between 2026 and 2030.

Published by the European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC), the report examines the “hidden” costs of European policies. These include not only bureaucratic burdens but also regulatory uncertainty, poorly planned transitions, and overlapping obligations. According to the report, these factors can slow investment, limit innovation, and ultimately undermine the policies’ intended goals.

Europe risks imposing substantial economic costs on itself if a new generation of EU regulation is introduced without greater attention to competitiveness, proportionality and the cumulative burden on businesses, according to a new study from the Brussels-based European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC).

The report, estimates that five major areas of regulation currently facing European policymakers could, under its more restrictive scenarios, be associated with €159 billion in foregone EU GDP each year between 2026 and 2030.

It estimates an accompanying annual investment shortfall of approximately €36 billion, with around 419,000 jobs potentially at risk.

But the report's central argument is not that regulation itself is economically damaging. Rather, it contends that poorly sequenced, insufficiently differentiated or unpredictable regulation can impose costs which more carefully designed policies could avoid.

EPIC calculates that what it calls a "better regulation" approach could make a difference of approximately €125 billion in GDP each year, while supporting around €28 billion more annual investment and improving the projected employment outcome by some 241,000 jobs.

The analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the EU, where improving competitiveness has moved rapidly up the political agenda following Mario Draghi's landmark report on the future of European competitiveness.

EPIC examined artificial intelligence regulation, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, biotechnology and novel food, and the forthcoming revision of the EU's Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).

TPD emerges as the largest potential shock

The study identifies the TPD revision as potentially the biggest avoidable economic shock, but says smarter regulation could protect growth, investment and public health

EPIC estimates that a highly restrictive approach to the forthcoming TPD revision could be associated with an annual GDP loss of approximately €48 billion, including around €24 billion in lost tax revenues.

The same scenario would put roughly 120,000 jobs at risk and produce an estimated annual investment shortfall of about €11 billion.

By contrast, under EPIC's alternative scenario — based on a more differentiated regulatory treatment of products according to risk and greater emphasis on maintaining legal-market innovation — the organisation calculates an annual GDP gain of €32 billion.

The difference between the two regulatory approaches is therefore almost €80 billion in GDP each year, according to the modelling, alongside an improvement of more than 182,000 jobs and approximately €18 billion in investment.

These are significant numbers, but they require an important qualification.

They are scenario-based projections rather than forecasts of losses which have already occurred or inevitably will occur. EPIC itself stresses that its prospective figures are estimates based on alternative regulatory assumptions and should not be interpreted as guaranteed outcomes.

In the tobacco case in particular, the restrictive scenario assumes a major relocation of manufacturing outside the EU, with only part of wholesale and retail activity retained and some demand migrating into illicit channels. That is a substantial modelling assumption and is central to the scale of the estimated economic impact.

Nevertheless, the study raises a broader policy question which Brussels may find harder to dismiss: whether the economic consequences of the next TPD are being examined with the same intensity as its health objectives.

From COP11 to the next TPD

EPIC bases part of its TPD scenario on measures discussed in connection with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's COP11, held in 2025.

The report identifies proposals including flavour restrictions across tobacco and nicotine products, tighter sanctions, additional restrictions affecting newer nicotine and heated tobacco products and possible limitations on particular product components, including filters.

That debate exposed significant disagreements among EU member states.

According to the report, countries including Italy, Greece, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Czechia raised concerns about applying broadly similar restrictions to combustible cigarettes and alternative nicotine products despite differences between product categories.

Those disagreements became sufficiently pronounced that the EU was unable to maintain a common position during important parts of COP11, according to the EPIC analysis.

The significance for Brussels is that decisions taken at an FCTC Conference of the Parties do not automatically become EU law.

However, EPIC argues that COP priorities have historically influenced European tobacco policy and could feed into the Commission's forthcoming revision of the TPD.

The report points in particular to EU-funded tobacco-control initiatives which incorporate FCTC and COP priorities into their work and to a 2025 Council working document which raised a possible cigarette-filter ban.

EPIC therefore warns against what it sees as the potential importation of an international tobacco-control agenda into EU legislation without first undertaking sufficiently detailed economic, enforcement and proportionality assessments.

The illicit-market question

Another significant element in the study is illicit trade.

EPIC argues that restrictions which significantly reduce the availability of products for which consumer demand continues to exist can transfer trade away from regulated businesses rather than eliminate consumption.

The EC and EU agencies are simultaneously attempting to combat illegal tobacco and nicotine markets, yet, according to EPIC, some regulatory measures could make illegal supply comparatively more attractive.

According to the report, younger consumers are not necessarily insulated from such markets merely because products disappear from legal retail channels, pointing to concerns surrounding illicit e-cigarette distribution and sales through social media.

This is an issue with implications beyond the tobacco industry. Lost legal sales can mean lost VAT and excise revenues, while enforcement costs increase and legitimate retailers face competition from operators which pay neither tax nor compliance costs.

Not an argument for deregulation

Importantly, EPIC does not present its report as a case for abandoning European health, environmental or consumer-protection objectives. Instead, it advocates what it describes as "Stability-by-Design".

The principle is relatively straightforward: policymakers should analyse economic effects, implementation capacity and differences between sectors and technologies before regulatory choices become politically fixed.

It calls for predictable rules, earlier stakeholder involvement, differentiated regulation where risks differ and implementation schedules which take account of infrastructure, supply chains and enforcement capabilities.

It also argues that regulations should increasingly be assessed collectively rather than individually.

Businesses do not experience the TPD, taxation measures, packaging requirements, environmental legislation and other compliance obligations separately. They experience their accumulated cost simultaneously.

For tobacco, this is particularly relevant because the TPD revision is taking place against the backdrop of parallel debates over tobacco excise taxation, packaging and sustainability rules.

The combined economic impact could therefore be greater than examining each initiative separately would suggest.

For the next regulatory wave, it calculates annual GDP impacts of around €48 billion from its restrictive TPD scenario, €24 billion from the AI framework, €42 billion from packaging regulation, €44 billion from CBAM and €1.6 billion from slower biotechnology and novel-food approvals.

The figures will inevitably be debated, particularly because economic models depend heavily on the assumptions placed into them.

But the policy issue raised by the report is harder to reduce to a dispute over individual numbers.

At a time when European leaders are repeatedly warning that the Union must close its productivity and investment gap with the US and China, EPIC is effectively asking whether Brussels subjects the economic consequences of regulation to the same level of scrutiny as the objectives regulation is intended to achieve.

The third edition of EU TalentOn closed with the announcement of its winning teams on 11 September in Brest, France. Over five days, 100 early-career researchers aged 21 to 35 of 43 different nationalities, worked in teams to develop concrete responses to some of Europe's most pressing challenges, based on the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe.

The participants competed for a share of an €80,000 prize pool. First and second prizes were awarded in each of the five categories, alongside an Alumni Prize, a Special Jury Prize and the overall Grand Jury Prize.

The teams winning the 1^st prize were:

• Adaptation to climate change: Alejandro Roman, Marie Johanna Univer, Edoardo Kimani Bellotto and Florin Miron won with IMPRREST - from big data to decisions, a tool that gives responders one verified assessment of climate emergencies and evidence for adaptation.
• Cancer: Xhilda Dhamo, Oliwia Kosecka and Jafar Gura won with CogniVoice - a patient centered speech monitoring platform for post-treatment surveillance of Brain Cancer.
• Restore our Ocean and Waters Mission: Gabriel Tejero, Siddhanth Shishodia, Dominika Czekanowska and Gjylije Hoti won with Mission PFASSible – a solution that helps with pollution removal into verified risk reduction: sensing, capturing, concentrating, and proving water safety. 
• Climate-neutral and smart cities: Lucia Petronio, Samar Momin, Samira Huber and Imen Kaabachi won with Block2City - turning building data into renovation choices, funding guidance and expert handoff, while helping cities map local demand.
• Soil: Natasha Waris, Ilaria Bertolini, Felipe Quiroz, and Victoria Boycheva, won with RhizoSentinel – a solution that turns plants into living soil biosensors that reveal hidden soil biological threats before they cause crop losses, enabling earlier intervention and smarter soil management.
• The Grand Jury Prize of €12,000 for the best overall project went to RhizoSentinel, while the Special Jury Prize of €3,000 was awarded to Marion Le Meur, Narjes Yazdi, Suresh Ajmeera, and Alberto Galindo Caballero with their project Colospy - a rapid, saliva-based molecular test detecting colorectal-cancer-miRNA signature, designed as a stool-free screening option.

The projects were assessed by a jury of experts from academia, business and government on both scientific merit and market potential – the ability to become real innovations that would contribute to Europe's competitiveness.

Startups, Research and Innovation Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva (pictured) said:

“Congratulations to the winners of EU TalentOn 2026. The solutions you have put forward show what European talent can achieve when it is given room to think differently. Results like these underline that Europe's most important asset are its brightest minds.”

Background

EU TalentOn brings together early-career researchers to develop solutions to major societal challenges linked to the five EU Missions under Horizon Europe. By bringing science closer to citizens and building new connections between science and society in open, playful and engaging ways, it supports the objectives of the ERA Policy Agenda. 

EU TalentOn is a flagship event of Science Comes to Town, the Commission's year-long initiative bringing research and innovation closer to citizens across three host cities in 2026: Kiel (Germany), Brest (France) and Split (Croatia). With over more than 1,000 activities and with more than 70 partners, Science Comes to Town 2026 is connecting scientific institutions, innovation ecosystems and the public throughout the year.

The programme continues later this month, when Kiel hosts the 36th EU Contest for Young Scientists (EUCYS 2026) from 22 to 27 September, before Science Comes to Town 2026 draws to a close with a joint Closing Event and Ceremony on 14–16 December.

Science Comes to Town will return for a second edition in 2027, hosted by four new cities: Aarhus (Denmark), Genoa (Italy), Kaunas (Lithuania) and Oeiras (Portugal). EU TalentOn 2027 will be held in Kaunas, while EUCYS 2027 will take place in Genoa.

Women accounted for 54% of participants in the 2026 edition, reflecting the growing contribution of female talent to Europe’s research and innovation landscape.

More information

• EU TalentOn 2026
• Science Comes to Town

Towns and cities from around the Arctic took part in the launch of an EU-funded Arctic co-operation initiative that will enable more municipal leaders, Indigenous representatives and youth to work together.

The European Union has launched a new initiative gathering 21 towns and cities from across the Arctic to work together on shared priorities. BRIDGE, Building Resilient International Dialogue and Governance for Arctic Engagement, is led by the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF), building on the foundations of the Arctic Regional and Urban Cooperation network (AURC).    

“At a time of ever-increasing environmental and geopolitical change, cooperation among Arctic communities is more important than ever,” said Peter M. Wagner, Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, speaking at the EU Arctic Forum 2026 in Brussels. “We are proud to launch a new phase of EU support to Arctic cities forging connections across borders, building local capacity, and delivering tangible benefits for their residents.” 

“A safe, resilient and inclusive Arctic isn't a side interest for the EU, it's a shared project,” said Patti Bruns, AMF Secretary General. “I’m excited about our work over the next four years, bringing together communities from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland to strengthen cooperation between local governments who face increasing challenges – and opportunities.”

More cities co-operating in a permanent structure

BRIDGE integrates AURC’s approaches and methods into AMF’s permanent structure, extending the cooperation to more Arctic mayors and urban practitioners. 

Despite variations in size and governance structures, Arctic communities share a surprising range of challenges. Building on AURC achievements, these cities are now identifying common themes for the next four years of peer learning, exchanges, study visits, and collaborative problem-solving.

AURC sparked positive changes in Arctic communities 

In 2024, AURC gathered 15 Arctic local authorities from Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Alaska in the United States for the first time to work together on sustainable development. After two years of structured cooperation with expert support, positive local results were already visible. 

“Whether it was learning from Tromsø’s approach to community hubs or troubleshooting heavy equipment with our Canadian neighbours, AURC provided us with a roadmap for growth,” says Assisaun Toovak, Mayor of Utqiaġvik, the northernmost town in the United States. “We aren’t just a remote town in Alaska: we’re a key player in a global Arctic community.”

From new international welcome houses and services in Rovaniemi (Finland), Gällivare and Luleå (Sweden) and Tromsø (Norway) to plans for a new Youth Commission in Fairbanks North Star Borough (USA) inspired by peers in Sweden, Norway, Iceland and elsewhere, AURC sparked an array of positive local changes across the Arctic. These span citizen engagement and youth participation; attracting and retaining talent; sustainable tourism; culture and inclusive economic development; and resilience and emergency preparedness.

Arctic connections supporting resilience and sustainability

Beyond these tangible changes on the ground, trusted exchanges between mayors and staff of Arctic local authorities are boosting knowledge, capacity to adapt, and new initiatives. So far, these include cross-border cultural exchanges, focused workshops for sustainable Arctic tourism professionals, and best-practice sharing on wildfire preparedness. 

Another major result is a new Interreg Aurora project TALENT NORTH, Attracting and Anchoring Global Talent in the Arctic, developed by the Arctic Six universities alliance and AMF, along with administrations and universities of several Arctic cities.

Erkki Parkkinen, Mayor of Salla, Lapland (Finland), said: “It was the best thing for Salla to join AURC: I can now exchange good practices with friends across the Arctic. It’s very important for our municipalities to stay in touch with each other, for the future of the Arctic, for resilience.”

Read more about positive changes EU-funded cooperation has sparked in Arctic towns and cities. 

BRIDGE is funded by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), working closely with the European External Action Service, the diplomatic wing of the EU, and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE).

Arctic Mayors’ Forum is pan-Arctic forum representing the voices of Arctic Peoples through elected leaders at the municipal and community level. They provide an open, collaborative platform for their members, including Indigenous Peoples from around the Arctic.

The European Commission has approved a €52 million (RON 277 million) Romanian state aid scheme for cattle farmers facing increased fuel and fertiliser prices due to the Middle East crisis.

The scheme was approved under the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF) adopted by the Commission on 29 April 2026.

The Romanian scheme

Romania notified to the Commission a €52 million scheme to support companies active in the cattle farming sector. The scheme, which will run until 31 December 2026, aims to mitigate the impact of the increase in agricultural fuel and fertiliser prices.

The aid will take the form of direct grants, with a maximum of €50,000 per company.

The Commission assessed the scheme under EU state aid rules, in particular Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which enables member states to support the development of certain economic activities subject to certain conditions, as well as Sections 1 and 2.1 of the METSAF.

The Commission found that the scheme is in line with the conditions set out in the METSAF. In particular, the aid will be granted based on a scheme with a clear estimated budget and will be provided to temporarily support the development of companies active in the primary production of agricultural products. The Commission concluded that the scheme is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to facilitate the development of an economic activity and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

On this basis, the Commission approved the Romanian scheme under EU State aid rules.

Background

On 29 April 2026, the Commission adopted the METSAF to enable member states to support the EU economy in the context of the Middle East crisis. The METSAF is a targeted and temporary framework to address the effects of the crisis on some of the most exposed sectors of the economy: agriculture, fishery, transport and energy-intensive industries. The METSAF will be in place until 31 December 2026. During its period of application, the Commission will keep the content, scope and duration of the framework under review in the light of developments in the Middle East and of the general economic situation.

While the transition towards a clean economy remains the long-term solution to shield EU companies from the effects of global energy shocks, the METSAF allows Member States to act immediately to make sure that the growth of the most exposed companies is not irreparably hampered by the current crisis.

To this end, support can take various forms for companies active in the agriculture, fishery and transport sectors. This includes aid based on actual consumption to cover part of the price increases for fuel or fertilisers, and a simplified approach for small amounts of aid.

The METSAF also includes a temporary adjustment to the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework allowing for further flexibility and higher aid intensities to address electricity price spikes.

More information on the METSAF can be found online.

For more information

The non-confidential versions of today's decisions will be made available under case number SA.124647, in the state aid register on the Commission's competition website. New publications of state aid decisions on the internet and in the Official Journal are listed in the Competition Weekly e-News.

Related topics

Competition

State aid

Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.

The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk.  But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.

Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.

The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.

From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.

KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.

Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.

Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.

This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new.  The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.

Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore  mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”

The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.

Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”

The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.

The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.

The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence. 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.

De Facto territorial division

The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.

Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:

• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.

• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.

More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.

The PUK–New Generation coalition

The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.

Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.

Socioeconomic fallout

With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:

• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.

• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.

• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.

Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations

The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:

1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.

2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.

3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.

Why this matters to Europe

The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.

Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.

The future of a protected wetland in Albania might seem like a local issue. In reality, it is becoming a test of the European Union's credibility, writes Besjana Guri, Albanian Environmental Activist and Founder and Director of Lumi. 

For [over] 100 days, I and thousands of citizens have been protesting unlawful developments in Vjosa-Narta, one of Albania's most important protected landscapes, at a moment when Albania is widely regarded as one of the frontrunners for EU accession.

At these protests, I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with citizens of all walks of life: scientists, artists, students, local communities, environmental activists and public figures. What might once have been seen as a local conservation issue has become a national conversation about whether safeguards for protected areas will actually be enforced, and whether environmental safeguards mean anything when powerful development interests are involved.

The EU enlargement process works because candidate countries know that membership is earned by meeting clear conditions. Among them is a commitment to uphold environmental laws, protect vulnerable ecosystems and give citizens a meaningful voice in decisions that affect them. Vjosa-Narta is testing whether those principles still carry weight when they collide with major development ambitions.

Albania is widely regarded as a frontrunner for EU membership. If it advances while protected areas are opened up to contested development and environmental safeguards are weakened, the credibility of the enlargement process itself will be called into question.

For those of us who support Albania's European future, that is precisely why developments in Vjosa-Narta must be addressed now, not after irreversible damage has been done.

A test case of environmental safeguards

The protected Vjosa-Narta landscape is formed of wetlands, lagoons, salt marshes, dunes, forests and coastal habitats. It is an important stopover for migratory birds travelling along the Adriatic Flyway, while its wetlands support local livelihoods and help regulate water, store carbon and protect against flooding.

It forms part of the wider Vjosa landscape, which gained international recognition in 2023 when Albania declared the river Europe's first Wild River National Park, following years of campaigning by Albanian activists, local communities and international partners, including outdoor clothing brand Patagonia. For many of us who worked to secure that protection, it demonstrated that environmental leadership and economic ambition do not have to be in conflict.

Yet the debate surrounding Vjosa-Narta is no longer simply about one protected area. It has become a test of whether environmental safeguards can be weakened and developments advanced while a country continues progressing towards EU membership.

The EU has been clear that environmental protection is not an optional extra of accession. Chapter 27, covering environment and climate change, is a significant and technically demanding part of the enlargement process. Candidate countries are expected not only to align their laws with European standards, but to demonstrate that they can implement and enforce them effectively.

Albania’s progress towards meeting these requirements has been undermined by recent setbacks in the legal framework for protected areas. Amendments to Albania's Law on Protected Areas in 2024 significantly weakened environmental safeguards by opening the door to broader tourism and infrastructure development within protected areas. The European Commission and European Parliament have both raised concerns about whether those changes are compatible with EU environmental standards. At the same time, concerns around environmental impact assessments, permitting procedures and public consultation in Vjosa-Narta have turned this protected landscape into a real-world test of whether environmental commitments are being upheld.

Setting the precedent for EU accession

If Albania continues advancing towards membership without resolving these concerns, it risks sending a message that environmental conditionality can be negotiated away when powerful economic interests are at stake.

This sets a worrying precedent for the accession process and the outcome will be watched closely across the Western Balkans, where other countries such as Montenegro and North Macedonia are in accession negotiations. As one of the EU's most advanced candidate countries, Albania is helping to shape expectations of how accession standards are applied in practice.

If concerns around protected areas and environmental assessments can remain unresolved without affecting progress towards membership, future candidate countries may draw their own conclusions about the weight given to environmental commitments.

Wider implications for the bloc

Existing member states must have confidence that new members have been held to the same standards. And citizens must trust that environmental laws cannot simply be set aside when they become inconvenient.

If the EU is seen to tolerate environmental shortcuts during accession, it risks weakening its ability to defend those same standards across the bloc. The issue therefore is not simply whether Albania is meeting its obligations, but whether the EU is prepared to uphold the standards it asks others to meet.

Brussels now faces a choice

As Albania enters the final stages of accession, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental commitments have real meaning in practice, not just on paper. Addressing concerns around Vjosa-Narta would send a clear signal that enlargement remains a process built on accountability, implementation and shared standards.

That's not only important for Albania. It's important for the credibility of enlargement itself.