When Vivek Ramaswamy ran for president in 2024, he liked to describe himself as a "national libertarian" whose worldview included skepticism of new Middle Eastern wars and support for free trade (provided it wasn't with China). 

In a midterm election season in which voters are increasingly angry about higher prices born of protectionist tariffs and high gas prices caused by a new Middle Eastern war, that would seemingly give Ramaswamy, now running for governor of Ohio, a straightforward story to tell about how he'd bring costs down. 

Unfortunately for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, the person responsible for the tariffs and the war is President Donald Trump, whose support he's counting on to get him over the finish line in a surprisingly close race against Democrat Amy Acton. 

The latest polls show Ramaswamy slightly ahead of Acton, with many voters still undecided. 

Other Republican midterm candidates, most prominently Mike Rogers in Michigan, are escaping this bind by criticizing the tariffs and the war without explicitly naming the president who's responsible for both. 

Ramaswamy has chosen a different tactic: Shift the conversation to other sources of voters' cost-of-living anxiety that can't be directly laid at Trump's feet. 

In the last weeks of this election campaign, Ramaswamy has focused like a laser on two proposals he says will deliver cost relief to Ohio voters. The first is his proposed rollback of homeowners' property taxes. The second is a moratorium on new data center construction. 

Like many Midwestern and Western states, Ohioans' property tax bills have shot up in recent years, driven by a pandemic-era spike in home values. 

That's in turn sparked a full-blown property tax revolt in the state. The Republican-controlled Legislature passed a raft of property tax relief measures in 2025. Activists are also collecting signatures to place a full abolition of taxes on real property on the statewide ballot next year. 

Ramaswamy hasn't endorsed full property tax abolition, but he is promising voters that he will roll back property tax assessments for homeowners to pre-pandemic levels. 

On the data centers, he has staked out a very restrictionist position. 

Ohio is currently one of the leading states for data center development. Pew Research counts 57 projects currently in the pipeline there, attracted by cheap land and a robust power grid. 

The state's data center boom has caused a backlash in rural communities, where voters have objected to data centers' consumption of land and electricity and the special tax incentives some projects have received. 

On the ballot in 10 Ohio localities this November are initiatives that would impose additional restrictions on data center development. 

Ramaswamy has proposed to go further with a statewide moratorium that will remain in effect until the Legislature passes laws that not only require data centers to cover the full costs of the power infrastructure they need, but also provide property tax rebates and free electricity to nearby homeowners. 

Local property tax cuts paired with local reductions in spending would, of course, be well in line with a small government worldview. 

But the residential property tax rollback Ramaswamy has proposed doesn't directly do that. 

Instead, it would reduce property tax revenues and then leave it up to localities to make up for the lost revenue somehow. That could result in spending cuts. 

It could also result in localities shifting tax burdens onto commercial properties, raising non-property taxes (like sales taxes), or relying on the state government for more of their revenues. 

In the former two scenarios, local tax regimes would become more hostile to growth, given that property taxes are considered one of the most "efficient" taxes. In the latter scenario, the link between people who pay taxes and the people who consume taxpayer-funded local services would become more distant.  

Neither is ideal. 

While some data centers in Ohio have received tax subsidies, Ramaswamy's proposed solution is to block new data centers until they're legally required to subsidize their neighbors with free electricity and other community benefits. 

All of that is to say that it's a shame to see Ramaswamy adopt increasingly non-libertarian positions to avoid making critiques of Trump's cost-increasing tariffs and Iran war that would align with his erstwhile "national libertarian" worldview. 

It's ironic, too, that, in trying to avoid making those critiques, Ramaswamy has wound up being more restrictionist on data centers than Trump himself. 

In an August Truth Social post, the president famously urged local communities to "let Data Reign" and welcome data center development. Those that did would become "rich and successful," he predicted. Those that didn't would remain "poor and backward." 

At a rally in Vandalia, Ohio, over the weekend for Ramaswamy and Republican Senate candidate John Husted, Trump reiterated his support for data centers, saying, "We want them. Look, there's so much money to be made for Ohio. You can't just turn them off. They'll go to China."

Rather than criticize the president's statist interventions, Ramaswamy is talking up his own instead. Ohio will be poorer as a result.

The post To Avoid Criticizing Trump's Tariffs and War, Vivek Ramaswamy Takes on Data Centers appeared first on Reason Magazine.

​Three Charlotte cops have resigned and three more are facing termination after a Flock probe uncovered a text chain littered with racist messages, religious and sexual bias and a reported competition over who could arrest the most black people.

The group chat came to light after Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) officer Seth Elliott was caught using Flock's database to out an undercover cop to his drug dealer friend, which sparked an investigation by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (NCSBI).

When questioned by the NCSBI, Elliott, who has since resigned, admitted he ran the plate but denied knowing that it belonged to an undercover officer. He told agents that his friend had reached out to ask if Elliott could help identify a strange person hanging out around his father's business, so Elliott ran the plate through Flock's database.​ According to reporting from the Watauga Democrat, the NCSBI arrested Elliott in July and charged him with " illegally accessing a government computer, a Class 1 misdemeanor."

During its investigation into Elliott, the NCSBI downloaded data from his phone, which it turned over to the CMPD, where a subsequent review uncovered the racist text thread. ​According to anonymous sources who spoke to Charlotte's WBTV, the group chat included "numerous uses of the 'n-word' related to use of force and discharging firearms at black residents," and a competition to see who could arrest the most black people. In one text reportedly written by a member of the group, an officer said, "Our texts sound like a clan [sic] rally," according to a message reviewed by WCNC Charlotte, a local NBC affiliate. At a press conference on Thursday, CMPD Police Chief Estella Patterson said that an independent chain-of-command board unanimously voted for the officers' termination. Three have already resigned and the other three she "hopes to refer to as former employees."

The fallout won't end there. Every case these officers touched could now be called into question, and for good reason. In Giglio v. United States (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors must disclose information that could undermine the credibility of a government witness or law enforcement officer. Mecklenburg County District Attorney Spencer Merriweather will have to examine the messages and determine whether their word as witnesses can still be trusted. Depending on his decision, this could lead to dropped cases and challenges to prior convictions.

Defense attorney Tim Emery weighed in, telling WBTV that the officers' "credibility is severely questioned and compromised," and that the district attorney's office should consider halting cases in which the officers were heavily involved.

Police abuse of Flock and other automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) is not new. The Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm, has cataloged over 200 instances of ALPR abuse at the hands of the police since 2018. In the last year alone, officers have been caught using ALPRs for everything from pursuing personal grudges to stalking exes and romantic interests. This time, the victim of Flock misuse was an undercover officer rather than a civilian.

The post 3 Charlotte Cops Resign After Group Chat Reveals Competition To Arrest the Most Black People appeared first on Reason Magazine.

President Donald Trump is plainly frustrated that the Ukraine War continues to drag on. This is understandable. Trump came into office pledging to end this conflict on day one, and succeeded in resetting the expectations of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2025, in hopes of bringing the war to a close. Yet no peace deal emerged.

In recent weeks, Trump has complained ceaselessly that the war is impacting global energy prices, and thus indirectly hurting the American economy and damaging Republicans' midterm prospects. Earlier this week, the president arbitrarily declared an "energy ceasefire" and instructed both countries to stop targeting each other. Neither side had been given forewarning of this, but Ukraine went ahead and complied; Russia did not. With no actual ceasefire in place, Ukraine resumed hostilities.

Unfortunately, it appears that Trump has decided to punish Zelenskyy rather than the responsible party: Putin. It's not Ukraine that wants war—it's Russia. It's not Zelenskyy prolonging this conflict—it's Putin. Ukraine is willing to accept an immediate ceasefire and negotiations. Russia is not. Putin's action suggest that the goal is to subjugate Ukraine, and regardless of the impression he gives Trump, Putin is not willing to stop.

Given this, the rational course of action for the U.S. is to continuing supporting Ukraine until Russia—the invading party—is willing to negotiate. And yet, the U.S. is seemingly (suddenly) sabotaging Ukraine. This week, the Ukrainians discovered that use of Starshield, the U.S.-run satellite system they use to defend themselves against Russian forces inside Ukrainian territory, had been restricted; Starshield is a division of SpaceX, but according to Elon Musk, it is operated independently by the U.S. government. If it's not functioning properly, the most likely reason is that Trump made such a call.

Trump also signaled a willingness to cut off the Ukrainians from routine intelligence sharing with regard to Russia's bombing targets, though the administration insists that no such decision has been made. Such intelligence is extremely important for the Ukrainians, and vital for civilian safety. Ukrainians rely on air raid sirens to let them know that Russian strikes will soon take place and they should seek shelter. (I learned this firsthand during my trip to Ukraine in June, which was sponsored by a pro-Ukrainian aid group.) It's malicious of the U.S. to deliberately keep the Ukrainians in the dark when we could save lives by letting them know what we know.

None of this means that the U.S. is obligated to send even more tax dollars to Ukraine or to supply them with weapons. We have already spent $185 billion, after all.

But the U.S. should not deliberately undermine the Ukrainian position by failing to share intelligence or by hamstringing already existing military systems. Of course Trump would be within his rights to work to constrain Zelenskyy if Zelenskyy were the barrier to a peace deal, but this is simply not the case at all. We can't blame the Ukrainians for defending themselves in the face of invasion when Putin is the one refusing to negotiate.

Given all this, Zelenskyy has admitted that he feels "betrayed" by Trump and is concerned that Ukraine is losing the U.S. as a partner. The war will continue regardless, with Europe stepping in to fill whatever void the U.S. leaves behind. It's proper for Europe to shoulder more of the responsibility for protecting Ukraine, since this war is ultimately a Europe problem—the U.S. cannot be solely responsible for the security of the entire free world.

But there's a difference between thinking Europe should do more and the U.S. should do less, and thinking that the U.S. should actively hurt Ukraine to help Russia so that energy prices briefly (maybe?) improve. That's not in the long-term best interests of anyone, including and especially the U.S.

Rather than bullying Ukraine into agreeing to put up less resistance as Russia conquers it, Trump should put his negotiating skills to work on Putin.

This Week on Free Media

The latest episode of Freed Up will be available later this afternoon, so subscribe here and check back soon!

Worth Watching

Here's something exciting: I am participating in another Reason Versus debate—this time alongside the boss, Katherine Mangu-Ward! We will be up against Mehdi Hasan and Jason Stanley, who posit that "authoritarianism is a right-wing problem." It should be an entertaining, spicy debate, and (if we're being honest) probably not quite as friendly as the last one I was involved in. Get your tickets here!

The post Blame Russia, Not Zelenskyy, for the Ukraine War's Endless Slog appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A Missouri judge who locked two children in jail cells because he was frustrated by their resistance to a parental custody decision is liable for violating their Fourth Amendment rights, a federal appeals court ruled this week. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit rejected Taney County Judge Eric Eighmy's claim that he was shielded by qualified immunity, a doctrine that blocks federal civil rights claims unless they allege a violation of "clearly established" law.

"A reasonable judge should have known better," Judge David Stras writes in an opinion joined by the two other members of the 8th Circuit panel. "The law was 'clearly established' enough" to "place the issue 'beyond debate.'"

Institute for Justice attorney Dylan Moore, who wrote an 8th Circuit brief arguing against immunity for Eighmy and participated in oral arguments, welcomed the decision. "Every reasonable person knows that a judge can't throw children in jail for no good reason," he said. "Yet Judge Eighmy claimed qualified immunity shielded him from accountability anyway because no prior case told him that imprisoning innocent kids is unconstitutional. That defense is ridiculous, and we are thrilled that the court saw through it. When government officials commit such obvious constitutional violations, qualified immunity should never enter the picture."

The incident at the center of the case happened after an October 2019 custody hearing involving Kadan Rockett, then 14, and his 12-year-old sister, Brooklyn, who had achieved a modicum of fame as magicians performing on America's Got Talent. Their divorced parents, Bart Rockett and Kami Ballard, agreed that Ballard, who at that point lived in Missouri, would have primary custody of the children, while Rockett, who was living in California, would be "responsible for them at the beginning of each month and 'during TV pilot season.'" But Kadan and Brooklyn did not want to go home with their mother, which led to an argument in the lobby of the courthouse.

Eighmy intervened, telling Kadan and Brooklyn to come with him to a conference room, where he informed them that they had to leave with Ballard. "The children would not budge, even after the judge mentioned that the other option was foster care," Stras notes. "Frustrated, Judge Eighmy had the children follow him again, this time to a waiting area in the courthouse's juvenile division." A few minutes later, Eighmy "led them down a hallway to two holding cells."

Outside the cells, Eighmy again threatened Kadan and Brooklyn with foster care, but they were still unmoved. "Lock them up," the judge told an officer, who "patted them down and ordered them to remove their socks and shoes" before confining them in separate cells.

It is not clear exactly how much time Kadan and Brooklyn spent in the cells. The Institute for Justice says "about an hour," while Stras says "the time spent in the holding-cell area was between twenty and forty minutes." In any case, the children's respect for Eighmy's authority had improved by the time he came back. He "asked them one more time whether they would leave with their mother," Stras writes. "This time, they both nodded yes, so he let them go."

In June 2021, Rockett, the children's father, sued Eighmy on their behalf under 42 USC 1983, which authorizes claims against state or local officials who violate constitutional rights under color of law. In his motion to dismiss the lawsuit, Eighmy argued that he was protected by judicial immunity, which is absolute with respect to a judge's official duties. U.S. District Judge Douglas Harpool disagreed, and the 8th Circuit affirmed that ruling in 2023, noting that Kadan and Brooklyn were beyond Eighmy's contempt power because they were not parties to the custody case and that "judges do not do double duty as jailers."

Eighmy reiterated his judicial immunity claim in a motion for summary judgment, and Harpool rejected it again. After the trial began, Eighmy claimed qualified immunity twice, once after all the evidence had been submitted and again after the jury's verdict in favor of Kadan and Brooklyn. Harpool denied him that defense both times.

The jury ultimately awarded Kadan and Brooklyn $5,000 each in damages, and Harpool added about $327,000 in attorney fees. Eighmy appealed again, reiterating his judicial immunity claim. But the appeals court ruled that he had abandoned that argument by failing to raise it during the trial or after the verdict. So Eighmy was left with qualified immunity, which the appeals court said he did not deserve.

Eighmy clearly violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, Stras says, because he "did not have 'probable cause to believe that [the children had] committed' an offense, much less one that justified placing them in a holding cell. Rather, their only misdeed was one every parent knows well: resisting authority. Even in the context of legal-custody proceedings, refusing to leave with a parent is not a jailable offense. Nor were there 'exigent circumstances' arising out of danger to themselves or others."

Did Eighmy's authority as a judge give him extra leeway? Nope. "Criminal contempt was off the table because the children were neither parties to the custody case nor present inside the courtroom," Stras notes. "Nor could the power to punish a party for violating an injunction have provided the justification, given that Judge Eighmy never issued one."

Eighmy's motive for jailing the children does not change that analysis. "We have no doubt that Judge Eighmy believed he was acting in 'good faith,' and possibly even in the children's best interests, by detaining them," Stras writes. "But good faith in the Fourth Amendment context is about reasonable reliance, either on binding appellate precedent or a warrant issued by a 'neutral magistrate.'"

What about Eighmy's argument that he had no way of knowing his actions were unconstitutional? "The law in this area" was "clearly established," Stras says. "'[I]t would have been sufficiently clear [to] every reasonable official,' Judge Eighmy included, that locking up two children for refusing to follow directions violated the Fourth Amendment. As we put it over a decade and a half ago, long before the events in this case, '[i]t is clearly established that a warrantless arrest, unsupported by probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment."

That principle was so well established, in fact, that Kadan and Brooklyn, neither of whom had attended law school, took it for granted. "I don't know how you have a right to lock us up," Kadan told Eighmy when he threatened to jail them, according to Rockett's amended complaint. "We have done nothing wrong." The complaint says Brooklyn raised the same point. "How can you just lock up kids?" she asked. "This isn't legal. We've done nothing wrong."

Given Eighmy's obvious disregard for Kadan and Brooklyn's Fourth Amendment rights, "we are not concerned about the lack of a prior case" with "fundamentally similar" facts, Stras says. "Indeed, given how clear the law is, it would have been surprising to find one." He quotes an observation that Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch made as a 10th Circuit judge: "Sometimes the most obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on point is itself an unusual thing."

The post The 8th Circuit Rejects Qualified Immunity for a Judge Who Jailed 2 Kids for 'Refusing To Follow Directions' appeared first on Reason Magazine.

This year, Alaska held its primary elections on August 18.

As per a 2020 ballot measure, Alaska primary voters pick among all qualified candidates for a single office, regardless of party affiliation, and the top four then advance to the general election.

In the U.S. Senate primary, Republican incumbent Dan Sullivan won 41 percent of the vote, while former Rep. Mary Peltola, a Democrat, captured nearly 50 percent.

Dan Sullivan was also the distant third-place finisher—but in this case, it was Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., a retired schoolteacher who is also running as a Republican but is not the same person as Daniel S. Sullivan, the junior U.S. senator for the 49th state.

The presence of dual Dan Sullivans is a headache for Republicans, who have fought to keep Daniel J. off the ballot, concerned he would split their votes and cost their candidate his seat.

"Mary Peltola and Chuck Schumer know they can't beat Senator Sullivan on his record, so they're resorting to deceitful political maneuvers that attempt to trick Alaskans and buy a seat," a Republican spokesman told Fox News.

"We are looking into it," President Donald Trump said this week. "It's a disgrace." In fact, NBC News reported in July that the FBI and Department of Justice had launched an investigation "looking for possible wire fraud or a conspiracy to deprive Alaskan voters of a free and fair elections process, which could be a civil rights violation."

In August, the government apparently issued subpoenas, though Daniel J. later said he had not received anything.

But is what he is doing actually illegal? For that matter, should it be?

Carol Beecher, director of the Alaska Division of Elections, barred Daniel J. from the ballot in June after concluding that he was running "with the purpose of confusing or misleading the electorate and compromising the fairness of the ballot."

But a state superior court reversed that decision. "Despite the Division's assertion that Mr. Sullivan may be excluded from the ballot because he lacks 'good-faith,' there is no statute which provides such a criterion," wrote Judge Thomas A. Matthews. "The concept of 'good-faith,' or pure motive, or bona fide intent is simply absent." The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, keeping both Sullivans on the November ballot.

Granted, it seems extremely likely that Republicans are right, and Daniel J. is running specifically to hurt Daniel S.'s prospects.

"Campaign material metadata reveals that Amber Lee, a progressive consultant, authored a press release announcing [Daniel J.'s] Senate bid," WFMD reported in May.

Daniel J. told The New York Times that he was running as a moderate Republican in an attempt to steer the party away from its MAGA wing. But he also admitted that he had voted for the Democrat in the last three presidential races and for Peltola in her races for the U.S. House.

In Beecher's original order keeping Daniel J. off the ballot, she wrote that Daniel J. had asked to be identified as "Dan S. Sullivan" on the ballot, the same name as the senator's. (Alaska reporter Dermot Cole wrote in July that this was not true: Daniel J. wrote "Dan S. Sullivan" in an email to Beecher but followed up hours later to correct it to "Dan J. Sullivan.")

If Daniel J.'s goal truly is to mislead voters, then that is indefensible. But it's not clear that it's illegal, or whether it should be.

"I am not sure exploiting voter confusion about names is any worse than exploiting their ignorance about policy issues like crime, immigration, and health care," wrote George Mason University law professor Ilya Somin. "Trying to prevent such exploitation through criminal and civil liability is likely to violate the First Amendment. In addition, it would likely end up giving incumbent political leaders broad power to curb speech and control electoral campaigns that they cannot be trusted with."

"This is a case about someone running for office with impure motives who is lucky enough to have a name that could confuse some voters," agreed election law expert Richard Hasen. "I don't see how the government could criminalize his running for office for having impure motives. And if it could do so, then it could be a crime every time that the Republican Party backs a Green Party candidate, or Democrats support a MAGA candidate in a primary in the hopes that the candidate would be weaker against a Democrat in the general election. This stuff happens all the time."

But it's entirely possible that Alaska's ranked choice voting system will solve the problem on Election Day.

After the August open primary, the top four candidates compete on a ranked choice ballot, where voters list the candidates in order of preference. If no candidate gets an outright majority, then the lowest performer is eliminated, and every ballot that picked them first is retallied and applied to their second choice.

As long as every Alaskan who wants to vote for Dan Sullivan—either one—lists both Dan Sullivans as their first and second choices, then the system will take care of any confusion. In the (highly likely) event that Daniel J. does not capture a majority on the first ballot, his votes will be retallied and applied to their second choices. The only plausible hiccup is if Peltola, the Democratic candidate, wins a majority in the first round—in which case either Sullivan would have lost anyway.

Of course, Republicans have opposed the ranked choice system since Alaska adopted it. Former Gov. Sarah Palin, who ran against Peltola twice unsuccessfully, said ranked choice was "so weird" that "it results in voter suppression."

In a post last week on Truth Social, Trump called ranked choice voting "Corrupt" and said it "shouldn't be allowed in our Country."

"I just left Alaska, where we have a real bad thing," Trump said Wednesday at a campaign rally in Arizona. "They have the ranked choice voting, where you go into I guess some kind of a test tube or something, and they pick whoever the hell they want. That's another disgrace."

As ever, it's not clear what Trump was talking about. And despite Republicans' complaints, ranked choice voting works quite well: According to the American Bar Association, recent research finds that it "is an improvement over plurality voting with clear benefits in terms of representation, campaign quality, mobilization, and turnout." It also "encourages greater consensus building as well as more civil political campaigns," and voters find it easy to understand.

In the event that a political party finds itself, for example, with two Dan Sullivans on the ballot, ranked choice voting is a perfect solution. If only the party weren't so hostile to it.

The post What Happens When 2 Dan Sullivans Run for the Same Senate Seat? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

With Social Security barreling toward insolvency, the government is increasing benefits in January.

On Wednesday, the Social Security Administration (SSA) announced that retirees will receive a 3.6 percent increase in Social Security benefits next year. The raise, which was unveiled shortly after the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported consumer prices rose 3.7 percent year over year in September, will amount to an increase of $75 per month for the average beneficiary. It also represents a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) that will be 0.8 percentage points higher than last year's, which was 2.8 percent, and 0.9 percentage points higher than what was projected by the Social Security Trustees, according to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

"Social Security will implement this cost-of-living adjustment for 76 million Americans, giving them greater financial stability," said SSA Commissioner Frank J. Bisignano in a press release. "Under President Donald J. Trump, Social Security is delivering better, faster, higher-quality service for the American people."

But the announcement comes as Social Security faces a looming funding cliff.

The program has been spending considerably more than it receives for years, thanks in large part to the U.S. demographic problem: Birth rates have collapsed, life expectancy has risen, and there are fewer working-age people paying taxes to fund retirees. In 2025, the program collected $1.45 trillion in revenue and spent $1.61 trillion, leaving a $160 billion shortfall. Trust fund reserves covered the gap, but they are rapidly dwindling. In June, Social Security's Trustees projected that, without legislative changes, incoming revenue would cover only 78 percent of scheduled retirement and survivor benefits by late 2032—a 22 percent shortfall. Combined retirement and disability funds are expected to run out by 2034. There are a handful of fixes, including raising the retirement age, reducing benefits, raising the cap on earnings, means-testing the program, privatizing it, or getting rid of it altogether.

While many lawmakers have acknowledged reality, Congress remains divided on how to address the issue. In August, Sen. Ron Wyden (D–Ore.) blocked a proposal from Sen. Bill Cassidy (R–La.) to establish a congressional process to consider reforms, arguing that it would slash retiree benefits and help billionaires "avoid paying their fair share."

"People are objecting to doing their job," Cassidy complained in September. "Congress needs to fix Social Security this year."

What makes Wednesday's increase even more unjustified is the fact that older Americans are already among the wealthiest age groups in the country. According to the Federal Reserve's latest Survey of Consumer Finances released last week, households headed by someone aged 75 or older had a median net worth of $504,900 in 2025, compared with just $33,000 for households headed by someone under 35. Despite their relative wealth compared to working-age people, retirees are getting a COLA increase that is greater than the average worker, whose wages have risen by 3 percent in the last year.

For the very wealthiest beneficiaries, the 2027 COLA will constitute an enormous increase. According to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the highest-earning couples who retired this year will receive a combined increase of $3,600, meaning that their combined benefits would exceed $100,000 next year. However, without congressional action, Social Security recipients could expect a 22 percent cut that, in 2032, would wipe out the previous nine years' COLAs all at once.

Despite years of warnings about Social Security's deteriorating finances, Congress has yet to enact reforms to avert the looming shortfall. For now, beneficiaries can look forward to larger checks in January, even as the program moves closer to the day when it can no longer pay the benefits it has promised.

The post Social Security Is Running Out of Money. Benefits Are Rising 3.6% Next Year Anyway. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The federal government just closed fiscal year 2026 with a deficit of nearly $2 trillion, according to figures the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released last Thursday. Only the two pandemic years of 2020 and 2021 were worse. Today, though, there is no recession and no emergency. These enormous budget deficits are the new normal.

The usual response to a deficit warning is that the government just needs more money. It doesn't. Thanks to the remarkable strength of the private sector, federal revenue rose by 3 percent, to more than $5.4 trillion, over the fiscal year. But spending rose by 6 percent, reaching $7.4 trillion.

Some will blame the Supreme Court for striking down most of President Donald Trump's tariffs and forcing the government to issue refunds. But even if Washington had kept the $130 billion in illegal levies, it would cover less than one-tenth of the gap. Tariffs were never a serious revenue source at our insanely high level of spending.

Look at where the money went. Spending on the three main entitlement programs—Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—grew by 7 percent. That's faster than total spending growth. Defense grew by 5 percent. Interest on the debt rose by 11 percent, exceeding $1.1 trillion. That last figure is the bill for every earlier year of borrowing—years when Washington was sending clear signals that it isn't serious about fiscal responsibility.

If you want to see where such irresponsibility can lead, look at France. The country that big spenders from Paul Krugman to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) have cited as proof that big government is viable and full of upsides is now on the brink of a serious crisis. France's debt equals 120 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and interest payments are rising quickly. Slow growth and social unrest aren't helping.

The U.S., of course, has some advantages that France doesn't, largely because we're a country of innovators with a private sector unmatched at creating wealth. Nonetheless, debt that is swelling out of control should still worry us. First, the same anti-wealth and anti-growth forces that brought France to where it is now are gaining popularity here. Second, we too will see debt reach 120 percent of GDP in a few years, and our interest payments are already consuming an alarming share of resources.

A wise Congress would put us on safer footing if only because debt raises interest rates for everyone, from homebuyers to small businesses. This operates as a drag on growth, and hence on wages. In other words, controlling debt should be part of an affordability agenda in the same way as streamlining regulation.

When legislators decide to take affordability seriously, I recommend looking at a September Advancing American Freedom (AAF) report on this topic. Its section on fiscal restraint offers a useful menu of reforms, including targeting the programs that most drive the debt.

Start with Social Security. Under current law, benefits will be cut by roughly 20 percent when the program's trust fund runs dry in the early 2030s. Nobody believes Congress will actually let that happen, but we'd better hope its answer isn't to double down by borrowing the difference between payroll taxes and benefits.

Nor are tax increases an option. The payroll tax meant to fund entitlements is now 12.4 percent of wages. It began at 2 percent when Social Security was first rolled out. It is also the most burdensome tax for many Americans. Enough already. The fixes AAF fellow Rachel Greszler proposes are worth considering: Index the retirement age to life expectancy, use an accurate inflation measure for cost-of-living adjustments, and move gradually toward a flat universal benefit that protects lower-income retirees while ending Social Security's de facto welfare for the wealthiest.

Next is Medicare. More than 40 percent of its financing already comes from general revenue rather than from payroll taxes. The report recommends converting the program to premium support, giving beneficiaries a fixed contribution to spend on traditional Medicare or on competing private plans. It would also raise the eligibility age to 67, matching Social Security, and trim subsidies for well-off seniors. That's a start.

As for Medicaid, the problem is one of pricing. And yet competition based on price—the best cost-control tool—has never been seriously tried. Washington covers 90 percent of the cost of states' expanded Medicaid programs for adults. A state can buy a dollar of spending with just a dime of its own money. Changing the states' incentives would be key here. Implementing risk-adjusted per-capita caps, through which the federal government would give states a fixed amount per enrollee, would do just that. States would pay for their own inefficiencies or would be able to use every dollar they save by becoming more efficient.

The same logic supports returning more welfare programs to states, starting with the federal share of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. State governments have to balance their budgets in some form.

None of these reforms are painless. But the alternatives will prove far more painful. The U.S. will either continue paying a slow, unlegislated tax called inflation or face a fast, ugly fiscal crisis when bond buyers stop giving Washington the benefit of the doubt.

COPYRIGHT 2026 CREATORS.COM

The post The Federal Government Collected $5.4 Trillion. It Still Can't Pay Its Bills. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From U.S. v. California, decided yesterday by Ninth Circuit Judge Mark Bennett, joined by Judges Jacqueline Nguyen and Daniel Collins:

Section 10 [of the California "No Vigilantes Act"] requires any non-uniformed "federal law enforcement officer" operating in California, with narrow exceptions, to "visibly display identification" while performing federal law enforcement duties. Officers who violate the law may be criminally prosecuted by the State.

We previously granted the United States's motion for an injunction pending appeal. As before, we conclude that … § 10 of the No Vigilantes Act attempts [in violation of the Supremacy Clause] to directly regulate the United States in its performance of governmental functions, and Congress has not authorized such regulation. Indeed, we conclude that the United States is certain to succeed….

"[U]nder the intergovernmental immunity component of the Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution, states may not directly regulate the Federal Government's operations or property." "It is of the very essence of supremacy," the Supreme Court has emphasized, "to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence." To that end, "states have no power" to "in any manner control[ ] the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." And "where 'Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation,' 'the federal function must be left free' of regulation" by the States.

Intergovernmental immunity "prohibit[s] state laws that either 'regulat[e] the United States directly or discriminat[e] against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals' (e.g., contractors)." A direct regulation is one that "lays hold of" federal officers "in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." It imposes conditions upon "a function of government," and it regulates "the right to carry on the business" of the federal government. Put another way, a direct regulation regulates the government qua government; it controls how the government conducts specifically governmental functions.

The Supremacy Clause prohibits States from directly regulating federal operations even when regulating state operations in the same manner…. "[E]ven the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States." … And critically, "Supreme Court case law compels the rejection of a de minimis exception to the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity." So "[a] state or local law that directly regulates the conduct of the federal government or discriminates against it is invalid, even if it is no more restrictive than federal law."

In sum, if a state law directly regulates the governmental conduct of the United States without congressional authorization, it is void irrespective of whether the regulated activities are essential to federal functions or operations, and irrespective of the degree to which the state law interferes with such functions or operations….

Section 10 of the No Vigilantes Act expressly applies to federal officers. It controls the conduct of those federal officers in performing law enforcement operations. Section 10 explicitly overrides the federal government's power to determine whether, how, and when to publicly identify its officers. And in so doing, it regulates the manner and conditions under which federal agents can enforce federal law. Again, § 10 defines "law enforcement officer" as including "any federal law enforcement officer." And any non-uniformed federal law enforcement officer "operating in California" "shall visibly display identification that includes their agency and either a name or badge number or both name and badge number when performing their enforcement duties."

These provisions "lay[ ] hold of" federal agencies and officers "in their specific attempt to obey orders and require[ ] qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." As a result, § 10 regulates the performance of "governmental action[s]" which are "carried on by the United States itself"—not merely "persons who [a]re acting for themselves and not for the United States." Indeed, it applies only to law enforcement agencies and their officers, including federal law enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement officers. Section 10 thus directly regulates inherently sovereign functions. Because Congress has not authorized such legislation, it is barred by intergovernmental immunity.

The United States has also shown that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Again, § 10 exclusively regulates quintessentially government conduct: law enforcement. So as applied to federal agencies and federal officers carrying out their duties under federal authority, the statute is invalid in all applications. The United States is therefore likely—indeed, certain—to succeed on the merits of its facial challenge to § 10's constitutionality….

California … advances its view that a state statute constitutes an impermissible direct regulation only when the law "impose[s] substantial burdens on federal operations." … The district court applied, and California urges us to adopt, the standard applicable to States' regulation of federal contractors and third-party employers—not the standard that governs direct regulation of the United States's governmental activities.

"Private contractors do not stand on the same footing as the federal government, so states can impose many laws on federal contractors that they could not apply to the federal government itself." But "where, as here, the governmental action is carried on by the United States itself and Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation or taxation, the inherent freedom [from direct regulation] continues." So the burden of the regulation on federal operations, whether substantial or otherwise, is irrelevant because, as discussed, there is no de minimis exception to the United States's immunity from direct regulation.

To be sure, the Supremacy Clause likely does not "bar[ ] all state regulation which may touch the activities of the Federal Government." For example, in Johnson v. Maryland (1920), the Supreme Court suggested that "when the United States has not spoken," States might be able to impose on federal officers "general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the[ir] employment—as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets."

But the Court has never relied on that distinction to uphold a State's direct regulation of federal functions performed by federal officers. And unlike traffic laws which, for example, might require a full stop before a right turn, and which regulate conduct that any ordinary citizen could engage in, § 10 applies exclusively to law enforcement officials and exclusively to their performance of law enforcement operations. Thus, § 10 does not just "incidentally" sweep up the conduct of federal officers carrying out their duties. So even if we were to read Johnson as carving out an exception to intergovernmental immunity for laws of general applicability that affect federal operations in incidental ways—an issue that we need not and do not resolve today—such a putative exception would not apply here because § 10 is neither generally applicable nor its effect on federal officers "incidental."

Taking a different tack, California argues that the Supremacy Clause "provides a case-specific defense that confers immunity on federal officers who can show that they held an 'honest and reasonable belief' that the charged conduct was 'necessary in the performance of [their] duty.'" From there, the State contends that the United States's facial challenge must fail because there is no "reason to believe that in all (or nearly all) cases where [§ 10] might apply, the federal officer would be covered by the case-specific defense."

We agree that federal officers are immune from state criminal prosecution under state laws regulating conduct of members of the general public "only when [their] acts are both (1) authorized by the laws of the United States and (2) necessary and proper to the execution of [their] responsibilities." And under this standard, an officer need not "show that his action was in fact necessary or in retrospect justifiable, only that he reasonably thought it to be."

The immunity at issue here, however, belongs to the United States, which enjoys a distinct form of immunity under the Supremacy Clause: intergovernmental immunity. Thus, whether any officer would hold an honest and reasonable belief that the charged conduct was necessary to perform his or her duty is irrelevant to whether the United States, or an agent exercising quintessentially governmental authority of the United States, is entitled to complete and total immunity from regulation of the type embodied in § 10. To reiterate, § 10, by its explicit terms, expressly regulates the conduct of federal officers while those officers are discharging law enforcement duties under federal authority. So an individual officer would be entitled to a Supremacy Clause defense against any prosecution brought under the statute….

Andrew M. Bernie, Mark R. Freeman, Daniel Tenny, and Eric D. McArthur represent the federal government.

The post California Law Generally Requiring Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Display ID Violates Supremacy Clause appeared first on Reason Magazine.

President Donald Trump promised that his tariffs would usher in a "golden age" by prioritizing the interests of American workers.

Those workers, however, are now turning against Trump's tariffs.

Support for the Trump administration's tariff policies has fallen by 25 percentage points among blue-collar workers over the past year, according to new polling data from Echelon Insights and the Economic Innovation Group (EIG).

A poll conducted by the two groups in August 2025 found that blue-collar workers supported the tariffs by a narrow margin. Now, that same segment of the population has turned decisively against Trump's tariffs: 58 percent oppose them, compared to just 36 percent who support them.

Overall, support for the tariffs has declined from about 43 percent last year to only 34 percent. Opposition to the tariffs has grown from 50 percent to 59 percent. Elsewhere in the same survey, 68 percent of respondents said the tariffs have made the cost of living higher.

It's not hard to figure out why people have turned against the tariffs: They have contributed to rising prices across the economy.

The annualized inflation rate ticked upward to 3.7 percent in September, according to new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). More BLS data released Thursday morning shows that the producer price index, which often operates as a precursor to inflation, is up 6.3 percent over the past year.

America's war with Iran has been a major factor in rising inflation, but the tariffs have played a significant role as well. In a study released last week, the New York Federal Reserve concluded that consumer prices would have declined slightly over the past year if not for the economic effects of the tariffs.

The tariffs have become so unpopular that not even partisanship can save them. "Among GOP-voting workers, only 3 percent select tariffs as their top priority," note Jordan McGillis and John Lettieri, policy experts from the EIG, in their write-up of the poll.

Other parts of Trump's economic agenda are not faring much better. The Trump administration has bought or seized shares of more than 30 private businesses over the past two years—ranging from major firms such as U.S. Steel to small mining companies with few customers. "The federal government's state corporatism is unprecedented," reports the Cato Institute in a new analysis of those deals.

Large majorities of workers across both major parties and all generations said they opposed the federal government taking equity stakes in American companies in the Echelon/EIG poll.

In short: This economic populism sure isn't very popular.

All of this is likely to be a major factor in next month's midterm elections. Regardless of how that shakes out, however, there are lessons to be drawn from this poll for both sides of the political divide.

For conservatives, these polling data should end the tariff experiment. It has proven economically damaging, and it is no longer a political winner (if it ever was).

Remember, the idea to hike tariffs and start trade wars with all of America's biggest trading partners was not some grand plan backed by careful study and thoughtful analysis. It sprung, half-baked, from the head of one man. Yes, there have been various attempts to support, in a post hoc way, Trump's desire for tariffs. All of that can, and should, be easily discarded. There is no reason to allow a lame duck president to continue to set such a politically and economically destructive path for the country.

Undoing the tariffs might also put a meaningful dent in rising prices. That should be a no-brainer after the midterms, no matter which party controls Congress.

On the left, this poll should be a reminder that Americans do not look favorably on the mixing of government and business. Democrats should promise to unwind the "equity stakes" that the federal government has taken under Trump's watch. Heading toward the 2028 presidential cycle, Democrats might want to borrow some old Republican talking points about how government shouldn't be picking winners and losers—they may find that message is still quite popular.

Yes, it's probably right to be skeptical that those things will happen. Trump's efforts to centralize economic power in the executive branch are likely to outlive his presidency—that's how these things always seem to go.

But there is a glimmer of hope here. Americans are soundly rejecting the Trump administration's big government policies.

The post Even Blue-Collar Workers Have Turned Against Trump's Unpopular Tariffs appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A federal judge referred Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner and one of his deputies to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution for alleged misconduct. In response, Krasner's office filed a motion seeking to force the Judge--Paul Diamond--from a case involving his office.

Yesterday, Judge Diamond rejected the Philly DA's motion with a terse and forcefully worded order.

Here, from the order, is some background:

In the last two years, the Third Circuit, this Court, and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court have condemned as dishonest repeated post-trial concessions of relief made by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. . . . The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was so concerned that it took the remarkable step of ordering all Philadelphia Common Pleas Judges to seek the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General's intervention whenever the DAO made a post-trial concession, so that the Attorney General could confirm the concession's honesty. . . .

The DAO's present post-trial concession is also remarkable: Here, four DAO supervisors credibly testified that the District Attorney himself and his lieutenant, Assistant District Attorney Matthew Stiegler, urged them to make false representations to this Court to "protect the office." According to "the Four," the District Attorney threatened them with "consequences" if they did not. Because these and related accusations, if true, could amount to criminal misconduct, I disqualified the District Attorney and Stiegler from participating further in this case and referred the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation. In the DAO's newly-filed Motions and the District Attorney's unsworn "Declaration"—all of which generate more heat than light—the DAO seeks my recusal from all matters in which the Office appears and asks me to reconsider my rulings in this case. I decline to do either.

And on the merits of the recusal request, here is what Judge Diamond had to say:

During the three-day hearing before me, the DAO failed to object to virtually all the rulings and actions it now challenges. That the Office chose to object only after the Court issued a decision unfavorable to the District Attorney and his lieutenant confirms that the DAO merely disagrees with those rulings. . . .

The Office challenges my noting that the District Attorney neither testified nor offered an affidavit in response to the Four's testimony—on which I based my disqualification order and DOJ referral. I do not credit the District Attorney's absurd suggestion that he did not know he could testify—especially after I twice asked DAO counsel if he wished to call any witnesses. Nor has the District Attorney explained why he did not offer a responsive affidavit, which would have required the declarant to tell the truth (under penalty of false swearing). The Office thus cannot truthfully dispute that the District Attorney chose not to give his version of events in Court under oath. The DAO's apparent belief that this tactical choice was reasonable hardly warrants recusal.

Finally, the DAO believes that I should have been leerier of Mason's testimony—the various corroborative documents notwithstanding—and more responsive to the uncorroborated, dubious testimony of Stiegler. Again, disagreement with my credibility determination is not a basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 ("[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."); Wecht, 484 F.3d at 220–21 (recusal not warranted despite the court's "skewed and unfair reading of the record"). The other arguments the DAO raises do not warrant discussion. Accordingly, I will deny as frivolous the Motion for Recusal.

And on the question of reconsideration:

The DAO does not discuss or even mention the burden and criteria a party seeking reconsideration must meet. Rather, as it did in seeking my recusal, the Office urges me to revisit my rulings because it disagrees with them. Once again, that disagreement does not warrant reconsideration. . . .

I will not discuss here every protest the Office makes to virtually all my rulings, my credibility determinations, and (once again) my reference to the District Attorney's silence in the face of damning testimony from his own employees and former employee. In his belated, unsworn "Declaration" the District Attorney attacks three of these witnesses as unworthy of belief.  This after-the-fact attempt to cram "evidence" into a closed record seems intended to persuade the media, not the Court. In any event, the evidence is unpersuasive and does not warrant reconsideration. . . .

Accordingly, I will again deny the DAO's frivolous Motion.

Judge Diamond's order concludes:

Four of the District Attorney's supervisors offered powerful, unrebutted testimony that their boss and Stiegler urged them to misrepresent to this Court. When the Four told the District Attorney that he had thus created a conflict compelling them to inform the Court and withdraw from this case, he threatened them with "consequences." There are few attorney transgressions more serious than lying to the Court, urging others to do so, or threatening them should they tell the Court the truth. . . . If this in fact occurred, it is all the more serious because it occurred after four Courts condemned the DAO's conduct in circumstances like those presented here. Disqualifying the District Attorney and Stiegler and referring them for investigation is thus reasonable and warranted. That the District Attorney chose not to testify but sought to "make his case" with an unsworn declaration—the credibility of which I am unable to assess—makes that investigation even more necessary. Although Mr. Krasner may yet have the opportunity to testify under oath in another forum, his intemperate filings provide no basis for recusal or reconsideration of my rulings.

The post Judge Refuses to Recuse in Case Involving Alleged Misconduct by Philly DA's Office appeared first on Reason Magazine.

According to The Washington Post, "The chairman of the Republican-led House Oversight Committee is investigating two D.C.-based activist groups over hosting what he called 'jury nullification training sessions,' claiming that their instructions given to potential jurors were an illegal attempt to subvert federal prosecutors."

The committee chair in question, Rep. James Comer (R–Ky.), has set his sights on the groups known as Free DC and Harriet's Wildest Dreams because they, in Comer's words, believe "that potential jurors should not make decisions impartially based on applying the law as instructed to the facts presented before them in the case, but based on their subjective, personal beliefs and activist agendas."

I hate to break it to Comer, but many prominent members of America's Founding generation would have agreed with those D.C. activists.

The debate over jury nullification asks whether there is a proper place in our legal system for a jury to acquit, not because of any lack of evidence of a defendant's guilt, but because the jury believes the underlying law that was supposedly broken, or the prosecutor's particular enforcement of that law, to be unconstitutional.

In 1791, the influential Founding Father James Wilson, who was a signer of both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, delivered a widely discussed lecture on law at the College of Philadelphia. "Whoever would be obliged to obey a constitutional law, is justified in refusing to obey an unconstitutional act of the legislature," Wilson said. "When a question, even of this delicate nature, occurs, every one who is called to act, has a right to judge." Needless to say, jurors are among those "called to act" in this very manner. Jurors therefore have their own "right to judge" the constitutionality of the law (and prosecution) before them.

Thomas Jefferson made a similar point in a 1789 letter to Thomas Paine. "The trial by jury," Jefferson wrote, is "the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." How else may a jury hold the government accountable to the principles of the Constitution than by judging for itself the constitutionality of the government's actions, including the actions of the police and prosecution?

According to Comer, the job of a juror is mechanically "applying the law as instructed to the facts presented before them in the case."

But that's not what Founding Fathers such as Wilson and Jefferson thought. They argued that the job of the juror was to apply the text of the Constitution to the actions of the government and to acquit the defendant if either the law or its enforcement came up short. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it in his great book, Democracy in America, the jury "places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed, or a portion of the governed, and not in that of the government."

In Other Legal News

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments this week in two cases that are worth keeping track of.

• On Tuesday, the justices weighed the matter of Beaird v. United States, which asks how much judicial deference is owed to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary on the federal sentencing guidelines when a judge is applying those guidelines during a federal criminal defendant's sentencing. You can read this newsletter's past coverage of that case here.
• On Wednesday, the justices took on the matter of Salazar v. Paramount Global, which asks whether the website 247Sports violated the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 when it shared a user's private information, including what videos he watched, with Facebook. Past Injustice System coverage of that case is available here.

The post Jury Nullification Is Not a Crime appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Thanks to a 2005 DUI conviction in Pennsylvania, Edward Williams permanently lost the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But he did not realize that until a decade later, and his confusion on that point is understandable.

The federal law that stripped Williams of his Second Amendment rights is commonly described as applying to "felons," and Williams' offense was a misdemeanor. But although his sentence did not include any time behind bars, his crime theoretically could have sent him to prison for up to five years. That was enough to trigger 18 USC 922(g)(1), which covers anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."

When a lawyer alerted Williams to that wrinkle, which made his continued ownership of firearms a federal felony, he got rid of his guns. But he did not think that requirement was fair, reasonable, or constitutional, and this week a federal appeals court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recognized a historical tradition of disarming "physically dangerous individuals" whose possession of firearms would pose a threat to public safety. But it said Williams plainly does not fit into that category.

"The federal government spent nearly a decade trying to permanently disarm a peaceable man over a nonviolent misdemeanor—and it lost bigly," says Brandon Combs, president of the Firearms Policy Coalition, which supported Williams' lawsuit. "The government does not get to turn a nonviolent conviction into a lifetime ban on exercising a constitutionally protected right."

The 3rd Circuit's en banc decision in Williams v. Attorney General affirms a 2023 ruling by a federal judge who likewise concluded that disarming Williams was unconstitutional. It elaborates on the logic of Range v. Attorney General, a 2023 decision that restored the gun rights of a Pennsylvania man who had been convicted of food stamp fraud. In both cases, the 3rd Circuit held that applying Section 922(g)(1) to the plaintiffs was not "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation"—the Second Amendment test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

Writing for the majority in Williams' case, 3rd Circuit Judge Paul Matey acknowledges that the Supreme Court has described "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" as "presumptively lawful." But "those longstanding customs restricted the violently dangerous (within which some felons would be included), not felons writ large," he says. "Felons were restricted because they posed a physical danger, rather than for their offense of conviction."

Matey argues that "focusing on physical dangerousness corrects the erroneous argument" that "only law-abiding and responsible citizens can exercise the rights protected by the Second Amendment"—a claim that the Supreme Court rejected in the 2024 case United States v. Rahimi. "We find no history that supports disarming irresponsible people, where 'responsible' is defined by the whim of the sovereign or the will of the majority," he says, alluding to the danger of allowing legislators to whittle away at the Second Amendment by criminalizing an ever-widening range of conduct.

Matey emphasizes "the novelty of forever restricting all felons from possessing firearms for lawful purposes." The original restriction, which Congress approved in 1938 as part of the Federal Firearms Act, applied only to violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. In 1961, Congress expanded the ban to cover nonviolent crimes punishable by more than a year in prison.

Williams' 2005 DUI conviction qualified for two reasons. He had a prior DUI conviction, stemming from a 2000 arrest in State College. And when he was arrested again in Philadelphia four years later, his blood alcohol concentration was a whopping 0.223 percent. That made his second offense a first-degree misdemeanor, which carries a maximum prison sentence of five years.

Since then, Williams has stayed out of trouble. "He has done nothing violent, let alone dangerous, for over twenty years, and has held steady employment at the same job for over three decades," Matey notes. Williams drinks only occasionally, and a psychological evaluation found he "has a normal personality, without psychopathology and without addiction or violent tendencies."

The Justice Department nevertheless argued that Williams' continuing disarmament is consistent with the Bruen test, which requires historical analogs that are "relevantly similar" in motivation and scope. In making that case, the government relied mainly on early laws aimed at "habitual drunkards"—the same analogy that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected last June in United States v. Hemani, which involved the federal ban on gun possession by "unlawful" drug users.

Although the Justice Department "acknowledges it may proscribe Williams's possession of firearms only if he 'presently poses a physical danger if armed,'" Matey says, it "offers no evidence to establish this as the aim of the habitual drunkard laws." Those laws, the Supreme Court noted in Hemani, "did not seek to protect the public from violence so much as to protect habitual drunkards from themselves and their families from financial devastation."

Nor did the habitual drunkard laws permanently disarm people, as Section 922(g)(1) does. "Most statutes capped the commitment of habitual drunkards to the state inebriate asylum, prison, or hard labor to a few months or years," Matey notes. "Others provided for an indefinite period of incarceration, but had no indication that upon release individuals continued to forfeit their arms. Rather, once someone was 'safe' to 'go at large,' they were restored to the status of a full rights-bearing citizen."

Contrary to the considerations that the Supreme Court deemed relevant in Hemani, Matey says, the Justice Department "fails to show that Williams threatens to 'misuse[] a gun while intoxicated,' or that he 'poses a danger to himself or others as a result' of
alcohol abuse. In fact, much like those nineteenth-century drunkards released from custody and restored their rights, the record shows that Williams poses no present physical danger from the use of a firearm, or anything else."

The 3rd Circuit is one of three federal appeals courts that have allowed people with nonviolent felony records to argue that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. But such challenges have been blocked in six circuits, notwithstanding compelling historical evidence that the law reaches much farther than the Second Amendment allows. So far, the Supreme Court has declined to accept any of the many petitions asking it to resolve that circuit split.

The post The 3rd Circuit Upholds the Gun Rights of a Man Who Committed a Nonviolent Misdemeanor 2 Decades Ago appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Two ships sink: "A ​container ship and a dry bulk carrier have both sunk near the Strait of Hormuz in the past ‌24 hours after being hit by projectiles in separate incidents, maritime officials said on Wednesday," reports Reuters. One ship was Singapore-flagged and the other was Antigua and Barbuda–flagged; one crew member has died so far, but the majority were safely evacuated. "Attacks around the waterway have surged over the past 10 days, with Iran saying it is stepping up strikes in response to the US blockade of its ports and tougher sanctions introduced last month." Basically, Iran is escalating because the U.S. naval blockade—reinstated in July—has choked off its new oil exports, and Tehran's answer is to make sure no one else's oil gets out either. Shipping volumes in the Strait have plunged as attacks have escalated.

These two are the third and fourth commercial ships to have been sunk since the Iran-U.S. war began in February, depending on how you count. The India-flagged Haji Ali went down off the coast of Oman, and the Malta-flagged container ship Safeen Prestige was struck and later sank in the Strait of Hormuz as well. Back in July, a cargo ship sank after colliding with another vessel in the Strait, though that wasn't technically an attack. And in September, the U.S. destroyed several Iranian tankers—at least two in the Gulf of Oman area and one near Kharg Island, among others. So many ships have been caught in the crosshairs, though relatively few have gone down.

Why does the decline of religion matter? "The decline of American religion over the last thirty years bears…a significant responsibility for the dysfunctional state of American politics," writes Jacob Williams for Cracks in Postmodernity, reviewing Shadi Hamid and Matthew Kaemingk's new book, Can Religion Save Democracy? "Religious communities—churches, mosques, and synagogues—channel our spiritual impulses in a healthy direction. Religion—actual, traditional, 'organized' religion—appeals to mankind's need for wonder, mystery, and ultimate purpose; and it schools those impulses into forms conducive to civic virtues like humility, tolerance, forbearance, and constructive disagreement."

"Religion does all this," continues Williams, "because it achieves the Augustinian virtue of desacralizing politics and lowering its stakes to a less eschatological plain, in which we see political conflict as 'serious but not sacred.' Our need for ultimacy is directed onto what is actually ultimate—God—and not onto conflict with our fellow man. We learn epistemic humility by hedging our arguments with the recognition that, as Muslim scholars put it, 'God knows best.' Ritual formation reminds us at a deep 'pre-rational level' that we are not divine and that losing an earthly struggle is not final: 'prayer…is a daily concession speech.' Even belief in Hell, paradoxically, makes us less judgmental about one another's flaws, since if true evil will be punished in the hereafter, we can easily face the prospect of its survival in the here and now."

Scenes from New York: Comedian Shane Gillis is apparently in hot water, once again, for hosting Saturday Night Live and offending people with the jokes in his monologue. Gillis was, of course, fired from SNL back in 2019, immediately after being hired, because of anti-Asian slurs he'd used in a podcast the year prior, while doing a bit where he was pretending to be a landlord. The first time he was invited back to give a monologue, he "bomb[ed] on 'SNL' with Down syndrome and gay jokes," according to The Daily Beast. And then this most recent time, he offended people by saying, "I haven't been to the gym in so long, I didn't know women just dress like whores now." Given the prevalence of "scrunch butt"–style leggings, I kind of think he's dead-on, but I've also long been a Gillis apologist.

"In that very same monologue, Gillis denigrates men, gay men, his sisters, and himself—repeatedly," writes Reason's Robby Soave. "He admits that he's fat and ugly. That's the basis of the humor. It does not suggest that he has some problem with women or enjoys laughing at their expense and solely their expense. He's doing observational comedy, and no one is spared, not even Gillis." Gillis seems dumb as a bag of bricks, but he's actually quite incisive.

I do think there's a deeper thing going on, though, given that Gillis keeps getting into trouble, which is that bro-y culture no longer unites us as a country. Bros are dwindling in number and prominence. Gillis isn't widely regarded as funny because the culture killed off the bro. And I, for one, mourn that loss.

QUICK HITS

• Anthropic reportedly plans to IPO next month; OpenAI intends to wait until 2027.
• "When President Trump announced that Katie Zacharia would serve as the next White House press secretary, he referred to her as an attorney. But she hasn't passed the bar exam in the U.S.," reports The Wall Street Journal. "Zacharia sat for the California bar exam after graduating from law school at Pepperdine University in 2011, according to a person with direct knowledge of the matter, but she didn't pass." Truth be told, I don't think the fact that she hasn't passed the bar yet represents herself as a lawyer matters all that much; I think the fact that she seems terrible at public speaking is the greater problem, given her new role.
• James Talarico continues to really like his own line that "the Bible is silent on the issue of abortion." I don't think he's especially persuasive to the Catholic voter he was confronting in the above clip, who countered with an invocation of the Ten Commandments, but I guess voters will decide soon enough.
• "With less than three weeks until Election Day and Republican approval numbers down, President Donald Trump is taking unorthodox measures to drum up support for the GOP," writes Ryan Curtis for Reason. "Last week, Trump sent out $90 payments to over 20 million Americans on Medicare Part B—which covers doctor visits and regular checkups. The money was made available to help seniors 'pay for their Medicare Part B premiums,' which cost $202 per month."
• Watch the quote-tweeted video only if you dare:

These people will drag you back to 2020 tomorrow. We don't have to live like this. https://t.co/5U3DvNkrp8

— Mary Katharine Ham (@mkhammer) October 14, 2026

The post Sinking Ships appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Doe v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc., decided last week by Bridgeport (Conn.) Superior Court Judge Robert Golger:

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, instituted the present action seeking a Bill of Discovery from defendant Sacred Heart University (Sacred Heart), The national Chapter of Phi Sigma Sigma Fraternity, Inc., and The IOTA NU Chapter of the Phi Sigma Sigma Fraternity. The plaintiff's complaint alleges that in the Fall of 2025 she was involved in an incident with an underclassman during pledge week in which she was video recorded encouraging a Phi Sigma Sigma Fraternity pledge to drink alcohol (the hazing incident). The incident is detailed at paragraphs 11-15 of her complaint. The video was subsequently circulated around campus.

The plaintiff alleges that she became the subject of harassment and cyberbullying as a result of the publication of the hazing incident and that the defendants failed to conduct any meaningful investigation into her complaints. The plaintiff also alleges that she became the subject of improper disciplinary hearings and was left with no choice but to withdraw from Sacred Heart. The plaintiff seeks records related to the defendants' investigation into the hazing incident and the retaliation (which consisted of anonymous cyber bullying) which led to her "constructive expulsion" from the school.

The plaintiff further alleges that as a result of this retaliation, she began to suffer from severe anxiety and depression. The plaintiff seeks to proceed with her action for a Bill of Discovery by using a Pseudonym.

The plaintiff's request to proceed using a Pseudonym was initially granted on an ex parte basis. The defendants have objected to the plaintiff's continued use of a Pseudonym. The plaintiff has responded that the continued use of the Pseudonym is necessary. The plaintiff has submitted affidavits in support of her claims detailing the harassment and threats she has received and the effects they have had on her physical and emotional health.

The standard for the granting of Pseudonym status can be found in Practice Book § 11–20A(h)(1) which provides in pertinent part: "Pseudonyms may be used in place of the name of a party or parties only with the prior approval of the judicial authority and only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in knowing the name of the party or parties."

"The principle of openness of judicial proceedings includes the question of whether one may proceed anonymously therein, because the question of who is using the judicial system is ordinarily as much a part of that principle as why it is being used." For this reason, our Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be granted only in the rare case where the nature of the issue litigated and the interest of the parties demand it and no harm can be done to the public interest."

"The presumption of openness of court proceedings … is a fundamental principle of our judicial system." This policy of openness is not to be abridged lightly.

"The ultimate test for permitting a [party] to proceed anonymously is whether the [party] has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings." "A [party's] desire to avoid economic and social harm as well as embarrassment and humiliation in his professional and social community is normally insufficient to permit him to appear without disclosing his identity." "The most compelling situations [for granting a motion to proceed anonymously] involve matters which are highly sensitive, such as social stigmatization, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the [party's] identity…. There must be a strong social interest in concealing the identity of the [party]….["]

The court has reviewed the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff associated with her treatment and is aware of the scope of her alleged harm and fears. However, what the court must determine here is the appropriateness of shielding the identity of someone who has victimized another. A review of the relevant caselaw concerning applications for the use of Pseudonym status does not reveal any cases where an initial wrongdoer was allowed to proceed with a Pseudonym because of alleged harm incurred in retaliation for their wrongdoing.

The court has determined that after balancing the interests of the parties in this matter, the plaintiff's personal privacy interests do not outweigh the public's interest in the continued openness of these judicial proceedings. The defendants' objection to the continued use of a Pseudonym is therefore sustained.

James M. Sconzo and Marc G. Bernatchez (Carlton Fields, P.C.) represent the University.

The post No Pseudonymity for Apparent Hazer Suing University for Supposedly Improper Actions Against Her appeared first on Reason Magazine.

10/15/1883: The Civil Rights Cases are decided.

The post Today in Supreme Court History: October 15, 1883 appeared first on Reason Magazine.

When a president starts with a predetermined policy and then goes looking for a statutory pretext to justify it, he is building on shaky ground. President Donald Trump illustrated that point once again in July, when he announced a third round of broad tariffs after his first two attempts ran into legal trouble.

Shortly after taking office in 2025, Trump claimed to have discovered a previously unnoticed delegation of extensive tariff authority in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that does not mention import taxes and had never been used to impose them. That claim was rejected by every court that considered it.

Last February, the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all. But Trump had a backup plan: Hours after that decision, he announced another sweeping set of tariffs, this time relying on Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.

That provision allows tariffs in response to "fundamental international payments problems" caused by "serious United States balance-of-payments deficits." In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that the new tariffs were illegal because Trump had failed to "identify balance-of-payments deficits within the meaning of Section 122."

Although that decision was stayed pending appeal, Trump's Section 122 tariffs, which were subject to a 150-day statutory limit, expired on July 24. Trump then switched to Plan C, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act, which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign "act, policy, or practice" that is "unreasonable or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce.

Trump's Section 301 tariffs supposedly targeted countries that had failed to "impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor." The alleged offenders included 86 economies that accounted for nearly all U.S. imports.

In separate complaints, the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) and the law firm Akin Gump, which had played leading roles in challenging Trump's prior tariffs, immediately asked the CIT to block the new import taxes. By and large, they noted, the government had failed to explain how the targeted countries had fallen short, how their alleged failures burdened U.S. commerce, or why the new tariffs could be expected to ameliorate the problem they were supposed to address.

The LJC argued that the forced-labor issue was "simply a pretext" for reinstating Trump's "invalidated global tariff regime." It added that Trump's reading of Section 301, like his interpretation of IEEPA, would violate the "major questions" doctrine, which requires clear congressional authorization for policies of "vast economic and political significance."

This was Trump's "third attempt" to "impose essentially the same set of sweeping global tariffs," Akin Gump's lawyers wrote. "The third time's not the charm."

The post Trump Keeps Coming Up With Legally Dubious Tariff Justifications appeared first on Reason Magazine.

5 years ago
November 2021

"The PATRIOT Act was the fruit of a poisoned tree, and we can still see the shadow of its overgrowth in 2021 as the Biden administration transfers its own 'domestic terror' anxieties onto anything related to Trumpism following the January 6 melee. The administration in June issued a new strategy report on domestic terrorism, and while so far it seeks no new lawmaking power, that report troublingly insists that 'it is equally important that the Federal Government engage in efforts to prevent individuals from being drawn into the grip of domestic terrorism in the first instance. That means reducing both supply and demand of recruitment materials by limiting widespread availability online and bolstering resilience to it by those who nonetheless encounter it, among other measures.' That smacks of the sort of infiltration and harassment of people who have, as of yet, merely engaged in First Amendment protected activities."
Brian Doherty
"The PATRIOT Act's Poisoned Tree"

The PATRIOT Act's Poisoned Tree

"All across the country, mayors, city councils, governors, and judges issued emergency halts to evictions in the early days of COVID-19. The immediate justification was to keep hard-pressed renters, thrown out of work by the global pandemic, from also losing the home they'd need to safely socially distance. These eviction moratoriums were dropped into place with virtually no public discussion of the limits of bureaucratic power, the rights of private property holders, the unintended consequences, or any other ramifications of such moves. Governments simply asserted that they had these powers and then used them."
Christian Britschgi
"How the CDC Became America's Landlord"

How the CDC Became America's Landlord

40 years ago
November 1986

"The United States probably has spent too much time and too many resources containing communism, and too little time and resources spreading capitalism. The marketplace is this country's strongest institution, and the United States must learn how to use it to help the poorer countries of the world develop a vested interest in the capitalistic system. Once capitalism spreads, communism will contain itself. The best way the United States can spread capitalism is through deeds, not words. The poor countries of the world already have had too many lectures from the richer nations about the benefits of free trade, and too few examples of it. Access to the vast American market is what these countries need—and should get—to build their allegiance to a capitalistic system. American protectionism is as subversive to U.S. security interests as Soviet cooperative forces."
Melvyn Krauss
"No More Rich Bully"

No More Rich Bully

"We all know how temporary 'temporary' government programs are. And besides, aid is aid. Instead of paying the current U.S. price of $110 a ton [of wheat]—as they're supposed to do under a treaty, or contract, signed in 1983—the Kremlin's hard bargainers will now pay $85 a ton, with the difference picked up by you know who. This subsidized wheat will help the Soviets once again avoid the consequences of their oppressive and inefficient economic system. It could well start a trade war with the Europeans, Canadians, and Australians. And it will help some American farmers keep pretending that their work is economically productive."
Virginia Postrel
"Tempted to Aid? Just Say No."

Tempted to Aid? Just Say No

45 years ago
November 1981

"Nowadays, it is often feared that Americans have lost their ability to compete in new, risky, high-technology ventures. Yet there are plenty of space entrepreneurs champing at the bit to do just that. Whether or not they get their chance—and the potential benefits of space transportation and development come to be realized—depends on the course taken by the federal government."
James Bennett
"The Second Space Race"

The Second Space Race

55 years ago
November 1971

"New York's troubles stem from a deeper root. This City, the shrine/citadel of American liberalism, is so imbued with the tenets of its religion that it cannot face the reason for its failures. The reason is politics. New York's religion is Government, Social Necessity, Public Good, and attendant lesser sacraments. It has taken the faith very seriously, because it convinced itself early on that social awareness is very noble and very necessary—in sum, very humanitarian. (Or, to be more accurate, the overwhelming bulk of New York's financial and social élite convinced itself of this.)"
Mark Frazier
"New York—Death of a City"

New York—Death of a City

The post Archives: November 2026 appeared first on Reason Magazine.

I gave a lecture at Stanford Law School last week on a Fourth Amendment topic that has drawn recent attention: How Should Flock Cameras Be Regulated Under the Fourth Amendment?  The video has now been posted, and you can watch the 35-minute lecture, plus 10 minutes of Q&A, starting at the 7:30 mark in the video below.

I will probably write a short essay about these topics over the coming weeks, focusing on the latter half of the lecture, so any feedback among those who have watched the lecture is very welcome. Thanks.

The post How Should Flock Cameras Be Regulated Under the Fourth Amendment? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Dylan Hembrough, editor in chief of the student newspaper at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, contacted the school's communications office to protest a policy requiring a communications staff member to sit in on interviews between student reporters and university staff. As a result, university officials reported Hembrough to campus police for harassment. Police looked into the report, decided his comments did not constitute harassment, and recommended dropping the case. In a statement, the communications office defended the policy and said the real problem is that the student paper has printed inaccurate information and refused to retract it.

The post Brickbat: Listening In appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason Magazine.