Can Congress meaningfully constrain presidential tariff authority when an older, less restrictive statute offers an alternative route to achieve the same goal?
Can Congress meaningfully constrain presidential tariff authority when an older, less restrictive statute offers an alternative route to achieve the same goal?
Oxfam pays white staff 33% less on average than ethnic minority colleagues while Cancer Research UK and the British Red Cross aren't far behind, despite commitments to equality and fairness.
In the final weeks of Michigan’s Senate race, the Democratic nominee finds himself facing both ugly attacks and pointed questions about family members. He has pushed back forcefully.
The Department of Justice is allowing business groups to exclude Americans in posts that advertise jobs to H-1B workers and other non-immigrant foreign workers.
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to hearAssociation for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education. The case, which was originally brought forth in 2020 by the Association for Education Fairness (AFEF), a coalition of Montgomery County, Maryland, parents, alleges that Montgomery County's selection process for magnet programs (gifted programs for STEM and humanities studies in middle schools) violates the Constitution'sEqual Protection Clause by discriminating against Asian American students. The county insists that the selection process is race-neutral.
Montgomery County changed its selection process in the 2021–22 school year. According to reporting from The New York Times, the county was facing pressure from community groups, including the NAACP and Citizens Assisting and Sheltering the Abused (CASA Inc.), over the underrepresentation of black and Latino students in its magnet programs. Previously, students were selected based on test scores and grades. The new process implemented a lottery system in which high-achieving students are placed in a selection pool and selected at random.
The AFEF's central complaint is that the new system factors school poverty levels into the criteria for pool eligibility. This means students' eligibility depends on their scores relative to students in similarly affluent or disadvantaged schools, rather than the general population. They argue that since Asian Americans are concentrated in high-performing, lower-poverty schools, they have to clear a higher bar to become eligible. The group alleges the new system has caused fewer Asian American students to be admitted into magnet schools, a claim that is backed up by admissions data (which also show that the share of Asian American applications has fallen). The AFEF alsocites Montgomery County's 2015 hiring of Metis, a national consulting firm, to recommend ways to make the system more "equitable" as an indication of the county's effort to "racially balance" its magnet programs.
The complaint was dismissed by U.S. District Judge Paula Xinis in 2022, whoruled that the parents hadn't shown the policy disproportionately harmed Asian American students, citing the fact that they made up a larger share of admitted students than of the applicant pool. Xinis drew a distinction between accounting for economic disparities, which she called "wholly permissible," and racial discrimination. "Alleged disparity in treatment based on socioeconomic status alone does not make plausible discrimination on account of race," she wrote in the ruling. The tension raised by Xinis sits at the center of many debates regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion, as factors like poverty levels can often become a proxy for race; therefore, policies that are neutral on their face can still disparately impact a certain race.
In February, the 4th Circuit Court of Appealsupheld the dismissal, ruling that precedent from the Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board (2023) requires parents to show the policy disproportionately harmed Asian American applicants, which they hadn't. However, there is a real legal question as to whether racial groups should have to prove they were harmed as a group, as opposed to the individual, and lower courts have given mixed answers.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), a public-interest law firm representing the AFEF, litigated asimilar case in New York City, where the city implemented an economic need index in its admissions process for competitive high schools, aimed at increasing the number of black and Hispanic students. Again, parents alleged that the requirement discriminated against Asian American students. In 2024, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals found that if the city intended to discriminate, the parents don't have to prove Asian Americans were harmed as a group and that harm to an individual was enough for the case to move forward. The case was sent back to the district court to determine whether the city intended to discriminate, where it remains pending.
The Supreme Court will now settle the issue anddetermine "whether a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the applicant pool," according to SCOTUSBlog.
In a statement on Monday, PLF Senior Attorney Chris Kieser said, "The Constitution protects students as individuals, not as members of a racial group. A school district should not be able to defeat a discrimination claim by showing that its policy did not harm enough Asian American children. Every family deserves admissions rules that judge their child on their own merit."
NFL Hall of Famer Eric Dickerson’s family sued a California private school, alleging administrators failed to protect his sixth-grade son from repeated racial slurs, bullying, and physical attacks despite complaints from his parents.
Today, the Supreme Court decided to hear Association for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education, a challenge to "facially neutral" discrimination against Asian applicants to selective public magnet schools in Montgomery County, Maryland. The admissions criteria are, on their face, racially neutral. But evidence indicates they were likely adopted for the purpose of reducing the percentage of Asian students in entering classes. More specifically, the case addresses the issue of "[w]hether a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the applicant pool." This issue is increasingly important since the Supreme Court banned most explicit racial discrimination in college admissions (and, by extension, school admissions) in SFFA v. Harvard (2023).
The lower court ruled that, even if there is evidence that a facially neutral admissions policy was enacted for the specific purpose of reducing the number of admitted students from a specific racial or ethnic group, it must still be upheld so long as the percentage of admitted students from that group is as high or higher than the percentage of applicants from that group.
Longstanding Supreme Court precedent holds that evidence of unconstitutional motivation for "facially neutral" policies shifts the burden of proof to the government to show that they would have enacted the same policy even in the absence of illicit motives. If they fail to prove that, then the policy must be subjected to strict scrutiny, which it would be unlikely to survive. In the TJ case, the Fourth Circuit majority opinion by Judge Robert Bruce King holds that even the most blatant discriminatory motivations do not trigger strict scrutiny so long as the group being targeted for discrimination by "facially neutral" means is still represented in proportion to its percentage of the relevant population (or more). Under the new admissions policy, Asians were still 54% of accepted applicants (as compared to 73% under the old one). Since that is still higher than the Asian percentage of the applicant pool, evidence of discriminatory intent becomes irrelevant….
I and others have previously compared today's anti-Asian discrimination in selective educational institutions to discrimination against Jewish applicants in earlier eras. Under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, old-time policies using facially neutral means to reduce the percentage of Jewish students at elite universities would be perfectly legal, so long as Jewish applicants were admitted in the same [or higher] percentages as other groups. And that would be true no matter how extensive the evidence that the new policy was motivated by anti-Semitic prejudices, or that Jewish applicants had to have stronger academic records to be admitted than those required of gentiles.
The same point applies to all kinds of discrimination against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. So long as facially neutral means are used and the overall success rates of different groups are similar, this reasoning would allow even the most blatant discriminatorily motivated policies intended to reduce the participation of some groups for the benefit of others. There are many situations where members of some minority groups are "overrepresented" in educational institutions, government contracting, and elsewhere, relative to their percentage of the applicant pool or of the general population. Jews, Muslims, Asians, atheists, and Mormons are obvious examples of groups that fit that bill in a variety of educational and professional settings.
If a federal or state government adopted a seemingly neutral policy to try to reduce the percentage of blacks among professional football or basketball players, that too would pass muster, so long as the percentage of blacks in the the relevant pro sports leagues remained at least as high as the percentage of blacks among those seeking employment as players…. Progressives and others inclined to support today's decision should consider whether they are really willing to live with these troubling implications.
Since I wrote the above, the ideological valence of anti-Asian discrimination in education has shifted somewhat. For a long time, many left-wingers defended such discrimination (along with discrimination against white applicants) on the grounds that it is necessary to achieve "diversity" and compensate Blacks and Hispanics for the history of discrimination against those groups. Most conservatives condemned it because it violates principles of constitutional color-blindness.
During the second Trump Administration, however, right-wing nativists have increasingly defended discrimination against Asian immigrants on such ridiculous grounds as that they work too hard (thus making it too difficult for whites to compete with them), or even that they undermine the supposed value of racial "homogeneity." The political right actually has a long history of anti-Asian bigotry. But recently the problem has gotten much worse, after a period in which it was diminishing because conservatives (rightly) condemned such discrimination as a violation of color-blindness. The growing anti-Asian bigotry among right-wing nationalists is similar to and linked with their growing tendency towards anti-Semitism. Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, the two prejudices are similar in many respects. Both Asians and Jews are condemned for supposedly working too hard, emphasizing academics too much relative to other activities, and supposedly dominating various business and intellectual fields.
The left-wing rationales for anti-Asian discrimination are little better than the right-wing ones. If you truly value diversity, it makes no sense to disfavor Asian applicants as a class. They add as much or more to diversity as any others. Indeed, as I have pointed out before, lumping all Asians in one category makes no sense, as this group includes a vast range of different ethnicities and cultures, covering more than half the world's population.
The compensatory justice rationale for anti-Asian discrimination collapses under the weight of the fact that many Asian groups have themselves faced extensive discrimination at various times in American history. Discrimination against Chinese and Japanese by federal and state governments has a long and sordid history, of which Japanese internment during World War II is just one particularly awful example.
It is important to recognize that "facially neutral" policies adopted for the specific purpose of excluding particular racial or ethnic groups differ from those that merely have an unintended disparate impact. The former are deliberate efforts to discriminate on the basis of race, whereas the latter are probably inevitable in a diverse society where groups differ from each other in various ways. For example, laws banning violent crime disproportionately affect any group which is, on average, younger than others, since young people (especially young men) have much higher crime rates than older ones.
The Constitution at least presumptively bars racial discrimination by government, whether motivated by left-wing objectives or right-wing ones. And such discrimination is forbidden even if cloaked in "facially neutral" garb. Otherwise, the government could easily discriminate against virtually any group simply by targeting some characteristic that correlates with group membership. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will recognize that and rule the right way in this case.
NOTE: The plaintiffs in this case are represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation, a public interest group that was my wife's employer until recently. As noted above, she helped represent the plaintiffs in a previous case (also litigated by PLF), on which the lower court ruling in this case was based. She is not one of the attorneys in this case, and is no longer with PLF.
The Baltimore Rock Opera Society fired its recently hired executive director, allegedly because she was wearing her hair in cornrows and thus engaging in supposed cultural appropriation. The concern wasn't that cornrows were seen as unprofessional as such, but rather that a white woman was wearing a hairstyle that is seen as culturally black. (Katie Herzog at Blocked and Reported has a very good new podcast episode on this.)
Such a firing, I think, is illegal under federal antidiscrimination law, though it's possible (but not certain) that BROS may have a First Amendment defense, given the particular job that the woman held.
[1.] The gender identity discrimination precedent: The key precedent here is Harris Funeral Homes v. Stephens, the trans companion case to Bostock v. Clayton County. In those cases the Court held that gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination, and therefore banned by the Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination. Here's the key part of the logic behind that argument:
[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer's mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague. Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an employee to fire based in part on the employee's sex, and the affected employee's sex is a but-for cause of his discharge.
Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.
Thus, if an employer fires a biological male for presenting as a woman—wearing clothing, makeup, and hairstyles associated with women—that is presumptively illegal because it is discrimination based on sex: The employer would allow biological females to wear clothing, makeup, and hairstyles associated with women, but not biological males, so "the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision."
[2.] The same logic carries over directly to race: If an employer fires a white woman for wearing a particular hairstyle, but would allow a black woman to wear the same hairstyle, "the individual employee's race plays and unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision." (Likewise, if an employer fires employees for engaging in interracial relationships—e.g., by firing a black employee for dating a white woman but not firing white employees for dating white women—that is race discrimination, just as firing employees for engaging in same-sex relationships is sex discrimination.)
Now of course some people may well be offended by white women wearing hairstyles that are viewed as traditionally black, just as they may be offended by people whom they view as female presenting as male and vice versa, or by white women dating black men. But concern about customers and coworkers being offended isn't a legally adequate justification for discriminatory rules, even when such offense may lead to tangible loss to the employer.
Note that this is a different question from whether employers can implement a facially "race-neutral policy" that requires hairstyles to "reflect a business/professional image," and that is read as forbidding certain hairstyles (such as dreadlocks) "physiologically and culturally associated with people of African descent." (See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions (11th Cir. 2016) (upholding such a policy, precisely because the court viewed it as race-neutral.) Such a policy would apply to all employees, black or white, who wear such hairstyles. The BROS decision appears to have stemmed not from a general view that cornrows look unprofessional, but from the view that cornrows should not be worn specifically by white women (or at least women who aren't black).
[3.] Race discrimination is illegal even for small employers: Employment discrimination based on race (and ethnicity, but not sex or religion) violates not only Title VII, but also the ban on race discrimination in contracting in the federal 42 USC § 1981 statute. Section 1981 applies to employment, including by very small employers, unlike Title VII, which only covers employers with 15 or more employees. (I'm not sure how many employees the Society has; apparently it largely operates through volunteers.)
[4.] Maryland's CROWN Act treats discrimination based on "traits associated with race, including hair texture, afro hairstyles, and protective hairstyles" "includ[ing] braids, twists, and locks" as race discrimination. It's not clear whether the CROWN Act would apply to firing people for supposedly culturally appropriating traits associated with a different race. But it too has a 15-employee threshold, so we can set it aside here, and focus solely on the straight-up § 1981 race discrimination claim.
[5.] Historically, courts have allowed sex-based dress and grooming codes, such as rules requiring men to wear short hair, requiring women to wear makeup, and the like, on the theory that those policies impose "essentially equal burdens on men and women," even if the rules differ for men and women. (This is part of a pattern of allowing "separate but equal" for men and women in certain narrow situations even after that principle had been rejected as to race; the pattern is also visible in the law's tolerating single-sex bathrooms, single-sex sports teams, and single-sex colleges, where it would not do so as to race.) To quote the reasoning in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc):
In Frank v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir.2000), we dealt with a weight policy that applied different standards to men and women in a facially unequal way. The women were forced to meet the requirements of a medium body frame standard while men were required to meet only the more generous requirements of a large body frame standard. In that case, we recognized that "[a]n appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment." The United weight policy, however, did not impose equal burdens. On its face, the policy embodied a requirement that categorically "'applie[d] less favorably to one gender[,]'" and the burdens imposed upon that gender were obvious from the policy itself.
This case stands in marked contrast, for here we deal with requirements that, on their face, are not more onerous for one gender than the other. Rather, Harrah's "Personal Best" policy contains sex-differentiated requirements regarding each employee's hair, hands, and face. While those individual requirements differ according to gender, none on its face places a greater burden on one gender than the other. Grooming standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory.
We have long recognized that companies may differentiate between men and women in appearance and grooming policies, and so have other circuits. The material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, but whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an "unequal burden" for the plaintiff's gender.
Not every differentiation between the sexes in a grooming and appearance policy creates a "significantly greater burden of compliance[.]" For example, in [an earlier case], this court upheld Safeway's enforcement of its sex-differentiated appearance standard, including its requirement that male employees wear ties, because the company's actions in enforcing the regulations were not "overly burdensome to its employees [.]" Similarly, as the Eighth Circuit has recognized, "[w]here, as here, such [grooming and appearance] policies are reasonable and are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect on employment opportunities." Under established equal burdens analysis, when an employer's grooming and appearance policy does not unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will not violate Title VII.
I'm not sure that this reasoning survives Bostock and Stephens, which seem to create a much more categorical definition of sex discrimination. To quote the Supreme Court in those cases,
Nor is it a defense for an employer to say it discriminates against both men and women because of sex. This statute works to protect individuals of both sexes from discrimination, and does so equally. So an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently masculine may treat men and women as groups more or less equally. But in both cases the employer fires an individual in part because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this employer doubles it….
Finally, an employer cannot escape liability by demonstrating that it treats males and females comparably as groups…. [A]n employer who intentionally fires an individual homosexual or transgender employee in part because of that individual's sex violates the law even if the employer is willing to subject all male and female homosexual or transgender employees to the same rule.
The Court in Bostock did say that it wasn't deciding the legality of sex-based "dress codes," but its logic suggests that they are indeed illegal. And post-Bostock cases dealing with sex-based dress codes in public schools have concluded that they do indeed constitute sex discrimination. SeePeltier v. Charter Day School, Inc. (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (expressly rejecting the pre-Bostock "'comparable burdens' test for sex-specific dress codes"); Doe through Doe v. Rocky Mountain Classical Acad. (10th Cir. 2022) (likewise).
[6.] "Different but essentially equal burdens": But in any event, for BROS to defend itself by arguing that the sex-based appearance code cases apply to race discrimination, it would at the very least have to show that its "appearance standard … imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment"—i.e., that BROS would forbid black employees from wearing hairstyles associated with whites (or other non-black groups), such as straightened hair for black women.
That strikes me as quite unlikely to be true. And if I'm right, and BROS indeed imposes a "no cultural appropriation" rule only on white employees (or perhaps on non-black employees), then the cases allowing certain sex-based dress codes just wouldn't apply.
[7.] No exception for high-level nonprofit executives: I appreciate the argument that, since organizations often live or die by the goodwill of their customers, donors, and volunteers, they should be able to accommodate those groups' preferences and even prejudices in selecting at least the organization's leaders. Indeed, some antidiscrimination laws—though not § 1981—include some narrow exemptions that can be used to accommodate such preferences, as well as the preferences of the employers themselves. Title VII, for instance, exempts discrimination by elected officials in choosing their non-civil-service "personal staff," "an appointee on the policy making level," or "an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office."
Some courts have also held that partners who co-own the employer are not employees for purposes of some federal employment laws. That would generally allow partners to discriminate based on sex, religion age, disability, and similar attributes in expelling partners, forcing them to retire, and the like. (Recall that § 1981 covers all race discrimination in contracting, not just employment discrimination, so race discrimination against partners would still be illegal.)
But there is no such general exemption for high-level managers of a business or a nonprofit: Even CEOs can sue for discrimination, for instance, and so can salaried officers of nonprofits. And outside these narrow exemptions, antidiscrimination law forbids race discrimination even when it stems from the rational desire to accommodate others' preferences.
[8.] Constitutional exceptions: Finally, a last twist that offers BROS a possible defense, though it's not clear that it would work. While § 1981 categorically forbids race discrimination in contracting, there are of course some constitutional exceptions to that:
A church, for instance, has a First Amendment right to choose its clergy, without constraint by antidiscrimination laws.
A theater company (including BROS) has a First Amendment right to choose the actors it hires, even if that involves race discrimination.
Groups' right of expressive association would allow a nonprofit (such as the Boy Scouts) committed to promoting a "straight" lifestyle not to hire gay activists as people who speak for the group (that's the Boy Scouts v. Dale case); likewise, a group committed to opposing interracial relationships would presumably be entitled not to select volunteer spokespeople who are known to be in such relationships.
Creators' right not to create expression they disapprove of would likely allow them to refuse to create material promoting, say, interracial weddings or interfaith weddings as well as same-sex weddings (that's 303 Creative v. Elenis).
People's right of intimate association likely allows them to choose their roommates based on race, free of antidiscrimination law.
People's right to marry and right to sexual autonomy would likewise presumably allow them to choose spouses and sexual partners based on race, even if antidiscrimination law purported to forbid that.
But there is no constitutional right for an organization to choose its employees or partners based on race, and I don't think any court would recognize such a right as to executive directors, either. Nor do I think that BROS can fit within the Boy Scouts v. Dale exception, at least unless it can show that its having an occasionally corn-row-wearing executive director "would significantly affect its expression." ("[A]n expressive association" cannot "erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message.") It's also not clear that Dale, which arose as to volunteers covered by public accommodation law, would apply to employees. (Compare Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese (S.D. Ind. 2020), which declines to apply Dale to employment, with Youth71Five Ministries v. Williams (9th Cir. 2025), which does apply Dale to employment.)
At the same time, the scope of this exception, as to expressive nonprofits such as the Boy Scouts and BROS, is necessarily somewhat vaguely defined, and the executive director does speak for the organization to the public (and to volunteers and employees). The Boy Scouts argument would therefore probably be BROS's strongest defense.
Britain’s biggest employers set bold diversity targets – but has anyone checked the maths? Actuary Peter Crowley runs the numbers and finds the arithmetic rather less accommodating than the slogans.
Brazilian speech therapists accuse the Central Administration of the Health System (ACSS) of barring them from the profession for not speaking “European Portuguese”. A petition has already reached the government.
A temporary open-air pool erected outside Berlin’s iconic theater was supposed to represent the ultimate low-barrier urban oasis. Instead, a plan to allow only Black people to attend on Fridays has sparked outrage and accusations of racism.
Conceived as a free, non-commercial refuge requiring no identity checks — though reliant on a competitive online reservation system — the €300,000 project was introduced to the public as a shared summer meeting point. However, the organizers have implemented a protocol that excludes anyone non-Black one day this week, a clearly discriminatory practice.
Tensions arose over a specific event slated for Friday, Aug. 14. According to the official program, “During this period, the public bath is exclusively open to Black communities.”
Between 12:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., general admission is suspended. According to Berliner Zeitung, the venue’s operators added a note asking that “this collective self-designation and the associated spaces be respected.”
The event is organized in partnership with “EOTO” (Each One Teach One), a publicly funded non-governmental organization dedicated to social and cultural programming for Black individuals. Because the NGO receives financial backing from both the German federal government and the state of Berlin, the decision to restrict access during those six hours — effectively excluding white visitors —has drawn criticism from those who feel it contradicts the venue’s core mission.
When the venue was launched, organizers praised it as a communal stand against urban commercialization, describing the initiative as a open “summer invitation.” Critics now argue that reserving public infrastructure for specific demographic groups breaks that initial promise.
Notably, advocates for the Black-only policy claim racism against White people must be implemented to provide a “safe space” for communities facing systemic racism.
The pop-up installation serves as the inaugural project for incoming artistic director Matthias Lilienthal. The pool has been pushed as a practical solution to the city’s seasonal pool shortages. Nothing is said of the fact that Berlin’s population has exploded, mostly due to mass immigration, leaving many outdoor pool areas overcrowded and sometimes even violent.
Lilienthal noted to news outlet ZDF: “Half of the indoor and outdoor swimming pools are closed, so we thought we were helping the Governing Mayor Kai Wegner.”
The venue operates on a substantial budget, benefiting from over €20 million in annual public taxpayer subsidies. The pool itself, measuring 25 meters in length and 1.30 meters in depth, can host a maximum capacity of 46 swimmers simultaneously, with the total budget designed to accommodate an estimated 20,000 visitors over the course of the swimming season.
Racism against Whites is funded by the taxpayer in Germany
This is the hardly the only controversy involving race in Germany, with a number of government programs excluding White people or funding organizations that exclude White people.
Just this year, the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) vowed to cut off taxpayer money for left-wing activist groups after a Berlin organization that runs a coworking café that reportedly excludes White people received more than €662,000 in public funding.
The pattern has been seen across Germany. In August 2023, a German museum of industrial heritage in Dortmund was scolded for only allowing “Black, Indigenous, and People of Color” to enter the museum on Saturdays between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. for the “That’s Colonial” exhibition. The Zollern Colliery museum argued it was creating a “safer space” intended to protect people of color from “further discrimination.”
The exclusive access was “an offer for BIPoC and black people to be able to withdraw and exchange ideas openly,” according to the museum. “For BIPoC, such safe spaces are rarely found in everyday life or in museum rooms.”
In May 2025, the German Evangelical Church (EKD) was accused of racism after banning White children from attending a workshop on being “courageous and strong” during its Church Congress in Hanover.
The “Become Courage and Strong” workshop was, again, only open to Black, indigenous, and children of color. However, while ethnic Germans and ethnic Europeans are indigenous to Germany and Europe, the designation did not apply to them, only indigenous people from other continents.
“This offer is aimed exclusively at Black, Indigenous, and children of color,” read the program website.
The organization, which identifies as a “post-migrant education initiative,” has received significant taxpayer funding from Germans and operates a reporting center for anti-Muslim racism.
White participants were expected to pay up to €2,290 for the course that runs from March to September.
What is clear is that anti-White racism is a massive and lucrative industry in Europe, with funding amounting to tens of millions of euros, and possibly more, for tax-payer projects and NGOs targeting Whites for exclusion, ridicule, and discrimination.
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