For years, Serbia’s opposition has struggled to turn public discontent into a credible challenge to Aleksandar Vučić’s political dominance. On Sunday (25 October), a student-led movement that began with demands for accountability after a deadly train station collapse will attempt to do what established opposition forces have repeatedly failed to achieve: translate civic mobilisation into political change.

The upcoming parliamentary elections are about more than the (re)distribution of seats. They represent the endeavour citizens want and need in a democratic society.

For several years now, “the students operate according to the principles of direct democracy,” senior research associate at the University of Belgrade, Vasiljević told EUobserver. They gather in “plenums” and make collective decisions.

The motor behind that movement was anger. The lack of accountability after the collapse of a canopy at Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024, which killed 16 people was the main trigger.

Since then, protests have been taken place around in the country. Eventually, they grew into a nationwide challenge to the government. The student movement even marched from Belgrade to Brussels and Strasbourg to appeal to the EU institutions.

“It brought some irreversible changes that will have a lasting impact on society,” said Vasiljević.

And these changes could be now transposed into politics. “The country has been held captive for far too long by one ruling party and, in fact, one ruling elite,” Miloje Savić, a volunteering poll observer, told EUobserver.

For many Serbs, as for Savić, the students’ organisation represent “a tectonic shift in how society is organised and how it should function.”

The Student List, now the electoral vehicle for the mobilisation, has given people frustrated with established politics a new focus for their demands. The main idea being that political participation can be rebuilt from the ground up.

“It is not a good time to be living in Serbia. And during my life, I can’t remember a time when it was,” Ivan Bartoš, a 31-year-old organiser of student protests in Bački Petrovac told EUobserver.

Serbia, as many European countries, is suffering from an ageing population. It brings to the social debate a generational difference. On one side, the middle-aged and “corrupted” regime led by Vučić, on the other, a proposal of change without real political experience.

And the question that is heard in the run-up to the elections is “does Serbia need a professional politician who has been trained for years in kleptocracy, or is society willing to take a risk?”

Vučić’s ‘men in black’?

Yet the movement’s rise has exposed a fundamental tension: society may be changing faster than the institutions through which change must be delivered.

“The institutions have been captured and controlled by the regime. There is not enough institutional space to accommodate these political changes,” Vasiljević said.

Previous Serbian elections have been accompanied by allegations of vote-buying, voter intimidation and ballot-box stuffing. After the last ones, held in December 2023, European MP’s called for “independent investigations into the irregularities”.

Knowing what is at stake, the Student List is trained an unprecedented number of poll monitors (15,000), seeking to protect the vote and document potential irregularities.

Attacks on opposition representatives by groups of unidentified men dressed in black have repeatedly raised concerns during the rule of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

The media are not safe either.

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Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday (16 October) that the US-Russia ‘diesel deal’ came as a surprise and could lead to further sanctions relief for Moscow.

“We cannot treat the agreements concerning diesel and coal as isolated cases … gas could be next. I am absolutely convinced of that,” Zelensky told reporters in Brussels, after meeting with EU leaders. 

“The risks I am talking about are clear: sanctions could be progressively eased,” he warned.

EU leaders are expected to “regret” the diesel deal in their summit conclusions, while discussions on a new package of sanctions against Russia are still underway.

“It is not a time to release sanctions on Russia,” said EU Council president Antonio Costa on Friday, alongside EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Zelensky before the discussion with EU leaders.

“We will not lift any sanctions unless Russia ends the war,” confirmed von der Leyen, adding that Europe will keep working on “pressuring Russia”.

Europe has adopted 21 packages of sanctions on Russia since the beginning of the war, alongside the listing of thousands of individuals and entities, and is currently working on the 22nd.

But one Ukrainian senior diplomat told EUobserver that the coming months could be crucial to agree on more sanctions against Moscow, since February is seen as a possible deadline given the upcoming 2027 French presidential elections.

Russia’s economy has come under growing pressure from Western sanctions. Although a month-on-month decrease in exports was observed (six percent for fossil fuels, eight percent for crude oil), the US diesel deal could offer Moscow a potential lifeline. 

No concessions

The diesel deal is widely seen as a way to restart peace talks. At the same time, the United States is pushing Kyiv and Moscow toward a negotiated settlement, which puts Ukraine under growing pressure to come to the table, even though any deal could force it to make painful concessions.

Zelensky, however, has warned against any deal that would compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.

“Putin plans to stick around much longer. He is building a Russia that looks like North Korea,” he wrote on X.

Instead, the Ukrainian president has turned to European “real leaders”, seeking to shore up their political and military support and strengthen Kyiv’s position in any future negotiations. 

And in the words of von der Leyen, Europe is already helping Ukraine to prepare for “winter-isation”, which for Zelensky should translate into more funds and defence support.

This week, the commission disembursed €2.9bn to Kyiv to purchase drones, air defence systems, missiles, radars, electronic warfare systems and ammunition, as part of the EU’s €90bn loan, backed by EU leaders last year. 

But Kyiv has warned it will need tens of billions more to continue fighting against Russia, as the war intensifies on the front lines and the number of attacks in Ukrainian cities increases.

Ukraine’s defence needs are estimated for 2026 around €23bn and Kyiv still needs to fund a hole of roughly €69.3bn for 2027.

“We will have to increase the funding once again,” German chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Thursday before meeting EU leaders in Brussels. 

Protect Russian frozen assets

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Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels with two main requests for his meeting with EU leaders on Friday (16 October): more funds for Kyiv for defence and more sanctions against Russia. 

“All of us in Europe want this war to end. And for that to happen, strong signals are needed – more real pressure on Russia and more defence support for Ukraine,” he said on X.

“It is especially important now to act together to protect lives,” he added.

Zelensky’s plea comes days after US president Donald Trump announced a deal to bring Russian diesel to the US and global markets, raising questions about the consistency of Western efforts to restrict Russia’s energy revenues that are feeding the Kremlin war machine. 

EU leaders are expected to “regret” the Trump-Putin deal in their summit conclusions, where they also mention more financial, humanitarian and diplomatic support to Kyiv ahead of what many predict to be one of the most difficult winters for Ukraine.

Dutch PM Rob Jetten said the diesel deal was “not a good step”, adding that “Europe has to show that we are not only dependent on the US”.

But he also appealed directly to the US, calling for more support: “Do what is necessary to support the Ukrainians. They need not only sufficient weapons to defend Ukraine, but also the information they need to repel Russian attacks.”

Despite the diesel deal, Estonian PM Kristen Michal, whose country hosts a US military base, also said the US is still a “partner” of Europe in the war in Ukraine.

“We will see what happens in the midterm elections. But I will never give up trying to talk to and convince … our transatlantic partners that we are better off united than divided on this issue,” European Parliament president Roberta Metsola said during a press conference on Thursday after meeting EU leaders.

And in a warning to Moscow about Nato’s unity, US top military commander Alexus Grynkewich also said earlier this week in Warsaw that any “foolish” attack on the Nato alliance would be “utterly futile”.

Funding gap

In December 2025, EU leaders failed to agree to use over €210bn in Russian frozen funds sitting in Europe and instead decided to go for a €90bn loan, aimed at covering about two-thirds of Ukraine’s external financing needs. 

“The remaining third is the problem,” Tetiana Shevchuk, from the Kyiv-based Anti-Corruption Action Center, told EUobserver, referring to commitments by other countries like Canada and Japan coming only for 2026. “2027 is the real gap”.

The €90bn loan is split into €45bn for 2026 and 2027, but recent reports point to about a €23bn financial gap amid an expected Russian escalation ahead of the winter. 

Zelensky has asked Brussels to bring forward part of the loan to cover this gap in the defence ministry. But Brussels fears this advance “could unravel the compromise on gradual instalments and leave a hole later in 2027,” Shevchuk also said.

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The Black Sea has become a new frontline between Russia and Ukraine, as the two agricultural powers join battle to halt each other’s exports.

On Tuesday (13 October), the Ukrainian-owned Chelsea 3, sailing under a Maltese flag, was struck by three drones only 30km off Bulgaria.

According to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev, two ships were hit by drones, one of which sank.

The recent incidents underline the vulnerability of commercial shipping in a region where Russia and Ukraine depend on maritime routes for their international trade.

And on the coast, Bulgaria’s position is particularly sensitive, as a Nato member bordering the Black Sea.

EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen condemned the attacks on social media, calling them an “escalation” of the Russian war in Ukraine.

Nato general secretary Mark Rutte also reiterated the alliance’s commitment to regional security. “Nato would continue working closely with its Black Sea allies and had strengthened its posture along the eastern flank,” he said.

Shipping route under pressure

For Ukraine, access to the Black Sea is essential to exporting grain, sunflower oil, metals and other goods.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian Black Sea ports handled exports worth more than $40bn (€35.74bn).

Russian attacks on port infrastructure and shipping have severely undermined this trade, while the threat of further strikes raises the cost and risk of operating in the region.

Severe problems with Ukrainian agricultural exports became apparent as early as August, when the country managed to export only 20 percent of the grain it had shipped during the same period the previous year.

“With grain, it is more difficult,” Ukrainian agriculture minister Taras Vysotsky said.

He added that Ukraine’s domestic market was not suffering for now. Although buckwheat could become scarce, the main challenge for Kyiv now is to be able to export the supplies before they perish.

And alternative routes offer only partial relief.

Ukraine has increasingly relied on Danube ports, including Izmail and Reni, with cargo moving towards Romania’s Constanța port before being transferred to larger vessels for international markets.

But this corridor is under growing pressure from low water levels on the Danube, congested terminals and also drone attacks.

Waiting times for vessels seeking access to the river have exceeded two weeks.

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More than a third of people who receive warnings of disasters are unable to act before they strike, according to a global poll. Social resilience has fallen also in Poland, Greece, and France.

The findings, published by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation on Tuesday (13 October), drew on more than 143,000 interviews conducted by Gallup across 140 countries in 2025.

They show that an estimated 1.1 billion people – one in five adults worldwide – experienced a disaster in the previous five years.

Almost 220 million received no warning at all.

“A warning is only as good as what people are able to do with it,” said Nancy Hey, director of evidence and insight at Lloyd’s Register Foundation’s Global Safety Evidence Centre.

The gap between being warned and being able to respond is stark between rich and poor countries. Adults in low-income countries were almost twice as likely to have been affected by a disaster as those in high-income countries, at 31 percent compared with 16 percent.

Yet only 64 percent of affected adults in low-income countries received a warning, against 84 percent in high-income countries.

Even when warnings arrive, they do not guarantee safety.

The challenge is not simply to warn people when disaster approaches, but to ensure they have the means and support to act.

Fewer than half of warned adults in low- and lower-middle-income countries were able to act, compared with 71 percent in high-income countries.

Europe’s resilience is unequal

The report’s companion study, ‘A resilient life: How wellbeing shapes the capacity to cope’, pictures the preparedness to act under pressure — including in wealthier countries.

“There are some changes that are happening in Europe that I’m not seeing in other parts of the world,” Hey told EUobserver.

Across the EU, 77 percent of people affected by a disaster received a warning, compared with 80 percent globally.

But only 59 percent of those warned could act, against 64 percent worldwide and 71 percent in high-income countries.

“Some of the biggest drops globally have been in Greece, Netherlands, Estonia, and France, which is surprising given that generally that measure is going upwards,” Hey said.

Just 29 percent of EU households have a disaster plan, and only 28 percent of people think their national government is well prepared for a disaster.

Meanwhile, 44 percent say their government does not care about them at all, compared with 29 percent globally.

The differences between countries are stark.

In France, 80 percent of those affected received warnings, but only 61 percent could act. Just 22 percent of households have a disaster plan, compared with 47 percent in Germany and 60 percent in Austria. And overall, France’s social resilience has fallen six points since 2021.

Greece faces a deeper crisis of preparedness and confidence.

Only 55 percent of disaster-affected people received warnings, and just 39 percent of those warned could act. Only 12 percent believe their government is well prepared, while 70 percent say it does not care about them.

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Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country remains deeply divided along ethnic and political lines.

The agreement brought peace, but its complex political system has done little to overcome those divisions. Republika Srpska, the predominantly Serb entity, has pursued an increasingly divergent political course, while Serbia and Croatia maintain close ties with different parts of the country.

And for Christian Schmidt, the international community’s high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021-26) the main threat is no longer a return to war, but political stagnation and growing frustration.

He says that weak civic engagement, slow progress towards EU membership and the influence of Russia and neighbouring countries are reinforcing Bosnia’s divisions. Young people, he says, are increasingly responding by leaving the country.

In this interview, Schmidt discusses foreign influence, the EU’s role, the legacy of Dayton, and why Bosnia’s future may depend on whether it can build a stronger political community across its ethnic divisions.

A country that remains divided

You started your work in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021 and were there for five years. It was a period of major changes, with COVID and then the war in Ukraine. What were your experiences of these moments. How has the situation in Bosnia evolved?

I think there has not been sufficient involvement. Civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not very strong. It is, more than just politically, somehow divided on political issues. This prevents a joint political position or commitment from civil society to make more progress in democratic development and European integration.

So far, I don’t see that this has changed very much. It has also not changed that some parties, especially the SNSD, [Serb nationalist Milorad] Dodik’s party, but honestly not only them, are counting on ethnic differences as an argument for supporting their party instead of having a multi-ethnic approach. One can be doubtful about their real pro-European commitment.

Russia and its influence

When civil society is not engaged and when countries are not politically stable, we know that they are prone to interference from other states or political entities. Is this being seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

It is evident that neighbouring countries, especially Serbia and Croatia, have a kind of preferred relationship with parts of the country. This is, by the way, also established in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement]. So it is not necessarily something that is not in line with Dayton [Agreement].

But there is beyond this more interference if I refer, for example, to Serbia’s reaction on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 2024 about establishing an international day of commemoration for the Srebrenica genocide. There was a really remarkable attack against this, despite the fact that Serbia was not named in the resolution. There were only named individuals who had committed war crimes or genocide.

But it was used to create a “Pan-Serbian declaration”, which can be seen as a way of bringing cultural issues of the same ethnic group closer together. It has to be seen additionally as a tool to try to gain more political influence in the other part of the country.

You mentioned Croatia and Serbia. Is Russia also playing a role in these interferences?

Yes, but not ethnic interference. It is more through traditional good relations, especially with the Orthodox community, which is basically the Serb Orthodox community, where there are relations and a lot of activities, including in the media and on social media.

They [Russia] try to influence a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially Banja Luka and Republika Srpska, and Dodik is somehow to act as an influencer for Russian interests. This is indeed the case. Dodik has been sitting together with [Russian president Vladimir] Putin for the 11th time since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. This is really remarkable.

How important is Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dodik for Russia and for Putin?

The economic and political-strategic importance is nearly zero. But it can be used as a way of distracting from European and somehow American activities, just by giving them a negative impact on everything. So this is more seen as a tool, rather than an area of influence.

EU— only accession talks?

Does the EU have a role in fighting such interference — Russian, but also the ethnic interference from Croatia and Serbia?

The ethnic relationships are within the framework of Dayton, and they are acceptable. But I think it is very important that the EU makes it clear that European integration is not based on ethnic differences, but on uniting in diversity.

This is something that is very complicated. You cannot do this only with programmes or money. I think these challenges are the typical issues that you can address through European commitment, but in the details, it has not delivered.

Unfortunately, maybe the European Union should sit down again and think about more tools and opportunities, especially addressing civil society, to give more attraction to the European idea.

How would that work?

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An annual conference on foreign information manipulation opened in Vilnius this week with a sensitive question on its agenda: Can the United States be considered a threat to Europe’s information space?

And the question caused a diplomatic incident.

EU DisinfoLab’s annual #Disinfo2026 conference, held in Vilnius on 7 and 8 October, brings together researchers, journalists, civil society groups, technology specialists and policymakers working on “foreign information manipulation and interference”, known as FIMI in EU jargon.

The programme was to look at moving beyond analysis of disinformation to practical responses, including disruption, deterrence, and litigation. 

But shortly before the conference several of its government supporters withdrew their official backing.

The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the European External Action Service (EEAS) all disappeared from the conference’s list of sponsors.

The dispute centred on a panel entitled “USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back”.

According to the published programme, the session asked how the European counter-disinformation community could build resilience without Washington and what solidarity should look like in a fractured transatlantic relationship. 

Reuters reported that the US State Department had lobbied Canada and European allies over their support for the conference.

Three US officials familiar with the matter and correspondence reviewed said American officials had contacted counterparts in Lithuania, Canada and France.

And the US diplomats persuaded the Canadian and Lithuanian foreign ministries to distance themselves.

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The Alfa Watan, a ship sailing under the flag of Togo, and the Able, a vessel flying the flag of Palau, were targeted by naval and aerial drones on Tuesday (6 October) morning in the Black Sea near the Bulgarian coast.

The Alfa Watan sank, and rescuers at the scene found only an overturned boat, life jackets, and fragments of the ship’s equipment, according to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev.

The 18-member crew of the Able caught fire, but was successfully evacuated to the port of Varna.

“This is an unacceptable attack in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone,” Radev said after an emergency government meeting on Tuesday.

Bulgaria had discussed the drone attack inside the EU and Nato, he added.

It came after a drone also sank a Turkish-owned grain ship, the Royad Mammadov, killing two sailors, on Monday.

But even though Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to blame Russia, the perpetrators have not been formally identified yet, in a grey-zone conflict in which deniability is a tactic.

Russia and Ukraine have been escalating attacks on ships for several months in an effort to disrupt each other’s export economies.

And Moscow’s attacks have largely halted Ukraine’s maritime exports of agricultural products, while Kyiv’s attacks have forced Russia to seek alternative routes for exports.

“The situation in the Black Sea is increasingly concerning,” said EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen on X on Tuesday.

Ukraine has “proposed concrete steps to de-escalate the situation”, also said Zelensky.

But for all his good will, the attacks were just part of a broader deterioration in Europe’s security environment, covering also Nato’s eastern and southern borders.

‘Shadow war’

For Czech president Peter Pavel, speaking to Czech daily Deník N on 22 September, the most imminent danger came from a false-flag attack in Estonia or Latvia, to test Nato’s resolve.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina’s election, held on Sunday (4 October), has reinforced the country’s deep ethnic and political divisions, with nationalist parties retaining a strong grip on power and low turnout underscoring voters’ growing disillusionment with a political system that has long frustrated the country’s ambitions to join the European Union.

Public support for EU membership remains strong. According to a 2026 survey by Bosnia’s directorate for European integration, 74.4 percent of citizens said they would vote for EU membership in a referendum. Even in Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb component, where support is lower, 54.1 percent said they would back joining the bloc.

And Bosnia became an EU candidate in 2022, but its path towards membership remains stalled.

The European Commission has identified 14 priorities that the country must address before it can move towards opening accession negotiations. So far, it has not opened a single accession-talks chapter and does not have a chief negotiator for EU membership.

Meanwhile, Bosnia’s complicated political system, built around three constituent ethnic groups, continues to hamper the adoption of reforms.

Forgotten elections

The Bosnian nationwide turnout was just 42 percent, reflecting political apathy, but the complexity of its system also means few people in the EU followed what went on.

Instead of a single president, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a tripartite presidency comprising one Bosniak (South Slavic ethnic group), one Croat, and one Serb.

Voters registered in the federation may vote for either the Bosniak or Croat member, but not both. Voters in Republika Srpska elect the Serb member.

From the provisional results, on Sunday, Denis Becirović won a second term as the Bosniak member of the presidency with 38.12 percent.

He is to be joined by Darijana Filipović (46.55 percent) of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) as the Croat member, and Željka Cvijanović of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) as the Serb member (55.37 percent).

The Bosnian system excludes citizens who do not identify as Serb, Croat, or Bosnian from standing for the presidency.

And the post-war power sharing agreement includes 14 parliaments and governments in total for the country of some 3.1 million people, making reforms hard to push through.

But amid the complexities, the biggest winner from Sunday’s elections could be Serb nationalist politician Milorad Dodik, while the big loser could be the EU, according to Adi Ćerimagić, a senior analyst on the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative think tank.

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Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.

Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.

Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.

In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.

And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.

For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.

But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.

And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.

“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.

Stress test shows EU cracks

“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.

And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.

“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.

“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.

She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.

But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.

Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.

And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.

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