Amid reports that the US has virtually exhausted all its long-range precision munitions, as well as missile interceptors, it is becoming increasingly clear that Washington is in no position to fight a protracted war with Iran and has no real leverage over Tehran.

On August 5, CNN reported that the US military has exhausted nearly 80% of its interceptors for a key missile defense system.

“The US military has burned through nearly four-fifths of its THAAD missile inventory compared to pre-war numbers and roughly half of its Patriot interceptors since the start of the war, according to two sources familiar with the latest inventory report,” it said.

Similarly, the US has exhausted virtually the entire stockpile of highly accurate long-range missiles, such as ATACMS and PrSMs.

Consequently, any possible US-Iran ceasefire agreement is likely to be on terms favorable to Tehran.

During previous rounds of negotiations, Iran has indicated that while it is agreeable to some compromise on the nuclear issue, it will not compromise on the issue of managing the shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and charging a fee from all ships transiting the narrow maritime corridor.

For instance, according to the June 2026 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed between Tehran and Washington, Iran will make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels “with no charge for 60 days only,” followed by dialogue with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states, “to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz… in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states.”

Iranian officials interpreted the limited 60-day free period plus the “maritime services” reference as implicitly allowing “service fees” for navigation, security, and environmental protection, once the 60-day window has lapsed.

While the US administration rejected this interpretation, the US media itself, including The New York Times, acknowledged that the language of the MoU was vague and that it formalized Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Again, multiple media outlets reported earlier this week that Iran and Oman are close to finalizing a deal between them for joint management of the Strait of Hormuz.

Details included Iranian management of vessel entry, joint oversight of exits near the Oman coast, and a “central corridor.”

According to a Reuters report published on August 6, Iran is seeking fees of ​between 5% and 7% of the price of cargoes from ships using the strait, according to the senior Iranian official. Oman is discussing fees of around 3%, while Washington wants ‌no fees ⁠at all.

In normal (pre-war) times, the narrow waterway handled roughly 20–21 million barrels per day of crude and petroleum products, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the world’s total oil consumption and roughly 25% of seaborne oil trade.

According to a Gulf News estimate, this would generate a net profit of US$385 million per day for Iran, or up to US$140 billion per year gross.

At an oil price of US$80/barrel, the cargo is worth US$160 million; a 7% fee would equal roughly US$11–11.2 million for that one voyage.

Given that Iran would have to spend a minimal amount of money to oversee the entry of cargo vessels into the Strait of Hormuz, most of this annual revenue of USD140 billion would be ‘net profit’ for Tehran.

Even if Iran spends USD5 billion annually on these expenses, Tehran would still pocket a net profit of USD135 billion.

That is a staggering amount.

For perspective, Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority reported US$4.67 billion in revenue for the 2025/2026 fiscal year.

The income of Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority looks meager when compared to Iran’s prospective income from the Strait of Hormuz if indeed it is able to charge a 7% fee on all cargo vessels passing the maritime corridor.

Indeed, Iran will get control of the world’s most lucrative and profitable tollway.

The disruption in the Hormuz traffic during the last four months has shown that many countries would not mind paying a fee to Tehran as long as it can ensure a steady supply of oil and LNG from the maritime corridor, even if there is no provision under the International Law (International Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS) allowing a coastal state like Iran to charge for passage through a natural waterway, impose a “toll” or a “service fee”.

In fact, according to Bloomberg, Iran has already started charging a transit fee from commercial vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The report said that Iran charged as much as USD 2 million per vessel as a transit fee, and many countries paid the fee to Tehran to let their cargo vessels pass from the narrow maritime corridor.

Reports also said that these payments were made in Chinese Yuan.

In March, Lloyd’s List reported that Iran’s IRGC ran a de facto “toll booth” system requiring vetting, clearance codes, and escorts via a controlled corridor.

Meanwhile, the Financial Times reported that transits were mostly linked to Chinese, Indian, or Gulf-linked owners, including some “dark fleet” vessels.

What’s even more is that at USD 135 billion, Iran’s profit from the Strait of Hormuz would beat some of the world’s biggest and most profitable technology companies.

For instance, in 2025, Google’s Alphabet made a profit of USD 132 billion.

Similarly, in fiscal year 2026, Nvidia made a profit of USD 120 billion. Apple made a profit of USD 112 billion. Microsoft made a profit of USD 101 billion. And Saudi Arabia’s oil major Aramco made a profit of USD 105 billion.

These are some of the world’s biggest technology and oil companies, which have reached here after years of hard work and innovation.

However, if Iran’s plans to collect a 5-7% toll fee from all commercial cargo vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz materialize, Iran will start making more profit than these companies from the first year.

Furthermore, this would be a vicious cycle, as a toll fee of 5-7% would mean that oil prices would go up. This would also mean that insurance prices for these cargo vessels would shoot up, further increasing the oil prices.

As oil prices rise, the absolute value of Iran’s proposed 5–7% toll – calculated on cargo value – would increase in tandem. Consequently, Tehran would benefit twice over: its toll revenues would grow both from higher shipping volumes and from escalating oil prices.

Notably, Iran holds the world’s third-largest oil reserve.

In addition to this windfall gain, another condition of the June Iran-US MoU was that Washington would “undertake with regional partners to develop a definitive mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Another condition was: “The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MoU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations.”

Estimates of the frozen assets involved ranged from roughly US$12–37 billion; however, some Iranian sources claimed that the frozen assets amounted to over USD 100 billion.

If all these conditions are met, Iran would get a windfall of over USD 500 billion within the first two years. A substantial part of this money is set to be invested in the further development of Iran’s ballistic missile program.

In effect, it could mean that a few years down the line, Iran could be a much stronger adversary, militarily as well as economically.

The repercussions of that for the US and Israel could be devastating.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee  News, Economic Times, and Microsoft  News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Iran’s $500 Billion Bonanza: How Trump Could Enrich Iran More Than Apple, Nvidia & Microsoft Combined appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Australia is poised to become the first international buyer of the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), one of the US Air Force’s (USAF) best-kept secrets and unarguably its longest-range air-to-air missile.

Speaking at the ongoing multi-national military drills, Exercise Pitch Black, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said the country will invest “almost” $736 million AUD, or about $518 million USD, to acquire “up to 450” missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

The missiles would be acquired through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route.

“This announcement is the latest milestone in the delivery of long-range, high‑tech capabilities for our Defense Force,” Marles said in Darwin. “The Albanese government continues to deliver critical capabilities that will allow the ADF to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary, and protect our national interests. It is fitting to make this announcement at Exercise Pitch Black, which is an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the peace, stability, and security of our region.”

The AIM-260 is apparently designed to succeed the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is already extensively used by the RAAF.

The missile will initially be integrated on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and later fielded on the F-35A and EA-18G Growler, according to the Australian Defense Department. However, there is speculation that the missile may eventually be fitted to the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, which has already test-fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM.

With this acquisition, Australia will officially become the first export customer of the JATM, even before allies like Israel.

Interestingly, the AIM-260 JATM purchase continues a pattern in which Australia serves as an early or exclusive partner for advanced US systems. For example, Canberra was the first international customer for the Super Hornet, the first and the only export customer for the EA-18G Growler, the first international buyer of the AGM-158 JASSM and AGM-158C LRASM long-range missiles, the first non-US customer for the MH-60R military helicopter, and only the second country (after the UK) approved to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Australia is also the only nation outside the United States assembling GMLRS rockets, and one of only two countries (alongside the UK) granted access to highly restricted U.S. nuclear propulsion technology for submarines under AUKUS.

Moreover, the Australian Shadow ministers are proposing the purchase of the B-21 Raider bomber from the US to fill the capability gap until the AUKUS submarines arrive, a possibility first publicly examined by Marles in 2022 and referenced in the 2023 Defense Strategic Review, as previously reported by EurAsian Times.

Australia’s official announcement to purchase the AIM-260 JATM once again validates the strength of these strategic ties. “The acquisition of the AIM-260 JATM will provide Air Force platforms with a credible deterrent against airborne targets, complementing existing air-to-air missile capabilities and other surface-based missile capabilities across the Australian Defense Force (ADF). It will also further enhance Australia’s interoperability with the United States,” the Australian Department of Defense said in a statement.

More significantly, though, it marks a major improvement in the RAAF’s combat capacity in the face of China’s growing Indo-Pacific security threat. 

AIM-260 JATM Against China

Although the announcement did not name China, Australian strategic documents and officials consistently identify Beijing’s rapid military expansion as the primary security challenge in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2023 Defense Strategic Review described China’s build-up as “the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War,” conducted “without transparency or reassurance,” and noted that Chinese actions in the South China Sea undermine the rules-based order in ways that affect Australian interests.

Australian leaders have repeatedly flagged China’s coercive behavior in territorial disputes, unsafe intercepts of ships and aircraft, and growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific, which Canberra has historically considered its own sphere of influence.

Experts have also suggested that Australia may get dragged into a US-China conflict in the future. Although Canberra has never officially confirmed that it would join forces with the US military in a military contingency, it hosts several US military facilities that may come under attack by Chinese long-range missiles, as explained in detail by a previous EurAsian Times report.

Although ties between Australia and China have stabilized in recent times, Canberra has committed billions of dollars to acquire advanced, high-tech missiles as part of a broader strategy to safeguard the nation, deter potential adversaries, and defend national interests.

Marles had earlier highlighted that this involves turning Australia into a “porcupine island,” fully armed with deadly weapons to thwart any attacking nation. The acquisition of the AIM-120 JATM aligns with this approach, especially given that China has developed an array of long-range air-to-air missiles in recent years. 

The AIM-260 JATM is considered a response to the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile. China has purportedly produced and deployed at least 500 J-20 fighter jets, each capable of carrying up to 8 PL-15 missiles that have a range of 200 to 300 kilometers.

Additionally, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing very long-range air-to-air missiles (VLRAAM) that can strike targets. A previous Pentagon report stated that China already has the PL-17 VLRAAM and is working on a more advanced long-range missile, PL-XX or PL-21.

In contrast, the existing AIM-120 AMRAAM in the RAAF arsenal has a range of about 150-160 kilometers, even in its most advanced iteration.

With long-range, greater kinematic performance and improved guidance, the AIM-260 JATM will allow Australian fighters to engage threats earlier and from safer distances. Moreover, it could be integrated on multiple RAAF jets, giving the service a common advanced air-to-air weapon across its main combat aircraft.

The AIM-260 JATM Is Coming

The existence of the AIM-260 JATM was initially confirmed in 2019 during an Air Force Life Cycle Management Center industry conference. Due to its sensitivity, the AIM-260 JATM is classified as a Special Access Program (SAP), and details about the missile remain scarce.

In 2022, General Mark Kelly, the head of the United States Air Force’s Air Combat Command, shared an artist’s concept of the Lockheed Martin F-22 firing an AIM-260 JATM.

More recently, the US Navy publicly revealed the rendering of the missile in February 2025. At the time, experts inferred that it was comparable in appearance to the AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missile, including in size.

Nonetheless, the AIM-260 appears to have a larger rocket motor section and no mid-body surfaces, unlike the AIM-120.

Although little is known about the covert missile, reports suggest it will be powered by dual-pulse rocket motors or ramjets to increase its range and performance.

Experts anticipate that the AIM-260 will have an advanced multi-mode seeker system that may include infrared imaging and active radar. They claim that the dual-seeker system will improve resilience to electronic warfare countermeasures and increase accuracy.

Like the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM derivative, the AIM-260 is anticipated to have a two-way datalink. This feature would greatly increase the missile’s efficacy in networked battle by enabling mid-course targeting upgrades or re-targeting.

After initially being introduced with the USAF’s Raptor, the missile will eventually be fitted to the F-35 and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F. In fact, the AIM-260 JATM will also likely arm the US Navy’s F-47 sixth-generation combat aircraft, which is currently under development.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post AIM-260 JATM: Australia To Become 1st International Buyer of “Secretive” U.S. Long-Range Missile appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The United Kingdom lost its global empire by the mid-twentieth century – and with it, its status as the world’s pre-eminent military power.

Today, according to the Global Firepower Index, Britain ranks as the world’s eighth-strongest military, while the IMF places it as the fifth-largest economy, just marginally ahead of India.

Yet in one domain it still stands at the very top: the shadowy world of intelligence and spycraft.

MI6, the UK’s foreign intelligence service, has been ranked as the most powerful foreign intelligence service in Europe ahead of France and the Netherlands, according to a peer review.

The British service topped a field of 25 countries, finishing well ahead of France’s DGSE in second place.

The British intelligence agency scored 251 points in the research and was commended for its expertise in recruiting high-level informants and penetrating the ruling elites in Russia, China, Iran and Turkey, according to the review by 60 professionals from 25 countries.

The review was conducted by French magazine L’Express, which contacted people in state services de renseignements (intelligence services) to rate their counterparts in the Western-allied countries.

After MI6, France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) finished in second place with 169 points for its global reach and operational capability, the Times reported.

Notably, there was a gap of 82 points between first and second place, underscoring MI6’s huge lead over its continental rivals.

The Netherlands came third with 97 points. Ukraine was fourth with 77 points, and Germany was fifth with 62 points, followed by Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Poland and Denmark. Slovakia was rated the weakest.

The UK spy agency was praised for its global reach and for its long-term human intelligence (HUMINT) work, recruiting high-level sources and penetrating elites in top adversary countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran.

MI6 was also praised for its patience, often investing in developing sources for decades. The agency was also praised for its willingness to use bold tactics.

A former head of the DGSE said: “The British have the ability to play the long game, investing in sources over a 10-year horizon, somewhat like the Russians. And they have a taste for dirty tricks.”

Olivier Mas, a senior DGSE officer until 2017, pointed to recruitment as a factor.

He said “all European intelligence services draw inspiration from British methods” and noted that “the best from Cambridge and Oxford join MI6.”

As many as eight out of the last 10 MI6 chiefs attended Oxford or Cambridge.

These strengths of MI6 have practical advantages.

For instance, Britain was the first to warn Ukraine about the likelihood of the Russian invasion that began in February 2022.

London has also been one of the staunchest allies of Kyiv during the war. Less than six weeks after the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson also visited Kyiv and promised Ukraine full support.

The exploits of MI6 are also recognized by the CIA, the US foreign spy agency.

Ralph Goff, a former chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia at the CIA, told the magazine: “The British are in the lead on the Ukrainian file. We are right behind them.”

Robert Gorelick, a former CIA station chief, added: “The United Kingdom has by far the strongest secret services in Europe. MI6 is extraordinary.”

Notably, last year, Blaise Metreweli became the first woman ever to lead MI6, taking over from Sir Richard Moore.

Earlier in 2022, Israel’s spy agency Mossad announced that a female officer, known only as Agent “A,” has assumed the post of Director of the Intelligence Authority (parallel to the Head of the IDF Intelligence Branch), the first woman in the history of the Mossad to hold the office.

While MI6 was praised for its human intelligence, the French spy agency DGSE was rated as one of the world’s best in counter-terrorism.

The service is renowned for its clandestine operations to “eliminate” people deemed a threat to French security. François Hollande, the former French president, spoke publicly about ordering at least 40 operations to assassinate “high value” targets in the Middle East and Africa, according to a 2017 book.

A Polish intelligence executive told L’Express: “It is the only service in continental Europe with near-global reach. They combine technical collection, human intelligence and operational action capabilities.”

A Brief History of MI6

MI6, formally the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), was established in 1909. At that time, due to the growing fears of German espionage, Britain established its own spy service, known as the Secret Service Bureau.

It had two divisions: the Home Section, which later became MI5, was responsible for domestic security, and the Foreign Section, the forerunner of MI6.

The Foreign Section was led by Captain Sir Mansfield Cumming, a Royal Navy officer. He became the first Chief of the service and signed documents with a green-ink “C” – a tradition that continues to this day. The service is still headed by a Chief known simply as “C.”

The service got its initiation by fire just five years later during the First World War when it ran several agent networks behind German lines in occupied Europe.

After the war and German defeat, the newly-established Soviet Union became its primary theatre of operation.

Again, during the Second World War, it worked in close collaboration with American and Free French allies, and had important links to the codebreakers at Bletchley Park.

Bletchley Park was where Alan Turing and other agents of the Ultra intelligence project decoded the enemy’s secret messages, most notably those that had been encrypted with the German Enigma and Tunny cipher machines. Experts have suggested that the Bletchley Park code breakers may have shortened the war by as much as two years.

After the war, it helped establish a lasting partnership with the newly created CIA.

During the Cold War, once again, the service’s primary target became the Soviet Union and its allies.

However, its reputation suffered severe damage from the discovery of the Cambridge Five spy ring, a group of five British elite intelligence officers – Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, and John Cairncross – who spied for the Soviet Union from the 1930s through the early 1950s. Recruited while students at Cambridge University, they leaked thousands of secret documents to the Soviets.

However, MI6 was also able to recruit some high-profile Soviet spy agency KGB agents as its informers.

For instance, a senior KGB officer, Oleg Gordievsky, became an informer for the British spy agency. Gordievsky was one of the highest-ranking Soviet moles ever handled by the West.

Over more than a decade (1974-1985), he provided MI6 with extraordinary intelligence on Soviet intentions, agent networks, and the Kremlin’s thinking. His reporting is widely credited with helping avert a potential nuclear confrontation during the 1983 Able Archer crisis when the Soviets misread a NATO exercise as preparation for a first strike.

In 1985 MI6 successfully exfiltrated him from Moscow in a daring operation, code-named Pimlico, after his cover was blown.

Recently declassified documents suggest that MI6 also provided valuable inputs to India on Sikh separatist activities and Khalistani terrorists during the early 1980s.

Since the end of the Cold War, priorities have shifted toward counter-terrorism, cyber threats, nuclear proliferation, and state actors such as Russia, China, and Iran.

MI6’s work is also credited with uncovering the global nuclear black market network developed by Pakistan’s disgraced nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who was clandestinely supplying nuclear secrets, blueprints, and components to many countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

However, it must be noted that due to the very nature of spycraft, often operating in shadows, many of MI6’s most daring operations remain classified and will be known only much later.

The post British MI6 Ranked Europe’s Top Spy Agency in Major Peer Review, French DGSE Takes Second Spot appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Tax authorities in Greece uncovered a smugglers ring illegally extracting and collecting protected red corals around the island of Skopelos. The value of the illegal cargo is estimated at 800,000 euros. The perpetrators who collected the precious corals had rented a pleasure boat. Their movements were suspicious and were arrested by inspectors of Independent Public […]

The post Red coral smugglers ring uncovered in Skopelos; Italians arrested appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

For decades, the US has maintained an unassailable lead in aircraft carriers.

The US currently operates 11 flattops, all of them nuclear-powered. China is a distant second with three aircraft carriers, none of them nuclear-powered.

The US operates roughly half of the world’s true aircraft carriers. However, for years, the security analysts in Washington have been wargaming for a nightmarish scenario.

What if the US’s carrier fleet is not a force multiplier, but a strategic vulnerability? Or, to put it another way, can Beijing sink the US Navy’s aircraft carriers?

These questions have assumed significance ever since China claimed to have developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), the DF‑21D and DF‑26B, also known as “carrier-killers.”

These ASBMs are part of China’s broader A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) architecture intended to push U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) beyond the first island chain.

In the last decade, several wargames, research studies, think‑tank reports, and opinion columns have wondered whether carriers are becoming obsolete, the new battleships – large, complex, and expensive systems – but vulnerable to cheap, long‑range missiles.

But a new Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) research paper has flipped the script: if US carriers are vulnerable, why can’t Washington also hold China’s new carriers at risk?

Are Aircraft Carriers Becoming Obsolete? 

In 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that researchers at North University of China claimed that it took an average of only 24 hypersonic missiles to sink the USS Gerald R. Ford and its five escort ships across 20 simulated battles.

From an economic point of view, that would imply that for every $1 China spends on new classes of low-cost hypersonic missiles, it could destroy $10,858.59 worth of U.S. capital ships.

A British study published in 2024 found that their carriers – the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales – were similarly at risk.

Not just think tanks, even senior US government figures have expressed similar fears.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said in a recent podcast interview: In wargames against China, ‘We lose every time.”

The secretary went further, linking US defeat to the vulnerability of aircraft carriers: “We know what our real capability [is]…If our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe . . . and if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what
does that look like?”

But if US carriers are so vulnerable, why can’t Washington bring China’s expanding carrier fleet within its firing range?

China’s Expanding Carrier Fleet

After the US, China has the world’s second-largest carrier fleet.

Beijing currently operates a fleet of three aircraft carriers. China launched its third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), an 80,000‑ton supercarrier capable of launching a mix of over 50 fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and key enablers such as KJ-600 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

China also launched Sichuan (Type 076), a 40,000‑ton amphibious assault ship also suspected of serving as a drone carrier capable of using an electromagnetic (EM) catapult to launch GJ-11 stealth unmanned combat aircraft.

A fourth carrier (Type 004) is undergoing construction. Satellite imagery suggests that this will likely be China’s largest and first nuclear-powered carrier.

China plans to construct six additional aircraft carriers by 2035, bringing its total carrier force up to nine, according to the Department of War (DOW).

China’s growing carrier fleet is a force multiplier; however, it could also become a strategic vulnerability.

The Vulnerability of the US Aircraft Carriers

China recognized early that the US ability to project force globally rests on its fleet of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It also recognized that it would be decades before it could match Washington in carrier fleet strength.

Therefore, China focused its energy on developing weapons systems that could negate the US advantage and developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).

Recent pieces have argued that Chinese hypersonic and ballistic missiles, supported by an increasingly sophisticated space‑ and AI‑enabled “kill web,” could force US and allied carriers so far offshore that their air wings become operationally irrelevant.

For example, the YJ-21 is a Chinese air-launched medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to strike high-value assets such as carriers. This missile can be launched from fighters and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and uses redundant guidance systems that make it difficult to jam; a variant can be fired from Type 055 destroyers, though this may have been the YJ-20.

Combined with older missiles such as the DF-26, colloquially known as “carrier-killers” with a range of up to around 4,000 kilometers (km), and the DF-17, which has a shorter range of up to around 2,500 km but is designed to strike high-value assets and evade US interceptors (e.g., THAAD and Patriot), China has an arsenal of systems capable of hypersonic speeds that can hold carriers at risk up to 2,500 miles away.

However, the current discussion in Washington often frames carriers as unique to the United States and uniquely vulnerable, while underplaying the fact that China is now building its own large-deck, network‑enabled capital ships that are at least as targetable as the U.S. ships China aims to threaten.

How the U.S. Can Make China’s Carriers Vulnerable?

According to the CSIS paper, Washington could follow a five-pronged strategy to make China’s growing carrier fleet vulnerable.

(1) Subsurface ambush operations: China’s Achilles’ heel at sea remains anti‑submarine warfare (ASW).

“Despite various improvements, PLAN surface ASW, fixed‑wing ASW, and undersea sensing are still patchy compared with U.S. and Japanese capabilities, particularly in noisy littorals and chokepoints,” it said.

A cost‑effective way to threaten China’s carriers is through a layered subsurface screen built around the following assets:

■  U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) operating at range.

■  Allied diesel-electric submarines from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and potentially the Philippines, including submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion where available.

■  Shared undersea sensing networks and common heavyweight torpedoes, enabling coordinated ambush of PLAN carrier groups in transit corridors rather than near the Chinese coast.

■  Shared unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) capable of both conducting intelligence collection and limited strike missions against PLAN ships.

The key is to turn the “undersea domain into a continuous threat envelope that forces Beijing to invest heavily in escorts, ASW aviation, and fixed sensors simply to move carriers out of its home waters.”

Further, this approach also leverages existing areas of production and operational excellence from various U.S. allies, making implementation faster and cheaper than more novel approaches.

(2) Land-based maritime strike networks: China’s A2/AD system is, in part, a land‑based missile problem. The United States and its regional partners can mirror that logic by building a distributed, multinational anti‑ship missile network on land from Japan through the Philippines and, where politically feasible, into the South Pacific and even around key maritime terrain globally, including the following:

■  U.S. Marine Corps and Army units fielding Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile systems, Mid‑Range Capability (i.e., Typhon batteries), and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) adapted to strike ships and a host of information warfare systems (e.g., cyber, space, electronic warfare, and inform/influence activities) stationed as a
littoral rotational force.

■  Australian, Japanese, and potentially Philippine coastal missile batteries (e.g., upgraded Type 12, BrahMos, and naval strike missiles) integrated into common fire control and ISR architectures.

■  Pre‑negotiated access, dispersal sites, and logistics arrangements to ensure these units can survive Chinese Air Force and Rocket Force (PLAAF/PLARF) strikes and continue to generate maritime fires.

Such a network can threaten PLAN carriers during deployment, not just at the point of conflict.

Moreover, “the mere expectation that upon entering the Philippine Sea, carriers such as the Fujian or Sichuan will face dense, land‑based anti‑ship fires backed by allied ISR raises the perceived risk of using them as front‑line tools of coercion.”

(3) Long-range air and space-enabled fires: The United States and its allies can conduct long-range strikes using a mix of bombers, fighters, and maritime patrol aircraft:

■  U.S. Air Force bombers and Navy aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles, such as LRASM and future hypersonic anti-ship weapons, connected to a complex battle network that both supports the attack and degrades enemy sensors.

■  Allied F‑35 fleets (from Australia, Japan, and South Korea) using low‑observable sensors to contribute to the maritime picture and deliver their own long‑range anti‑ship munitions.

■  A mix of kinetic and non-kinetic attack vectors with a conscious emphasis on mission kills, specifically by degrading flight‑deck operations, destroying aviation fuel and ordnance handling, or disabling key escorts and logistics ships supporting the carrier, rather than only aiming for catastrophic hull loss.

This approach is particularly suited to large military powers such as the United States but can be partially adopted by states with smaller budgets by investing in a limited number of fifth‑generation or advanced fourth‑generation aircraft plus modern anti‑ship missiles.

(4) Cyber-electromagnetic disruption: PLAN CSGs are nodes within a broader battle network. Their combat value depends on complex links to off‑board ISR, satellite navigation, command networks, and electromagnetic attack and defense platforms.

By disrupting the carriers’ connections to this broader network, the United States and its allies can deny the PLAN access to the enablers that make its forces more combat-capable.

Rather than treating ships solely as physical targets, U.S. and allied planners should prioritize EM and cyber operations.

(5) Unmanned swarm and port-denial campaigns: The Ukraine war has shown how even a state with a modest navy can use unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles, and shore‑based missiles to attrite a larger fleet.

Ukraine has successfully forced Russia to pull major units out of Sevastopol and turned the Black Sea into a contested battlespace.

While the terrain of the Pacific is not identical to the Black Sea, a similar logic can be applied to PLAN carriers, especially in the first island chain.

Swarms of relatively low‑cost USVs and loitering munitions can attack ships in port, logistic hubs, and fixed defenses, driving carriers to relocate to more distant, less convenient bases.

The central idea is to make a carrier’s routine employment around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or beyond the first island chain appear prohibitively risky.

By following these steps, the U.S. and its allies could blunt the advantage of China’s growing carrier fleet.

While China has for years invested in AA/AD vectors to make the U.S. carriers vulnerable, Washington could flip the script and make Beijing’s own carriers equally vulnerable.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee  News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post U.S. vs China’s Aircraft Carriers: New Report Shows How America Can Turn the Tables on “World’s Largest” Navy appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The number of West Nile virus infections in Greece continues to rise, according to an announcement of the National Public Health Organization (EODY), which on Wednesday reported 23 additional locally acquired cases over the past week. Since the start of the surveillance period and up to 5 August, 2026, a total of 65 locally acquired […]

The post West Nile virus infections increasing in Greece, summer 2026 appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The body of a man found in the sea west of the island of Symi on Wednesday has been identified as the missing German yacht passenger, the Greek Coast Guard announced on Thursday. that of the eighth passenger of a sailboat who had been missing since August 2, the Hellenic Coast Guard announced on Thursday. […]

The post Body found off Symi identified as missing German yacht passenger appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Τhe 26-year-old boxer suspect for the murder of 38-year-old British national Elisabeth Jane Ross has been remanded in custody after appearing before an investigating magistrate on Thursday. The defendant, who entered Greece as an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan in 2016, has been charged for the offenses of intentional homicide, robbery and weapons possession.. The body […]

The post Suspect for the murder of Elizabeth J. Ross remanded in custody appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Ukraine is staring down a new and deeply unsettling threat: a possible North Korean missile unit deployment to western Russia amid a lack of anti-ballistic interceptors in its arsenal. 

North Korea is preparing to deploy a missile unit to western Russia, according to a Ukrainian military intelligence official, marking a significant escalation in the conflict.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment involves Russia’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade and about 90 North Korean personnel based in the Voronezh region, which borders Ukraine.

While the exact composition of missiles will be finalized during senior-level talks next month, Pyongyang has already sent a new batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles and personnel ​to Russia, the GUR official claimed.

Further, he noted that the unit could eventually field up to 120 short-range ballistic missiles along with six launchers.

An informed source reportedly told Reuters that the United States was aware of the plan but did not provide further details.

Designed to evade missile defenses by flying on a lower, “depressed” trajectory that reduces radar detection, the KN-23—resembling the Russian Iskander—has a range of 800-900 kilometers.

Previous reports indicated that Moscow had allegedly modified the missile to enhance its accuracy.

Meanwhile, the KN-24 has a comparatively shorter range of about 410 kilometers and employs a quasi-ballistic or depressed trajectory with possible in-flight maneuvers, making it harder to intercept.

GUR’s claims could not be officially verified, and the Pentagon has not made a statement acknowledging any such intelligence reports. Nevertheless, the GUR’s assessment comes days after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced Russia used a North Korean missile for a strike on July 30, which killed five members of a family.

Although Russia has previously used North Korean ballistic missiles, the Ukrainian reports hinted that Moscow might have received a fresh supply.

Earlier, Pyongyang had reportedly delivered more than 100 short-range ballistic missiles (primarily KN-23 and KN-24), millions of artillery shells, over 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems, and more than 120 multiple rocket launch systems. Additionally, it had deployed an estimated 11,000 troops for the Ukraine war, of whom approximately 2,300 were killed in combat.

While the US and NATO are on the ground in Ukraine, studying the realities of modern warfare and using those lessons to develop the next generation of military technology, North Korea, Iran, and China are also closely observing the conflict to refine their own weapons and military doctrines.

Why is Ukraine Alarmed

Russia has been exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses to launch frequent ballistic and hypersonic missile strikes.

On August 4, Russia conducted a major overnight attack with drones and ballistic missiles that killed 17 people. Ukrainian forces intercepted 98 of 115 drones but failed to shoot down even a single ballistic missile, as recently reported by the EurAsian Times

Having run out of Patriot interceptors, which are the only reliable defense against ballistic missiles, Ukraine is practically left defenseless.

Ukraine has been pleading with its allies to supply more Patriot batteries and interceptors, which remain among the few weapons capable of countering ballistic missile threats such as North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 and Russia’s Iskander.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelenskyy wrote on social media after the August 4 strike. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Notably, the US has been sending Patriot missiles to Ukraine, among other weapons and munitions—including through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a new system wherein NATO nations pay for the transfer of weapons from the US. However, recent reports suggest that the US has expended a massive chunk of its own Patriot interceptors in the Ukraine war, eroding any space to make fresh deliveries to Kyiv.

Meanwhile, other NATO allies remain wary of aiding Ukraine with Patriots amid heightened security threats and long production timelines.

The Patriot shortage has allowed Moscow to use ballistic missiles with near impunity, creating a dangerous “window of vulnerability” for Ukraine that will only expand with North Korea’s deployment. In fact, experts fear that the situation will get increasingly challenging as winter approaches, which is when Russia intensifies attacks on Ukraine’s power grids.

The expanding Russia-North Korea partnership also carries broader geopolitical implications for Ukraine after nearly five years of war.

“Kyiv is rattled not because North Korean missiles are more advanced than Russia’s Iskander, but because they signal a deeper, more dangerous geopolitical alignment—and their sheer volume and indiscriminate use are overwhelming Ukraine’s already strained defenses. This isn’t just about weapons—it’s about the normalization of new military collaboration and geopolitical alignment. Russia’s use of North Korean missiles also suggests Pyongyang has replenished Moscow’s arsenal, enabling intensified bombardments as Russia seeks to break Ukrainian morale. For Kyiv, each KN-23/24 impact is both a physical and symbolic blow,” Air Marshal G.S. Bedi (retd) told the EurAsian Times.

Notably, North Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are believed to be less accurate compared to their Russian counterparts. A previous Ukrainian state prosecutor’s report stated that about half of the KN-23s launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 veered off course and sometimes exploded midair.

Moreover, strikes launched using these missiles have caused large-scale civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, the deployment of North Korean missiles will give Russia what it needs to overwhelm and batter Ukraine: volume.

This allows Moscow to reserve more precise systems such as the Iskander for high-value targets while using KN-23 and KN-24 missiles against population centers and infrastructure to increase pressure on Kyiv.

Interestingly, during a meeting of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reportedly announced that his country will destroy Russian missile launchers to reduce attacks on Ukrainian cities.

“Our military knows they must destroy the enemy’s launchers to reduce strikes on Ukraine, its critical infrastructure, and civilians. They are working on this and will continue to do so,” Zelenskyy said.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post North Korea’s Missiles Are Moving West — 120 of Them May Head Toward Ukraine Amid Kyiv’s Plea For Help appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

China’s state broadcaster recently released the first footage showing multiple DF-17 hypersonic missiles in a single frame, in what appears to be a deliberate power-projection message. The display comes at a time when hypersonic weapons have proven their lethality and ability to penetrate air defenses in the Ukraine and Iran wars.

On August 3, state-owned CCTV aired video from the PLA documentary series Zhìshèng (“Victory”) featuring at least six DF-17 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) together.

Military affairs expert Zhang Junshe told the Global Times that the display indicates the system has been mass-deployed and is reliably placed on combat duty.

Zhang emphasized that the DF-17 is a vital weapon that can alter the rules of modern air defense warfare, as it can precisely hit adversary forward air defense installations and strategic command targets by leveraging its hypersonic penetration advantage.

Typically, hypersonic weapons are very hard to intercept by conventional missile defense systems due to two main reasons: 1) these weapons travel faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound, equivalent to approximately 100 kilometers (60 miles) per minute; 2) these are highly maneuverable weapons that follow an unpredictable trajectory.

Only a few countries have developed and combat-deployed hypersonic weapons, including China, Russia, and sanctioned countries like Iran and North Korea.

Of these, both Russia and Iran have used these weapons in combat with Ukraine and the United States, respectively.

On its part, Ukraine has intercepted some Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles with Patriot batteries.

However, these hypersonic missiles have been wreaking havoc on Ukrainian cities in recent weeks, as earlier reported by the EurAsian Times. Moscow purportedly exploits a gap in its air defense coverage and launches Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to cause devastation in the embattled country. Additionally, Moscow has struck Ukraine with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, which Ukraine has been unable to shoot down so far.

Meanwhile, Iran claimed to have fired hypersonic missiles (Fattah-class) on Israeli cities and US military bases across the Middle East during the hostilities earlier this year.

However, independent verification of claimed terminal speeds, maneuver performance, and interception rates remains limited. Previous video footage from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities showed Iranian missiles dodging as many as 10 interceptor missiles and hitting their targets at hypersonic speeds.

Notably, the latest footage comes more than a month after CCTV published footage of a DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle missile launch in June 2026. At the time, analysts noted that China was sending a deterrence message by emphasizing its strike capability to the United States, particularly amid tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the First Island Chain, and the South China Sea.

The same argument may apply to the latest footage, particularly since the DF-17 is the world’s first medium-range missile to field a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

China has amassed a variety of deadly hypersonic missiles, including the DF-17, DF-27, YJ-21, and YJ-20. These weapons are part of the formidable Chinese A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) network along its coastline.

Chinese experts believe that even the most advanced missile defenses in the US, including the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) and PAC-3 Patriot, are not effective against hypersonic weapons.

“Existing US missile defenses can theoretically intercept some hypersonic weapons in their final stage, but high speed, maneuverability, and stealth make it very difficult,” read a previous Chinese paper titled “Tactical Missile Technology” on the ability of US missile defense systems to intercept hypersonic weapons.

The US and allied forces are developing countermeasures, including improved sensors, the Glide Phase Interceptor, SM-6 variants, and other technologies, but substantial challenges remain in tracking and engaging maneuvering hypersonic vehicles at scale for now.

Chinese experts have noted that the DF-17 is a potent strategic deterrent because it is a conventional, medium-range missile capable of reaching important targets in the first island chain—stretching from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines—including strategic sites in Japan and other areas.

Chinese experts have previously noted that the missile may reach as far as parts of the Second Island Chain, extending from Japan through Guam, Micronesia, and Palau. They believe that coordinated multi-vehicle salvo launches may play a crucial role in both launch site security and strike effectiveness—compounding the threats faced by the US military forces in the Indo-Pacific region.

DF-17’s Mass Deployment

The DF-17 is China’s first operational road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

With a range of 1,800–2,500 kilometers, it is Beijing’s most operationally mature hypersonic strike system and is widely regarded as capable of penetrating nearly any missile defense network worldwide.

Like ICBMs, hypersonic glide weapons are launched by rockets high into the atmosphere. However, unlike ICBMs, whose warheads rely primarily on gravity once they begin their descent, hypersonic glide weapons dive back toward Earth sooner, then flatten their flight path. They make continuous course corrections to stay on target while traveling at speeds up to 12 times the speed of sound, using onboard navigation systems, making them much harder to detect by the adversary and allowing them to suppress enemy missile defenses at an early stage, clearing the way for follow-on strikes.

The DF-17 made its public debut in October 2019 at a military parade that marked the 70th anniversary of Communist Party rule in China.

In 2021, the PLA conducted its first known hypersonic test involving the DF-17 glide vehicle, rattling the United States. Later, the Pentagon published the China’s Military Power 2022 report, referring to the DF-17 as a critical threat in the Western Pacific.

“The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads,” the report added.

Zhang pointed out that the DF-17 can avoid adversary targeting and reconnaissance because it does not depend on fixed launch silos.

Moreover, DF-17’s powerful anti-jamming and precision strike capabilities greatly increase its battlefield survivability and make it well-suited for a variety of complex field combat scenarios, as it is difficult for adversary satellites to detect its operational patterns.

“In addition to a longer vehicle body and more wheels [of the TEL], the biggest change in the DF-17 is the shape of the missile itself. Unlike the cone-shaped warhead we are familiar with from past models, the DF-17’s warhead has undergone significant changes and now features four wings and a tail fin,” Gong Chunyu, a training staff officer from the DF-17 conventional missile formation, was quoted as saying by CCTV earlier. 

“This design reflects a more scientific and advanced concept, with the missile capable of flexible and varied flight trajectories and greatly enhanced penetration capabilities,” he added.

It may be noted that China’s public releases of multiple TELs in formation and field launches demonstrate that the system is no longer experimental or small-scale, and it signifies distributed, mobile, ready forces that could hunt US-based targets quickly.

The missile’s range and penetration capability are repeatedly linked to targets in the western Pacific. Analysts interpret this as reinforcing China’s ability to hold at risk U.S. and allied bases, airfields, command nodes, and surface ships in a Taiwan or regional contingency—raising the cost of a US intervention.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post China ‘Mass Deploys’ DF-17 Hypersonic Missiles as Iran & Russia Have Shown They’re Hard to Intercept appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Part of ceiling of the newly renovated Emergency Department (ER) in the General Hospital of Corinth, collapsed less than a month after the inauguration by Health Minister Adonis Georgiadis. According to hospital personnel, the collapse occurred in the exact same area where the inauguration took place, putting employees, patients and attendants at risk. In a […]

The post Ceiling in ER of Corinth Hospital collapses a month after inauguration appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The Ancient Olympia is getting ready and in the mood to host the  2nd Olympia Night Run – Run Under Zeus, an event scheduled to take place on Saturday, August 8, 2026 in Ancient Olympia. Staring time: 9 o’ clock in the evening. According to organizers, registrations have been completed on Wednesday and more than […]

The post 2nd Olympia Night Run event in Ancient Olympia, Aug 8 appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

A 55-year-old man has been arrested by police when it was found out that he was keeping the body of his father in a deep freezer for years in order to collect his pension payments. The case was discovered after relatives/neighbors complained to police that they have not seen the old man for years. The […]

The post Man kept father’s body in deep freezer to collect pension payments appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The regional unit of Attica remains at Very High Fire Risk also on Wednesday and Thursday, August 5-6, 2026, the Civil Protection has warned. Also other regions including Greek islands are on the same Category 4, while many parts of the country are at High Fire Risk Category 3. According to the Fire Risk Forecast […]

The post Civil Protection warns of Very High Fire Risk in Greece, Aug 5-6 (MAPs) appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The body of a man was recovered from the sea near Panormitis Bay, off the island of Symi, the Greek Coast Guard announced on Wednesday. The body was picked up by a Coast Guard patrol boat during a Coast Guard operation and will be taken to the Rhodes General Hospital for autopsy. Authorities will investigate […]

The post Body of a man recovered off Symi; Missing German yacht passenger? appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

If anything, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s call on August 3 for greater “military-civil integration” to create “a robust defense ecosystem to tackle emerging challenges” implies that there is still a structural mismatch between generalist bureaucrats (critically called Babus) and uniformed personnel within the Ministry of Defense (MoD). 

In other words, in India’s higher defense reforms, integration between the military and civil components of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is being seen as important as greater jointness among the three armed services (army, air force, and navy).

For decades, the relationship between civilian staff and military personnel within the MoD has been described by experts as both a strength and a fault line, particularly at the level of defense management.

Therefore, as India moves toward theatre commands, self-reliance under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) scheme, and faster procurement of defense components, the question is: how has this synergy worked in retrospect, and what should it look like in the future?

Addressing the 85th Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civilian Services Day celebrations in New Delhi on Monday,  Singh emphasised that both the uniformed and civil services cannot proceed along separate paths, adding that, as joint and integrated structures develop, there will be a need for continuity and expertise across all areas – policy, administration, human resource management, financial processes, logistics, and institutional knowledge.

He highlighted the importance of further enhancing structured cross-exposure between civilian and military officers, suggesting joint training programs and developmental assignments for both sides to learn from each other’s experiences.

“Military officers bring operational experience, a command perspective, and an understanding of warfare, while civilian officers contribute through administrative continuity, policy experience, an understanding of government processes, and institutional memory. When these strengths combine, decision-making becomes more informed, balanced, and effective,” stated the Defense Minister.

As things stand today, there are nine major participating groups dealing with India’s defence – three military services, and the non-military six – Department of Defence(DoD), the Department of Military Affairs(DMA), the Department of Defence Production ( DDP), the Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D), the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW), and Defence Finance.

While these nine groups are — three military services, and the non-military six – inside the MoD, there are three others outside the domain having considerable influence on defense matters – the Ministry of Finance (controlling the defense spending), the Cabinet Secretariat (policy matters that have implications for other ministries) and the Prime Minister’s Office (which can always intervene or arbitrate selectively).

However, we will focus here only on the MoD, particularly on the integration of the military services with the non-military ones.

To begin with, one is reminded of what late Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara had said: each of the major participating groups in Indian defense is known for  “jealously guarding its turf and mistrustful of the others”.

Incidentally, the Admiral was talking of eight groups, because the DMA was a later creation. But the spirit behind his comment remains intact.

It may be noted that the total workforce under the MoD stands at approximately 2.92 million (29.2 lakh) personnel, making it the largest employer in the world. Expenditure on salaries and pensions for both civilian and non-civilian personnel is fully integrated into the official MoD budget.

The total strength encompasses active military personnel, reservists, and defense civilians. Approximately 1.43 million active-duty personnel serving across the Army, Navy, and Air Force are complemented by roughly 1 million reserve personnel.

Approximately 400,000 defense civilians are distributed across administrative services. They come mainly from the Indian Defense Accounts Service, Indian Ordnance Factories Service, Defense Research & Development Organization scientists, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service, the Defense Accounts Department (DAD), Border Roads Organization (BRO), DRDO, and top bureaucracy.

The apex bureaucratic positions like the Defense Secretary, Secretary (Defense Production), and Secretary (Ex-Servicemen Welfare) are often held by IAS officers.

The last 5 years have seen some important defense reforms in India. For the first time, a serving 4-star General became Secretary in MoD as Chief of Defense Staff. DMA handles procurement, tri-service matters, and jointness. This is said to have broken the wall between the civilian secretariat and the military.

Service HQs have been integrated with the HQ of MoD. Joint Secretaries from the military now sit in the MoD and sign files. This means operational officers are now part of the procurement and policy process.

Before this reform, the MoD was entirely dominated by generalist civilian bureaucrats under the Department of Defense (DoD), led by the Defense Secretary. The Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters operated merely as “attached offices,” meaning military files had to be routed through junior civilian desk officers for approval.

However, there are still well-documented latent and reported mutual resentment between military and civilian personnel in the MoD, which analysts and scholars refer to as “civil-military dissonance”.

The friction does not stem from opposition to the constitutional principle of political/democratic civilian control, which the military fully accepts. Instead, the resentment focuses on “bureaucratic control,” where career civil servants are perceived to act as a barrier between the uniformed leadership and the political executive.

A primary driver of public friction involves rank parity and protocol equivalence between military officers and civilian cadres. As Admiral Arun Prakash points out, the three Chiefs have been accorded “no locus standi in the structure of the GoI, so much so that the Secretary of the Department of Defense is deemed to represent the three Services in most forums”.

According to the “Government of India Allocation of Business Rules” (AoB Rules) and the “Government of India Transaction of Business Rules” (ToB Rules), the Secretary of DoD (a IAS officer) is allocated the responsibilities of “(a) Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective Demobilisation; (b) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force; (c) Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters”.

This looks particularly strange as, in terms of protocol, the Defense Secretary ranks at 23 in the order of preference, along with “Army Commanders/ Vice-Chief of the Army Staff or equivalent in other services”. In contrast, a Service Chief of Staff holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank is at number 12.

Even at 16, Officiating Chiefs of Staff holding the rank of Lieutenant General or equivalent rank are higher in protocol than the Defense Secretary.

Similarly, the Military officers are said to have resented the equation of lower-tier civilian administrative posts of Joint Secretary with senior military ranks like Major Generals. It is argued that a Major General has significantly more operational responsibility and seniority (often over 32 years of service) compared to an IAS officer reaching Joint Secretary level in roughly 18 years.

Military officials often point out that allowances, non-functional financial upgrades, and pension structures have favored civilian bureaucracies over the unique hazards of military service. Successive Central Pay Commission awards have frequently triggered military dissatisfaction.

In other words, there is an underlying perception of hierarchical degradation that persists within the armed forces.

Secondly, there are gaps between the military and civilian officials over what is called “Policies vs Operations”. While civilians are accused of lacking operational understanding, the military is accused of not understanding procurement rules. This really leads to delays in equipment purchase.

Perhaps, realizing these deep-seated systemic silos, Defense Minister Singh said on Monday that the military and civilian wings can no longer afford to operate in isolated silos to build an effective national defense ecosystem.

As he underscored, the civilian officials should read  Indian military history, examining it from a civilian perspective, thereby fostering fresh ideas and new perspectives. He called upon the Civilian Services to evolve into the “strategic brain” of India’s defence management architecture by developing a comprehensive understanding of the defence sector, functioning effectively in a joint environment, and continuously enhancing its expertise to face the emerging challenges.

Notably, when one talks of dissonance between the military and civilian officers, it is perhaps more to do with purely civilians like IAS and other central services within the MoD rather than the non-military technical and scientific personnel.

There has been relatively smoother synergy in areas like defense production and infrastructure building. For instance, Defence Public Sector Undertakings like the HAL, BEL, BDL and OFB, which are run with a mix of civilian managers, engineers, scientists and military users, have produced platforms and ammunition like Tejas, Arjun, BrahMos.  succeeded because civilian scientists in DRDO worked with military feedback loops.

Similarly, the BRO, a civilian-led organization with military engineers, has built highly acclaimed critical roads in the country’s northern and north-eastern border (Line of Actual Control) with China.

However, it is with the civilian officials working within the MoD that military officials have some issues, such as policy decisions, pay, and ranks.

But then, it is also to be noted that while services may all agree on their fight against the civilians,  when it comes to “promoting jointness” in military matters, they do not have the same ideas.  There is an intense rivalry amongst them. Although the situation has improved of late,  there are differences over whether the country should have theater commands, and if it will have them, then how those will be operated.

In other words, there are, overall,  challenges in building better “Civil-Military Synergy”. There seem to be merits when some experts argue that National Defense College (NDC) and the College of Defense Management (CDM) could bridge strategic and administrative silos, fostering deeper synergy, mutual understanding, and coordinated policy-making between senior civilian bureaucrats and military leadership.

There are also ideas like extending the DMA model to have military officers in all key procurement and policy wings, and civilian officers in Integrated Theatre Commands. Defense civilians should have tenures in field formations and military officers in  MoD finance and policy.

Another interesting suggestion is to extend the synergy beyond the MoD and involve the private sector, startups, academia and state governments. Of course, in a way this is happening with projects like defence corridors, and through collaboration in the space, cyber and AI  sectors.

Viewed thus, the core challenge to the synergy that the Defense Minister has talked about is removing what is said to be the “Trust Deficit” between the civilian and military wings within the MoD, due to decades of suspicion.

The synergy does not mean the dilution of civilian supremacy at the policy-making level, be it the MoD, or the Union cabinet, or the Parliament.   But it means the military’s voice is heard in policy-making.  The military does not grudge civilian control; it opposes “the bureaucratic control”.

Synergy does not imply that civilians are made into soldiers, or soldiers into ‘babus’. Its goal is to make both into “defense managers”

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Biggest Weakness Emerges in India’s Military Setup: Rank, Power & Toxic Rift Between “Babus” & Soldiers appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

A month after the collapse of the France–Germany–Spain Future Combat Air System (FCAS) fighter program, the outlook for France’s Rafale F5, the next major upgrade standard of the Dassault Rafale multirole fighter succeeding the F4, has itself grown uncertain.

The French Air and Space Force has indicated it would rather receive additional F4-standard jets sooner than wait for the more advanced F5 variant.

The Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force, General Jérôme Bellanger, told senators that his force needs more Rafales well before the fighter’s next standard, the F5, becomes available.

Taking more Rafale F4-standard jets, which Bellanger described as a very capable fighter, would be preferable to waiting for the F5.

While Bellanger did not directly mention the Russia-Ukraine War and fears of the war spreading to Europe and NATO, he did suggest that changed geopolitical circumstances necessitated greater fighter fleet strength sooner.

General Jérôme Bellanger appeared before the Senate foreign affairs, defense and armed forces committee in May, during hearings on the bill updating France’s 2024-2030 military programming law. However, the whole session was held behind closed doors, and transcripts of the meeting were released only in the first week of August.

France’s updated 2024-2030 military programming law, which was adopted by the Senate on July 1, 2026, defers the delivery of 20 Rafale fighter jets from 2031-2032 to 2033-2034, so that the aircraft could be delivered directly to the upgraded F5 standard.

Rafale F5 Standard

France’s planned Rafale F5 standard will be armed with ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missiles and STRATUS RS missiles for suppressing enemy air defenses and for anti-ship warfare, will be powered with a domestically produced, high-thrust T-REX engine, and will feature Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) with loyal wingman drones, including plans for a stealth combat drone by 2035.

France’s defense procurement agency, the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), notified MBDA on June 2, 2026, about the framework agreement for the implementation and development contract for the ASN4G (Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4ème Génération), the country’s fourth-generation nuclear-armed hypersonic cruise missile.

The DGA has set a target of 2035 for the missile’s induction, adding that it will be carried by the Rafale F5 and integrated into both the French Air and Space Force’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) and the Navy’s Nuclear Air Force component.

Meanwhile, the M88 T-REX is an advanced higher-thrust military turbofan engine developed in France by Safran Aircraft Engines to power the Dassault Rafale F5 fighter jet. Officially unveiled at the Paris Air Show in June 2025, it provides a 20% power boost over the standard M88 engine.

“F5 variant of Rafale will have more powerful engines, improved survivability and data links, and will be accompanied by an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) weighing more than 10t,” Dassault Aviation’s chief executive Officer, Eric Trappier, recently said in an interview.

The Rafale F5 standard is targeting initial operational service capability by 2030. However, integration into the French Air Force and Navy could happen around 2033-2034, with integration of ASN4G hypersonic missiles expected only by 2035.

The aircraft combat fleet target, as per the 2024-2030 military programming law, is unchanged at 225 aircraft by 2035: 185 for the French Air and Space Force and 40 for the French Navy.

However, Bellanger told the Senate that he would need the aircraft sooner, even if they’re of the F4 standard.

“I am going to need more aircraft quickly,” Bellanger told the committee. “If we are not in a position to produce the F5 standard before 2033, we will have to choose the F4, which is already a very fine aircraft, unless the operational contracts of the Air and Space Force on the fighter segment are revised.”

Notably, Bellanger is not alone in demanding more F4-standard Rafale jets sooner, instead of waiting for the F5-standard aircraft.

The Senate committee itself has questioned the design to postpone the induction of 20 Rafale jets so that they can be inducted directly in F5-standard.

It cited the tremendous pressure on the Rafale fleet of the French Air Force, the advanced age of the Rafale Marine aircraft, and mounting operational commitments constraining aircraft availability, according to reports.

Warning that the postponement could widen the capability gap at a critical time, the Senate committee said that the decision seems to be motivated more by budgetary considerations than operational choices.

Notably, in June this year, nearly 80% of the French fighter fleet was airborne at the same time for the first time ever.

Bellanger attributed it to Operation Poker, the quarterly Strategic Air Forces nuclear raid exercise, and intensive deployments in the Near and Middle East, where French Rafales were helping defend Gulf countries against Iranian drones and missiles.

French Rafales are also deployed into Eastern Europe as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission.

In June this year, two French Rafales were scrambled from Siauliai Air Base in northern Lithuania and met up with Gripens to jointly intercept a group of six Russian aircraft, including a Su-35.

Lithuania | Interception of 6 aircrafts within the Baltic air space
 
Scramble of two Rafale aircraft of the Baltic Air Policing 71 detachment, based in Šiauliai , in order to escort aircrafts operating in the Baltic responsibility area.
 
  Visual… pic.twitter.com/eDMIBB7xBI

— The Joint Staff – Military operations (@FrenchForces) June 4, 2026

“We are overusing the Rafale,” Bellanger said. “Versatility does not mean ubiquity.”

Another reason for overusing the Rafales is France’s expanding nuclear posture.

Earlier this year, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled the “forward deterrence” nuclear doctrine, proposing to expand France’s independent nuclear deterrent umbrella across Europe.

However, this “forward deterrence” nuclear doctrine would put additional pressure on the Rafale fleet.

Bellanger said that the larger arsenal announced by President Emmanuel Macron at Île Longue in March would “mechanically” force France to reconsider the number of nuclear-armed Rafale B, the single-seat Rafale C assigned to protect them, and potentially its tanker fleet, which remains capped at 15 A330 MRTTs under the updated law.

This would be a major issue for the next programming law, he said, adding that “many more” aircraft would be needed.

“If we expand the nuclear arsenal, it is not so the weapons can sit in storage,” Bellanger said.

Another issue is the tremendous pressure on Dassault Aviation to deliver on its large Rafale orderbook.

France currently has nearly 165 Rafales in its fleet, 41 in the French Navy, and 124 for the French Air Force.

France has a target of 225 Rafale jets by 2035. So Dassault will have to deliver around 60 more Rafales in the coming years.

However, Dassault also has to deliver 165 Rafales for export customers, including India, Egypt, Qatar, Greece, Croatia, the UAE, Serbia, and Indonesia.

This does not include the 100 aircraft that Ukraine has shown intent to acquire, nor the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) proposal for 114 Rafale aircraft, which is currently under active consideration by India’s Ministry of Defense (MoD). If these two deals go through, the numbers will be even more significant, around 380 for export customers and 60 for France.

For perspective, Dassault delivered 26 Rafale fighter jets in 2025, one more than its target of 25. Of the 26 Rafales, 15 were for export customers and 11 for the French armed forces.

A year ago, the Rafale production rate was 2 aircraft a month (24/year). The same has now been increased to 3 per month (36 per year), with plans to increase to 4 per month (48 per year) to handle a growing backlog of orders.

Meanwhile, France’s existing Rafale fleet is working at full capacity, its Rafale Marine fleet is aging rapidly, and the current geopolitical environment and France’s expanding nuclear posture demand more Rafale aircraft sooner rather than later.

Under these circumstances, Bellanger feels that more F4-standard Rafales sooner is preferable to fewer F5-standard Rafales at a later date.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Rafale F5 in Doldrums After Collapse of FCAS 6th-Gen Program; French Air Force Pushes for More F4 Jets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The map of absolute destruction: 42% of the forests in Attica burned in the last 10 years. From 2017 until yesterday, August 3, 2026, a total of 15 major fires have burned more than 800,000 stremma* or 80,000 hectares and approximately 197,684.3 acres acres. The data resulting from the updated analysis of the burned areas […]

The post Absolute destruction: 42% of forests in Attica burned 2017-2026 (MAP) appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Four turtles rescued from a fire-stricken area in northern Greece were found to have been abused by human thugs who painted their shells  with orange oil paint.The discovery prompted the  intervention of the Prosecutor’s Office in Thessaloniki on Tuesday. The unprecedented incident was revealed when members of the Wild Animal Rescue & Reintegration Team arrived […]

The post Turtles painted with oil paint: rescued from fire, abused by humans appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

British tourists on the island on Kefalonia showed their gratitude and paid for water bottles for the firefighters battling the big blaze on the island in the Ionian Sea over the weekend. Local media kefaloniapress.gr reported about the spontaneous “Thank you!” incident that apparently occurred on Sunday, August 2. The post published today, Tuesday, August […]

The post Kefalonia: British tourists pay for water for firefighters combating the big fire appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.