This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Janka Oertel, director of ECFR’s DARE* initiative, and Andrew Small, head of ECFR’s Asia programme, to examine the growing impact of the “China shock 2.0” on Germany and Europe.
A new wave of Chinese competition, driven by overcapacity and state-backed industrial strength, is hitting sectors such as car manufacturing, chemicals and machine tools. Germany is at the epicentre, with mounting job losses raising questions about Europe’s long-term economic resilience and competitiveness. The crisis is reshaping German politics, exposing government divisions and putting pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz ahead of September’s potentially divisive regional elections.
Together, Mark, Janka and Andrew discuss the policy options being considered in Brussels and in European capitals—from emergency trade measures to new industrial strategies. Can Europe protect its industrial base without triggering a damaging escalation with China? Is Germany able to lead a coherent European response amid its own political turbulence?
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Jörg Lau, international correspondent at Die Zeitand Jana Puglierin, head of ECFR’s Berlin office, to explore the political turmoil in Germany ahead of an electoral autumn. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government is becoming increasingly unpopular: it faces collapsing approval ratings, growing tension within the governing coalition and mounting pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
As regional elections approach, Jana argues that Germany’s traditional parties face difficult choices that could reshape the country’s political landscape, while Jörg discusses what the AfD’s rise means for Germany. A “firewall” has kept mainstream parties from cooperating with the far right in the post-war period—but Jörg reflects on the strain this is under, and whether the AfD’s first taste of regional power could transform German politics.
Together, Mark, Jörg and Jana assess the prospects for Merz’s leadership, the future of the CDU and whether Germany’s political centre can withstand such pressure. Are established parties capable of renewing themselves? What happens if the AfD makes gains at the regional level? And what would prolonged instability in Berlin mean for Europe?
This podcast episode was recorded on August 12th 2026.
Cover image: picture alliance / Xinhua News Agency | Li Bo
Reluctance among German decision-makers has long stopped Berlin taking a tougher economic approach towards China. When France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Spain recently pressed the European Commission for tougher measures and faster trade defence action against China, Germany not only declined to join, it even called for stronger industrial ties with Beijing.
Yet, one thing Berlin should not worry about is voters’ disapproval should it pursue a more hawkish China policy. ECFR polling data find that Germans are the most China-sceptical out of 15 European countries surveyed. No fewer than 60% of Christian Democrat and Social Democrat supporters regard the country as an adversary or rival. In contrast, elsewhere in Europe, majorities still see China as either a “necessary partner” or even an ally. In Italy and Spain, 56% and 65% of people hold this view respectively. (Closest to the sceptical Germans are the French public; President Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly hawkish political posture vis-à-vis Beijing may have found an audience willing to listen.)
The China shock has hit Germany particularly hard: its manufacturing sector lost around 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025 and it continues to shed 10,000 jobs each month. The car industry is paying the highest costs, being squeezed out of a market increasingly dominated by Chinese manufacturers at home and abroad.
The mood in the European Council is shifting, and with Germany’s acquiescence. When EU leaders met in June 2026, they backed a stronger trade defence toolbox of existing measures against China. This included instruments such as the Industrial Accelerator Act’s “Buy European” provisions and limits on high-risk Chinese technology. Despite its past hesitations, Germany no longer acts as a spoiler on firmer EU action, and it has cautiously supported this new direction. Nevertheless, the combination of growing public scepticism towards China, mounting pressure on German industry and appetite for a more assertive policy on the European level creates a political mandate that German decision-makers could yet seize.
The German public’s views on the energy transition should also prove encouraging for their leaders. Voters want to see investment in renewables: 57% back what would amount to the growing electrification of the economy. Across the countries polled by ECFR, 61% of respondents say they support prioritising renewables and the clean tech sector.
This public support should help persuade leaders, including in Germany, that they can take action to limit emerging dependencies on China. They can accelerate the energy transition while de-risking the clean tech sector through providing support for domestic European industries, from wind to batteries.
For Berlin, and capitals across Europe, it is safer to move ahead rather than delay. Chinese economic policy is already doing irreparable damage to European industry—but European policymakers still need to protect an increasingly electrified economy from weaponisation by China. If they fail to do so, governments will almost certainly pay the price at the ballot box. Those that pursue electrification and economic de-risking as a single package are most likely to reap the political rewards.
Marine Le Pen’s candidacy for president means Europeans should brace for the possibility of a France wholly different to the one they know.
A Rassemblement National government would be hostile to the EU and a disruptive partner on numerous issues facing Europe; including on Russia, enlargement, climate and migration.
The party is divided over whether and how to work with other right-wing parties in France; and how to position the country within Europe and the Western alliance.
Le Pen is likely to work in a “duo” with party leader, Jordan Bardella, but there are notable differences between their outlooks. Europeans should pay attention to these.
European political leaders would struggle to influence a Le Pen-led government, but nor should they expect a unified European far-right to emerge. They would be wise to begin their preparations now.
Note: This policy brief is a second edition of an earlier paper published on June 9th 2026. It updates the prior analysis in light of Marine Le Pen’s confirmation that she will run for the French presidency.
The restoration of a matriarch
In the early hours of November 2nd 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Paris home of the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and his family. The perpetrators were never found. His youngest daughter, Marine, 8 years old at the time of the attack, later seethed that the family was not shown “the slightest sign of solidarity or compassion” by the French authorities. Today, as Marine Le Pen launches into her fourth—and most competitive—bid for France’s presidency, that quote reveals something of the woman who might soon occupy the Elysée Palace. If she wins, European policymakers will need to understand this self-defined outsider and how her family’s and party’s long years in the political wilderness shape her domestic and international agenda.
That insurgent self-perception may seem odd now. After all, the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) is far ahead in polling for the first round of the election, is accepted by an increasing share of French polite society, and is close to some of the country’s most powerful economic elites. But it still explains why the rest of Europe should brace for the possibility of a French president who sees herself as a rebel against the country’s and the EU’s established norms and institutions. As this paper will argue, a Le Pen presidency of France would be a significantly more formidable challenge to European orthodoxies than Giorgia Meloni is in Italy or Viktor Orban was in Hungary.
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Only one thing is certain about the result of France’s presidential election next year: President Emmanuel Macron’s decade in power will come to an end. Who replaces him is an open question, with any number of conceivable outcomes. The exact field of candidates is not yet clear, not even in Macron’s centrist camp, where two former prime ministers—Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal—are vying for primacy. French presidential election campaigns are often volatile; both those in 2017 and 2022 saw major shifts over the half-year before polling day. But current polling suggests that the RN party candidate is on track to win the first round, on April 18th 2027, and to enjoy good prospects in the second, due on May 2nd.
The RN went through months of speculation over who would represent it at the presidential election. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzling European parliamentary funds and received a five-year ban on standing for election. Over recent months, Jordan Bardella, the RN’s untested young leader and Le Pen’s protégé, was talked about as the party’s best hope.
On July 7th 2026, however, the Court of Appeal reduced Le Pen’s ineligibility penalty, which enabled her to run. It also required her to serve a year of house arrest with an electronic ankle tag. That evening, Le Pen announced that she would seek the presidency and would appeal to the Court of Cassation. The penalty is suspended until France’s highest court rules on the case, which could take place as late as April 2027.
Her candidacy has significant implications for the rest of Europe. Le Pen is an experienced campaigner and an established (though also divisive) figure in France. Her bid for the presidency is perhaps more likely to survive the heat of the campaign than a Bardella run would have. The fact that she is the candidate probably increases the chances of the French far-right coming to power for the first time since Marshal Pétain, the puppet leader of Vichy France.
Le Pen is marked by the RN’s long years in the wilderness. She believes in radical solutions. As president, she would likely be a confrontational and abrasive force in Europe.
To reiterate, the outcome of the election remains wide open. But the scale of the potential rupture of a Le Pen win means policymakers elsewhere in Europe must both understand the RN and prepare for that eventuality. To that end, the authors of this paper have extensively researched the party’s Europe and foreign policies. The following study is based on in-depth interviews with an array of senior RN figures and external experts as well as analysis of the party’s speeches, legislative proposals, voting records and electoral programmes. The result is a series of five theses about what a Le Pen win next year would mean for Europe.
Understanding an RN presidency
Point 1: Marine Le Pen’s candidacy reaffirms her primacy inside the RN, although her duo with Bardella will endure
Marine Le Pen’s decision to run for president despite her upheld conviction—and in contradiction of her own prior statements—is a reminder of her centrality to the RN. She is still the party’s dominant leader. The decision also dispelled the illusion that Bardella constitutes a real alternative to her leadership. It showed that today’s RN is still Marine Le Pen’s inheritance and achievement.
The party was founded as the National Front (FN) in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, along with French former members of the Waffen-SS and other nostalgists for colonial French Algeria. It drew together different threads of the far-right. For decades most French citizens considered it beyond the pale. When Jean-Marie Le Pen narrowly made it into the second round of the 2002 presidential election, it shocked both France and Europe. He was roundly defeated by 82% to 18% by then-president Jacques Chirac.
Taking the reins of the party from her father in 2011, however, Marine Le Pen pursued a strategy of “dédiabolisation” (“detoxification”). This saw her expel Jean-Marie from the party in 2015 over his racist and anti-Semitic comments. After her resounding defeat to Macron in 2017 she intensified the process, renaming the party and dropping its commitment to “Frexit” (leaving the EU).
In 2019, she appointed a fresh-faced young activist from a deprived Paris suburb to lead the RN’s campaign for the European Parliament election. Jordan Bardella delivered the party’s first ever first-placed result in a national election and was rewarded with the RN presidency in 2021. He would play a central role in the party’s 2022 presidential campaign—a much closer contest—and in its triumphant win in the 2024 European vote. Le Pen further empowered Bardella when she announced he would be her choice for prime minister. When it looked like she might be banned from running, Bardella became her natural replacement as a presidential hopeful.
Nevertheless, despite Bardella’s rapid rise and growing public profile, the RN remains firmly in Le Pen’s hands. For nearly half a century, the promotion of family members, such as Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal, and significant turnover among the lower levels of the party has kept power within the Le Pen clan. Many of the party’s cadres remain more loyal to her than to Bardella, and were determined that she should run rather than him.
Now that the party is back behind its leader, Le Pen will continue to highlight the duo she forms with Bardella—as she did on prime-time television when she launched her campaign. She once again promised to make him prime minister if she becomes president. Running a “ticket” for the French presidency is unprecedented and anathema to the function. But it has a distinct advantage: broadening her voter coalition while keeping the party together.
Le Pen’s own political base has two main parts. First, an anti-elite and disaffected working- and middle-class electorate in the northern post-industrial Pas-de-Calais region that she has represented since 1998 (as a councillor, MEP and in the National Assembly), And, second, a chain of strongholds along the Mediterranean coast, which adhere to long-term RN positions hostile to immigration and taxes.
By contrast, Bardella appears more economically liberal and temperamentally closer to other parts of the French right, including the conservative flank of the Republicans (LR, the rump centre-right force) and culturally reactionary forces like Éric Zemmour’s far-right Reconquest. He is also more engaged with the wider European right, especially Meloni in Italy. Within the RN itself this aligns him more with a more bourgeois and younger new electorate.
Over the last year, Bardella had even started to sand down some of the party’s most abrasive ideas. Where Le Pen cleaves to some of the party’s old Putin-friendly instincts on Russia, he has spoken in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. He also broke from Le Pen on pensions reform, suggesting dropping the fixed retirement age and moving to a more contributory system. Where Le Pen went to Budapest to help out an embattled Orban, he struck a friendly tone towards Germany and even met with the country’s ambassador in Paris. All this created expectations in Brussels and other EU capitals that a President Bardella might be closer to the bloc’s economic orthodoxies and more open, at least, to compromises.
Le Pen’s candidacy firmly relegates him to a subordinate position within the party. Gone, too, is the spectre of a somewhat more conciliatory RN presence in the Elysée Palace if the party wins power next year. “Bardellism cannot exist, as it is ultimately Marinism”, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, a senior RN figure, has said. The reassertion of Le Pen’s primacy within the RN thus makes the party both more likely to take power and more likely to disrupt the rest of the EU and its foreign policies if it does.
Point 2: An RN presidency would be a rupture in French and European politics
France is a highly centralised state, and its president wields executive power more akin to an American president than to counterparts in its European neighbours. The country also remains a pivotal power in Europe as one of its two nuclear-armed countries and half of the Franco-German motor that long drove the European project.
News of an RN win would therefore send shockwaves around the continent, stunning the mainstream. It would also lift the spirits of much of Europe’s radical right after a difficult 2026 in which its pre-eminent governing leader, Orban, lost power and its links with Trump turned out to be liabilities. After all, the RN has been unapologetic in its support for fellow “patriots” across Europe. Le Pen campaigned for Orban, and Bardella has engaged closely with Meloni and her government in Italy and Nigel Farage’s Reform in the UK.
Farther afield, the RN has been increasingly welcomed by fellow nationalists like Israel’s Likud government, which hosted Bardella and other far-right leaders in 2025. The Trump administration has professed its own commitment to supporting “patriotic parties” and would react favourably to an RN win. This is despite Bardella’s and Le Pen’s efforts to cool their party’s earlier enthusiasm for the US president.
The RN would revel in the sense of rupture. In private, party leaders compare their potential accession to power to left-winger François Mitterrand’s historic victory in 1981—which they see as the only true political change France has undergone in the last 50 years.
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Thus empowered, the RN would want to enact its programme. Although foreign and defence policy may not be its top policy priority, “fixing” France’s relationship with the EU is bound to be one.
In its 2019 and 2024 European election campaign manifesto, the RN suggested transforming the European Commission into a mere secretariat of the EU, leaving legislative initiative only to the European Council. The party decries attempts to expand qualified majority voting, refuses any new transfers of competencies on foreign and defence policy to the commission—and seeks European allies in that endeavour.
The RN is vehemently against EU common taxation and borrowing. Both Le Pen and Bardella have proposed slashing the French contribution to the EU budget (by “between €2bn and 3bn”, as Bardella suggested, equivalent to 9-14% of the French payment in 2024). RN MPs have already put forward severalamendments to the budgetary laws to that effect. In July, Bardella has even advocated reducing the contribution by half. In place of European joint spending, the party wants the creation of a sovereign wealth fund to back “sovereign industries” in defence, technology and energy.
The party’s antipathy towards NATO means it plans to prioritise national-level defence instead. The RN has committed to maintaining current defence spending, but argues this should support France’s own military-industrial infrastructure first and foremost. Even if it has paused an earlier plan to leave NATO’s integrated command, at least for “as long as the war [in Ukraine] goes on”, Le Pen revived the idea as recently as May 2026.
The strictly national principle applies to energy too. The RN has promised to lower French energy costs, notably by breaking from EU-wide electricity pricing (which often depends on gas prices less relevant to France’s nuclear-heavy energy system) and thus allegedly reducing the French retail price. And, despite claiming to be concerned about the consequences of climate change, the RN is relentless in its opposition to the European Green Deal and its insistence that French nuclear energy should exempt the country from EU climate strictures.
Overall, if Le Pen were to become president, the RN’s highly disruptive European agenda would inevitably put France on a path to confrontation with European partners and institutions. As the fight against the EU is both a symbolic and a policy priority for the RN, other European leaders may have to find a way to negotiate on some of the demands—that for a budget rebate, for example—in order to prevent French vetoes.
Point 3: The RN’s inexperience and lack of interest in foreign policy would make France an erratic partner, especially in a crisis
Europe’s best hope, in the event of a Le Pen presidency, may reside in the fact that foreign policy would not be the top priority for the RN in power.
First, the RN’s foreign policies often remain vague or only partially formed. Despite its long-standing presence in the French political landscape, the party has no national governing experience and only in 2022 won a significant share of seats in the National Assembly. With little network among the French diplomatic establishment, RN leaders have rarely engaged closely with foreign policy debates. The party prefers to hide behind references to General de Gaulle’s pro-independence foreign policy to justify criticisms of the EU or NATO without being too specific.
According to RN insiders, the party’s foreign policy decisions emanate from private discussions between Le Pen and Bardella, with the occasional counsel of the advisory group Les Horaces. If she attains power in 2027, Le Pen may seek to attract more experienced figures from the traditional right (from LR or UDR) or from the military to lead on top foreign policy positions.
Second, the RN is clearly prepared to change its tone on international topics when political expediency dictates. RN figures privately insist that foreign policy cannot win it elections, but can lose it ones. They blame Le Pen’s defeat in April 2022 on her failure convincingly to pivot away from Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine two months earlier.
The party abandoned Frexit after the UK’s Brexit turned out to be a disaster. It curbed its old openness to strongmen such as Putin (repaying a contentious loan to a Russian bank in 2023) and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. In recent years, it attempted to erase its anti-Semitic past by adopting a strongly pro-Israel line. Since February 2022, the party has walked a tightrope: paying lip service to Ukraine’s right to self-defence while criticising sanctions against Russia as costly to French consumers and opposing some military aid to Kyiv as escalatory. Having greeted Trump’s re-election in 2024, the party has become a nimble critic as his erratic foreign policies have made alignment with him a political liability.
It is safe to assume, then, that, even with Le Pen as candidate, the party will tend towards orthodox language on most foreign policy ahead of the election. It has a vested interest in a campaign that focuses on topics such as immigration, crime and purchasing power (where the party is most confident), rather than one that debates France’s role in Europe or global geopolitics (where it is more uncertain and, in some cases, divided).
And even if the party wins power, the domestic agenda will likely come first. This can be summarised as: countering cultural and industrial decline by pursuing “national preference”. In policy terms it would include harsher law-and-order measures (especially on migration and crime), trade protectionism and efforts to reverse green policies in the hope of revitalising industry, and prioritising French nationals over foreigners in accessing welfare or public services. European partners should reckon on an RN presidency being most intransigent on EU matters related to those domestic priorities—and possibly being more open to negotiation in other areas.
In sum, however, they should expect a Le Pen foreign policy that is unclear, evolving or even contradictory. Under her leadership, France would take few initiatives and rather behave as a blocker. For example, it is hard to imagine an RN president responding decisively to a security crisis on Europe’s eastern flank. If under pressure from EU member states to be tougher on Russia, she would likely seek concessions and negotiations rather than further action.
If it does anything proactively, such a presidency would concentrate on disentangling France from EU policies that contradict its domestic goals. At best, the RN’s lack of interest and inexperience may be an opportunity for other European governments to shape some of the outcomes, as long as they keep their expectations low.
Point 4: How broad and how European? The strategic debates running through the RN
Today’s RN is infused by two strategic debates that would shape Le Pen’s tenure as president.
Movement or coalition?
The first has to do with the RN’s political identity: the party is struggling to determine whether it seeks to forge an union des droites (union of the right) or whether its outsider populist status remains its core identity.
In the long years the FN and the RN spent on the political margins, the Le Pens’ “neither left, nor right” approach appealed to disillusioned voters who rejected all forms of politics. It acknowledged the cordon sanitaire between the mainstream right and their parties. Even back in the FN days, Jean-Marie Le Pen crushed several internal attempts to unite the right. Marine Le Pen remains firmly opposed to any such efforts today.
If she is elected, it is unclear how Le Pen will position herself towards other right-of-centre French parties. Her instinct seems to be that working with them would dilute the RN and prevent it from conducting truly disruptive policies. Given her aversion to compromise and her long years of ostracism by the mainstream political class, Le Pen would struggle to extend a hand to others to form a majority in the National Assembly.
She may, however, continue using Bardella as a useful bridge to other parties of the right, at both national and European levels. In an interview with Le Figaro after Le Pen’s official launch of her presidential bid, he insisted that, as prime minister, he would seek to gather the right-wing electorate back to his party in order to build a “solid majority”.
It is reasonable to expect that, if Le Pen allows Bardella to forge these links at home, she will let him do so abroad too. If so, Bardella would continue building alliances with the European right spanning conservatives and various families of the radical right, likely with immigration as a focal point. The RN has already demonstrated its ability to build coalitions with other far-right parties and the European People’s Party to advance tougher migration legislation in the European Parliament. It would likely continue to do so if elected. Bardella has indicated that he wouldshare this agenda with leaders such as Meloni and German chancellor Friedrich Merz and seek to work with them.
Rival futures
The second faultline within the RN today is between rival conceptions of national sovereignty, a point that came across especially strongly in the authors’ interviews with senior party figures. Le Pen and the “old guard” around her have long held the view that France must resist Anglo-American hegemony and EU technocracy alike. They treat Washington and Brussels as equal threats to French autonomy.
Yet a new generation around Bardella—having come of age against the backdrop of the 2015 terror attacks in Paris and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine—has adopted an identity-based sense of Europeanness. It acknowledges the need for European cooperation against common threats, as long as this cooperation is “chosen”. It is inclined to invoke a shared Western and European cultural affinity.
For example, on Russia and Ukraine, Le Pen and the old guard have continued to blame NATO’s enlargement for “provoking” Russia. This fits their antipathy to Washington and Brussels. Their old ideological affinities with Moscow as a counterweight to American hegemony allow them to imagine a future in which Russia might even be a partner in a multipolar order once the war ends. But Bardella has admitted the “naivety” of Europeans in the face of the Russian challenge. Despite a less-than-keenly pro-Ukrainian voting record in the European Parliament, he has also spoken in favour of Ukrainian national sovereignty and against Russian imperialism.
These debates will continue within the RN—especially because Le Pen has been unwilling to sweep aside Bardella’s “union of the right” and rhetorically “pro-Ukraine” positions. For as long as she wants the electoral breadth he brings, the tension will persist.
Point 5: The likeliest outcome of an RN presidency would be a more isolated France in a weaker EU
The disruptive nature of RN policies towards Europe means France’s relationship with European partners would deteriorate over time.
At first, the RN would likely seek to reassure the financial markets and its international partners. Victory for the party may be accompanied by protests and strikes, and the new government would face economic limitations like France’s high levels of debt. In this context, Le Pen may want to project stability. Nevertheless, the RN has promised to engage on a number of priorities that will put it at odds with other European governments—including those led by the right—as well as EU institutions.
Opting out of the EU-wide electricity pricing could push up prices for other member states; quitting the migration pact would put greater pressure on others; curbing the French contribution to the EU budget would force others to pay more and possibly trigger an infringement procedure. More generally, Paris governing in a spirit of French exceptionalism would roil Europe’s collective efforts on common challenges.
Enlargement could prove an especially inflammatory topic. Plenty of European governments have concerns about bringing Western Balkans countries, Moldova and especially Ukraine into the EU. But if the RN wins the French presidency, it will be the most outspokenly opposed government among major European states. It has warned that enlargement would ruin French agriculture and suppress French wages; intensify the EU budgetary demands on France; and further centralise power within the EU at the cost of individual states. The accession of Ukraine, with its vast agricultural industry, particularly alarms the RN.
The long-term result of these trends would likely be some degree of French isolation. The party’s policies and instincts would set Le Pen up for conflict with the European Commission—but also with other national governments, including right-wing counterparts. Although others in the EU might conceivably come around to RN doubts about enlargement, the insistence on French national priority will alienate even ideologically sympathetic forces elsewhere.
Tensions could emerge with other far-right leaders, such as Meloni, over issues like migration. Despite broad ideological alignment on reducing migration, the RN prioritises national sovereignty over the management of borders and migration flows. By contrast, Brothers of Italy has advocatedgreater EU coordination and burden-sharing. As a result, a cohesive far-right alliance at the EU level should not be taken for granted. If these conflicts escalate, an “empty chair” moment, where France simply withdraws from EU meetings as it did under de Gaulle in 1965, is not unthinkable.
At a time when nationalist parties are rising in other major EU states, including Germany, an RN presidency could encourage unilateralism there too. The result could be doubly paradoxical: a lonelier right-wing France in a more right-wing Europe, and a more nationalist France more exposed to the interference of external powers like China, Russia and the US.
How the rest of Europe can move into “brace position”
As the rest of Europe faces up to the possibility of President Le Pen, the risk is that leaders and other policymakers bunch around one of two poles: complacency (the over-confident belief that she could simply be “handled” like any other challenging leader); and panic (the fatalistic assumption that an RN-led France would automatically mean the beginning of the end of the European project). Of the two courses, the first—the assumption of business as usual—currently looks like the greater risk. But neither is advisable.
This paper has shown that an RN win is a real possibility and would herald great disruption for the EU and its place in the world. It has argued that a Le Pen presidency would see itself ultimately as a radical insurgency against the French and European establishment. But it has also explored some of the complexities and shed some light on how the rest of Europe should think about them. In particular, leaders elsewhere on the continent should:
Abandon all precedents when thinking about an RN-led France
As president, Le Pen would be as fundamentally rooted in French traditions and peculiarities as equivalent leaders are in those of their countries. Trump’s America is simply too different to be closely relevant to France, despite the executive power both presidents wield. Orban’s Hungary does not fit either, with its distinctive tale of state capture and subordination to kleptocratic interests. Meloni’s Italy, meanwhile, is a complex story of creeping authoritarianism at home but emollience internationally. A Le Pen presidency would bear passing resemblances to each, but be sui generis.
Seek to understand the party and its instincts
Le Pen is a familiar figure, but her party has never held national power before and has evolved over time. Knowing how it ticks will be essential. This should lead decision-makers to engage with the party now, including by pursuing carefully calibrated efforts to meet with its senior figures to assess their true intentions. The decision of the German government to make contact with Bardella, for example, was the right one—though Europeans should be wary about reading Le Pen’s positions and instincts via Bardella and his circle.
Brace for a wider, but not necessarily more unified, European right
An RN win would be significant for Europe’s far-right. But ECFR’s research points firmly away from the idea of a coherent and durable European “union of the far-right” of any sort. The radical right has an emphatic sense of momentum, but that is not the same thing as a common project. Indeed, dismantling European integration is likely to generate conflicts over budgets and policies on issues like borders, energy, industry and defence—even between governments of similarly nationalist ideological hues.
Manage expectations when seeking to work with an RN-led France
Even in today’s more plural Europe, France is too big and too important to be circumvented entirely in a world of predators. Perhaps there would even be some limited common ground (most likely to be around defence, geoeconomics and building strategic autonomy). There could even be the possibility to mould a party that is still uncertain about its exact foreign policy agenda. But, especially under Le Pen rather than Bardella, this would still be a significantly less predictable, less collegiate and less European France than the one partners have known under Macron.
Prepare to deploy all the arts of European and international politics
An RN-led presidency would be complicated and disruptive. It would call for real diplomatic skill and political leadership in the EU and the rest of Europe, especially in powerful states like Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and, outside the bloc, Britain. In some cases, the task at hand might be to moderate France and bind it into groups of other states on matters of common and agreed interest. In others, it would be to build coalitions of the willing where France was reluctant to join. This would be a good time to deepen relationships between Brussels, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid and London, as well as other capitals.
The other futures
Europeans prepare for the possibility of Le Pen as president of France, they should keep in mind that an array of outcomes is still possible. There is also a significant chance of a moderate candidate making it to the second round and rallying the republican front once again against the RN. And in today’s volatile and fragmented French politics, there is even the possibility of a far-right against far-left runoff. But polls are polls, and probabilities are probabilities. This paper is a response to one major possibility among several—and an urgent call to France’s European partners to be ready.
About the authors
Célia Belin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office.
Jeremy Cliffe is editorial director and senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He co-heads the New Politics Project within the European Power programme.
Camille Lons is a policy fellow and deputy head of the Paris office at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Constance Victor is the Paris office coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Acknowledgments
We would like to start by thanking ECFR colleagues, including Piotr Buras, Teresa Coratella, Agathe Demarais, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, Jana Puglierin, Marta Prochwicz Jazowska, Herman Quarles, Jeremy Shapiro, Vessela Tcherneva and Pawel Zerka who gave thoughtful comments on various drafts. We would also like to thank Zineb Bouziane for her thorough research support in the earlier stages of this project.
We are grateful to experts such as Catherine Fieschi, Jacob Ross and Victor Mallet for engaging with us and offering constructive feedback. We also would like to acknowledge the politicians, journalists and thinkers we interviewed over the course of this research; while we respect their anonymity, we thank each of them for their time and insights.
The task of editing the two editions of this paper fell to Kim Butson and Adam Harrison and we are grateful for their time and dedication in bringing it to completion. Thanks also go to Chris Eichberger for offering beautiful visuals to complement our work.
Dopo l’estensione del 2020, il golden power ha ridotto le operazioni di fusione e acquisizione nei settori più innovativi dell’economia italiana. L’effetto è stato particolarmente intenso nel primo biennio, per poi attenuarsi fino a scomparire.
Poland’s party system is unravelling. The Law and Justice (PiS) party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczyński, has split. More than 40 of its members have formed a separate parliamentary caucus that includes Mateusz Morawiecki, prime minister for most of the party’s rule from 2015 to 2023. This ends an era of over 20 years that has been shaped by two powerful men and their parties: Kaczynski’s right-wing nationalist, Eurosceptic PiS and Donald Tusk’s liberal-conservative, pro-European Civic Coalition (KO).
At first glance, the collapse of his old enemy is a gift to Tusk. KO leads with 29%; PiS has slipped below 19% since the split. Four groupings now compete on the right, and Poland’s voting system punishes fragmentation, so four medium-sized parties win fewer seats than one large party on the same vote.
However, Morawiecki broke away in protest at PiS’s radicalisation, hoping to win over the very centre-right voters who helped return Tusk to power in 2023 after eight years of PiS rule. Most are now disillusioned (Tusk’s government has dismal approval ratings), politically homeless and angry. If they split their vote among the four right-wing parties or stay at home, Tusk may meet the same fate as Kaczynski in 2023: he could win the election in 2027 but be unable to assemble a majority coalition.
The other problem is one of method. For two decades Tusk has, often successfully, run against Kaczynski rather than on a programme of his own. Polarisation served both men well: each could rally his own voters by invoking the threat of the other, and smaller parties were squeezed out. Kaczynski’s decline forces Tusk to find another way to win.
Solution
Rather than betting on his enemy’s demise, Tusk should proactively set the agenda and win centrists beyond his base, as in 2023. Economic and social questions will matter, but foreign policy is set to loom unusually large in next year’s campaign. A record 25% of Poles favour leaving the EU (“Polexit”), hostility to Ukraine is rising and the right-wing parties are competing to outdo one another in anti-EU, anti-German and xenophobic rhetoric.
Tusk, a risk-averse tactician, has long avoided confrontation on those fundamental issues, calculating that exposing himself to attack from the right would be self-defeating. The far-right, however, has filled that vacuum, for example through its campaign against SAFE, the EU’s defence-loan scheme, and in the hardening mood towards Ukraine.
A more volatile party system may paradoxically make anti-Tusk majorities easier to build. That is an argument for the leader of Poland’s pro-European camp to take up the fight rather than duck it. Tusk needs to explain to Polish voters, more forcefully than before, why the EU is the best response to pressure from Donald Trump and Russia; why anchoring Ukraine in Europe is a Polish raison d’état; and how Poland’s interests differ from those the nationalists describe.
Context
Poles vote for a new parliament in October 2027. Tusk’s five-party coalition faces an uphill struggle to stay in office. The coalition partners have weak support or may not be able to re-enter the government at all.
Recent polls give the four right-wing parties a majority between them; whether their rivalries would allow a coalition is another matter. PiS has moved further right in recent months to stop core voters defecting to more radical rivals, in a shift which provoked Morawiecki’s rebellion. His departure will probably set off further political realignments before the 2027 election.
Cover image: picture alliance / AP Photo/Virginia Mayo | Virginia Mayo
Problem
Bulgaria has agreed to host up to eight American refuelling tankers at its Bezmer military base to support US operations in the Middle East. The announcement came just days after prime minister Rumen Radev withdrew his country from the European coalition of the willing (CoW) for Ukraine, arguing that military support would only prolong the war and that Bulgaria lacks the resources to contribute.
Radev has put the final decision on Bezmer to a vote in Bulgaria’s parliament, allowing him to spread the political responsibility and limit direct ownership of the move. Now the prime minister can maintain his rather clumsy position: by rejecting military support for Ukraine (despite previous parliament votes) and justifying logistical support for American military operations elsewhere, he hopes to preserve US security guarantees without dedicating Bulgaria to Europe’s developing security architecture.
These decisions expose a growing inconsistency in Bulgaria’s strategic posture. Sofia is distancing itself from European efforts to strengthen Ukraine and is planning for its own defence, while simultaneously supporting Washington’s military operation in the Middle East. Rather than aligning with the broadly pro-European consensus and anti-American sentiments in Bulgarian society, Radev is attempting to balance competing security frameworks without sufficiently considering European security interests.
This ambiguity also presents a broader challenge for Europe. As the Trump administration continues to conduct foreign policy through bargaining, some European governments appear tempted to pursue bilateral arrangements with Washington rather than invest in European unity. Such behaviour risks weakening collective defence, precisely when strategic coordination is needed.
Solution
European security cannot rely on member states choosing cooperation only when politically convenient. The EU needs to engage more actively with the Bulgarian government and push back on Radev’s form of hedging while political conditions remain favourable, to help strengthen defence cooperation among the EU’s 27 member states.
The EU should also reinforce the political and practical incentives for participation in common defence initiatives, for example through its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and other European defence instruments. At the same time, it needs to reduce opportunities for external powers—particularly China, Russia and the US —to exploit divisions, institutional weaknesses and the strategic ambiguity encouraged by MAGA. Bulgaria’s recent work to delist two Russian oligarchs and a Russian patriarch from the EU’s 21st sanctions package is an example of Russia’s growing leverage over the government in Sofia.
Overall, the EU should treat Bulgaria as an urgent political case rather than a lost cause. This is especially true given that, in 2027, Europe will see several major elections which have the potential to return governments that are more concerned with nationalism than European unity. This, in turn, would constrain the political space in which governments committed to a strong European foreign and security policy can act.
Context
Since taking office in May 2026, Radev has gradually shifted Bulgaria’s foreign policy away from alignment with its European partners. Bulgaria did not join the international agreement to establish the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, nor did Radev attend May’s B9 summit in Bucharest. Bulgaria’s decision to leave the CoW has attracted strong criticism from pro-European parties and raises broader questions about Bulgaria’s long-term strategic orientation.
The latest move in Bezmer follows the previous deployment of as many as 15 US tanker aircraft at Sofia Airport between February and June, which sparked political controversy. The government ended the deployment, which was linked to arrangements for (unsuccessful) discussions on Bulgaria’s inclusion in the US Visa Waiver Program, on June 30th.
Delays in military modernisation and uncertainty surrounding planned defence-industrial cooperation, including a Rheinmetall partnership, are compounding Sofia’s lack of clarity about whether it intends to become a consistent contributor to Europe’s security architecture. As it stands, Radev appears to be pursuing more transactional, case-by-case relationships with both Europe and the US.
Cover image: picture alliance / Sipa USA | Davide Bonaldo
Problem
Industrial decarbonisation is not easy. While EU leadership in the field has brought some benefits—it was the first to offer innovative, low-carbon products to the global market, for example—there are also transition costs, especially in sectors such as steel and chemicals.
Now Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine and the US-Israel-Iran conflict are pushing up energy prices; there is fierce competition from China and others for products such as chemicals, fertilisers and steel. At the same time, companies also face growing emission trading costs. Other parts of the world are not moving fast enough to reduce cost differences for European front-runner companies; the 2025 IEA Breakthrough Agenda report shows that global low-carbon industrial transitions are happening too slowly to achieve the targets of the Paris Agreement.
At the EU level, climate diplomacy is not sufficiently prioritising partnerships for industrial decarbonisation and instead focuses on general mitigation and financing issues. While the launch of the EU Task Force for International Carbon Pricing and Markets Diplomacy in 2024 was an important step, it did not address how Europeans can help develop the infrastructure, access to finance, intellectual property rights and personnel skills necessary for industrial decarbonisation.
The EU thus requires a stronger and more coherent diplomatic approach to industrial transformation. Most of all, it needs to focus on improving its outreach and expanding its offers on finance, market demand and innovation cooperation.
Solution
An informal meeting of environment and climate ministers (ENVI) is taking place on July 23rd-July 24th. It has two relevant items on the agenda: decarbonisation and competitiveness, and climate diplomacy. But these items are interconnected, and ministers should take an integrated approach when addressing them.
The EU should learn from the more active industrial policies of China, Japan and South Korea, which have the institutional capacity to make strategic choices about which technology to support, and have designed a good mix of policy instruments to promote them. Europeans should also look at how European coal regions, for example in Poland, have transitioned to create new green jobs. Such areas provide a blueprint for other countries trying to build public acceptance for closing mines and winding down fossil-dependent manufacturing.
The EU needs to devote more resources to international cooperation with partner countries on industrial transformation, for example by lowering the climate impact of steel and cement production. Such partnerships should be long term and include innovation cooperation for emerging clean technologies. Ministers should include industrial transformation diplomacy in the strategic roadmap document that underpins their discussions, and push for adequate funding in the next “Global Europe” instrument for development policy.
The EU must address the lack of coherence between EU and member state initiatives and promote a “Team Europe” approach. To meet the China challenge, even big member states such as Germany cannot build strong enough partnerships alone. But this requires a more cooperative culture; staffing for climate diplomacy in Brussels and at EU delegations should be increased to facilitate this.
Finally, ministers should engage more positively in the industrial decarbonisation agenda under the Paris Agreement. This could follow Brazil’s 2025 initiative to launch a process for accelerating low-carbon transformations of industry, and Turkey’s ambition to continue this work at COP31 in November 2026.
Context
The EU has set ambitious climate targets for 2030 and 2040, with the bloc aiming to become climate neutral by 2050. However, policy instruments are being hotly debated. For example, on July 17th the European Commission proposed weakening EU emission trading to accommodate industry while simultaneously strengthening its support mechanism for green transitions.
In parallel, EU environment ministers and their climate negotiators have started a process to improve climate diplomacy after what many saw as disappointing, weak language on reducing overall emissions at the 2025 COP30 in Belém. The process has so far focused on improving preparations for formal climate negotiations, such as the upcoming COP31 in Turkey—and less on broader partnerships around, for example, industrial decarbonisation.
Cover image: picture alliance/dpa | Michael Kappeler
European leaders breathed a sigh of relief as US president Donald Trump departed last week’s NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey. Despite a few unseemly moments in which Trump reiterated his desire to seize Greenland and nonsensically ordered a halt to all trade with Spain, the meeting went off without any major catastrophes.
Most importantly, Trump did not announce any major troop withdrawals from Europe or any moves to leave the alliance. He even had warm words for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and pledged to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot air-defence missiles domestically. By the end, even Trump proclaimed that there was “love” in the air.
But optics aside, the summit was an absurd exercise. NATO leaders revelled in their pledges to increase defence-related spending to 5%, even though everyone knows that this arbitrary number means nothing in the absence of deeper discussions about capabilities. The figure was pulled out of thin air last year to appease Trump. In the months leading up to the summit, the same leaders had worried that Trump would withdraw the US from the alliance or dramatically reduce its presence in Europe, which would then find itself at the mercy of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
That is why NATO leaders expended so much energy preparing a summit that would not allow for any unscripted moments. Fears that the mercurial US president would use the occasion to undermine the alliance were palpable. When the moment came, European leaders reportedly fell over themselves to praise Trump, with NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, leading the sycophantic charge.
Some commentators believe that saving NATO and keeping the Western alliance alive was worth this self-abasement. But by kowtowing to Trump and indulgently harking back to the good old days of the transatlantic relationship, Europe’s leaders are risking more than just their dignity.
Consider the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall. After the initial euphoria, many parts of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were emptied out as their populations left, even as property prices were driven up by an influx of wealthier West Germans. The result was a wave of nostalgia for a lost world, expressed in films like Good Bye, Lenin!
The term coined to describe this emotion was Ostalgie (“Eastalgia”), and it has shaped German politics and culture for almost 40 years now. Although many East German writers have criticised such sentimentality for trivialising East Germany’s decades-long repression, some see it as the key to understanding what ails Germany’s eastern regions today. There one finds a widespread refusal to acknowledge that the world has changed, a habit of free riding, and a tendency—occasionally—to look ridiculous, such as when East Germans parrot Russian talking points on Ukraine.
Ironically, Europe’s problem today is not just that Ostalgie has held back eastern Germany; it is that a new malady, Westalgia, has taken hold. It was on full display in Ankara.
Westalgia has several key features. The first is a refusal to acknowledge that the world has moved on. By acting as if US security guarantees are still as ironclad as they were under the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, and by continuing to purchase US weapons, they hope to turn back the clock. But a better strategy would recognise that America has changed in fundamental ways. Even if a Democrat moves into the White House in January 2029, US retrenchment will continue.
Europe’s hyper-reliance on American power clearly had an infantilising effect
Those who want to turn back the clock naturally see the past through rose-tinted glasses, even though elements of the post-cold war settlement were not to Europe’s advantage. Specifically, Europe’s hyper-reliance on American power clearly had an infantilising effect. Even when caught between a predatory Russia, a fickle US and a coercive China, Europeans are still wont to downplay and underestimate their own power and influence.
The second feature of Westalgia is a tendency to free ride. Just as eastern Germans grew accustomed to the transfer payments and subsidies (the infamous Solidaritätszuschlag, or “solidarity tax”) that flowed eastward after unification, so have Europeans become accustomed to America bankrolling their security. As a result, Europeans have under-invested, not just in defence but also in their industrial base, technological sovereignty and energy independence.
Instead of complaining that US citizens no longer want to be responsible for defending Europe, and instead of spending billions of dollars to satisfy Trump’s vanity, Europeans would be better off having a serious conversation about how they could fight a high-intensity conflict on their own, if necessary. Instead of spending an arbitrary share of their GDP on defence, they should critically evaluate their capability gaps and adjust their spending to match their needs. Coffers are tight everywhere, but it will be easier to justify expenditures on weapons if they appear less geared toward flattering Trump.
Third, in their subservience to the US president, Europeans often do not hide it well, which prevents them from being taken seriously—be it by Trump, Putin, or Chinese leader Xi Jinping. If there is one man who presumably respects Rutte less than Rutte himself, it is Trump. Europe will garner the world’s respect only when it stands up for itself.
Whereas Ostalgie was a bottom-up phenomenon, Westalgia is being driven by elites. Of course, European politicians need to allay their skittish electorates’ fears. But if they want to succeed in the 21st century, they must stop selling nostalgia and start looking to the future.
This article was first published by Project Syndicate on July 15th 2026
Italy’s 2027 electoral campaign has begun. So far, the contest has been defined by opposition parties exploiting what they see as prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s flaws in government policy on Russia, Ukraine and defence spending.
One person in particular is fuelling this criticism: former general Roberto Vannacci and his far-right party, National Future (Futuro Nazionale). With Meloni struggling to justify her commitment to Ukraine, NATO and the EU, and an Italian left radicalising along pacifist lines, National Future embodies an ideological nationalism which could prove indispensable for Italy’s right-wing bloc ahead of 2027.
Vannacci is also a Trojan horse for Russian influence inside Italy. He has publicly stated that he would have “no problem” accepting party and legal funding from Moscow or Beijing, and has adopted a transactional, sovereigntist posture modelled closely on Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Domestically, this is an easy argument to win: a recent ECFR policy brief confirmed that Italians are favourable to resuming imports of Russian gas and oil. This openness to Russia is compounded by his military past: Vannacci was Italy’s military attaché in Moscow, raising anxieties about counterintelligence and security.
Should National Future enter a governing coalition, Vannacci’s background could shatter the EU’s collective security consensus. A Rome influenced by Vannacci would actively block EU defence initiatives, veto sanctions and leak sensitive security coordination. For Meloni, normalising Vannacci would trigger an immediate rupture with the European mainstream with which she has been cooperating since 2022. Ultimately, he alone could paralyse Brussels’ capacity as a coherent geopolitical actor.
Solution
To fully grasp the extent of the danger that Vannacci poses to the EU, Europeans need to look beyond the playbook of contemporary European populism. While figures like Marine Le Pen have spent years achieving dédiabolisation—meticulously distancing themselves from Vladimir Putin’s regime to capture mainstream credibility—Vannacci is highly likely to align himself with the pro-Russia Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Italians and Europeans alike should thus not treat National Future as just another right-wing movement. Instead, Vannacci—who also sits in the European Parliament—should be dealt with as a strategic issue. Whether or not National Future joins a second Meloni government, his party’s emergence demonstrates that Europe’s mainstream must no longer simply contain the far right or the far left. Now Europeans need to preserve the credibility of democratic politics as new radical actors reshape the political landscape.
Meloni should exclude National Future from any form of governance. She needs to resist this new far-right siren call by using the political capital she has built in the EU since 2022: she has been at the forefront of support for Ukraine, collaboration on trade, initiatives on migration, and contributions to EU reactions to international developments. Importantly, Meloni has maintained a friendly relationship with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.
However, the conservative mainstream also needs to react. It is normalising anti-EU parties by seeking their political support at the EU level and in the European Parliament. Building a cordon sanitaire around anti-EU forces requires everyone’s engagement: EU conservative leaders should work together to show their voters that they reject such extreme views. Pragmatic collaboration will also help overcome some divisions which are freezing decision-making on issues such as Russian security threats and migration.
Context
Meloni entered office in 2022 and gradually established herself as a pragmatic conservative leader, separate from more openly revisionist forces on the European right. But her recent decision not to attend a Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris on July 13th highlights the pressure she is under, ahead of Italy’s 2027 election, to focus on domestic commitments instead of European debates on Russia, Ukraine and defence.
Here, Vannacci is a key force. National Future, which he founded only four months ago, is polling around 6% and establishing itself as the second-largest force in Italy’s right-wing bloc. Vannacci’s platform combines nationalist rhetoric, opposition to military support for Ukraine, openness to legally permissible Russian and Chinese electoral funding, and a confrontational approach to liberal democratic values.
His ideological trajectory mirrors the social architecture, ethnonationalism and systemic Euroscepticism of the AfD. Vannacci is not constrained by regional economic interests or coalition dynamics, unlike the leader of Italy’s right-wing League party, Matteo Salvini. This defines Vannacci as a loose cannon; National Future is well-positioned to capitalise on societal anxieties and economic grievances to pull the Overton window toward radical revisionism.
America has long been the go-to home for emerging tech companies. With this, it has reaped economic and geopolitical benefits such as technological sovereignty, innovation culture, brain gain and standard setting, to name a few. But President Donald Trump’s rule is now eroding some of America’s most competitive assets: predictability and legal certainty. From tariff volatility and political pressure on independent agencies to restrictions on foreign researchers and the politicisation of investment decisions, doing business in America now comes with much higher risks.
For the first time in decades, Europe has a chance to compete by offering emerging companies an alternative: stable institutions, clear rules, independent regulators and a rule-of-law guarantee. To beat the US at its own game, the EU will need to take a much more continental approach.
In some ways, Europe is not too far behind. It currently competes head-to-head with the US and China in the creation of new tech companies, for example. Since 2015, it has produced more start-ups than America and has the same share of founders creating new companies with Asia. Talent costs are lower than in the Bay Area or New York, and Europe holds advanced positions in quantum technology, climate tech and biotech.
The problem arises at the scaling stage. The fragmentation of 27 member-state markets and the regulatory complexity this brings is an invisible ceiling on the continent’s start-up environment. In 2024, investment rounds above $100m totalled $120.8bn in the US compared to just $18.1bn in Europe. And in 2025, deep tech investment reached $130bn in the US compared to just $16bn in Europe, a gap that widens when looking at AI and other breakthrough technologies.
Over time, these dynamics have led to a structural decline: Europe’s share of global tech market value has plummeted from 30% in 2000 to just 7% today, even though the tech industry now accounts for 15% of Europe’s GDP, compared to 4% in 2015. The consequences for Europe’s tech sovereignty and geoeconomic sway are unquestionable.
It would be misleading to only blame regulatory fragmentation for this gap. Other factors weigh heavily on European venture capital growth too. There are few deep pockets in public equity markets able to absorb large tech IPOs; European institutional capital, like pension funds, chronically underinvests in venture capital; and the broader institutional culture prices risk more conservatively than America’s.
A lack of European money means that much capital comes from overseas. Nearly half of Europe’s growth-stage funding last year came from abroad, predominantly America. In itself this is not a problem, but it becomes one when those investors push entrepreneurs to relocate their companies once they reach scale. This creates a “high-growth forum shopping”that drains talent, high-quality jobs, innovation capacity and previously invested public funding out of Europe. This has created a familiar pattern of European-born companies ending up incorporated on the other side of the Atlantic.
Creating an EU Inc
To address these issues, the European Commission recently took a decisive step towards approving a European company model: EU Inc., otherwise known as the 28th regime. The idea is to create a harmonised EU-level legal framework to allow companies, especially startups and scale-ups, to operate in the single market under one set of rules rather than facing 27 different national systems. This should create European-born and -raised firms.
The first part is already on the table: a regulation establishing EU Inc. as an optional, automatically recognised and fully digital corporate entity covering commercial, tax, insolvency and labour law. In theory, this should lead to less regulatory fragmentation, more risk investment and better access to capital markets and European talent. The practice, however, is more difficult.
Achieving a broad ecosystem of innovative EU Incs will depend on whether founders choose it and whether investors trust it is consistent and usable. On the attractiveness front, the current proposal faces two big difficulties. First, the regime can only reach its full potential if the EU makes progress on other files including key items of the startup and scaleup strategy, the European Innovation Act, the capital markets union and the transformation of certain merger guidelines.
Second, in the complex institutional negotiations up until 2027, certain countries and stakeholders will likely seek to dilute the regime’s capacity to become a unified standard. This is because it will need to bypass certain domestic legal barriers to make it easier to build, invest, and scale across Europe. Germany, for example, will scrutinise any framework that bypasses its co-determination model (Mitbestimmung). France will defend the centrality of its tech national champions agenda. And the Nordics will protect the favourable tax treatment of stock options and employee share schemes. In June 2026, the Council’s own legal service already advised national delegations that the proposal may need to be downgraded from a regulation to a directive, which would undermine its harmonising ambition from the outset.
Should the 28th regime derail under pressure from national interests, it would be a macroeconomic failure of the first order
Should the 28th regime derail under pressure from national interests, it would be a macroeconomic failure of the first order. To prevent that and keep the capitals on board, the proposal must be preserved as the commission designed it, as a regulation, not a directive. That means EU Inc is optional for entrepreneurs and businesses, but not for member states: national company law stays in place, and companies simply gain a European corporate form alongside it. Capitals therefore retain their legal sovereignty while their most promising firms become less likely to move abroad. Within this, the new legislation must include tax measures to prevent huge imbalances of member states with more attractive tax laws such as Ireland, Luxembourg or the Netherlands.
Moreover, in case of an effective blockage of negotiations, parallel levers should be activated: the move away from unanimity voting suggested by Ursula von der Leyen in April together with fast-track routes such as mutual recognition mechanisms between member states. The European Competitiveness Lab is a good model to inspire this member-state coordination. The geopolitical urgency framing the debate can provide the political tailwind.
Europe has networks of academic research centres and connected clusters such as the AI factories which are already generating projects and spin-offs in critical technologies. There is still time for these spin-offs to be born as EU Incs. The combination is straightforward: AI factories and the EuroHPC joint undertaking provide the scientific infrastructure, EU Inc is the legal vehicle, and the European innovation council and investment bank work as the financing bridge between laboratory and market. This is the most scalable path available to Europe to turn its research strength into corporate strength; it just requires the alignment of institutions and laws that already exist.
The EU can do it again
The potential transformative dimension of the 28th regime has two precedents worth recalling, both of which combined a common legal framework, pooled public investment and continental scale to overcome the limits of national efforts.
In the late 1960s, Airbus emerged as a political-industrial project to equip Europe with a champion capable of competing with the US in commercial aviation. France and Germany agreed in 1970 to a single legal vehicle, joined shortly after by the UK and Spain. They then channelled public funding into a shared corporate structure, and eventually consolidated their fragmented national aerospace industries into one European company.
And in the 2000s, Galileo gave Europe its own global positioning technology based on a system that was open, civilian-controlled and compatible with GPS but more precise. It required EU member states to agree on a common legal and governance framework under EU law, to commit more than €10bn of joint EU-budget funding over two decades and to operate the system as shared European infrastructure rather than as competing national projects. Its development is widely credited as a factor that pushed Washington to end the deliberate restrictions of GPS for civilian use.
Today, both operate at a global scale. The lesson for the 28th regime is the same: a single legal framework, pooled resources and continental scale turned political ambition into industrial reality. Europe’s competitiveness in the coming decades will depend on its capacity to do this again and support companies, especially those driven by emerging technologies. With this, the EU could achieve a new strategic form of sovereignty and the greatest practical step forward for the single market in decades.
Cover image: picture alliance / Hans Lucas | Frédéric Pétry
The restoration of a matriarch
July 7th saw one period of uncertainty in French politics end and another begin. Despite an appeals court upholding Marine Le Pen’s fraud conviction, the leader of the far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) will run for president next year. The election result remains wide open, but she is polling strongly and the possibility of a Le Pen-ist France is once again plausible. Should she win, the rest of Europe would have to contend with a highly abrasive and confrontational leadership in Paris, determined to unwind significant parts of the country’s integration with the rest of the EU.
Bracing for impact
European policymakers must prepare for that turbulent eventuality. In particular, they should:
Avoid clinging to precedents when thinking about an RN-led France. A President Le Pen would be neither “a Viktor Orban” nor “a Giorgia Meloni”, but a distinct phenomenon rooted in French political traditions and circumstances.
Seek to understand the party and its instincts. Le Pen is a familiar figure, but her party has never held national power before and has evolved over time. Knowing how it ticks will be essential.
Manage expectations about the pliability of a Le Pen presidency. Unlike Bardella, she primarily thinks not in terms of alliances with the broader political right (at home or in Europe) but of the RN as a monolithic national movement, beyond left and right, dedicated to French autonomy. Working with others will come less easily to her.
Prepare to deploy the arts of European and international politics. As France is one of the keystone states of the EU, its turn away from the project could be highly disruptive. Handling a Le Pen presidency will demand a clear sense of where cooperation could be possible (elements of European defence, perhaps) and where events might necessitate coalitions-of-the-willing circumventing Paris.
Courting public opinion
France’s appeals court on July 7th confirmed Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling European public funds. It reduced her “ineligibility” sentence, opening the possibility of her running as a candidate in the presidential election, but required her to serve a year of house arrest wearing an electronic tag. Le Pen has always said she would not run in those circumstances, but has announced that she will appeal to the Court of Cassation, France’s highest court, suspending the penalty until it delivers its verdict at some point in the new year. Until then, she is tag-free and able to take back the reins from her young protégé, Jordan Bardella. The possibility that his more cautious approach might temper the party’s populist radicalism now seems remote.
Now entering her fourth presidential campaign, Le Pen is an experienced candidate well-known to the French electorate. Having taken over the party (then called the National Front) from her father in 2011, she has sought to detoxify its image. Le Pen presents herself as both an empathetic leader and an unapologetic nationalist who champions “national priority” for French citizens over foreigners. She is polling far ahead of challengers in the first round and appears highly competitive in the second. Current polls put her slightly ahead of her strongest (centrist) challengers in the second round of voting, though French presidential elections cansee significant volatility.
This week, Mark Leonard welcomes Célia Belin, head of ECFR’s Paris office and senior policy fellow, and Jeremy Cliffe, ECFR’s editorial director and senior policy fellow, to discuss Marine Le Pen’s decision to run in France’s 2027 presidential election.
After a Paris appeal court ruling rescinded her ban from holding public office, Le Pen has reasserted leadership of the far-right National Rally (RN) and sidelined Jordan Bardella, who was widely expected to lead the party into the 2027 election. Her announcement has led to rivals across the centre and the left recalibrating their strategies in an already volatile political landscape.
Together, Mark, Célia and Jeremy explore how Le Pen’s candidacy changes France’s electoral outlook. They discuss whether she is a stronger candidate than Bardella, how French political parties are preparing for an election that RN enters as the favourite, and they draw on ECFR research to examine what an RN presidency could mean in practice.
Would a Le Pen government seek confrontation with Brussels? How might it reshape France’s approach to migration, the EU budget and European integration? Could nationalist governments across Europe really cooperate? And how would a Le Pen presidency impact relations with Ukraine, the US and France’s European allies?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 8th 2026.
Andy Burnham, front left, is sworn-in as an MP in the House of Common in London, England, Monday, June 22, 2026. (House of Commons via AP) | picture alliance / House of Commons via AP | Uncredited
Within a few weeks, Britain will have a new prime minister. Andy Burnham, who was recently elected as an MP following nine years as mayor of Greater Manchester, looks set to take over without competition following Keir Starmer’s announcement that he would step down from the role.
Burnham has wide support among Labour MPs who think he represents the best hope of reviving the party’s popularity and seeing off the populist-nationalist Reform UK party in Britain’s next election. However, his recent experience in regional politics and his sudden ascent to become prime minister-in-waiting mean that Burnham’s approach to domestic policy is much clearer than his approach to foreign affairs. Domestically, as prime minister, he is likely to focus above all on spreading power and opportunity across Britain’s regions and communities.
Nevertheless, to achieve both his aim of inclusive regeneration and to protect the country’s security, Burnham needs to make some fundamental choices about Britain’s place in the world. It is possible to anticipate at least some of how he is likely to approach Britain’s international role. While Burnham is likely to continue with Starmer’s current approach to crisis management, the pressure of global trends and his political instincts could push him to set out a clearer picture of Britain’s partnerships, with a greater emphasis on Europe and middle powers.
Burnham’s vision of renewal
In Burnham’s set-piece speech on Monday, he presented the vision that he said will guide his leadership of Britain. He sees the defining goal of his premiership as restoring the British people’s trust in government by making it deliver better for all parts of the country. Some of his policy ambitions continue in the broad direction pursued by Starmer and chancellor Rachel Reeves: a focus on industrial strategy, the pursuit of greater self-sufficiency in key sectors essential for national security, encouraging innovation, directing public procurement towards domestic production, encouraging inward investment in Britain and tackling the shortage of affordable housing.
Burnham has said less about the foreign policy questions that have taken up much of Starmer’s time as prime minister, including Ukraine, the Middle East, relations with Donald Trump’s America and China. He will likely emphasise that he is prioritising domestic affairs, in contrast to Starmer who sometimes seemed more comfortable dealing with global issues than difficult domestic choices (and was mocked by critics as “never here Keir”). This might make Burnham inclined to appoint a relatively senior politician as foreign secretary who could carry out some high-profile diplomatic commitments on his behalf.
Aligned on foreign affairs
In any case, British policies on Ukraine and the Middle East are likely to remain much the same, because Starmer’s positions are mainstream within the Labour Party. According to foreign secretary Yvette Cooper, Andy Burnham is “100% behind [the UK’s] unwavering support for Ukraine” and is a fundamental believer in NATO and Britain’s multilateral partnerships. Jonathan Powell, Starmer’s influential national security adviser who played a key role in these areas, will likely stay on at least until the end of the year. Although Burnham has occasionally sounded more critical of Israel’s war in Gaza—he called for a ceasefire in October 2023, two months before Starmer—there is little reason to expect any significant change in policy.
Burnham is pro-European (and has a Dutch wife) and said in 2025 that he hoped Britain would rejoin the EU in his lifetime. But during the recent by-election that brought him back into parliament, held in a constituency that voted strongly for Leave in 2016, he emphasised that he was not advocating that Britain rejoin now. In the short-term, his government’s focus will be on completing the EU-UK agreements that were due to be signed at a summit meeting on July 22nd. The summit is also supposed to set a direction for the next steps in the reset process; it seems unlikely that Burnham will come into office with views that would significantly change Britain’s approach to negotiations.
For a medium-sized, open economy like Britain, prosperity, re-industrialisation and the kind of economic security that Burnham wants to focus on cannot be achieved without paying attention to international partnerships
Nevertheless, despite Burnham’s likely intention to broadly preserve Starmer’s foreign policy and to focus on domestic issues, he will have to answer big questions about Britain’s international role. For a medium-sized, open economy like Britain, prosperity, re-industrialisation and the kind of economic security that Burnham wants to focus on cannot be achieved without paying attention to international partnerships in areas like trade, supply chains, investment energy and technology. Britain is already overdue to develop a more defined national strategy for these sectors, for an age where the kind of rules-based international order that it once relied on (and saw itself as a guardian of) has given way to a messier and more uncertain world.
Finding Britain’s global place
While Starmer played a strong role in supporting Ukraine and building security coalitions with other European countries, he did not set out a compelling wider vision of how Britain should position itself and its interests in a challenging global context. Burnham, however, is well placed to take on this task. His commitment to inclusive growth at home pairs well with a revised view of how Britain works internationally: he could set out a vision of internationalism for Britain that is rooted in the needs and aspirations of communities across the country, in line with the goal of regional regeneration that he espoused.
To do that, however, he will have to take some decisions about Britain’s international partnerships and affiliations, and how they relate to each other.
Given the alignment in Britain’s interests and the extent of its links with Europe, its relationship with the EU must be at the centre of foreign policy. The idea of a closer relationship with Europe is increasingly popular and, at a time when the US has become unreliable as a partner, presents the best foundation for promoting British security and prosperity. Whatever institutional form it ultimately takes, Burnham could set a more explicitly political vision of Britain’s role in Europe as a central element in navigating a complex and uncertain world.
Alongside this, he will need to create a balance between Britain and the US that preserves the benefits of cooperation but gives Britain greater ability to withstand pressure. Central to this will be technology and particularly AI—a subject that was surprisingly absent from Burnham’s speech, but which ministers within Starmer’s government are thinking about. Some in Labour circles expect Burnham to adopt a less deferential approach to Trump than Starmer pursued, at least until the US-Israeli attack on Iran this year.
Beyond the traditional transatlantic relationship, Burnham will need to determine how Britain acts towards increasingly influential emerging and middle powers. Here, it may be significant that Lord Jim O’Neill, a former Treasury official and economist for Goldman Sachs, has emerged as one of Burnham’s key economic advisers. O’Neill coined the acronym “BRICS” and argues strongly for including non-Western powers in global economic management. Most relevantly, he has proposed that rethinking traditional Western economic models goes hand-in-hand with greater engagement with non-Western countries that have different political-economic models.
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Britain’s G20 presidency in 2027 could be the perfect opportunity for Burnham to set out an ambitious vision of how international economic cooperation can benefit the populations of all countries. At the same time, Burnham should confront the trade-off between global cooperation and sustainability, and the risks of dependency, de-industrialisation and vulnerability to coercion. China will bring these trade-offs into sharp relief, making it among the defining strategic questions of Burnham’s premiership.
Biomanufacturing uses biological processes to produce food, fuels, chemicals and materials that today rely on fossil resources.
The underlying science is not new. But advances in AI and falling renewable energy costs are transforming biomanufacturing from a niche climate solution into a new production paradigm, with the potential to reshape industrial competitiveness and geopolitical power much as fossil fuels did in the previous industrial age.
China has identified biomanufacturing as a strategic technology for resilience and self-reliance, deploying a familiar playbook of state-backed investment and infrastructure to build globally competitive industries.
Europe remains a formidable competitor, leading in patents and core technologies, with world-class research, specialised industrial clusters, skilled talent and globally competitive firms across the value chain.
Its weaknesses are limited infrastructure, regulatory delays and growing dependence on Chinese manufacturing capacity.
Without greater urgency, Europe risks repeating the mistakes it made in solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles: inventing breakthrough technologies while ceding profits and geopolitical leverage to China, this time with even greater consequences.
The microbe revolution
For two centuries, the molecules that underpin modern life have been pumped from the ground in the form of oil and gas. The next industrial revolution may instead grow them in laboratories and tanks.
This is the promise of biomanufacturing: using biological processes to produce the building blocks of the future economy. Scientists can programme living cells to act like microscopic factories, capable of producing everything from food, fuels and fertilisers to plastic, chemicals and advanced materials—nearly all of which still rely to some degree on fossil resources. For millennia microbes were used to turn grain into beer and milk into cheese. Now they are engineered to turn straw into jet fuel and sugar into armour.
What sounds like science fiction is rapidly becoming reality. Driven by abundant and affordable renewable energy and dramatic advances in artificial intelligence (AI), biomanufacturing is beginning to change not only what economies produce, but how they produce it. In doing so, they address a deeper layer of fossil dependence than renewable electricity alone. The shift could be as transformative as the invention of the petrochemical industry itself. If the geographical distribution of fossil resources shaped the geopolitics of the last industrial age, then the ability to produce key molecules without them could shape the next.
China’s leaders have recognised this opportunity. Beijing has spent an average of roughly €1.4bn per year on electric vehicle research and development (R&D) over 15 years to build a globally dominant industry. It is now reportedly spending €2bn-3bn in biotechnology R&D alone. And it is doing this at a time when China already accounts for more than 70% of global basic fermentation capacity.
But its ambitions for the bioeconomy go much further. The 2022 Bioeconomy Five-Year Plan set a goal of global leadership by 2035, while the 2026 15th Five-Year Plan places biomanufacturing alongside AI at the heart of China’s future industrial model. In July 2025, Beijing unveiled a list of 35 flagship biomanufacturing products to replace fossil-based chemicals or food and feed additives, and selected 43 companies to build pilot plants. No other major power is investing in the bioeconomy with comparable scale or strategic intent.
But Europe has not lost the race to China just yet. As in areas like semi-conductors, European companies provide some of the key foundational technology and microbial strains that make Chinese fermentation successes possible. Europeans are at the cutting-edge of research—the continent has a thriving biosolutions sector worth €60bn, comparable to the GDP of Slovenia, and growing around 5% annually. And according to industry estimates, if scaled successfully, biomanufacturing could replace a quarter of European oil-based chemicals, halve the continent’s protein imports, drastically cut greenhouse gas emissions and create 700,000 additional jobs—by as soon as 2030.
Yet beneath these strengths lie familiar vulnerabilities. European firms already depend on Chinese producers for basic parts of the existing biomanufacturing value chain. As China scales its fermentation capacity, European start-ups are increasingly tempted to manufacture and scale there, exposing valuable intellectual property to a fierce competitor. In a 2025 report to Congress, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission likened fermentation capacity to that of chip factories, warning that China’s dominance could become a strategic chokepoint. Policymakers are already losing sleep over China’s massive share of global rare-earth refining. But biomanufacturing could prove even more consequential. Imagine similar leverage extending across all future food, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and energy inputs.
Europe’s lack of urgency is worrying. Policymakers still seem to treat biomanufacturing as a niche sustainability issue rather than a foundational technology layer capable of reshaping whole economies. If Europe fails to adjust course soon, it risks sleepwalking into an old pattern: pioneering innovation, creating demand through regulation and then watching production, profits and geopolitical leverage migrate to China.
This paper argues that European policymakers should view biomanufacturing not simply as another industrial sector but as a strategic foundational technology layer. They should see China’s push for leadership in this field as a geopolitical challenge as much as an economic one. The EU needs policies and investments that amplify its significant advantages in research and innovation before they are eroded by China’s scale and industrial capacity. As with solar panels and batteries before it, Europe risks inventing the future only to surrender its strategic power—but this time with far greater consequences.
Biotechnology, biosolutions, biomanufacturing
The terminology surrounding the sector can be confusing. Biotechnology is the broadest catch-all description. In Europe, the term biosolutions is sometimes used to distinguish industrial applications of biotechnology from the pharmaceutical sector, although the boundary between the two is not always clear.
The distinction matters because the pharmaceutical sector follows a very different commercial logic. Biopharmaceutical companies develop low-volume and high-value products, such as specialised cancer treatment, where expensive R&D can be justified by potentially high returns—“consumers”, after all, are willing to pay steep prices for lifesaving or life-enhancing drugs.
By contrast, biosolutions often focus on replacing existing products (fertilisers or fuels). They create an alternative with environmental advantages (animal-free dairy) or inventing entirely new materials with specific qualities (spider-silk fabric) and wide industrial appeal. Unlike pharmaceuticals, these products must compete directly with established products or industries in low-margin markets often dominated by powerful incumbents.
China prefers the term biomanufacturing to describe the industrial applications of biotechnology. This reflects a focus on the process and a view that the technology is not simply the industrial application of biotechnology but the foundation of a new manufacturing model. As the world’s largest manufacturing power, China has already made it clear that it intends to dominate this next stage of industrial development. This policy brief adopts the same terminology to reflect that strategic perspective.
In the end, semantics matter less than the underlying shift. Whether described as biosolutions or biomanufacturing, the underlying transformation extends far beyond a collection of new products. It is a crucial layer of the emerging industrial economy, enabled by electrification and artificial intelligence.
The five pillars of biomanufacturing
Like the petrochemical industry before it, biomanufacturing at scale needs an industrial infrastructure.
Precision fermentation, one of the most promising techniques of the sector, uses genetically engineered microorganisms to produce specific target molecules. These organisms are cultivated in fermentation tanks and supplied with sugar-based feedstocks. The produced molecule is then extracted and purified. It could be a dairy protein made without a cow, a polymer with all the qualities of traditional plastic but none of the fossil-based input, or a protein that mimics spider silk, creating fibres strong enough to be used for body armour.
The science behind all this has been around for a while, but the combination of advances in AI and the renewable energy boom are making some of the existing solutions commercially attractive, while allowing the more cutting-edge innovation to scale from the lab to industrial production faster. Microorganisms are fickle—they are alive and evolving after all—but AI can make working with them more predictable. Success requires the availability of physical infrastructure (large tanks as one would know them from wine production, for example), access to cheap energy, reliable feedstock supply and significant investment before profits can materialise. AI specifically has accelerated the lengthy cycles of designing, prototyping and testing, changing the whole biomanufacturing equation.
China’s advantage is not due to a single scientific breakthrough or one national champion, but because it has positioned itself incredibly well across the five pillars of biomanufacturing and morphed them into a mutually reinforcing ecosystem: patient capital, industrial infrastructure, cheap energy, feedstock access and cost-competitive AI capabilities. Europe will need to accelerate on all of these fronts if it wants to compete.
Capital
Advanced fermentation-derived products still often cost two to three times more than petrochemical alternatives. Many are entering markets where they must either displace a product or create entirely new categories of demand.
This is precisely the sort of problem that China’s state-capitalist system is well suited to solve. Having identified biomanufacturing as a way to build new industries and upgrade existing ones, Chinese leaders are willing to support nascent companies through years of low returns and uncertain future profitability. Abundant patient capital allows Chinese companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones, to experiment, fail, refine and scale.
In Europe, industry groups consider the investment gap and lack of a coherent enabling framework one of the key weaknesses. This includes clear government signalling through consistent regulation. In a December 2025 report, the OECD argued that policymakers are falling to make full use of powerful tools to bring in private investment for the sector, including blended finance, de-risking mechanisms, market-based instruments and public-private partnership frameworks.
Infrastructure
China recognised the need for infrastructure very early. The 13th Five-Year Plan of 2016, for example, called for the development of fermentation products such as amino acids and vitamins, and China has since become the world’s largest producer of these products. They may seem mundane commodities, but the underlying infrastructure is relevant to more advanced applications.
Producing next generation proteins or biochemicals shares many industrial needs with vitamin production, despite the differences in the processes. Fermentation facilities, engineering expertise, supply chains and operational know-how can be decisive advantages in mastering the breakthrough on more advanced products.
However, Chinese producers still depend heavily on imported microbial strains—much like many AI developers rely on foundational models created elsewhere, but then fine-tune them for more specific applications. Denmark’s Novonesis, for example, is one of the world’s leading producers of microbial strains. Yet China is accumulating experience in large-scale fermentation using these strains, and it is advancing fast in building infrastructure needed for testing and scaling. Developing its own foundational strains is the next logical step of its industrial strategy.
Besides, manufacturing itself creates its own chokepoints. As fermentation capacity concentrates in China, innovators elsewhere may increasingly depend on Chinese infrastructure to bring products to market. Similar dynamics have already emerged in batteries and other clean technologies, where manufacturing ecosystems and testing facilities had to rely on infrastructure overseas.[1] As China’s lead grows, private capital in the rest of the world will be less attracted to building competing facilities because they will struggle to match its scale and costs. The result is not only supply-chain dependence, but the risk that valuable know-how migrate with it.
Europeans are not alone in their growing discomfort with this dynamic. The solution is to push for investment in infrastructure in Europe and in a range of partner countries. India, for example, has a strong industrial base in the pharmaceutical sector and low construction costs, making it well-placed to expand fermentation capacity quickly.
For decades, China’s leadership has invested in sectors it considers crucial for national power. Made in China 2025, the industrial masterplan that produced its massive dominance in automotive, robotics and energy technology, was designed as much to boost competitiveness as it was to build resilience and security. Biomanufacturing should be seen in the same way: a strategic capability that can strengthen food and energy security while reducing dependence on fossil imports.
Energy
Fermentation is energy-intensive and, outside pharmaceuticals, price margins for biomanufactured products will likely be slim. Electricity costs are thus a critical determinant of commercial viability. China’s industrial electricity prices are among the lowest in the world, below even those in emerging economies such as India or Mexico—and dramatically lower than in Europe, where energy prices shot up after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other geopolitical crises. A massive expansion of renewable energy, continued investment in nuclear and domestic coal, significant state control over pricing, plus regional pricing policies to encourage industries to set up in certain provinces mean that Chinese industry pays roughly 50% of the global average for its electric power.
For China, the green transition is not a hindrance to industrial competitiveness, but the vehicle towards it.Its leaders are driving an ambitious electrification agenda with the declared goal of fully replacing fossil fuels with renewables in the next decades. And the cheaper and cleaner China’s electricity becomes, the more competitive its biomanufacturing industry will be.
Feedstock
Feedstock represents another potential bottleneck. Sugars, grain, agricultural residues and other biological sources of carbon are, according to a recent report, responsible for up to 60% of total production cost.
As in any industry where margins are thin, access to cheap inputs matters significantly for market viability. Transporting large volumes of cheap biomass adds costs, making local supply a competitive advantage. The economics will also create incentives for recycling, reusage and carbon capture, all of which could become more viable as infrastructure for collection and processing expands. Regions that can grow biological feedstock, especially under conditions of rising temperatures, will become attractive partners. But quantity is only half of the equation: equally important will be improving yields and engineering crops better suited for industrial use.
According to one observer, no one has yet fully mastered the feedstock question. But China is positioning itself well. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, longstanding scepticism towards genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has given way to a more pragmatic approach in favour of domestic innovation and food security. The takeover of European seed and agricultural technology giant Syngenta by state-owned ChemChina in 2017 was emblematic of this shift.
In the emerging bioeconomy, carbon will remain the essential raw material. The difference is that it will increasingly come from renewable, highly available and fully circular sources.
Artificial intelligence
The final pillar of the sector may prove the most important.
AI is beginning to transform biomanufacturing from end to end. By enabling products and production processes to be designed and tested digitally first, it can dramatically accelerate development cycles and reduce the number of costly physical experiments.
Industry leaders argue that the interactions between the production process and AI will become increasingly important. Better data analysis and digital modelling will improve production, while sensors embedded in the industrial process will generate the data needed to improve the AI models in a continued feedback loop. As biology can be fickle, and microbes are living organisms that can evolve during production, achieving consistent results is a challenge. Richer data makes production more predictable and commercially viable. This is why the increasing availability and the falling costs of AI computing and model inference are a game changer for biomanufacturing.
The Chinese leadership is prioritising the industrial use and of AI and is actively encouraging companies to integrate AI and manufacturing. In 2025, for example, the government released a list of 16 typical application cases for AI in biomanufacturing. Chinese AI models are also cheaper, driving uptake in sectors where margins are thin and where start-ups rely on limited funding, both in China and abroad. As analysts Dirk van der Kley and Tom Campbell have argued, China’s emerging lead in biomanufacturing thus does not lie in a single layer of the value chain or the production process, but in its ability to combine these pillars into an ecosystem that increasingly blurs the line between the digital and the physical world.
New materials, new food, new energy
Making things
The application of biomanufacturing extends well beyond replacing fossil-based inputs. It is increasingly focused on creating entirely new materials for new technologies.
Alongside textile and construction, the defence sector has become particularly interested in these products. NATO elevated biotech to a strategic priority with its first dedicated strategy in 2024 and now channels over €500m annually to 28 dual-use startups via the DIANA programme. Although still at the R&D stage, European researchers are developing new bio-based materials with specific defence capabilities, such as armour, drones and rare-earth substitutes.
Here Europe retains an important edge. While Chinese companies dominate production volumes in traditional industries such as textiles or bio-based plastics. Such plastics include PHB—a bio-polymer that can be used in the medical sector for sutures or in the food sector as bio-degradable packaging; it is already being produced at scale in China while in Europe it has barely achieved market entry. European companies lead in several advanced biomaterials for aerospace, defence and other high-performance applications. Germany’s AMSilk, for example, is the world’s first industrial-scale producer of spider silk proteins and is working with Airbus on lightweight aerospace composites and with Evonik for industrial-scale fermentation supply. In 2024, it partnered with Denmark’s 21st.BIO to scale its protein production. Dutch firm Avantium, backed by both EU and private investment, has begun commercial-scale production of PEF, a fully recyclable bio-based alternative to fossil-based PET plastic.
As in other advanced industries, China increasingly leads on scale while Europe remains strong in specialised innovation.
Making food
The food sector is one of the most promising areas for biomanufacturing. In fact, one of the most consequential biotechnology breakthroughs in agriculture passed largely unnoticed by consumers. Fermentation-produced chymosin (FPC), the enzyme used to make cheese, replaced animal rennet taken from a cow’s stomach. It became widespread in the 1990s and today accounts for 80–90% of all commercial cheese production globally. Now, similar technologies are spreading across proteins, fertilisers and crop production.
Microbial biofertilisers can reduce the need for synthetic fertilisers by 20-40% while improving crop yields. Gene-edited crops can be designed to adapt to different nitrogen levels in soil. Precision fermentation allows microbes to produce dairy or egg proteins without animals. Biomass fermentation can grow fungi directly into a protein source. Because these systems depend less on land, climate and livestock, they offer a degree of resilience that conventional food production cannot match.
This matters particularly for China. Protein security remains one of the weakest links in China’s quest for autonomy. The country must feed 19% of the world’s population with only 8% of its arable land, while still importing much of the energy needed to power its economy. As Xi Jinping has repeatedly said, “China must keep its rice bowls firmly” in its own hands. Yet rising incomes have transformed diets, increasing demand for animal protein and imported feed. Food self-sufficiency has dropped from 94% to 66% between 2000 and 2020, while in 2025 soybean imports hit a record 111.83m metric tonnes. By 2035, China could face a protein feed shortfall of 120m tonnes.
Reducing this vulnerability has become therefore a matter of national security. Beijing is pursuing a range of solutions, such as improving crop yields and climate resilience, developing ways to decouple the feed and food supply chains, and creating novel foods.
Europeans, on the other hand, rarely talk about protein security. Decades of subsidies and protection have created the impression of abundance of milk, butter, meat and grain, and Europe’s understanding of food poverty and famines has largely vanished. At the same time, agricultural lobbies continue to exert outsized influence in many EU member states, ensuring that agricultural exports remain a national priority. While exports of cars and advanced machinery struggles, European leaders returning from Beijing increasingly announce deals for oats (Sweden), pork (Spain), dairy and seafood (Ireland) and even chicken feet (Germany).
This is not just a European phenomenon. US president Donald Trump’s visit to China in April brought little clarity on semi-conductor sales, but agreements on soybeans and oil. The problem is that Beijing has little intention of remaining dependent on imported food. By the time Europeans realise this, it may already be too late.
Making fuel
Energy is the third frontier. Biomanufacturing can use engineered microorganisms or synthetic enzymes to convert organic matter into fuels that can replace or complement fossil fuels. The appeal is both environmental and strategic.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has yet again demonstrated the vulnerability of global fuel supply chains and its implications for shipping, commercial flying and military mobility. Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) is a renewable, non-fossil alternative to conventional jet kerosene. Produced from renewable and waste-based raw materials, it can be safely blended up to 50% with conventional jet fuel (because it is chemically almost identical to it), requiring no modifications in existing aircraft or airport infrastructure. It is produced from renewable and waste-based raw materials rather than fossil fuels, cutting lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by up to 80%. In a major conflict, air forces account for 85% of total military fuel consumption. Recognising this, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that all aviation fuel procured from January 2025 will include SAF.
China sees similar opportunities in global shipbuilding and port equipment. As the global shipping industry moves towards decarbonisation, Chinese firms are seeking to establish an early need. China is the world’s largest shipbuilder, controlling 55% of global output and 75% of new orders. Now the country has launched sea trials for the world’s largest methanol dual‑fuel container ship (designed and built by Nantong COSCO KHI) and is also building the world’s first deep‑sea bulk carriers with ethanol-powered main engines. These technologies allow Chinese shipyards and equipment makers to shape emerging standards and capture the market for biofuel‑ready ships.
The logic mirrors Beijing’s broader strategy: make China less dependent on the world while making the world more dependent on China. As alternative fuels become increasingly integrated in shipping, countries that control both the fuels and the infrastructure that use them will enjoy an advantage. Without investment, European companies such as Maersk or Hapag-Lloyd will have a hard time competing in this sector without embedding themselves into the Chinese supply chain, and risk becoming reliant on Chinese suppliers in yet another strategic industry.
Why Europe can still lead on biomanufacturing
Unlike on solar panels, batteries and EVs, Europe is not playing catch up on biomanufacturing. Europe has world-class research, vast industrial potential and a strong market. But the window to assert itself as a leader is closing fast.
Europe has the market
Europe holds twice the precision fermentation capacity of the US: 479 demonstration, semi-industrial, and pilot plants; 2,362 additional biorefineries, spanning pharmaceuticals, food, chemicals, and industrial biotechnology. With the right support, alternative proteins alone could contribute €111bn in annual gross value added to the EU economy by 2040—comparable to the size of Europe’s entire wine sector and could build a €60 billion export market, comparable to current EU exports to South Korea.
The bloc also has the infrastructure to scale. Although the EU faces a plant protein deficit of nearly 19m tonnes (largely for livestock feed), it holds 47% of global protein and enzyme fermentation capacity for industrial applications. Meanwhile, Europe’s biofuel market exceeded $43.7bn in 2025 and is expected to grow at 9.4% annually in the coming decade. The dependence on imported carbon to power should focus the minds of policymakers on using non-food feedstock (agricultural and forestry residue, waste and algae) and scaling the market to make these products competitive faster.
Perhaps most importantly, the EU is creating demand through regulation. By 2030, EU member states are required to achieve either a 29% share of renewable energy in transport or reduce transport fuel emissions intensity by 14.5%. SAF represented just 0.6% of all aviation fuel in EU airports in 2024 but is required to rise steadily to 70% by 2050. The FuelEU Maritime Regulation aims for a 6% reduction of emissions in 2030 and up to 80% by 2050.
The challenge is to ensure that European firms rather than foreign competitors capture the resulting market opportunities. Today, 69% of feedstocks used for production of SAF used in the EU originated outside the bloc, with China supplying 38% and Malaysia 12%. Europe risks creating demand at home while becoming dependent on foreign imports.
Europe has the conditions
Europe enjoys structural advantages over China as it has abundant, low-cost biomass availability in relation to population size. Denmark benefits from plentiful agricultural waste from sugar beet production, while Germany can use forestry residues and Italy its cereal or wine residues. South-eastern Europe combines renewable energy potential with availability of olive and wine by-products. Bulgaria, for example, could make use of its potent agricultural base to become a hub for large-scale fermentation, using its solar resources to power this infrastructure instead of relying solely on its booming battery storage sector, which largely relies on Chinese battery imports.
Europe also has an often-overlooked advantage: skills. Biotechnology requires not only trained manufacturing professionals but also researchers, scientists and AI experts. In Denmark, a large share of the industrial workforce receives vocational training tailored to biotech manufacturing, including precision fermentation and bioreactor management. Europe’s tradition of apprenticeships and technical education is well placed to adapt. But timing matters. The foundations of industrial leadership in the next decades will be laid over in the next few years.
Europe has the know-how
By combining strong fermentation infrastructure with supportive policies, Denmark has built one of the world’s most advanced biomanufacturing ecosystems, where pharmaceutical, agricultural and chemical firms share industrial waste with one another.
Denmark’s industrial base is also closely linked to agriculture. About 20% of Danish land is organically farmed, while companies like Novonesis produce microbial inoculants that boost crop yields by 3-7% while cutting fertiliser use. Instead of treating biotechnology as a threat to agriculture, Denmark positioned the sector as a tool to make farming more productive and sustainable. This contrasts with many other European countries in which the agricultural lobby continues to push back against genetically modified crops and alternative proteins.
Denmark also shows that the EU’s regulatory hurdles are not inevitable. EvodiaBio moved from laboratory to profitable industrial production in only three and a half years, a remarkable achievement in a region where biotechnology approvals are notoriously slow. Across the EU, novel food authorisations average 2.5 years and can take as long as six; GMO crop approvals take up to six years compared with less than two in America; biopesticide approvals average seven to nine years.
Germany is Europe’s second biotech powerhouse. Companies such as Sartorius, or the pharma companies BioNTech and Merck KGaAhold roughly 25% of EU precision fermentation capacity for low-carbon chemicals. Formo leads in fermentation-derived proteins, while Bayer and BASF are advancing biopesticides and other crop protection agents.
Switzerland dominates contract development and manufacturing organisations (CDMOs) globally, led by companies such as Lonza and Roche. These firms own and operate the specialised infrastructure required to produce biological products at scale. While biosoutions companies own the intellectual property, CDMOs provide the fermentation tanks, the purifiers, and the manufacturing capacity.
The Netherlands is Europe’s leading hub for cultivated meat and precision fermentation, with DSM-Firmenich and Avantium excelling in biomass conversion.
France also has a robust agricultural biomanufacturing industry, with companies like Standing Ovation and Valley in alternative proteins, and De Sangosse (€315m) in biopesticides. Meanwhile, Italy ranks third in the EU by organic farmland area. Firms such as Rovensa Next lead in biostimulants and biocontrol, products that improve crop health while reducing dependence on conventional synthetic chemicals. Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain are also leading EU SAF producers, with commercial-scale output already under way—Neste in Finland, TotalEnergies in France, BP in Germany, Repsol in Spain, and Eni in Italy.
How Europe can lead on biomanufacturing
Define the vision
What is holding Europe back is not a lack of capital, talent or technology. It is a lack of ambition, sense of urgency and confidence.
China’s leadership has already articulated its vision. The 15th Five-Year Plan leaves little doubt that Beijing sees biomanufacturing as a pillar of its future economy and is aligning industrial policy, infrastructure, regulation and investment accordingly. European policy makers should pay close attention and decide whether they want to compete or simply adapt to a world of Chinese biomanufacturing dominance, with all the consequences of dependence, deindustrialisation and decline.
If they want to compete, the first step is to move biomanufacturing out of the “green niche” category and recognise it as a strategic component of a post-fossil, highly electrified global economy. Biomanufacturing should not be treated as a sectoral issue but as part of a broader vision for Europe’s future prosperity, competitiveness and security—a holistic push for infrastructure, science, education, regulation and market entry conditions is needed.
This requires political leadership. Key decision-makers, not just technical experts, need to understand the sector’s potential. Policymakers do not need to become fermentation experts any more than they needed to become semiconductor specialists. But they need to become as comfortable discussing microbes and enzymes as they now are rare earths and chips.
European leaders should make the case for biomanufacturing in terms of jobs, growth and innovation as well as harnessing the potential of European frontrunners. The narrative should be less about environmental virtue and more about hard economic reality. The debate must move beyond technicalities around the forthcoming Biotech Act II and become part of a broader conversation about Europe’s future. The China factor can help make this case. The Chinese leadership is not investing billions into a niche sustainability sector. It is investing in what it believes will be the foundational layer of a new industrial order.
Involve the existing industry
European policymakers should bring together representatives from the chemical sector, the manufacturing industry, defence companies and trade unions. Europe’s chemical and machinery industries in particular are under massive pressure from Chinese competition and are looking for new sources of growth. Biomanufacturing offers one. The experience of chemical firms, many of which conduct bio-based research, will be crucial for scaling. The manufacturing sector will be critical in building the new industrial infrastructure. And unions should be involved from the outset to ensure broad societal buy-in for the transformation process.
Defence could become an important catalyst. Europe is currently investing billions in rearming. Even a fraction of that spending directed to biomanufacturing-related R&D could generate a massive innovation push. Applications already under way include biosensors and microbial technologies that detect chemical or biological toxins, which can support clean-up operations in conflict regions. New systems designed to identify chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats are expected to reach important milestones before the end of 2026.
New European legislation must also facilitate the integration of biotechnology innovations into civil-military supply chains. A recent ECFR event organised with Dank Industri underscored opportunities ranging from bio-based concrete for reconstruction to drones and medical supplies. In China, this integration of civil and military supply chains is part of its success story which Europe can take note of and replicate at a time of vast defence spending. Framing industrial renewal as defence could even help increase support for defence spending in more reluctant countries. Spain for example has a huge potential for becoming a biomanufacturing champion due to abundant renewable energy and proximity to agricultural feedstocks.
Build coalitions with allies
Besides building internal coalitions, Europe also needs its external partners if it is to succeed in a biomanufacturing revolution.
A grand bargain with Britain
Britain remains a world leader in life sciences and research but faces challenges in scaling. An ambitious EU-UK biomanufacturing partnership could combine European market scale and British scientific strength. Joint infrastructure projects, coordinated funding, university cooperation schemes, student exchanges and shared regulatory sandboxes would all help competitiveness. The UK’s higher appetite for risk-taking in areas such as cultivated products offers valuable lessons for Europe.
An economic security agenda with Japan
Japan’s biomanufacturing sector is smaller than China’s but highly mature and deeply embedded in agricultural, food and chemical supply chains. Patent activity has been consistently high in synthetic and engineering biology but remains dominated by large corporations and public research institutes. Public agencies and private investors support early-stage funding but Japanese companies lack the necessary infrastructure to grow, such as fermentation facilities. But Japan’s manufacturers are also deeply embedded in Asia-Pacific supply chains, making the country a potential hub rather than a standalone actor. Biomanufacturing should become a dedicated pillar in all EU-Japan exchanges, not just from a business but also from an economic security perspective. Japan’s concerns with Chinese coercion closely mirrors Europe’s own.
A dedicated Trade and Technology Council track for India
India has both the potential and the ambition to become an important actor in biotech. It combines a strong pharmaceutical industry with growing renewable energy capacity, while alsoplanning to expand manufacturing. Investments in biomanufacturing have been significant and its regulatory approval processes are much faster than Europe’s, a huge advantage in a fast-moving sector. The recently concluded EU-India Free Trade Agreement provides an opportunity for joint projects and technology exchanges. Biomanufacturing should become a priority track of the regular EU-India Trade and Technology Council, sounding out options for joint research and investment.
Speed up the action
The 2025 EU Bioeconomy Strategy sets out an ambition vision for bioplastics and biobased packaging, textiles, chemicals, construction products and fertiliser. The commission aims to launch theBio-based Europe Alliance to address gaps across the value chain that prevent companies from scaling up at the Global Bioeconomy Summit in Ireland in September 2026. The forthcoming Biotech Act II is expected to address regulatory hurdles and streamline access to European funding. The proposed European Competitiveness Fund could support biobased materials, biomanufacturing and innovative food products and biochemicals. On paper, momentum is building.
The question is whether biomanufacturing will be treated as a standalone sector or become an integral part of European industrial policy. The upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act mentions bio-based solutions only in passing, an omission that should be fixed during negotiations with the European Parliament.
Industry concerns[1] remain strikingly consistent: speed of permitting, over-regulation and lack of access to capital. Shell lost $600m in investments when it cancelled a SAF plant in the Netherlands in 2025, illustrating the risk that continues to deter private capital despite legislative demand signals. To unlock their own markets, governments will need to reduce those risks by providing guarantees, offtake agreements and funding from EU vehicles, such as the new European Competitiveness Fund.
Faster permitting, investment and regulatory simplification must go hand in hand with broader competitiveness policies and responses to Chinese overcapacity. China’s success stems not only from the scale of its investments but from its ability to integrate policy, infrastructure and strategic objectives.
That may be the most important lesson for Europe. If the continent wants to defend its market, preserve its innovation power and defend its manufacturing future, it cannot afford to let its biotechnology assets slip away.
[1] Interviews with biomanufacturing industry representatives between May 2025 and May 2026 in Copenhagen, Brussels, Berlin from a range of European countries.
The race is still open
China’s challenge to Europe’s traditional industries does not stop at cars and solar panels. As the rise of biomanufacturing shows, the competition now extends to the future of industrial production itself. The technologies discussed in this paper are still emerging but the foundations of industrial leadership are already being laid.
China’s leadership understands this. Through a combination of industrial policy, regulatory framework, state-backed capital, and the creative and entrepreneurial force of its companies, Beijing is positioning itself to shape the next industrial revolution.
Europe should take that ambition very seriously. The continent has the talent, the money, the sophisticated industrial clusters, and the network of international partners. It has the ingredients required to build a successful biomanufacturing ecosystem and to emerge as an additional pole in a world increasingly defined by technological rivalry.
Europe has a fair chance to accomplish this. To do so, policymakers in member states and in Brussels must look beyond protecting the incumbents and relieve the regulatory burden, and instead build the conditions for new industries to thrive. Bringing in private capital through the European Competitiveness Fund, the Industrial Accelerator Act, the Biotech Act II and the next EU budget will be key.
Biomanufacturing is not simply another climate technology—it is a new way of producing food, materials, chemicals and energy, driven by advances in biology, data, renewables and AI. The countries that master these technologies will define the rules of the future economy, the ones who do not even try will remain stuck in the industries of the past.
[1] Interviews with industry representatives from the batteries sector in March and May 2036 in various European locations and during the DARE* batteries taskforce meetings.
About the authors
Janka Oertel is a distinguished policy fellow with the European Power programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She leads the DARE* project, a three-year initiative focused on European competitiveness and clean technology transition.
Nina Schmelzeris a research assistant for the DARE* initiative at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Berlin. She supports a wide range of activities related to Europe’s industrial competitiveness, clean technology leadership and security within the context of global geopolitical and economic shifts.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Cam Watson, Dirk van der Kley and Nicolas Krink for their fantastic comments to this text and leading intellectual contribution to the overall research landscape; Sofie Carsten Nielsen of Dansk Industri and Emmanuel Molding Nielsen of Think Tank Europa for their support in deepening our understanding of the industry and connecting us to key companies; and Massimo Portincaso from Arsenale Bioyards for providing valuable insights into an entrepreneur’s approach to biomanufacturing and his conceptual framing of “neo-industrial”. Taisa Sganzerla did an outstanding job editing this unusually technical publication and added valuable insights and framing. And yet again, Sonia Li has provided invaluable support on research and conceptualisation. The publication is part of the DARE* initiative. All mistakes remain solely the authors’ responsibility.
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