“Se pensano di potermi tappare la bocca con questi metodi non sanno con chi hanno a che fare. Non mi sono lasciato intimidire da Riina e Berlusconi, non mi lascerò intimidire da questa sporca politica”. In conferenza stampa con Giuseppe Conte e i capigruppo Luca Pirondini e Riccardo Ricciardi, il senatore M5s Roberto Scarpinato risponde alle accuse della destra e del procuratore di Caltanissetta Salvatore De Luca, che martedì in Commissione Antimafia ha indicato di nuovo l’ex procuratore generale di Palermo come “depistatore” delle indagini sulla strage di via D’Amelio. “Ci sono una decina di persone che, se domani potessero dire cos’è successo dietro le stragi del ’92-’93, questo Paese si fermerebbe, il governo cadrebbe”, afferma Scarpinato. “La campagna stragista del 92-93 ha portato al potere questa classe politica, i Berlusconi, i Dell’Utri. Questa commissione e la presidente” Chiara Colosimo, di Fratelli d’Italia, hanno impedito qualsiasi indagine conoscitiva sui mandanti e i concorrenti esterni” delle stragi: è stata chiusa una saracinesca sul passato, hanno militarizzato la commissione e vogliono strumentalizzare gli errori della procura di Caltanissetta”, ha attaccato.
L'articolo Stragi, Scarpinato risponde alle accuse della destra: “Non mi hanno intimidito Riina e Berlusconi, non mi farò intimidire da questa sporca politica” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
In a direct confrontation with Russia, European NATO states would likely be even more vulnerable than Ukraine to swarms of Russia’s new jet-powered strike weapons, Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) argued in a 20 October op-ed for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He calls them low-cost cruise missiles. Just three days earlier, Romania met what it believes were two of them over the Black Sea.
Romanian F-16 fighter jets shot down two jet-powered Geran-family drones over Romania’s territorial waters on 17 October, the Defense Ministry said. Interim Defense Minister Radu Miruță said they flew at about 450 km/h and were likely Geran-4s, the first of that type Romania had downed.
Russia began using the Geran-4 in May in response to effective Ukrainian interceptor drones, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said, adding that it reaches up to 500 km/h. By June, those interceptors were downing about half of slower Shahed-type drones, defense adviser Serhii Beskrestnov estimated.
Hoffmann traces the shift to the Geran-3, a model Ukraine recovered intact in 2025. In his account, a Chinese JT80 turbojet roughly doubled its speed, from 185 to 350 km/h. However, he puts newer models, including the Geran-4, at 600 km/h or more, above HUR’s figure for that model.
By his estimate, each costs $150,000–$250,000, against about $50,000 for a long-range drone. Still, from Russia’s perspective, he wrote, that buys a significantly higher chance of getting through.
Hoffmann argues defenses must match the threat’s speed, for example with jet-powered interceptor drones. Ukraine already fields some. On 4 October, President Zelenskyy said its Bars interceptors had shown the highest percentage among Ukrainian interceptors, about 30% of targets, according to Militarnyi. One unit destroyed five aerial targets with five Bars interceptors, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara later told journalists. He also called aviation one of the most effective tools against jet drones.
Hoffmann’s concern is scale. Jet engines are in short supply, he wrote, because too few European and US suppliers can meet demand. Ukraine’s Defense Industry Council flagged a shortage of such engines for its drones in April. In his view, gun systems and higher-end missile defenses are too scarce or too costly to fill the gap.
Avere la partita Iva, essere iscritti all’albo e fatturare compensi non basta a dimostrare che un rapporto lavorativo sia autonomo. Anzi se il professionista è inserito stabilmente nell’organizzazione aziendale, si assume responsabilità e risponde ai vertici societari, la collaborazione può essere qualificata come lavoro dipendente, anche con inquadramento dirigenziale.
In questo modo la Cassazione con la sentenza 24668/2026 tutela tutti quei professionisti “esterni” che, in concreto, svolgono attività secondo i canoni della subordinazione. Questi stessi professionisti hanno bisogno delle tutele tipiche di chi è alle dipendenze.
La controversia nasce dal ricorso presentato da un commercialista che aveva collaborato con una società, dopo aver firmato un contratto di consulenza.
Il professionista avrebbe però collaborato per quasi dieci anni con modalità ben diverse da quelle di una consulenza esterna. Egli infatti sosteneva di avere diretto l’area amministrativa e finanziaria, coordinato gli uffici e il personale, assunto responsabilità gestionali e mantenuto un rapporto costante con l’amministratore unico della società.
Di conseguenza chiedeva al giudice di accertare il vincolo di subordinazione nel rapporto, con riconoscimento della qualifica dirigenziale, delle differenze retributive, del Tfr, dell’indennità sostitutiva del preavviso e di ulteriori somme, compreso il risarcimento connesso all’illegittimità del recesso.
La società si opponeva indicando alcune “spie” di un rapporto autonomo: tipologia di contratto, iscrizione del professionista all’albo, partita Iva, fatturazione dei compensi e assenza di vincoli gerarchici. Contestava inoltre che le mansioni svolte giustificassero un inquadramento dirigenziale.
Il Tribunale di Roma riconosceva la natura subordinata e dirigenziale del rapporto, condannando la società al pagamento del Tfr e dell’indennità sostitutiva del preavviso, ma respingendo le altre domande. Stesso esito presso la Corte d’Appello capitolina.
Insoddisfatta dell’esito del giudizio, la società ricorreva in Cassazione e, con sentenza 35687/2021, quest’ultima annullava la pronuncia d’appello per motivazione insufficiente sulla rilevanza e il ruolo del contratto di consulenza, predisposto dallo stesso professionista. Senza escludere la subordinazione, la Corte chiedeva cioè di verificare con maggior attenzione la corrispondenza tra accordo scritto e modalità concrete del rapporto.
Nel giudizio di rinvio, la Corte d’Appello capitolina ribadiva la natura dipendente e dirigenziale della collaborazione. La società proponeva quindi un nuovo ricorso in Cassazione.
Il principio centrale evidenziato dalla Cassazione è che la qualificazione formale del rapporto non è decisiva quando le modalità effettive di lavoro indicano una situazione diversa.
La distinzione tra lavoro autonomo e subordinato non dipende soltanto dal “nome” attribuito al contratto, ma dal modo in cui la prestazione viene concretamente organizzata e svolta.
Ecco perché la Suprema Corte ha ritenuto corretta la valutazione degli elementi raccolti nel corso del processo, tra cui:
Non solo. Le testimonianze, le e-mail e gli atti societari raccolti confermavano il ruolo del professionista come direttore amministrativo e finanziario.
Parallelamente, la presenza di una partita Iva, l’iscrizione all’Albo, la titolarità di uno studio professionale e l’entità elevata dei compensi non sono stati considerati elementi sufficienti a escludere la subordinazione. Queste circostanze erano qui “secondarie” e, anzi, potevano ben coesistere con il lavoro dipendente. Era stata esclusa anche la collaborazione a progetto.
Nel lavoro dirigenziale, la subordinazione può manifestarsi in forma attenuata perché il dirigente gode di ampia autonomia e non necessita di ordini continui o controlli puntuali. Come chiarito dalla sentenza 3640/2020 della Cassazione, occorre piuttosto verificare se la prestazione sia funzionalmente coordinata con gli obiettivi aziendali e soggetta alle direttive generali del datore di lavoro.
Nello specifico caso in oggetto, la subordinazione era emersa dagli indici già descritti mentre la qualifica dirigenziale è stata giustificata dalle responsabilità quotidianamente esercitate.
Le citate procure e le deleghe gli consentivano inoltre di rappresentare e impegnare la società nei confronti di terzi, distinguendo la sua posizione da quella del quadro. La Cassazione ha così confermato la correttezza della valutazione tecnico-giuridica fatta dalla Corte d’Appello.
La società contestava anche il riconoscimento del Tfr (tema delicato come conferma un recente contributo giurisprudenziale) e dell’indennità sostitutiva del preavviso sostenendo che i compensi già elargiti al professionista, eventualmente superiori a quelli previsti dal contratto collettivo, dovessero essere considerati ai fini dell’assorbimento delle somme dovute.
La Cassazione ha però bocciato questo ragionamento ribadendo che — quando viene accertato un rapporto subordinato formalmente qualificato come autonomo — il principio dell’assorbimento non si applica né alle spettanze del Tfr né all’indennità sostitutiva del preavviso. La società è stata altresì condannata al pagamento delle spese del giudizio di Cassazione.
Il principio giurisprudenziale che emerge dalla sentenza 24668/2026 dei giudici di piazza Cavour interessa i professionisti: partita Iva e contratto di consulenza non garantiscono, da soli, l’autonomia. Lo stesso principio potrebbe riguardare, per esempio, un avvocato che coordina stabilmente l’ufficio legale di un’azienda o un ingegnere che dirige un reparto tecnico, rispondendo direttamente ai vertici.
Inoltre le conseguenze della riqualificazione di un rapporto non riguardano soltanto le tutele del lavoratore, ma anche gli obblighi contributivi dell’impresa, come chiarito dalla Cassazione in un’altra vicenda relativa a collaborazioni trasformate in rapporti subordinati.
Per le imprese, la qualificazione contrattuale deve sempre trovare riscontro nell’organizzazione concreta del lavoro. Per i professionisti, invece, fatture, iscrizione all’albo, la presenza di fatture e uno studio proprio non impediscono di chiedere il riconoscimento della subordinazione – e delle relative tutele (contributi, ferie, permessi ecc.) – se ne ricorrono i presupposti concreti. Saperlo in anticipo potrà evitare lunghi e onerosi strascichi giudiziari.
In definitiva, la valutazione del rapporto resta legata alle circostanze del singolo caso: nessun singolo indizio è necessariamente decisivo. È l’insieme degli elementi — letto alla luce delle norme e dei principi giurisprudenziali — a consentire di distinguere una vera consulenza autonoma da un rapporto di lavoro subordinato, anche dirigenziale.
© Corbis via Getty Images
O almirante Giuseppe Cavo Dragone diz que Portugal precisa de aviões de quinta geração para cumprir os objetivos de capacidades da Aliança Atlântica e que a NATO ainda não detetou atividade russa junto aos cabos ao largo da costa portuguesa. O militar mais graduado da Aliança espera para janeiro o resultado da revisão da presença militar dos Estados Unidos na Europa
O almirante Giuseppe Cavo Dragone diz que Portugal precisa de aviões de quinta geração para cumprir os objetivos de capacidades da Aliança Atlântica e que a NATO ainda não detetou atividade russa junto aos cabos ao largo da costa portuguesa. O militar mais graduado da Aliança espera para janeiro o resultado da revisão da presença militar dos Estados Unidos na Europa
The diplomatic track around the Ukraine conflict has become unusually busy. U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff is touring Europe, and a new round of contacts is unfolding just as Moscow and Kyiv weigh very different assumptions about who holds the stronger hand.
On October 20, talks took place in Oslo between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and representatives of the United States and several European countries. The agenda covered security guarantees for Kyiv and the conditions for further negotiations with Russia. Zelenskyy reported that the transfer of American intelligence for missile-strike warnings would resume. Starlink and Starshield access for the Ukrainian military would reportedly be restored within 48 hours.
Moscow, however, used the eve of Witkoff’s visit to set out its position. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on October 20 and kept expectations low. “Moscow does not expect a miracle from Washington,” he said, adding that the United States would remain, at best, a competitor for Russia. His main points were consistent. Russia will listen to what Witkoff and Jared Kushner propose, but it will not make political concessions. It is ready for economic deals, but not for political compromise. Relations with the West may resume, but not on the pre-2022 terms. Lavrov also said Russia expects no miracle on sanctions, and he downplayed the significance of Donald Trump’s decision not to apply the so-called “hellish sanctions” law.
The confidence in that tone has a source. Russia is negotiating from a position of battlefield momentum. Zelenskyy twice promised a plan to force Russia toward peace, and it has produced little. Ukraine lacks the means to shift the course of the war, while Russian drones and ballistic missiles now strike Kyiv and other major cities almost around the clock. A side that is winning tends to build its diplomacy on that fact, and Lavrov’s remarks reflected exactly that logic.
Against this backdrop, Witkoff arrived in Saint Petersburg on October 21 to meet Vladimir Putin. He is carrying an updated American settlement plan, prepared after the consultations with Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo. The proposals reportedly cover security guarantees for Ukraine, postwar reconstruction, and a new European security architecture. Washington hopes to lay the groundwork for direct three-way talks.
One issue remains unresolved: Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Kushner again demanded that they stop. Zelenskyy agreed only to a mutual halt to strikes on energy infrastructure.
Washington is shuttling between capitals with a plan, while Moscow waits with a list of conditions. Kyiv, under nightly bombardment, is asked to compromise first. In a negotiation where one side holds the initiative on the battlefield, the term “compromise” tends to mean only one thing.
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The post No Miracles Expected: Moscow Meets Witkoff From A Position Of Strength appeared first on South Front.
By Jacob G. HORNBERGER
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Right-wing and left-wing interventionists and interventionist mainstream-press commentators are up in arms over President Trump’s decision to ease economic sanctions against Russia in connection with the Russian government’s agreement to supply diesel fuel to the United States.
The notion is that nothing — not even the midterms — must be permitted to interfere with the Cold War II racket that holds that Russia is an aggressor nation that is hell-bent on conquering the world and, therefore, that it is necessary to target the Russian populace with severe impoverishment and even death by starvation or illness with ever-more economic sanctions.
Central to this racket, of course, is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notion was that Russia was on the march. As soon as it conquered Ukraine, U.S. officials maintained, it would re-conquer Eastern Europe, and then Western Europe and England, and then make its way to South America, Central America, Mexico, and finally the United States, all of which Russia would reconstitute into a new Soviet Union of the world. In other words, Russia is coming to get us again.
The Cold War I racket was used to justify the conversion of the federal government to a national-security state, a type of governmental structure that came with omnipotent powers, including the power of orchestrating and committing state-sponsored assassinations. The racket enabled the national-security branch of the government to quickly become the most powerful branch of the federal government, one to which the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court decided to defer.
The Cold War I racket was also used to justify an anti-communist crusade, during which the U.S. national-security establishment targeted suspected communists, both here and in foreign countries, with destruction of reputation or even with assassination.
Beginning in 1989, the Cold War racket came to a sudden and unexpected end. The Berlin Wall was torn down, Germany was reunified, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and Russian troops withdrew from Eastern Europe.
Officials in the U.S. national-security branch — i.e., the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA — naturally were extremely concerned. Suddenly, they had lost the justification for their existence and for the racket that they were certain would go on forever. People were talking about a “peace dividend,” which would involve a deep reduction in national-security-state spending and maybe even a restoration of America’s founding governmental system of a limited-government republic.
To replace the old racket with a new racket, new official enemies were developed, such as “the terrorists,” “the Muslims,” “the drug dealers,” and “the illegals.” They were all coming to get us, or so they said. Everyone remained deathly afraid.
But the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA were not about to let go of their old Cold War racket so easily. After providing Soviet officials with assurances during the negotiations over German reunification that NATO would not expand eastward, U.S. officials proceeded to do precisely that. NATO began marching eastward, absorbing former members of the Warsaw Pact and moving inexorably toward Russia’s borders, knowing full well what Russia’s reaction would be.
That was what the threat to absorb Ukraine into NATO ultimately accomplished — provoking Russia into invading Ukraine in an effort to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. U.S. officials had been warned for years that NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine, could produce precisely such a confrontation. Yet they proceeded anyway.
Voila! The national-security branch had its old Cold War racket back, albeit in a revised format. The Russians are coming to get us … again (along with the terrorists, the Muslims, the drug dealers, and the illegals). The big fly in the ointment, however, is that Russia has been unable to conquer Ukraine. That’s, of course, a problem. If Russia can’t even conquer Ukraine, how is it going to be able to conquer Eastern Europe, Western Europe, England, South America, Central America, Mexico, and then the United States? Whoops!
Never mind that inconvenient problem. In the eyes of national-security statists, it is imperative that we continue hewing to the official narrative. Russia is coming to get us, just like before. We need ever-increasing budgets for the national-security establishment and its ever-growing army of voracious fat-cat “defense” contractors. Who cares if the United States goes bankrupt in the process? We need to again be kept “safe” from the Reds — I mean, the Russians (and from the terrorists, Muslims, drug dealers, and illegals.)
Oh, and don’t forget the Cuban Reds! They are coming to get us too. No doubt the right-wing and left-wing interventionists and the interventionist mainstream press, all of whom remain steadfast acolytes of the national-security establishment, are scared to death that President Trump might lift the old Cold War embargo and the new Cold War blockade against the Cuban people as well. Of course, fat chance of that happening given Trump’s own interventionist mindset.
Original article: www.fff.org
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Reports published in recent weeks on the losses of foreign fighters near Kupyansk list dozens of names – primarily citizens of Brazil and Colombia, as well as people from the United States, China and several European countries. Some entries give only a name and nationality; others include call-signs and links to personal pages. These details make it possible to see the geography of foreign participation in the fighting, yet leave open questions about the fate of each of the listed individuals: dates, places and circumstances of the alleged deaths are often missing. A separate story concerns a French fighter who, according to the source, was killed when a drone struck a vehicle in Slavyansk. Altogether the materials contain 40 names from 11 countries.
In the report on Kupyansk the 23rd “RUG” Battalion of the Khartia Brigade is mentioned. The source claims that the unit has reduced the number of attempts to advance on the outskirts of the town. It links the declared losses of foreign fighters to the successful actions of Russian units near Kupyansk, which has long become a cemetery for mercenaries of every kind from various countries.
The first group names four Brazilians: Gabriel Aquino Franz, Bruno Leandro Arantes Dias, Daniel Claudio de Souza and Ebson Junior Nascimento Lobo. Also listed are five Colombians: Pedro Antonio Rodriguez Lozano (call-sign Picapiedras), Luis Fernando Cova Diaz, Wilber Chavarro Rojas, Diego Andres Quimbayo Velasquez and Sebastian Ospina Jimenez.
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The second group consists entirely of Brazilian citizens. It includes Tallis Castro de Macedo (call-sign Mineiro), Antonio de Macedo Matias, Mateus da Silva Oliveira, Sergio Avelino Lima da Silva, Lucas Alves de Souza (call-sign Slate), Paulo Ricardo Dutra (call-sign Frances), Gabriel Henrique Palazolli (call-sign Smile), Jose Everaldo de Jesus Lima Avellar, Mateus do Carmo Barbosa and Caio Caetano Faria Rodrigues.
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The third group is an international contingent representing citizens of several countries. Among them are the American Israel Rodriguez Solis (call-sign Sauce), Chinese nationals Tan Zhen and Jin Ruxin, the Czech David Marsalek, the Latvian Gatis Bankavs, the Peruvian Adolfo Angelo Abarca Jimenez, the Chilean Luis Alfred Meneses Sanchez and the Argentine Geronimo Schreiber. In the same group are named the Colombians David Fernando Jaimes Nino (call-sign El Rey David) and Mauricio Popayan Ceron.
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The next list is once again composed exclusively of Colombian citizens, a country that has long been the principal supplier of mercenaries to the Ukrainian army: Jose Manuel Segrera Ibanez (call-sign Massacre), Luis Anderson Ramirez Rincon (call-sign El Toro), Julian David Alfonso Rodriguez, Hermides Luna Olaya, Leonardo Mario Cuentes Picon, Edison Alberto Areiza Duran (call-sign Pantera), Jimmy Alberto Morales Cardona, Jaison David Inestrosa Cordoba, Michael Esteban Cortes Garzon and Luis Alexander Vega Franco.
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Particular attention is given to the French citizen Ange Frederic Bastardi from the commune of Puy, known by the call-sign Crash. He was killed in Slavyansk when a fibre-optic-controlled FPV drone struck a Nissan vehicle that, according to the report, belonged to the 60th Separate Mechanised Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The strike took place on Torskaya Street.
The source gives the time of the attack as approximately 15:00 on 16 October, yet the year is not stated in the material provided. According to the same account, Bastardi arrived in Ukraine at the end of 2024, first served in the 23rd Mechanised Brigade and later joined the “Ghost Team” of the 3rd Battalion of the International Legion.
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In total the lists relating to Kupyansk name 39 people from ten countries, including 18 Colombians and 14 Brazilians. Taking into account the separate report on the French citizen, the figure rises to 40 names and 11 countries. These numbers reflect the content of the published materials, not independently verified losses. Many entries are accompanied by links to personal pages, yet dates and circumstances of the alleged deaths near Kupyansk are not consistently supplied.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
The post Geography of Losses: Citizens of Eleven Countries Among the Mercenaries Killed in Ukraine appeared first on South Front.
Presented on Tuesday, 20 October, by the European Commission and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the strategy proposes a maritime security hub, expanded satellite surveillance, greater icebreaker capacity and improved military mobility across northern Europe.
The document marks a departure from the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy, which placed greater emphasis on climate change, environmental protection and scientific cooperation. The revised framework treats the region as an increasingly important component of European security and economic policy.
Russia’s expanding military infrastructure in the High North is a principal concern behind the policy revision.
Moscow has reopened Soviet-era military installations, strengthened its northern forces and maintained substantial nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The region contains strategically important naval bases used by Russia’s Northern Fleet, including facilities supporting its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.
Russian operations in the Arctic also have implications for maritime access between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, an area increasingly important to NATO’s northern defence arrangements.
The EU intends to work more closely with NATO and its northern partners, including Norway, Iceland, Britain, Canada and the United States, while developing capabilities that complement existing military structures.
Kallas said the Arctic’s security environment had deteriorated significantly since 2021, with geopolitical competition increasingly affecting a region previously associated principally with environmental and economic cooperation.
The EU’s revised priorities reflect concerns extending beyond conventional military deployments, particularly the exposure of undersea communications networks and energy infrastructure to sabotage and disruption.
A central proposal involves establishing an EU Maritime Security Hub to improve information-sharing between member states and partner countries operating in Arctic waters.
The system would strengthen monitoring of maritime movements and support the identification of suspicious activity near critical infrastructure.
Brussels also proposes an Arctic Cable Hub, initially concentrating on the protection, monitoring and repair of submarine communications cables across the North Atlantic and Arctic.
Such infrastructure carries international data traffic and supports communications between Europe, Greenland and North America. Damage to cables could interrupt telecommunications, financial services and government networks.
The Commission’s new Arctic policy framework also supports the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable connecting Greenland directly with Europe, together with secure satellite communications through the EU’s IRIS² programme.
Further measures envisage expanded use of Copernicus satellite surveillance, improved maritime intelligence and closer monitoring of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.
These measures form part of a broader attempt to improve European surveillance capabilities without relying exclusively on military assets provided by individual NATO members.
The strategy also addresses Europe’s limited capacity to operate in extreme northern conditions.
The Commission wants to support additional icebreaker capabilities, which are essential for maintaining access to Arctic waters, conducting emergency operations and supporting scientific and logistical activity.
Russian icebreaker capabilities remain considerably more extensive than those available to most European countries, providing Moscow with operational advantages along the Northern Sea Route.
European investment would also support ports, railways, energy terminals and digital infrastructure capable of serving both civilian and security requirements.
The emphasis on dual-use infrastructure reflects the growing importance of military mobility across northern Europe, particularly following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Improved transport links could facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel while also supporting economic development in sparsely populated northern regions.
However, the Commission has not provided a comprehensive financial allocation for the proposed security measures, leaving important questions about funding, procurement and implementation.
The revised strategy also introduces a significant change in the EU’s position on Arctic fossil fuel development.
In 2021, Brussels proposed pursuing an international legal commitment to prohibit further oil, gas and coal extraction in the Arctic.
The new strategy maintains the EU’s opposition to environmentally damaging fossil fuel development but no longer includes the explicit ambition to secure a multilateral legal prohibition.
The adjustment follows sustained disagreement with energy-producing countries and recognition that an international agreement would be difficult to achieve under current geopolitical conditions.
Norway has argued that continued exploration in parts of the Barents Sea remains important for European energy security, particularly as production from mature Norwegian fields is expected to decline.
EU Today previously reported on Brussels’ opposition to Norwegian Arctic drilling plans and the disagreements between environmental objectives and Europe’s long-term energy requirements.
The latest strategy does not represent an endorsement of new Arctic drilling. It does, however, acknowledge the limitations of the EU’s previous diplomatic approach.
Greenland occupies a prominent position in the revised strategy because of its location, mineral resources and importance to transatlantic communications.
The Commission wants to expand cooperation on digital connectivity, critical raw materials, research and infrastructure investment, while recognising the responsibilities of Greenland’s own institutions and the Kingdom of Denmark.
Brussels also intends to strengthen scientific cooperation and support Arctic communities adapting to rapid environmental change.
The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, creating new commercial opportunities while imposing substantial costs on local populations and infrastructure.
The EU’s proposals therefore combine security measures with investment in transport networks, research facilities and economic diversification.
For Brussels, implementation will require agreement between member states with different geographical interests, defence capabilities and budgetary priorities. Cooperation with NATO will also require careful coordination to avoid duplicating existing military arrangements.
The Commission has established a significantly broader Arctic agenda than the one adopted five years ago. Its practical impact will depend on whether member states finance the surveillance systems, vessels and infrastructure that the new strategy envisages.
The war in Ukraine can be ended permanently on terms that protect Ukraine’s statehood, meet Russia’s security concerns, and lay the foundation for a durable European security order. As another round of negotiations gears up in Norway, I propose a settlement concluded as a single package, signed by Ukraine and Russia, adopted by a vote […]
The post A viable path to peace in Ukraine appeared first on Asia Times.
NATO allies Canada and Turkey are expected to sign a joint declaration aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation in four areas, including defence and energy, during Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit later this week, a person briefed on the matter said.
The declaration is also expected to encompass the economy, looking to advance bilateral free trade talks, while boosting social and diplomatic ties. The countries would establish committees in all of the areas to draft action plans, the person said.
Carney will be the first Canadian prime minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey. He is set to meet with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on Thursday and then with Turkish business leaders in Istanbul on Friday.
The visit is part of Carney’s efforts to reduce trade dependence on the United States and strengthen partnerships with regional powers amid a damaging trade war with Washington and an increasingly adversarial relationship with President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly questioned Canada’s sovereignty.
At a Canadian government briefing on Tuesday, officials declined to confirm what specific declarations, agreements or deals might be signed during the trip.
Carney will meet Erdogan “to advance cooperation in trade and investment, energy, defense and security and people-to-people ties,” said a Canadian government official.
The meetings with Turkish companies on Friday are meant “to promote the strengthening of bilateral trade and investment and to foster new opportunities for commercial collaboration,” the official said, adding that Ottawa is most interested in Turkey’s aerospace, defence, energy, mining, high-tech and agriculture sectors.
Turkey’s presidency and the Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar told the Kanal 7 broadcaster on Sunday that energy, namely nuclear power, would be among the top agenda items during Carney’s visit.
Ankara anticipates that energy discussions will also include potential purchases by Turkey of liquefied natural gas from Canada as well as critical minerals, according to the person briefed on the matter. A working group is expected to be created to study the feasibility of a bid by Canada’s CANDU to build a planned nuclear plant on Turkey’s Black Sea coast.
Turkey has held talks with Canadian engineering firm AtkinsRealis ATRL.TO, which owns CANDU, as well as South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation and China’s State Power Investment Corporation, about potentially building its planned second and third nuclear power plants. Russia’s Rosatom is building its first.
The discussions on the defence sector are expected to focus on drones and naval cooperation. In 2024, to help thaw bilateral ties, Canada removed weapons-export controls on Turkey, including on optical technology used in drones that Turkey exports to dozens of nations.
Carney will be accompanied on the trip by his foreign minister Anita Anand and energy minister Tim Hodgson.
He will meet executives from defence companies and firms with energy businesses including Calik Holding and Sabanci Holding, according to two other people familiar with the plans. Sabanci Holding declined to comment while Calik Holding did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Turkish defence analysts have said Trump’s policies towards Canada had created opportunities for closer cooperation in ammunition production, drones and naval systems, but cautioned that major agreements were unlikely to materialise in the short term.
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