North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK

— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

Recent satellite imagery of a shipyard in northeastern China offers interesting new insights into the country’s next-generation submarine developments. The images notably show a pumpjet propulsor and other features worth examining on an example of what is generally described as a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine, or SSN.

TWZ has obtained a new image taken on September 18 of the submarine in question, which is being built at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, from Vantor. Janes reported on this submarine earlier today, based on a separate Vantor image from September 1. The outlet also described the boat as a Type 095, a commonly used, but still unofficial designation. This is something we will come back to later on.

As mentioned, the pumpjet propulsor immediately stands out in both images. This is also understood to be a feature on the Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, a significantly improved variation on that earlier design, which first emerged in the early 2020s. Compared to traditional exposed propellers and more basic shrouded types, pumpjets offer benefits for quieter operation and efficiencies, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The recent imagery also highlights the submarine’s X-shaped stern plane arrangement. This is not found on the Type 093B, which is considered to be something of a bridge between that class and the next-generation design. Broadly speaking, an X-shaped configuration offers advantages when it comes to enhanced maneuverability, efficiency, and safety, which can be particularly useful in littoral environments. It can also provide benefits when it comes to acoustic signature reductions across significant parts of the submarine’s operating envelope compared to the cruciform stern planes.

Another Chinese submarine design that emerged in 2024, currently referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class, and that is understood to feature a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, also has an X-shaped stern configuration. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it appeared to have sunk in a shipyard.

An X-shaped stern arrangement also looks to be a feature on yet another new class of submarine that appeared at the JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai earlier this year. Initial reports also suggested that the design lacked a traditional sail. However, it has been confirmed that it has a sail, but that is very small proportionally to the overall size of the boat. Truncated sails can offer performance and other advantages, but there are trade-offs.

The image of the submarine that Janes obtained also notably shows an open rectangular-shaped section aft of the sail. The September 18 image that we received from Vantor shows a structure placed over that section of that submarine, obscuring ongoing work on that part of the boat. The Type 095 is widely expected to feature some type of vertical launch system (VLS) array able to accommodate a variety of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic types. The Type 095 is also sometimes referred to as a guided missile submarine, or SSGN, as a result. The open area seen in the September 1 shot could be where the VLS array is set to be fitted. It might also provide access to the reactor compartment or another area of the submarine.

The clearest photos we have on the Type 095 SSN!

As we can see, there is one confirmed chamber than could physically fit about 18-24 VLS Cells. There is a big chance that more than one VLS Chamber exists, with an estimate VLS count from 24-48+ VLS pic.twitter.com/0ZJ8gsl4su

— PLA Military Updates (@PLA_MilitaryUpd) September 21, 2026

Interestingly, the September 18 image also shows what look to be at least two relatively large circular openings, side-by-side, at the bow end of the submarine in front of the sail, the purpose of which is not immediately clear. There is a possibility these could also be for vertically launching munitions or other payloads. As a point of comparison, U.S. Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, starting with the Block III version, have two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), one in front of the other, in the bow in front of their sails. At the same time, the openings on the submarine in Huludao also appear to be in a position that is very close to where the submarine’s main sonar array would be installed, and they could be tied to that aspect of the design, too.

“I think it’s too early to be sure about the VLS configuration from publicly available imagery. I realize people assume the large rectangular space halfway behind the sail is the VLS, but I am not sure this is the case and I’d caution to jump to conclusions. The space could also be related to work on the reactor compartment,” Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine and Chinese navy developments, told TWZ. “With Type 093B, the VLS after launch was initially covered with a tarp, and then the installed launchers were readily visible quite quickly during the fitting-out process. The work process may change with these newer boats, but the different appearance during launch and fitting out needs to be considered in that regard.”

“I do expect Type 095 to have a VLS of some sort, but I am not sure as of yet what the configuration would look like, or where exactly it is located,” he added.

The bigger outstanding question may be exactly what type of submarine is currently being built now at the Bohai Shipyard. Based on a review of additional imagery from Planet Labs’ archive, the boat appears to be around 394 feet (120 meters) long. When the first example of what was assessed to be a Type 095 emerged in Huludao in February, it was estimated to have a length of roughly 361 feet (110 meters). The ‘small sail’ design that broke cover earlier this year in Shanghai is also estimated to be some 394 feet/120 meters long based on available imagery, but also looks to be narrower than the boat presumed to be a Type 095 in February.

“One significant question is the nature and difference between the boat launched by Bohai in February, and the two newer hulls launched in late May/early June both by Bohai and at Jiangnan in Shanghai,” Luck, the naval analyst, also told TWZ. “Specifically, we do not quite know whether they are for different operational roles, or rather a two step development for one final configuration of a new SSN. I think the latter is at least plausible.”

“A related question then is what boat we are looking at now with the new imagery, i.e. the February boat or the newer hull Bohai had launched,” he continued. “Without exact and reliable measurements that question for now is unresolved in the public discourse. For now we need more, and more detailed imagery, including of the different boats together, to clarify these aspects.”

“This [September 1] image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We’ve already seen both versions side by side in Bohai,” Luck also wrote on X after Janes‘ published its report.

This image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We've already seen both versions side by side in Bohai. https://t.co/wBMkB1gmSQ

— Alex Luck (@AlexLuck9) September 21, 2026

Regardless, the emergence in recent years of so many new, more modern submarines, and across what appear to be several distinct classes, is significant. It is no secret that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is working to significantly expand the size and capabilities of its submarine force with a clear eye toward extending operations further and further out in the Pacific, at least. In the past, U.S. officials have publicly said the overall quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

In particular, the Type 095, as well as the new Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, “represent next-generation platforms expected to enter service during the late 2020s through 2030s,” Brookes also wrote at that time. “These submarines will incorporate substantial advancements in nuclear reactor design, sensor performance, weapons integration, and noise quieting technologies.”

Submarine modernization efforts are just one aspect of a larger effort by the PLAN to expand its capabilities above and below the waves. Chinese shipyards have also been producing ever-more capable aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, frigates, and more in recent years, as well. The pace of China’s construction of new surface ships and submarines has also been growing, creating a particularly significant and still-widening disparity in this regard with the U.S. Navy. This is something that has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

Work in Huludao, as well as shipyards elsewhere in China, is certainly already revealing interesting new insights into China’s next-generation submarine efforts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Chinese Next-Generation Submarine Developments Spotted In New Satellite Imagery appeared first on TWZ.

Earlier this year, an Iran-linked actor used Anthropic’s Claude artificial intelligence model to scrape and analyze data with the aim of helping target U.S. naval forces in the Middle East. A group in Yemen – very likely Iranian-backed Houthi militants – also used Claude to assist with work on guidance systems for ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

These are just some of the revelations about how adversaries and other malign actors have been using one of the premier pieces of AI software being developed in the United States that were contained in a new report Anthropic released late yesterday. The 154-page document also details instances where Claude was used directly and indirectly to support intelligence gathering and surveillance, cyberattacks, influence operations, and even worrisome biological research over the past eight months. In addition to Iran and Yemen, the human actors behind these activities were based in Russia, China, and a host of other countries.

Anthropic has shared details about what it calls the “misuse” of its models in the past, but describes the new report as its “most detailed” to date. The company has clearly been cataloging these case studies, and has assigned each one a control number. Though the entire contents of the report are cause for concern, the explicit attempt to use Claude to target American forces, as well as to develop new higher-end missiles and other military technology, are particular standouts and signs of what’s to come, as we will highlight below.

GTG-30005: Military reconnaissance

GTG-30005 is the case study dealing with the targeting of U.S. naval forces, and the summary is as follows:

“In another investigation, we identified and disrupted an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region. The threat actor used Claude to compile targeting handbooks, through a Python pipeline the threat actor built with Claude’s assistance, to identify and track naval positions based on open-source information. The compiled material included a roster of US personnel scraped from captions on public military photographs; publicly accessible ship and aircraft transponder identifiers; commercial satellite-imagery query scripts; and an inventory of public websites that exposed US naval movements. The threat actor also directed Claude to compile vulnerability research on shipboard systems, cataloging known CVEs in maritime VSAT terminals, Cisco communications equipment, and industrial control products.”

“We banned the actor’s account, developed detections to reduce the risk of future misuse, and shared threat intelligence with government authorities to disrupt the threat.”

How exactly Anthropic defines the term “nexus” here is not immediately clear, and other entries in its new report also use “state-nexus” in addition to country-based variations. However, in this specific case, an addendum is added to the entry that explicitly says that the same account was separately tied to “domestic mass surveillance” software development work “for Iranian state systems,” clearly pointing to an actor directly linked to the regime in Tehran.

Whether or not any of the data collected and analysed here was directly used to subsequently carry out attacks on U.S. forces is unknown. However, there have been media reports just in recent weeks that Iran has been increasingly trying to strike American warships. Those same reports have raised questions about how the country has been prosecuting those operations given its limited capabilities and capacity to track maritime targets far from its shores. The possibility that Russia or China could be supplying targeting data has been put forward.

The use of AI technology by nation-state armed forces to develop target sets and engage them is already known to be growing globally. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been a pioneer in this regard, but the U.S. military, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and others are also known to be developing and fielding these capabilities.

U.S. military officials have also voiced increasing concern in recent years about the ability to track the movements and disposition of U.S. military assets and personnel using publicly available pictures and other data. There has been much talk, in turn, about how to balance transparency and operational security.

GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software

Anthropic’s new report details an instance where an individual in Yemen used Claude as part of missile guidance work, which is given the control number GTG-87001.

“We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.”

“The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.”

“Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.”

“These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.”

“We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB.”

As mentioned earlier, the report does not name the Houthis, but that group has historically been based primarily in the northern end of Yemen. It is also the only entity in the country known to have active missile development programs, which are conducted with critical support from Iran.

Whether this particular work directly resulted in any new capabilities is unknown. Anthropic notes that there looked to be at least one failed test launch before the accounts were banned, which would have occurred sometime after the beginning of this year, based on the stated cutoff dates for the report. By the end of 2025, the Houthis had already amassed a wide array of very real ballistic missiles, including types with at least claimed ranges of 2,000 kilometers (approximately 1,242 miles). The group also has a variety of cruise missiles and one-way attack drones that it has employed operationally.

Still, being able to leverage Claude could only have helped any domestic missile development efforts in Yemen, which might help reduce dependency on Iran, at least to a degree. Furthermore, developing functional hypersonic glide vehicles capable of prolonged stable flight has historically been notoriously difficult, even for entities with extensive relevant knowledge bases on an organizational level.

GTG-17001: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to draft a fire control specification and acquisition documents for undersea warfare

Use of Claude in foreign military endeavours goes beyond the Middle East, as evidenced by case study GTG-17001. This involved a Chinese actor conducting work related to a naval counter-torpedo defense system.

“We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude to advance three parallel tracks of work on an anti-torpedo weapons system:”

• “First, the actor used Claude to draft a Chinese-language specification for an anti-torpedo fire control system (the core logic that aims and times an anti-torpedo weapon’s response). The document was written to win approval from a Chinese defense manufacturer, which would move the work on to technical certification and operational testing.”
• “Second, the actor used Claude to produce a Chinese-language technical proposal of more than 200 pages, accompanied by an executive briefing deck.”
• “Third, the actor used Claude to benchmark their own system against specific US anti-torpedo and anti-submarine programs based on publicly accessible information. They then generated a Chinese-language briefing on US Navy systems derived from open-source reporting.”

“The actor presented themselves as an original equipment manufacturer in the US defense sector. We assess the actor was associated with a Chinese defense industry manufacturer aiming to produce a weapons specification and acquisition proposal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”

“The actor used Claude to write the acquisition proposal, refining it over many drafts. After each draft, the actor instructed Claude to role-play a hostile expert reviewer to critique the proposal, then used that feedback to sharpen the next version. In parallel, the actor used Claude to build pieces of the anti-torpedo weapons system’s fire control software and a test matrix to validate them.”

“The operational lift the actor achieved was a function of using Claude to automate complex technical outputs. The actor leveraged the model to compress the development timelines for the certification registry, compliance documentation, and automated fire control logic. The actor also accelerated the traditional human review cycle by having Claude critique the acquisition proposal across multiple rounds of review while role-playing a persona.”

“We uncovered this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We cannot attribute the activity to a specific entity or actor. But we have banned the account for violating our Supported Regions Policy and our Usage Policy, which prohibits weapons design and development, and incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to mitigate the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report does not name the U.S. programs leveraged here, but does note the information in question was publicly available. Anti-torpedo systems for surface warships and submarines have been an area of significant interest for the U.S. Navy for years now. Those developments have also produced compact torpedo designs for use in other applications.

The PLAN’s interest in these same kinds of capabilities is not at all surprising. Underwater threats and countermeasures to them, broadly speaking, would play a central and vital role in any future conflict between the United States and China across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

GTG-27005: Disrupting a Russia-based operation using Claude to engineer an autonomous military drone swarm

Another case study, GTG-27005, details the use of Claude by Russian actors working on drone swarming technology.

“We identified likely freelance Russia-based threat actors who set out to build a full-stack autonomous first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drone swarm. The actors used Claude Code to write and test the code and save it directly into the actors’ own project files. In addition to Claude Code, the actors used a software-in-the-loop simulation stack and a rented graphics processing host for model training. They called the operation ‘DronDoc’ or ‘Serafim.'”

“The actors used Claude to build the core software system, including the drones’ shared swarm memory and fault-tolerant coordination logic (FTCL); an onboard small language model to govern attack, observe, and return-to-base behaviors; a terminal guidance software system to steer drones to their target (using the onboard camera) and issue the call to detonate; a control-link geolocation module to find opposing drone operators; a passive acoustic detection layer; and low-level logic for the drones’ programmable chips. The actors designed the platform for autonomous lethal engagement; the onboard model could select targets (including a ‘person’ target class) and issue detonation commands without a human in the loop. The actors’ activity—including flashing the low-level firmware to live development boards, provisioning single-board computers, and wiring up a simulation environment over a mesh network—confirmed that they were using real hardware-in-loop testing within their sessions.”

Many were surprised yesterday by the news that a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone flew into Kramatorsk and attacked a car.

But there is nothing surprising here. The war of 2025 is already very different from the war of 2024.
From LBZ to Kram — 20 kilometers. Enemy FPVs can fly even… pic.twitter.com/hTfhJFPcxZ

— Richard Woodruff (@frontlinekit) October 6, 2025

“The actors trained a computer vision classifier on scraped Ukrainian combat footage, splitting the target classes into “enemy” and “friendly,” and allow-listing Russian systems. They also repeatedly used a fixed coordinate in Donetsk Oblast as the demonstration strike point, with front-line cities and corridors in Ukraine as the mission geography.”

“The actors created their accounts between late 2025 and early 2026 and started the operation in mid-May 2026. The actors circumvented our geographic access controls by routing traffic through commercial virtual private servers.”

“We assess the actors were a small, specialized freelance team doing a mix of civilian and military work, not a Russian state entity. We identified nine accounts associated with this group; eight were used only for ordinary freelance work, not weapons-related software development. Based on our investigation, we assess the actors had ties to a regional university with a federal research center associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The actors claimed to have received funding from Russia’s Advanced Research Foundation, National Technology Initiative, and Ministry of Defence, though we cannot verify those claims. We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts associated with the actors, and have incorporated our investigative findings into safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report included a table, reproduced below, detailing different types of drones and other capabilities that were fed into the model as part of this work.

Also, while Anthropic said it could not confirm any direct ties in this instance to the Russian government, the work described here is fully in line with capabilities that have already been demonstrated to varying degrees in Ukraine in the past few years. TWZ has been very closely tracking developments on both sides of the conflict when it comes to new automated targeting and swarming capabilities for shorter- and longer-ranged kamikaze drones. In 2024, we also published a detailed feature outlining a coming revolution in drone warfare, signs of which were already emerging then, thanks to AI and the ever-lowering barrier to entry for leveraging that technology.

GTG-17002: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to build targeting software for electronic warfare and air defense suppression

The last case study in the Conventional Weapons section of Anthropic’s new report, GTG-17002, covers electronic warfare-related work by a Chinese actor, with a particular focus on potential air defense targets in Taiwan.

“We identified a China-based actor who used Claude’s chat, coding, and agentic work tools to design, build, and iterate on a Chinese-language suite of about 16 modules for electronic warfare, using the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, jam, or deceive an opponent’s radar and communications, and for suppressing an opponent’s air defenses.”

“The actor used Claude to build the software system, from the underlying logic to the user interface, and iterated through 12 versions. This included implementing and optimizing the system’s radar detection and jamming physics, generating a vulnerability analysis module, and drafting Chinese-language targeting instructions. The software suite the actor built analyzed an opponent’s radars, surface-to-air missile sites, command posts, and communications nodes, then computed their detection coverage, assessed the effectiveness of jamming, ranked targets by value and vulnerability, including which to suppress first, and determined how best to assign jammer sorties to targets across multi-day campaigns. The suite also ranked which of an opponent’s assets to suppress first, and modeled specific engagement envelopes, including those of Patriot and THAAD-class [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] systems.”

“Mid-project, we observed the actor change the simulation’s default scenario to 12 targets in Taiwan. The targets included a command bunker in Taiwan, an early warning radar site, Patriot and Tien Kung [surface-to-air missile] batteries, major air bases, and a regional combatant command headquarters.”

“The actor also ran a self-hosted model on an internal network alongside Claude and connected the software suite to this model through a tool-use integration.”

“Based on our investigation, we assess the actor is a China-based defense and military-industrial researcher. Account-level metadata and content flagged by our safeguards indicated the actor was linked to PRC research institutions, including the PLA Academy of Military Sciences. We detected this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts linked to the actor, and have incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

An accompanying table, seen below, mentions several specific types of U.S.-made air defense radars, as well as the Link-16 datalink network, as having come up in the course of this work. Electronic warfare variants of the Chinese Y-8 and Y-9 aircraft, as well as the J-16D electronic warfare jet, and what appears to be a reference to the Golden Eagle drone helicopter, are also mentioned.

The suppression of enemy air defenses is an essential part of any modern air campaign, whether conducted independently or as a part of a larger operation. This would be no less critical in any military intervention against Taiwan from the mainland, or any other larger-scale conflict the PLA might find itself in.

Guardrails and ethics

Beyond the details in any of the specific case studies, Anthropic’s new report underscores growing broader concerns about guardrails for the use of AI and general ethics surrounding the technology. As noted in the instances above, Anthropic has also implemented various safeguards to try to block access to Claude from certain regions and/or to prevent the model from conducting certain types of work. At the same time, what the company has now shared makes clear that those protections can still be circumvented to a significant degree, at least for now.

For its part, Anthropic has been publicly supportive of transparency laws and regulation, at least within the United States. The company also notably made tweaks to certain Claude models earlier this year to address U.S. government cybersecurity concerns.

Starting in December 2025, Anthropic has also been very publicly embroiled in a dispute with the Pentagon over the potential use of Claude to support mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. This subsequently led to the company being designated a supply chain risk, and limitations being imposed on the use of that model within the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government. Anthropic is continuing to fight that action in court. However, just yesterday, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Pentagon Chief Technology Officer Emil Michael said the U.S. military had scaled back the use of Anthropic’s products in support of classified work by 90 percent.

Anthropic is still a designated Supply Chain Risk at @DeptofWar and for the Defense Industrial Base. Thank you for your attention to this matter!

— Under Secretary of War Emil Michael (@USWREMichael) September 3, 2026

The concerns about ‘misuse’ outlined in Anthropic’s new report apply, in general terms, to publicly accessible models being developed by other companies, too. There have already been publicly disclosed instances of AI agents themselves engaging in hacking and other malign behavior in order to complete assigned tasks, raising additional questions about security and public safety, not to mention ethics.

TWZ has noted in the past that America’s adversaries are likely to be less worried about ethics, in general, when it comes to AI. Anthropic’s new report also shows there are few bounds to what state-aligned or even non-state actors might seek to use this technology for, including the development of potential weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, AI models like Claude are not going away, and developments continue to advance at an ever-quickening pace, opening the door to further proliferation. Developments are rapidly intermingling globally, with companies in China notably leveraging models created in the U.S. to further their own work, which is then released publicly. The technology will increasingly become more integrated and critical to most aspects of military operations and weapons development, alongside its commercial and civilian applications. It is just as much a superweapon as anything else, and the country with the more capable models, and the willingness to deploy them, will have a major edge in future conflicts.

With all this in mind, it seems very plausible, if not probable, that the case studies described in Anthropic’s new report are just the tip of an approaching iceberg that will need a concerted effort to tackle.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Adversaries Using Claude AI To Target Americans And Develop Missiles Is A Sign Of What’s To Come appeared first on TWZ.

After pulling into Thailand looking very much like it just spent 286 days at sea, the U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln is now getting much-needed TLC. When the Lincoln arrived in the Thai port of Laem Chabang on Sept. 2, it had so-called “running rust” and algae caked all along the sides of the hull. Other parts of the ship, especially around the edges of the flight deck and sponsons on either side, also looked rough. The ship’s condition was a stark, visible reminder of the hardships endured by the carrier and its crew during a long deployment that included a key role in the war against Iran.

Video emerged on social media of local workers cleaning the carrier. Two of them can be seen on a scaffolding platform, dressed in silver-colored protective clothing, yellow helmets, face shields and black boots, spraying the side of the big ship. You can see that most of the rust, as well as all of the green swath of algae, was removed from the section where they are working.

The camera also pans across the ship, showing the extent of the work still needed. 

Those recent viral rust photos/footage of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in Thailand overstated the story.

Yes, the hull looked rough in pictures, but the ship itself was never in question, that's the part the headlines skipped.

Today at Laem Chabang Port in Thailand, local… pic.twitter.com/b8SP2oyrJZ

— Comandante (@commandante_) September 4, 2026

It is unclear whether this work had already been scheduled as part of routine maintenance or whether it had been ordered after images of the ship emerged showing its rough condition. The ship was a huge focus of attention even before it got to Thailand.

Lincoln and Carrier Strike Group 3 took part in the opening salvo of strikes on Iran on February 28 as part of what the U.S. military dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln and the rest of the strike group continued to support Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran for months thereafter. The decision was finally made to rotate the carrier out of the region last month following a raft of reports of severely flagging morale and mental health among the crew. One sailor had to be rescued last month after deliberately jumping overboard. There were reports that at least one other individual onboard had attempted to do the same. President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, among others, have pushed back on concerns about mental health and other issues on the ship.

Interest in the Lincoln flared up anew after it arrived in Thailand due to its condition, as well as intense curiosity about how the crew would fare in a Thai port call after being at sea for so long.

As we noted in our initial story about the Lincoln’s arrival in Thailand, running rust on U.S. Navy ships has sparked criticism over the years, including from President Donald Trump. This is in part due to the negative optics of such visible wear and tear on American naval vessels, especially during calls in foreign ports.

“It’s terrible. I think they should be ashamed,” John Phelan told members of Congress at a hearing last year, when he was then-nominee for Secretary of the Navy, after being shown pictures of a very worn-looking Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Dewey, during a stopover in Singapore. “Would you want to go on that ship?”

One driving factor in the condition of ships like Lincoln is the operational tempo of deployments, a Navy official noted earlier this year.

“We know what to do, but we choose not to do it,” Mark Lattner, director of the Navy’s Ship Integrity and Performance Engineering, Naval Systems Engineering Directorate, said in January during a panel at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium that TWZ attended. “And we choose not to do it because there’s always some other problem I’ve got to fix. I don’t have time. Our corrosion can wait. And so we don’t implement the fixes.”

Finding a solution to the Navy’s rust problem became one of Lattner’s main missions in the wake of the fallout from Trump’s late-night texts to Navy officials demanding answers about the condition of the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Dewey after he saw pictures of it covered in running rust as it pulled into Singapore last year.

Port calls offer critical time to fix long-standing issues and resupply the ship of pretty much everything you can think of, from jet fuel to food. So it’s no surprise that the Lincoln would be swarmed with support personnel and supplies while much of her crew enjoys being on land once again for a few days.

It’s unclear how long the clean-up work on the Lincoln will last or how much of it will be finished by the time the ship and crew leave port. Either way, from what we have seen so far, it will look much better leaving Thailand than when it arrived.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USS Abraham Lincoln Is Getting A Badly Needed Scrubbing While In Thailand appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln is now in Thailand for a much-deserved and highly publicized liberty port call. The carrier had gone 286 days without making such a stop, with much of that time spent executing grueling combat operations against Iran. The ship has been run very hard, relying on at times a rickety conveyor of sea replenishments to continue operating for months on end, and it has the scars to show for it. The Lincoln looks very much worse for wear, with so-called “running rust” and algae caked all along the sides of the hull, as well as around the edges of the flight deck and sponsons on either side. It’s something of a startling appearance for one of the most powerful ships on the planet and a major symbol of U.S. power projection, but it is also a reminder of what the vessel and its crew have endured for months on end.

The Lincoln arrived in the Thai port of Laem Chabang earlier today. The carrier did make a stop in Guam in December 2025 and reportedly made another one somewhere in the Middle East in July. However, in both cases, these have been characterized as brief logistical stopovers that did not offer any real opportunity for personnel onboard to disembark. Thai media reports say the carrier is expected to remain in Laem Chabang through the end of the weekend.

“Our arrival in Laem Chabang provides a well-deserved opportunity for our Sailors and Marines to rest and recharge. It also underscores the strong and enduring partnership and alliance between the United States and Thailand,” Rear Adm. Robert E. Loughran, commander of Carrier Strike Group 3 (CSG-3), said in a statement in a press release today. “What this strike group has accomplished is truly historic. I could not be prouder of the exceptional professionalism and expertise demonstrated by every member of this team during our operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.”

Lincoln and its strike group had left port in San Diego in November 2025 for what was originally expected to be a routine cruise in the Pacific. The carrier, its air wing, and escorts were subsequently directed to the Middle East and arrived in that region in January 2026.

CSG-3 took part in the opening salvo of strikes on Iran on February 28 as part of what the U.S. military dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln and the rest of the strike group continued to support Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran for months thereafter. The decision was finally made to rotate the carrier out of the region last month following a raft of reports of severely flagging morale and mental health among the crew, which we will come back to later.

Two of the Arleigh Burke class destroyers assigned to CSG-3, the USS Michael Murphy and the USS Spruance, are still understood to be operating in the Western end of the Indian Ocean. A third destroyer in the strike group, the USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., accompanied the Lincoln to Thailand and is now docked in a separate port in Sriracha, near Laem Chabang. The Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Robert Smalls also helped escort the carrier, and that warship “also arrived in Map Ta Phut, Thailand for their own scheduled port visit,” according to the Navy.

As mentioned, Lincoln definitely looks like it’s been at sea more or less continuously for the last nine and a half months or so. Pictures and videos of the ship in Laem Chabang seen throughout this story plainly show big dark rust stains all around the hull and other similar signs of wear elsewhere. There is also a bright green ring of algae layered on the hull at the waterline. While carriers have very large crews and usually keep the ship’s appearance up relatively well while on cruise, there is only so much that can be done out of port on particularly long deployments, where all resources are focused on sustained high-tempo combat operations.

Running rust on U.S. Navy ships has been something of a lightning rod for criticism in recent years, including from President Donald Trump. This is in part due to the negative optics of such visible wear and tear on American naval vessels, especially during calls in foreign ports.

“It’s terrible. I think they should be ashamed,” John Phelan told members of Congress at a hearing last year after being shown pictures of a very worn-looking Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Dewey, during a stopover in Singapore. “Would you want to go on that ship?”

Phelan was testifying at the time regarding his nomination to be Secretary of the Navy. At the time, he said that President Trump had already been texting him in the middle of the night regarding the issue. Phelan was subsequently confirmed and served as the Navy’s top civilian until he was unexpectedly fired in April, reportedly over disagreements regarding the new Trump class battleships and other more general friction within the administration,

Lincoln‘s current condition is, of course, an extreme case that is the result of very specific operational circumstances. The carrier has already been in the news for weeks now due to the aforementioned morale issues, which family members of those onboard have been very vocally calling attention to through the media. One sailor had to be rescued last month after deliberately jumping overboard. There were reports that at least one other individual onboard had attempted to do the same. President Donald Trump and Secretary Pete Hegseth, among others, have pushed back on concerns about mental health and other issues on the ship. In a statement shared on social media on August 16, Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), acknowledged, but still downplayed, the seriousness of the mental health situation, in particular.

At the same time, the carrier’s marathon deployment is indicative of larger shipbuilding, readiness, and other issues that the Navy continues to struggle with. Strains on the service carrier fleets in particular have been steadily building for years and are now becoming a low-level crisis. The USS Gerald R. Ford wrapped up a historic 326-day-long deployment in May. The Navy has publicly said that the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which is set to begin its latest cruise soon, could be away from home for at least eight months. The longer the ships remain deployed, the longer they typically have to spend in port afterward, further compounding the situation with each passing day during months-long extensions. This all has very worrisome cascading impacts on even routine maintenance cycles, let alone deep overhauls and upgrade efforts, as well as personnel management matters, as we have explored in detail in the past.

“It’s my earnest attempt to really try to keep those [deployments] at seven months,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle, the Navy’s top officer, said during a question-and-answer session at Fort Meade, Maryland, Monday, which was livestreamed. He also said he wanted a Navy “that can sustain a seven-month deployment and still give our combatant commanders the amount of naval force they need to accomplish their missions, solve their key operational problems, and make sure they have all the naval force necessary to do what they need to do.”

Caudle had notably acknowledged concerns about strains on the Ford while speaking to TWZ and other outlets at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium back in January.

The Lincoln‘s visibly worn state certainly draws new attention to the stress on America’s carrier fleets as personnel onboard are now finally getting a much-earned reprieve in Laem Chabang.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USS Abraham Lincoln Looks Like It’s Been Through Hell After 286 Days At Sea appeared first on TWZ.

Chinese state-run shipping company COSCO has been using concealed systems on its vessels to gather signals intelligence around North American, European, and Asian coastlines for decades, it has been alleged. Similar claims have been made in the past, and overlap between nominally civilian enterprises in China and the country’s military and intelligence services is well established at this point.

Reuters first reported on the use of COSCO ships as discrete signals intelligence platforms earlier today, citing two unnamed officials within President Donald Trump’s administration.

“The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the U.S. assessment of the Chinese program, said COSCO has a decades-long intelligence-collection partnership with Beijing,” according to the report. “The arrangement allows China to collect communication signals from vessels ​and aircraft operating across Europe, North America and Asia, they said.”

It is worth noting here that China’s National Intelligence Law, enacted in 2017, includes a specific provision that requires all organizations and citizens within the country to support state intelligence work as required. It also obligates the state to protect entities that do so.

“The advanced equipment aboard the ships is intended to enable China ​to gather information about ‘military communications technologies and encryption developments,’ one of the officials said,” Reuters‘ story today added. “The officials did not detail the type of equipment COSCO ships were allegedly using, but said they were ‘sophisticated signals intelligence collection’ platforms, not routine communications hardware.”

Officials at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., unsurprisingly denied these assertions, according to that outlet.

Purpose-built signals intelligence suites can range widely in size and shape, as can their capabilities. They can be very small and basic or far more elaborate systems. Even the latter could be concealed as modern commercial ships, which already feature lots of antennas.

What might happen to intelligence collected by the ships is unknown. At the very least, systems onboard could record the data, which could then be batched out when safe to do so, either physically or via transmission. Basic passive signals suites can also run autonomously, or even be controlled from anywhere in the world if the ship is connected via satellite communications (SATCOM). High-bandwidth SATCOM is very common now on ships around the globe.

Personnel on the ship could also operate the systems, and even process receptions of interest. It might be possible to fit the ships with suitable datalinks to then transmit the collected data in near-real-time to other nodes, including ones back in China, for further analysis and exploitation.

Reuters‘ sources said scooping up data on “military communications technologies and encryption developments” was a priority for the commercial vessels turned spy ships. Signals intelligence can take many other forms, from emissions from radars to communications chatter. Depending on what is collected and how, specialists can use that information to glean details about how systems function, as well as insights into standard operating procedures and other details. This is especially true when multiple forms of intelligence are fused together. Generally speaking, signals intelligence is routinely used to help build out so-called ‘electronic orders of battle’ detailing the disposition and capabilities of an opponent’s forces, especially air defense and command and control networks.

As mentioned, this is not the first time claims in this general vein have emerged, either. At least some evidence has been presented in the past, through open-source analysis. Reuters‘ sources directed that outlet to a report published last year by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College exploring exactly this topic in relation to China’s quasi-military maritime militia. The maritime militia is made up of ostensibly civilian fishing fleets, but has direct ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Coast Guard. It is routinely used to harass and intimidate foreign vessels in disputed waters, especially in the South China Sea.

“Undergirding these operations is a cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists called ‘information personnel.’ Information personnel are organized into force contingents that support operational militia forces,” according to that report. “Most have day jobs in the fishing industry, but many hale [sic; hail] from other sectors, including marine shipping and even maritime law enforcement units.”

“It is more likely than not that PRC [People’s Republic of China] vessels operating overseas have already begun embarking information personnel to serve intelligence collection and reporting functions. In the case of China’s fishing fleet, serving this foreign intelligence collection function could be as simple as adding a new duty to the ‘information personnel’ that already embark aboard some distant-water fishing vessels,” that report added. “Aside from their primary responsibilities of tallying and reporting production numbers, serving as experts on international and national fisheries regulations that affect their work, and handling interactions with foreign officials while at sea and in port, they might also be tasked with collecting and reporting military and political intelligence while operating overseas.”

“Similar processes may already be in place in the commercial shipping industry,” it continued. “For instance, Guangxi province’s Beihai city has built up its ranks of maritime intelligence specialists by recruiting from among marine shipping personnel.”

No explicit mention is made in the report about signals intelligence gathering.

In the past year or so, there have been multiple reports that Russia is also using its so-called ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tanker ships in a secondary role as intelligence-gathering platforms. The primary job of those vessels is to help the Kremlin evade sanctions.

There is other tangential evidence that also lends credence to today’s report from Reuters. As mentioned, in the midst of still mysterious drone swarms that harassed U.S. Navy ships off the coast of southern California back in 2019, U.S. authorities at least explored the possibility that a Hong Kong-flagged bulk carrier, the M/V Bass Strait, might have been a launch point. It remains unknown, at least publicly, whether the Bass Strait or another nearby ship might have been the source of the harassment, or if it came from somewhere else, potentially further away. TWZ was the first to report on this detail as part of a deeper investigation into these incidents, which came amid a spike in news about claimed sightings of what are now commonly referred to as unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP). We have been saying for years now that, while some UAP sightings do remain unexplained, many more are likely to have been drones (as well as balloons), which foreign governments could be using for intelligence gathering and other malign purposes.

It’s also worth noting here that intelligence collection from international waters and airspace is a practice that nation state armed forces and intelligence agencies globally, including those in the United States, engage in regularly with varying degrees of openness. Leveraging nominally civilian ships, as well as aircraft, for these purposes is hardly new.

Despite the official denials to the Reuters piece today, it would be hard to imagine Chinese authorities not making use of commercial ships for this purpose, if possible, given that major deepwater ports worldwide are often dual-purpose civilian/military facilities. Radar sites and other critical facilities are often positioned along or near coastlines. Cargo ships and tankers often pass by major exercises and under major military operating airspace, where they could scoop up critical data.

With commercial ships already plying their routes, this would also just offer the Chinese government ways to readily bolster maritime intelligence-gathering capacity at low cost and low risk. China’s commercial fleets dwarf any other on Earth, making their presence commonplace and providing many opportunities to hide these operations.

A 2021 report published through the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) Tearline Project also highlighted the possibility of Chinese-owned facilities at ports around the world being used for intelligence gathering or even for launching non-kinetic attacks, including electronic warfare jamming. It specifically noted how COSCO’s facility in Belgium’s Port of Zeebrugge is “in close proximity to a Belgian Naval Base and thus could fulfill additional militarized requirements.”

Concerns about land owned by Chinese companies and nationals being used to collect intelligence or for other purposes have become an increasingly hot topic of discussion in the United States in recent years.

Reuters‘ piece does not say what, if any, steps U.S. authorities have taken or may be planning to take now to monitor for or take more active countermeasures against Chinese-flagged ships being used for intelligence gathering, despite this being said to be a decades-old practice. The report does note that “the Pentagon put COSCO on its list of companies linked to China’s military in January 2025, a designation that carries serious reputational costs for companies ​as well as U.S. government procurement ​bans, but does not entail ⁠formal sanctions.”

Though no hard evidence has yet been provided, Chinese authorities using cargo ships as additional discreet signals intelligence-gathering assets is very plausible, and would certainly seem to be an issue that should be taken seriously, if it is not already being addressed.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Chinese Cargo Ships Clandestinely Gather Signals Intelligence: Report appeared first on TWZ.

The first of Japan’s two new cruiser-sized Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is continuing to take shape, recently receiving its huge main integrated mast, giving the vessel a new and remarkably imposing silhouette. The four very large fixed arrays for the ship’s powerful AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar will eventually be integrated onto this structure. The ASEV’s stated primary mission is missile defense, but Japanese authorities plan to give the vessels additional counter-drone, anti-ship, and land attack capabilities in the future. Tomahawk cruise missiles are notably set to be added to the ship’s arsenal down the line.

The ASEVs are large surface combatants, set to be some 620 feet long, have a beam (the widest point of the hull) of some 82 feet, and a standard displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, Japan’s largest surface combatants today, its Maya class destroyers, are just over 557 feet long, have a beam of some 73 feet, and a standard displacement of around 8,200 tons. It is worth noting here that the size of new and advanced destroyers, often optimized for anti-air warfare missions, has been trending upward globally in recent years. This, in turn, has caused the line between destroyers and what have more historically been categorized as cruisers in certain cases.

The first ASEV was laid down at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI) shipyard in Nagasaki in July 2025. The second was laid down in February of this year at Japan Marine United Isogo shipyard, which is situated in Yokohama City near Tokyo, according to a past report from Naval News. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is currently aiming to have the first of these vessels in service before the end of the country’s 2027 Fiscal Year, which runs from April 2027 to March 2028. The second is expected to follow in the 2028 fiscal cycle, which extends into 2029.

Significant progress in the overall construction of the first ship has been made just this year. The addition of the main mast structure, installed on top of the main superstructure, as seen in pictures at the top of this story and below, has drawn particular attention in recent weeks.

Japanese are very fast with ship building.

March 26 and today. ASEV-class destroyer.

190 m hull, SPY-7 Aegis, 128cell Mk 41 VLS. SM-3 for ballistic missiles, SM-6, plus Japan’s long range Type 12 SSM. pic.twitter.com/RQZixtqWwe

— 信濃 Æýà (@Shinano_AEya) August 30, 2026

The especially large size of the ASEV’s integrated mast is driven by that of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar from Lockheed Martin. Each one of the radar’s four rectangular arrays is reportedly around 14 feet (nearly 4.3 meters) tall. This would put them in the same general size category as the arrays for Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) found on U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers. That being said, the pictures we have now raise the question of whether the AN/SPY-7(V)1 arrays are bigger than previously assessed. The AMDR is another notably large design heavily optimized for missile defense.

The size and location of the mast provide a centralized, elevated position for the AN/SPY-7(V)1’s large arrays, which will also require significant power generation capacity and thermal management to keep everything cool. This is a notable departure from the placement of the arrays on the main superstructure on existing Japanese destroyers, as well as the U.S. Arleigh Burke class, and offers an unobstructed, elevated line-of-sight to the horizon. Beyond the ballistic missile defense mission, this view farther out over the horizon would be important for tracking and engaging low-flying drones and cruise missiles, which might be targeting the ship itself. This is something we will come back to later on.

“With five times the tracking capability of the SPY-1, it [the AN/SPY-7(V)1] counters lofted trajectories and simultaneous multiple ballistic missile threats,” according to a machine translation of a section of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2026 defense policy white paper, which was released earlier this month.

The passive electronically-scanned array (PESA) AN/SPY-1 was the first radar to be paired with the Aegis Combat System, and both were first introduced in the 1970s. Variants of the SPY-1 are still found on a variety of U.S. and foreign Aegis-equipped warships, including Japan’s Kongo, Atago, and Maya class destroyers.

The AN/SPY-7(V)1 is also a derivative of the U.S. military’s static, land-based Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Japan also originally planned to employ the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on land at a pair of Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. However, that effort was subsequently cancelled, with the ASEV emerging to fill the resulting gap.

Additional versions of the AN/SPY-7 with much smaller arrays are also being integrated onto new F110 Bonifaz class frigates for the Spanish Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy’s forthcoming River class destroyers (also known as the Canadian Surface Combatant). The use of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on the ASEV could impact decisions regarding new radars for other future and existing Japanese warships. Raytheon is also pitching versions of its increasingly popular AN/SPY-6 family for use on a successor to the Kongo class and for refit on the Maya class, according to a recent report from Naval News.

When it comes to the ASEV, as already noted, the AN/SPY-7(V)1 is central to the ship’s main stated missile defense mission. As the name makes clear, the ship will also feature the Aegis Combat System. The vessel will be capable of “remote engagement and guidance against anti-air targets tracked by other vessels” via a “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC),” per the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual defense white paper.

The video below provides details about the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) developments, which are likely very similar to what Japan has planned for the ASEV.

In terms of armament, when the ASEVs first enter service, their main weaponry is expected to be a mix of variants of the Standard Missile-3 and -6 (SM-3 and SM-6). The SM-3 family is designed to engage ballistic missile threats during the mid-course portion of their flights while they are traveling outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. The SM-3 also has a demonstrated anti-satellite capability. The SM-6 is a multi-purpose missile that was originally designed with an anti-air focus. It can be used to target incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and also has at least a degree of capability for engaging hypersonic weapons. SM-6 can be used in a surface-to-surface mode, including against ships, as well. Japan is also a partner in the U.S.-led development of a new Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed specifically to intercept unpowered, but highly maneuverable hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

SM-3, SM-6, and future GPIs will be loaded into either of the ASEV’s two Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays, one at the bow end and another toward the stern. Each one of the ships will have a total of 128 VLS cells. For comparison, Japan’s Maya class destroyers, as well as the U.S. Navy’s Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke class destroyers, have 96 VLS cells apiece. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class cruisers each have 122 VLS cells, and 128 is also the number of VLSs currently expected to be found on the future Trump class battleships.

At the time of writing, Japanese authorities do not appear to have explicitly mentioned plans to arm the ASEVs with other missiles when they first enter service. That being said, any VLS array capable of accommodating SM-3s and SM-6s should be able to fire a variety of other weapons, including shorter-ranged SM-2s and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), which the ship could use for more localized air and missile defense, as well as protecting the ship itself.

Renderings and models of the ASEV do show the design also armed with a five-inch naval gun in a turret on the bow, along with two Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) and other automatic cannons for point defense.

As mentioned, while missile defense is the immediate focus for the ASEVs, there are already plans to significantly expand their capability to engage other ships and targets on land. Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new, extended-range version of the Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile are set to be added to the arsenal of these vessels in the 2032 timeframe, according to the latest official Japanese defense white paper.

Japanese authorities want the ASEVs to eventually be able to help fend off waves of enemy drones, too. High-energy laser-directed energy weapons are set to be integrated onto the ships down the line to help address those threats. The overall size and other general characteristics of the ships would leave the door open to the possible addition of high-power microwaves and other capabilities in the future.

TWZ has long noted that the ASEVs will bring huge new boosts in naval air and missile defense and long-strike capability to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The vessels also reflect a significant evolution in post-World War II Japanese doctrine, toward what officials currently frame as a “stand-off defense” construct that remains within the bounds of the country’s current pacifist constitution.

Just with SM-3, SM-6, and GPI, the ASEVs will offer an important addition to the air and missile defense bubbles around Japan’s home islands and outlying territories in the face of growing geopolitical friction with China and Russia, two countries that are increasingly cooperating militarily. The vessels will also add to Japan’s deterrent against long-standing and still evolving threats posed by the regime in North Korea, which has its own close ties to the Chinese and Russian governments. All three of these nations continue to expand their arsenals of ever-more capable ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Long-range one-way-attack drones are another growing part of the equation, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and fighting in the Middle East in recent years underscoring just how real a threat they pose.

With the addition of Tomahawks, the ASEVs, along with other Japanese warships, will gain the additional ability to threaten counterstrikes against targets on land (and potentially at sea) at least around 1,000 miles in any direction. As part of the broader stand-off defense strategy, the Japan Self Defense Forces is developing new land-based long-range strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, as well.

It is worth noting that with current plans to acquire only two ASEVs, these will be high-value but also low-density assets, which will have to be very deliberately deployed for maximum effect. They will also stand out as top-priority targets in any future conflict, and will need to be protected as such.

It is possible that the roles and missions of the ASEVs, just like their designs, could evolve further as time goes on. The threat ecosystem facing Japan will continue to evolve, likely more rapidly, in the coming years. The country is also expanding its naval capabilities in other ways, and with an eye toward more blue water operations. This includes expanded light carrier capabilities through refits of existing Izumo class ships. Anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, among large volumes of more traditional threats, could see the ASEVs used as escorts, even if experimentally. While just two hulls are barely enough to keep one on patrol to protect Japan, more could be built for expeditionary applications.

Regardless, the ASEVs are set to be a major addition to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s fleets that will have big ramifications. From the progress that is visible at the shipyard in Nagasaki, MHI looks to be well on track to deliver the first of these ships next year or two.

Special thanks to @kensakai9310 on X, who also goes by “Sakai,” for sharing recently taken pictures of the first ASEV under construction at MHI’s yard in Nagasaki with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly expanding a secretive airbase in the northwest of the country that is loosely akin to America’s top-secret proving ground at Area 51. The facility is used to test experimental platforms and next-generation combat aircraft, sporting one of the longest runways in the world at 16,400 feet. It has transformed from a relatively austere and remote airstrip into an increasingly sprawling People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flight-test center over the past few years, and there is no sign that construction will slow anytime soon. In fact, it’s accelerating, and one of its newest features is of significant interest.

Satellite imagery taken by Planet Labs on August 27, 2026, shows the scale and scope of the buildout in high-resolution detail.

The installation is located near the infamous Lop Nur Nuclear Test Base in the desolate, arid Xinjiang autonomous region of northwestern China. Lop Nur is the PRC’s primary testing facility for nuclear weapons and where China detonated its first nuclear device, codenamed Project 596, in 1964, becoming the world’s fifth nuclear power.

Last year, TWZ spotted both of China’s sixth-generation stealth fighter designs, the J-36 and J-XDS, at the base for the first time − far from the home airfields of their respective manufacturers, Chengdu and Shenyang. Before supporting the development of advanced air combat technologies, the facility was linked to military space development efforts and testing reusable space planes as far back as 2020. At that point, the site was nothing more than a 3.1-mile runway with a small hangar and a few scattered vehicles.

In 2023, the main apron was significantly expanded, and a new large hangar was added. In 2025, new hangars were added on both sides of the main ramp area via extensions. These shelters appeared to be optimized for tactical fixed-wing aircraft. Not long after those facilities were complete, the two 6th-generation fighter aircraft showed up. The pace of further construction ramped in May 2025 and hasn’t let up since. The time-lapse below visualizes the gradual, then all-at-once progression over the past six years.

“New taxiways, aircraft turning pads, hangars and possible fuel-storage infrastructure substantially increase the airfield’s capacity to support aircraft movements and sustained flight-test activity,” Damien Symon, a geo-intelligence researcher and friend of TWZ, told us. Symon assisted TWZ in identifying the new structures.

Several key areas of the site have been reshaped since the beginning of the year, marked on the annotated graphic near the top of this story.

Below the southern end of the runway, construction is moving fast on a new taxiway extension running parallel to the runway, connecting it to the central apron and main hangar. The nearly completed route will allow additional aircraft to move more freely without having to back-taxi on the runway, which is a huge problem for higher operations tempos and more complex sortie launches and recoveries.

“Of particular interest are several large aircraft hangars in the southern section of the airbase, each measuring approximately 80 by 40 meters (262 by 131 feet),” Symon said of the three hangars grouped together that are being constructed on the south ramp. A fourth appears on its own just farther south on the apron, with different dimensions. The hangars, with direct access to the new southern taxiway, are sized to accommodate all of the tactical and strategic aircraft in the PLA’s current fleet. For scale, the PRC’s only strategic bomber in active service, the Xi’an H-6, has a wingspan of approximately 108 feet. But what’s already flying operationally isn’t the focus of these new facilities, it’s a unique class of aircraft, some of which are in testing now and more will be in the future.

The hangars’ wide proportions are similar to those of new ones found at China’s other secretive major test airbase in Xinjiang, located near Malan, which is largely focused on unmanned aircraft. The buildout comes as two massive stealth flying wing drones are in flight testing and we await the H-20 stealth bomber. It remains unclear where the H-20, which still hasn’t made a public appearance, will be tested. However, Lop Nur would be an ideal locale considering how sensitive the program is, and these new hangars could very well be in preparation for its arrival. It’s also worth noting that this installation appears more focused on crewed platforms, not drones, like at Malan. So sending the H-20 here for at least part of its test program would make sense, although this is just speculation at this time.

Broad construction continues behind the central apron area, with several buildings that were in development late last year now completed. A cluster of prefabricated containers arranged in tight rows for storage and accommodation has appeared since our last review. The additional laborers, materials, or equipment could be housed there to support the aggressive pace of development, as a much larger workforce would be required to speed up the construction process. Excavation and construction have started at other locations nearby, but they are in the early stages of development and their future purpose is unknown. Farther east, on the outskirts of the facility, a concrete batching plant with wash-water ponds and segregated aggregate stockpiles was recently built.

Grading is underway for another taxiway that will connect the central apron to the northern part of the main runway. The latest imagery suggests that concrete has just started to be poured. A circular pad with a 400-foot diameter has taken shape at the northern end with direct access to both the runway and the main base, which TWZ assesses to be an engine run and turnaround pad. If a shelter were added, it could also act as a “scoot and hide” area for keeping sensitive test articles from being seen by satellites passing overhead. An apron extension near the circular pad is also under construction, with at least two large hangars being built there, although they will have more traditional proportions compared to the four wide ones on the south ramp.

Additionally, Symon identified possible fuel-storage infrastructure under construction that would “further expand the base’s aviation-support capacity.” If confirmed, “the additional infrastructure could support a higher sortie rate and longer periods of sustained flight activity, consistent with an expansion in the scale or tempo of operations at Lop Nur,” he added.

The facility is clearly in the process of taking on a very important role in China’s advanced aerospace development ecosystem, and its significance will only grow as it expands to accommodate more, and bigger, airframes. With the hangar additions we are seeing, major programs are about to migrate there, even on a detachment basis, for extensive testing. The new southern hangars, in particular, suggest the PLA expects to be testing aircraft with far wider wingspans in the not-too-distant future.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io or on X @ianellisjones

Author’s note: Special thanks to Damien Symon for assisting with the imagery analysis, be sure to follow him on X at @detresfa_

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Indonesia is about to become the second Southeast Asian country to operate an aircraft carrier, nearly three decades after Thailand became the first with HTMS Chakri Naruebet. The latest addition to the region’s small carrier club is the former Italian Navy carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, which departed Italy earlier this week, bound for Indonesia, where it will eventually become KRI Gajah Mada. Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali confirmed the ship’s departure on Tuesday.

Garibaldi is expected to spend more than 20 days making the journey from Italy to Indonesia, passing through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Italian frigates are accompanying the carrier during the transit.

According to Admiral Ali, the ship is scheduled to reach Indonesia between September 15 and 20.

The carrier will retain its Italian identity throughout the voyage, sailing as Giuseppe Garibaldi under the Italian flag until the formal transfer, when it will be renamed and placed under Indonesian command.

Commissioned in 1985, Garibaldi was initially described as a “helicopter cruiser” before being redesignated as an aircraft-carrying cruiser in 1989 and receiving the Italian Navy’s AV-8B Harrier II jump jets. The ship subsequently served as Italy’s flagship and later shifted toward amphibious operations and command-and-control duties after the larger Cavour entered service.

At around 13,850 tons full load, Garibaldi combined a relatively compact aviation capability with a multirole weapon and sensor fit, at least in its early period of service. Its armament historically included two octuple launchers for Sea Sparrow/Aspide surface-to-air missiles, four Otomat Mk 2 anti-ship missiles, two 2 triple torpedo tubes, and three twin Oto Melara 40mm guns.

Indonesia is acquiring the ship through an intergovernmental grant arrangement rather than purchasing it through a conventional commercial transaction.

Although it has spent almost four decades in Italian service, the ship offers considerable flexibility, combining a large aviation facility with the ability to serve as a command and support platform.

Jakarta says it plans to use the ship primarily as a helicopter-capable aviation platform, with aircraft from the Indonesian Navy, Air Force, and Army expected to operate from its deck.

Ahead of the ship’s arrival, preparations have included establishing a training facility at Juanda Naval Air Station/International Airport in Sidoarjo, East Java. Here, the large outline of a carrier flight deck has been painted on an apron/helipad area on the southern side of the installation, to familiarize naval pilots and deck crews with carrier flight-deck procedures.

Thailand’s experience provides useful context here. When Chakri Naruebet entered service in 1997, it was configured to operate AV-8S Harriers as well as helicopters. The Harriers were subsequently retired, leaving the ship to perform a much broader range of roles, including helicopter operations, disaster response, training, and VIP duties. TWZ has previously examined that unusual evolution in detail.

Once in service, Indonesia will likely operate the Gajah Mada as a mobile aviation base. This will allow helicopters to provide transport, surveillance, logistics, search and rescue, disaster relief, and potentially anti-submarine warfare and amphibious support capabilities over much greater distances than when operating from land bases, and in much larger numbers than operating from other Indonesian Navy vessels.

The potential mission set is particularly relevant for Indonesia, whose territory stretches across thousands of islands.

Occupying a strategic position at the southern end of the South China Sea, Indonesia is also locked in a maritime dispute with China, including incidents in which Chinese fishing boats accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard vessels have entered Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. The tense situation as regards China seems to be driving something of a defense spending spree in Indonesia, with high-profile acquisitions including French-made Rafale fighters and submarines.

Meanwhile, in peacetime, disaster response is also a significant consideration for Indonesia. The Gajah Mada will be able to bring helicopters, personnel, supplies, and command-and-control capabilities to areas where local infrastructure has been damaged or where access is otherwise difficult.

The ship is also likely to take part in maritime security missions and regional deployments including multinational training exercises.

There is potential for Indonesia to adapt the warship for drone operations too, something that Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri has previously proposed. While Indonesia has not announced such a capability as part of the ship’s initial configuration, it has acquired Turkish-made Bayraktar TB3 drones, which have demonstrated operations from carrier decks.

As well as Turkey’s Anadolu, which has evolved into a platform for operating drones after Turkey lost access to the F-35B program, other navies are similarly experimenting with integrating uncrewed aircraft into helicopter-carrier-sized ships, reflecting a broader shift toward using large flight decks for mixed crewed and uncrewed aviation. The trend includes experiments with fixed-wing drones on amphibious assault ships, including in China and the United States.

For Indonesia, a future combination of helicopters and drones could provide the Gajah Mada with persistent surveillance and potentially strike capabilities without requiring the country to develop a conventional fixed-wing carrier air wing.

How extensively Indonesia eventually makes use of any of its capabilities will depend on its ability to sustain the ship and build the associated aviation infrastructure and expertise.

The Indonesian Navy is constructing the warship’s future base in Lampung, on the southern tip of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The facility is expected to be finished around the time the ship arrives and operational by the end of September.

The ship’s formal transformation into an Indonesian warship is planned for September 25. A commissioning and flag-changing ceremony is scheduled for that date, with President Prabowo Subianto expected to attend and officiate.

At that point, the carrier will become KRI Gajah Mada, taking its name from the famous Majapahit-era military commander and statesman.

The Navy plans to include the ship in celebrations marking the 81st anniversary of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, or TNI, in October.

Thailand’s experience with the Chakri Naruebet, which only very rarely goes to sea for any length of time, underscores the fact that buying a carrier is the relatively easy part. Creating a sustainable carrier aviation capability around it is much more challenging.

Nevertheless, the Gajah Mada gives Jakarta something it has never previously possessed: a large, dedicated maritime aviation platform capable of carrying helicopters from multiple services. As such, it could prove useful across a wide spectrum of missions.

Ciontact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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