NATO member Latvia is moving toward acquiring Anduril Industries’ Barracuda family of long-range strike missiles, with Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs highlighting the effort during a visit to the U.S. defense technology company and a series of new defense-industry cooperation agreements involving Latvia. If the acquisition goes through, Latvia would be the first of the Baltic states to field a strike weapon in this category.
“It was great to visit Anduril to meet with Palmer Luckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and Origin Robotics,” Rinkēvičs said in a post on X. “Looking forward to complete acquisition of Barracuda long-range missiles and [Latvian-U.S.] defense industry cooperation.”
It was great to visit @anduriltech to meet with @PalmerLuckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and @OriginRobotics. Looking forward to complete acquisition of Baracuda longe range missiles and
— Edgars Rinkēvičs (@edgarsrinkevics) September 25, 2026
The statement does not specify the precise Barracuda variant involved, the number of missiles Latvia intends to acquire, the expected delivery schedule, or the value of the prospective purchase. We have reached out to Anduril for more details.
A likely candidate weapon is the Barracuda-500M, one member of Anduril’s family of autonomous, jet-powered cruise missiles, alongside the Barracuda-100M and -250M variants. Official descriptions put its range at more than 500 nautical miles, with a stated speed range of approximately 190 to 500 knots. The missile can be air-launched, for which it has received the official U.S. military designation AGM-189A. But with only a handful of utility biplanes and helicopters in its inventory, Latvia would acquire the surface-launched version, designated SLB-500M.
The announcement points to a potentially significant expansion of Latvia’s precision-strike capabilities as NATO’s eastern flank continues to build out longer-range conventional fires.
Latvia has already ordered the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which will be fired from M142 HIMARS launchers. The system is expected to enter Latvian service in 2027 and has a maximum range of about 186 miles.
Latvia’s ATACMS capability will give the country a foundation for ground-launched precision fires, but the broader European trend is toward significantly greater reach.
Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets at between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers (620 and 1,242 miles) or more are an emerging target for several European NATO members. France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom are pursuing combinations of indigenous development and foreign procurement to address this requirement.
Latvia’s neighbor Poland, for example, has been building a layered long-range strike architecture combining JASSM/JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles with HIMARS and ATACMS. Warsaw’s ambitions are extending toward ground-launched weapons with ranges potentially reaching 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and the country has previously expressed openness to hosting U.S.-owned nuclear weapons on its territory, too.
Latvian interest in Barracuda fits into the same larger transformation in European conventional strike capabilities.
For NATO’s Baltic members, the logic is particularly straightforward, with mobile, ground-launched weapons providing an additional means of striking military targets at depth without requiring control of the air over the launch area.
The potential Barracuda acquisition would represent another step in a broader European shift toward deep precision strike, a term increasingly used to describe conventional weapons capable of holding targets hundreds or thousands of miles away at risk.
Deep precision strike is widely acknowledged as an increasingly important European capability gap. European NATO members have historically relied heavily on air-launched cruise missiles and other aircraft-delivered weapons, while ground-launched long-range systems have been comparatively scarce.
The deterioration of the European security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, together with the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, are important factors behind renewed European interest in long-range conventional strike.
A key driver behind Europe’s push for longer-range conventional strike is the desire to build a credible deterrent capable of holding targets deep inside Russia at risk, potentially including Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has demonstrated the strategic value of being able to impose costs at significant distances, while also underscoring the importance of having sufficient stocks of precision weapons. For NATO’s eastern flank, systems such as the ground-launched Barracuda could therefore provide not just another fires capability, but an additional means of imposing costs on an adversary without relying exclusively on airpower.
Importantly for Latvia, the emerging European approach is not limited to large air forces. NATO’s prospective deep-strike requirements are likely to place significant emphasis on mobile ground-launched systems because they can be dispersed and offer survivability advantages while avoiding the cost and vulnerability associated with relying exclusively on aircraft or ships as launch platforms.
That makes systems such as the surface-launched Barracuda particularly relevant to countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
Anduril has positioned Barracuda as part of an effort to address what it describes as a shortfall in affordable, producible long-range precision weapons. A prototype surface-launched Barracuda-500 successfully demonstrated its launcher, missile, and booster concept in testing in 2025. Anduril has emphasized that the family is intended to be more producible and affordable than many existing “exquisite” long-range weapons.
The emphasis on production capacity is notable in light of lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine, where both sides have demonstrated the importance of maintaining substantial stocks of precision weapons and relatively inexpensive one-way attack systems.
European governments are increasingly wrestling with the same issue. However, there is a fundamental tension between rapidly filling capability gaps through off-the-shelf purchases and developing indigenous European weapons that can strengthen the continent’s defense-industrial base, which is also a critical political consideration.
Latvia’s emerging relationship with Anduril appears to combine elements of both approaches, by acquiring an American-developed strike capability while simultaneously pursuing industrial cooperation with U.S. defense companies.
There is also a recent European precedent for combining Barracuda procurement with local industrial participation.
In July 2026, Anduril signed a strategic agreement with Polish national maintenance, repair and overhaul provider Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M at WZL-2 facilities in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa said Poland was the first European country to sign such an agreement with Anduril.
Bezpieczeństwo zaczyna się od silnych sojuszy.
— Ministerstwo Aktywów Państwowych
Polish officials have also emphasized the missile’s intended low production cost relative to higher-end U.S. cruise missiles. The planned Polish program is expected to progressively increase Polish content and eventually incorporate broader European elements, including software solutions from Anduril.
Latvia has not publicly detailed whether any Barracuda-related production, assembly, or other industrial work would be conducted in the country.
However, Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency says the country’s defense-technology delegation in the United States is seeking opportunities involving joint development, testing, manufacturing, system integration and supply chains. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian companies participating in that effort.
The broader Latvian delegation includes companies working across unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, communications, electronics, sensors, software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and manufacturing.
Exactly how Latvia intends to employ Barracuda, how many missiles it plans to acquire, and whether any portion of the system will eventually be produced or integrated in Latvia remain unclear from the president’s announcement.
For now, the development marks another indication that long-range precision fires are moving from a capability concentrated among Europe’s largest military powers toward a broader requirement across NATO’s highly strategic eastern flank.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Latvia To Order Anduril’s Barracuda Cruise Missile For Long-Range Strike Capability appeared first on TWZ.
Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.
The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.
A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:
A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from
— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026
The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.
At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.
Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.
The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.
Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.
Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.
”A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today” https://t.co/z6oLs1LCT4 pic.twitter.com/n18MdST6r1
— Jamming (@balticjam) September 18, 2026
The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.
The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.
Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.
Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.
The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.
Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.
The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.
Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.
The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.
Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.
Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.
For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.
A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.
The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.
At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.
There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with "accidental" missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.
— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026
Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…
For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill appeared first on TWZ.
On 24 August, the Commission adopted its proposal for the 2027 fishing opportunities for the Baltic Sea. The proposal sets the total allowable catches (TACs) and quotas for the ten EU-managed fish stocks in the Baltic Sea: Bothnian herring, central Baltic herring, Gulf of Riga herring, sprat, plaice, Main Basin salmon, Gulf of Finland salmon, western Baltic cod, eastern Baltic cod, and western Baltic herring.
It responds to scientific assessments that highlight the critical state of several fisheries and allows for continuing the rebuilding trajectories for relevant stocks.
The Commission proposes to increase fishing opportunities for Bothnian herring (+3%), central Baltic herring (+49%), Gulf of Riga herring (+11%) and sprat (+44%). Catches of plaice, salmon in the Main basin and in the Gulf of Finland would remain unchanged compared to this year. In addition, based on the latest reporting by Member States, the Commission proposes to reduce the allocations of unavoidable by-catches – fish unwantedly caught by fishers - of western Baltic cod (-88%), eastern Baltic cod (-51%) and western Baltic herring (-45%).
These proposed TACs are based on the best available scientific advice from the International Council on the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and follow the Baltic Sea multiannual management plan adopted in 2016 by the European Parliament and the Council.
Cod
For eastern Baltic cod, the Commission has proposed to keep a catch limit for unavoidable by-catches and all the accompanying measures in place already for several years. However, since the stock continues to be in bad condition, the by-catch limit should be adjusted, based on the number of by-catches reported by each Member State in 2025. Despite the measures taken since 2019, when scientists first warned about the poor status of cod, the situation has not improved.
The situation is similar for western Baltic cod. The Commission therefore proposes to adjust the by-catch TAC to address a deteriorated condition of the stock, and to keep all the accompanying measures.
Herring
The stock size of western Baltic herring remains significantly below minimum levels. The Commission proposes removing the exemption for small-scale coastal fisheries and adjusting the TAC to unavoidable by-catches only.
The stock size of Bothnian herring is larger than previously estimated but still below sustainable levels. With the maximum catch levels contained in the ICES advice, the stock size would continue to decrease. In order to continue the rebuilding trajectory, the Commission proposes a TAC level which keeps the fishing mortality rate stable and increases the stock size. The Commission also proposes to keep the three-month spawning closure – restricting fishing during reproduction periods - in shallow coastal waters.
The stock size of central Baltic herring has increased but remains below sustainable levels. ICES forecasts a positive stock development due to high estimated recruitment. In order to continue the rebuilding trajectory, the Commission proposes a cautious approach and to set the TAC at the level which keeps the fishing mortality rate stable. In addition, the Commission proposes to keep the three-month spawning closure in shallow coastal waters.
Herring in the Gulf of Riga is healthy, and the Commission proposes to set the catch limits according to the maximum advised by ICES.
Plaice
Scientific advice recommends a slight increase, but the Commission proposes to keep the TAC unchanged due to the bad condition of individual fish. In addition, new measures for flatfish fisheries, including plaice, entered into force last year. These measures will help improve the sustainability of flatfish fishing, notably by reducing unwanted cod by-catches – which still occur frequently.
Sprat
After several difficult years the size of the sprat stock has increased significantly due to recent very high reproduction rates. ICES estimates that the stock will continue to increase. The Commission therefore proposes setting the TAC at the advised maximum and to discontinue the three-month spawning closure.
Salmon
ICES did not publish a new advice for 2027. The Commission therefore proposes to maintain the (by-catch) TAC levels and the accompanying conditions for the two salmon TACs, with the exception of recreational fishing on reared salmon which should stop.
Next steps
Based on these proposals, EU countries will take a final decision to determine the maximum quantities of the most important commercial fish species that can be caught in the Baltic Sea. The Council will examine the Commission's proposal in view of reaching a political agreement during its meeting on 26-27 October 2026. The formal adoption by the Council will follow later in the course of November.
Background
The fishing opportunities proposal is part of the European Union's approach to adjust the levels of fishing to long-term sustainability targets, called maximum sustainable yield (MSY), as agreed by the European Parliament and the Council in the Common Fisheries Policy. The Commission's proposal is also in line with the Multiannual Plan for the management of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and with the policy intentions expressed in the Commission's Communication 'Sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2027'.
The current situation is difficult for fishers as stocks are subject to various pressures which have led to the degradation of the Baltic Sea's biodiversity, such as high nutrient inputs and persistently high levels of contaminants. These stressors, in part, stem from failures to implement EU legislation. Furthermore, the scientific advice also recognises the impact of misreporting of fishing, without being able to quantify it. Misreporting potentially leads to hidden overfishing.
The Baltic Sea is the most polluted sea in Europe. It is affected by biodiversity loss, climate change, eutrophication, past and probably current hidden overfishing, and elevated levels of contaminants such as pharmaceuticals and litter. Concerned about this dire situation, the European Commission organised several editions of the Our Baltic Conferences in 2020, 2023 and 2025 to bring together Ministers from the eight EU countries surrounding the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden).
For more information
Proposal fishing opportunities Baltic Sea 2027
Table: Overview of TAC changes 2026-2027 (figures in tones except for salmon, which is in number of pieces)
| 2026 | 2027 | |
| Stocks and ICES fishing zones; subdivision | Council agreement (in tonnes & % change from 2025 TAC) | Commission proposal (in tonnes & % change from 2026 TAC) |
| Western Cod 22-24 | 266 (0%) | 31 (-88%) |
| Eastern Cod 25-32 | 430 (0%) | 211 (-51%) |
| Western Herring 22-24 | 788 (0%) | 437 (-45%) |
| Bothnian Herring 30-31 | 55 869 (-16%) | 57 308 (+3%) |
| Central Herring 25-27, 28.2, 29, 32 | 96 463 (+15%) | 143 860 (+49%) |
| Riga Herring 38.1 | 34 367 (-17%) | 28 183 (+11%) |
| Sprat 22-32 | 201 975 (+45%) | 291 590 (+44%) |
| Plaice 22-32 | 10 973 (-3%) | 10 973 (0%) |
| Main Basin Salmon 22-31 | 25 537 (-27%) | 25 537 (0%) |
| Gulf of Finland Salmon 32 | 10 232 (+1%) | 10 232 (0%) |
* Updated on 25 August 2026, at 14:16 CEST
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