U.S. won’t resume strikes on Iran before midterms, Trump says



A profound transformation is underway in the politico-military-industrial complex that has dominated the US defense realm for over seven decades.
As drones, AI, autonomous systems, satellites, robots, and networked platforms reshape the battlefield, Silicon Valley is quietly edging out the US defense market’s big five: Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.
On October 6, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth tapped SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and Palmer Luckey, the co-founder of defense technology firm Anduril, to lead “Project Meridian: The Future of Warfare,” a new 120-day initiative tasked with identifying the technologies and capabilities required for future military dominance.
“We are witnessing rapid advances in artificial intelligence, autonomy, directed energy, robotics, biotechnology, among other critical high-tech areas. Combined, these new domains, new ways of fighting, and technological developments will profoundly alter the character of warfare,” Hegseth said in his one-page memo while announcing Project Meridian on September 30.
“To maintain global dominance, the United States must anticipate future operational environments and act decisively to develop the tools to dominate in them.”
Defining the scope of the study, Hegseth said: “Project Meridian will study the battlefields of the future, identify which weapons and technologies warfighters will need to harness to dominate in these environments, and propose actionable solutions to start developing, testing, and fielding these capabilities such that America will have overmatch for the 21st century and beyond.”
In his memo, Hegseth hinted that the center of gravity is shifting over who defines and decides the parameters of future defense weapons, technologies, and requirements.
“Project Meridian will leverage critical perspectives from outside the Pentagon, drawing upon a group of top technologists, innovators, business leaders, policymakers, and national security experts.”
Its primary function will be to map the trajectory of future warfare, identify critical capability gaps, and propose actionable solutions, Hegseth said.
The Elon Musk and Palmer Luckey-led panel will therefore discuss not a particular weapons platform, but what American warfare and the battlefield will look like in the future.
What they will discuss and define is not merely a change in weapons technology, but the way the Pentagon sees warfare and organizes the production of military power itself.
The study’s co-directors will “identify the domains that we must conquer, and capabilities we must master,” Hegseth said at Marine Corps Base Quantico on September 30.
“The Project Meridian effort will examine the technologies and operational concepts required to sustain U.S. military advantage across the full spectrum of future warfighting domains across a 10-20 year time horizon,” said a spokesperson for the Department of Defense.
The Musk- and Luckey-led study could therefore shape the Pentagon’s defense procurement decisions for decades.
It’s no accident that while SpaceX’s Musk and Anduril’s Luckey are on the panel, the executives of the Big Five are conspicuously missing.

The US military-industrial complex started taking shape in the 1950s.
While the two World Wars saw large-scale mobilizations and the channeling of industries toward weapons production, the distinctive military-industrial complex emerged in the 1950s.
US President Eisenhower himself later described the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry as new in the American experience.”
In April 1950, the top-secret U.S. National Security Council (NSC) policy (NSC-68) concluded that the “only plausible way to deter the Soviet Union was for President Harry Truman to support a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear weapons.
In other words, the US should maintain elevated defense spending even during peacetime.
U.S. military budget jumped from USD 13 billion to USD 60 billion within a couple of years. Most of these funds went to private contractors, rather than government bodies.
For nearly the next seven decades, military production and weapons procurement in the US followed a set pattern.
The Pentagon defined its requirements, the US Congress approved the budgets, defense production firms, mostly a handful of prime contractors, submitted bids, and the winner developed platforms with lifecycles ranging from a few years to a few decades.
Fighter jets, bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers, missiles, radars, military communication platforms- all these platforms were developed this way.
For decades, they remained industrial objects; however, these platforms gradually became computational systems. The F-35, for instance, has been described as a flying supercomputer.
New-age military platforms, however, are first and foremost computing platforms.
Drones, for example, are all these systems rolled into one.
They are at once a fighter jet and a bomber, equipped with radar seekers, missiles, a network of sensors, a communication system, and a software platform that integrates AI into flight paths and target selection.
Satellite constellations are becoming central to military communication and targeting by drones, as seen in the critical role Starlink is playing in the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian drones use AI to select flight paths that exploit gaps in Russia’s layered air defense network.
Command-and-control software and Battlefield Management Systems (BMS) fuse information from diverse sources, including satellites, drones, ground-based radars, and AWACS, within seconds to create a unified, simplified battlefield picture and propose the most critical sites for targeting.
Underpinning all these systems are software, computing systems, and AI, not just hardware.
In this new warfare, large, expensive defense platforms are often a liability, rather than an asset.
In short, military value is shifting at an unprecedented speed.
Defense platforms costing millions of dollars and once considered invincible could now be targeted by a drone costing just a few thousand dollars.
This shift is also forcing military suppliers to change. Software firms in Silicon Valley that combine artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, and machine learning (ML) to deliver innovative defense solutions are now at the center of this shift.
In recent years, they have won contracts worth tens of billions of dollars, edging out the Big Five of defense production.
The rise of these new military technology firms marks the biggest shift in the US arms industry over the past five years.
“Companies like SpaceX, Palantir, and Anduril have been tapped for multi-billion-dollar contract awards from the Pentagon for communications, targeting, unpiloted vehicles, anti-drone defenses, and hypersonic weapons. The funds from these awards will flow to the companies over time, which should put them in the top ranks of Pentagon contractors by value of awards within the next several years,” a recent report from the Costs of War project said.
For instance,

has received awards for countering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from the Marines (US$642 million); a contract for its Roadrunner UAV interceptor system (US$250 million); and contracts for its Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicle as part of the U.S.-UK-Australia AUKUS project, to name a few.
Anduril has also been selected to build the next generation of Army goggles, the Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), which are “intended to give soldiers everything from night-vision capability to warnings of incoming airborne threats.”
In June this year, the U.S. Air Force awarded engineering, manufacturing development, and production contracts for Collaborative Combat Aircraft Increment 1 to both Anduril (FQ-44) and General Atomics.
However, Anduril’s most lucrative contract could be in border security technologies. The Big Beautiful bill commits over US$6 billion for various border security technologies. However, as Eurasian Times reported earlier, the bill’s conditions mean Anduril is the only firm that qualifies for these border surveillance tenders.
SpaceX is launching most of the U.S. military’s satellites. It is also receiving funding for the military version of its Starlink system.
Separately, the Pentagon is considering investing in SpaceX’s Starship system.
SpaceX and Anduril could also win billion-dollar contracts in the upcoming ‘Golden Dome’ project.
Established tech firms are also challenging the Big Five’s dominance. For example, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, and IBM are collectively investing US$10 billion in the Pentagon’s cloud computing program.
“To the extent that the Pentagon moves towards AI-driven weapons systems, including swarms of drones and uncrewed aircraft, ships, and combat vehicles, the dominance of the Big Five firms may be reduced,” the report by the Costs of War Project added.
In fact, a recent essay on the Anduril Industries blog, ‘Rebooting the Arsenal of Democracy,’ dismissed the Big Five defense contractors as ‘remnants of the Cold War’ that need to be supplanted if America is to take the lead in developing and producing the weapons of the future.
“Why can’t the existing defense companies simply do better? The largest defense contractors are staffed with patriots who still lack the software expertise or business model to build the technology we need.
“Tomorrow’s weapons – autonomous systems, cyberweapons and defenses, networked systems, and more – are enabled through software, while these companies specialize in hardware. These companies work slowly, while the best engineers relish working at speed… These companies built the tools that kept us safe in the past, but they are not the future of our defense,” the essay said.
The trend, therefore, has already started.
Project Meridian, which could profoundly impact US defense procurement for decades, will further accelerate this trend.
Musk and Luckey’s appointment to lead this study suggests Silicon Valley tech firms are quietly edging out the US military-industrial complex’s Big Five.
The post No Boeing, Lockheed or Any of the Big Five: Musk & Luckey Co-Lead Project Meridian on America’s Future Warfare appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Persuading China that its €1bn daily trade surplus with the EU is not sustainable was always going to be a hard sell for EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.
And the early signs are that Šefčovič’s two days of talks with Chinese commerce secretary Wang Wentao, which conclude on Friday (9 October), are not going to deliver the breakthrough demanded by EU leaders when they gather for a summit in Brussels next week.
“The message around the table was clear: the need to improve access to the Chinese market, while boosting our economic security,” Šefčovič posted on X ahead of the first day of talks.
But rhetoric aside, three months after the EU Commission set up a series of ‘work streams’ with Chinese officials, with a mandate to address the multi-layered EU-Sino trade dispute, it is hard to see much tangible progress.
Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs).
In August, data published by Schmidt Automotive Research found that 14 percent of EV sales across Europe this year were Chinese-made, up from 9.4 percent last year.
That is despite the EU imposing additional tariffs of between 17 and 36 percent on Chinese EVs in October 2024.
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The EU’s border agency, Frontex, shared coordinates of an overcrowded and partly deflated boat in the Mediterranean sea with the Libyan coastguard and then watched them run it over.
The boat was carrying 27 people, including children.
The findings, by Frontex’s own fundamental rights officer, described an incident that took place on 19 June 2026.
And this was just a tiny part of a wider pattern of violence by the EU-backed Libyan coastguard, which has also shot at or near civil rescue vessels.
No one was killed in the June event. But people were tossed into the water. Others, pulled onto the Libyan vessel, were then beaten by Libyan uniformed officers.
Frontex had issued a Mayday relay and then shared the sightings by email with the Libyan rescue centre.
No vessels were reported to be in the vicinity, but the Libyans showed up 90 minutes later.
The internal Frontex findings highlight ongoing tensions in the agency over sharing rescue coordinates with the Libyans in the name of saving lives.
“Saving lives is the absolute sort of absolute right that people have,” Hans Leijtens the agency’s director, told EUobserver earlier this year.
“And it’s our job to contribute to that, and if that sort of starts with looking at which part of the Mediterranean ship is sailing, and if it’s a north African country, we all have to inform the authorities there,” he added.
But his own rights officer also notes that the botched rescue on 19 June amounted to a violation of the right to life, citing article six of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
He says the standard is not simply whether the migrants were ultimately rescued, but if the operation was planned and executed to minimise risks to human life.
In this case, the Libyans violated that right among others, he says. Frontex did not reply to the findings in the report, as of publication.
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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Last week, 7 ARAD-7 rifles of Israeli manufacture were seized by the Brazilian Federal Police at a transport company located in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, while they were being prepared to be sent to drug traffickers of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) organization. These are the same drug traffickers who control a territory called “Complexo de Israel,” which brings together the favelas Cidade Alta, Parada de Lucas, Vigário Geral, Cinco Bocas, and Pica-Pau.
Two years ago, we wrote here at the Strategic Culture Foundation an article about the danger of “narcopentecostalism” – the deep linkage between drug trafficking and neo-Pentecostalism in some favelas – pointing to this new phenomenon as a possible national security threat for Brazil, as well as a potential focus of activities aimed at destabilizing the social fabric and religious persecution. Indeed, in TCP territories, Catholic churches and Afro-Brazilian religious centers are closed and violently attacked.
Nevertheless, at the time we wrote that article, in July 2024, there were not yet enough material elements to incisively affirm the existence of a direct connection between narcopentecostalism and the State of Israel. TCP traffickers exalted the State of Israel, used Israeli patches and uniforms, but all of this was circumstantial and could be explained by mere adherence to evangelical discourse.
Now, however, we have more specific evidence to be able to return to the topic and raise concern about the possible link between Israel and one of Brazil’s main drug trafficking organizations.
After all, to date it is still not known how these modern Israeli rifles reached the logistical branch of an important Brazilian criminal organization, when this specific rifle is still uncommon among Brazilian police forces and nonexistent among the military.
The first objection that could be raised would be about Israel’s “interest” in arming or financing a criminal organization in Brazil. Well, it would not be the first time.
In the 1980s, 500 automatic weapons (including IMI Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns) and 200,000 rounds of ammunition were found in a warehouse belonging to the Medellín Cartel, one of the largest drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. At the time, “independent investigations” concluded that the person responsible for the operation, the mercenary and retired Israeli military officer Yair Klein, had acted on his own. Klein himself, however, always stated that his activities in Colombia (which involved not only arms sales but also the training of paramilitary groups) had the knowledge and authorization of Israeli authorities.
Klein’s link to the Israeli state apparatus, demonstrating that he was not really an “independent agent,” is confirmed by the fact that when he was arrested in Sierra Leone in 1999 for selling weapons to insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front, the State of Israel intervened to secure his release, as well as refused all extradition requests.
Another interesting and recent piece of news involves Mexico, where authorities declared that 80% of the weapons found with soldiers of the drug cartels were of U.S. origin… and most of the remaining 20% were of Israeli origin. Indeed, Israel officially exported 24,000 automatic weapons between 2006 and 2018 to Mexico’s military and police institutions, and another 18,000 in more recent years. Note, however, that estimates from independent observatories suggest that Mexican cartels as a whole possess an arsenal of several hundred thousand automatic weapons. If something like 15-20% of these weapons are of Israeli origin, then we are talking about any number between 20,000 and 100,000 Israeli-origin weapons in the hands of the cartels. These are numbers that simply do not match the figures of official Israeli arms exports to Mexican security forces.
One last point that may draw attention is the recent attention the U.S. has given to Brazilian criminal organizations, with the PCC and CV groups categorized as terrorist groups by Donald Trump’s government. What draws attention is the fact that the TCP – the 3rd largest criminal organization in Brazil, with a presence in some other countries in the region, operations in several Brazilian states, and at least one verifiable link to an individual connected to Al-Qaeda’s financing network, not to mention an operational alliance with the PCC – was left out of the categorization.
Naturally, it could be a coincidence. But even so, it is an interesting coincidence that the neo-Pentecostal criminal organization apparently armed by Israel is exactly the one that was not categorized as terrorist by the White House.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
A major scandal has erupted at Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), one of the most serious cases to hit the agency in recent years.
Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General is investigating former BND President August Hanning on suspicion of espionage against the state, obtaining state secrets, attempted treason, and engaging in intelligence activities. Another long-serving employee of the agency is facing charges of aiding and abetting attempted treason and espionage against the state. Both men have been detained, and the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office has confirmed their arrests.
Information: What is Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND)?
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany’s official foreign intelligence service. Its founder was Reinhard Gehlen, who served as the head of intelligence on the Eastern Front during Nazi Germany. In its early years, the agency recruited numerous former members of Nazi organizations such as the Gestapo and the SS. During the Cold War and in the period that followed, the agency continued to be one of “American imperialism’s biggest partners” in Europe.
Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) officers detained Hanning at his home in Nordwalde, near Münster, in the early hours of the morning. This was reported by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung.
At the same time, another former senior BND employee was detained in Bavaria. The suspect, identified as Manfred D., was reportedly Hanning’s former chief of staff and had worked at the BND until spring 2026. Investigators searched locations associated with the suspects both there and in Berlin.
Information: What is the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)?
The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) is Germany’s federal criminal police agency responsible for combating crime at the national level.
The two senior figures in German intelligence are expected to appear before a judge today or tomorrow. The judge will formally notify them of the arrest warrants and decide whether they will remain in custody pending trial.
What are the charges?
First of all, it is alleged that D., Hanning’s former chief of staff, provided Hanning with highly classified information from the BND in exchange for money until at least 2022. It is not unusual for retired intelligence officers to take on roles such as security consultants for various organizations after leaving government service. In Hanning’s case, however, investigators suspect that the former BND chief may have prepared a security analysis for a foreign intelligence service “in at least one instance.”
According to information obtained by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung, that foreign service was not Russia.
In another case, Hanning is alleged to have used information obtained from internal BND documents in his communications with a foreign agent.
In fact, the story of how Hanning first came onto investigators’ radar goes back to last year.
According to information obtained by Tagesschau from intelligence sources, Hanning came under investigation after searches were carried out at his home and offices in September last year. At the time, the Hamburg State Criminal Police Office (LKA) was searching for evidence related to the kidnapping of Christina Block’s children.
Child abduction and sensitive documents
The case concerned allegations by the Hamburg prosecutor’s office against restaurant entrepreneur Christina Block and her lawyer, Ingo Bott, over the abduction of children. Prosecutors accuse Block of arranging the kidnapping of her two young children at the end of 2023 amid a custody dispute with her former husband. Hanning is also alleged to have been involved in the attempted abduction. Hanning denies the allegations.
According to the allegations, Hanning, together with a former LKA employee who was his business associate, conspired to hand the children’s father a hard drive containing images and videos of child sexual abuse material.
Information: Who is Christina Block?
Christina Block is the daughter and heiress of Eugen Block, founder of Germany’s well-known Block House steakhouse chain. She is accused of instigating or planning the violent abduction of her two youngest children from Denmark and their transfer to Germany on New Year’s Eve 2023.
The LKA also discovered an electronic data storage device containing highly sensitive material while examining materials seized from Hanning last year.
According to the findings, the former intelligence chief had access to highly classified BND documents from the recent past that he had absolutely no reason to possess. Hanning’s tenure at the BND, meanwhile, had ended in November 2005.
In total, D. is believed to have passed approximately 2,000 documents to Hanning. A significant portion of these reportedly consisted of briefings prepared for the weekly “intelligence situation” meetings held at the Chancellery, where the heads of the country’s security agencies exchange information.
According to information obtained by investigators, the documents included reports on highly sensitive subjects such as Iran’s nuclear program and the Russian military. Intelligence sources say that some of the documents even contained information obtained from foreign intelligence services.
The leaking of such material is being described in the intelligence community as virtually a “super-GAU.”
Information: What is a super-GAU?
Super-GAU is a German-derived term referring to the largest and most destructive situation or catastrophe imaginable, going beyond even the worst-case scenario that has been designed for. It is derived from the German expression “Größter anzunehmender Unfall” (“the greatest assumed accident”).
‘Treason against the state’ allegations
Following the Hamburg LKA’s investigation, the documents seized were handed over to federal authorities. The Federal Prosecutor General’s Office launched a secret investigation into Hanning and the alleged informant within the BND in May 2026.
It is not yet known how long Hanning had been receiving confidential internal information. According to security sources, the most recent documents seized date from June 2022.
It is also unclear how the alleged informant inside the BND managed to remove the material from the tightly secured agency.
The BND was asked for an urgent statement on the matter. The agency referred the case to the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office, citing the fact that an ongoing investigation was involved.
August Hanning’s lawyers have so far failed to respond to an urgent request for comment on the allegations.
Not the BND’s first case
For the BND, this is the second serious case to emerge within a matter of several years.
A former BND official is currently on trial before the Higher Regional Court in Berlin, accused of spying for Russia together with another suspect in 2022. In that case as well, highly classified information concerning BND cyber operations was allegedly leaked outside the agency.
If the allegations against Hanning and the other suspect are confirmed, the case will reach unprecedented proportions in the history of German intelligence.
There has never been another case in German history in which suspicions of treason against the state have targeted such a senior government official as a former head of an intelligence agency.
August Hanning is also a prominent figure in the intelligence world. Throughout his career, he held positions at key points in Germany’s security architecture. Before becoming president of the BND, he served as an official responsible for confidentiality and security at West Germany’s diplomatic mission in East Germany.
He later held various positions at the Federal Chancellery, including serving as Coordinator of the Federal Intelligence Services. Hanning, who holds a doctorate in law, became head of the BND in 1998.
After leaving the intelligence service, he became a State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior at the end of 2005. Four years later, he was placed into temporary retirement.
Of course, it would not be enough to view this case simply as an instance of “rot” within the institution. We reach this conclusion particularly by recalling how German intelligence has been involved in dirty operations from the very foundation of the agency and throughout its history.
It was not merely a matter of one former director. German intelligence has been involved in numerous dirty operations, from employing Nazi war criminals to Operation Rubikon, carried out jointly with the CIA, and NATO’s secret stay-behind/Gladio networks. In all of these cases, methods strikingly similar to those employed by Hanning were used.
What happened in Hanning’s case is that he continued using what he had learned during his retirement — and was caught.
From this perspective, the Hanning affair can be read not so much as the story of a “rotten official,” but rather as the story of an “official who got caught.”
OPED by Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, VSM (Retd)
The difficulty in ending the Iran war is not identifying the ingredients of peace. The nuclear issue, missiles, sanctions, regional armed groups, freedom of navigation, and Israel’s security concerns are all well known. The harder question is: how adversaries who deeply distrust each other can take the first step without believing that they are making themselves more vulnerable.
Military action can change the battlefield, but it cannot by itself create a durable political settlement. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the danger that military calculations become disconnected from the strategic objective.
The answer may not lie in one grand bargain, but in a sequence of reciprocal bargains, each limited in scope, independently verifiable and linked to the next. The objective should not be to create trust between Iran, Israel and the United States. That is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
The objective should be to create a system that can function despite the absence of trust.
The broad issues are already clear. Iran wants recognition of its sovereignty, sanctions relief, and protection from military attack.
Israel wants assurance that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iranian-supported groups cannot threaten its population. The United States wants to prevent nuclear proliferation, protect regional stability and avoid another open-ended war.
These objectives are not necessarily irreconcilable. The difficulty lies in sequencing them.
Iran fears that surrendering strategic capabilities before receiving meaningful concessions will leave it exposed. Israel fears that sanctions relief before Iranian capabilities are constrained will simply give Tehran resources to rebuild. Washington fears that concessions without Iranian compliance could be interpreted as weakness.
This is the classic security dilemma: each side sees its own actions as defensive while viewing the other’s actions as a threat that must be countered.
A successful peace process must therefore address not only what is negotiated, but how concessions are exchanged.
The first step could be a time-bound Strategic Pause, perhaps lasting 30 days. During this period, the parties would freeze specified offensive operations, avoid attacks on civilian infrastructure and commercial shipping, and suspend actions that materially escalate the confrontation.
Compliance would need independent monitoring. More importantly, neither side should have to make a leap of faith. Each concession should trigger a corresponding concession by the other side.
A verified Iranian reduction in a specified category of nuclear activity could trigger suspension of particular sanctions. A verified reduction in attacks by regional armed groups could trigger defined relaxation of maritime or economic pressure. A verified violation would automatically suspend the corresponding benefit.
The settlement would therefore be built incrementally, with each step creating the conditions for the next.
No settlement can succeed if it ignores Israel’s fundamental security concerns. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s nuclear program is only one part of the threat. Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis has created a network of armed actors capable of imposing military pressure on Israel and disrupting regional security.
The practical approach would be to negotiate capabilities and behavior rather than political allegiance.
Iran could progressively restrict the transfer of specified advanced weapons, particularly long-range missiles, precision-strike systems and sophisticated drones, and commit to preventing attacks that deliberately target civilians or expand the conflict beyond agreed limits. In return, Iran would receive progressively stronger security assurances against direct attack.
The exchange is straightforward in principle: Iran reduces the forward military pressure it generates through its regional partners, while its security becomes less dependent on maintaining that forward deterrence.
For Israel, the benefit would be reduced military pressure on its territory. For Iran, the benefit would be a reduced perceived need to maintain an extensive regional deterrence architecture.
These three groups should not be treated as one problem.
For Hezbollah, the central issue is Lebanon’s sovereignty and the presence of a heavily armed non-state actor on Israel’s northern frontier. A settlement should strengthen the Lebanese state’s authority and provide for a phased reduction or relocation of heavy weapons from sensitive areas. The immediate objective need not be the disappearance of Hezbollah as a political organization, but preventing any non-state actor from initiating a major interstate conflict without the Lebanese state’s consent.
Hamas presents a different challenge because it is inseparable from the unresolved Palestinian question. Requiring Hamas simply to disappear is unlikely to be realistic. A more viable pathway would involve Hamas relinquishing governance in Gaza, progressively reducing heavy weapons and transferring administration and security responsibilities to a legitimate Palestinian structure supported by the international community.
That process would need reconstruction and a credible political horizon for Palestinians. Otherwise, disarmament could simply create a vacuum for another armed movement.
The Houthis should be addressed through a separate Red Sea security arrangement. Iran could restrict the transfer of specified missile, drone, and maritime-strike capabilities, while a Yemeni political process provides the Houthis with a legitimate political future.
The objective would be to separate Yemen’s internal conflict from the wider Iran-Israel confrontation and restore freedom of commercial navigation.

Sanctions relief should also be redesigned. Iran is unlikely to make major concessions today in exchange for benefits that may arrive years later.
A Peace Escrow Mechanism could address this problem. Sanctions would be suspended in stages rather than simply lifted. Oil revenues, access to frozen funds, and selected financial channels could be released automatically when independent monitors verify specified Iranian actions.
The same principle would operate in reverse. If commitments are violated, the corresponding benefits would automatically pause.
Iran would therefore not have to trust that sanctions relief will eventually materialize; the economic benefit would be directly linked to verified compliance. At the same time, the United States and its partners would retain leverage until Iran demonstrated its commitments.
Sanctions would cease to be merely punishment or bargaining leverage and become an instrument for implementing the settlement.
The Strait of Hormuz offers an immediate opportunity for confidence-building because its security affects the entire international community.
Iran could provide a verifiable commitment to the safe passage of commercial shipping, while the United States and its partners could suspend specified maritime pressure measures during the Strategic Pause. An independent mechanism could investigate incidents and determine responsibility.
If commercial vessels can move safely while military forces exercise restraint, it would demonstrate that reciprocal commitments can work even when the parties remain deeply hostile.
That lesson could then be applied to the nuclear program, missiles and regional armed groups.
The central mistake would be to expect trust to precede the agreement. Trust is more likely to result from repeated compliance.
The settlement should therefore rest on four principles: reciprocity, verification, gradualism and automaticity. Every concession should have a corresponding benefit; important commitments should be independently verifiable; major concessions should be broken into manageable stages; and agreed rewards or penalties should operate automatically rather than depend on renewed political bargaining.
This approach also gives each government a politically defensible narrative. Iran can present the process as an exchange of specific military concessions for tangible economic and security benefits rather than capitulation. Israel can demonstrate that its security concerns are being addressed through enforceable restrictions rather than political assurances. The United States can retain leverage while reducing the risk of another prolonged regional war.

Most importantly, the framework recognizes a basic reality of international politics: peace does not always begin with trust. Sometimes it begins with managing distrust.
The parties do not have to agree on history, ideology or regional ambitions. They need only agree that certain actions are too dangerous to continue and that restraint can produce tangible benefits.
A durable peace is therefore unlikely to emerge from one dramatic handshake or a single comprehensive treaty. It is more likely to emerge from a chain of smaller agreements in which each side discovers, step by step, that restraint produces greater security than escalation.
The real diplomatic breakthrough would not be an agreement that ends all disagreements. It would be an agreement that makes continued disagreement less dangerous, more predictable and progressively less dependent on the use of force.
The ultimate test of diplomacy will not be whether Iran, Israel and the United States learn to trust one another. It will be whether they can construct a system in which they do not need to trust one another to stop fighting.
The post Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Cannot Be Disarmed With a Single Deal: U.S. & Israel Need New Mechanism: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Indonesia is awaiting the first batch of Chinese J-10C multi-role fighter jets in the first half of next year, according to new reports.
Once and if the aircraft arrive, the Indonesian Air Force could become the first in the world to operate both the Chinese J-10C and the French Dassault Rafale jets.
Indonesia could receive its first Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets in six months, Republika Online, a local Indonesian news outlet, reported. Citing informed sources, the report claimed the first delivery could take place as early as April 2027, although the number of jets to be delivered is currently unknown.
So far, neither the Chinese nor the Indonesian side has officially confirmed it. EurAsian Times has reached out to Indonesian authorities and awaits a response.
However, Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono urged the public to “just wait” for the arrival of the Chinese Vigorous Dragons, according to Republika Online, suggesting a purchase may have been made.
Notably, the reports come a year after the Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin confirmed in October 2025 that the country would soon buy the jets from China as part of its military modernization drive.
“They will be flying over Jakarta soon,” Sjafrie said, without providing further details. Separately, Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa had confirmed that his ministry had approved a $9 billion budget to purchase the Chinese aircraft, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

Interestingly, Indonesia communicated the decision to buy the aircraft months after its J-10C fighters made their combat debut against the Indian Air Force in an intense four-day conflict in May 2025.
At the time, Pakistan claimed to have downed multiple Indian fighters, including the Rafale, using long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles launched from the J-10C. India, in turn, claimed to have downed multiple Pakistani jets, including JF-17s and F-16s, but the list did not include China-supplied J-10Cs.
The Rafale shootdown claims, although unverified and not officially accepted by India or Dassault Aviation, were blown out of proportion and amplified by Beijing to promote the J-10C in the international market. French intelligence officials even accused Beijing of running an anti-Rafale campaign to discredit the Rafale jets.
China offered Indonesia a “battle-tested” J-10C less than a month after the May 2025 Indo-Pakistan conflict, according to Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto. By then, only Pakistan had acquired the combat jet, even though Beijing positioned it as an affordable alternative to the F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter Typhoon.
If reports are to be believed, Indonesia is on track to become the third buyer of the type after Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The latter released footage of its newly acquired J-10CE fighter jets on August 28, 2026, as part of the country’s Independence Day celebrations. In a state broadcast, at least six J-10CE fighters were shown flying in formation, approaching the runway, and receiving a water-cannon salute.
Bangladesh has been exploring the purchase of China’s J-10CE fighter jet to modernize its aging Air Force since 2024.
Separately. China is also reportedly trying to sell the aircraft to Azerbaijan. Last month, it displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), in what appeared to be a targeted appeal.
There is no doubt that J-10CE has drawn significant international attention after the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Armed with PL-15 missiles, the J-10CE’s beyond-visual-range air warfare capabilities are impressive.
Meanwhile, Jakarta is undertaking a massive modernization drive to replace aging aircraft like its US-made F-16A/Bs and Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters.
As part of this effort, Jakarta signed a contract for 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighters from France in 2022, and the first of these jets were delivered earlier this year. In addition, the Southeast Asian country signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to acquire additional Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in May 2025.
Indonesia also signed a contract to acquire 48 KAAN fighter jets from Turkey in July 2025, covering extensive collaboration in manufacturing, technology transfer, and engineering.

Beyond these acquisitions, Indonesia had also committed to co-developing the KF-21, but reportedly abandoned those plans in June this year after a “comprehensive evaluation” of the program’s effectiveness, technology transfer, economic value, and internal defense requirements.
Nonetheless, it would still buy the South Korean jets.
It is currently unclear how the Indonesian government would finance these varied fighter jet acquisitions amid budgetary constraints, and whether buying J-10Cs would mean Jakarta would not place an additional order for French Rafale jets.
If Indonesia goes ahead and acquires J-10C jets, it would be an interesting development because the two aircraft are often compared as rival 4.5-generation multirole fighters in the export market. Both jets use a delta-canard configuration, feature advanced AESA radars, modern electronic warfare suites, and beyond-visual-range missile capability.
However, China is pitching the jets as more cost-effective alternatives with little to no strings attached.
An early delivery of Chinese jets could temporarily strengthen Indonesia’s air combat posture while the Rafale fleet builds up. However, acquiring the J-10C may come with its own risks, particularly those of operating a diverse fleet. Analysts like Nitin J Ticku, who also serves as editor of EurAsian Times, wrote in an article that a mixed fleet could become a logistical nightmare for Jakarta.
Meanwhile, Chinese experts argue that buying weapons from multiple sources would be a smart move to safeguard Indonesia’s interests rather than ‘putting all eggs in one basket.’
The post Rafale & J-10C: This Asian Country Could Become The Only Air Force to Fly Both French & Chinese Jets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
The US Air Force’s next strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider, is moving from flight test to the flight line, and the industrial base is expanding to match that pace. As part of this effort, the Department of the Air Force and the manufacturer broke ground on a new bomber final assembly line at Plant 42 in Palmdale, California.
“It’s more than construction… we’re moving fast to build B-21s! The Department of the Air Force & @northropgrumman have broken ground in Palmdale, CA, on over 1M sq ft of new facilities that will be the final assembly line at Air Force Plant 42,” Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Troy E. Meink recently wrote in a post on X.
The B-21 Raider is the USAF’s next-generation nuclear- and conventional-capable, long-range penetrating bomber optimized for highly contested environments.
The new assembly line likely supports an agreement signed in February 2026 to increase annual B-21 production capacity by 25% using $4.5 billion in funding from the fiscal year 2025 reconciliation legislation.
Separately, Northrop Grumman is investing approximately $2.5 billion of its own capital over several years in related facilities and capacity. In September 2026, the company also opened the East Gate 3 manufacturing campus in Layton, Utah, to produce key B-21 components.
The construction of an all-new assembly line shows that expansion at the B-21’s production facility has moved from planning and funding to active construction.
This expansion is meant to give the service extra manufacturing capacity as the B-21 advances through flight testing and into initial operational deliveries.
The USAF plans to buy at least 100 B-21 bombers to replace the B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit and eventually complement the B-52 Stratofortress.
The B-21 Raider program remains in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins.
At the same time, senior officials have said the Air Force may need more than the current minimum of 100.
In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed “a lot more” B-21s were needed. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo had earlier said he would favor a fleet of 200 for nuclear deterrence and penetrating strike.
A Mitchell Institute report has likewise argued that 100 is a raid force, not a campaign force. None of those comments changes the program of record, and the Palmdale construction is tied to the February capacity agreement, not to an approved increase in the buy.

Furthermore, a report by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies said the USAF’s current plans to purchase “at least” 100 B-21s match one-time operations into hostile airspace but are insufficient to maintain pressure in a larger conflict because they are “a raid force, not a campaign force.”
Meanwhile, the USAF has said the sixth-generation bomber—which currently has no analogs in the world—is “close” to entering service. In fact, it is expected to reach Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota, one of the three bases selected to host the Raider, in 2027.
This bomber project has moved at a breakneck pace, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in November 2023. In fact, an operational test pilot flew alongside a developmental test pilot, sharing the B-21 cockpit for the first time in June this year, underscoring the urgency of fielding the bomber.
The B-21 Raider’s rapid path from first flight to operational ramp at Ellsworth AFB in 2027 marks a striking acceleration in how the US fields a complex new strategic bomber.
Observers have lauded the speed, remarking that it has been unusually compressed for a program of this scale and sensitivity. This speed, however, was made possible because of a more fundamental shift: the B-21 was built virtually before it was ever built in metal.
For decades, major US defense programs followed the process, but aspirational designs fell behind schedule and prototypes revealed problems missed earlier, delaying programs and driving up costs. Northrop claims to be breaking away from this pattern.
Northrop states that it built the B-21 virtually first, using an extensive digital ecosystem and high-fidelity digital twins long before cutting metal. Succinctly put, unlike previous bombers that were primarily analog and later adapted for the digital era, the B-21 was built to function, endure, and evolve in the contemporary environment.
Developing and producing combat aircraft previously involved designing, building a prototype, testing it, discovering problems, and redesigning. However, Northrop essentially inverted this sequence, using a constantly changing digital model for the Raider.
This gave engineers, manufacturers, and operators a common reference point, enabling them to evaluate and implement design changes almost instantly.
This method enabled engineers to model aerodynamic performance, stealth features, structural loads, and systems integration long before components entered production.
This meant that design modifications that once required expensive rework could be assessed and verified virtually, often in a few hours rather than months.
The team simulated and refined structural loads, stealth characteristics, flight dynamics, and systems integration in the virtual environment before committing to physical hardware.
As a result, the physical aircraft that emerged from this approach matched or even outperformed the models’ predictions, according to the manufacturer.
This, in turn, has allowed the program to compress testing timelines, accelerate production, and keep costs under tighter control.

Unsurprisingly, the result was an unusually mature aircraft when the first Raider took flight. Northrop earlier said, “Before the B-21 ever took to the sky, the flying test bed completed more than 200 test sorties totaling more than 1,000 flight hours, testing production hardware, software, and sensors in a dynamic environment and enabling teams to tackle discovery well in advance.”
The speed with which B-21 moved from production to testing and into an operational setting at a USAF airbase was best demonstrated by the approach the manufacturer and the Air Force took during flight testing. A major 180-day test cycle was reportedly completed in just 73 days, as revealed in May 2026.
Officials have even stated that the program is exceeding expectations, as test aircraft are achieving high “code one” rates, which is the rate at which the aircraft is ready to fly again with minimal issues
The Combined Test Force achieved half the originally planned missions in less than half the planned time, while supporting significant contract value.
This compression was not the product of rushed flying, and reflected fewer surprises, higher aircraft availability, real-time data analysis, and the ability to clear multiple test points on single sorties.
The advantage of building the aircraft digitally has reportedly extended to the production lines. “Where the digital environment meets the production floor, this digital technology expedites configuration management, facilitating communication between technicians and engineers during the build, in some areas already reducing manufacturing hours by roughly a third,” according to the Northrop Grumman newsroom.
Nonetheless, the B-21 is not without risk, though experts think careful digital engineering, precise digital twins, and a conscious move away from sequential physical prototypes can break the long-standing pattern of delays.
The post B-21 Raider: Northrop, US Air Force Break Ground on New Palmdale Line. Flight Test Runs Ahead of Schedule appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.





