Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces on October 9 again claimed to have captured the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait and nearby Mayyun Island.
A Yemeni military source told the German Press Agency (dpa) that the operation began before dawn with Saudi air support.
The source said the Southern Giants Brigades and Nation’s Shield forces seized the al-Ardi camp, Coast Guard observation posts and a range of high ground overlooking the strait.
Furthermore, the source claimed the forces had established full control over Mayyun Island, noting that clashes and clearing operations continued in the surrounding area.
The announcement marked the second time within days that Saudi-backed forces had claimed to capture the area. On October 5, the forces made a similar claim during Operation Yemen Dawn, but that announcement eventually proved to be false.
Responding to the latest claims, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said in a statement that the group’s forces had repelled a second attempted advance by Saudi-backed forces toward Bab al-Mandab.
Saudi-backed forces had tried to move toward the waterway from Lahj province but had failed to advance, according to the spokesman.
Saree said Houthi forces struck the advancing troops with ballistic missiles, artillery and heavy weapons. He claimed the attacks destroyed more than 22 armored vehicles and killed or wounded dozens of fighters, including several commanders.
The spokesman added that more than 30 ambulances had arrived in Aden transporting dead and wounded personnel from the Saudi-backed forces.
Bab al-Mandab connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is a key shipping route linking the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Mayyun Island lies within the strait, making control of the island and surrounding coastline strategically important to the opposing forces.
The latest attempted advance by Saudi-backed forces shows that the kingdom remains focused on recapturing Bab al-Mandab, despite the deteriorating situation of its allies in Taiz, where they are fully besieged by the Houthis. The fall of Taiz could, however, pose a serious problem for Saudi-backed forces, as it would allow the Houthis to launch an attack toward the port city of Aden, potentially trapping all troops amassed near Bab al-Mandab.
Let’s start with exclusive intel. On Thursday, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, speaker of the Sana’a-based House of Representatives under Ansarallah, delivered a letter to Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, requesting Pakistani mediation between Ansarallah and Riyadh.
Ra’i, widely respected, has been the speaker in Sana’s since 2008. Sadiq began his current term as speaker in Islamabad in March 2024. This direct parliamentary channel is immensely significant as a diplomatic opening – as Pakistan faces enormous pressure, domestically and across the lands of Islam, over its real commitments related to the Saudi Arabia vs. Yemen clash as determined by the Mecca Defense Alliance.
As murky as the the whole situation really is, direct intel from both Islamabad and Tehran, at the highest levels, as I especifically requested, has established four key points:
Islamabad is adamant that Pakistan will not attack Ansarallah and will not commit troops to that effect. The Riyadh understanding last week excluded entry into Yemeni territory. Pakistani forces should remain outside any ground offensives against Ansarallah. That seems to be the case – for now.
Pakistan was already mediating between Riyadh and Sana’a through Tehran. Field Marshal Asim Munir personallly requested that Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi use Iran’s influence with Ansarallah, together with Araghchi’s contacts with both Islamabad and Riyadh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office did not deny this diplomatic channel.
Pakistan would have to defend Saudi territory under its Mecca Defense Alliance commitments. Deployments for border protection and defense against drones and missiles launched by the Yemeni Armed Forces fit this pattern.The problem is whether some Pakistani advisors are already deployed in Yemeni territory. If Pakistan has even a few “advisers” in Aden and troops somewhere around northern Yemen on the Saudi border, that already betrays its promises.
Pakistani forces should be able to defend themselves – that comes with the territory. It’s a stated contingency; not a prediction of retaliation. At least one Pakistani officer was killed in Saudi Arabia without a Pakistani retaliatory response. That spells out restraint – at least for now.
Transiting Hormuz: use CIPS and pay in rials
On the wider U.S.-Iran front, diplomatic moves support what we have been reporting for the past few days on Transition Protocol. Pakistan in fact is desperate to maintain engagement with both Riyadh and Tehran, alongside non-stop coordination with Beijing. After all, China completely supports Pakistan mediation; and Araghchi keep speaking to Munir, as he did following talks with Wang Yi in Beijing.
Meanwhile, on the Washington front, speculation is feverish all over the spectrum over preparations for a Trump administration renewal of the war – including potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure and even, quite worrisomely, nuclear targets. There is no final decision yet by the Psycho/Sociopath in Charge, much less a launch date.
The immediate risks anyway are staggering.
Diplomacy – even in ersatz form – is mired in impasse. Tehran remains – and will continue to remain – anchored to its existing conditions, detailed by the dead cat MoU, but now carrying the threat of blocking transit routes along Oman’s coastline that it considers illegal. Washington for its part is obsessed with vast nuclear concessions.
Earlier this week, we confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in Tehran made two very consequential decisions.
Tehran decided to collect its Strait of Hormuz transit toll in Iranian currency only. No yuan, no crypto. Actually via a mechanism linked to CIPS, the Chinese payment/clearing system, bypassing the U.S. dollar. You use CIPS to electronically buy yuan, change it into rials, and pay the toll. Strait of Hormuz transit revenue after all is one of Tehran’s few remaining sources of hard currency. The new mechanism will definitely strengthen the value of the rial.
Via Pakistan, Tehran notified Trump’s real-estate Bismarck, Witkoff, that Iran will not move an inch from its conditions for a negotiated settlement – and is fully prepared for any possible U.S. offensive. And this after J.D. Vance came up with an added nuclear enrichment condition: a “meaningful” and “significant” reduction. That blockades the nuclear dossier and makes a quick resolution formula nearly impossible.
The bottom line is that the escalation ladder could get out of control in no time.
Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 in effect
On the Saudi-Yemen front, the Yemeni Armed Forces are absolutely ruthless. The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 is already in effect.
The damage at Jeddah refinery, close to Yanbu, is massive. Ansarallah is simultaneously hitting Saudi Arabia’s eastern and coast and western coast, plus the East-West pipeline in between.
For all practical purposes Sana’a is going for the whole key Riyadh infrastructure. The U.S. defense umbrella is a joke: remaining PAC-3 and Patriot batteries are useless against Yemeni ballistic missiles.
Saudi troops may number at best 75,000, plus 125,000 from the National Guard. The Yemeni Armed Forces command at least 350,000 that can be easily ramped up to 800,000. To expect “help” from the GCC petrosheiks doesn’t even qualify as a joke.
The Yemeni Armed Forces also unleashed two ballistic missiles plus explosive drones in the direction of Aden’s international airport. Ansarallah said the target was Saudi military supplies that had just arrived at Badr Camp, the mercenary HQ adjacent to the airport. An unspecified number of high-ranking Saudi officers and officials – perhaps even some Pakistanis – were killed.
Turkey for its part is also about to put boots, aircraft and air defenses on Saudi ground. These Turkish forces in thesis could protect Riyadh, the holy cities and the East-West pipeline. Ankara, just like Islamabad, insists it has no plans to enter the war inside Yemen.
The swift liberation by the Yemeni Armed Forces of the western coast close to the Red Sea also made it crystal clear how the so-called Saudi “coalition” – actually a gang of proxies/mercenaries – was deploying de facto terrorists all along.
Ansarallah recovered a wealth of foreign passports – especially from Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Syria – belonging to ISIS and Al-Qaeda goons. Call it the Terror Inc. Legion.
I’ts the same old song. Qatar and Turkey, in sync, instrumentalized the transfer of ISIS/Salafi-jihadi goons from Syria and Iraq: they were welcomed in Yemen by the Islah Party. Turkey was the key transit route; at least 2,100 of these ISIS assets are Turkish.
AQAP is back!
Way back in 2020, Ansarallah had already seized documents, maps, and videos showing ISIS/Daesh and Al-Qaeda jihadis directly supported by Riyadh roaming Yemen, with captured goons confessing they were paid, weaponized and logistically supported by the Saudis.
Now a new incarnation of the former al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is alread in effect – via at least 20,000 Daesh/takfiri terror goons “imported” from Syria. They will be sent to Aden governorate – following the request, actually the demand by MbS himself, fully approved by the Trump administration and its throat-slitter vassal turned President in Damascus, former ISIS al-Jolani.
The definitive headline of the whole affair though is that the House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia.
By controlling the Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah de facto cuts off the Israeli port of Eilat. That had already happened before during the genocide of Gaza. Riyadh was furious because they had struck deals for the – now virtually scrapped – NEOM project that would connect up to Eilat once the Trumpian Abraham Accords were up and running.
Considering the whole picture, all hell could still break loose due to a single spark. Possibilities include: a Yemeni strike on Saudi Arabia causing massive casualties; a toll-enforcement mess in the Strait of Hormuz; an Iranian strike on a GCC petro-sheikh target, following an American provocation; an Iran-linked attack on a U.S. base, once again folowing an American provocation; and most of all a Sociopath-forced “land, air and sea” CENTCOM (mis)adventure.
The Houthis struck two airports in Saudi Arabia in the past two days, killing three people and injuring dozens as the Iran-backed militant group intensifies its attacks on the kingdom from Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has $142 billion in American weapons. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world. So why can’t Riyadh win?
Last month, Ansar Allah seized Mokha and Perim Island, and with them the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, cutting off Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil route around the closed Strait of Hormuz. Mohammed bin Salman begged Trump for US airstrikes, then backed “Dawn of Yemen,” a 100-warplane offensive aimed at Sanaa, as crude oil again tops $100 a barrel. Veteran war correspondent and analyst Elijah Magnier joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra on the Red Sea front, as nearly 1,000 Yemenis have been killed and 184,000 displaced since fighting resumed.
But Magnier argues Ansar Allah – often referred to in US media as the Houthis – hasn’t lost much ground. He explains why Saudi warplanes are largely powerless in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, and why he sees the movement advancing on Taiz and Marib. And Magnier breaks down how Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become two fronts of the same war – different demands, same enemies – and how Israel’s quiet push into Somaliland could drag it directly into the Red Sea fight.
Watch full episodes of BT Live, join breakthroughnews.org as a member today!
A US and Syrian official said Syria is considering sending troops to Saudi Arabia as the kingdom battles Ansar Allah in Yemen.
Reuters reported on Thursday that a US official and a Syrian defense official said that Damascus may send Syrian forces to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has reached out to several allies for support in its war against Ansar Allah.
On Monday, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to provide military support to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Accords, a mutual defense pact signed by the three countries earlier this year.
A joint statement released by the Mecca Accords members explained, “The Committee decided to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments and to take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the Kingdom, in accordance with the approved arrangements and the national legislation of the Parties, thereby enhancing readiness, military integration, and the collective capacity to confront and counter threats.”
Turkey indicated it would provide Saudi Arabia with military capabilities rather than ground troops, which would require parliamentary approval, while Pakistan did not provide details on the forces or capabilities it plans to deploy.
The statement was released following an emergency meeting of the alliance to discuss the situation in Saudi Arabia. The fighting between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia reignited in July after the kingdom attacked the Sanaa airport. In recent weeks, Ansar Allah has taken a significant amount of territory from the Saudi-backed forces in Yemen and attacked several energy sites in Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh has reached out to international partners for support. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman requested that President Donald Trump order direct attacks on Ansar Allah positions. So far, Trump has limited US involvement to intelligence sharing and battlefield planning, and refused to conduct direct strikes on Ansar Allah.
Saudi Arabia has also asked China and Pakistan to place pressure on Iran to rein in Ansar Allah. According to three Iranian sources speaking with Reuters, Beijing privately asked Tehran to rein in Ansar Allah after receiving a request from Riyadh. The sources told the outlet that Iran responded that stability in the region depended on US and Israeli aggression.
While Saudi Arabia’s ties to the US and Ansar Allah’s relationship with Tehran allow the war between the two to appear to be a part of a larger regional war, the conflict began over a decade ago. Additionally, Ansar Allah did not begin its offensive following the US and Israeli surprise attack on Iran, but rather after Saudi-backed forces attacked the Sanaa airport, prompting Ansar Allah to resume attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Western officials and media often label Ansar Allah as a proxy of Iran. However, while Iran has provided support to Ansar Allah, there is little public evidence that Tehran directs the group’s military operations.
While Syria was a long-time [resistance] ally under the rule of Bashar al-Assad and his father, Damascus fell to rebels, led by former al-Qaeda members, in 2024. Syria is now led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who previously led al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.
Saudi airstrikes hit a passenger vehicle in Yemen’s southwestern Taiz province on Thursday, killing at least two civilians and wounding six others, as civilian casualties continue to mount in the US-supported bombing campaign. According to the Yemeni Health Ministry within the Ansar Allah-led government, a pregnant woman also lost her baby due to the strike, […]
Yemen’s Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, has launched multiple attacks on airports in Saudi Arabia in recent days, marking an escalation of the conflict, which was reignited by Saudi airstrikes on the Sanaa International Airport back in July. The ramped-up Ansar Allah strikes on airports came after the group warned on October 5 […]
The Houthis (Ansar Allah) released footage on October 8 showing their forces driving Saudi-backed forces from al-Shamayatayn district in the southwestern Yemeni province of Taiz.
The footage include scenes from the capture of al-Turbah, the district’s main city. The footage showed Houthi fighters moving through positions and areas they said had been abandoned by the Saudi-backed forces. It also shows several vehicles and loads of weapons captured by the group.
The release came as the Houthis reported further gains in Jabal Habashi, west of Taiz. Pro-Houthi Yemeni media said the group had expelled government troops from the highest peaks of the mountain, including Najd al-Oud and al-Anaqib, adding to their gains across the province.
Separately, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said the group had shot down a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı acombat drone over Taiz while it was carrying out what he described as hostile operations. He said the drone was brought down with an “appropriate weapon.”
The developments show growing Houthi pressure on the western and southern approaches to Taiz, even as Saudi-backed forces continue efforts to reverse earlier territorial losses.
Click to see full-size map. (Islamic World News)
Meanwhile, the Saudi-backed counterattack toward Bab al-Mandab meanwhile remains stalled. The strategic waterway remains under the control of the Houthis.
All in all, the Houthis maintain the upper hand on all fronts in Taiz. The two main objectives for the group now are likely to reach Taiz city, which is already under a tight siege, as well as to restore control over the few positions it lost near Bab al-Mandab, most notable of which is Dhubab’s airstrip. Fighting could go on for weeks, or even months.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) have made battlefield gains in Taiz, halted a Saudi-backed advance near the Bab al-Mandab Strait and carried out repeated missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia over the past week.
Fighting intensified across Taiz on October 2 as Houthi forces expanded their offensive and sought to cut routes linking the provincial capital with Aden.
The Houthis continued their operations around Taiz while expanding attacks into Saudi Arabia on October 3. Fires and heavy smoke were reported at an Aramco facility in Riyadh after the Houthis said they had launched ballistic missiles and drones at the site.
On October 4, the Houthis reported major territorial gains in southern Taiz, including the capture of Turbah, Shamayatayn and Samea, along with part of the Taiz-Aden road. Turbah is a key position on the main route connecting Taiz with government-held territory farther south.
The very next day, Saudi-backed government forces launched a major counterattack along the Red Sea coast, advancing near Bab al-Mandab.
The Houthis responded with another wave of strikes on Saudi Arabia, claiming attacks against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Abha airport, Khamis Mushait military base and an Aramco refinery in Rabigh.
On October 6, the Saudi-backed advance began to stall. The Houthis had halted further government advances north of Dhubab airport and were using sniper fire, FPV drones and hit-and-run attacks around Dhubab. Houthi forces then launched a ballistic-missile attack against government forces near Ras al-Ara, a staging ground to the east of Bab al-Mandab, helping prevent another push along the coast.
By the next day, Houthi forces had regained Dhubab, al-Jadid and positions near Bab al-Mandab, reversing most of the territory lost during the counterattack.
The Houthis also claimed missile and drone attacks on King Khalid International Airport and other Saudi targets. Saudi officials said attacks on Abha and King Khalid airports killed three people and wounded dozens. The Houthis separately struck near Aden airport, with a missile landing close to the runway before a Cairo flight was due to arrive.
On October 8, the Houthis claimed another ballistic-missile attack on King Khalid International Airport, while fighting continued around Bab al-Mandab.
Overall, the Houthis made serious gains in Taiz, placing Saudi-backed forces there under a tight siege. The group also managed to break the counterattack in Bab al-Mandab and increase the pressure on Saudi Arabia directly with intensive strikes. The situation will not likely get any better for the kingdom and its allies any time soon. Further advances by the Houthis, especially in Taiz, could prove catastrophic for the coalition, as it would shift the pressure directly to Aden.
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The Yemeni army (AnsarAllah) shot down a Saudi-operated Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci drone over Taiz;
The Yemeni army (AnsarAllah) struck Saudi military concentrations at Ras al-Arara south of Bab al-Mandab, as well as King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh with ballistic missiles;
The Yemeni army (AnsarAllah) captured the summit of Jabal Habashi in Taiz, further expanding their control in the province.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) claimed two separate ballistic missile attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 8, as explosions disrupted air traffic in the Saudi capital and reports emerged of fires and possible strikes on oil and defense-related infrastructure elsewhere in the kingdom.
In a statement issued early in the day, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said the group had “targeted King Khalid Airport in Riyadh with a ballistic missile,” which he said “hit its target accurately” and disrupted airport operations.
Saree issued another statement hours later, saying a second ballistic missile had struck the airport successfully and caused damage and further disruption to air traffic.
Saudi authorities said their air defenses intercepted two ballistic missiles fired toward Riyadh. Still, impacts were reported.
The attacks produced visible disruption at King Khalid International Airport. The Associated Press reported that a large explosion was heard at the airport, where fire and ambulance crews were deployed and passengers were told to evacuate.
Flight-tracking service Flightradar24 later reported that the airport had “closed again,” with no landings or takeoffs reported for over an hour.
Reuters reported that smoke was rising from a stationary civilian aircraft at the airport. Three people briefed on the incident said the aircraft was believed to have been empty.
The latest disruption came one day after Saudi authorities reported that an attack on King Khalid International Airport had killed one person and wounded eight. A separate attack on Abha International Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia killed two people.
The escalation extended beyond Saudi Arabia’s airports. Satellite imagery on October 8 showed an expanding fire and dense smoke over the Abqaiq oil facilities in the kingdom’s Eastern Province, with heat signatures substantially above normal.
The Houthis subsequently warned personnel working in Saudi oil facilities to stay away from sites they consider military targets.
“We warn all employees, including experts, engineers and workers in all Saudi oil facilities, against being present in places that represent targets for our forces,” Saree said.
He repeated an earlier warning to international airlines, saying it was the group’s “last” warning against continuing to operate flights through Saudi airspace, which he said had become a theater for its military operations. Saree noted that the warning did not apply to the airspace over Mecca and Medina.
The Saudi-led coalition responded to the broader escalation with strikes inside Yemen. Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki said Thursday that coalition forces had destroyed 82 Houthi military targets in Saada, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf and Marib, including ballistic missile storage sites, command centers and weapons depots.
Saree separately claimed that the Houhtis had struck Saudi-backed forces with ballistic missiles at Qa’wa camp in the Ras al-Arah area and at concentrations south of Bab al-Mandab, Al-Suqya and Ras al-Arah. He claimed the attacks caused casualties and fires at weapons stores.
The escalation in strikes on Saudi Arabia came as the kingdom’s allies in Yemen continue to lose ground in Taiz and have yet to make any meaningful gains close to Bab al-Mandab. Now, the Houthis appear to be close to imposing a real no-fly zone over vast parts of Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan has begun directly striking Yemen’s Houthis, a senior Pakistani military official told The New York Times on October 8, bringing Islamabad into Saudi Arabia’s renewed air campaign and exposing different interpretations among the members of a newly activated defense pact with Riyadh.
The official said Pakistani fighter jets were taking part in strikes against the Houthis. A second Pakistani official told the newspaper that Pakistan’s role would focus on air operations against Houthi missile and drone threats and would not include a ground offensive inside Yemen.
The reports came three days after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey activated their Makkah Joint Defense Agreement following a series of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory.
The pact states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all three, but the governments have taken different approaches to how that obligation should be carried out.
Pakistan had already confirmed that its forces were in Saudi Arabia. Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, spokesman for Pakistan’s military, said on October 8 that Pakistani forces were operating in the kingdom in “multiple capabilities and domains.”
Turkey has taken a more limited approach. Reuters reported on October 7 that Ankara was providing Saudi Arabia with mainly defensive and technical assistance, including air defense systems, logistical support, drone operators, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Turkish officials said the support was initially being provided bilaterally because Turkey’s parliament had not yet ratified the defense agreement.
Following Reuters’ report, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made clear that Turkey would not follow Pakistan into direct attacks inside Yemen.
Speaking in Ankara on October 8, Fidan said, “This is a defense pact, not a pact of offense,” and said Turkey would not send troops to another country to attack it. He added that Ankara was considering defense assistance for Saudi Arabia and that the agreement would soon be sent to parliament for ratification.
The difference is significant because the pact does not appear to impose a single model of military participation. Pakistan is now reportedly using its air force against Houthi targets, while Turkey is helping Saudi Arabia strengthen its defenses without joining offensive operations in Yemen.
The Pakistani contribution is relatively limited in size. Reuters reported on May 18 that Pakistan had deployed about 8,000 troops, a fighter squadron of roughly 16 aircraft, two drone squadrons and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air defense system to Saudi Arabia. The fighter squadron consisted mostly of JF-17 aircraft.
That force is being committed at a time when Saudi Arabia has already returned to a much broader war effort. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major offensive on October 4 to recover territory from the Houthis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with more than 100 Saudi warplanes supporting the operation, according to The Associated Press. The Houthis have largely repelled the offensive. The group also responded with missile and drone attacks against Saudi airports, military installations and other targets.
Saudi Arabia has fought this war before, with no success. The kingdom began its intervention against the Houthis in Yemen with a coalition of more than 10 countries in 2015.
At the time, Saudi Arabia was reported to have mobilized around 100 warplanes and 150,000 troops, while aircraft from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain participated in the campaign.
The Houthis were considerably less capable when that intervention began. Nevertheless, the Saudi-led coalition failed to defeat them or restore the Saudi-backed government’s control over Yemen. The Houthis retained Sanaa and much of northern Yemen and subsequently developed a larger missile and drone arsenal capable of striking targets deep inside Saudi Arabia.
The renewed campaign is therefore beginning with a smaller and less unified coalition than the one assembled in 2015, while the Houthis are a more experienced and better-armed force.
Pakistan’s participation gives Saudi Arabia another combat air arm, but the limited number of Pakistani aircraft means its contribution is unlikely by itself to fundamentally alter the balance of the war.
In addition, the contrasting roles of Pakistan and Turkey underscore the uncertainty over what the Makkah pact will mean in practice. Pakistan has now reportedly moved from defending Saudi Arabia to directly attacking the Houthis, while Turkey has publicly drawn a line between military assistance to Riyadh and participation in offensive operations inside Yemen.
Operation Dawn has opened a new chapter in Yemen’s long-running war, bringing the strategically vital Bab al-Mandeb Strait back to the centre of the conflict, as Iran, the United States, Pakistan and Türkiye are increasingly drawn into a wider struggle. On 4th October, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said in a televised address, “Today, I announce […]
Syria on October 7 stopped short of ruling out military cooperation with Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen, while denying that it had already agreed to send forces to the conflict.
The statement from Syria’s Ministry of Information came after Asharq Bloomberg Washington bureau chief Hiba Nasr reported on X that “Syria may join the war in Yemen,” citing multiple sources and stressing that “No final decision has been made, but the idea is under discussion.”
Reuters subsequently reported that Damascus was considering military assistance to Saudi Arabia, citing a United States official and a Syrian military official. The options included defensive assistance to protect Saudi territory as well as the deployment of Syrian forces to fight alongside Saudi-backed Yemeni troops.
Later, Axios reported that Saudi Arabia and Syria were discussing the possible deployment of Syrian troops to Yemen, citing three U.S. officials. It said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa was seriously considering the proposal but had not made a final decision.
Damascus responded by emphasizing its support for Riyadh while avoiding a categorical rejection of military cooperation. The official Syrian Response account on X, operated by the Ministry of Information’s Foreign Media Directorate, said, “Syria’s position is clear: we stand firmly with Saudi Arabia against threats to its security and stability.”
“At the same time, Syria’s policy in the region is focused on stability, peace and cooperation, not opening new fronts,” the statement said. “Our priority is Syria: rebuilding the country, strengthening its institutions, working with our partners on reconstruction and improving the lives of Syrians.”
It added that “any military cooperation with partner countries would take place only through official channels and existing bilateral frameworks.”
The wording left open the possibility of future assistance while making clear that Damascus was not announcing participation in the Yemen war yet.
The reports emerged after al-Sharaa met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh on October 6. The Syrian presidency said the meeting addressed bilateral relations and regional developments but did not announce any military agreement concerning Yemen.
Reuters reported that a U.S. official said Saudi Arabia had requested Syrian forces to fight the Houthis, but that claim was rejected by Ahmad Zaidan, Sharaa’s personal media adviser. Zaidan claimed that the reports were false, according to the news agency.
The Syrian response therefore drew a distinction between an immediate Saudi request for troops, which Damascus denied, and future military cooperation.
The Reuters report noted that Syria’s main priority remained rebuilding after years of civil war, while military involvement in Yemen could expose the country to a wider regional conflict.
Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major offensive near Bab al-Mandab this week but failed to make any meaningful gains. Meanwhile, the Houthis have expanded their control in the province of Taiz and continued strikes on Saudi territory.
The renewed fighting has turned the conflict into a wider regional confrontation, increasing pressure on Riyadh to secure military and technical support from its partners. The kingdom is already receiving support from Turkey and Pakistan, members of the Mecca defense pact.
Being in an extremely difficult economic situation, Syria could end up joining the war against the Houthis in one way or another if Saudi Arabia offers serious financial incitement. Still, this would carry great risk for Sharaa, as the Houthis and their allies will certainly strike back, possibly targeting Syria’s fragile infrastructure. This would be catastrophic for Damascus.
Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson and Professor Mohammad Marandi said that Yemen holds the upper hand in its war with Saudi Arabia, and that neither Turkey nor Pakistan is likely to change that by sending forces to the kingdom’s aid.
Speaking on Al Mayadeen’s The Grand Standoff: Iran and the World on Tuesday, both guests also noted that Tehran is working on the assumption that the US will restart its war on Iran, while Johnson argued that Washington has less capacity to carry one out than its rhetoric suggests.
Yemen advances as Saudi-backed forces falter
Marandi said that the past weeks have shown a one-sided war. He stated that the Saudi camp’s claims that it could retake significant territory proved to be empty talk, as Yemeni forces, led by Ansar Allah and the Yemeni government, kept moving forward. “The liberation of Taiz is near,” he said.
Johnson stressed that Yemen “has every advantage in this war.” He put Saudi Arabia’s dependable fighting strength at about 75,000 soldiers, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at another 100,000, and the Yemeni Armed Forces’ at 350,000. He described the Saudi army as “basically a group of mercenaries,” while Yemeni fighters have the motivation of defending their own land.
Johnson highlighted that the PLC’s latest offensive showed a lack of military competence. “Successful military attacks are usually not announced in advance, they usually prefer not to give the opposing side a heads up about what you’re going to do,” he said, noting that this one was announced beforehand. He added that the PLC launched it “even without what’s called close air support.”
Saudi aircraft carried out a number of bombing runs along the front lines, Johnson said, “but they were not coordinated.” He explained that “normally you want somebody on the front lines who can actually be in communication with the pilots or with the air controllers, the combat air controllers, to identify specifically along the front lines where bombs need to be dropped.”
“What we’ve seen is that [the Yemeni Armed Forces] operate at a more sophisticated level,” he said. He rejected the Western line that this is Iran’s doing. “Contrary to Western propaganda that this is all just the work of Iran, this is not the work of Iran,” he said. “Anybody that’s had any dealings at all with the Houthis knows that they are quite independent.” He said the movement sees Iran as a friend, but “they don’t let Iran dictate its choices or what it does.”
Johnson added that he believes Saudi Arabia attacked Sanaa after the funeral of Sayyed Ali Khamenei because the US encouraged it. He explained that Washington wrongly saw Yemen as a paper tiger, and described its approach to West Asia as “a combination of ignorance and arrogance.”
Turkey, Pakistan face a logistical nightmare
Both guests dismissed the idea of a Turkish or Pakistani deployment. Johnson said the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan would effectively declare war on Yemen “was laughable.”
He clarified that air power would not solve the problem either. “Dropping bombs without effective ground controllers is just, it’s a waste of bombs,” Johnson said. “It’s just punching holes in landscape without accomplishing anything.” He called the announcement “more Western hype” that “speaks to the desperation of the Saudis,” adding, “I don’t see Turkey or Pakistan intervening in any significant way.”
Marandi said he does not know whether Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad have even decided to send forces. “It’s possible,” he said. “But as Larry said, this would be a logistical nightmare, and the cost would be extraordinary. And even troop movements inside Saudi Arabia would not be easy.”
He stated that neither country has the capacity. “Pakistan, of course, its military is on the border with India, and they have very bad relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” Marandi said, adding that Turkey has difficult relations with almost all of its neighbors. “The armed forces of Pakistan and Turkey are not designed for such mass movements of troops.”
Marandi asserted that Turkey and Pakistan are also harming themselves by letting the narrative spread that they stand with Saudi Arabia. “Turkey and Pakistan are not doing themselves any favors by pushing or allowing this narrative to be pushed that they are on the side of Saudi Arabia,” he said. He pointed to their stance on Gaza, which he said made them popular across the region. “They’ve become heroes across the region,” he said, and “it’s clear that their sympathies lie with [Ansar Allah].”
Saudi Arabia exposed on oil, infrastructure
“The Saudis are in real trouble,” Johnson said. He said the East-West oil pipeline is down and that reports of oil getting through, including through the Strait of Hormuz, are false. “They have lots of infrastructure that can be targeted and is being targeted by Ansar Allah,” he noted, while “Ansar Allah doesn’t sit there with an abundance of infrastructure that can be targeted by the Saudis or the Western helpers.” His conclusion was that “Yemen holds the upper hand.”
Marandi pointed to the weight of the kingdom’s finances. “The Saudis have nothing but their oil exports and their oil industry to sustain themselves, and it is a country that has very high costs,” he stressed. “The government spends a lot of money, so the economy is doing very poorly.” He warned that “the longer this war lasts, the more Saudi infrastructure will be destroyed.”
Marandi argued that the way out is obvious. “The smart thing to do would be for Saudi Arabia to end this war, to do a deal with the people of Yemen, and to lift the siege, and to recognize the government, and stop interfering in Yemen’s internal affairs,” he said. “But Mohammed bin Salman is not the wisest of leaders, to say the least.” He compared the crown prince to Trump. “I think both are very arrogant, neither are wise, and the people around them are yes-men,” he asserted. “Otherwise the Saudis would have ended this by now.”
Johnson put the responsibility on Riyadh. “This is a fight that the Saudis chose to initiate,” he insisted, adding that Ansar Allah “was content to live side by side with the Saudis” and “abiding by the ceasefire” until the Saudis broke it. For Johnson, the kingdom now has a single option. “The choice is settle, make peace with Yemen, or risk the absolute destruction of the government and the country of Saudi Arabia.”
Tehran plans for a renewed US war on Iran
Marandi told the program that Tehran is planning around the assumption that Trump will restart the war. “I’m not saying that war is inevitable, but the working assumption is definitely that we’re going to have war,” he stated. Iran “has been preparing itself for a major confrontation, a very heavy war that would take perhaps weeks,” he noted, and it has warned US-aligned countries that helped Washington that “this time around the Iranian response will be much more devastating for them as well.”
He detailed upgrades to Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, improved air defenses, expanded underground bases and strengthened command and control meant to protect its leaders from targeted strikes. The remaining question, he argued, is timing. “Will there be conflict before Netanyahu’s election, or between the two elections, or after the US midterm elections? That is basically the real question.”
Marandi also pointed to deepening energy shortages. “Trump can pretend that the Strait of Hormuz is open and that more oil is getting through than ever before,” he said. “But the reality is that that’s not the case. The shortages are accumulating.”
Flows reached 11 to 12 million barrels a day for a couple of weeks, when Iran avoided escalation around President Masoud Pezeshkian’s planned US trip, but even then they fell short of demand. Shortages of diesel, gasoline, helium, sulfur and LNG are growing faster than the oil shortage, he explained.
He questioned why Trump keeps threatening to wipe out Iran if, as Trump has claimed for over seven months, the country is already defeated. “I don’t think anyone in Iran takes him seriously anymore,” Marandi added.
Johnson points to limits on US firepower
Johnson argued that Washington’s capacity is thinner than its threats suggest. “I wouldn’t characterize it as a wider escalation, because the United States is limited in what it can do to escalate,” he stated. He noted that the US lacks a robust supply of Tomahawk and JASSM cruise missiles and that its air defense stocks are depleted. “They’ve exhausted their air defense systems. Patriot missiles and THAAD missiles are, I mean, they’re out.”
He cited the evacuation of 12 B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford as evidence. Washington blamed a possible Iranian drone threat, but Johnson countered that “if they still had an adequate number of Patriot missiles, they wouldn’t have evacuated 12 B-1 bombers from the Fairford RAF airfield.” Even against drones, he added, the US does not have enough PAC-3 missiles.
Johnson dismissed press reports of 10,000 US troops being surged to the region, pointing out that 50 to 60 percent of them are the crews of aircraft carriers, escort destroyers and a Marine Expeditionary Unit. The USS Theodore Roosevelt is replacing the USS George H.W. Bush, which is docked in Phuket, Thailand, and due to depart on October 9. “So it doesn’t look like there’s a buildup on that front,” he observed, adding that it is unclear whether the Bush will return to waters off Iran.
Johnson believes the bomber withdrawal followed a secret meeting last Friday at Camp David involving J.D. Vance, Pete Hegseth and John Ratcliffe. In his view, they recognized that “the United States really is in a limited position to carry out any kind of effective or sustained strikes against Iran that are risk-free.” He expects Iran to act preemptively if it judges strikes are imminent, for example against aircraft deployed to al-Udeid.
For Washington, he concluded, “the United States stands to lose much, much more than they’ve already lost if they decide to renew conflict and war with Iran.”
On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.
From treaty to military alliance
Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.
The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.
But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.
Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.
The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.
America stays, but its role changes
It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.
The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.
Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.
A different kind of American order
This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.
Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.
Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.
The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.
That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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