Two Ukrainian defense-tech firms, The Fourth Law and Odd Systems, have joined forces to mass-produce thermal imaging sensors in Europe and the US, The Fourth Law told Militarnyi. The goal is to wean Western militaries off foreign suppliers, chiefly China, for the core part of every thermal camera.
Amid Russia's daily attacks, Ukrainian drone makers have been shifting production to allied countries. Linza and Zoom drones are now built in Germany, and another top manufacturer has taken its technology to Canada and Finland. Sensor plants would move a core component west, not just finished drones.
The project, called Project Foundation, will build long-wave infrared sensors, known as microbolometers. These chips register heat, so a camera can pick out a person or vehicle at night or through smoke. The aim, The Fourth Law said, is to "ensure the sovereignty of Western countries in the field of thermal imaging technology."
The project will run two sites, First Foundation in Europe and Second Foundation in the US, from a headquarters in Eindhoven, a Dutch semiconductor hub. Mass production is due to start in 2027. Within three years, the partners want to quadruple Europe's output of these sensors and double America's.
Ukraine's front line burns through sensors faster than Europe can make them. "Europe currently produces less than 500,000 such sensors per year, while Ukraine consumes this amount in about five months," Odd Systems co-founder Yaroslav Azhniuk said in February, when he first announced plans for a plant able to make one million sensors a year. European sensors cost about five times as much as Chinese ones and are hard to buy at all, because Europeans need them too, he added.
Factories working for Ukraine abroad have already become sabotage targets. In March, an arson attack in Pardubice, Czechia, destroyed nearly all the production capacity of a plant making drones and thermal sights for Ukraine's army. Czech investigators are looking into a possible Russian trail behind the attack.
China has rejected a European Union request to restrict exports of hybrid cars to Europe, increasing the likelihood of new trade defence measures against Chinese manufacturers as negotiations continue in Beijing.
The disagreement comes during a visit by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who is seeking commitments from Chinese officials to address the bloc’s growing trade deficit and improve access for European businesses to the Chinese market.
According to accounts of the negotiations, Beijing has declined the EU’s proposal for voluntary restrictions. The European Commission is consequently considering safeguard measures that could limit hybrid vehicle imports or impose additional tariffs when shipments exceed specified thresholds.
No final decision has been announced, and the precise scope of any restrictions remains under discussion.
The dispute adds another difficulty to EU–China economic relations before European leaders meet in Brussels on 15–16 October, when the bloc’s commercial relationship with Beijing is expected to feature prominently.
The latest confrontation follows the introduction of EU countervailing duties on battery-electric vehicles manufactured in China in October 2024.
Those measures, imposed after an investigation into Chinese state subsidies, did not cover hybrid vehicles.
Chinese manufacturers have since increased their presence in Europe’s hybrid market, offering competitively priced vehicles that combine combustion engines with electric propulsion.
The European Commission previously confirmed that its original anti-subsidy investigation applied specifically to battery-electric vehicles and could not automatically be extended to hybrids.
Consequently, any additional import restrictions must have a separate legal basis.
One option under consideration is a safeguard mechanism that would permit a defined quantity of imports before higher tariffs apply.
Such a measure would differ from the existing anti-subsidy duties, which target alleged unfair financial support provided to manufacturers.
Safeguard restrictions are designed to address injury caused by increased imports. They may also create difficulties for Brussels because measures directed at a particular product can affect suppliers from countries other than China.
Japan, South Korea and Britain could therefore face consequences depending on the structure and legal basis of any proposed restrictions.
The dispute is taking place against a widening imbalance in goods trade between the European Union and China.
The EU’s annual merchandise trade deficit with Beijing has reached approximately €360 billion, equivalent to almost €1 billion per day.
European officials are particularly concerned about Chinese industrial overcapacity and the export of manufactured goods at prices that European producers struggle to match.
During the latest trade negotiations, Brussels has sought commitments concerning market access, import volumes and restrictions affecting European companies.
Chinese exports of plug-in hybrid vehicles to the EU have reportedly increased by 86 per cent over the past year, while battery-electric vehicle imports have risen by approximately 40 per cent.
This expansion has intensified pressure on European manufacturers already confronting high production costs, weak demand in some domestic markets and substantial expenditure on electrification.
EU Today reported in September that Brussels had requested voluntary restrictions on Chinese hybrid exports as part of a broader effort to rebalance commercial relations.
Beijing’s refusal has now brought the possibility of unilateral European measures closer to consideration.
Germany and France have increasingly aligned their positions on the need for stronger European instruments to address unfair competition and dependence on Chinese industrial supply chains.
France has long advocated a more interventionist European industrial policy, while German manufacturers have traditionally placed greater emphasis on preserving commercial access to China.
That calculation is changing as Chinese competitors strengthen their position in the European automotive market.
The problem is particularly sensitive for Germany, whose automotive industry depends on extensive supplier networks, skilled employment and exports.
German manufacturers also operate significant businesses in China, meaning that new European trade measures could expose them to retaliation in one of their principal overseas markets.
China has already responded to previous European restrictions with trade investigations and duties affecting agricultural products and alcoholic beverages.
Further measures against Chinese vehicle imports could therefore extend the dispute into sectors unrelated to the automotive industry.
The European Commission must determine whether voluntary arrangements can produce measurable reductions in Chinese exports or whether formal restrictions are required.
The legal distinction between anti-subsidy duties and safeguard measures will be particularly important.
The existing electric-vehicle tariffs were introduced following an investigation that examined subsidies and their effects on European manufacturers.
A safeguard mechanism would require a different assessment, including evidence concerning increased imports and injury to domestic producers.
It would also have to comply with the EU’s international trade obligations.
Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers are developing production facilities within Europe, potentially reducing their exposure to tariffs imposed on imported vehicles.
EU Today’s earlier examination of the proposed hybrid tariffs considered the broader consequences of Chinese investment in European manufacturing and the bloc’s dependence on critical raw materials.
The negotiations in Beijing are expected to influence whether the Commission proceeds with formal restrictions or continues seeking a negotiated settlement.
The immediate question is whether China is prepared to offer concessions sufficiently substantial to persuade Brussels that additional tariffs are unnecessary.
With EU leaders due to discuss relations with Beijing next week, the dispute has become a test of the Commission’s willingness to use trade defence instruments against one of Europe’s largest commercial partners.
Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.
The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.
The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.
Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.
Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.
He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.
Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.
Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.
The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.
The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.
The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.
Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.
The court subsequently issued further warrants against senior Russian commanders. In June 2024, former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were accused of responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.
The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.
The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.
The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.
The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.
Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.
The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.
The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.
On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.
The ICC condemned the additional American sanctions, warning that restrictions targeting judges and prosecutors interfere with its judicial work.
The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.
The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.
Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.
The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.
Moldova is creating protective zones at border crossing points along its border with Ukraine amid the threat of drone attacks. It is also relocating its personnel from joint border crossings on Ukrainian territory back to Moldova. Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said this on 7 October, according to NewsMaker.
In recent months, Russian attacks on Ukrainian border crossing points near the country's borders with neighboring states have become more frequent. Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings are among those most frequently targeted by Russia. As a result, Moldova now plans to withdraw all of its border personnel from Ukrainian territory.
A Moldovan border guard was also recently injured when a projectile struck near a passenger bus at the Palanca border crossing, Moldova's Border Police reported.
Moldovan authorities are working to strengthen security measures at all Border Police crossing points, including those located on Ukrainian territory, according to the statement.
Authorities are already setting up protective zones so that Border Police officers, government officials and civilians at the crossings can evacuate to a safe location if necessary, the minister said.
Moldova is also discussing moving its personnel from joint border crossings located on Ukrainian territory to Moldova. Personnel have already been withdrawn from two crossings, with plans to do the same at other joint crossings, Missail-Nikitin said.
NewsMaker clarified with Moldova’s Interior Ministry that the measure involves withdrawing Moldovan personnel from two joint border crossing points with Ukraine — Criva and Palanca.
The first time Chisinau withdrew its personnel from Ukrainian territory at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings was a month ago. Moldova temporarily changed the operating arrangements at three joint border crossings with Ukraine because of security risks linked to Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure near the border, Moldova's Border Police reported on 11 September.
The crossings in question are Giurgiulesti–Reni, Briceni–Rossoșani, and Criva–Mamalyga, where Moldovan border guards and customs officers had previously carried out controls on Ukrainian territory, according to the Border Police.
Starting 12 September, Moldovan personnel returned to Moldovan territory for 90 days and began working from existing infrastructure on the Moldovan side. The crossings themselves remained operational, and the cross-border movement of people and vehicles continued. Only the location where Moldovan services carried out their duties changed, the authorities said.
Ukraine is also strengthening the protection of its border infrastructure. The State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development plans to install 135 basic mobile shelters at 28 border crossing points and on access roads leading to them. The shelters are intended to protect civilians crossing the border and border crossing personnel. Procurement is being carried out by the Restoration Services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn Oblasts, according to the statement.
Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukrainian border infrastructure near the Moldovan border in recent weeks. On 25 August, a Russian drone struck the Vynohradivka–Vulcănești border crossing in Odesa Oblast.
On 5 October, Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure caused an incident near the Palanka–Mayaky–Udobne border crossing. A projectile fell near the crossing, ricocheted off the ground and struck a passenger bus. The control booth was also damaged, and one Moldovan border guard sustained a minor injury.
On 9 September, Russia attacked the Starokozache–Tudora border crossing. One drone struck the crossing, while two others crashed nearby on Ukrainian territory. Two people were killed and three others were injured in the attack, and the crossing was temporarily closed. Russia claimed that this strike on a border crossing was prompted by Ukraine transporting weapons through the facility, a claim Moldova has denied.
Ukraine has found the US component in a Russian jet-powered drone targeting civilians, supermarkets, medical warehouses, and bridges. According to its Defense Intelligence, the new weapon contains a PNI5GA magneto-inductive sensor made by the US company PNI Sensor.
The US-made navigation component adds to evidence that Western technology continues to appear in Russia's strike drones. HUR had already identified US-made chips in the Geran-4 in May, but the newly reported PNI5GA is a navigation sensor in a modified version of the drone that Institute for the Study of War (ISW) says Russia may seek to field ahead of winter.
Russia has also replaced the drone's Chinese-made Telefly turbojet engine with a Russian-made equivalent produced in Alabuga. Russia is using the Alabuga zone to bring more of its drone production home rather than importing Iranian or Chinese parts, according to the ISW.
"The remaining electronic units and components are unchanged and identical to those used in previous Geran UAVs," HUR said.
The modified drone also carries a specialized KRSN warhead designed to cut through bridge structures and power-line supports. Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov described the warhead on 30 September, saying it consists of a 40-kilogram main charge and four strike modules. Its warhead is meant to destroy hardened targets made of steel and concrete and to damage cable-stayed bridges.
Russia has stepped up strikes on Kyiv's Northern and Southern bridges across the Dnipro in recent days with such drones.
However, Russia may try to field more resilient and more dangerous versions of its strike drones before Ukraine has effective countermeasures in place. Russia could use them to degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure and logistics ahead of a winter strike campaign that it said will very likely be brutal.
TOKYO – For decades, the US enjoyed a remarkable luxury: its two biggest creditors, Japan and China, kept showing up at Treasury auctions with checkbooks open. Now, Donald Trump’s trade wars, tariff threats and widening geopolitical confrontations raise an uncomfortable question: what happens if Washington’s most reliable bankers decide they’ve had enough? Granted, global investors […]
The post When Asia’s central banks turn bond vigilante on Trump appeared first on Asia Times.
Steve Rose investigates a catastrophic pollution incident at Furnace Brook, a fishing lake in East Sussex, where thousands of fish suddenly died and the local ecosystem collapsed. Neighbours suspect pollution from nearby Morgans Farm, and Rose examines whether their concerns are justified. In doing so, he uncovers broader national problems with water pollution, illegal waste dumping, and the limited power and resources councils and regulators have to tackle them.
He headed about half a mile up the valley to a tributary joining the stream from a neighbouring property named Morgans Farm. “You could clearly see the water upstream [of the tributary] was totally normal, a sandy colour with clay silt in it, and what was below it had gone a blue-black colour. You could see dead brook trout, wild eels, and there was a dead crow or raven, which may well have eaten something poisonous from the river.” In some places, he says, there was a thick layer of blue-grey scum on the water, which he later learned is sometimes called “bacterial cheese”. “There’s so much nutrient [sic] in the water that it allows for a bacterial colonisation explosion.” The bacteria take up all the oxygen, which causes most of the fish, especially the older, larger ones, to die.
The Bishop of Leeds is urging Catholics to 'live simply' to protect the planet. But why are bishops banging on about climate change when they're supposed to be saving souls? asks Roger Watson.
The post Saving the Planet, One Pastoral Letter at a Time appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Kate Manne, a philosophy professor at Cornell University, situates the lawsuit from a former student alleging she was gang-raped at the Chi Phi fraternity in 2024 within a broader, deeply troubling campus “rape culture.” The specific details of Jane Doe’s case are horrific, but Manne also points to shocking statistics and examples showing that sexual misconduct is rife and often taken less seriously than other student infractions. She is critical of Cornell’s response and culture, but emphasizes that, tragically, this normalization of misogyny is widespread across many American campuses. A disturbing, important read.
In a deeply misogynistic society, groups of boys and men routinely bond over humiliating and exploiting women, as Soraya Chemaly has written. And the victim is not only physically and emotionally traumatized following one of the most fundamental imaginable violations: They are likely to be doubted and undermined at every subsequent step of the process. In Jane Doe’s case, the district attorney did not bring any charges after relying on the investigation done by campus police; they didn’t even speak with the men involved. The district attorney just announced that they are reopening the case on the basis of new information contained in the civil lawsuit, and in recognition of the fact that “it can take years of therapy and healing for victims of sexual assaults to fully process and understand what happened to them.”
Ferries remain docked at several ports in Greece on Friday, October 2, due to gale-force winds reaching 9 and up to 10 Beaufort locally in the Aegean Sea. A sailing ban was imposed at the ports of Rafina and Lavrio in south-eastern Attica on Friday morning, while sailings from the port of Piraeus were also […]
The post Sailing ban for ferries due to gale-force winds in the Aegean Sea appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.
The EU has played down claims by the Dutch government that the bloc’s decision to suspend aid support for Sierra Leone was because the west African country refused to extradite one of the world’s most-wanted drug traffickers to face trial in the Netherlands.
Speaking on Thursday, (1 October) after a meeting of EU justice ministers in Luxembourg, migration commissioner Magnus Brunner told reporters that the decision to suspend support was made for “technical reasons” — but without giving more detail.
Sierra Leone was allocated €352m in EU funding between 2021 and 2027, under the bloc’s seven-year budget framework. The country was set to receive €18m from the EU this year.
But Dutch justice minister David Van Weel insists that the suspension of funds is the result of months of pressure from the Dutch government to persuade president Julius Maada Bio’s government to hand over convicted Dutch drug trafficker Jos Leijdekkers.
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