The continuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could cause an increase in food insecurity in Asia and Africa, an UN official warned on Wednesday, October 14, asking both the US and Iran to allow free shipments, particularly of fertilizers.

“It is absolutely crucial to get the deal in the next few weeks. Otherwise, we will miss the planting session,” UN Under Secretary General Jorge Moreira da Silva told Reuters on the sidelines of the ongoing annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Bangkok, Thailand.

Almost one third of all global supplies of urea and around half of sulphur used to pass through the Strait of Hormuz before the US-Israeli war on Iran began in late February and Iran blocked traffic through it in retaliation.

Most countries in Asia and Africa get their urea products, used in the majority of fertilizers worldwide, from the Gulf nations.

Given the fact that global fertilizer supplies from Russia had already been affected due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia imposed by the EU and US, the restrictions on the Gulf have intensified already existing shortages pushing up prices and making farming more expensive for the majority of farmers.

Food prices are already rising in different countries in Asia and Africa and it is expected that if the supply constraints remain the same, food production could be impacted and prices will rise further in the coming days, affecting millions of people in the region.

The crisis is further intensified due to the rising cost of oil, particularly diesel which is extensively used in farming.

The Strait of Hormuz was the source of around a quarter of world energy supplies before the war. Despite the claims that supplies of energy have been normalized in recent days the global oil prices remain much higher than the pre-war period.

According to a Reuters’ report, fertilizer supplies from the Strait of Hormuz have remained negligible despite resumption of other shipments including the oil in recent weeks.

Iran asserts control over the Strait of Hormuz

The UN set up a taskforce to facilitate the passage of fertilizers through the Strait of Hormuz in March itself. The taskforce has proposed an interim arraignment to resume the fertilizer supplies through the region with the consent of both the US and Iran.

Iran has demanded that it will only allow normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz after the US ends its war, lifts its naval blockade on the country, and fulfills its obligations under the interim peace deal signed in June.

The US claims the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) are redundant and refused to lift the blockade.

Reuters reported the US State Department reiterating on Wednesday that it will continue to target Iran, accusing it of disrupting freedom of navigation and taking the global economy hostage.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out a fresh attack on a small vessel in the Gulf of Oman, allegedly linked to the IRGC on Wednesday.

The US and President Donald Trump have also repeatedly claimed the Strait was fully under its control and free for all kinds of navigation. CENTCOM also reiterated on Wednesday that Iran has no navy to control the Strait.

However, Iran has refuted the US claims, citing fresh attacks on several ships trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz without its prior permission.

At least two ships, one container ship and a large bulk carrier, reportedly bound for Singapore, sank after allegedly being hit by projectiles on Wednesday.

The IRGC also claimed that another tanker was hit by the Iranian Navy on Thursday after it ignored repeated warnings. The ship carrying oil caught fire in the attack.

“The Americans claim that the Strait of Hormuz is open and they control it, but this claim is far away from the realities on the ground,” Ali Ozmaei, IRGC Navy chief, said on Tuesday, asking the US armed forces to “step into the field and see who is in control of it.”

It blamed US restrictions on media reports for a wrong impression about the status of the shipping through the Strait and repeated that all ships wanting to transit through it must obtain prior Iranian permission if they want to avoid any kind of mishap.

Il titolo definitivo dell’intera vicenda, tuttavia, è che la Casa dei Saud sta attaccando Ansarallah per proteggere il culto della morte in Asia occidentale

Segue nostro Telegram.

Cominciamo con alcune informazioni esclusive. Giovedì, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, presidente della Camera dei Rappresentanti con sede a Sana’a sotto il controllo di Ansarallah, ha consegnato una lettera a Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, presidente dell’Assemblea Nazionale del Pakistan, richiedendo la mediazione pakistana tra Ansarallah e Riyadh.

Ra’i, figura ampiamente rispettata, ricopre la carica di presidente a Sana’a dal 2008. Sadiq ha iniziato il suo attuale mandato come presidente a Islamabad nel marzo 2024. Questo canale parlamentare diretto riveste un’enorme importanza come apertura diplomatica – poiché il Pakistan si trova ad affrontare enormi pressioni, sia a livello interno che in tutto il mondo islamico, riguardo ai suoi reali impegni relativi allo scontro tra Arabia Saudita e Yemen, come stabilito dall’Alleanza per la Difesa della Mecca.

Per quanto l’intera situazione sia in realtà oscura, informazioni dirette provenienti sia da Islamabad che da Teheran, ai massimi livelli, come da me specificatamente richiesto, hanno stabilito quattro punti chiave: Sembra che sia così – per ora.

Islamabad è irremovibile nel sostenere che il Pakistan non attaccherà Ansarallah e non impiegherà truppe a tal fine. L’intesa raggiunta a Riyadh la scorsa settimana escludeva l’ingresso nel territorio yemenita. Le forze pakistane dovrebbero rimanere al di fuori di qualsiasi offensiva terrestre contro Ansarallah.

Il Pakistan stava già mediando tra Riyadh e Sana’a attraverso Teheran. Il feldmaresciallo Asim Munir ha personalmente richiesto al ministro degli Esteri iraniano Araghchi di esercitare l’influenza dell’Iran su Ansarallah, avvalendosi dei contatti di Araghchi sia con Islamabad che con Riyadh. Il Ministero degli Esteri pakistano non ha smentito l’esistenza di questo canale diplomatico.

Il Pakistan sarebbe tenuto a difendere il territorio saudita in virtù dei propri impegni nell’ambito dell’Alleanza per la Difesa della Mecca. I dispiegamenti finalizzati alla protezione dei confini e alla difesa contro droni e missili lanciati dalle Forze Armate yemenite rientrano in questo quadro. Il problema è se alcuni consiglieri pakistani siano già dispiegati in territorio yemenita. Se il Pakistan avesse anche solo pochi «consiglieri» ad Aden e truppe da qualche parte nel nord dello Yemen, al confine con l’Arabia Saudita, ciò costituirebbe già una violazione delle sue promesse.

Le forze pakistane dovrebbero essere in grado di difendersi da sole – è una conseguenza naturale del territorio. Si tratta di una contingenza dichiarata; non di una previsione di ritorsione. Almeno un ufficiale pakistano è stato ucciso in Arabia Saudita senza che il Pakistan reagisse con una ritorsione. Ciò denota moderazione – almeno per ora.

Transito attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz: utilizzare il CIPS e pagare in rial

Sul più ampio fronte USA-Iran, le mosse diplomatiche confermano quanto abbiamo riportato negli ultimi giorni riguardo al Protocollo di Transizione. Il Pakistan, infatti, è determinato a mantenere i rapporti sia con Riyadh che con Teheran, parallelamente a un coordinamento costante con Pechino. Dopotutto, la Cina sostiene pienamente la mediazione pakistana; e Araghchi continua a dialogare con Munir, come ha fatto in seguito ai colloqui con Wang Yi a Pechino.

Nel frattempo, sul fronte di Washington, le speculazioni sono febbrili su tutta la linea riguardo ai preparativi per una ripresa della guerra da parte dell’amministrazione Trump – compresi potenziali attacchi alle infrastrutture energetiche iraniane e persino, cosa piuttosto preoccupante, a obiettivi nucleari. Non vi è ancora alcuna decisione definitiva da parte dello «psicopatico/sociopatico al comando», tanto meno una data di avvio.

I rischi immediati, in ogni caso, sono sbalorditivi.

La diplomazia – anche nella sua forma surrogata – è impantanata in un vicolo cieco. Teheran rimane – e continuerà a rimanere – ancorata alle proprie condizioni attuali, specificate nel memorandum d’intesa ormai privo di significato, ma ora con l’aggiunta della minaccia di bloccare le rotte di transito lungo la costa dell’Oman che considera illegali. Washington, dal canto suo, è ossessionata dall’ottenere vaste concessioni in materia nucleare. All’inizio di questa settimana, abbiamo confermato che il Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC) di Teheran ha preso due decisioni di grande rilevanza.

1. Teheran ha deciso di riscuotere il pedaggio di transito nello Stretto di Hormuz esclusivamente in valuta iraniana. Niente yuan, niente criptovalute. In realtà, tramite un meccanismo collegato al CIPS, il sistema cinese di pagamento e compensazione, aggirando il dollaro statunitense. Si utilizza il CIPS per acquistare elettronicamente yuan, convertirli in rial e pagare il pedaggio. Le entrate derivanti dal transito nello Stretto di Hormuz, dopotutto, rappresentano una delle poche fonti di valuta forte rimaste a Teheran. Il nuovo meccanismo rafforzerà sicuramente il valore del rial.
2. Attraverso il Pakistan, Teheran ha comunicato a Witkoff, il «Bismarck» del settore immobiliare di Trump, che l’Iran non si smuoverà di un millimetro dalle proprie condizioni per un accordo negoziato – ed è pienamente preparato a qualsiasi possibile offensiva statunitense. E questo dopo che J.D. Vance ha avanzato un’ulteriore condizione sull’arricchimento nucleare: una riduzione «significativa» e «sostanziale». Ciò blocca il dossier nucleare e rende quasi impossibile una formula di risoluzione rapida.

Il punto fondamentale è che la spirale di escalation potrebbe sfuggire al controllo in un batter d’occhio.

La “Tempesta yemenita in arrivo 1.0” è già in atto

Sul fronte saudita-yemenita, le Forze Armate yemenite si stanno dimostrando assolutamente spietate. La “Tempesta yemenita in arrivo 1.0” è già in atto.

I danni alla raffineria di Jeddah, vicino a Yanbu, sono ingenti. Ansarallah sta colpendo contemporaneamente la costa orientale e quella occidentale dell’Arabia Saudita, oltre all’oleodotto est-ovest che le collega.

A tutti gli effetti, Sana’a sta prendendo di mira l’intera infrastruttura chiave di Riyadh. Il «paracadute» difensivo statunitense è una farsa: le batterie PAC-3 e Patriot rimaste sono inutili contro i missili balistici yemeniti.

Le truppe saudite potrebbero ammontare, nella migliore delle ipotesi, a 75.000 unità, più 125.000 della Guardia Nazionale. Le Forze Armate yemenite dispongono di almeno 350.000 uomini, che possono essere facilmente portati a 800.000. Aspettarsi un «aiuto» dai petrol-sceicchi del CCG non è nemmeno degno di essere definito uno scherzo.

Le Forze Armate yemenite hanno inoltre lanciato due missili balistici e droni esplosivi in direzione dell’aeroporto internazionale di Aden. Ansarallah ha dichiarato che l’obiettivo erano i rifornimenti militari sauditi appena giunti al Campo di Badr, il quartier generale dei mercenari adiacente all’aeroporto. È stato ucciso un numero non specificato di ufficiali e funzionari sauditi di alto rango – forse anche alcuni pakistani.

Da parte sua, anche la Turchia sta per schierare truppe, velivoli e sistemi di difesa aerea sul territorio saudita. Queste forze turche potrebbero, in teoria, proteggere Riyadh, le città sante e l’oleodotto Est-Ovest. Ankara, proprio come Islamabad, insiste nel sostenere di non avere alcuna intenzione di entrare in guerra nello Yemen.

La rapida liberazione da parte delle Forze Armate yemenite della costa occidentale vicino al Mar Rosso ha inoltre reso chiarissimo come la cosiddetta «coalizione» saudita – in realtà una banda di proxy e mercenari – stesse schierando di fatto dei terroristi fin dall’inizio.

Ansarallah ha recuperato una grande quantità di passaporti stranieri – in particolare provenienti dal Kuwait, dal Qatar, dalla Turchia e dalla Siria – appartenenti a sicari dell’ISIS e di Al-Qaeda. Chiamatela pure la Legione della Terror Inc.

È sempre la solita storia. Il Qatar e la Turchia, di comune accordo, hanno strumentalizzato il trasferimento di miliziani dell’ISIS e dei salafiti-jihadisti dalla Siria e dall’Iraq: questi sono stati accolti nello Yemen dal Partito Islah. La Turchia è stata la principale via di transito; almeno 2.100 di questi membri dell’ISIS sono turchi.

AQAP è tornata! Già nel lontano 2020, Ansarallah aveva sequestrato documenti, mappe e video che mostravano jihadisti dell’ISIS/Daesh e di Al-Qaeda, direttamente sostenuti da Riyadh, mentre vagavano per lo Yemen, con i miliziani catturati che confessavano di essere stati pagati, armati e sostenuti logisticamente dai sauditi.Ora è già in atto una nuova incarnazione dell’ex Al-Qaeda nella Penisola Arabica (AQAP) – attraverso almeno 20.000 mercenari terroristi del Daesh/takfiri “importati” dalla Siria. Essi saranno inviati nel governatorato di Aden – in seguito alla richiesta, anzi alla pretesa dello stesso MbS, pienamente approvata dall’amministrazione Trump e dal suo vassallo tagliagole diventato presidente a Damasco, l’ex membro dell’ISIS al-Jolani.

Il titolo definitivo dell’intera vicenda, tuttavia, è che la Casa dei Saud sta attaccando Ansarallah per proteggere il culto della morte in Asia occidentale. Controllando Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah isola di fatto il porto israeliano di Eilat. Ciò era già accaduto in precedenza durante il genocidio di Gaza. Riyadh era furiosa perché aveva stretto accordi per il progetto NEOM – ora praticamente accantonato – che avrebbe collegato Eilat una volta che gli Accordi di Abramo trumpiani fossero entrati in vigore. Considerando il quadro d’insieme, una singola scintilla potrebbe ancora scatenare l’inferno. Tra le possibilità figurano: un attacco yemenita contro l’Arabia Saudita che causi ingenti perdite; un caos nella riscossione dei pedaggi nello Stretto di Ormuz; un attacco iraniano contro un obiettivo legato ai «petro-sceicchi» del CCG, a seguito di una provocazione americana; un attacco legato all’Iran contro una base statunitense, ancora una volta a seguito di una provocazione americana; e, soprattutto, una (dis)avventura del CENTCOM «via terra, aria e mare» imposta da un sociopatico.

Allacciate le cinture di sicurezza.

The House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia, Pepe Escobar writes.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Let’s start with exclusive intel. On Thursday, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, speaker of the Sana’a-based House of Representatives under Ansarallah, delivered a letter to Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, requesting Pakistani mediation between Ansarallah and Riyadh.

Ra’i, widely respected, has been the speaker in Sana’s since 2008. Sadiq began his current term as speaker in Islamabad in March 2024. This direct parliamentary channel is immensely significant as a diplomatic opening – as Pakistan faces enormous pressure, domestically and across the lands of Islam, over its real commitments related to the Saudi Arabia vs. Yemen clash as determined by the Mecca Defense Alliance.

As murky as the the whole situation really is, direct intel from both Islamabad and Tehran, at the highest levels, as I especifically requested, has established four key points:

1. Islamabad is adamant that Pakistan will not attack Ansarallah and will not commit troops to that effect. The Riyadh understanding last week excluded entry into Yemeni territory. Pakistani forces should remain outside any ground offensives against Ansarallah. That seems to be the case – for now.
2. Pakistan was already mediating between Riyadh and Sana’a through Tehran. Field Marshal Asim Munir personallly requested that Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi use Iran’s influence with Ansarallah, together with Araghchi’s contacts with both Islamabad and Riyadh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office did not deny this diplomatic channel.
3. Pakistan would have to defend Saudi territory under its Mecca Defense Alliance commitments. Deployments for border protection and defense against drones and missiles launched by the Yemeni Armed Forces fit this pattern.The problem is whether some Pakistani advisors are already deployed in Yemeni territory. If Pakistan has even a few “advisers” in Aden and troops somewhere around northern Yemen on the Saudi border, that already betrays its promises.
4. Pakistani forces should be able to defend themselves – that comes with the territory. It’s a stated contingency; not a prediction of retaliation. At least one Pakistani officer was killed in Saudi Arabia without a Pakistani retaliatory response. That spells out restraint – at least for now.

Transiting Hormuz: use CIPS and pay in rials

On the wider U.S.-Iran front, diplomatic moves support what we have been reporting for the past few days on Transition Protocol. Pakistan in fact is desperate to maintain engagement with both Riyadh and Tehran, alongside non-stop coordination with Beijing. After all, China completely supports Pakistan mediation; and Araghchi keep speaking to Munir, as he did following talks with Wang Yi in Beijing.

Meanwhile, on the Washington front, speculation is feverish all over the spectrum over preparations for a Trump administration renewal of the war – including potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure and even, quite worrisomely, nuclear targets. There is no final decision yet by the Psycho/Sociopath in Charge, much less a launch date.

The immediate risks anyway are staggering.

Diplomacy – even in ersatz form – is mired in impasse. Tehran remains – and will continue to remain – anchored to its existing conditions, detailed by the dead cat MoU, but now carrying the threat of blocking transit routes along Oman’s coastline that it considers illegal. Washington for its part is obsessed with vast nuclear concessions.

Earlier this week, we confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in Tehran made two very consequential decisions.

1. Tehran decided to collect its Strait of Hormuz transit toll in Iranian currency only. No yuan, no crypto. Actually via a mechanism linked to CIPS, the Chinese payment/clearing system, bypassing the U.S. dollar. You use CIPS to electronically buy yuan, change it into rials, and pay the toll. Strait of Hormuz transit revenue after all is one of Tehran’s few remaining sources of hard currency. The new mechanism will definitely strengthen the value of the rial.
2. Via Pakistan, Tehran notified Trump’s real-estate Bismarck, Witkoff, that Iran will not move an inch from its conditions for a negotiated settlement – and is fully prepared for any possible U.S. offensive. And this after J.D. Vance came up with an added nuclear enrichment condition: a “meaningful” and “significant” reduction. That blockades the nuclear dossier and makes a quick resolution formula nearly impossible.

The bottom line is that the escalation ladder could get out of control in no time.

Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 in effect

On the Saudi-Yemen front, the Yemeni Armed Forces are absolutely ruthless. The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 is already in effect.

The damage at Jeddah refinery, close to Yanbu, is massive. Ansarallah is simultaneously hitting Saudi Arabia’s eastern and coast and western coast, plus the East-West pipeline in between.

For all practical purposes Sana’a is going for the whole key Riyadh infrastructure. The U.S. defense umbrella is a joke: remaining PAC-3 and Patriot batteries are useless against Yemeni ballistic missiles.

Saudi troops may number at best 75,000, plus 125,000 from the National Guard. The Yemeni Armed Forces command at least 350,000 that can be easily ramped up to 800,000. To expect “help” from the GCC petrosheiks doesn’t even qualify as a joke.

The Yemeni Armed Forces also unleashed two ballistic missiles plus explosive drones in the direction of Aden’s international airport. Ansarallah said the target was Saudi military supplies that had just arrived at Badr Camp, the mercenary HQ adjacent to the airport. An unspecified number of high-ranking Saudi officers and officials – perhaps even some Pakistanis – were killed.

Turkey for its part is also about to put boots, aircraft and air defenses on Saudi ground. These Turkish forces in thesis could protect Riyadh, the holy cities and the East-West pipeline. Ankara, just like Islamabad, insists it has no plans to enter the war inside Yemen.

The swift liberation by the Yemeni Armed Forces of the western coast close to the Red Sea also made it crystal clear how the so-called Saudi “coalition” – actually a gang of proxies/mercenaries – was deploying de facto terrorists all along.

Ansarallah recovered a wealth of foreign passports – especially from Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Syria – belonging to ISIS and Al-Qaeda goons. Call it the Terror Inc. Legion.

I’ts the same old song. Qatar and Turkey, in sync, instrumentalized the transfer of ISIS/Salafi-jihadi goons from Syria and Iraq: they were welcomed in Yemen by the Islah Party. Turkey was the key transit route; at least 2,100 of these ISIS assets are Turkish.

AQAP is back!

Way back in 2020, Ansarallah had already seized documents, maps, and videos showing ISIS/Daesh and Al-Qaeda jihadis directly supported by Riyadh roaming Yemen, with captured goons confessing they were paid, weaponized and logistically supported by the Saudis.

Now a new incarnation of the former al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is alread in effect – via at least 20,000 Daesh/takfiri terror goons “imported” from Syria. They will be sent to Aden governorate – following the request, actually the demand by MbS himself, fully approved by the Trump administration and its throat-slitter vassal turned President in Damascus, former ISIS al-Jolani.

The definitive headline of the whole affair though is that the House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia.

By controlling the Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah de facto cuts off the Israeli port of Eilat. That had already happened before during the genocide of Gaza. Riyadh was furious because they had struck deals for the – now virtually scrapped – NEOM project that would connect up to Eilat once the Trumpian Abraham Accords were up and running.

Considering the whole picture, all hell could still break loose due to a single spark. Possibilities include: a Yemeni strike on Saudi Arabia causing massive casualties; a toll-enforcement mess in the Strait of Hormuz; an Iranian strike on a GCC petro-sheikh target, following an American provocation; an Iran-linked attack on a U.S. base, once again folowing an American provocation; and most of all a Sociopath-forced “land, air and sea” CENTCOM (mis)adventure.

Fasten your seat belts.

Saudi Arabia has $142 billion in American weapons. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world. So why can’t Riyadh win?

Last month, Ansar Allah seized Mokha and Perim Island, and with them the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, cutting off Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil route around the closed Strait of Hormuz. Mohammed bin Salman begged Trump for US airstrikes, then backed “Dawn of Yemen,” a 100-warplane offensive aimed at Sanaa, as crude oil again tops $100 a barrel. Veteran war correspondent and analyst Elijah Magnier joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra on the Red Sea front, as nearly 1,000 Yemenis have been killed and 184,000 displaced since fighting resumed.

But Magnier argues Ansar Allah – often referred to in US media as the Houthis – hasn’t lost much ground. He explains why Saudi warplanes are largely powerless in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, and why he sees the movement advancing on Taiz and Marib. And Magnier breaks down how Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become two fronts of the same war – different demands, same enemies – and how Israel’s quiet push into Somaliland could drag it directly into the Red Sea fight.

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The Pakistan government’s decision on Monday, October 5, to deploy its armed forces to Saudi Arabia and provide other military assistance in its fight against Yemen is facing widespread criticism from the left and other progressive sections within the country.

Critics have questioned the rationale behind the decision, expressing concerns that it will further erode the credibility of Pakistan among the people in the region and unnecessarily drag it into endless wars.

According to the joint statement, the constituents decided “to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments” under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and provide military force and other capabilities to Saudi Arabia to protect its security and territorial integrity.

The statement was issued after a meeting of the Strategic-Political and Defence Committee of the Mecca Alliance countries in Riyadh on Monday. 

The Mecca Alliance is a three party group (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye) created earlier this year as a regional collective security alliance. 

Though Pakistan has one of the largest armed forces in the world along with being the sole Muslim majority country with a nuclear weapon, the decision has invited strong criticism from the scholars and activists in the country.  

Critics have pointed out how its armed forces have already been engaged in numerous domestic conflicts, such as prolonged operations against the terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other separatist forces in Balochistan 

These groups have been allegedly involved in carrying out large-scale violent attacks against civilian and military targets.

Terrorism and the failure of the country’s armed forces to curb it has emerged as one of the central issues in the ongoing long march to the capital, Islamabad, by thousands of supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and the country’s main opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).  

Pakistan, which is also facing a grave financial and economic crisis is also involved in cross border fights with the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan for months now and has an active decades-long conflict on its eastern borders with India.

Given the multifrontal engagement of the Pakistan army at the moment it would be dangerous to get involved in yet another conflict in West Asia, experts have pointed out.

Pakistan is being drawn into an endless quagmire 

Saudi Arabia has been involved in an over-a-decade-long war against Yemen since 2015. It has imposed a complete air, sea, and land blockade on the country, which has caused an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the Arab world’s poorest nation.

Though the joint statement issued after the meeting on Monday did not name Ansar Allah or Yemen explicitly, it condemned the alleged attacks on Mecca and Medina, two of the holiest places of Islam, last month.

Ansar Allah has denied Saudi Arabia’s accusations about its involvement in those attacks.  

“Pakistan is getting sucked into the Saudi-Yemen war. We can all thank Trump for igniting a new war in the Middle East. But shouldn’t we also have more sense to stay out of such a quagmire?” asked Taimur Rahman, leader of the left-wing Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP), in a post on X on Tuesday.

Ammar Ali Jan, leader of another major left formation in the country, the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) claimed that the “deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia is a dangerous escalation that can push Pakistan into an endless quagmire.”

He questioned the government for moving against “the people of Yemen” who “have shown exemplary solidarity to Gaza despite suffering endless aggression and siege,” claiming “attacking them would be a political and moral catastrophe.”

United Airlines has been sending military hardware to Israel on passenger flights, right under your feet.

A new report from the People’s Embargo for Palestine, the Palestinian Youth Movement, and others documents 2,761 shipments of military cargo to Israeli weapons manufacturers and military institutions, including Elbit Systems, Lockheed Martin Israel, Nevatim Airbase, and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Belal Elsiesy, organizer with the PYM and the People’s Arms Embargo, joins Zoe Alexandra to break down the findings.

With cargo including F-35 bomb release units used to drop 2,000-pound bombs on Gaza, Merkava tank sights, and “hunter-killer” machine gunner sights destined for Elbit, Elsiesy argues civilian airports are a critical point of intervention. He also discusses what’s behind Elbit’s US rebrand as 26 Defense, how campaigns against Maersk and FedEx have targeted the weak links in Israel’s weapons supply chain, and why the airline’s silence on the #NoWeaponsOnUnited campaign is a good reason to act now.

Watch full episodes of BT Live, join breakthroughnews.org as a member today!

Two years after Israel’s pager attacks on Lebanon killed dozens and maimed thousands, Lebanese investigative journalist Radwan Mortada’s new two-part Al Jazeera documentary, The Trap (Al-Mesyada), goes inside the September 2024 Mossad operation more than a decade in the making.

Mortada joins Rania Khalek to trace the web of front companies stretching from Taiwan to Bulgaria that enabled Israel to infiltrate Gold Apollo, a supplier Hezbollah had trusted for decades.

As a new Israeli propaganda film Paging Hezbollah heads for US theaters, Mortada reveals that Israel’s goal to kill as many as 20,000 Hezbollah fighters with booby-trapped walkie-talkies, in fact, fell far short. He also breaks down Hezbollah’s own fatal mistakes, and the lasting psychological toll of a terrorist attack that, contrary to US and Israeli narratives, was far from “precise” or “targeted,” destroying the lives of children, families, and medical workers.

“Hezbollah’s biggest mistake was forgetting Israel’s capabilities – forgetting how bloody and cruel they can be.”

Watch The Trap Part 1: aljazeera360.com/video/1017661

Part 2: aljazeera360.com/video/1017626

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Rough transcript follows:
[Rana:] And joining me to discuss this two-part investigative deep dive into the pager attacks is the producer himself, Redwan Mortada. Redwan, welcome to Breakthrough News Live.

[Redwan Mortada:] Thank you, Rana. Thank you for having me.

[Rana:] Well, it’s a real pleasure, and I got a chance to watch the documentary. I encourage everybody to go check it out. It’s available online. It’s also available with English subtitles, and it’s really worth the watch. I mean, you expose so much new information we didn’t know before. But before we get into some of the specifics, Redwan, I want to ask you, you’ve called this one of the most complex cases that you’ve ever worked on as an investigative journalist. And we have all watched Israel commit so many atrocities across Lebanon that have killed far more people than the pager attacks did. Yet, in your film, you call this the most devastating blow that Hezbollah has taken since its founding. So, two years on from this attack, why does this operation still loom so large that you felt it warranted a two-part investigative series?

[Redwan Mortada:] You’re right, Rania. Israel killed tens of thousands of Lebanese over the years. But in fact, this operation is different—the pager attack. I mean, because it came from a place Hezbollah thought was secure for years and years, for decades, if you want. There has been an intelligence war between the resistance, mainly between Hezbollah and Israel, in Lebanon and in the region. Israel assassinated several senior commanders of Hezbollah, carried out several operations against it, killing Abbas al-Musawi, the ex-secretary-general, and at the same time, Hezbollah carried out several operations against Israel. But this pager operation was different because it was one of the biggest blows to Hezbollah—an attack that only Mossad could imagine. No one could imagine this kind of operation and this kind of killing, because it didn’t only affect Hezbollah fighters. It affected tons of children and women, and it breaches all international and humanitarian rules across the world.

[Rana:] Yeah. And just for everybody who’s watching Breakthrough News and your organization, Blue House Films, you produced a documentary on the pager attacks and how they impacted civilians specifically that came out last year. People who are probably watching this have seen that documentary, and it shows the toll specifically on children and other civilians caught up in it—their faces totally maimed, destroyed, and blinded for those who did survive. I mean, just a horrific attack. But your documentary, this two-part series, really dives deep into the timeline of Israel plotting this attack. I mean, Israel spent years on this; it started back in 2015. And in your documentary, you lay out how Mossad built these front companies spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong, Hungary, and Bulgaria. They infiltrated the pager company that Hezbollah had grown to trust, they manipulated the Hezbollah representative that was dealing with that company, and they rigged the devices with small amounts of this powerful explosive substance hidden in the batteries that was so hard to detect, and then they detonated them at a moment of their choosing. I mean, the way you lay it out, it plays like a movie thriller. So walk us through some of that Israeli timeline—how did they pull this off?

[Redwan Mortada:] It is a long story. You have to watch the film and go deep into the details, the exclusive information, the exclusive data, and the interviews, because it also presents the story of Hezbollah. We post in the film the email communications between the company called Gold Apollo and Hezbollah. But in fact, if I want to go back to how this started, after the 2006 war, Israel started looking for ways to penetrate Hezbollah, especially its network and communication, because you know the result of the war in 2006 was that Hezbollah beat Israel, and Israel wanted revenge. So they started trying to penetrate Hezbollah. They tried to recruit the sales representatives in Taiwan; they failed. They tried to sell pagers to Hezbollah through several front companies, but they failed. And the story they distributed in the media about a blonde girl that manipulated a representative to sell him the pagers was not true. The truth is that they penetrated a trusted company that had a relation with this company over 20 years, starting in the 2000s—Gold Apollo. So they penetrated Hezbollah through this company. They recruited Teresa, the employee in the company, and through recruiting Teresa, they penetrated Hezbollah, and they sent these pagers. And it was not just one plan for Mossad; there was a Plan A and a Plan B. Plan A was to explode the walkie-talkies, and this operation started in 2014. I am not saying that Israeli officials declared that, but they succeeded in sending 15,000 walkie-talkies to Hezbollah. But these walkie-talkies were in storage, and Hezbollah did not decide to go into battle in full power, so they did not distribute all the walkie-talkies; they distributed around 800 walkie-talkies. So Mossad moved to the second plan, which is Plan B—detonating the pagers. This operation started in 2020, and they succeeded in sending 500 pagers to Hezbollah at the beginning, in 2023. Because of the necessity of the battle at the beginning, Hezbollah refused these pagers because this model—the new model—was different; he had ordered the old model. Gold Apollo sent Hezbollah the new model, and the representative of Hezbollah whose name was Mike said, “We don’t want to deal with you because we ordered the old version.” But because of the necessity of the battle and the urge of what was going on after October 7, it forced Hezbollah to receive 4,200 pagers, and they distributed around 3,000, of which only 1,850 exploded.

[Rana:] Yeah. And people really need to go watch this documentary, because you also lay out how the Israelis would find out that Hezbollah was on to them, and then they would stop scanners from Iran from coming to Lebanon that could have detected the substance by bombing a warehouse and another warehouse, and then claiming they were bombing this to kill somebody when it was really to stop Hezbollah from finding out about the pagers. I mean, it’s just really wild stuff. But I want to talk about Hezbollah’s mistakes here, because the attack did expose how deeply Hezbollah had been penetrated, which is what you’re talking about. And you mentioned 2006. After 2006, Hezbollah did build its own communications network, and you described in the documentary how this is precisely because Lebanon’s telecoms were so compromised by the Israelis. And then the war in Syria turned Hezbollah into a much larger and more exposed army that allowed for more penetration. At the same time, these failures come off as so shocking, because Hezbollah did have guardrails in place to try to detect if anything was messed with. What were some of Hezbollah’s mistakes? Again, people really should go watch the documentary because you go into deep detail on what those mistakes were. But if you had to give a brief explanation, what were Hezbollah’s mistakes, and could this have been prevented? And I guess I’d also add to that, has Hezbollah reckoned with this internally?

[Redwan Mortada:] I said it in the film, and I will repeat it: the biggest mistake was forgetting Israeli capabilities and forgetting how bloody and cruel they can be. This is one of the biggest mistakes Hezbollah committed. In fact, you’re right, the war in Syria exposed Hezbollah, and the capabilities and advanced technology Israel had also helped them to do this operation. But in addition to that, they used a new kind of technology, which is CL-20—a new kind of US explosive material manufactured by the United States of America. This kind of explosion is not detectable, and also when Hezbollah gave the pagers that did not explode to the Lebanese army, when they detected it… I put in the film that report that mentions this is an unknown material; it’s not listed in the explosive library. That’s why the airport scanners in Hong Kong, Turkey, and Lebanon couldn’t detect it.

[Rana:] That’s so scary. It’s so scary to think what else they’ve infiltrated.

[Redwan Mortada:] Especially, Rana, these pager devices are civilian devices; they are not military devices.

[Rana:] Yeah. Well, you also—I thought it was super interesting—mentioned in the documentary that Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh used to cut open screws when he would take apart devices to make sure the screw hadn’t been messed with. I mean, one of the biggest mistakes that was mentioned was that Hezbollah operatives were asking questions—there was something weird about these pagers and walkie-talkies, and they were taking them apart and looking at the different pieces to see what was wrong with them, but they never cut open the batteries because…

[Redwan Mortada:] Okay, that shows a lot, by the way. That shows a lot, because even us at the time, when this happened, our question was: where was Hezbollah? Where was the protocol for experimenting on all of these? In fact, I mentioned in the film that there was like a mind race between Hezbollah and the Mossad officer, and it was one step… I mentioned two names in the film, and Jibril Jibril is a nickname for Hussein Bazi, an engineer inside Hezbollah. He was an officer who had doubts, and when he started to remove these pagers from small groups, Israel knew about that and decided to start the operation instead of losing the element of surprise.

[Rana:] So that they could do at least some damage, even though they didn’t get to kill as many people as they wanted. I wanted to ask you, though, obviously this did not destroy Hezbollah because they were able to go on and fight the war in 2024, but it did do a lot of damage to the organization. So can you explain, in terms of manpower, command, morale, and trust in their own systems, what was the damage of this operation to Hezbollah?

[Redwan Mortada:] For me, I think the biggest impact was psychological. The Israelis started this war by exploding the pagers. The first day they exploded the pagers; the second day they exploded the walkie-talkies. Then they carried out over 1,400 airstrikes on Lebanon in one day. After that, they assassinated the special forces commanders—the Radwan Force in Hezbollah—until they assassinated Hassan Nasrallah. For around 10 days, Hezbollah and Lebanese society experienced and went through one of the hardest days in our history. The goal and target for Israel was to destroy Hezbollah. But in fact, Hezbollah survived, and you can tell that if you do a comparison between the war in 2024 and the war in 2026, the level of assassination and the level of penetration wasn’t the same at all.

[Rana:] I want to ask you also, Redwan, you talked about this in your documentary, and I covered it in the documentary that I did with Blue House: Israel and its supporters continue to celebrate this as a marvel of precision. They call it surgical, targeted, and clean. And actually, I don’t know if you’ve seen, but the Israelis also have a movie coming out called Paging Hezbollah.

[Redwan Mortada:] A propaganda film, you mean? The propaganda film where they started swimming and they are at the beach, and you will hear another voice: “We are in a special area, but in fact, we are in a hostile environment where everyone wants to destroy us”? They are justifying why they went into a major operation.

[Rana:] Yeah. So this is going to be in American theaters on October 30th. It’s called Paging Hezbollah, an Israeli propaganda film that celebrates this attack. I encourage people, instead of watching that, to go watch Redwan’s documentary, which we’ll include a link to in the description. But I wanted to ask you, what was the actual impact of what Israel did on civilians? Israel and the US celebrate the pager operation as a major achievement, calling it precise and targeted. But they are lying. They are liars, because really it was a terrorist attack, a war crime, because it also hit civilians. And you met tons of civilians, women and children, in your documentary. But in fact, this is not just my word; Human Rights Watch said it was a war crime. Booby-trapped pagers used by civilians on a daily basis—when they exploded, they didn’t target only Hezbollah fighters, because you know they are a part of Lebanese society, and they chose a peak time when families were gathered, when children came back from school. So when they exploded, they targeted, killed, and injured children, women, families, doctors, nurses. They are not all military; part of them are civilians.

[Redwan Mortada:] And the injuries—I mean, just so people understand the injuries from this explosion. It exploded in people’s faces, so it was destroyed eyeballs, destroyed facial structure and bones, missing fingers. Really, really horrific stuff. I think you experienced—my colleague told me that when you wanted to give a neck mic to one of the children to start the interview, he ran away a bit because it was similar to the pager.

[Rana:] No, they were scared. Yeah, the kids I spoke to were scared, of course. They have PTSD from this device because it looked similar. It’s just horrible. And the other thing, too, is people blinded. If you’re blind, you usually learn to read with your fingers, with Braille, but the pager—the way it exploded, people were holding it, so it also cut off people’s fingers in addition to taking away their sight, so they can’t even learn to read Braille. There are just so many layers of horror that this has impacted, and people are still getting surgeries two years later to fix their faces, if they can ever be fixed. It’s just horrifying and should not be celebrated. But you noted—and again, I encourage people to go watch the documentary because it goes into detail—Israel’s real aim was to have these exploding walkie-talkies kill as many as 20,000 fighters, and it didn’t manage to do that. So obviously they did a lot of damage to Hezbollah, but their ultimate operation failed. But connected to all this: yes, Hezbollah was able to demonstrate it survived, especially watching it fight in 2026. Like you mentioned, there weren’t major assassinations because Israel doesn’t even really know who’s in charge anymore, and they were able to fight the Israelis. However, Israel has managed to occupy a huge portion of Lebanon, and right now Hezbollah is not really responding to Israel’s daily attacks, killings, and bombings—it’s blown up like 60 villages at this point. So where does the battle stand today? Hezbollah has lost ground, Israel is expanding its occupation, and people are wondering why Hezbollah is not responding right now. What, in your opinion, is Hezbollah’s real capability as it stands today, and is there any deterrence left against Israeli aggression?

[Redwan Mortada:] This question should be addressed to Hezbollah, but I will tell you my evaluation of how I’m looking at what’s going on now. In fact, the war did not finish yet. The war is still going on, and the war is not only in Lebanon—the war is in the region, the war between the United States of America and Iran, between Iran and Israel, between Hezbollah and Israel. We are part of this big war in this region. Until now, there are rules of engagement, and the last agreement is still going on, because if you can see in Lebanon, Israel doesn’t dare to target Beirut, to target the Beqaa, to target the Dahieh, because there are rules of engagement between the United States of America and Iran. I think we have to wait and see. During the past 15 months, if you remember, everyone went out and said Hezbollah is done, Hezbollah is finished. But when the battle erupted, we saw another equation on the ground. So I think we are still in the middle of the war; we cannot expect what will go on, whether there will be another round—and that’s what we think, there will be another round, the third round. And we hope that we can survive, we hope that we can kick the Israelis out of our country, because you know that they believe in their myth of Greater Israel, and they believe that and declared that they can take part of Lebanon and part of Syria to fulfill their dream and their myth. So we are fighting with these psychopaths who are now destroying our houses, destroying our lands, killing anyone in that yellow zone in the south of Lebanon. And the United States of America, unfortunately, is backing them and covering them, and our government is involved in this betraying. So let’s wait and see how things will go on.

[Rana:] Well, Redwan, I want to thank you so much for this incredible two-part documentary that you put together. Again, we’ll include a link to it in the description for people to watch, and also for all of the incredible work you do. You really are one of the best journalists we have here in Lebanon. So thank you for all of the wonderful work you do, and hopefully we can have you on again soon.

[Redwan Mortada:] Thank you. Thank you so much.

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