Mucho ha llovido en la prestigiosa Universidad de Brown (Estados Unidos) desde que su catedrático Roberto Serrano denunciase en este diario en junio un fraude masivo con inteligencia artificial (IA) en uno de sus exámenes, sin que el decanato reaccionase. La noticia fue replicada por los principales medios ―hasta la revista Nature le pidió un artículo―, Serrano ha recibido “cientos” de cartas de apoyo y la persona que estaba al frente del Comité del Código Académico ha sido cesada. Pero lo que más conmueve al eminente economista español es que cree que sus alumnos han aprendido la lección.
© CreativaImages (GETTY IMAGES)
© Tony Gutierrez/Associated Press
Dominic Cummings is right, says Professor James Alexander: the idea that civil servants are the 'guardians of the constitution' is pernicious in the extreme. But who then should play such a lofty role?
The post Who is the Guardian of the Constitution? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
As he charges head first into the Brexit debate, Andy Burnham resembles no one so much as Donald Trump, says Prof James Alexander: cause a stir via wild assertions, the better to give cover to what you really want to do.
The post Brexit Does Not Mean Brexit appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Labour may be enjoying a Burnham bounce, but Mark Littlewood still thinks the smart option is to bet against the Prime Minister winning the next General Election. He explains why in the Daily Sceptic.
The post Betting Against Burnham appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Ukraine’s reform record currently produces two figures that appear difficult to reconcile.
Under the Ukraine Plan, Kyiv had completed 84 of the 95 milestones due by late September — around 88 per cent. The result was strong enough for EU governments to approve another payment of almost €3 billion under the Ukraine Facility.
Three months earlier, however, a coalition of Ukrainian organisations monitoring ten rule-of-law and anti-corruption commitments agreed with Brussels had awarded progress just 15 points out of 100.
Neither figure is wrong. They measure different programmes.
The first covers a broad reform and investment agenda extending from the judiciary and financial markets to energy, agriculture, transport, human capital and the business environment. The second examines a deliberately narrow collection of reforms concerning prosecutors, criminal investigations, anti-corruption agencies and judicial governance.
Put together, they raise a more useful question than whether Ukraine is “reforming” or “not reforming”.
Why has a country capable of delivering most of a demanding EU programme during a major war found this particular group of reforms so much harder to complete?
Russia’s aggression provides part of the answer. Ukraine has been attempting an institutional transformation while mobilising its population, financing its armed forces, repairing infrastructure and keeping a functioning state under repeated Russian missile and drone attacks. No previous EU candidate has operated under comparable conditions.
But the ten reforms where progress has been weakest have something else in common. Most concern institutions that can investigate senior officials, prosecute corruption, scrutinise appointments or otherwise place limits on the exercise of political authority.
That is what makes the comparison important.
The wider reform record should not be understated.
When the European Commission released €2.9 billion to Ukraine on 2 October, it specifically credited Kyiv with implementing reforms covering the judiciary, financial markets, human capital, the business environment, energy, transport, agriculture and the green transition.
Total EU support provided under the Ukraine Plan has now exceeded €32 billion. More than €17 billion in further budget support remains potentially available during 2026, provided Ukraine fulfils the corresponding conditions.
The money is particularly important because the Ukrainian state is directing such a large share of its own resources towards defence. European financing helps keep the civilian state operating while Ukraine fights Russia.
The Ukraine Facility has therefore become more than an aid mechanism. It gives Brussels a means of measuring reform against specific commitments and releasing money when they are met.
That system has generally worked.
It also makes the areas where progress is weaker much easier to identify.
The 15/100 assessment published in June concerned ten priorities agreed in December 2025 between Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos and then deputy prime minister Taras Kachka. The score came from Ukrainian civil society, not the European Commission, and cannot legitimately be presented as Ukraine’s overall EU reform score.
It had nevertheless risen only six points from an assessment of nine out of 100 in April.
Among the unfinished commitments were changes to criminal procedure affecting high-level corruption cases, stronger guarantees for the independence and effectiveness of NABU and SAPO, reform of the State Bureau of Investigation, new arrangements surrounding the Prosecutor General, competitive recruitment within the prosecution service and further changes to judicial governance.
These are among the most difficult reforms Ukraine has undertaken since 2014 because they concern who has the authority to investigate whom.
The events surrounding NABU and SAPO in July 2025 remain central to understanding why Brussels is paying such close attention.
Ukraine had spent years building a specialised anti-corruption system intended to make investigations of senior political figures less vulnerable to interference from the conventional prosecutorial hierarchy.
NABU conducts investigations. SAPO provides specialised prosecution. The High Anti-Corruption Court hears the cases.
The system has never been free from political controversy, nor has its performance been beyond criticism. But its independence became an important part of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and other international partners.
Then, in July 2025, parliament passed legislation placing NABU and SAPO under substantially greater authority of the politically appointed Prosecutor General. Zelenskyy signed it.
The decision produced an unusually sharp reaction inside Ukraine. Demonstrators took to the streets despite martial law, while European partners made clear that the legislation threatened reforms regarded as fundamental to the country’s European integration.
As EU Today reported during the crisis, the dispute went far beyond the technical division of powers between prosecutors and investigators.
Kyiv reversed course within days. Parliament restored the independence of the two bodies.
The reversal demonstrated that Ukraine’s political system still contained powerful corrective forces. Civil society mobilised, public opposition was visible and international pressure had an effect.
Yet the episode also established that the independence of institutions created specifically to investigate high-level corruption could still become the subject of direct political intervention.
That changed the context in which subsequent reform commitments are being judged.
The European Commission’s 2025 report on Ukraine recorded both sides of the episode. It acknowledged the restoration of NABU and SAPO independence, while warning that undue pressure on anti-corruption agencies remained a concern.
The Commission also identified practical weaknesses. NABU still required better access to timely and impartial forensic examinations, while SAPO needed stronger powers in cases involving members of parliament.
This is why simply retaining NABU and SAPO is no longer sufficient evidence that this part of the reform process is secure. Brussels is looking at whether they can operate when investigations become politically difficult.
The same issue appears elsewhere.
Ukraine agreed to review the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, drawing on European standards and the Venice Commission. It also committed itself to transparent and competitive recruitment for senior positions throughout the prosecution service.
The significance is obvious. The Prosecutor General occupies a pivotal position in the Ukrainian criminal-justice system. The method by which that office is filled — and the circumstances in which its occupant can be removed — affect the credibility of every politically sensitive prosecution beneath it.
Progress has been slow.
There is a similar problem with the State Bureau of Investigation, which handles cases involving senior officials and law-enforcement personnel. Kyiv agreed to an independent assessment of the bureau followed by reform of its legal and institutional framework.
Again, the issue is not administrative tidiness. An agency responsible for investigating state officials has little value as a check on government if its own leadership or investigative decisions are susceptible to political influence.
Criminal procedure provides another example.
Ukraine committed itself to changing provisions under which corruption proceedings can eventually be closed because deadlines for pre-trial investigations have expired, as well as addressing limitation periods for corruption offences.
Draft legislation has appeared. Bills No. 15333 and 15334 were registered in parliament, and NABU and the Ministry of Justice have worked on amendments.
But the process has taken months.
For a simple criminal case, procedural deadlines may appear an obscure legal question. Top-level corruption investigations are different. They can involve offshore structures, large quantities of financial evidence, foreign jurisdictions and prolonged litigation. If the clock eventually disposes of a case that investigators and prosecutors cannot bring to judgment quickly enough, the anti-corruption architecture fails at the point where it is supposed to produce results.
The same pattern is visible in judicial reform and the new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030. Work is taking place, legislation is being prepared and institutions are consulting one another. Some changes have been completed.
Others remain somewhere between agreement and implementation.
This is precisely the stage of accession at which that distinction begins to count.
When Ukraine and Moldova moved further into the EU accession process, the significance of the Fundamentals cluster was that progress would increasingly depend on the functioning of institutions rather than declarations of political intent.
Ukraine has no shortage of declarations of European intent. What the Commission needs to establish is whether the machinery beneath them works.
Any assessment that ignores Russia’s war would be unserious.
Full-scale aggression has inevitably changed the Ukrainian state. Decisions that might take months in peacetime sometimes have to be taken within days. Military information cannot be handled according to ordinary transparency rules. Elections cannot proceed under normal conditions. The executive carries responsibilities that no Ukrainian government faced before 2022.
Reform is also competing for administrative capacity with mobilisation, defence procurement, reconstruction, energy emergencies and the daily consequences of Russian attacks.
This has to be taken into account when Brussels sets timetables and assesses progress.
It is less convincing when applied indiscriminately.
Competitive recruitment of prosecutors does not interfere with the defence of Ukraine. Neither does an independent procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General. NABU’s ability to investigate senior officials does not prevent the armed forces from conducting operations, while closing procedural loopholes in corruption cases has no obvious adverse effect on wartime decision-making.
There is therefore a boundary between powers required to fight Russia and powers that are simply easier for government to retain during wartime.
Finding that boundary is becoming one of the more difficult questions in Ukraine’s relationship with the EU.
This does not support the sweeping claim that every important Ukrainian institution has been placed under political control. The evidence does not justify it.
It does show why Brussels is concentrating increasingly on institutional independence.
The problem with wartime centralisation is rarely that it begins without justification. Governments fighting wars need authority. The longer an emergency lasts, however, the more important it becomes to distinguish measures required by national security from arrangements that have become politically convenient.
Ukraine has now lived under full-scale war for more than four years. Institutions created for the post-war European state are being shaped while the wartime state still exists.
That makes the current reform period unusually consequential.
The EU has one powerful instrument with which to influence the outcome: money.
The Commission is already using it.
The almost €3 billion approved in September followed the completion of agreed Ukraine Plan milestones. The next payments depend on further commitments being met.
As EU Today reported when the Ukraine Plan was amended, additional financing has come with additional rule-of-law and anti-corruption requirements.
There is a limit to how far Brussels can push this. Ukraine is fighting a Russian war of aggression that also poses a direct security threat to Europe. Destabilising the Ukrainian budget in order to demonstrate the rigour of EU conditionality would make little strategic sense.
Kyiv is well aware of that.
But Brussels cannot simply waive the conditions either. Doing so would weaken reformers inside Ukraine, reduce EU influence over the accession process and make it more difficult to explain enormous long-term transfers to European taxpayers.
The result is already visible: continued financial support accompanied by increasingly detailed scrutiny of how reforms are implemented.
That approach is likely to become tougher as accession advances.
There is another reason for it.
Ukraine will eventually have to manage reconstruction on a scale Europe has not seen for decades. European governments, international financial institutions and private investors will be asked to commit hundreds of billions of euros. Confidence in prosecutors, courts, public procurement and anti-corruption agencies will affect how much money arrives and on what terms.
Strong institutions are therefore not a concession Ukraine makes to Brussels in exchange for membership.
They are part of the infrastructure required for Ukraine’s recovery.
The same applies to the war itself. Corruption in defence procurement, reconstruction or public administration gives Russia opportunities to damage confidence in the Ukrainian state and strain relations between Kyiv and its partners. Moscow has every interest in amplifying genuine scandals alongside fabricated ones.
The most effective answer is not tighter political management of damaging information. It is institutions capable of investigating misconduct credibly.
That is also why the role of Ukrainian civil society deserves attention.
The organisations producing critical assessments of Kyiv’s reforms are operating in a country under attack. Many have supported Ukraine’s European integration for years. Their reports can be disputed and their scoring methodologies examined, but criticism of government performance is not evidence of disloyalty.
The ability to produce such criticism is itself one of the features separating the Ukrainian political system from the authoritarian model Russia represents.
Ukraine’s reform record consequently looks neither like the failure portrayed by some critics nor the uninterrupted success sometimes presented by its defenders.
The broader record is impressive. Completing 84 of 95 Ukraine Plan milestones while fighting a major war is not a trivial achievement, and the EU would not have continued releasing billions of euros if the reform programme existed only on paper.
The difficulty appears further down, where institutional reform begins to affect the ability of political authorities to influence prosecutors, investigators and judicial appointments.
The NABU-SAPO confrontation made that problem impossible to ignore. The subsequent reversal showed that Ukraine also possesses the political and civic capacity to correct course.
What happens next will matter more than either episode.
Bills that have remained in parliament will have to become law. Reviews of the SBI and prosecution service will have to produce institutional changes. Competitive appointment procedures will have to work when the preferred candidate of those in power does not win. Anti-corruption bodies will have to be allowed to pursue cases when their targets are politically connected.
These are less visible achievements than opening accession negotiations or announcing another EU funding package.
They are also much closer to what EU membership ultimately requires.
Russia has forced Ukraine to build an exceptionally powerful wartime state. European integration requires Kyiv to ensure that some of that power can eventually be constrained by institutions that do not depend on whoever occupies the presidential administration.
The figures that currently look contradictory — 84 out of 95 and 15 out of 100 — are therefore telling different parts of the same story.
Ukraine has shown that it can reform during the war.
The harder test is whether it can complete reforms precisely where doing so reduces political discretion.
With the US mid-terms in November looking like being somewhere between a heavy defeat and a bloodbath for the Republicans, Mark Littlewood looks at what comes after Trump and which are the bets worth taking.
The post What Follows Trump After the Dems Win in November? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
After struggling for hours with an electronic check-in at an Arizona motel, Guy de la Bédoyère is convinced that if any evil genius thinks he can take over the world with computers he is going to be bitterly disappointed.
The post Why No-One Will Ever Be Able to Take Over The World With Electronics appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Rugby spent its first century as an amateur game run by national unions that answered to nobody but themselves, then three decades of professionalism have changed that. Players sign contracts across borders, clubs compete in cross-border leagues, and private capital owns stakes in its biggest competitions. That places rugby inside the reach of European Union law, which treats an athlete as a worker and a governing body as an undertaking.
In December 2023 the EU's top court ruled in football's Super League case that a governing body can only block a rival competition if its rules for doing so are clear, applied equally and no stricter than necessary.
In October 2025, eight national rugby unions declared that anyone joining the proposed R360 franchise league would lose eligibility for Test rugby. If that ban is challenged, unions would likely keep the power to say no, but they will have to publish rules for saying it, as UEFA did after its defeat.
Below the regulated professional game, the EU's influence comes through money rather than courts. Erasmus+ has a sport budget aimed at grassroots participation and equality, and rugby has already used it for women's projects, some built around sevens, where the calendar of rugby sevens fixtures gives newer unions a realistic way into international competition.
The Parliament wants that budget increased from 2028, which matters most to unions outside the Six Nations and its broadcast deals.
A rugby player is a worker in the eyes of EU law, and that has shaped who clubs can sign for thirty years. Bosman in 1995 stopped leagues capping the number of EU players in a squad, and Kolpak later gave the same rights to players from countries with EU trade deals, including South Africa.
Brexit ended both for clubs in England, Wales and Scotland while Ireland's provinces kept them, so one league now recruits under two sets of rules.
The next shift is about conditions rather than passports. In October 2025 the European Parliament backed treating athletes as employees with full labour rights and player unions having a say on calendars and welfare.
Rugby's governing bodies still write their own laws, calendars and eligibility rules, but what has changed is that those choices are now reviewable by courts and shaped by policy that treats sport as an economic activity first. Autonomy remains, but only on condition of compliance, and the exceptions keep narrowing.
The Kazakhstani tenge has become the best-performing currency in Asia and Europe in 2026, according to the Financial Times. Since the beginning of the year, it has appreciated by nearly 10% against the US dollar, outperforming all other currencies worldwide except for several currencies of Latin American and African countries. This performance has been underpinned by economic growth driven by the transformation of Kazakhstan’s economic model. The country is rapidly evolving from a commodity-based economy into a financial and technology hub for Central Asia, amid growing inflows of foreign capital.
Growth factor
This year, the key factor behind the tenge’s significant 9.7% appreciation was not oil prices, which have traditionally been associated with Kazakhstan’s economic performance. This time, the appreciation of the Kazakhstani currency was driven by capital inflows, Dmitry Dolgin, Chief Economist for the CIS at ING, told the Financial Times. As of June, foreign investments in tenge-denominated government debt had reached $5 billion, 2.5 times higher than a year earlier, accounting for nearly one-tenth of the total volume of such securities outstanding.
Foreign investors seeking to diversify their portfolios are attracted by high yields — with the base rate at 16.75% — combined with a moderate level of risk, as confirmed by Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating. Another factor contributing to increased foreign capital inflows is the easier access for foreign investors to the country’s government debt. In April, the Kazakhstani authorities announced plans to connect local government bonds to the international clearing system Euroclear, and foreign investor activity has increased notably in recent months.
In addition, Kazakhstan expects to be included in the benchmark JPMorgan GBI-EM index of local-currency government bonds of emerging markets. The US bank is also preparing a separate index for frontier markets (a category of emerging markets — ed. note), in which, according to the National Bank, Kazakhstani bonds could account for an 8% share if included.
Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan
The growth of foreign direct investment is providing additional support for the tenge. In the first quarter, FDI amounted to $6.3 billion. As the Financial Times notes, Kazakhstan is seeking alternative sources of income beyond oil, including by positioning itself as a transit and technology hub for goods moving from China to Europe. To this end, the country is investing heavily in infrastructure, the publication emphasizes.
In recent years, the country’s authorities have implemented reforms aimed at strengthening the national investment ecosystem, including tax, customs and other incentives. As a result, the total gross inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan from 2021 through 2025 amounted to approximately $114.3 billion. In 2025, the figure reached $20.5 billion, up 14.4% year on year. At the same time, the structure of investment has also changed, with capital increasingly flowing into manufacturing, trade, the financial sector, transportation and the IT industry.
The changes have resulted in record economic growth. In 2025, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, the highest rate in a decade. Growth continued in the first five months of 2026, reaching 3.7% despite a decline in oil production. Meanwhile, the real sector of the economy grew by 4%, while services expanded by 3.6%, which can be seen as evidence of a qualitative transformation of the economy.
Statistical data illustrate the rapid expansion of the non-resource sector during this period. Construction recorded the strongest performance in 2026, growing by 13.4% in the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2025. Manufacturing was also among the leaders, increasing by 9%. The highest growth rates were recorded in machinery manufacturing, which expanded by 23.3%, and pharmaceuticals, which grew by 35.2%.
According to the IMF, Kazakhstan’s economy measured at purchasing power parity is expected to reach $993.7 billion in 2026, effectively approaching the psychological milestone of $1 trillion. Over the past decade, this figure has nearly doubled.
Competitive economy
Based on its 2025 results, Kazakhstan ranked among the world’s most competitive economies, taking 34th place out of 69 countries in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, ahead of Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, India, Italy and other countries. Kazakhstan was also the only country from the CIS and Central Asia represented in the ranking. Analysts note that the country’s economy is becoming increasingly diversified. Today, manufacturing, logistics, energy infrastructure and investment projects are playing an increasingly important role.
Kazakhstan also ranked 53rd out of 150 countries in the Global Investment Risk & Resilience Index, achieving the highest result among Central Asian countries.
Focus on digitalization
Digitalization is one of Kazakhstan’s strategic priorities. In early June 2026, it was announced that an agreement had been signed with Firebird and Nvidia US companies to build data centers in the so-called “Data Center Valley.” According to Bloomberg, investments in the project could amount to $10 billion.
According to the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence, Kazakhstan’s IT services exports exceeded $1.142 billion in 2025. The sector has been growing at a rapid pace: five years ago, exports of high-tech solutions from Kazakhstan amounted to just $33.5 million. The strategic goal is to increase Kazakhstan’s IT services exports to $5 billion by 2030.
Fintech for export
Kazakhstan is expanding its export potential in the financial sector. In August, the subsidiary of one of the largest fintech holdings operating in Kazakhstan, Freedom, received a brokerage license from the local regulator in Turkey, becoming the first foreign broker in 34 years to obtain such a license. In late July, the company also completed the acquisition of a local bank. According to the holding’s founder, Timur Turlov, the company plans to invest $300 million in the Turkish market to create an integrated digital financial ecosystem built around its brokerage and banking businesses.
Freedom already operates in 24 countries worldwide. This year, the company applied for a banking license in France, viewing it as a gateway to the broader European market. The holding currently serves more than 600,000 brokerage clients in Europe and aims to increase that number to 50 million by exporting its ecosystem.
The total number of clients across all companies within the Freedom group stands at 14 million, while the holding’s assets exceed $14 billion and its market capitalization stands at $10 billion. Since Freedom’s listing on Nasdaq in 2019, the value of its shares has increased nearly 13-fold.
Another Kazakhstani fintech giant, Kaspi.kz, is also actively expanding its presence in Turkey. In July, the company announced the completion of a deal to acquire the Turkish subsidiary of Rabobank Dutch group. Earlier, in 2025, Kaspi.kz acquired a controlling stake in Turkish marketplace, Hepsiburada. The company’s shares are also traded on a US stock exchange, underscoring the high level of international confidence in Kazakhstani fintech companies.
Kazakhstan is also actively building its own financial infrastructure, while its stock market ranks among the largest in Eastern Europe. Trading volume on the Astana International Exchange (AIX), which officially began operations just eight years ago, amounted to $2.1 billion in 2025. Since its launch, AIX has facilitated the raising of $12.4 billion in debt and equity capital, while assets under management within the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) exceeded $5.4 billion at the end of 2025.
On the country’s oldest exchange, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE), trading volume in 2025 amounted to KZT 400.8 trillion ($769.1 billion). At the same time, the KASE Index has nearly tripled over the past four years, reaching 7,712.53 points by the end of June 2026. Combined trading volume on the two exchanges increased by nearly 50% in the first half of the year, while equity market capitalization rose by 18.8%.
As crypto casinos look for their next wave of growth, industry sources suggest Lucky Rollers may be exploring expansion into new international markets, with Korea and Thailand mentioned as regions the platform is reportedly evaluating as part of a broader push into Asia, alongside signs of growing interest in Europe.
A region with growing crypto adoption
Southeast and East Asia have seen some of the fastest growing cryptocurrency adoption rates globally, driven by younger, digitally native populations and a strong existing interest in online gaming culture. Europe presents a different but complementary opportunity, with a more mature regulatory landscape in many jurisdictions and a well established base of crypto users who are already comfortable with digital asset platforms. For crypto native platforms like Lucky Rollers, that combination of a fast growing Asian user base and a stable, regulation aware European market represents a potentially significant opportunity, assuming any expansion is structured in a way that accounts for local regulatory realities in each region.
What expansion could look like
If Lucky Rollers does move forward in these markets, it would likely follow a pattern common among crypto casinos operating in similarly restricted or tightly regulated regions: localized marketing and language support aimed at players who are legally able to access the platform from outside those countries, rather than a direct consumer launch targeting residents. In Europe specifically, that could mean tailored offerings for jurisdictions with clearer frameworks around crypto gaming, alongside multilingual support suited to the continent's diverse player base. The platform's existing crypto first infrastructure, supporting 13 cryptocurrencies and fast cross border transactions, would suit that kind of approach well, regardless of which markets it ultimately prioritizes. Notably, the platform has already rolled out a special welcome offer of a 100% bonus on first deposits aimed at Asia Pacific customers, with particular emphasis on players from China, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, a detail that may hint at where its regional priorities currently lie, even as European interest continues to build in parallel.
Continued growth at home
In the meantime, Lucky Rollers continues to build out its core platform, offering a 100% welcome bonus up to 15,000 USDT, ongoing tournaments with prize pools up to 30,000 USDT, a weekly 15,000 USDT lottery, and a game library spanning live dealer tables, original games, jackpots, slots, and sports betting. For Asia Pacific customers specifically, including players from China, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, Lucky Rollers is offering a special welcome bonus of 100% on their first deposit, a foundation that could just as easily support the platform's next steps into Europe.
Image source: Pexels
Roulette looks simple from the other side of a screen. A wheel turns, a ball settles, and the table records the result. Recreating that sequence in a browser, however, requires several systems to agree at exactly the right moment. Graphics, game logic, account data, and network communication all have to work together without making the machinery visible.
The result is a useful example of Europe’s wider shift from location-based services to software platforms. A familiar physical product has not merely been filmed or copied; it has been rebuilt as a responsive digital service.
Older web games often depended on plug-ins and desktop software. Modern browsers can handle animated graphics, encrypted connections, and real-time updates directly. That removed a major barrier for table games: users no longer had to install a dedicated program for every platform.
Responsive design then allowed the same underlying game to adapt to laptops, tablets, and phones. Controls can move, table proportions can change, and information can be prioritized according to screen size. The wheel remains central, but the interface around it is fluid.
Our reporting on how newer online platforms challenge established operators highlighted the role of differentiated products and payment options. Technical reliability is the quieter part of that competition. A novel interface has little value if a session disconnects or an account update is delayed.
Browser delivery means the product cannot assume one machine, connection, or input method. A fiber-connected desktop and a phone on a mobile network may request the same game but need different image sizes, control spacing, and recovery behavior. Responsive layout handles appearance; resilient session management handles what happens when the connection changes mid-action.
Regional delivery adds another layer. Language, permitted formats, account information, and payment options can vary by market. Those differences should be resolved before the interface presents an option; otherwise, a user may travel through several screens only to discover that the selected feature is unavailable.
A collection such as Royal Vegas online roulette demonstrates how one historic game can be represented through multiple digital formats. Underneath the visual differences, each round depends on a controlled sequence: accept selections, close the round, generate or receive the outcome, settle the result, and update the account record.
Timing is essential. If the animation gets ahead of the server state, the experience feels unreliable. If every action waits visibly for a distant response, it feels sluggish. Developers therefore use local animation to maintain flow while authoritative systems preserve the actual game state.
Live-dealer versions introduce video production and low-latency transmission. Multiple camera angles, table data, and user controls must remain synchronized. A delay of a few seconds that barely matters to ordinary video can be disruptive when a betting window is closing.
The visual wheel is only one representation of an event recorded by back-end systems. Account balance, game state, and transaction history have to agree on what occurred. If a page refresh produces a different view, the service needs to recover from the authoritative record and explain the correction clearly.
Security is woven through that process. Encrypted connections protect data in transit, authentication limits access to the account, and monitoring helps identify abnormal traffic. These controls should operate without turning every ordinary action into a maze of prompts. The challenge is to add friction where risk is high and remove it where repetition adds no protection.
Live formats increase the coordination burden because video, table events, and user controls travel through different technical layers. A short delay is not always avoidable, but the interface can show whether a selection was received and when betting has closed. A clear state is more important than pretending latency does not exist.
Roulette's browser migration therefore reflects a broader European software question: how can a regulated service remain consistent across devices and borders? The answer lies less in spectacular animation than in dependable records, transparent availability, and interfaces designed for imperfect networks.
For a plain-language look at one part of this system, web.dev's introduction to WebSockets explains how a browser and server can keep a two-way connection open, allowing either side to send data when it is ready. That makes the technology relevant to interactive products where timely updates matter more than repeatedly loading a conventional page.
Roulette’s move to the browser is therefore not a story about replacing a wooden wheel with an animation. It is about rebuilding an entire service around networks, responsive interfaces, and auditable data—while keeping the result familiar enough to understand at first glance.
Four of CQUR’s five original directors came from VTB Capital or RCB Bank, a Cypriot lender then 46.29 per cent owned by VTB. After the Russian bank sold its stake in May 2022, two senior figures from that network remained as chairman and chief executive and later appeared in CQUR’s disclosed ownership chain. Public records show institutional continuity — but not who financed the sale or whether VTB retained any rights.
On 16 May 2022, less than three months after the United States and Britain imposed blocking sanctions, VTB announced that it had sold its 19 per cent stake in Qatar’s CQUR Bank. It disclosed neither the buyer nor the price.
On paper, VTB’s involvement ended there. The corporate record tells a more complicated story.
CQUR was established in the Qatar Financial Centre in 2019. The five directors named in contemporaneous reports citing the QFC were Makram Abboud, Ziad Al-Amin, Vladimir Zrazhevsky, Vladimir Ostrovsky and Nicolas Neophytou. Abboud and Al-Amin came from VTB Capital. Zrazhevsky and Ostrovsky came from RCB Bank in Cyprus, in which VTB then held 46.29 per cent. Four of CQUR’s five disclosed directors therefore came from VTB Capital or a bank nearly half-owned by VTB.
The board later changed substantially: four of its five current members were not on the 2019 list. But continuity remained at the top. Abboud, now CQUR’s chairman, previously ran VTB Capital’s Middle East and Africa business and sat on the board of VTB Capital plc. Al-Amin, CQUR’s chief executive, worked at VTB Capital and later headed RCB’s Dubai office.
Both men have since appeared inside CQUR’s ownership chain. Abboud is a director of Quince Holding, the bank’s current direct shareholder, and the disclosed significant shareholder of Quince Tree, one of the companies above it. Al-Amin is another director of Quince Holding. They did not simply remain employed by CQUR after VTB’s exit; they later took positions in the companies through which the bank is owned.
There was a striking precedent inside the same network. On 24 February 2022, the day VTB was sanctioned, its 46.29 per cent stake in RCB was acquired by Cypriot shareholders representing RCB’s management. Less than a month later, S&P suspended RCB’s ratings, saying it could not assess either the full effect of the management acquisition or the remaining links between RCB and VTB.
Large assets were also moving back towards the Russian bank. In 2020, VTB assigned CQUR rights to a RussNeft loan and a $100 million Kazchrome tranche. CQUR returned both in February 2022, when their reported value was about $1.18 billion. A month earlier, RCB had returned $1.7 billion in Kazchrome claims.
Audited company accounts therefore establish nearly $2.9 billion in transfers from CQUR and RCB back to VTB in January and February 2022. They do not disclose the price or purpose of those transactions. The transfers demonstrate intensive coordination before VTB’s exit from CQUR; they do not, by themselves, prove control after the sale.
Who bought VTB’s stake remains unclear. An archived CQUR page shows that the other 81 per cent of the bank was held by Amathus Investment Fund SPC, a private fund in the British Virgin Islands. After VTB’s departure, Amathus was the only significant shareholder named by the bank. But no public transfer document reviewed for this investigation identifies it as the buyer of VTB’s shares.
CQUR later said that it had been acquired by Middle Eastern private investors led by management. That wording was absent from the bank’s pages archived in November 2022 and February 2024; it appeared by January 2025. The statement does not reveal who paid VTB, how much was paid or where the money came from.
The ownership structure now recorded in Qatar took shape later. As of 25 August 2026, the QFC register named Quince Holding, incorporated four months earlier, as CQUR’s significant shareholder.
Its disclosed shareholders include Quince Tree, linked to Abboud, and MHF Holding, owned by the established Emirati group Al Hail. That offers a plausible independent explanation for the present structure. But all three vehicles were created after VTB’s exit. They show who sits in the chain now, not who bought the stake in May 2022.
CQUR also retained a clear capacity to serve Russia-linked business. Its latest published terms set a 1pm cut-off for payment orders in Russian roubles. Fix Price’s audited accounts show balances with CQUR worth RUB1.65 billion at the end of 2023 and RUB3.87 billion at the end of 2024. Those amounts are rouble equivalents used in Fix Price’s reporting, not proof that the account itself was denominated in roubles. They do, however, document substantial post-sanctions business with a group focused on the Russian market.
None of this proves sanctions evasion. Rouble payments and service to Russian companies are not illegal in themselves. Such a finding would require evidence of a transaction involving a blocked party, a concealed beneficiary or end user, false trade documents, or a regulator’s action. No such public record involving CQUR was found. The bank says it screens customers, beneficial owners and transactions against UN, Qatari, EU and US sanctions lists.
The evidence supports a firm but bounded conclusion. VTB’s departure did not produce a demonstrable institutional break. CQUR had been built around VTB Capital and RCB personnel; large credit assets returned to VTB shortly before the exit; senior alumni remained at the top and later appeared in the ownership chain; and the bank continued to contemplate rouble payments and serve Russia-linked business.
What the evidence does not establish is whether VTB financed the acquisition, retained voting or economic rights, or issued instructions after the sale. The documents that could answer that question remain undisclosed: the 2022 sale agreement, the identity of the original buyer, proof of funds, voting agreements, pledges, options and any nominee arrangements.
Until those records emerge, VTB’s exit from CQUR can be verified as a change of registered ownership — but not as a clean institutional separation.
What once felt like science fiction, an AI robot Olympics, now looks more possible as robotics improves. Reports mention sprinting, soccer, table tennis, gymnastics, and other tests. The World Humanoid Robot Games in Beijing brings in more than 2,000 robots for 51 events. That scale shows how fast robot sports are growing.
Still, could robots run something like their own Olympics one day? It could happen. But getting a world wide version would mean big upgrades in tech, clearer event rules, stronger safety, and a solid way to organize it across countries.
The idea is now more than just theory. The World Humanoid Robot Games has made a global stage where robots take part in sports and show what they can do in motion. In August 2026, a Chinese humanoid robot named Tiangong Ultra is said to have run the 100-meter dash in 8.86 seconds. That time beats Usain Bolt's well known mark of 9.58 seconds.
These events let teams study balance and how a machine moves. For viewers, it is a fun way to watch progress in robotics unfold.
A future AI robot Olympics might look like the human Games, but add contests made for machines.
In the main lineup, there could be robotic sprint races, robot jumping events, robot swimming, robot soccer, robotic weightlifting, and robot gymnastics. Alongside those, there could also be robot-only events that check battery use, fine control, path finding through obstacles, long mechanical runs, gripping and moving objects, and doing tasks with less outside help.
Robots would not be judged in the same way as people. Some scores could come from the kit itself, like the sensors, the motors, and the software setup. Organizers might also ask how well the system handles shifts in its surroundings, or how steadily a robotic hand finishes tricky work.
With this setup, a robot Olympics would feel more like a tech contest than a simple sports meet. It could draw teams from around the world to prove who builds the better machine.
A big contrast between sports played by people and robot contests is how much artificial intelligence is involved. A robot’s body still matters, but it is also tested on how it reads the world, avoids trouble, and chooses what to do next.
The International Olympic Committee has pointed out that AI matters more and more. It did this with the Olympic AI Agenda, and the plan talks about using AI in a way that stays focused on people throughout the Olympic Games.
So a coming robot event could link AI work with real athletic effort. The contest could set up tasks where deciding on the fly is just as critical as raw speed.
Robots have made real strides, but they still cannot fully take over normal sports run by people. A few humanoid machines can sprint at high speed. Yet they often trip on simple tasks like slowing down, staying upright, or getting back up after a fall. In recent events, there were crashes that showed gaps in current engineering.
If robots were to compete regularly, clear rules would be needed. People would have to decide what kind of machines are allowed. Would it be remote control only, full autonomy, or some kind of mix with assistance? There would also need to be set limits for the gear and the code. Battery limits and safety rules would matter too. The goal would be to keep the games fair even in PH Bingo on GameZone.
It feels more likely now than it did a few years back. More countries are joining in already, and many robotics events are getting tougher and more advanced. If the tools keep getting better, an event built around AI robots could bring in makers, schools, major tech firms, and robotics teams from many places.
For people who like tech and digital games, this kind of change also shows how fast interactive stuff is moving. If you have been watching new trends in gaming and online entertainment, you might run into sites such as PH Bingo on GameZone. That is one more sign that digital tools keep reshaping how people relax.
An AI robot Olympics plan would still take time, so it is not ready yet. Still, the base work is happening. Today’s robot contests already show that machines can handle more complex physical tasks. As AI models, sensors, power systems, and robot parts improve, the gap between a science demo and a real sport may shrink in a way that draws more attention.
Right now, the traditional Olympics belongs to people. But the growth of robot contests hints that a separate global event for machine athletes may be closer than many expected.
The Belgian federal government has nominated Hans Kluge (pictured) for the position of Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO).
“I am very honoured by the trust Belgium has placed in me and am grateful for the opportunity to take on this important responsibility,” Kluge said on X. “Serving the WHO has been the greatest privilege of my professional life.”
Kluge has served as WHO Regional Director for Europe since 2020 and began a second term in February 2025. Under WHO rules, he will step aside as WHO/Europe Director while campaigning for the role, a process that involves lobbying member states, NGOs and the organisation's largest funders.
Tried and tested
After qualifying as a doctor in Belgium, he began his international career with Médecins Sans Frontières in conflict settings in Liberia and Somalia. He subsequently coordinated tuberculosis programmes in Siberian prisons and across the former Soviet Union.
Kluge joined WHO in 1999, initially working on tuberculosis and HIV in...
Login