Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who came to power after a 2013 coup, said on Saturday he will step down in 2030.

The post Sisi Announces Plans to Step Down as President of Egypt in 2030 appeared first on Breitbart.

On September 30, I walked out of a three-hour medical appointment to dozens of missed calls. They were from colleagues: the entire newsroom of Matsadaash, an independent fact-checking platform, had been arrested. Six journalists, five of them trainees in their early twenties, all picked up in less than 24 hours.

I didn’t know any of them. It didn’t matter. An entire newsroom taken in a day, then disappeared: that was enough. I don’t need to know someone to stand with them. If they are journalists arrested for doing their job, I am with them.

For five days, no one knew where they were. Their families and lawyers filed 18 complaints in that time, according to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), which represents them. The Interior Ministry called Matsadaash an unlicensed, foreign-run page, and linked it to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt designated a terrorist organization in 2013. The Matsadaash founder, Abdelrahman Mansour, denies any affiliation.

When the six journalists were finally produced before state security prosecutors, some, according to their lawyers, said they had been blindfolded, bound, stripped, beaten and given electric shocks. State prosecutors said forensic examinations found no injuries. The journalists were charged with joining and financing a terrorist group, reporting fake news and using social media to spread it. On October 13, their pretrial detention was extended for another 15 days. Their salaries, which EIPR and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate say were paid under employment contracts filed with Egyptian banks, were described, in the prosecution’s words, as “monthly funding in foreign currencies.”

Over three days, each of the six journalists was interrogated for nearly 30 hours. According to EIPR, not one was confronted with a single report they had written that could be called false. Instead, the prosecution’s own statement accused them of “highlighting shortcomings — and nothing else — in state institutions,” belittling officials and amplifying people’s grievances.

But that is precisely our job. It is what we sign up for as journalists — to ask questions of those in power. On October 4, another colleague was summoned for questioning; thankfully, she was released the same day.

Word spread the way it does now, through social media posts, journalists’ pages and a knot of phone calls I can no longer untangle. Colleagues were gathering at the Journalists Syndicate every day. So I went too. The Syndicate is a union with a long history of standing up for us, and I joined my colleagues there in solidarity with those who had been detained. Not everyone could come every day, but there was always someone — on some days just four, on others more than 20. 

Even our older colleagues, in their 60s, 70s and 80s, showed up. Ustaz Mohamed Abdel Kouddous, who once headed the Syndicate’s freedoms committee, is recovering from an accident and could not be there in person, but he was with us through his voice and his written messages. For as long as I can remember, he has been there for every struggle: at Al-Ahram, arguably Egypt’s most prominent daily newspaper; and at the Syndicate, with his megaphone, firing us up. He and I don’t share the same politics, but it has never mattered. 

In 2008, on the day of a nationwide strike, plainclothes officers dragged him from his car in broad daylight and held him until nightfall. He asked the Syndicate to demand an investigation, though he expected nothing to come of it. “We do what we need to do,” he said then. It could be the motto of our sit-in today.

Many of us feel embarrassed to eat or to have a cup of tea, not knowing whether our colleagues inside have the same luxury. When I kiss my girls goodnight, I feel ashamed that my colleagues in jail cannot do the same.

I keep thinking about how we got here.

Under Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak, the red lines were clear. You did not touch the head of state, his wife and his sons, or a certain institution (the military). But everything else was fair game. We knocked ourselves out writing about poverty and corruption, labor rights and children’s rights, domestic violence, sexual harassment and female genital mutilation. 

Then came 2011, and a revolution unlike any other. In Tahrir Square, we rejected violence, and our chant was “selmeya, selmeya” (peaceful, peaceful).

When we brought Mubarak down, he didn’t flee like the Tunisian “strongman” Zine al-Abidine Ben, and we didn’t lynch him like Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. We put Mubarak on trial, in a courtroom. It was dignified. It was the revolution of the dreamers.

In those few years, Egyptian journalists lived with freedoms we had never known. But dreamers are not politicians.

We had lived for decades with no politics: no real political parties, no real elections, no way to learn how power works. So when the door was opened, we didn’t know how to build what we had dreamed of. People kept asking, “What is the alternative?” We had the dream, but not the tools.

What followed our revolution was the opposite of what we fought for: restrictions on a scale we had never seen. The red lines blurred and multiplied, until no one knew where they were anymore. The story of our country, of our revolution and of our journalism is the same story. We are not organized. We are not politicized. But we dare to dream.

Today, at least 25 journalists are behind bars in Egypt, says the Committee to Protect Journalists, almost all of them in pretrial detention. That period is technically limited to two years, but prosecutors file new charges and renew detentions. Some, like the photojournalist Hamdy al-Zaeem, have spent a decade in and out of detention without a single conviction. My colleague Haidar Kandil was taken in June, after documenting arrests of Egypt’s Shia minority.

On the evening of October 14, the lobby of the Syndicate’s headquarters in downtown Cairo was filled with banners and cartoons. Three colleagues and I sat down to write letters to our jailed colleagues: 26 names in total. We fussed over how to organize the letters: how to arrange the names, whether the envelopes should be open or closed, which color went with which name. Colleagues with beautiful handwriting wrote each name in calligraphy. Then we realized we couldn’t spend the whole evening rearranging the deckchairs. At some point, we had to start writing.

But our minds were blank. What could we say? “Why are you inside, and why are we free?” “We feel guilty that we are free and you are paying the price. Maybe we should have paid it instead.”

Of the 26, the only one I have worked with is Haidar. He had a good eye for a story. Like most of the young journalists I work with, he needed guidance, but he was always responsive to edits, to make changes and turn in better copy. We spoke on the phone and exchanged emails and texts, but we had never met. I only know his face from photos online, and here I am pinning his photo on the noticeboard in the syndicate with a #FreeThemAll banner. 

In the end, all I wrote was: “I miss you, Haidar. I hope to see you soon. Hang in there. Love, Lina.”

Whenever I feel small, I remind myself that this Syndicate has always fought the good fight. That same evening, the veteran journalist Medhat El-Zahed told us how, during the 1989 Iron and Steel workers’ strike, he and his leftist colleagues were arrested and tortured. The Syndicate’s head at the time, Makram Mohamed Ahmed, was close to the authorities. Still, he protested over the treatment of journalists and visited them in prison.

Today, for the first time, the head of our Syndicate is one of us. Khaled El-Balshy is a dreamer. Eman Ouf, who heads the freedoms committee, is one of us too. The Syndicate has pledged to defend all six Matsadaash journalists. It has asked the Attorney General to investigate the abuse allegations. Its statement chose every word with care, stressing its commitment to the law and to the country’s higher interests, and asked only that our colleagues be released on the Syndicate’s guarantee, or any other, given their young age. It was the most modest of requests. Even that was too much for some.

The tide is so high, and we are so low. 

After more than two weeks, we have suspended the sit-in. We are not leaving the Syndicate, and we are not giving up. In our statement, we promised to keep standing with our colleagues through other events, because the battle for press freedom “needs a long breath.”

On October 18, eight independent news outlets from Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia and Syria, among them Mada Masr and Al-Manassa, announced a joint newsroom to fact-check “Egypt Forum 2026,” the government’s “achievements conference.” The summit runs from October 19 through to October 24 – six days for six journalists. The eight newsrooms have united under the slogan: “Until they return, the fact-checking continues.” The dreamers are learning to organize.

We journalists and dreamers, like those of us who gather in the Syndicate, are stubborn. Many are behind bars of some kind: real ones, imaginary ones, or the bars of a censored internet. But we always walk towards the light. Journalism is how we live and breathe. If we don’t fight for it now, there will be nothing left to fight for tomorrow. No profession, no dignity, and no Syndicate.

This story was published in collaboration with Egab.

The post In Egypt, the government has seized a newsroom appeared first on Coda Story.

The Cradle | October 19, 2026

Egyptian construction firms coordinated with Israel on a US-backed “Green Rafah” project aimed at “housing” tens of thousands of Palestinians in the city that was eradicated by Tel Aviv’s genocide, sources told Middle East Eye (MEE) on 19 October.

“Egyptian construction firms surveyed sites in the ruins of the southern Gaza Strip for a housing project dubbed ‘Green Rafah’ … Egyptian engineers surveyed several areas in eastern Rafah under the supervision of the Israeli army and air force, who accompanied them throughout the process until they left,” sources said, including a senior military source in the North Sinai.

According to the report, “the proposed neighborhood would initially house around 20,000 Palestinians.”

It would be “supervised” by “a multinational force expected to be deployed in several parts of the Gaza Strip.”

The report likely refers to US President Donald Trump’s plan to form a so-called International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza.

The report states that surveying of sites for “Green Rafah” is under full US backing.

“Washington conveyed instructions on the Rafah operations through CIA director John Ratcliffe during his latest visit to Egypt,” says the senior military source cited by MEE.

Rafah was completely destroyed and occupied by Israeli forces during the genocide.

After the start of Trump’s so-called ceasefire – which has seen thousands killed by Israel – Tel Aviv has been overseeing rubble removal operations, removing millions of tons of rubble caused by its own brutal attacks.

The Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor reported at the year’s start that “no less than 70 percent of rubble removal operations in the city have been completed.”

“Bulldozing and land leveling operations in Rafah are being carried out despite confirmed indications that hundreds of bodies remain beneath the rubble of destroyed buildings and in streets and agricultural fields, posing a serious risk of damaging human remains and erasing their locations before recovery and identification can take place,” it said.

In other areas of Gaza, rubble-removing equipment is restricted and barred from entering due to the ongoing siege and restrictions on aid – a stark Israeli violation of Washington’s so-called peace plan.

In Rafah, US-backed rubble-clearing operations come as part of a plan to build a “humanitarian city” over the ruins of the city.

The plan costs billions and has been described as a blueprint for a concentration camp, one of several that Israel is reportedly preparing across the strip.

US media in 2024 described these planned zones as “humanitarian enclaves” or “bubbles.”

According to much newer Israeli media reporting, Washington’s Board of Peace in Gaza is planning to transfer Palestinians into so-called “humanitarian shelters,” in order to “disconnect” the strip’s population “from Hamas” while Israeli forces solidify and expand their occupation,

Meanwhile, Israeli forces are completing a massive trench aimed at partitioning Gaza and expanding the occupation there.

Riyadh says six injured in Iran-backed rebel attack, two soldiers killed in helicopter crash; Egyptian parliament postpones vote on aiding Saudi effort as Houthis issue threats

The Houthis have repeatedly attacked airports and oil infrastructure across the kingdom with drones and missiles that can change direction during flight, posing a challenge to interceptors.

Al Mayadeen | October 18, 2026

The United Arab Emirates has reportedly agreed to resume funding selected forces in southern Yemen fighting the Yemeni Armed Forces, while Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide air cover for those forces, according to sources in Yemen.

The reported arrangement signals a possible thaw in relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi after months of disagreement over the scope of each other’s political influence in Yemen.

The renewed coordination comes as the Yemeni Armed Forces continues to make gains and Saudi Arabia faces repeated drone and missile attacks targeting its territory, airports, and energy infrastructure.

Gulf rivals reconsider their positions

Southern forces, particularly the Giant Brigades, were previously trained and funded by the UAE and are considered among the more effective formations in the fragmented coalition opposing the YAF. Abu Dhabi withdrew its involvement in Yemen in January, cutting off financial support to forces it had backed, following pressure from Saudi Arabia.

The reported agreement suggests that advances by the YAF are prompting rival Gulf powers to reconsider their differences. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has responded to a recent demand by southern separatists for an independence referendum that would restore the borders in place between 1967 and 1990, when Yemen was divided into two states.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has also yet to agree to deploy its forces beyond the boundaries of the former South Yemen. Saudi approval of a referendum could potentially remove that restriction, although no such agreement has been announced.

Attacks on Aden intensify pressure

The Aden government announced a counteroffensive last week aimed at retaking Sanaa. The campaign achieved limited gains around Majzar near Marib and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, but was met with a sizeable retaliation by Sanaa’s forces.

On Friday, two missiles struck Aden airport; Information Minister Moammar Al-Eryani said the missiles landed about 500 meters from the Yemenia Airways aircraft and roughly 100 meters from the runway’s midpoint. No casualties were reported.

The attack followed a strike on a presidential palace in Aden that killed at least five people and wounded 16, further underscoring the risks facing the Gulf-backed south.

Relations between the STC and Riyadh remain strained. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled to Abu Dhabi in January after an unsuccessful attempt by the council to assert control across southern Yemen and announce a referendum on independence within two years.

Saudi Arabia subsequently bombed UAE arms shipments intended for STC forces. Abu Dhabi then announced its withdrawal from Yemen, while the Saudi-backed government said it would seek to prosecute Zubaidi for treason.

Egypt and UK face decisions over military support

Regional involvement is also expanding beyond the Gulf rivals. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has called for an emergency parliamentary session to authorize possible military action to “defend” Saudi Arabia if requested, while emphasizing that Egypt would not undertake offensive operations.

Sanaa’s Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali al-Ra’i warned Egypt against a potential involvement in the Saudi military aggression against Yemen, urging Cairo not to allow itself to be drawn into a confrontation that serves Riyadh’s policies.

In an urgent letter to Egyptian Parliament Speaker Hisham Badawi, al-Ra’i expressed serious concern that developments could lead to Egyptian military participation alongside Saudi Arabia, stressing that such a move would contradict Egypt’s historical role in defending Arab causes.

In the UK, discussions continue over a Saudi request for additional military assistance. London has deployed an RAF Voyager aerial refueling aircraft, but some Arab officials are pressing for further support.

The prospect of deeper British involvement raises legal concerns. In 2019, the UK Court of Appeal ruled that the government had acted unlawfully in granting arms export licenses during the previous Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen in 2015–2016. The Campaign Against Arms Trade argued that officials had failed to properly assess potential violations of international humanitarian law, prompting revisions to export licensing procedures.

Sanaa’s resistance against Saudi aggression followed a brutal, years-long siege that caused one of the worst famines in modern history. The Ansar Allah government has made clear that their fight against Saudi Arabia will not cease so long as Riyadh continues to escalate it even further. 

The Yemeni Armed Forces forces have remained firm in their resistance under the banner of a military equation: blockade for blockade and escalation for escalation. 

The post Sisi Calls Emergency Session to Authorize Egyptian Defense of Saudi Arabia appeared first on South Front.

Families have been scattered, fathers separated from their children, and couples unable to reunite and marry

Wijdan Abu Matar, 43, was forced to leave Gaza in November 2023 with her eight children for medical treatment, while her injured husband, Hatem, remained behind.

Wijdan and her family were living in the Nuseirat refugee camp when the Gaza war began with the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. Ten days later, on 17 October that year, an Israeli strike hit the al-Muhandseen tower, near their home, injuring Wijdan and every member of her family.

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© Photograph: Mohammed Salem/The Guardian

© Photograph: Mohammed Salem/The Guardian

© Photograph: Mohammed Salem/The Guardian

Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

Ancient geographers listed many cities called Arsinoe, from Cyprus to Cilicia (in what is now southern Turkey), from Ephesus to the Gulf of Suez. Most of them were linked to the Ptolemies, the dynasty that ruled Egypt after the death of Alexander the Great. One, however, lies far from the Nile. It stood in the […]

By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.

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Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.

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A man in Behbeit el-Hagar, a village in Egypt’s Gharbia province, was working on a plot of land in front of his house when he came across a block covered in carvings. He told the local antiquities inspectorate. What came out of the ground afterwards, according to a statement from Egypt’s Ministry of Tourism and […]

The post More Than 70 Killed in Strikes on Illegal Mining Sites Along Egypt-Sudan Border (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

When we think of Greek mathematics, we think of Euclid, Archimedes and Apollonius of Perga: elegant proofs and general rules. Alongside that tradition ran a humbler one, which rarely makes it into textbooks. It was maths for getting a job done, and a new study argues that the people who practised it leaned heavily on […]

The Great Sphinx has been without a nose for centuries. Now a fossil crocodile skull taken from the same rock turns out to be missing the tip of its snout too. The coincidence has put a name on a species science did not know it had, Herugavialis cairensis, which spent almost a hundred years in […]

A new war of words has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It comes as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia pulls the country’s long-running disputes with its neighbors back into the open.

Ethiopia’s government has blamed neighboring states for the escalating conflict in the north. The government has accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could expand regionally. Birhanu Jula, Ethiopia’s army chief, stated that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has clearly needed outside support and supplies from Egypt, Sudan, and other foreign powers to sustain its campaign. 

Cairo rejected the claim. Foreign Ministry spokesman Nader Zaki said Egypt’s foreign policy rests on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of other states and on staying out of their internal affairs, adding that claims to the contrary had no basis in fact. 

Tension over Ethiopia minister’s remarks

The dispute quickly returned to the Nile. On Saturday, Ethiopia’s minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Itefa, published a social media post, later deleted, comparing the GERD to Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. “Before criticizing Ethiopia, Egypt should explain why it built the Aswan High Dam without Ethiopian consent.”

Cairo responded the same day. A source at the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation called the post “shameful” and said it reflected political confusion.

“Responding to such nonsense and the political confusion reflected in the post would be nothing more than a waste of time,” the source said. The source called the post “a desperate attempt to divert attention from the core dispute: Ethiopia’s continued unilateral actions over its illegal dam, which violate international law.”

Habtamu made the same argument. He said it was shameful to hear Egyptian politicians demand that Ethiopia obtain their consent for dams that do no significant harm, and argued that Egypt had not consulted Ethiopia when it built Aswan. He described Cairo’s insistence on prior consent as an outdated approach rooted in colonial-era arrangements. 

The $5 billion GERD sits on the Blue Nile, about 14 kilometers from the Sudanese border. It is 1.8 kilometers wide and 145 meters tall, with a design capacity of 5,150 megawatts. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated it on September 9, 2025. Egypt and Sudan, the downstream states, have long demanded a legally binding agreement on how it is filled and operated. The United States has also stepped back, in a January 2026 letter to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, US President Donald Trump offered to restart US-led mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia on Nile water-sharing. 

The El Alamein declaration

The leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia met in El Alamein and issued a joint declaration covering both the Red Sea and the Nile, and among other things. On the question of the Red Sea, the four states affirmed “the principle of freedom of navigation and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states.” 

Regarding the Nile, the declaration emphasized “the importance of respecting international law regarding transboundary rivers including the Nile River particularly the principle of ‘no harm’ and the obligation to cooperate through prior notification, consultation, and consensus.” It also categorically rejected “any unilateral measures that harm the existing water uses of the two downstream Nile states.” The four countries pledged to keep strengthening “consultation and coordination among the four countries and other sisterly African nations.”

“Realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric”

Ethiopia issued its own statement in response to the El Alamein declaration, arguing, “Ethiopia is the source of the Abay River, commonly known as the Blue Nile. Virtually all of the Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands, and the Abay contributes about 85% of the Nile River’s total flow. Any discussion concerning the utilization and management of the Abay River should be informed by these fundamental realities.”

Insisting that, “Despite changes in political boundaries over time, Ethiopia remains closely connected to the Red Sea, with its nearest border lying barely 30 miles from the coast. Accordingly, any serious discussion of regional maritime affairs and security architecture must account for Ethiopia’s legitimate interests and its enduring connection to the Red Sea.”

It added, “These geographic and historical realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric, coercive measures, or acts of destabilization. Actions taken through proxies or acts of aggression will not change the facts on the ground, nor will they diminish Ethiopia’s legitimate interests, role, and responsibilities in the region.”

Reaffirming that it “stands ready to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and core national interests,” Ethiopia urged regional actors to pursue “constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness rather than confrontation and zero-sum approaches.”

With fighting is spreading in Ethiopia’s north and rival blocs are forming along the Red Sea, the Nile dispute could be tied into a wider regional confrontation.

The Lighthouse of Alexandria has been gone for more than seven centuries. A series of earthquakes, including those of 1303 and 1323, brought down the tower that had guided ships towards the city for some sixteen hundred years. Its outline has now turned up on the seabed again, shrunk to the size of a ring. […]

Around 5,000 years ago, when writing was in its infancy and Egypt had just been united under a single king, the first pharaohs picked a patch of desert at Abydos, in Upper Egypt (the southern part of the country, upriver on the Nile), as their final resting place. The spot is called Umm el-Qaab, Arabic […]

Of all the animals shown in the tombs and art of ancient Egypt, very few have a name. Almost all of those that do are dogs. A handful of horses are named too, though far fewer survive. Cats, the animal most of us now associate with Egypt, are a different story. The literature offers only […]

Picture ancient Egypt’s funerary cult and the mind jumps to the dead themselves: the offerings, the gods, the pageantry. Easy to forget are the people who actually carried the bread, beer, and incense to the tomb, day after day, for generations. A team from the University of Seville wants to put them back in the […]