Driven off front lines by severe burnout and physical threats, tens of thousands of experienced nurses are moving to telehealth, urgent care and outpatient clinics
The U.S. Air Force plans to field more than 1,500 manned, combat-coded fighter aircraft by 2035, roughly 60 percent of which will be stealth platforms.
The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35As and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s. The sixth-generation Boeing F-47s are gradually expected to replace the aging Raptors.
If the plans materialize, then by 2035, every three out of five U.S. Air Force fighters will be stealth platforms, and every two out of five fighters will be F-35s.
The new plans are part of an updated fighter force structure report the USAF submitted to Congress last week, and Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, revealed them at a media briefing in the Pentagon on October 20.
About 40 percent of the fleet could be F-35s, Tabor said.
Another 20 percent would be a mix of F-22 Raptors and F-47s as the sixth-generation fighter replaces the Raptor, Tabor said, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
The USAF built 186 F-22 Raptors and plans to replace them with an equivalent number of sixth-generation F-47s.
Tabor did not provide a breakdown of the remaining 40% of the force structure; however, he said the remaining fleet would likely split evenly between F-15 Eagle variants and F-16 Fighting Falcons.
Notably, the F-35A Lightning IIs currently make up about 30 percent of the USAF fighter fleet, with the F-22 Raptors contributing another 10 percent.
The stealth platforms currently make up about 40% of the USAF fighter fleet.
The Air Force plans to increase the share of stealth platforms from 40% to 60% over the next nine years, with the F-35A share increasing from 30% to 40%, and the F-22 Raptors and F-47s contributing the remaining 20%.
He did not provide the breakdown of how many F-22s and F-47s the USAF plans to operate in 2035.
In March 2025, Boeing won the contract to design and develop the F-47 fighter under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort. The sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter operational service in 2029 or mid-2030, and gradually replace the F-22 Raptors.
The F-15 Eagles’ share is expected to rise from 15% to roughly 20%, while the F-16 Fighting Falcons’ share is expected to fall sharply from 45% to 20%.
F-47: Image for Representation.
By then, the USAF will phase out all A-10 Thunderbolts.
The USAF had about 162 A-10C Thunderbolt IIs at the beginning of 2026. The U.S. Congress blocked the Air Force’s request to retire them all in FY2026 and required the USAF to keep at least 103 aircraft until October.
The USAF now plans to retire them all by September 2030. Notably, the current breakdown of the USAF fighter fleet does not include the A-10C Thunderbolts: 45% F-16s, 30% F-35s, 15% F-15s, and 10% F-22s.
USAF Needs To Add Over 70 Fighters Annually For The Next Decade
The USAF aims to increase its fighter fleet from the current 1,271 fighters (including 103 A-10C Thunderbolts) to 1,509 combat-coded aircraft by 2035.
Notably, last year’s report set a 2030 target of 1,369 combat-coded fighters.
The USAF will therefore need to add another 238 aircraft over the next nine years. When accounting for the 103 A-10C Thunderbolts set to retire by 2030, the USAF will need to add 341 fighters.
However, the USAF will need to add many more fighters, as nearly 200 F-16s, at least 60 F-15Es, and some F-22 Raptors will also retire during this time.
The USAF will therefore need to add nearly 700 fighters over the next nine years to reach its target of 1,509 manned, combat-coded fighters, while also accounting for fighters that will retire during this time.
The USAF officials have consistently maintained that the service needs to buy 72 new fighters each year to replace its older, retiring jets and modernize the fleet.
The U.S. has not reached that target yet; in 2027, the budget request proposed adding 62 new fighters, including 38 new F-35s and 24 F-15EXs.
Tabor said those purchases can “ramp over time” to hit the numbers the Air Force needs.
“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” Tabor said. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”
The Continued Relevance Of Fourth-Gen Fighters
On an aside, the USAF report submitted to the U.S. Congress makes it clear that even in 2035, the force intends to have a substantial fleet of fourth-generation fighters, nearly 40 percent, split evenly between upgraded F-15EXs and newer F-16s.
Put differently, even in 2035, two out of every five USAF fighters will be non-stealth platforms, underscoring the force’s belief that these upgraded fourth-generation fighters will remain relevant over the next decade.
The USAF has already tested this doctrine of flying a mix of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters in the Iran War.
In June 2025, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the USAF employed a mixed force of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters against Iranian targets. The F-35As reportedly led the penetration of Iranian airspace, conducting SEAD/DEAD missions against air-defense systems and escorting B-2 bombers to their targets; F-22s provided air superiority, while F-15Es and F-16s also participated in the broader strike package.
An F-22 and a F-35 fly in the skies above Edwards Air Force Base: USAF
This operation provided a real-world test of using fifth-generation aircraft to suppress defenses and enable follow-on strikes by fourth-generation fighters.
The USAF followed the same strategy during Operation Epic Fury.
The USAF, therefore, continues to invest in upgraded fourth-generation platforms, such as F-15EXs.
According to the 2027 budget documents, the USAF plans to procure up to 268 new F-15EX aircraft over the next 10 years, potentially costing U.S. taxpayers over US$ 37 billion.
Meanwhile, the USAF is also considering an upgraded F-16 variant called the F-16G.
The F-16G variant differs from the Block 70 F-16 Viper, which many countries worldwide, including Taiwan, Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain, Peru, and others, have ordered.
Buoyed by the F-15EX’s success, Lockheed Martin is aggressively pushing the F-16G variant to the USAF.
Tabor clarified that while the USAF is considering the F-16G variant, it does not have to decide “immediately.”
“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately.”
He said the decision likely won’t be made in the 2028 budgeting process, but perhaps in the years that follow.
“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” he said.
“It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”
One advantage to buying more F-16s is that “it’s practically a ready-made aircraft,” Tabor said.
In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the USAF was weighing a new F-16 variant to fill capability gaps at a lower cost than the F-35.
Ordering upgraded F-16s also offers the USAF other advantages.
The U.S. already has an established F-16 production line in Greenville, South Carolina. So, ordering new F-16s wouldn’t require establishing a new production line or reviving a dormant one.
However, it remains to be seen whether the F-16G achieves the same success as the F-15EX.
Tabor stressed that pushing multi-year procurement packages, as the USAF is currently exploring for the F-35 and F-15EX, will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in expanding their production facilities, which will help meet the USAF’s ambitious target of adding 72 fighters every year.
Tabor also clarified that the USAF will continue investing in crewed fighter jets, even as it adds hundreds of autonomous drone fighters, known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), to its fleet.
The USAF aims to field 500 CCAs by 2032.
“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said.
“It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”
For the foreseeable future, the USAF is seeking to balance crewed fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation platforms with autonomous drone fighters.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
In a major milestone, the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz-class aircraft carrier remotely controlled an MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueller from more than 2,100 miles away, a capability that could eventually boost F/A-18 Super Hornets.
“In a historic U.S. naval aviation event, an aircraft carrier connected to and controlled an unmanned aerial refueler, the MQ-25A Stingray, more than 2,100 miles away,” the US Navy said in an official release.
The MQ-25 Stingray is designed primarily as an unmanned aerial tanker, though it could also be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
During what the Navy described as a preliminary sea trial, the ship’s Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC), used by Air Vehicle Pilots (AVPs) for controlling future MQ-25 Stingray airborne operations, employed its MD-5C Ground Control Station to establish a Beyond Line-of-Sight connection with an MQ-25A test aircraft through a Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) satellite network, the service stated.
While the carrier was in the Pacific Ocean, Boeing kept the MQ-25 at its Illinois facility for the trial.
To provide command and control of the MQ-25A, the MD-5C GCS combined Lockheed Martin’s MDCX hardware and software with other government-made equipment and the Navy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) network. The Navy also noted that this system will command and control the Navy’s future unmanned carrier aircraft and the Air Wing of the Future.
“This first-ever underway connection between a carrier-based UAWC and an MQ-25A aircraft proves that the Carrier Air Wing of tomorrow is a reality today,” said Capt. Daniel Fucito, program manager for the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office.
This marks a momentous step toward integrating unmanned systems into carrier air wings and preparing the Navy’s first carrier-based unmanned tanker for operational use. The trial was part of a series of build-up exercises intended to verify protocols, networks, and interfaces.
Before this, the MQ-25 Integrated Test Team, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and the US Navy, conducted pier-side and at-sea tests with the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office’s (PMA-268) Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System team.
Although the test showed remote connectivity and control over a significant distance, the Navy did not record an autonomous flight, aerial refueling operation, or carrier landing.
Nonetheless, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Hung Cao, said, “The MQ-25A Stingray’s carrier-based refueling capabilities enable F/A-18 Super Hornets to fly farther and longer. The integration of this unmanned aerial refueler demonstrates the transformational change our manned and unmanned asset integration provides the Fleet.”
Why Does This Long-Range Trial Matter?
This latest demonstration matters because it validated critical enabling technologies for unmanned carrier operations.
Notably, the earth’s curvature and the vast operating areas of carrier strike groups, such as the Pacific Ocean, limit traditional radio links. Routing commands and data through a resilient satellite constellation removes that constraint.
Against that backdrop, the latest trial confirms that the Navy’s MD-5C Ground Control Station architecture can operate in a realistic operational environment, not just in controlled shore-based or pier-side tests.
Furthermore, the successful use of a proliferated LEO satellite constellation from a moving warship proves that reliable beyond-line-of-sight command and control is achievable in a realistic at-sea environment.
Three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers feature Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC) infrastructure using Lockheed Martin Skunk Works-powered MD-5 ground-control systems. The USS George H.W. Bush served as the fleet’s initial developmental testbed, while the USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Ronald Reagan are officially designated as the Navy’s first and second fully operational, deployable drone-capable carriers.
File: Unmanned Aerial Refueler Remotely Controlled By At-Sea Aircraft Carrier Control Station (Via US Navy)
Demonstrating that a carrier can continuously control an unmanned aircraft over intercontinental distances from its own Unmanned Air Warfare Center proves the viability of the shipboard control infrastructure already installed on these carriers.
This infrastructure is purportedly intended to support tankers and future uncrewed platforms performing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or other roles, enabling deeper manned-unmanned teaming between crewed and uncrewed platforms.
This capability counts because the MQ-25A is designed to serve as the Navy’s carrier-based unmanned tanker, taking over aerial-refueling duties that currently take time away from the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
By validating long-range control from the carrier, the Navy has shown that operators aboard the aircraft carrier can direct the Stingray to deliver fuel to fighters hundreds of miles from the deck.
Stingray refueling will extend the carrier air wing’s combat radius and time on station while keeping more Super Hornets available for strike, air superiority, or other primary missions instead of diverting them into “buddy” tanker roles during crucial deployments.
MQ-25A freshly painted in U.S. Navy livery (Via Boeing)
This would be a critical enhancement to the carrier wing’s capability in theatres like the volatile Indo-Pacific region, where distances are long and adversaries like China field sophisticated anti-access/area-denial systems.
In a potential conflict with China, American carriers may need to operate farther from contested shorelines to reduce vulnerability to long-range missiles and other threats. In that scenario, a reliably controllable unmanned tanker that can be controlled from the ship will allow the air wing to project power over long distances without staying close to the carrier or relying on land-based or allied tanker support that may be hard to obtain.
That said, a proliferated satellite network also adds resilience, particularly because such constellations are harder to disrupt completely than single high-value satellites or line-of-sight links. This will improve the survivability of the command-and-control chain under contested conditions, and in a conflict with a near-peer adversary like Beijing.
Operationally, this will also help the Navy achieve its manned-unmanned teaming objective. The MQ-25 Stingray, for one, has been positioned as a trailblazer for the “Air Wing of the Future,” and is expected to help establish procedures, networks, and infrastructure that will support not only tankers but also future uncrewed systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and potentially even strike roles.
Earlier this month, for instance, Boeing announced a successful trial of the Stingray’s Link 16 datalink-based Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) command-and-control software during the Emerald Flag exercise at Eglin AFB, Florida.
The software was installed on a Beechcraft 1900D and a King Air E90 to demonstrate command and control between the two aircraft. This capability will eventually move into the MQ-25A and Super Hornet.
The latest trial is an important step before Stingray starts operating from carrier decks. The Boeing MQ-25 T1 test asset previously refueled three carrier-based aircraft—an F/A-18 Super Hornet, E-2D Hawkeye, and F-35C Lightning II —but it has yet to fly from a carrier.The first production-representative MQ-25 flew for the first time in April 2026, and the service plans its first carrier launch next year.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Starlink, and later Starshield, have become vital for Ukraine’s defense and even offensive capabilities.
Amid ongoing tussle over Starshield restrictions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on October 20, 2026, that he had positive talks with the United States to resolve the issues.
“I spoke with Marco Rubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital.
Third, we need to restore the Starlink/Starshield situation. Of course, all of this comes against the backdrop of our diplomatic efforts to end this horrific war and the constant killing of people. We agreed to get in touch again soon for an update.
Thank you, Marco, for the constructive discussion! Thank you to everyone in America who supports fair approaches!” Zelenskyy said in a post on X.
However, the restrictions have highlighted Ukraine’s heavy military dependence on US-linked satellite systems amid political friction with the Trump administration, including mounting pressure over Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and related disputes over intelligence sharing and sanctions policy, even as Moscow intensifies attacks.
Why is Starshield?
To understand Starshield and its utility for Ukraine, one must understand Starlink.
Starlink is a satellite internet service developed and operated by SpaceX. It operates a constellation of thousands of smaller satellites at around 550 kilometers above Earth.
Notably, traditional terrestrial and satellite communication (SATCOM) networks cannot match Starlink’s bandwidth. Most conventional SATCOM systems also rely on geostationary (geostationary orbit) satellites, which introduce higher latency and limit the effectiveness of real-time applications such as remote piloting of UAVs, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.
However, Starlink’s low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite architecture makes it more resilient to jamming and provides a more secure communication channel.
Starshield is SpaceX’s satellite program focused on government and national security. While Starlink is built for consumers, businesses, and general connectivity, delivering high-speed internet via a massive constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites, Starshield is purpose-built for government customers—primarily the US Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, the US Space Force, and allied countries and their military, like Ukraine.
Ukraine has used both: commercial Starlink terminals widely for communications and logistics, and Starshield for higher-security military needs where available.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, it systematically targeted fiber-optic cables, cell towers, and power grids, destroying all traditional internet and jamming military radios. This is when Starlink stepped in.
Ukraine wanted Starlink terminals because they don’t rely on ground infrastructure and operate in blacked-out or contested areas. Starlink and Starshield provide connectivity even when the enemy damages or destroys traditional telecommunications infrastructure.
Ukrainian troops currently rely on Starshield for long-distance video transmission for military operations, information gathering, and communication. It serves as the backbone for encrypted voice, messaging, and data links between units, headquarters, and isolated positions. This includes real-time situational awareness systems.
Satellite internet connectivity is especially important for drone operations, which are central to Ukraine’s offensive and defensive strategies. These unmanned Ukrainian systems rely on satellite connectivity because current operations frequently require constant contact between controllers and aircraft.
Starshield enables long-range control and live video feeds from reconnaissance and attack drones far beyond the reach of normal radio links. It also supports interceptor drones that pursue fast Russian jet-powered drones, including the notorious Shahed class.
Ukrainian officials recently alleged that Starshield receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, impairing drones that depend on them for onboard guidance over Ukrainian territory.
In fact, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry official said the sensors worked when moving, but only up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph), meaning drones had to slow down significantly. Some units reported disruptions at even lower speeds.
When connectivity is sketchy or slows, missions slow, lose accuracy, and sometimes become impossible. In fact, military officers quoted in media reports alleged that connections were lost during operations and missions were canceled when connectivity failed. These constraints may have been especially painful because Ukraine increasingly uses drones for long-range strikes, as well as air defense and interception.
This screen grab from a SpaceX live webcast shows SpaceX’s Starship Flight 14 deploying Starlink V3 satellites into orbit on March 6, 2025. Flight 14 is planned to be the first to send Starship into orbit around the Earth as well as deploy Starlink satellites. (Photo by SPACEX / AFP) / RESTRICTED TO EDITORIAL USE – MANDATORY CREDIT “AFP PHOTO / HANDOUT / SPACEX” – NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS – DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS
Ukraine also uses Starshield to launch strikes from ground-based systems. It allows targeting data to flow quickly from sensors and drones to guns and HIMARS, closing the sensor-to-shooter loop and improving precision.
Additionally, Starlink/Starshield are crucial to Ukrainian forces receiving intelligence from allies. Western partners provide Ukraine with surveillance data regarding Russian air strikes, missile launches, troop movements, anti-aircraft positions, and escape routes.
Put succinctly, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on Starlink for battlefield management, Secure communications, Drone operations, artillery coordination and precision strikes, cybersecurity and intelligence sharing, and logistics and command networks.
At the same time, Starlink has significant civilian applications. It has also been crucial for hospitals, emergency services, local administrations, journalists, and ordinary citizens in frontline or occupied areas, who use it to stay connected when conventional networks fail.
By 2025, roughly 50,000 Starlink/Starshield terminals were operating in Ukraine, according to analysis from the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. As of now, Ukraine has no equivalent resilient, high-bandwidth LEO alternative available at comparable scale and speed of deployment.
What is The Ongoing Issue?
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine’s former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked SpaceX owner Elon Musk on X to activate SpaceX’s Starlink satellites.
Musk complied almost immediately and shipped user terminals to Ukraine.
SpaceX’s satellite internet service has since provided resilient communications when ground networks were jammed or destroyed, supported drone operations, logistics, and reconnaissance, and helped maintain connectivity for civilians and the military. In fact, it has become the cornerstone of Ukraine’s offensive and defensive operations throughout the grinding war.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces were jolted by connectivity problems with Starshield terminals. The Ukrainian government alleged that the Trump administration and SpaceX had unilaterally restricted its access.
Serhiy Beskrestnov, a presidential adviser on defense technologies and well-known military blogger, stated: “Our armed forces did not receive a warning about these restrictions, and this led to the failure of a number of missions… It’s clear that this action cannot be a coincidence and is connected to the current political situation.”
President Zelenskyy said Russian forces appeared to exploit the disruption, noting that interceptor drones hunting jet-powered Shahed-type munitions depend on the connection.
“It is clear that the Russians are trying to take advantage of the problems with Starlink in Ukraine, as our interceptor drones depend on this connection among other things,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted to X.
Responding to the claims, Musk wrote on X that the US government owns and controls the Starshield systems, and that the US military and president control any limits on its speed or use. Starlink “cannot be used for offensive military action, as doing so would be inappropriate for a commercial company,” Musk highlighted in his post.
Citing sources, Reuters reported that the White House had ordered the Department of Defense to slow down Starshield services for Ukraine.
This sparked speculation that the crucial communications system was briefly restricted to add more pressure on Ukraine to stop its strikes on Russian refineries, which US President Donald Trump has repeatedly blamed for skyrocketing fuel costs that are hurting his Republican Party’s chances in the upcoming November midterm elections.
The Trump administration did not confirm these allegations.
However, the sudden Starshield outage coincided with massive Russian ballistic missile attacks for which Ukraine did not receive any warning from the US, just days after the Trump administration warned Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries or face suspension of intelligence sharing.
Another twist in this grueling tale came when The Telegraph reported that Musk approached Trump about slowing down Starshield in Ukraine.
However, Trump later said he did not believe that either he or Musk was responsible for Ukraine losing access to Starshield.
Over the weekend, Marco Rubio went on record saying Starshield is currently unavailable to Ukraine, adding that a request from Kyiv to use the system for attacks deep inside Russia was “under discussion.”
“Starlink is a commercial product, okay? And so it’s regulated and handled as a commercial product. Starshield is a defense product, a military product,” said Rubio in comments published by the Pentagon. “They’ve asked for access to it in order to conduct deep strikes inside of Russia. They don’t have access to it at the moment. That’s under discussion,” he added.
Ukrainian officials say the restrictions affected Starshield terminals they use for military operations. Secretary Rubio has stated that Starshield itself is not currently available to Ukraine and that Ukraine’s drone operations have relied on commercial Starlink. The two sides do not agree on which system was restricted.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Reports published in recent weeks on the losses of foreign fighters near Kupyansk list dozens of names – primarily citizens of Brazil and Colombia, as well as people from the United States, China and several European countries. Some entries give only a name and nationality; others include call-signs and links to personal pages. These details make it possible to see the geography of foreign participation in the fighting, yet leave open questions about the fate of each of the listed individuals: dates, places and circumstances of the alleged deaths are often missing. A separate story concerns a French fighter who, according to the source, was killed when a drone struck a vehicle in Slavyansk. Altogether the materials contain 40 names from 11 countries.
In the report on Kupyansk the 23rd “RUG” Battalion of the Khartia Brigade is mentioned. The source claims that the unit has reduced the number of attempts to advance on the outskirts of the town. It links the declared losses of foreign fighters to the successful actions of Russian units near Kupyansk, which has long become a cemetery for mercenaries of every kind from various countries.
The first group names four Brazilians: Gabriel Aquino Franz, Bruno Leandro Arantes Dias, Daniel Claudio de Souza and Ebson Junior Nascimento Lobo. Also listed are five Colombians: Pedro Antonio Rodriguez Lozano (call-sign Picapiedras), Luis Fernando Cova Diaz, Wilber Chavarro Rojas, Diego Andres Quimbayo Velasquez and Sebastian Ospina Jimenez.
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The second group consists entirely of Brazilian citizens. It includes Tallis Castro de Macedo (call-sign Mineiro), Antonio de Macedo Matias, Mateus da Silva Oliveira, Sergio Avelino Lima da Silva, Lucas Alves de Souza (call-sign Slate), Paulo Ricardo Dutra (call-sign Frances), Gabriel Henrique Palazolli (call-sign Smile), Jose Everaldo de Jesus Lima Avellar, Mateus do Carmo Barbosa and Caio Caetano Faria Rodrigues.
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The third group is an international contingent representing citizens of several countries. Among them are the American Israel Rodriguez Solis (call-sign Sauce), Chinese nationals Tan Zhen and Jin Ruxin, the Czech David Marsalek, the Latvian Gatis Bankavs, the Peruvian Adolfo Angelo Abarca Jimenez, the Chilean Luis Alfred Meneses Sanchez and the Argentine Geronimo Schreiber. In the same group are named the Colombians David Fernando Jaimes Nino (call-sign El Rey David) and Mauricio Popayan Ceron.
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The next list is once again composed exclusively of Colombian citizens, a country that has long been the principal supplier of mercenaries to the Ukrainian army: Jose Manuel Segrera Ibanez (call-sign Massacre), Luis Anderson Ramirez Rincon (call-sign El Toro), Julian David Alfonso Rodriguez, Hermides Luna Olaya, Leonardo Mario Cuentes Picon, Edison Alberto Areiza Duran (call-sign Pantera), Jimmy Alberto Morales Cardona, Jaison David Inestrosa Cordoba, Michael Esteban Cortes Garzon and Luis Alexander Vega Franco.
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Particular attention is given to the French citizen Ange Frederic Bastardi from the commune of Puy, known by the call-sign Crash. He was killed in Slavyansk when a fibre-optic-controlled FPV drone struck a Nissan vehicle that, according to the report, belonged to the 60th Separate Mechanised Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The strike took place on Torskaya Street.
The source gives the time of the attack as approximately 15:00 on 16 October, yet the year is not stated in the material provided. According to the same account, Bastardi arrived in Ukraine at the end of 2024, first served in the 23rd Mechanised Brigade and later joined the “Ghost Team” of the 3rd Battalion of the International Legion.
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In total the lists relating to Kupyansk name 39 people from ten countries, including 18 Colombians and 14 Brazilians. Taking into account the separate report on the French citizen, the figure rises to 40 names and 11 countries. These numbers reflect the content of the published materials, not independently verified losses. Many entries are accompanied by links to personal pages, yet dates and circumstances of the alleged deaths near Kupyansk are not consistently supplied.
Friends were surprised when I described Darwin as the only major scientist who was unequivocally an atheist, given that he considered himself an agnostic. I confess that I tend to erase this label in my memory, because the formal distinction presumed by it—to wit, the idea that an agnostic does not know whether God exists, while an atheist knows that God does not—does not correspond to reality. I am not aware of a single prominent atheist who claims to be able to prove the non-existence of the divine. Even Dawkins, the most stereotypical atheist in the media, does not suggest that this is possible. In The God Delusion (Chapter 2), he describes himself as a de facto atheist, defined by the following stance: “I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.” Thus, if we apply the traditional distinction, the world’s most famous atheist is not an atheist, but an agnostic.
Bertrand Russell held a similar position, as illustrated by his famous “celestial teapot” analogy. Can we prove that there is a teapot orbiting the planet? No. But we have no reason to believe that such a teapot exists. God is like that teapot: while it is impossible to prove that he does not exist, it is not reasonable to believe that he does. For this reason, Russell considered himself an agnostic in theory and an atheist in practice.
Darwin
If the term “agnostic” serves any purpose, it is to describe individuals who truly live in a state of doubt regarding the existence of God. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) was born to a deist father and a Unitarian mother. Deism entails the rejection of all institutionalized religion and the assertion that God exists, but takes no interest in humanity. As an 18th-century Englishman, Darwin’s father most likely believed in the Great Architect of Newton and the Freemasons. Unitarianism is a new flavor of Arianism, as it denies the divinity of Jesus, viewing him instead as a great moral reformer—comparable to Socrates. Unitarians took control of Harvard in the 19th century, and Newton was, in fact, a secret Arian. We might say, then, that Darwin did not grow up in a strictly Christian home; yet, he seriously considered becoming an Anglican priest and married a devout Christian woman. Undoubtedly, Darwin experienced crises of faith, which rendered him an agnostic, in the sense that the term describes a psychological state.
As far as we know, the first time he described himself as an agnostic was in 1879, at the age of 70, in a private letter to John Fordyce. According to some accounts, in 1881 he told a group of freethinkers that he had not abandoned Christianity until he was forty (which would have been in 1849). Did he abandon Christianity, adopt his father’s beliefs, and then eventually abandon those as well? I do not know the answer, but it is a vital question for Darwin’s scientific trajectory, since, by today’s labels, Newton would be a creationist or an intelligent design advocate.
The most illuminating account is found in his autobiography, written between 1876 and 1881 for his family. I quote James Moore from “Myth 16: That Evolution Destroyed Darwin’s Faith in Christianity—until He Reconverted on His Deathbed”: “Unwilling to give up Christianity, he had tried to ‘invent evidence’ to confirm the Gospels, which prolonged his indecision. Just as his clerical career had died a slow ‘natural death,’ so his faith withered gradually. But there was no turning back once the deathblow struck. His dithering crystallized into a moral conviction so strict that he could not see how anyone—even [his wife] Emma—‘ought to wish Christianity to be true.’ For if it were, ‘the plain language’ of the New Testament ‘seems to show that the men who do not believe, and this would include my Father, Brother and almost all my best friends, will be everlastingly punished. And this is a damnable doctrine.’ In later years, the residual theism evident in the Origin of Species became worn down, and now with ‘no assured and ever present belief in the existence of a personal God or of a future existence with retribution and reward,’ Darwin felt he must be ‘content to remain an Agnostic.’” Darwin’s father, a pivotal figure in his crisis of faith, died in 1848, a year before Darwin himself turned forty.
Darwin did not die in a state of indecision; he died firmly convinced that Christianity was immoral because it would condemn his loved ones to hell. If the term “agnosticism” applies here, it denotes a state of unknowing that follows the rejection of God as understood within the Abrahamic religions. Darwin knows that the Bible is wrong and that its God does not exist. But as for what God actually is, or what the truth may be—that, he does not know. Certainly, determining Darwin’s final state of mind is not enough to uncover the impact that his shifting religious convictions had on his thinking, given that the writing of On the Origin of Species (1859) spanned two decades.
The origin of the term “agnosticism”
No less than thirty years passed between the onset of Darwin’s disbelief and his first self-identification as an agnostic. A simple reason why he did not use this term earlier is that it had not yet been invented. It is rarely mentioned, but “agnosticism” is a term with a specific inventor and date of origin: in 1869, when Darwin was already 60 years old, Thomas Henry Huxley (known as “Darwin’s Bulldog,” and grandfather to both Aldous, the writer who advocated for opening the mind through drugs, and Julian, the eugenicist who founded the WWF and served as the first head of UNESCO) coined the term during a meeting of the Metaphysical Society, a somewhat secretive group open only to invited members. Darwin was not a member. The aforementioned Bertrand Russell had a deist relative who was a member: Lord Arthur Russell, nephew of Earl John Russell (Bertrand’s grandfather). Arthur Balfour, of the Balfour Declaration, was also a member. I could not have been there because I had not yet been born, but the Encyclopædia Britannica states that the term was coined under these circumstances, so I take believe it.
A public definition of agnosticism by the grandpa Huxley was first presented to the public in 1889, in the magazine Popular Science (or Pop Science), which still exists today. It reads as follows: “Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. That principle is of great antiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, ‘Try all things, hold fast by that which is good’ [1 Thess. 5:21]; it is the foundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him; it is the great principle of Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern science. Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in store for him.”
Based on this definition, there is no obvious connection to a stance regarding the question of divine existence; however, the text as a whole implies a negative position: throughout, Huxley distinguishes himself from Comte, and agnosticism from the Comtian “Religion of Humanity.” He finds it necessary to differentiate himself because they share a disbelief in an Abrahamic God, an adherence to scientism, and a triumphalism akin to the “End of History.” The differences are that Comte and the positivists were mediocre scientists who created a church with a structure inspired by Catholicism, whereas the 19th-century English agnostics were brilliant and had no intention of founding a church.
It is worth noting the Unitarian flavor of this rhetoric, which seeks to trace a rationalist and contrarian lineage—beginning with Socrates, running through the Bible, and reaching its pinnacle in the present day—stripped of any supernatural elements. Another significant 19th-century English figure who adopted this approach was John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty. His wife and collaborator was a Unitarian.
And, of course, we see here an opposition—perhaps historically unprecedented—between possessing a scientific spirit and believing in God. We can say that Darwin’s Bulldog, during Darwin’s lifetime, ostracized Deism from science, since Evolution was presented as a refutation the Newtonian Architect’s existence.
A Matter of Terminology
Ultimately, Thomas Huxley was what we would today call an atheist—as was likely Darwin, given that he chose the term coined by his friend to describe his own position. Curiously, even Comte did not call himself an atheist. It seems that the spirit of atheism and scientism was widespread among the 19th-century intelligentsia, yet the willingness to embrace the label was confined to radicals such as Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx (whose 1841 dissertation focused on Democritus and Epicurus, the fathers of materialism), and Mikhail Bakunin. In that era, the distinction between the terms “atheist” and “agnostic” likely amounted to little more than one’s willingness to shock society. Neither the French positivists nor the English evolutionists sought to shock; the communists and anarchists, however, did.
Over time, by the 21st century, being an atheist no longer shocks anyone; in more intellectual circles, it is the norm. Hence the tendency to discard the term “agnostic,” or to reserve it exclusively for those who are in a state of genuine doubt. Another semantic issue concerns what we mean by “God.” Some people say things like, “For me, God is energy”—which leads one to wonder: does it make sense to claim that God is the very same thing that makes my electric fan spin and subsequently shows up on my utility bill? In the United States, one of the few Western nations where declaring oneself an atheist can still cause a stir, it is common for people to label themselves “spiritual, but not religious.” Such individuals often gravitate toward esoteric practices—crystals, horoscopes, Zen meditation, gurus who are as ugly as they are hungry for sex, and so on—without committing to any specific religion. This is likely a legacy of deism; after all, Freemasonry played a significant role in the nation’s founding and is rooted in deism. It is no coincidence that this 21st-century deism can, much like its Renaissance precedents, the libertins, become blurred with atheism. Sam Harris himself, for instance, is an atheist who embraces New Age ideas.
It is a historical irony, then, that one of the coiners of the term “psychedelia” (Greek for “revelation of the mind”) happens to be the grandson of the man who coined the term “agnosticism.” It seems that a segment of humanity cannot relinquish the pursuit of ecstatic experiences and revelations, even after abandoning the notion of divine transcendence—leading them, instead, to seek such experiences within the material realm. The distinction between a “sober” atheist and a New Age atheist appears to be more a matter of temperament than of philosophy—much like the distinction between an atheist and an agnostic in the 19th century.
The Brazilian elections have proved fertile ground for the expression of the most common electoral stereotypes, which, by and large, are responsible for the sharp slide toward a superficial politics, barren of debate over effective solutions for our collective future, yet rich, deep down, in carnival aesthetics, more liberal or more conservative, in bitter invective, and in an exacerbated tendency toward the easy insult or even the basest personal offenses.
None of this is unfamiliar from the US, where national politics is discussed in a conservative, parochial, cramped, and backward fashion, with barricades on both sides avoiding debate on the truly divisive issues, labeled “radical”; nor is it unfamiliar from Old Europe, whose political class has lost quality to a degree that differs nothing, today, from what goes on in Brazil, Argentina, or other places marked by the submission of their leading political figures to Anglo-Zionist imperialism, to the immense power of the oligarchy, or, in the final analysis, to the need to reconcile domestic policies with the international agenda of imperialism.
As we look at a left wing caught, all too often, in individualistic, liberal identity politics — thereby diverted from the workplaces, from the factory floor, from the dramas of exploitation that underlie the deepest problems with which the majority of the population grapples — we also find a right wing that works as the other side of the coin: to the liberalism of part of the left (the liberal left) on matters of customs, the right answers with conservatism; to the left’s promises of social justice (the liberal left), the right answers with more liberalism and even “ultraliberalism.” Both end up saying very little about what really matters, focusing much of the time on side issues more closely bound to aesthetics than to essence.
Nevertheless, with a keen eye, we can always unearth what lies behind one or another piece of pamphleteering. One of the most important themes in contention today in Western societies — or Westernized ones, as is the case of Brazil, Latin America, and Latin Europe — is the tension between sovereignty and submission to Anglo-Zionist imperialism. If in Europe — in the cases of Portugal, Spain, or Italy — that tension is mediated by an already submissive EU, which tends to act as a protective layer over national tensions, then once the question of sovereignty is raised, the tendency is, one of two things: either to see it as an extension of European sovereignty, which hides the real problem, or to see it as an attempt to discuss leaving the EU, which is still regarded as taboo in broad circles of one camp or another. In Brazil, that tension lies more exposed, since there is no American Union to mediate the country’s foreign relations with the US and Israel, the great representatives of Anglo-Zionist imperialism.
And in this case, it is interesting to note that on the Bolsonaro side — from which one might expect the nationalist proposal — this does not happen, or happens only residually, because even when it does, the attempt is unmasked by the excessive support that American social networks give to Bolsonaro’s candidacy, or by the constant interference of Trump and his cronies in the Brazilian electoral process. However much the right wished to present itself as the defender of the nation and its independence, the effusive support of the US for the candidacy in question would bring the mask down, for the US — and Israel — would never support so vehemently and so openly anyone who was not subservient to them. Lula’s absence from Silicon Valley’s algorithmic command posts ends up giving away which of the two candidates is more subservient to US interests.
On Lula da Silva’s side, by contrast, the more clearly drawn proposals on the defense of sovereignty have in fact emerged — even if some of that intensity may later collide with the pragmatic dictates of realpolitik, imposed by the need to strike deals with a notoriously pro-imperialist “centrão.” Either way, this dividing line exists, and it seems scarcely credible to me that anyone in full possession of their mental faculties could choose a protégé of Trump to defend Brazil’s sovereign interests, rather than an experienced conciliator, even if not a revolutionary one.
Knowing how important this question is, afterward, for the sovereign management and use of endogenous resources and for their allocation to an independent development plan, the choice of Bolsonaro seems to me hard to defend, should the sovereign question weigh in that choice. As in the EU, the sovereignists have not found the best practices on the right either — perhaps with the exception of Viktor Orbán, who governed Hungary for sixteen years, until the April 2026 elections — but more out of a need to align with Russia and China, as a consequence of the EU’s energy and industrial choices, than out of any need to build a genuinely sovereign national project. Moreover, if further proof were needed, Orbán’s total alignment with Zionism allowed us to see that his disagreement with the EU was merely tactical, not a matter of principle or of defending national sovereignty. Orbán never for a moment renounced NATO or distanced himself from Israel and Zionism — factors he used as platforms of support against the Brussels bureaucracy. His submission to Trump, for that matter, was also explicit, and voiced with the fervor of one who saw in him “an envoy of God”!
In the case of Meloni, Babiš, and others, the question is the same: much talk, but in the end, the same alignment — which foreshadows where parties like the AfD will later turn. Faced with the fundamental questions, they too will fall in line, either with submission to Brussels or with direct submission to Zionism and US imperialism. Others, like Meloni, manage a middle path that, in the end, has the same social consequences. Where it really counts, young people keep running into unemployment, cannot find a home, watch infrastructure decay, see labor rights under relentless attack, and see their wages rapidly losing value against the brutal rise in the cost of living. There is no place where this “new right” is entrenched and seated in the halls of power where this does not happen.
Hence another important parallel persists between the Brazilian elections and what goes on in Europe and the West in general: whether in Brazil, the US, or Europe, this “new right” also uses the identity agenda as its dividing line against the left. Supposedly, the “left” — liberal, I would add — would be responsible for a decadence of customs and of cultural and religious values, for the social and moral decay of the defenders of this “woke” drift.
Now, this demarcation has served as a justification for many who once presented themselves as critics of Zionism, defenders of multipolarity, anti-imperialists, and defenders of Global South sovereignties, and who now use this supposed “wokeness” of the left to justify electing a representative of submission to imperialism like Bolsonaro. This demarcation has one problem: the only thing more “woke” than the “woke” is the one who makes wokeness the most important thing in politics, whether one is for it or against it.
On the left, many are unable to identify, in the excessively identitarian agendas, an individualistic, divisive agenda that fragments the working classes — one originating in the US itself, whose mass-manipulation services turned being “woke” (alert to social injustices) into a kind of identitarian pamphleteering. They stripped the “woke” movement of the class-based dimension and the just redistribution of wealth it once had, and gave it a panoply of identities in exchange — turning the concern with equality, social justice, and freedom, a materialist and universalist concern, into a tribalistic, individualistic concern, and, above all, one disconnected from the material dimension, that is, from the dimension of the just redistribution of the wealth produced by labor.
But on the right, when this tribalistic and individualistic drift is used as a dividing line, what genuinely distinguishes left from right is also denied. For in the historical matrix that separates left from right lies wealth: who dominates it, and how it is shared. On one side, those who hold that property and wealth must not be the measure of freedom and political initiative, and that all human beings are entitled to a life of dignity (universalism); on the other — on the right — plutocratic physiocracy: the idea that freedom and the capacity for political intervention should be measured by the wealth one has. Hence the liberal suffrages rested on a census-based — that is, identitarian — logic, in which what counted was the wealth one had, being a man, and knowing how to read and write; and were it not for the struggle, notably that of the suffragettes, to achieve what we today call “universal suffrage,” we would still be there. I suspect they, too, were accused of being “woke,” in the terms in vogue at the time!
Thus, from then on — that is, since the founding moment of the “left–right” dichotomy of the French Revolution — the right has committed itself more to the preservation of property in the hands of those who hold it, and the left more to real democracy, to economic, social, and cultural democracy, rejecting the idea that the rich must remain rich and the poor must remain poor. In a manner of speaking, this is what we call universalist progressivism, as opposed to individualist progressivism, which leans above all toward questions of individual identity.
So when this right embarks on the anti-woke logic, making this agenda the most important aspect of the political discussion — as if what really mattered were not the things that allow us to live, to sustain, feed, and enjoy our body and spirit — it does so with only one intention: to divert attention to a superficial issue, so that what is most precious to it does not enter the proposals under discussion: the just redistribution of wealth and economic, social, and cultural democracy. Thus, what matters most to it remains beyond debate, and elections turn into a carnival of little flags for and against. Whoever chooses where to vote because of someone else’s wokeness is every bit as woke as they are.
But the similarities do not end here. Another is the question of security and fighting crime: on the right, the idea is spread that crime is fought with brutal violence; on the left, it is argued that as long as there is poverty, crime cannot be eradicated. Now, it does not take much intelligence to see that the first proposal fails precisely where it is most talked about: the US. No country has more common prisoners — and few will have more political prisoners; no country spends so much on supposed crime-fighting; no developed country has so much crime. Because in the US, the breeding grounds of common crime — the Black and Latino ghettos, where desperate populations live, deprived of basic conditions of employment, education, and essential public services — remain overcrowded and ever more impoverished. But that is only the crime of the desperate, the kind that shows up on television.
Another form of crime — which also features in the right/left agenda — is the question of corruption. If this “new right” waves the banner of corruption and the left barely speaks of it, it is equally true that, once elected, this “new right” does everything except end corruption. One need look no further than Trump to find a case of incorrigible corruption. And those who remembered Bolsonarismo and expected the end of corruption were also left cursing in the desert: the Bolsonaro government was, itself, a den of corruption. Perhaps the discussion should start with the point that, to end corruption, one must end what originates it: the immense disparity in the distribution of wealth, which allows some to use their immense economic power to obtain from political power what they lack in electoral legitimacy. This crime — white-collar crime — being even more insidious and giving rise to the deep causes of the other, does not show up as often on television.
On immigration, we have perhaps the only one of the great differences between the elections in Latin America, in Brazil, and in the countries of advanced capitalism. But immigration also shows up as a form of shallow identitarianism of the right. The more the “new right” talks about “excessive immigration,” the more it forgets that those who employ these immigrants are the very same who finance and support it; that immigrants come to work in the economic sectors with the lowest wages, exploited by the most backward and conservative bosses — the social base of the radical right; and that employers only turn to immigration as a last resort, because their anti-labor agenda has left workers today unable to project a future with stability; because the young, victims of the transformation of housing into real-estate speculation, can no longer plan a future as a family; and because mothers and fathers, victims of the deregulated work schedules imposed by employers and enshrined in law by the right, have no time for their families.
Worst of all, the more they deny the necessary material conditions, the more they claim to defend the family and its values. A clear display of hypocrisy and cynicism, which denies the deep causes of the problem — a problem that affects the entire West. As they have done, it is easier to deny that the fertility crisis is intrinsically bound up with the prevailing system. Know where there was no fertility crisis? In the socialist countries of the East. Industrialized, literate, and well-fed countries, which doubled their populations in 70 years. Today, taken over by capitalism, they find themselves caught up in the same old tune of the advanced-capitalist countries. They will not get out of it until the fundamental features of an economic system change — one that not only leaves women no time to have children but also destroys family cohesion through the deregulation of work and, consequently, of life.
Now, what is most interesting about this political debate is that those who, a few years ago — those who said there was no left or right, that politicians were all the same — are now the ones telling us that salvation lies in this “new right,” and they are the ones who bristle when we tell them that this “new right” has nothing “new” about it and that, on the contrary, it reeks of classic fascism.
They are never fascists, but they submit to Zionism and the Anglo-Zionist empire; they are not fascists, but they resort to the demagogy and easy rhetoric used by classic fascism; they are not fascists, but they wave mass banners as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they use religion and the supposed degradation of customs to divert attention from what is essential, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but once in power they privatize, attack labor rights, and shut down essential public services, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they attack knowledge and devalue study and individual effort, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they dismiss political experience, individual and collective track records, as classic fascism did, in order to dismiss institutions; they are not fascists, but they adopt a racialist, xenophobic, supremacist, and ultra-individualist discourse, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they are all anti-communist, anti-socialist, and opposed to social progress, as classic fascism was; they are not fascists, but they are backed by the oligarchy and the most backward employers, as well as by imperialism, as classic fascism was.
They are not fascists, but they smell, fly, sing, and bellow like fascists…
Call it what you will, but a “thirties” of the 21st century, armed with AI and social media? No, thank you! We can expect nothing different from those who have the same bosses and want to boss around the same employees…
Afterward, whomever you vote for, I hope you will spare me the tired old refrain of “we were fooled.”
SOURCES
Incarceration in the US — the US has the largest prison population in the world (about 2 million people) and the highest incarceration rate of any democracy; per capita (World Prison Brief / Prison Policy Initiative, 2026). https://eji.org/news/u-s-remains-world-leader-in-number-of-people-incarcerated/
Jair Bolsonaro — convicted by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to 27 years and 3 months in prison (September 11, 2025) for attempted coup d’état, armed criminal organization, and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law; serving his sentence since November 25, 2025. https://apublica.org/especial/o-julgamento-de-jair-bolsonaro/ ; https://checamos.afp.com/doc.afp.com.A2V88ZQ
Donald Trump — convicted in May 2024 on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records; in January 2025 he received an unconditional discharge (no jail time or fine), with appeals still pending in 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g3m95ykzko ; https://www.axios.com/2026/08/28/trump-hush-money-conviction-appeal
Viktor Orbán — Hungary is a NATO member, and Orbán was a close ally of Netanyahu and Israel; in the April 2026 elections, Péter Magyar put an end to Orbán’s 16 years in government. https://apnews.com/article/hungary-israel-euro-2024-soccer-1514e137b54b18a1fed8be8b6cd89b19 ; https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjef3yqnbx
Suffrage — in Portugal, census-based suffrage was only abolished in 1968; women obtained a limited right to vote in 1931 and full equality only with the 1976 Constitution. https://www.europeana.eu/pt/stories/votes-for-women ; https://arquivomunicipal.lisboa.pt/fileadmin/arquivo_municipal/difusao/publicacoes/cadernos/Cad04.pdf
Origin of the term “woke” — African American English, with records from the 1920s–1940s, popularized from 2014 onward by the Black Lives Matter movement. https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/woke-meaning-origin ; https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-09-30/how-woke-went-from-an-expression-in-black-culture-to-a-conservative-criticism
Origin of the terms “left” and “right” — the seating arrangement of deputies in the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789. https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-grande-dicotomia-o-que-ainda-separa-a-esquerda-da-direita/
Crime — the US homicide rate (≈6.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf
China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet is estimated to have reached 500 aircraft, according to open-source assessments by analysts tracking serial numbers and unit deployments. However, its ambitious H-20 stealth bomber, touted as a challenge to the US B-21 Raider, remains conspicuously absent.
The J-20 Mighty Dragon first flew in 2011 and entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2017. China has rapidly increased its inventory; Chengdu Aircraft Corporation facilities produce about 100-120 airframes a year.
China unveiled the tandem-seat J-20S at the 2025 Victory Day Parade as the EurAsian Times reported at the time. If production continues at pace, reports suggest the total number of J-20 aircraft, including the two-seat variant, could reach or exceed 1,000 by 2030.
Alongside the J-20, China is scaling production of the J-35 family, its second fifth-generation aircraft. Some estimates suggest China could have 200 to 300 J-35s operational by 2030.
This makes China the only nation besides the US to field two fifth-generation aircraft.
Beijing has also begun flight testing two different sixth-generation prototypes: the larger, three-engine Chengdu J-36 and the smaller twin-engine Shenyang J-50. They are seen as a counter to the Boeing F-47 6th-gen aircraft.
Where is China’s H-20 Bomber?
China has hinted about the debut of the H-20 stealth bomber for several years.
China first publicly acknowledged a next-generation stealth bomber, later identified as the H-20, around 2016. At the time, officials described it as a flying-wing design intended to provide true intercontinental penetrating strike capability.
In January 2021, a clip from the PLAAF’s recruitment video showed off the supposed flying-wing design to the public.
The following year, images of a metallic wind-tunnel test model of a bomber linked to the final H-20 prototype surfaced on Chinese social media (subsequently posted to X), sparking speculation that the bomber technology may be maturing at pace, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report at the time.
Possible Design of H-20 Bomber
In March 2024, then-PLAAF deputy commander Wang Wei told reporters the H-20’s development had no “technological bottlenecks” and hinted that the bomber’s public unveiling was imminent. He assured reporters that manufacturing and commissioning would follow the aircraft’s test flights and take place shortly after its official public debut.
Later that year, Beijing was widely expected to showcase the H-20 at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024. However, that did not happen at China’s biggest air show.
Meanwhile, the US B-21 ‘Raider’ next-generation bomber has moved at breakneck speed, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in record time in November 2023. The program is currently in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins.
By contrast, the Chinese H-20 has had no confirmed test flight, no publicly verified prototype imagery of a finished airframe, and no visible production line as of October 2026.
In fact, United States officials and intelligence assessments have grown increasingly cautious and skeptical in recent years about an impending unveiling.
The Pentagon’s December 2024 assessment of China’s military stated the H-20 is unlikely to appear before the end of the decade.
“The PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber,” the report emphasized.
The Pentagon’s 2025 China report did not mention the H-20 at all, directly or indirectly. However, the head of US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) was quoted saying: “I can certainly understand their [the Chinese] desire to have a long-range strike capability like the United States, and I know that they’re pursuing it aggressively.”
“What I can tell you is they’re just not there yet. I think our adversaries look at our long-range strike capabilities, and … want to mimic them, but they can’t,” he continued. “There’s no other country in the world [besides the United States] that can take and deliver a long-range strike platform pretty much on any day, at any time and place that they’re choosing, right?” AFGSC commander Gen. Stephen Davis added.
Notably, China’s only operational bombers are variants of the Xi’an H-6 family, the Chinese-built version of the 1950s Soviet Tupolev Tu-16. China currently operates the H-6K, its primary modern conventional bomber; the H-6N, a nuclear-capable variant; and the H-6J, the naval maritime-strike version optimized for anti-ship missiles.
File Image: H-6K Bomber Via X
Unlike the United States, which fields the formidable B-2 Spirit, China does not yet have a dedicated long-range stealth bomber.
Currently, widespread speculation suggests China may have faced technical hurdles in developing the next-generation stealth bomber.
China does not yet have a ready, purpose-built, fuel-efficient jet engine designed specifically for a large, long-range flying-wing bomber. Engines currently used on its transport planes (like the Y-20) or fighters (such as the WS-15) are not well-suited for the efficiency, range, and low heat signature needed. In addition, creating a smooth, seamless stealth surface on a large aircraft is much harder than on smaller fighter jets.
Another challenge China may face is building large composite structures, precision tooling, and manufacturing. Typically, building a smooth, tailless flying wing requires specialized production tooling and controlled environments that China has been developing.
Tailless designs are also inherently unstable and require advanced fly-by-wire systems, thermal management, and overall system integration.
Interestingly, the US intelligence and military leaders have described the program as facing “significant engineering design challenges” and being “nowhere near as good as US low-observable platforms.”
Even if prototypes exist or limited testing has occurred, China may have strong reasons to withhold a public unveiling. For one, strategic bombers are part of the nuclear triad and long-range conventional strike, and premature disclosure could reveal design details of a highly classified program, something Beijing officials have been outspoken about.
H-20 Do?
The aircraft would add a flying leg to China’s nuclear triad. The Pentagon’s 2018 and 2019 “China Military Power Report” predicted that China’s new H-20 long-range stealth bomber would have an operational range of 8,500 kilometers. It will be a “flying-wing” design with a payload capacity of around 10 tons.
The H-20 could project power beyond the first chain of islands, threatening infrastructure, ships, and bases from farther away. Furthermore, China would be able to threaten regional rivals like Japan and India and attack extremely critical peripheral places, such as the US island territories of Guam and Hawaii, with an increased long-range strike aviation force.
Analysts predict the aircraft would have serrated air intakes, cranked-kite wings, and foldable twin-tail surfaces that can switch between horizontal tailplanes and V-tails.
The H-20 is likely to feature internal armament bays that can accommodate conventional weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons, much like previous stealth systems. However, the H-20 is probably not intended for carpet bombing or deep-penetration missions, but rather for stand-off and limited penetration.
While China’s next fighter jets are gaining momentum, the H-20 seems far from reality.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
What was supposed to be an announcement on fraud quickly devolved into Trump vs The Independent. Andrew Feinberg details how it all happened in the Oval Office
What was supposed to be an announcement on fraud quickly devolved into Trump vs The Independent. Andrew Feinberg details how it all happened in the Oval Office
Both candidates in Brazil's presidential election called for their rival's disqualification Tuesday over allegations of social media malfeasance, according to court filings. Left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s campaign said they will request the annulment of right-wing rival Flavio Bolsonaro's candidacy over alleged election interference by tech giant Meta, while Bolsonaro's team is accusing Lula of "abuse of power" in the mass sharing of government postings on WhatsApp.
Both candidates in Brazil's presidential election called for their rival's disqualification Tuesday over allegations of social media malfeasance, according to court filings. Left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s campaign said they will request the annulment of right-wing rival Flavio Bolsonaro's candidacy over alleged election interference by tech giant Meta, while Bolsonaro's team is accusing Lula of "abuse of power" in the mass sharing of government postings on WhatsApp.
The U.S. military has successfully demonstrated a new lower-cost receiver that could form part of a future over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. The testing also raises the question of whether the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) research site in Alaska, which the U.S. Air Force transferred away more than a decade ago, could be repurposed for operational use in this role. A new radar of this kind would help the United States plug critical gaps in surveillance coverage over the ever-more strategic Arctic region. Canada is notably already pursuing a multi-billion-dollar OTH radar project in cooperation with Australia for this exact purpose.
The U.S. military put out a press release yesterday regarding the testing of the newly developed receiver array, which occurred between September 7 and September 11. This was the culmination of a series of “Arctic air domain awareness” experiments conducted cooperatively by U.S. and Canadian authorities over the past three years.
An aerial view of the HAARP site in Alaska, taken on September 7, 2026. USAF
The final round of experimentation last month “examined whether an existing high-frequency transmitter [HAARP], paired with a newly developed, low-cost [16-element high-frequency] receiver array, could detect aircraft beyond the coverage of current long-range radar sites,” according to the release. “The effort focused on improving awareness across a region where vast distances, harsh weather and limited infrastructure present challenges for air surveillance.”
“Researchers used the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program [HAARP] facility and a receiver array in Cold Bay developed by MITRE to collect data on participating aircraft over the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea,” the release added. “MITRE also supported the effort throughout the three-year experiment series and designed and executed the field experiment in partnership with government, scientific, and operational participants.”
A view of the MITRE-developed array in Cold Bay, Alaska, which was part of the testing in September. USAF
The remote HAARP site was built in the 1990s as part of a joint U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy effort. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also involved. The central component of the 33-acre facility is an array of 180 crossed-dipole antennas, which can transmit up to 3.6 megawatts of radio frequency energy, according to the Air Force.
In 2014, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would shutter the HAARP site and dismantle it. However, the following year, the decision was instead made to transfer it to the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which has continued to operate it as a civilian research facility.
“During an experimental air domain awareness initiative, HAARP served as a high-power illuminator, transmitting signals toward the ionosphere to support the detection of airborne targets over Alaska’s maritime approaches,” according to the captions of several pictures that accompanied the release yesterday. “The experiment evaluated bistatic over-the-horizon detection methods to explore potential improvements in long-range surveillance and air domain awareness across Alaska’s maritime approaches.”
Another view of crossed-dipole antennas at the HAARP site. USAF
The most common types of OTH radars are so-called ‘skywave’ or ‘backscatter’ designs. They usually consist of two large and geographically separated arrays of antennas. The ‘illuminator’ array pumps out signals that are bounced off the ionosphere, the ionized layer of Earth’s upper atmosphere, at a specific angle so that they return to the ‘receiver’ array. Objects of interest (in the air and/or on the surface depending on the specific configuration) are detected in the process. AsTWZ has previously written:
“Commonly, radars are limited by line of sight due to the curvature of the Earth in relation to the altitude they are operating at. OTHRs overcome this critical limitation, but with some major drawbacks.”
…
“While they offer much lower fidelity than many of their line-of-sight counterparts in most cases, they make up for it in huge range, hundreds of miles to thousands of miles (1,500 miles is common, for instance, for powerful military sky wave/backscatter OTHR systems) and a large coverage area. The sky wave type of OTHRs achieve this by bouncing their radio waves off the ionosphere to a coverage area where they hit targets and return the same way to the receiving station. The angle at which the radio waves hit the ionosphere dictates the range, and that angle is limited to a specific envelope or the waves won’t properly bounce back toward Earth. As such, placing the radar in the right place in relation to the targeted surveillance area or areas, to begin with, is key.”
In the testing last month, Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes, HC-130J Combat King II rescue aircraft, and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers “served as cooperative targets, providing known positions against which researchers could compare the experimental data,” according to the official release. “The team successfully completed testing, meeting or exceeding its test execution objectives. Initial results show the system was successfully able to achieve full skywave (beyond line of sight) detections of aircraft and correlation to truth flights. Thorough data analysis is ongoing.”
An Alaska-based E-3 Sentry receives fuel from a KC-135 tanker during an exercise in 2022. USAFAn HC-130J Combat King II seen landing at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska in August. USAF/Alejandro Pena
The release also says that the tests “explored how existing infrastructure and emerging technology could complement current surveillance capabilities.” This raises the possibility that the HAARP site, specifically, might be utilized as part of a new OTH radar. Whether or not this is actually under consideration is still unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information.
Today, NORAD relies heavily on a network of ground-based radars called the North Warning System (NWS) to provide aerial surveillance coverage in the High North. The radars that make up the NWS are also all pointed northward, and none of them provide the kind of wide-area long-range coverage that an OTH design would offer.
A map showing NWS radar sites in Canada and their coverage arcs. Nasittuq Corporation
The NWS reflects a long-standing focus on monitoring for aerial threats heading across the North Pole toward North America, especially possible nuclear strikes from Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). However, new avenues for geostrategic competition in the Arctic with Russia, as well as China, over natural resources, from oil and natural gas to fish and other sealife, as well as trade routes have emerged in recent years amid receding ice and other impacts of global climate change. This, in turn, has only prompted growing demand for surveillance coverage.
“We need a layered sensing grid, from [the] seafloor to the space layer. And we have no choice. It has to be layered and deep, a defense in depth, from a sensing point of view,” Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna, head of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, also said during a panel discussion at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in 2025, at which TWZ was in attendance. “And I will say I suffer from an insufficiency of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the Arctic on a daily basis. And I am fighting for information.”
McKenna was responding at the time to a direct question about gaps in so-called “domain awareness” in and around the Arctic and how to address them.
“I think there’s an importance here of not just air domain, but also space domain, and having a sufficiency of ISR in the Arctic to actually build you the [domain awareness] picture,” he added. “I haven’t really touched on over-the-horizon radar, but I certainly can get into it. I think that’s a really important capability given the austerity of the Arctic and the need for it to cue other things.”
For its part, Canada is now building its own new Arctic Over The Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), at an estimated cost of more than $4 billion. In an announcement last year that caught many off guard, the Canadian government announced that it would be leveraging technology originally developed for Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support this development. It is also important to note here that relations between Canadian authorities and the Trump administration have been and continue to be heavily strained over a variety of issues, which has prompted broad concerns about future defense and security cooperation.
An element of Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). Australian Department of Defense
Back in the United States, OTH radar plans are also now tied in with the broader Golden Dome air and missile defense initiative. Golden Dome is seeking to establish new layers of defense around the U.S. homeland against a wide array of threat types, and puts major emphasis on new space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Expanded defensive architectures within the Earth’s atmosphere are also part of this plan.
“Adversaries are developing and building advanced nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, Vice Commander of the U.S. element of NORAD and Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in August. This includes “cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missiles, as well as fractional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, to threaten not only Alaska and Hawaii, but the entire continent of the United States.”
Chinese hypersonic and other developments, in particular, enable new modes of attack that “can approach North America from the south, rather than the traditional northerly vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed,” Jarrard continued. “The Chinese have also been building a conventionally-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles that can range [sic] targets throughout Alaska, providing Chinese leaders strike options against our homeland below the nuclear threshold.”
“Russia’s advanced missiles, like the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, are designed to circumvent the ground-based radars used by NORAD and NORTHCOM to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge the ability to provide threat warning and attack assessment,” he added.
New OTH radars positioned in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific will not be able to address all of these threat developments alone. At the same time, the recent testing leveraging the HAARP site is another step toward meeting demands for sorely needed expanded long-range radar coverage in the Arctic.
The Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is bitterly complaining that the country cannot intercept Russian ballistic missiles because Kyiv has not been receiving advance launch warnings from its partners for over a week.
On October 19, Zelenskyy wrote on platform X: “Another Russian ballistic missile attack came in several waves overnight, and once again, there was no early warning from our partners.”
Earlier, explaining the criticality of early missile warning, Zelenskyy said on October 13, “A Russian ballistic missile attack on Kyiv. Once again, no early warning from our partners… Our systems detected these missiles only when they were already virtually on approach to Kyiv. … And this is absolutely unjust: when they are destroying our energy infrastructure, and Ukraine is not even receiving early warnings about ballistic missile launches.”
Along with Patriot missile interceptors, Zelenskyy has described ‘missile early warning’ as absolutely vital to intercept Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.
“I spoke with Marco Rubio… First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital,” he said on October 20.
Zelenskyy has so far avoided blaming the US for failure to provide advance early warning of missiles; rather, he is blaming Ukrainian “partners” as a whole for this failure.
However, Ukraine’s European partners have absolutely no role in this, as they themselves are entirely dependent on the US for the space-based early missile-warning system.
Along with Starlink and Starshield, a space-based early missile-warning system is another critical area where Europe currently has no comparable system, and if Washington withdraws its support to Kyiv, Europe will be simply incapable of filling the gap.
While Europe has invested in ground-based radars and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, long-range radars that can track a missile in its mid- and terminal phases, Europe has no space-based early missile-warning system that can detect a missile launch in its boost phase and provide warnings to ground and airborne radars for tracking and intercepting the missiles.
This is critical for successfully intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles, as it gives ground-based and airborne radars more time to track and intercept them.
Space-Based Missile Early Warning System: How Does It Work?
The US has a series of space-based satellites fitted with sensors that can detect, track, and identify missile launches from anywhere in the world, a Cold-War-era system that has been perfected and upgraded over the decades.
The US currently has six Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) around Earth to provide 24/7 global strategic missile-warning capability.
Launched between 2011 and 2022, these satellites are known as SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System). The satellites carry high-power infrared sensors that monitor Earth’s surface nonstop to detect heat signatures from missile launches.
Credit: US Space Force.
SBIRS satellites can scan large swaths of territory to detect missile activity and also focus on areas of interest for smaller-scale activities, including tactical ballistic missile launches.
These sensors are independently tasked, meaning the satellite can scan a wide territory while also focusing on a specific area of concern.
For instance, currently, the US SBIRS satellites would naturally scan Iran and Russia more than any other region.
During the missile’s initial boost phase, its exhaust plume releases intense heat. These intense heat signatures stand out in infrared sensors against the cooler Earth background.
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) sensors on satellites spot this signature within seconds of ignition, even through clouds or darkness, and provide ground-based stations and radars with the first warning of a missile launch.
These powerful sensors can detect any missile launch within seconds, from small, unsophisticated missiles such as the Iraqi Scuds, which were detected, tracked, and intercepted during the First Gulf War, to Russia’s large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and everything in between, such as the short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and even cruise and hypersonic missiles.
These sensors can not only detect missile launches, but also identify them. Missile rocket motors produce exhaust gases at different temperatures based on their fuel, chemical composition, and other design features, helping these sensors identify distinct missile signatures.
However, infrared sensors on the six GEO satellites are not the US’s only space-based assets that help it detect missile launches in their boost phases.
The space segment of the SBIRS program also includes Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) sensors riding on host satellites and legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.
HEO sensors improve coverage of high-latitude and polar regions that are harder to monitor effectively from GEO alone.
The DSP program was launched in the 1970s, after the experimental Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) of the 1960s proved the concept of detecting ICBM launches from space.
Under the DSP program, the US launched over 20 satellites with spinning IR sensors into geosynchronous orbit between 1970 and 2007.
DSP provided continuous strategic warning during the Cold War. It was this system that detected Iraqi Scud missiles during the First Gulf War.
The SBIRS program succeeded DSP, with significantly higher sensitivity, dual sensors, multi-spectral capability, better resolution, and improved ground processing.
Together, GEO, HEO, and DSP satellites provide 24/7 monitoring of Earth’s surface and can detect a missile launch from anywhere on Earth.
These satellites downlink data to ground stations (Air Force Space Command in Colorado), which analyze it to characterize the event, launch time and location, missile type, possible trajectory, and likely point of impact, then relay the information to NORAD, US Strategic Command, combatant commands, and missile defense systems.
This early missile warning is crucial to successful missile interception because it gives ground-based and airborne radars more time to track and intercept the missile, and Europe currently lacks a corresponding system.
In this screenshot made on October 12, 2022, French president Emmanuel Macron (R) speaks during an interview by French journalist and TV host Caroline Roux (L) in front of pictures of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin as part of a new show entitled “L’événement”, in Saint-Denis, northern Paris, on October 12, 2022. Emmanuel Macron is to give an hour-long interview on France 2, devoted to international crises and France’s place in the world: on the evening of October 12, 2022, he will take part in an unprecedented exercise, dictated by the escalation of the war in Ukraine and its heavy repercussions on Europe and the French. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / various sources / AFP)
Why Europe Is Dependent On The US For Early Missile Warning
SBIRS collects data and processes it at ground stations, then shares it with European allies through NATO’s Shared Early Warning System (SEWS).
This data is complemented by Europe’s ground-based and airborne radars, as well as by the US AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar at RAF Fylingdales in the UK.
However, Europe has no comparable space-based early missile-warning system. It has some space situational awareness, but nothing equivalent to a persistent space-based infrared constellation for detecting missile launches.
Therefore, not only Ukraine but Europe itself depends on the US for early warning of ballistic or hypersonic missile threats.
Europe therefore cannot fill the gap if Washington decides not to share these missile-launch warnings with Kyiv.
Europe has pursued this capability for years; however, its programs have not progressed beyond the technology-demonstrator stage.
For instance, in 2009, France launched SPIRALE, a spaceborne early warning demonstrator program. It successfully collected infrared data on missile launches; however, the program ended in 2011 and France is yet to launch a full-scale follow-up program.
European countries also launched another technology demonstrator program, TWISTER, in 2019.
In October last year, France and Germany signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to launch two complementary, interoperable geostationary (GEO) satellites with infrared sensors, under the JEWEL (Joint Early Warning for a European Lookout) program.
However, Europe currently has no sovereign, operational, space-based missile early-warning system.
Europe recognizes its vulnerability and has demonstrated its technological capability, but building a space-based, IR-sensor-equipped satellite constellation that provides nonstop coverage of every part of Earth’s surface would take at least a decade more.
Meanwhile, both Ukraine and Europe remain critically dependent on the US.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
Mitchell Fairbarn found guilty of animal cruelty after prosecutors say he hurt and frightened the 27-year-old bird
A Canadian man was convicted of animal cruelty charges on Monday for snatching a flamingo named Peachy from its enclosure at an iconic Las Vegas hotel.
Prosecutors said it was a malicious prank while a lawyer for the tourist insisted it was drunken foolishness not meant to harm the bird.
Far-right presidential candidate’s TV debate swipe at rival backfires as people take to social media to parody it
To Flávio Bolsonaro and his publicists, it must have seemed an ingenious idea that would expose his rival’s supposed crookedness on the eve of Brazil’s presidential election.
But the far-right politician’s decision to attend a primetime television debate against his leftwing opponent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with the word “corrupto” (corrupt) written on the palm of his hand has backfired.
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