Russia's Kalashnikov concern has met its annual arms contract. The top producer of small arms has announced it delivered a batch of classic 7.62mm Dragunov sniper rifles to a Russian Security Forces customer and fully met its 2026 contract on time
The delivery shows how little the sanctions regime slows Russia's arms maker. In February 2026, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence said that nearly half of Kalashnikov's plants were still not subject to sanctions by any coalition country. Eight months later, the concern reports a full year's order delivered on schedule.
"The items were shipped on the set deadline, the obligations under the 2026 contract fully met," the manufacturer said.
The weapon in that batch is not new. Designed by Yevgeny Dragunov between 1958 and 1963, the Dragunov sniper rifle entered serial production at the Izhevsk machine-building plant in 1963, so in 2026, it has remained in serial production for more than 60 years.
The self-loading 7.62mm rifle is meant to hit personnel and unarmored targets at ranges up to 800 meters, the concern said. It uses gas-operated automatics with a short-stroke piston and a gas regulator, and can fire any 7.62x54R round, though sniper ammunition yields the best grouping, according to the maker.
The sniper rifles are only one line in Kalashnikov's output. Russia's defense industry has leaned heavily on refurbishing Soviet-era armor as newer reserves run low, with Ukraine's intelligence reporting in June 2025 that Russia had begun deploying 1960s-era T-62 tanks.
The restoration work was centered primarily at the 103rd Armored Repair Plant in Atamanovka, Trans-Baikal Territory of Siberia. Ukrainian intelligence documented the transfer of 21 T-62 tanks from the eastern region to the western part.
Small arms are a different line of production, built new rather than pulled from storage. That is why a 1963 design keeps rolling off the line while the sanctions net, as Ukraine's intelligence describes it, still has holes.
More than 50 Russian companies could default on their bonds this year, the most since 2009, a rating-agency analyst told Russian newspaper Izvestia, which reported it on 6 October.
Russia's wartime economy is straining under high interest rates, and the budget is too: the 2026 deficit has nearly doubled from the earlier forecast to a record $88 billion, with more deficits planned for the next three years as Moscow raises taxes to fund the war and plans its biggest defense budget since the full-scale invasion began.
A default is a situation in which a company cannot make promised interest payments to investors on time or repay borrowed money. If a payment is not made by the agreed deadline, the company becomes delinquent, which under certain conditions is recognized as a default.
So far this year, 20 companies have defaulted for the first time, compared with 24 in all of 2025, said Mikhail Nikonov of the Expert RA rating agency. Most of the companies that missed payments are small issuers of high-yield bonds, Izvestia reported.
In 2026, Russian companies have missed payments totaling 41 billion rubles (about $490 million), compared with 34 billion rubles (about $410 million) the previous year, according to investment bank Sinara.
By the end of 2026, the number of Russian companies unable to service their ruble-denominated debt on time could reach 40–50, the highest level since 2010, said Pavel Zholobov, junior managing director at the NRA rating agency.
The number of bond defaults in 2026 has already reached its highest level in a decade, Zholobov said. Similar figures were recorded in the mid-2010s: in 2014, 35 companies missed payments; in 2015, 52 did so; and in 2016, there were 44 issuers. This occurred in part after Western sanctions were imposed on Russia over its annexation of Crimea and its war in Donbas, as well as amid a halving of oil prices and a sharp weakening of the ruble.
There were more defaults only in 2009. At the time, amid the fallout from the global financial crisis, more than 100 issuers faced payment problems, while the volume of distressed debt reached nearly 200 billion rubles, Zholobov noted.
This time, the main reason for companies' difficulties in making bond payments has been the prolonged period of high interest rates, which has continued since 2023. Companies are raising financing at high interest rates but are unable to refinance their debt on more favorable terms, explained Ekaterina Sidorova, head of the Foreign Exchange, Commodities and Debt Markets Department at SberCIB Investment Research.
At the same time, the situation does not yet resemble a systemic debt crisis: defaults are primarily being recorded among companies with low credit ratings and high debt burdens, Sidorova said.
If a company fails to repay bond debt, it is given 10 business days to meet its obligations. If it fails to do so, the company may offer investors a restructuring—for example, by postponing payments in exchange for a higher interest rate.
The number of defaults will remain high in 2027, Sidorova believes.
High interest rates were a response to accelerating inflation in Russia. Domestic demand was outpacing production, Russia's Central Bank said in October 2023. Sanctions over the war and rising defense spending had also hit the economy and the ruble, which had lost about 25% against the dollar that year. The bank raised its key rate from 7.5% in the first half of 2023 to 15% by the fall.
Ukraine is also seeking to weaken Russia's economy as part of efforts to reduce its ability to finance the war. In particular, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said strikes on oil refineries are aimed at "bleeding the Russian war machine" and destroying its military and economic potential. According to the ministry, the attacks have knocked out more than 51% of Russia's oil refining capacity.
In the first half of July, Russian oil refineries processed about 3.9 million barrels of oil per day—the lowest level since March 2005. Due to the production cuts, Moscow was also forced to restrict fuel exports.
US prosecutors say an American forensic tool concealed its Russian owners and its development in Russia.
Used by numerous security agencies in Europe, Oxygen Forensics helps investigators worldwide access data from mobile phones and computers.
Many bodies are now suspending use of the software following recent revelations.
The Slovak interior ministry bought the software in 2018 when links to Russia were not yet publicly known, then renewed the license multiple times. Now, the ministry said IT department officials are investigating the issue.
The tool was also sold to other government bodies across Europe.
In the US, Virginia-based Oxygen Forensics CEO Lee Reiber was arrested at the end of September, along with Oleg Davydov, one of the Russian owners.
The company was headquartered in the US state of Virginia, appearing American.
According to federal prosecutors in the US, the company hid its Russian ownership through a shell company in Cyprus and that its software was developed in Russia.
Allegedly, this scam helped secure contracts for the forensic tool in the US, UK, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia.
Reiber, a 55-year-old American, was arrested in Idaho on Sunday. On Tuesday (22 September), he appeared before a federal court there and was released on bail. He is expected to appear before a federal court in Los Angeles soon.
Davydov, a 52-year-old from Moscow, was arrested on that same day at London Heathrow before he could board a flight to Istanbul. And the US plans to seek extradition. Both face charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
The group of five also owned a Russian company co-founded by Davydov in 2000. Until September 2022, it was called Oxygen Software and now operates under the name MKO Systems.
Its programmers worked in Russia, where the company sold the software under other names. According to investigative files, its clients included Russia’s secret service (FSB), investigative committee (SKR) and interior ministry.
Davydov, the company’s technical director, was responsible for software development. In 2013, he helped establish Oxygen Forensics in Virginia with Reiber joining the company in August 2015.
Prosecutors say that following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and US sanctions after, the duo agreed to hide both the real owners and that it was developed in Russia. In March 2022, Reiber became CEO and director.
Then, Russian owners were removed from public company records.
However, investigators said the Russians continued to control the company, making key decisions, determining Reiber’s pay, and outvoting him on the board.
The charges concern the concealment of the software’s ownership and origin in securing public contracts.
Two companies were found to have supplied the Slovak interior ministry with Oxygen Forensic tools.
In 2018, the sale was part of a broader procurement by the ministry for computers, laptops, servers, monitors and printers, ordered from the Czech company Risk Analysis Consultants for €125,000, the forensic tool itself costing €10,000.
The Prague-based company did not respond for comment.
An invoice issued to the Slovak interior ministry in 2022 by the Slovak company Microcomp–Computersystém indicates the renewal of a licence for this software. At the time, the minister responsible was Roman Mikulec.
The Slovak ministry also ordered a licence renewal in July 2024, under his successor Matúš Šutaj Eštok. Microcomp–Computersystém did not respond for comment.
On Friday (2 October), the Slovak national security authority (NBÚ) warned of the risks posed by using software from Oxygen Forensics and connected companies such as MKO Systems and Prostranstvo IT.
Their software helps investigators search for and examine data from digital devices. It can process vast amounts of information, including evidence, which makes it important who owns, controls and develops it. According to the NBÚ, this is important both for data protection and for the reliability of analysis results.
The warning came after the US case was made public.
The NBÚ considers links to Russia significant in assessing the security risk, also in view of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.
However, the warning itself does not mean that data leaked through the software. US prosecutors explicitly stated that the charges did not concern malicious code or unauthorised access to customer data.
The case concerns the alleged concealment of the software’s ownership and origin. And no court has yet ruled on the case.
“The ministry will proceed in accordance with the recommendations of the National Security Authority,” the Slovak interior ministry said.
The NBÚ recommended that public bodies identify this company’s presence and report it to the authority.
Belgian Green MEP Saskia Bricmont also called for the use of Oxygen to be stopped immediately and for an inquiry into whether sensitive information could have reached Russia after it was found that Romania, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and Hungary had purchased the software.
Several European security agencies are suspending the use of Oxygen Forensics software or taking steps to terminate their contracts after the company’s Russian ties came to light.
The tool was also used by Czech police. Czech security agencies continued to purchase licences for the computer software after 2022, when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. Czech authorities are awaiting further information from the United States. For now, they have prohibited software updates.
London’s Metropolitan Police has suspended the use of Oxygen tools and launched a comprehensive review. British police forces, including specialised units, had used the software.
And Latvian police suspended its use and is assessing whether it will continue using it.
Romania’s anti-corruption agency, too, took steps to terminate its contract with the Russia-linked tool.
Abbiamo assistito a uno spettacolo da prima serata – in realtà un doppio inganno: il 11 settembre rivisitato su FlyDubai.
Il 30 settembre, termine ultimo per una possibile mossa militare iraniana contro il blocco navale di Trump , è passato senza che l’Iran intervenisse. L’Iran ha mantenuto la sua posizione, senza però sferrare l’attacco decisivo contro la Marina statunitense (che è così lontana) impegnata nel blocco. Ma lo spettacolo deve continuare. Come piano B, abbiamo assistito a uno spettacolo in prima serata, in realtà una doppia farsa: la riedizione dell’11 settembre su FlyDubai.
Questa patetica trovata non è mai stata un “attacco terroristico”; si è trattato di una mediocre operazione psicologica del Mossad, confezionata in modo approssimativo e arricchita da una serie di comparse improbabili, tra cui un idraulico che ha preso i comandi dell’aereo perché lo aveva visto in televisione.
I manipolatori erano il culto della morte in Medio Oriente, gli stessi Emirati Arabi Uniti e Washington. La narrazione ufficiale è per persone con un QI inferiore a 50: un copilota “jihadista” – guarda caso proveniente dall’Oman, perché la demonizzazione lo richiede – tenta di far schiantare un aereo pieno di sionisti. I proverbiali passeggeri eroici – idraulico incluso – lo sopraffanno a mani nude.
Il culto della morte sta facendo di tutto per assolvere gli emiratini da ogni responsabilità. L’attenzione è puntata sul “terrorista” omanita.
Ecco la combinazione perfetta: i musulmani sono e saranno sempre terroristi; il culto della morte è sempre una vittima; e l’Arabia Saudita deve consegnare il “terrorista” al culto della morte.
Un gioco da ragazzi, quindi, per un copilota contrabbandare un coltello nell’aeroporto ultra-sorvegliato di Dubai, a bordo di una delle rotte più sorvegliate del pianeta. E che dire dell’aeronautica militare, fanatica della morte, che non è riuscita a impedire l’atterraggio dell’aereo a Tabuk?
Perché il piano è sempre stato quello di atterrare a Tabuk. Si tratta della più grande base aerea saudita nel nord-ovest, e la più vicina a Israele; la setta della morte ha cercato per anni di ottenerne l’accesso. Ora potrebbero finalmente ottenere tutto: accesso allo spazio aereo saudita, informazioni riservate e altro ancora, grazie alla pressione congiunta di Abu Dhabi e Washington.
Presso Transition Protocol abbiamo appurato che quando il leader della setta della morte si è recato “segretamente” ad Abu Dhabi per incontrare il capo degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, MbZ, in un incontro bilaterale, potrebbe aver incontrato anche persone provenienti da diverse nazioni arabe, tra cui Qatar, Oman, Libia e Marocco.
L’Arabia Saudita ha negato categoricamente di far parte del pacchetto. Lo stesso ha fatto la Giordania. L’Oman compare solo attraverso una fonte israeliana. Non vi è alcuna conferma ufficiale da parte di Qatar, Oman, Marocco o Libia.
Teheran ha comunque reagito con estrema irritazione, avvertendo di “conseguenze molto pericolose”. La determinazione iraniana è chiara: non permettere che quei chihuahua facciano deragliare il processo fondamentale di riduzione al massimo dell’influenza statunitense e israeliana in Medio Oriente.
Islamabad, dal canto suo, continua a perseguire l’impresa sisifea di avanzare a piccoli passi verso un progresso minimo, mediando sia tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah, sia tra Stati Uniti e Iran.
Martedì scorso a Doha, il Qatar ha effettivamente consegnato al ministro degli Esteri iraniano Abbas Araghchi la risposta degli Stati Uniti. Lo scontro sembra riguardare la sequenza degli accordi, piuttosto che i singoli elementi. Il testo, così com’è, è una sorta di versione migliorata del famigerato memorandum d’intesa fallimentare, noto anche come Accordo quadro di Islamabad. Nessuno scommette che il carro morto risorgerà, ancora una volta.
Russia, Iran, Yemen: diamo una lezione a quei bastardi senza pietà.
Ora veniamo al dunque: lo Yemen. E a quale livello di annientamento sono disposti a infliggere a Riyadh i duri di Sana’a. La distruzione degli impianti petroliferi è fin troppo facile: basta un’apertura graduale. Lo Yemen è in preda alla furia. E non si fermeranno davanti a nulla.
Possiamo già osservare una sorprendente convergenza tra la Casa dei Saud, la Marina statunitense al di fuori della Persia e la NATO nel Paese 404: vengono tutti martellati senza pietà. Russia e Iran non hanno ancora iniziato. E parliamo dello Yemen.
All’inizio di questa settimana, Sergey Karaganov lo ha ribadito pubblicamente: lo Stavka russo ha finalmente preso la fatidica decisione di porre fine alle sofferenze dei neonazisti di Kiev. E in una sessione informale di due ore al Valdai, alle porte di Mosca, il Gran Maestro Sergey Lavrov, in totale relax, ha ribadito ancora una volta che la Russia è pronta per la guerra in Europa. E sì, sarà rapida. Senza esclusione di colpi.
Ansarallah e le Forze Armate yemenite attendono che tre fattori si combinino: un’inevitabile Ora Zero che risuoni in tutta l’Asia occidentale; la crescente tensione e l’esplosività degli scontri interni alla famiglia reale e tra le tribù in Arabia Saudita; e il perfetto incastro di tutti i pezzi del puzzle per scatenare la prossima Tempesta Yemenita sull’Arabia Saudita.
Allo stato attuale, Riyadh non riconosce alcun attacco proveniente dallo Yemen, mentre Sana’a annuncia ogni giorno, con precisione svizzera, il numero di raid aerei sauditi sullo Yemen, che prendono di mira mercati, fattorie, case, ponti, infrastrutture idriche, reti di telecomunicazioni: il proverbiale manuale del sindacato Epstein.
L’Iran, dal canto suo, ha già alzato la posta in gioco, colpendo il giacimento di Bu Hasa della ADNOC, a sud-ovest di Abu Dhabi: si tratta di uno dei più grandi giacimenti di petrolio e gas onshore degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, che alimenta lo strategico oleodotto Habshan-Fujairah, l’unica via di esportazione degli Emirati Arabi Uniti che aggira lo Stretto di Hormuz.
Il gasdotto East-West, di proprietà dell’Arabia Saudita, è stato colpito tre settimane fa e bombardato nuovamente dallo Yemen all’inizio di questa settimana, ad Abqaiq.
Colpire ADNOC e Abqaiq quasi simultaneamente potrebbe comportare la perdita di ben 13 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno dal mercato. Non si ripete mai abbastanza che Iran e Yemen sono un tutt’uno. È questo il tutt’uno che conta, e nessun misero attacco informatico dell’11 settembre potrà cambiare le cose.
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