Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.
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Em 7 de outubro de 2023 iniciou-se, a partir de Gaza, uma memorável operação militar, na qual aproximadamente 4 mil homens armados das unidades de elite dos vários movimentos da resistência palestina local (Jihad Islâmica Palestina, FPLP, FDLP, Comitês de Resistência Popular, etc., liderados pelo Hamas) lançaram-se como um copo transbordando sobre os assentamentos sionistas dos arredores.
A ação era, simultaneamente, resposta à intensificação das expropriações de famílias palestinas na Cisjordânia, à pressão crescente sobre a Mesquita Al-Aqsa e à política de apaziguamento dos países árabes, e visava através da captura de militares (ativos e reservas) israelenses forçar a entidade sionista a uma guerra de atrito que pudesse conduzir a um desgaste significativo de Israel, internamente e externamente, e a uma reproposição da questão do Estado Palestino.
Ao que tudo indica, uma das expectativas da liderança do Hamas era de que o Hezbollah e o Irã e, talvez, as organizações militares da Cisjordânia se engajariam, também, brevemente e de forma sustentada, no conflito com Israel. Por uma série de motivos – totalmente diferentes para cada um dos atores – isso não aconteceu, exceto no caso do Hezbollah, e de forma limitada até a invasão terrestre do Líbano e, no caso do Irã, também de forma limitada durante a Guerra dos 12 Dias.
O evento levou a transformações cataclísmicas no Oriente Médio que podemos já descrever e a um panorama que, talvez, seja desconcertante para muitos que previram um cenário de vitória total sionista.
Não é nossa pretensão fazer uma descrição minuciosa dos processos que foram iniciados a partir da Guerra de Gaza, de modo que apenas tentaremos resumir cada um dos cenários em seus principais eventos e panorama atual.
Quanto à Gaza em si, a sua população foi vítima de limpeza étnica. Os números de mortes, se somarmos todas as causas, talvez chegue a 200 mil, ou seja, 10% da população a Faixa de Gaza. Uma parte significativa da liderança do Hamas, por sua vez, foi assassinada durante a guerra. Israel, porém, foi derrotada no conflito, considerando que não conseguiu alcançar os seus objetivos de destruir o Hamas, ocupar permanentemente toda a Faixa de Gaza e deslocar a população palestina. Os danos materiais e sociais para Israel, por sua vez, foram imensos. 60 bilhões de dólares em perdas econômicas gerais, aumento das tensões sociais internas e destruição total – talvez irreversível – da imagem internacional de Israel. Ademais, incapaz de derrotar o Hamas, Israel foi obrigada a aceitar um acordo de paz imposto pelos EUA. Enquanto isso, o Hamas segue com aproximadamente 12 mil soldados ativos e mais 15 mil recrutas jovens em treinamento, de modo que em breve retornará a aproximadamente o mesmo nível de força que antes de 7 de outubro de 2023.
Na frente libanesa, o conflito levou ao deslocamento de mais de 1 milhão de libaneses de suas casas, ao assassinato de Hassan Nasrallah, líder do Hezbollah, e de alguns outros líderes do movimento, à desestabilização política do Líbano, e envolveu a invasão por terra do país por parte do Estado de Israel, que, porém, não conseguiu também alcançar seus objetivos de forçar o governo libanês a desarmar o Hezbollah. O Hezbollah, por sua vez, que foi degradado de forma significativa entre 2023 e 2024 por tentar operar como forças armadas regulares, retornou à guerra de insurgência e com o aumento no uso de drones e novas ferramentas tecnológicas, bloqueou o avanço de Israel em 2026.
Quanto à Síria, testemunhamos o colapso do governo de Bashar Al-Assad e a tomada do país pelas milícias terroristas ligadas à Al-Qaeda, ao ISIS e outros grupos extremistas, os quais levaram à presidência Ahmed Sharrah. Israel se aproveitou do momento para destruir a maior parte do hardware militar sírio e ocupar uma faixa de segurança no entorno das Colinas de Golã, estabelecendo uma tênue aliança com as tribos e milícias druzas da região. A Queda de Assad impôs dificuldade para a logística do Hezbollah, que contava com a Síria para o trânsito de equipamento vindo do Irã. Se Israel esperava ter passagem livre pela Síria, porém, a situação é tornada mais complexa pelo fato de que a região é disputada, enquanto área de influência, com a Turquia, de modo que as tensões entre ambos países segue aumentando.
Os cenários palestino, libanês e sírio permitiam dizer, no início de 2025, por exemplo, que Israel estaria avançando significativamente em seus objetivos delineados no Plano Oded Yinon de desestabilizar e fragmentar os países vizinhos para facilitar a construção da Grande Israel. Teríamos aqui, naquele momento, a derrocada da estratégia do Crescente Xiita e do projeto geopolítico de Qassem Soleimani. Quando acrescentamos os cenários iraquiano e iraniano, bem como o contexto geral do Oriente Médio, a situação muda significativamente.
Porque no espaço entre a Guerra dos 12 Dias e a Guerra do Irã vimos o colapso do poder regional dos EUA no Oriente Médio, a ascensão do Irã a principal pretendente à hegemonia regional e o recuo de Israel para uma posição mais defensiva e de retaguarda.
Sinais de que o projeto israelense era mais frágil do que parecia à primeira vista apareceram já no conflito com o Irã em 2025. Incapaz de derrotar o Irã, que fustigava as defesas e infraestruturas israelenses com enxames de drones e mísseis, Israel teve que apelar por ajuda aos EUA, que realizaram um ataque aéreo majoritariamente simbólico contra instalações nucleares vazias no Irã. Isso não passou despercebido.
A nova rodada de conflito em 2026, iniciando-se no final de fevereiro, apesar de iniciar com o assassinato do Aiatolá Ali Khamenei, levou à eliminação de boa parte das bases dos EUA no Oriente Médio, ao bloqueio do Estreito de Ormuz, à destruição das capacidades antiaéreas israelenses, à evacuação das tropas estadunidenses no Iraque e à destruição do mito da superioridade militar incontestável dos EUA.
De fato, a incapacidade dos EUA de alcançar seus objetivos políticos militarmente no Oriente Médio (após o fracasso da tentativa de revolução colorida de janeiro), mesmo usando 2 porta-aviões (1 dos quais pode ter sido seriamente danificado nas operações), sua incapacidade de proteger seus aliados árabes, a própria incapacidade dos aliados árabes de defenderem a si mesmos, o esgotamento parcial dos estoques de mísseis dos inimigos do Irã, e a capacidade iraniana de rapidamente repor sua liderança e de agir militarmente de forma descentralizada, bem como sua demonstração de que sua capacidade industrial-militar permanecia ativa, mudaram o mapa geopolítico no Oriente Médio.
Em alguma medida, hoje, é o Irã quem dá as cartas. A evacuação do Iraque pelos EUA reabre o país para a penetração da influência iraniana, o que põe em risco até mesmo o domínio da Síria por Ahmed Sharrah.
Para contornar o controle iraniano de Ormuz, os sauditas têm experimentado com usar o Mar Vermelho e rotas terrestres. Se esses esforços fossem bem-sucedidos, a importância de Ormuz diminuiria e, com isso, o poder de barganha do Irã. O problema é que, exatamente quando isso começou a acontecer, o Ansarullah iemenita entrou no tabuleiro, iniciando uma operação militar em larga escala para derrotar os rebeldes apoiados por Riad. A resposta saudita aos avanços houthis levou ao fechamento parcial do Estreito de Bab-el-Mandeb e a ataques não apenas contra as instalações da ARAMCO, mas até mesmo contra poços de petróleo sauditas.
Se retornamos ao panorama geopolítico israelense, enfim, o país se encontra ainda com um problema palestino em Gaza, o Hezbollah ativo no Líbano, sem poder avançar na Síria por causa da ameaça turca e com suas capacidades militares defensivas bastante reduzidas.
Longe da “Pax Judaica” e da “Grande Israel” estamos vendo o reposicionamento dos atores geopolíticos e o ator na posição mais vantajosa é, hoje, o Irã. As negociações recentes entre Israel e os países árabes sunitas não muda significativamente o cenário.
3 anos depois da Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa, portanto, não nos é possível dizer se os objetivos de Ismail Hanyeh e Yahya Sinwar foram alcançados, mas é impossível negar que a ousadia do Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.
Sacrifice the inconvenient, never the project. “Pal-washing” in action.
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A familiar script
On 9 October 2026, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to Navanethem Pillay, an 85-year-old South African jurist, former judge at the International Criminal Court and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The citation speaks of a person who has paved the way for a more comprehensive global legal order. The Committee’s chair, Jorgen Watne Frydnes, added that the prize is a message to those who attack and undermine the international system and its institutions. The verdict is avowedly political, and it is on this level that it must be discussed.
The very same figure who, in 2011, is said to have ‘toppled’ Gaddafi, paving the way for the plundering of Libyan oil and the enslavement of African migrants, would now ‘topple’ Netanyahu, thereby paving the way for Israel’s rehabilitation. The underlying logic would be neither morality nor peace, but the agenda of George Soros’s Open Society: to sacrifice those who have become inconvenient, never the essence of the project itself. Some have dubbed it ‘pal-washing’. The fundamental question is a serious one, for it asks whether there is a pattern behind the prizes and jurisdictions of the liberal order.
It must be emphasised that the script is already familiar. Do you remember when Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize, whilst launching war after war? Or do you recall figures in search of a cause such as Machado, Mohammadi, or the defenders of Ukrainian criminals? But let us proceed in order.
Act One: Libya
In February 2011, Pillay, the High Commissioner, called on the Human Rights Council to take vigorous action to stop the violence and hold those responsible to account; the Council condemned the violations and established a commission of inquiry. The next step fell to the Security Council: referral to the ICC via Resolution 1970, followed by Resolution 1973, approved with ten votes in favour and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). No one claims that Pillay decided to go to war. What matters is the sequence of events: the language of human rights opened the door, that of the protection of civilians authorised the use of force, and the operation gradually shifted towards regime change. As early as April, Lavrov was accusing NATO of exceeding its mandate, and a French minister admitted that regime change would have required a new vote.
Then there are the costs. In 2017, the IOM documented auctions of sub-Saharan migrants in southern Libya, sold for sums ranging from 200 to 500 dollars. The link with the collapse of the state after 2011 is the most plausible interpretation, although the source documents the phenomenon rather than its cause. Libya and the migrants paid the price; the legal framework emerged, formally speaking, intact, even if the controversy over the mandate would later weigh on the vetoes of Moscow and Beijing in other matters.
Act Two: Bibi
On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Pillay had left the Court in 2008, but chaired the UN Commission of Inquiry which, on 16 September 2025, concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. This is where ‘pal-washing’ comes into play. International criminal law deals with individuals: a defendant, a charge, a period of time. If the case concludes with the fate of a leader, a narrative break occurs – the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of a man – after which the state can present itself as restored. Libya offers an analogy: there, the case concluded with the fall of a man.
The limitations of the process work in favour of this interpretation. The Court has no police force and the execution of warrants depends on the States Parties; the Commission is not a court and does not speak on behalf of the entire UN; the Committee itself, according to AFP, has stated that it is up to a court to determine whether genocide has taken place. The award has no legal effect, as we know, but it lends legitimacy to a system that promises justice yet cannot guarantee it.
We must also bear in mind that we have already seen dynamics of this kind on numerous occasions within the globalist order that dominates the West. The Open Society Foundations presents itself as the world’s largest private funder of groups working for justice, democracy and human rights, active in over one hundred countries, and Pillay received the Stockholm Human Rights Award, the same prize that went to Soros and Neier in 2011. It certainly seems that the pattern of the Soros agenda is repeating itself once again – an agenda comprising foundations, NGOs, tribunals, commissions and bureaucracies that share a common lexicon and worldview: that of a liberal order to be perfected and never called into question. Those operating within that lexicon may denounce a government, a leader, or even a state, but they cannot challenge the underlying assumptions of the order that grants them legitimacy.
Some will object that Pillay’s Commission attributes responsibility to Israel as a state, not merely to its leaders, which contradicts the idea of a purely personalised operation. The second point concerns the reaction. Netanyahu accused the Committee of having lost its moral compass; the Israeli Foreign Ministry spoke of a grotesque exploitation of the prize; and Washington announced sanctions against the ICC just a few hours after the announcement. All true. But it would make sense and have value if the Western system were not rotten to its very core, if its legal system were functioning properly, but this is not the case, in any respect (and we have already seen sufficient evidence of this – let us not forget the Epstein case either).
If, over the next twelve months, Netanyahu’s political downfall is presented as the conclusion of the case, rather than as a stage in proceedings concerning the state, ‘Pal-washing’ will gain traction. If the proceedings continue beyond his person, and if the State Parties execute the warrants, perhaps it will lose ground. Given the current evidence, the argument is plausible and, until proven otherwise, this is yet another ‘Non-Peace’ Nobel Prize – one we cannot call ‘war’.
Israeli forces and settlers escalated violence across the occupied West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem on Monday, with overnight raids, dozens of detentions, the demolition of homes belonging to 80 families and a settler incursion into Al-Aqsa Mosque, according to Palestinian and regional media reports.
RELATED: Netanyahu Orders Prosecution of Israeli Soldiers Who Exposed Gaza Crimes in Documentary “Naza”
In a pre-dawn operation, Israeli troops entered towns including Tulkarem, Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, Tubas and Ramallah, according to the reports. Dozens of Palestinians were detained and civilians were wounded by gunfire in Qabatiya.
Israeli authorities have demolished 80 structures in Al-Dahiya village in Israel’s Negev Desert, claiming they were built without permits. Rahat’s mayor says the demolitions have displaced around 400 Palestinians, leaving families facing uncertainty over where to find shelter. pic.twitter.com/q1Xj1lgWBW
— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) October 12, 2026
Under Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, destruction of property by an occupying power is prohibited except where absolutely necessary for military operations. Israel generally maintains that demolitions target structures built without permits or linked to security concerns.
In occupied East Jerusalem, a large group of settlers entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, reportedly under the protection of Israeli police and soldiers, carrying out provocative tours and religious rituals on the esplanade. Palestinian sources describe the move as a desecration and a breach of the historic status quo at the holy site.
Israeli colonial settlers stormed the courtyards of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem, performing Talmudic rituals and dances, singing collectively and raising Israeli flags under heavy protection from Israeli police. pic.twitter.com/tZYxnLhT47
— The Times of Palestine (@PalTimesNews) October 12, 2026
In the southern Hebron hills, the Shinaran family, made up of five adults and five children, has been besieged by armed settlers in the village of Wadi al-Rahim, according to the reports. The attackers allegedly blocked the exits of the home, threw stones, destroyed the water pump, burned vehicles and tried to set fire to the garage door with the family inside. The family was reportedly trapped for more than a week.
Residents cannot reach their drinking water or food without coordinating through Israeli forces, the reports say. Footage cited by the newspaper Haaretz reportedly shows soldiers praying alongside the settlers and allowing them to play loud music in front of the besieged house. Although the area has been declared a closed military zone, troops are reported not to have stopped the attackers.
The accounts say this is not an isolated case. They cite attacks on the Tubasi family in Jalud, whose home was allegedly attacked by a mob of more than 100 settlers who set property on fire, and on the Ridi family in Qusra.
The seventh day of the siege in Wadi Rakhim: Settlers pursued journalists who tried to reach the Shinaran family home, which is under siege by settlers. soldiers arrived and told the journalists they are not allowed to be there
— מחוץ לעדר/ kivsa shchora (@masafering) October 12, 2026
Credit @HurainiSami pic.twitter.com/EDGZaQl0NX
The reports link the pressure on Palestinian communities to the expansion of unauthorized outposts on Palestinian-owned land. Under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, an occupying power may not transfer parts of its civilian population into occupied territory. The international community, including the UN, widely considers Israeli settlements illegal under international law, a position Israel disputes.
Press reports cited in the source claim the campaign enjoys the explicit backing of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government amid the race toward Knesset elections. Settler groups and the government have rejected similar accusations in the past, and no response was included in the reports.
The order came through a statement from the Prime Minister’s office, which accused the participants of “serious crimes against information security, criminal defamation and harm to diplomatic interests.”
PM Netanyahu described the film as “a false, misleading and tendentious story that defames the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces internationally and seriously damages Israel’s reputation.” “We will always stand with our beloved and heroic fighters,” he added.
RELATED: Gaza Genocide Film NAZA Reveals Israeli Death Tech
Yet even as he dismissed the details as defamation, Netanyahu acknowledged that the documentary “reveals top-secret information.” In a letter to the Army chief, the head of the Shin Bet and the Attorney General, he demanded that they “act urgently to discover the identity of all those who are involved or appear in the film.”
Days after Netanyahu demanded the prosecution of the soldiers who spoke in “NAZA,” four more Israeli intelligence and drone soldiers have described the same kind of killing to Haaretz.
— Quds News Network (@QudsNen) October 12, 2026
They say that after October 7, “even the lowest-ranking target justified civilian casualties”… pic.twitter.com/1DqExgCCnZ
On September 14, Israeli military chief Eyal Zamir said the army had instructed its top legal official to examine options for legal action against those involved. Zamir claimed the film “adopts narratives of those who hate Israel, defames our soldiers and commanders and seeks to portray the IDF acting deliberately in an illegal manner.”
“Naza” recounts the killing of civilians in Gaza through testimony gathered from soldiers and intelligence officers. The interviewed service members described an environment of total contempt for international law, and said troops felt hatred toward Palestinians throughout the war.
Much of the film draws on reporting since 2023 by Israeli journalist Yuval Abraham, who co-directed it, published in +972 Magazine and The Guardian, which also produced the documentary. In those reports, intelligence sources describe how Israel moved, after October 7, 2023, from authorizing the deaths of dozens to hundreds of civilians as “collateral damage” in strikes on senior Hamas Resistance Movement figures.
The title comes from an acronym used by Israeli intelligence to estimate how many civilians could die in a strike, such as “20 Naza.” The film also describes the bombing of homes with entire families inside once a suspected Hamas member returns to sleep, and the use of artificial intelligence models that predict, with a 15 percent error rate, the probability that a Gaza resident is a militant.
The crackdown follows accusations that Netanyahu is inciting violence against the film’s directors. On October 2, The Guardian defended the investigation, saying it consulted more than 100 sources over three years, including senior commanders involved in authorizing strikes, and cross-checked testimonies against leaked classified documents and specific operations.
NAZA. The most important movie of our age.
— John Galt (@dadiani_george) October 12, 2026
Netanyahu just demanded it be banned. And that’s the loudest endorsement it could ever have wished for.
They’re so scared of you seeing it they even put out a counterfeit film on YouTube with the same name to try and bury it.
So what… pic.twitter.com/JMGsbeqqZP
Gaza’s official death toll exceeds 74,300. Medical journals and researchers say the destruction of Gaza’s health system has made counting extremely difficult and that the real number could be far higher. Nearly 1,500 Palestinians have reportedly been killed since the U.S.-backed ceasefire plan announced a year ago.
Human rights groups warn that the prosecution effort aims to silence testimony about violations of international law. For the soldiers who spoke, the order marks a turn from witness to target, while Palestinians in Gaza remain without protection and the occupation’s deadliest campaign continues without accountability.
Palestine’s long-awaited legislative elections have once again been postponed. The polls that were scheduled for November 28, have been pushed for one year, according to reports, through an agreement between Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas.
According to the report, the postponement aims to give time to rebuild the Palestinian political system in a way that allows all components to take part.
Meanwhile, Reuters reported on Friday, October 9 that Palestinian Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh informed France that the elections will be delayed possibly until September 2027, citing the deteriorating conditions throughout the occupied Palestinian territories as a reason.
On Saturday, October 10, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree, setting September 11, 2027 for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.
The reactions of Palestinian factions varied. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad welcomed the decision due to immense infrastructural, logistical, and political hurdles in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, which make the voting process impossible.
However, the Democratic Reform Current led by Mohammed Dahlan criticized it as “a crime against democracy”, accusing the PA’s leadership of monopolizing national institutions.
The move came amid the continuation of Israel’s genocidal aggression on Gaza, and its refusal to proceed to phase two of the US-brokered ceasefire deal.
In tandem, the Israeli forces and illegal settlers have escalated their attacks on Palestinians across the occupied West Bank, mainly focusing on the central governorate of Ramallah and Al-Bireh in the last couple of weeks.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has designated Ramallah and Al-Bireh as a de facto administrative capital since its establishment in 1994, following the 1993 Oslo Accords.
Therefore, many believe that destabilizing the governorate reveals Israel’s plans to further sideline the PA and undermine its power in a bid to ultimately dismantle it.
In late September, media reports surfaced indicating the Israeli government’s intention to reopen a route in the governorate for settler traffic, dividing its northern and southern halves.
The two weeks that followed saw a spiral in settler violence and raids carried out by the Israeli forces across Ramallah and Al-Bireh.
Friday, October 9, saw a notable increase in Israeli assaults across different parts of the governorate, coinciding with the onset of the olive harvest season.
A video circulated from Yabrud village east of Ramallah, showing a group of Israeli colonists attacking a Palestinian man and his son in their car. The settlers stole the vehicle after the man and his son ran away to survive.
Simultaneously, dozens of settlers stormed the northern town of Surda, wandering in its streets in an attempt to terrorize its people. They also destroyed the memorial of Muhannad Al-Halabi, one of the town’s martyrs.
Escorted by Israeli soldiers, settlers attacked international activists, who were protecting Palestinian farmers during the olive harvest in the town of Deir Ibzi, west of Ramallah. They also verbally abused journalists on site and tried to prevent them from covering the offensive.
On Friday evening, the Israeli army stormed Al-Bireh city, firing live ammunition and stun grenades, according to local media outlets.
Over the weekend and through Monday, October 12, settler attacks as well as military raids carried out by Israeli forces continued to take place in different parts of the governorate. The colonists also released a new video encouraging each other to continue storming Ramallah, and even the neighborhood where the Palestinian President resides in Al-Bireh city:
“You too can reach a point close to the house of Mahmoud Abbas and Ramallah,” the caption on the video noted.
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