China’s state-run Global Times on Thursday gushed over a visit by U.S. anti-war group Code Pink.

The post State Media Applauds Radical Leftist Group Code Pink for Propaganda Trip to China appeared first on Breitbart.

Ghaziabad, a city next to Delhi, tops the table of annual growth rates at 5.2 per cent, followed by Surat in the western Indian state of Gujarat

Zacharia moved to China after her husband, taking job at a law firm from 2011 to 2013

• Andrew Koller owns property in Canada, but decided to buy a home in Japan after visiting.
• Koller spent $15,000 CAD on an akiya and spent months renovating it.
• He plans to visit on occasion and rent it out some of the time.

This as-told-to essay is based on a conversation with Andrew Koller, 31, a freelance camera operator who purchased a home in Yamagata, Japan, in March. Koller, who's based in Edmonton, Canada, renovated the home and plans to use it as a vacation home. The following has been edited for length and clarity.

Like a lot of millennials, I was exposed to Japanese culture in some sense early on with "Naruto," "Pokemon," and "Dragon Ball Z." After that, I don't think my interest really left.

Come 2020, I had a bunch of time on my hands like everybody else. It seemed like a good time to finally learn Japanese. I've been learning Japanese with a private tutor since then.

Then, in 2023, I made my first trip to Japan.

Like everybody else who comes back from their first trip to Japan, I just fell in love. I couldn't stop talking about it, but I wanted a deeper connection to the community.

I wanted more than just the superficial, surface-level experience of Japanese life. So I thought maybe a good way to get that experience would be to buy a house that's not in a major tourist city, somewhat live there, and spend a good chunk of time over there getting involved with the community by renovating a forgotten property.

The algorithm was watching for sure. After my first Japan trip, my YouTube and Instagram algorithms were suggesting to me all these similar people doing similar things.

From that, I was like, this seems like something I can do. In my free time, I like to DIY. I have a little workshop — I wouldn't say I'm good at it, but I feel like I know enough to do the basics.

I'm at the point in my life now where I've had all these ideas and I've said, "Oh, it'd be cool to do this," but I never do it. I never follow through. I just wanted to prove to myself that I actually followed through on one of these somewhat whimsical ideas.

The house I bought in Japan cost a fraction of what houses cost in Canada

I've always been interested in real estate since a young age.

Purchasing your first house is doable, but if you want to purchase a second house after that, like a rental, it's extremely challenging to do that in Canada. Canada's housing market has exploded, especially in Alberta.

I'm in a very fortunate position where my partner and I own a house and we own a rental property as well close to the university area.

I bought the rental house when I was 20 with my parents — they had to sign on because no bank was going to loan a 20-year-old kid a mortgage. I rented out the rooms and then I lived for free for my time in college.

Both houses have a similar value. My primary residence is worth just under $600,000 CAD (about $422,880). When we bought the rental 10 years ago, it was around $500,000 CAD, but it's gone up since.

For my home in Japan, I spent $15,000 CAD (about $10,600) on the purchase price plus closing costs, which was another $3,000 CAD.

I can definitely see myself spending extended time in Japan.

I want to go out there at least a few times a year. It's close to a pretty big ski resort, and I snowboard.

Doing the math for that, if I was to go stay in Banff or Jasper — one of the more popular mountain towns in Alberta — for a week and ski, it's actually cheaper to fly to Japan, because the skiing is also very affordable, so that was a big factor for me.

I would like to rent it out, but I don't plan on making a lot of money from it

I went to Japan in October 2025 to look at properties. I made an offer in November, it got accepted, and then I got possession of the property in March 2026. Then I went up for the entire month of April to start renovations on it.

I wanted to respect what was already there when I went in. Even though the house itself wasn't ancient or historical — it was built in the '60s or '70s — it was very traditionally built with the Tatami rooms. I wanted to keep a lot of that, coming in as a Westerner.

I wanted to try and adapt to their way of life rather than trying to impose my own. I just wanted to complement what was already there.

Now, the house is 98% done.

The actual renovation costs right now are just over the purchase cost. So I'm at around $18,000 CAD and change, doing most of it myself.

Right now, the goal would be to do a short-term rental in the future, but I don't plan on it making a lot of money.

I think that's the one thing people will get confused about. They think, "If I do this and renovate it, I can make a ton of money off a short-term rental in Japan." That's not the case, because there's so much competition with the hotels there that are already amazing and very affordable.

I just want to cover the maintenance costs more than anything. Doing a little bit of short-term rental, I think, will help with that.

It's not an asset. I think maybe people go to Japan with the Western mindset, like, "Oh, it's a buy-and-hold asset." Outside of Tokyo and the big cities, real estate doesn't do that.

Real estate always goes down in value over time. If you're buying a house in Japan, go in with the expectation that it's not as much of a financial asset as it is a recreation: you'll get more of a cultural experience.

OPED by Imran Khurshid, PhD

China’s Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, has once again published a propaganda editorial against India titled “India’s ‘Victory Narrative’ Will Only Hit a Wall on China-India Border.” The article was published on October 14, 2026.

One notable characteristic of Chinese commentaries and diplomats is that they use polite language in their statements but then, within the same text, suddenly shift to intimidating language and issue warnings.

They act like a “big brother,” offering suggestions, dictating terms, and adopting a dominant attitude toward other countries, which stems from their “Middle Kingdom syndrome”—a mindset rooted in a historical Sinocentric worldview that exhibits king-subject thinking and demands homage and subservience.

This pattern is also reflected in what is commonly described as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” in which Chinese diplomats adopt a more confrontational tone when their country’s interests or positions are challenged.

Similarly, Chinese diplomats may appear cool and calm at first, then abruptly use fierce language to assert dominance and make strong statements.

Beijing’s Revisionist Map Games

This article targets India because New Delhi has recently stepped up its “counter-cartography” policy, formally assigning standardized names to key locations along the India-China border.

This includes the Home Ministry’s October 2026 announcement standardizing 28 strategic features in Ladakh—specifically covering crucial Line of Actual Control (LAC) friction points like Gogra and Hot Springs, alongside peaks, passes, and glaciers.

It also follows India’s August 2026 mapping of 27 critical sites in Arunachal Pradesh, including historic flashpoints like Longju and Thag La. The Global Times article claims that by assigning these names, India “creates the self-delusion that its border claims have been settled.”

The text further asserts that “first comes an administrative announcement, followed by the names being entered on official maps, and then repeated amplification through the media.” It thus criticizes India’s approach; however, China does exactly the same through its own lawfare.

Beijing has repeatedly used map manipulation as a geopolitical tool to assert its claims—such as by releasing multiple rounds of standardized Mandarin names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh (which it calls Zangnan).

This is a typical Chinese way of doing things; China historically used these exact cartographic and administrative assertions before annexing Tibet in 1950, and it continues to use maps as an aggressive tool to project its territorial claims today.

It says that “India is playing games,” but this is exactly what China does in its dealings with India by failing to honor its agreements, including those reached in 1993 (Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility), 1996 (Confidence-Building Measures), and 2003/2005 (Political Parameters and Modalities).

If peace and tranquility have prevailed along the India-China border or LAC for an extended period, it is because India has unilaterally honored and abided by these agreements.

For instance, before 1962, China signed the Panchsheel Agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), under which Beijing promoted the narrative of mutual interests, mutual benefits, and peaceful relations through the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai,” but then suddenly attacked India.

Similarly, in 2020, sensing India’s vulnerability when the country was battling one of its worst COVID-19 crises, China tried to grab more Indian land and attacked Indian soldiers in Galwan through deception, killing 20 Indian soldiers.

Cartographic Fraud

Then it says that, in 2019, “India unilaterally amended its domestic laws, revoked relevant constitutional provisions, and announced the creation of the so-called ‘Union Territory of Ladakh,’ deliberately incorporating Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India border into its own administrative jurisdiction.”

However, when India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution and reorganized Jammu and Kashmir, it was an internal decision of India’s sovereignty, over which no foreign country has any say. India has historical claims to this region, and it has been an integral part of India for centuries.

China cannot dictate to India when it changes names, reorganizes its territories, or makes administrative changes. China has actually occupied Aksai Chin since the 1950s, consolidating its control during the 1962 war. It has also occupied the Shaksgam Valley, which it continues to hold illegally.

It then says the China-India border has historically belonged to China and that “China possesses sovereignty over the relevant areas, including the Aksai Chin region in Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and has ample historical and legal grounds for its claims.” How can China claim historical ownership when it has no historical claim to these territories? This is a complete distortion of history.

In reality, China’s administrative footprint never historically extended south of the Kunlun Mountains, and its own official records contradict its claims.

For instance, the Postal Atlas of China—officially published by the Chinese government between 1917 and 1933—as well as the 1925 Peking University Atlas, explicitly marked the international boundary along the Kunlun range, placing the entire Aksai Chin plateau completely outside of China and within India.

Furthermore, India’s legitimate administrative and historical rights were formally established under the 1842 Treaty of Chushul, signed between the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir and Tibet/the Qing Empire, which solidified Ladakh’s traditional frontiers.

The 1865 Johnson Line precisely mapped this boundary, and the Maharaja of Kashmir even built a military fort at Shahidulla (Xaidulla) to safeguard trade routes.

China established a presence in Aksai Chin only in the 1950s by covertly building the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G219) across Indian territory while New Delhi focused on peaceful diplomacy, and it eventually occupied it by force during the 1962 war.

Using Multilateral Forums as Geopolitical Tools

It then says that when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping, they discussed improving ties. It then gives a warning to India, a typical Chinese way of behaving: first bullying and then giving advice.

It says that “India should exercise greater restraint on border issues of this kind rather than provoke tensions.” It further says that “some Indian politicians are now keen to stage political shows over the border issue to divert attention from domestic problems and pander to nationalist sentiment.”

It thus links India’s renaming of places with an attempt to divert attention from domestic issues. However, this description fits China’s all-weather ally, Pakistan, which always seeks to externalize its internal threats toward its neighbors, particularly India and Afghanistan.

In stark contrast, India has robust political stability under a strong parliamentary mandate, a functioning electoral democracy, and the title of the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with resilient GDP growth of around 6.5% to 7% despite global slowdowns. It faces no major internal crisis that would force it to externalize its problems.

It then says that “China and India are important neighbors, major developing countries,” and that their relationship extends beyond bilateral ties to global forums, where they must cooperate through platforms such as BRICS and the United Nations to address global challenges and uphold international fairness and justice.

It says this as if India is the irritant preventing China from cooperating with it. However, China uses these forums to its advantage and sometimes directly against India. In these global forums, Beijing consistently blocks India’s rightful interests and actively seeks to constrain India’s rise.

For instance, at the UNSC, China repeatedly uses its veto to block India’s permanent seat and places technical holds to shield Pakistan-based terrorists from global sanctions. Furthermore, Beijing single-handedly blocks India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while using BRICS to push its own geoeconomic agendas that violate Indian sovereignty.

Then, in typical Chinese style, it concludes with another warning: “We urge India to act in the broader interests of bilateral relations, exercise prudence in both words and actions on the boundary issue, and follow the important understandings reached by the two countries’ leaders.”

Ultimately, this Global Times article stands as a textbook example of Chinese doublespeak and strategic hypocrisy. It attempts to lecture India on restraint and respect for agreements while China itself has a long, documented history of violating bilateral treaties, executing covert land-grabs, and aggressively weaponizing cartography against its neighbors.

By trying to portray India’s sovereign, internal administrative decisions as “political shows” or “provocations,” Beijing is merely projecting its own anxieties onto New Delhi. India’s robust economy, stable democracy, and firm counter-cartography policy prove that it will no longer remain passive in the face of China’s “salami-slicing” tactics and lawfare.

If China truly wants “peace and tranquility” on the border, it must shed its outdated Middle Kingdom syndrome, look at India as an equal, and stop using global forums and state media to launch malicious propaganda against Indian sovereignty,

• THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
• Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
• Connect with the author at: khurshidimran (at) gmail.com

The post China Accuses India of Map Games and a “Victory Narrative.” But Beijing’s Old Maps Betray the Claim: Opinion appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

L’Iran e il Pakistan sono fortemente impegnati nella costruzione di un ordine finanziario post-americano nel punto di incontro tra l’Asia occidentale e l’Asia meridionale.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Andiamo subito al nocciolo della questione: dopo aver esaminato attentamente la scacchiera, la leadership politica e militare di Teheran è già giunta alla conclusione che un attacco congiunto statunitense-israeliano, la cui pianificazione procede a ritmo frenetico, sia inevitabile.

Pertanto, si sono ora posizionati come un cobra arrotolato, pronto a colpire e a iniettare veleno letale al primo sentore di una minaccia imminente da parte del Sindacato di Epstein – senza nemmeno attendere un attacco effettivo.

L’offensiva preventiva, già delineata, sarà devastante, estendendosi oltre le basi statunitensi nell’Asia occidentale ad altri obiettivi regionali e includendo potenzialmente le infrastrutture energetiche del Golfo e i cavi sottomarini (in questo caso con ripercussioni che interesseranno soprattutto il Golfo e l’India, molto più che gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa).

Ci troviamo in una situazione di pericolo chiaro e imminente: una mossa militare statunitense-israeliana intesa come pressione sarà certamente interpretata a Teheran come l’inizio di un attacco.

Pertanto, la pressione bellica esercitata dal «culto della morte» e da Trump si scontra ora con una soglia di tolleranza iraniana pericolosamente bassa. Le opzioni di attacco del Pentagono spaziano dagli impianti nucleari iraniani alle infrastrutture energetiche.

Va da sé che il «sociopatico in capo» – già in preda al panico per l’imminente debacle delle elezioni di medio termine – sia una facile preda della potente lobby sionista e dei suoi finanziatori favorevoli alla guerra. Il pericolo strategico supremo è quindi che questa pressione incessante possa produrre un segnale che Teheran interpreti come un attacco imminente, anche se Washington sostiene pubblicamente che non vi sarà alcun attacco prima delle elezioni di medio termine.

Lo Yemen sta portando la situazione a un livello superiore

Parallelamente, fonti privilegiate a Islamabad confermano il successo di un test missilistico pakistano a Mach 7, con una gittata di diverse migliaia di chilometri. Questa nuova capacità ha tutte le carte in regola per alterare concretamente l’equilibrio di potere in Asia occidentale, rafforzando la portata deterrente del Pakistan e la sua capacità di influenzare ogni calcolo di sicurezza regionale, oltre ad accrescere la sempre più profonda interconnessione del Pakistan con la Cina, l’Iran e le petro-monarchie del Golfo.

Ed ora un’altra esclusiva: membri dei servizi di intelligence militare israeliani, tra cui un generale di divisione, hanno lasciato Riyadh dopo che MbS, in un presunto momento di lucidità, ha detto «No» all’offerta di «assistenza» da parte del culto della morte. Eppure, più di 100 membri del personale del CENTCOM rimangono sul posto.

La decisione di MbS potrebbe essergli stata imposta dalla Turchia e dal Pakistan – gli altri due firmatari dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca, che si sono improvvisamente ritrovati nella stessa sala operativa a Riyadh fianco a fianco con agenti del culto della morte.

Ora, la loro partenza potrebbe aver eliminato un rischio di escalation, ma gli agenti statunitensi rimangono esposti: qualsiasi attacco, da qualunque parte provenga, che causi vittime tra le forze statunitensi trascinerà immediatamente Washington nella guerra tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah.

La guerra tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah, infatti, sta raggiungendo il livello successivo: quello della volatilità. Il mix esplosivo costituito dall’intercettazione di un missile da crociera sopra la provincia di Medina, dalle intercettazioni di droni in altre zone dell’Arabia Saudita e dagli attacchi missilistici delle Forze Armate yemenite contro il complesso presidenziale del governo fantoccio di Aden è solo l’inizio.

Ciò che è accaduto dopo che Ansarallah ha preso di mira Najran – una delle province meridionali dell’Arabia Saudita sottratte allo Yemen nel 1934 dagli inglesi – è un fatto che suscita grande stupore.

Un portavoce saudita ha accusato Ansarallah di aver lanciato un missile da crociera contro Medina. La risposta dell’iconico portavoce delle Forze Armate yemenite, il generale Yahya Saree, è stata devastante: «Oggi non abbiamo condotto alcuna operazione militare contro il territorio saudita. Pertanto, l’affermazione del nemico saudita secondo cui Medina sarebbe stata presa di mira è una vera e propria invenzione e una grave menzogna».

Traduzione: lo Yemen colpisce una delle sue ex province; i sauditi ricorrono a una notizia totalmente falsa, inventando un attacco a una delle due moschee sacre – senza dubbio come preparazione per un’operazione sotto falsa bandiera; poi lo Yemen nega prontamente di aver colpito qualsiasi (corsivo mio) territorio saudita.

Ciò significa che Sana’a sta dichiarando in modo sottile, affinché tutti possano comprenderlo, di non condurre più operazioni all’estero (il corsivo è mio) nelle tre province: Jizan, Najran e Asir. Sta già – psicologicamente e operativamente – preparando il terreno per recuperare il proprio territorio sottratto.

Tutto ciò si sintetizza in questa concisa analisi proveniente dallo Yemen sulla decostruzione della sfarzosa Casa dei Saud:

«Lo Yemen sta minando i pilastri estremamente fragili dell’economia non petrolifera su cui i “pirati del deserto” hanno riposto tutte le loro speranze: immagine, investimenti (FDI), evasione dalla realtà, nonché impunità e invulnerabilità nei confronti del terrorismo proveniente dall’estero».

Come Pakistan e Iran aggirano il FMI

Prestino ora attenzione a un fatto piuttosto sorprendente avvenuto a metà settimana a Bangkok, durante la riunione annuale del FMI e della Banca Mondiale – debitamente accolta da proteste di piazza in Thailandia.

Il governatore della Banca Centrale iraniana, Abdolnaser Hemmati, ha incontrato il governatore della Banca Centrale pakistana, Jameel Ahmad, a margine del principale rituale annuale in lode del dollaro statunitense.

Il Pakistan è sottoposto alla ferrea morsa degli adeguamenti strutturali imposti dal FMI e dalla Banca Mondiale – e, come se non bastasse, è minacciato dalle sanzioni statunitensi perché intrattiene rapporti commerciali con l’Iran.

Pertanto, il fatto che Pakistan e Iran stiano di fatto discutendo della de-dollarizzazione proprio all’interno della tana del leone – il tempio del dollaro statunitense – è di un valore inestimabile.

L’infrastruttura è operativa dal 2023, grazie a un accordo di swap valutario che utilizza il rial e la rupia al posto del dollaro statunitense. Il baratto è gestito da entrambe le Banche Centrali, mentre i canali bancari passano attraverso la Bank Melli in Iran e la Bank Mellat in Pakistan. I loro mercati di confine – almeno sei – sono in forte espansione: rotte commerciali fisiche che aggirano completamente il dollaro statunitense.

Ciò di cui si è discusso a Bangkok all’inizio di questa settimana è come espandere l’intero sistema: non gliene importa nulla delle sanzioni secondarie statunitensi. Soprattutto perché Teheran sta offrendo a Islamabad ciò che il sistema americano semplicemente non può offrire: sovranità, nessun cambio di regime, nessuna austerità, nessuna lezione e, soprattutto, nessun aggiustamento strutturale.

Senza contare che il Pakistan ha un disperato bisogno del gas iraniano – e delle rotte commerciali della Nuova Via della Seta promosse dalla Cina.

L’Iran ha costruito un’intera economia aggirando completamente il FMI – e in grado di sopravvivere a uno tsunami di sanzioni, a un blocco e alla guerra.

Ora l’Iran e il Pakistan sono impegnati a fondo nella costruzione di un ordine finanziario post-americano all’incrocio tra l’Asia occidentale e l’Asia meridionale – completo di swap valutari, commercio di baratto, mercati di confine in forte espansione e canali bancari adeguati, che rendono le sanzioni secondarie una farsa.

A proposito, ciò sta avvenendo proprio mentre un immenso treno iraniano, carico di petrolio greggio – e il primo di molti – è pronto a partire alla volta della… Cina attraverso l’Asia centrale, sulla ferrovia della Nuova Via della Seta costruita dalla Cina.

Il cobra arrotolato potrebbe essere pronto a colpire. Ma il cobra, da tempo immemorabile, ama anche fare affari.