Today, the Supreme Court decided to hear Association for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education, a challenge to "facially neutral" discrimination against Asian applicants to selective public magnet schools in Montgomery County, Maryland. The admissions criteria are, on their face, racially neutral. But evidence indicates they were likely adopted for the purpose of reducing the percentage of Asian students in entering classes. More specifically, the case addresses the issue of "[w]hether a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the applicant pool." This issue is increasingly important since the Supreme Court banned most explicit racial discrimination in college admissions (and, by extension, school admissions) in SFFA v. Harvard (2023).
The lower court ruled that, even if there is evidence that a facially neutral admissions policy was enacted for the specific purpose of reducing the number of admitted students from a specific racial or ethnic group, it must still be upheld so long as the percentage of admitted students from that group is as high or higher than the percentage of applicants from that group.
The case is similar to (and based on) Fourth Circuit decision in Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board, which the Supreme Court refused to take in 2024 (though three conservative justices indicated they did want to hear it) [my wife Alison was one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in that case]. The present case is also from the Fourth Circuit. In my view (see here and here), the earlier Fourth Circuit decision is badly wrong and would - if the same approach were adopted by the Supreme Court - license all kinds of invidious, unconstitutional discrimination against Asians and other minorities:
Longstanding Supreme Court precedent holds that evidence of unconstitutional motivation for "facially neutral" policies shifts the burden of proof to the government to show that they would have enacted the same policy even in the absence of illicit motives. If they fail to prove that, then the policy must be subjected to strict scrutiny, which it would be unlikely to survive. In the TJ case, the Fourth Circuit majority opinion by Judge Robert Bruce King holds that even the most blatant discriminatory motivations do not trigger strict scrutiny so long as the group being targeted for discrimination by "facially neutral" means is still represented in proportion to its percentage of the relevant population (or more). Under the new admissions policy, Asians were still 54% of accepted applicants (as compared to 73% under the old one). Since that is still higher than the Asian percentage of the applicant pool, evidence of discriminatory intent becomes irrelevant….
I and others have previously compared today's anti-Asian discrimination in selective educational institutions to discrimination against Jewish applicants in earlier eras. Under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, old-time policies using facially neutral means to reduce the percentage of Jewish students at elite universities would be perfectly legal, so long as Jewish applicants were admitted in the same [or higher] percentages as other groups. And that would be true no matter how extensive the evidence that the new policy was motivated by anti-Semitic prejudices, or that Jewish applicants had to have stronger academic records to be admitted than those required of gentiles.
The same point applies to all kinds of discrimination against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. So long as facially neutral means are used and the overall success rates of different groups are similar, this reasoning would allow even the most blatant discriminatorily motivated policies intended to reduce the participation of some groups for the benefit of others. There are many situations where members of some minority groups are "overrepresented" in educational institutions, government contracting, and elsewhere, relative to their percentage of the applicant pool or of the general population. Jews, Muslims, Asians, atheists, and Mormons are obvious examples of groups that fit that bill in a variety of educational and professional settings.
If a federal or state government adopted a seemingly neutral policy to try to reduce the percentage of blacks among professional football or basketball players, that too would pass muster, so long as the percentage of blacks in the the relevant pro sports leagues remained at least as high as the percentage of blacks among those seeking employment as players…. Progressives and others inclined to support today's decision should consider whether they are really willing to live with these troubling implications.
Since I wrote the above, the ideological valence of anti-Asian discrimination in education has shifted somewhat. For a long time, many left-wingers defended such discrimination (along with discrimination against white applicants) on the grounds that it is necessary to achieve "diversity" and compensate Blacks and Hispanics for the history of discrimination against those groups. Most conservatives condemned it because it violates principles of constitutional color-blindness.
During the second Trump Administration, however, right-wing nativists have increasingly defended discrimination against Asian immigrants on such ridiculous grounds as that they work too hard (thus making it too difficult for whites to compete with them), or even that they undermine the supposed value of racial "homogeneity." The political right actually has a long history of anti-Asian bigotry. But recently the problem has gotten much worse, after a period in which it was diminishing because conservatives (rightly) condemned such discrimination as a violation of color-blindness. The growing anti-Asian bigotry among right-wing nationalists is similar to and linked with their growing tendency towards anti-Semitism. Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, the two prejudices are similar in many respects. Both Asians and Jews are condemned for supposedly working too hard, emphasizing academics too much relative to other activities, and supposedly dominating various business and intellectual fields.
The left-wing rationales for anti-Asian discrimination are little better than the right-wing ones. If you truly value diversity, it makes no sense to disfavor Asian applicants as a class. They add as much or more to diversity as any others. Indeed, as I have pointed out before, lumping all Asians in one category makes no sense, as this group includes a vast range of different ethnicities and cultures, covering more than half the world's population.
The compensatory justice rationale for anti-Asian discrimination collapses under the weight of the fact that many Asian groups have themselves faced extensive discrimination at various times in American history. Discrimination against Chinese and Japanese by federal and state governments has a long and sordid history, of which Japanese internment during World War II is just one particularly awful example.
It is important to recognize that "facially neutral" policies adopted for the specific purpose of excluding particular racial or ethnic groups differ from those that merely have an unintended disparate impact. The former are deliberate efforts to discriminate on the basis of race, whereas the latter are probably inevitable in a diverse society where groups differ from each other in various ways. For example, laws banning violent crime disproportionately affect any group which is, on average, younger than others, since young people (especially young men) have much higher crime rates than older ones.
The Constitution at least presumptively bars racial discrimination by government, whether motivated by left-wing objectives or right-wing ones. And such discrimination is forbidden even if cloaked in "facially neutral" garb. Otherwise, the government could easily discriminate against virtually any group simply by targeting some characteristic that correlates with group membership. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will recognize that and rule the right way in this case.
NOTE: The plaintiffs in this case are represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation, a public interest group that was my wife's employer until recently. As noted above, she helped represent the plaintiffs in a previous case (also litigated by PLF), on which the lower court ruling in this case was based. She is not one of the attorneys in this case, and is no longer with PLF.
The post Supreme Court Will Hear Case on "Facially Neutral" Discrimination Against Asian Students in Admissions to Public Magnet Schools appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Samuel Alito was the only Supreme Court justice on Monday to signal that he wanted to help Missouri revive a restriction for sex offenders on Halloween.
The high court rejected review of that case and others on its order list announcing the latest actions in pending appeals. It takes four justices to grant review of a petition, and most denials pass without comment from any of the justices, which makes even an unexplained notation like Alito’s significant. The list only said that he “would grant” the state’s petition, without explaining why.
Although justices sometimes explain their disagreements, they don’t always do so. In any event, that Alito stood alone here is unsurprising. He generally backs law enforcement and has split from his colleagues in other First Amendment disputes.
The state sought Supreme Court review after a lower court struck down a law that required registered offenders to post signs that say: “No candy or treats at this residence.”
In the petition the justices denied Monday, Missouri asked them to take the case to settle what it said is a nationwide divide over whether sex-offender notifications unconstitutionally compel speech under the First Amendment.
The state called the rule crucial to enforcing its prohibition on sex-offender participation in Halloween “because it helps prevent children from approaching sex offenders’ doors and assists police in detecting sex offenders who (like Respondent) unlawfully participate in Halloween.”
The respondent to the petition in this case is Thomas Sanderson. Before he was convicted of a sex offense in 2006, he and his family had consistently put on elaborate Halloween displays. Missouri passed the law in question while he was incarcerated. When he was released in 2008, he was told that he was “grandfathered in” and could continue the annual displays. Apparently it was not an issue until 2022, when he was reported to the police and charged with violating the law.
Upholding a lower court ruling favoring Sanderson’s constitutional challenge, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit said there was “insufficient evidence to support the State’s assertion that the sign mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals.”
Successfully opposing review at the Supreme Court, Sanderson said there was no real division to resolve among the lower courts. He said that the appeals court in his case “applied settled First Amendment doctrine to strike down an unusual speech compulsion,” and that “no court of appeals or state high court disagrees with that ruling.”
The post Over Alito’s objection, justices decline to review Halloween-sign rule for sex offenders appeared first on MS NOW.
Last week, it was double jeopardy in Oklahoma. This week, it’s car seizures in Chicago. The through-line is Justice Neil Gorsuch joining Justice Sonia Sotomayor for the second week in a row to call out what they see as government abuses.
It’s not a new phenomenon for the Obama and Trump appointees to team up in a certain type of case that lends itself to bipartisan agreement.
But early in the new court term, they continue to distinguish themselves from their colleagues on the nine-member bench who haven’t shown the same interest in drawing attention to these appeals the court refuses to hear.
“I again encourage courts considering this issue to take care that due deference to state police powers does not eclipse constitutional rights,” Sotomayor wrote Monday in the case of O’Donnell v. Chicago, joined by Gorsuch. The issue, in their view, is that the city’s vehicle forfeiture scheme offends the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking private property for public use without “just compensation.”
Per Sotomayor’s statement, the city takes vehicles when drivers fail to pay as few as two parking tickets — after that, she wrote, the city “can do as it pleases with the vehicle, with no obligation to pay compensation, offset the unpaid ticket debt, or return any surplus to the owner if the vehicle is sold for a profit.”
Her statement appeared on the court’s latest order list, which is a routine scheduled document that announces the latest action on pending petitions. It takes four justices to grant review of a petition, and most of them are denied without comment from any of the justices. That’s what makes it notable when justices speak out in connection with denials.
To be sure, Sotomayor and Gorsuch didn’t dissent from the O’Donnell denial, as justices sometimes do in their separate writings. As was the case with her statement that Gorsuch joined last week on a double jeopardy issue, the duo agreed with their colleagues that the Chicago case didn’t warrant review. Sotomayor noted that the nation’s lower courts are divided on the constitutional issue, and that the split would “benefit from further percolation” before the high court steps in.
So, the subject could return to the justices in a future case, where petitioners can count on at least two justices showing interest. They would need two more to win review.
The denial in the O’Donnell case (and many others that went unremarked upon by any justices) came as the court granted review in two new appeals that will both be closely watched this term.
In Association for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education, the court that struck down race conscious university admissions in 2023 agreed to consider a challenge to the Maryland district’s magnet middle schools.
Challengers argue that the district’s lottery system is too hard to access for Asian American students who are packed in “high-performing, low-poverty elementary schools.” Unsuccessfully opposing review, the district stressed that the ultimate admissions decisions are random, adding that it’s “difficult to even conceptualize” how a lottery-based system could be intentionally racially discriminatory.
The legal question that the court will consider in the Maryland case involves what plaintiffs must prove to show that a facially neutral admissions policy is racially discriminatory. The answer carries nationwide implications.
The other new case taken up by the court on Monday asks whether the government can ban people from making liquor at home.
That’s been the case for more than a century, but a federal appeals court struck down the restriction, which led the Justice Department to ask the high court to step in. Notably, the opposing parties — people who want to distill at home and the Hobby Distillers Association — agreed that the justices should review the issue so that the court can provide a nationwide resolution on the matter, which has divided lower courts.
The legal question in that case, DOJ v. McNutt, is whether the federal prohibition on producing distilled spirits in certain locations, including homes, exceeds congressional power.
The court will hear arguments in both appeals later in the term, with rulings expected by July.
The post Sotomayor and Gorsuch join forces again to warn against rights abuses appeared first on MS NOW.
Today, the Supreme Court decided to review the case of Department of Justice v. McNutt, which challenges a federal law banning home distilleries. The key question in the case is whether the law in question is justified by the combination of the tax power and the Necessary and Proper Clause (which gives Congress the power to make laws "necessary and proper" for executing other powers granted to the federal government). This is likely to be most important Supreme Court Necessary and Proper Clause decision since at least NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), which ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power; it cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. This case is likely to further clarify the meaning of "proper," perhaps by explicating in more detail what counts as a "great…and independent" power.
In the lower court decision in this case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the law is not "proper" and even that it isn't "necessary." There is also a Sixth Circuit decision that went the other way, thereby creating a circuit split.
As explained in my earlier posts on the Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions (linked above), I think this law is not "proper," and I hope the Supreme Court strikes it down. I summarize the reasons why in my post on the Fifth Circuit ruling:
The Fifth Circuit… concludes that the law in question exceeds Congress' authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants the power to makes laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution other federal powers. I think the court is right that the law in question is not "proper." The Supreme Court, in NFIB v. Sebelius(2012), ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power. It cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. See my analysis in this article. The power claimed here is clearly "great and independent." As Judge [Edith] Jones notes, "[u]nder the government's logic, Congress may criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity."
I elaborated further in the post criticizing the Sixth Circuit decision:
[T]he Sixth Circuit is badly wrong to conclude that the law is "proper." As explained in my earlier post, the Supreme Court, in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power. It cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. The power to ban any home-based activity that might serve a substitute for taxable activity outside the home is clearly a "great and independent power." As Judge Edith Jones explains in the Fifth Circuit ruling, "[u]nder the government's logic, Congress may criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity."
The Sixth Circuit tries to address this point by claiming alcohol is somehow special….
This distinction between alcohol and all other commodities is totally arbitrary. The same reasoning could justify banning home production of anything else that is more easily taxed if produced outside the home. And there is a long history of home production of all kinds of other commodities taxed or severely regulated by the government, ranging from cigarettes to illegal drugs, to pornographic videos.
While Judge Edith Jones (author of the Fifth Circuit decision) is one of that circuit's most conservative judges, the ruling was also joined by liberal Obama appointee Judge James Graves. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit decision was written by prominent conservative Judge Raymond Kethledge. We shall see if the Supreme Court also divides on this issue in a way that cuts across conventional ideological and jurisprudential lines.
As noted in my post on the Fifth Circuit case, I think Judge Jones is not persuasive in arguing that the home distillery ban isn't "necessary," as well as improper. That argument is unlikely to prevail under the Supreme Court's expansive definition of "necessary, " dating back to McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), where Chief Justice John Marshall famously ruled that "necessary" includes any measures that may be "useful" or "convenient" for implementing an enumerated power.
As also noted in my posts on the two lower court rulings, I think the government has a better argument that this law is authorized by the Supreme Court's badly misguide precedent on federal power under Commerce Clause (which grants Congress power to regulate interstate commerce). But the Supreme Court is apparently not going to review that issue. The question presented submitted to the Court in McNutt is limited to the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The post Supreme Court Will Hear Necessary and Proper Clause Case on Federal Law Banning Home Distilleries appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Agreement would have spared Mohammed risk of execution in exchange for guilty plea and life in prison
The supreme court on Monday rejected an effort to revive a plea deal for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the accused mastermind of the attacks on 11 September 2001.
The agreement would have spared Mohammed the risk of execution in exchange for his guilty plea and a sentence of life in prison without parole.
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© Photograph: Janet Hamlin/POOL APF/AP
© Photograph: Janet Hamlin/POOL APF/AP
© Photograph: Janet Hamlin/POOL APF/AP
On Sunday, newspapers Estadao and Folha revealed for the first time that the Brazilian Federal Police had sent a new investigation to the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to examine suspicions of money laundering involving presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro and lawyer Willer Tomaz.
RELATED:
Lula da Silva Beats Flavio Bolsonaro in Debate Ahead of Runoff
The investigation seeks to clarify the relationship between them and possible irregularities in financial transactions detected during another probe related to the movement of capital through betting activities.
The journalistic revelation came hours before a televised presidential debate in which Workers’ Party leader Lula da Silva challenged the far-right senator to authorize Brazilian authorities to examine his bank accounts and phone so the Brazilian people could learn the origins of his personal wealth and his family’s fortune. Flavio Bolsonaro refused to do so.
On Oct. 8, the case file for the new investigation arrived at the Supreme Court and was assigned by lottery to Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Previously, he oversaw the case that ended with a 27-year prison sentence for coup plotting against former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio’s father.
Brazil’s election offers a simple choice:
— BRASILWIRE (@BRASILWIRE) September 21, 2026
Governance from Brasilia or from Washington.https://t.co/TORegJQvQK
De Moraes was also the justice responsible for the proceedings in which Eduardo Bolsonaro, the far-right presidential candidate’s brother, was sentenced to four years in prison for attempting to coerce judges and orchestrate U.S. sanctions against Brazil to obstruct the case against his father.
According to investigators, an analysis of data extracted from digital files linked to lawyer Willer Tomaz revealed records indicating a close relationship between him and Flavio. Items found in the material examined by the Federal Police included references to meetings, parties and gatherings, as well as the lawmaker’s personal documents.
The investigation also indicates that a bank account linked to Willer Tomaz recorded transactions totaling about 130 million reais between March and May 2025. Investigators seek to establish the origin and destination of these funds, as well as verify possible connections to companies and financial operations related to the betting sector.
The case also includes information about payments for Flavio’s trips to Europe and an account linked to Alcazar Holding, in which the senator was identified as the “master user.” Both Flavio and Willer deny any wrongdoing and say their relationship is one of “friendship.”
teleSUR/ JF
Sources: Estadao – Folha – La Jornada
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