The UK government has returned to an issue musicians have been discussing since Brexit: how to make working in Europe easier again.

Its new music strategy, Turn It Up: Our Plan for Music, refers to the first high-level meeting on culture between the UK and the European Commission, held back in March, and promises continued work to reduce the barriers faced by British artists touring the EU.

The timing is significant. The UK is preparing to rejoin Erasmus+ in 2027, while London and Brussels are pursuing a broader reset of post-Brexit relations.

Music offers an interesting test of that reset. The UK has left the European Union, but its musicians have not become any less European.

British performers still tour the continent, while European musicians continue to work in British orchestras. The musical ecosystem survived Brexit. Navigating it became considerably more difficult.

A UK government study estimates that additional barriers to EU touring between 2022 and 2024 cost Britain £208m in lost economic output and the equivalent of 2,490 full-time jobs.

A Musicians’ Union survey found that, among musicians who had previously worked in the EU, 75 percent reported fewer bookings and 72 percent lower EU income.

More than half said EU touring was no longer financially viable.

But music reveals something more interesting than another item on the list of Brexit consequences. Brexit drew a political border through a professional community that had operated internationally for centuries.

Musicians were ‘European’ before EU

European musical mobility did not begin with freedom of movement. In the early 19th century, theatre companies crossed linguistic and political borders. Imperial Russia accommodated French and German theatrical companies alongside Russian performers, while Italian opera was embedded in its musical life.

Individual musicians were equally mobile. John Field, the Irish pianist and composer at the centre of my own research, trained in London before spending most of his adult career in the Russian Empire. The German pianist Adolf Henselt settled there and became deeply involved in Russian musical education.

These were not exceptions: musical life itself was international. The EU did not invent that circulation. European integration merely made it administratively easier. 

Brexit did not make British musicians unwelcome in Europe, or European musicians unwelcome in Britain. It changed the cost of maintaining those relationships.

For an international star with professional support, another permit can be an inconvenience. For a young ensemble deciding whether four European concerts are financially viable, it can determine whether the tour happens at all.

The border appears before the first tour

The consequences begin before professional life. A conservatoire is not simply somewhere a musician obtains a qualification. It is where professional relationships form. A student may meet a future ensemble partner, while an exchange can produce an opportunity years later.

The post-Brexit figures are striking. The number of new EU students entering UK higher education fell from 66,685 in 2020–21 to 28,375 in 2023–24 — a decline of around 57 percent, according to figures based on HESA data.

Britain’s Turing Scheme supported outward mobility, but did not reproduce Erasmus+’s reciprocal structure.

The UK’s return to Erasmus+ in 2027 therefore matters beyond universities. In music, today’s exchange student can become tomorrow’s professional collaborator.

Meanwhile, Brussels is actively spending money to encourage cultural mobility. Creative Europe has a €2.44bn budget for 2021–27. Its Pan-European Cultural Entities programme specifically supports orchestras working across borders to develop young musicians: around €11m was allocated to five projects in 2024, expected to involve more than 1,000 young musicians from at least 20 participating countries. The policy assumption is revealing: movement itself creates value.

Put musicians into the reset

At the 2025 UK-EU summit, London and Brussels explicitly recognised “the value of travel and cultural and artistic exchanges, including the activities of touring artists.”

The new high-level cultural dialogue provides a forum to turn that promise into policy. Cultural mobility should become a permanent part of the UK-EU reset.

London and Brussels should use the dialogue to identify touring requirements that can realistically be simplified and work with member states towards greater consistency for short-term cultural engagements.

Emerging artists should also be explicitly considered in the proposed Youth Experience Scheme. The commission’s original proposal envisaged a time-limited route for people aged 18 to 30 to live on the other side of the English Channel. Paid cultural work should be clearly accommodated in whatever agreement emerges.

A 24-year-old violinist should not discover that a programme intended to restore opportunities for young Europeans works perfectly until somebody pays her to perform.

None of this means recreating freedom of movement through the orchestra pit. Britain chose to leave the EU and cannot expect every privilege of membership.

The argument is more practical. British and European cultural industries remain intertwined, and unnecessary friction is most expensive for those least able to absorb it. Major institutions employ administrators. International stars have managers. A young quartet may have four instruments and a group chat.

Two centuries ago, Field travelled from Ireland through London and built a career in Russia. Henselt left Germany and became part of Russian musical education. They did so long before Eurostar, Erasmus+ or Creative Europe.

Two hundred years later, crossing the continent is faster. Building a European career need not become harder. The UK has left the EU. Its musicians have not left European musical life.

As London and Brussels shape their new relationship, cultural mobility should be treated as part of its infrastructure. Musicians will continue to cross the Channel. The question is how costly we choose to make it.

Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen attacked Spanish leader Pedro Sánchez on migration during a summit debate in Brussels on Friday (16 October). 

Frederiksen, who despite leading a centre-left party has taken an increasingly hard line on migration, criticised Sánchez for granting renewable one-year legal residence permits to undocumented migrants.

“I have asked the commission to look into whether one country is doing almost everything in the opposite direction of what the others are doing. In other words, you come to a country illegally, and suddenly you’re allowed to be there legally,” Frederiksen said before arriving at the second day of the Brussels summit.

In response, Sánchez told reporters after the meeting with EU leaders that Spain’s regularisation scheme “does not go against the grain” – since there are many countries with similar measures.

In April, Spain approved plans to grant legal status to around 500,000 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. These so-called regularisations are a common labour-migration policy that other countries have also used, including Italy, which has authorised nearly 500,000 non-EU work visas through 2028.

But at the EU leaders’ summit in Brussels in June, several European leaders used the meeting to criticise Spain’s regularisation.

The criticism resurfaced during this October summit, after the summer’s migrant crisis in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, which some EU governments then weaponised against Spain.

Push for stronger wording

Following a breakfast on Friday (16 October), attended by 16 EU countries backing stricter migration restrictions, Denmark, Poland and Italy had also attempted to link migration to crime in draft EU summit conclusions.

They tried to amend the summit conclusions to call on the commission for extra efforts to monitor national migration measures that can affect other member states, highlight the impact of migration on welfare and public services, as well as avoid “measures that could create incentives for illegal migration”.

However, France and Luxembourg criticised the position of the 16, and leaders had a strategic exchange and agreed to return to the topic at a later date.

According to experts from the Migration Policy Centre, it is hard to conclude whether Spain’s regularisation plans encouraged more migration to the EU.

So-called ‘pull factors’ are difficult to consider in isolation, as migration depends on work opportunities, social networks abroad and other factors, but policies can also play a role. 

Regularisation could pave the way to legal work, generating  “positive employment and fiscal outcomes over time,” the scholars also said.

Denmark itself is not bound by EU laws (due to an opt-out) on border control, immigration, civil and criminal law, or police cooperation, and therefore cannot vote on them in the Council.

Rhetoric versus facts

It is not the first clash between the two socialist leaders on migration, but the timing matters. 

Sánchez faces elections in November, and France heads into presidential elections next spring, where it is feared anti-migrant rhetoric could roll out the red carpet for the far right.

In response to a barrage of criticism from the likes of Austria, Czech Republic and, Sánchez said that the numbers on illegal migration returns speak for themselves. 

“See what is happening in Spain – some politicians are willing to replace the population only so they can be … in government,” said Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš ahead of the meeting on Friday. “I am convinced that for some countries, it is too late – and that some day we will have to defend our borders so that migrants don’t come to us from Western countries if it continues like this. And we, of course, are preparing for this.”

“It’s a road to hell,” added Babiš, who belongs to the far-right Patriots for Europe group.

His comments, Sánchez said, resembled the rhetoric of the far-right political party Vox in Spain, now polling close to 20 percent. “One thing is the rhetoric, the blablabla, and another thing is the facts,” he said.

Ceuta crisis

The situation in Ceuta escalated at the end of July 2026, when tens of thousands of people simultaneously attempted to cross over from Morocco to the autonomous enclave.

The Spanish have since deployed additional security measures to regain control over the territory. 

A majority of newly arrived migrants were eventually returned to Morocco, but thousands remained in the city of 80,000 people – many of whom are unaccompanied children and teenagers.

The crisis has exposed tensions between Spain, Morocco and the EU on border control and asylum and put into question who is responsible for migrants. 

French president Emmanuel Macro previously said: “Spain was the target of an attack. Call it a hybrid attack if you like, but it was an information attack. Traffickers, and probably people seeking to destabilise Spain, led many people living in poverty to believe there was an opportunity, using false information and creating an information bubble.”

Meanwhile Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni previously called for a suspension of the Schengen free movement agreement with Spain.

The whole situation triggered tit-for-tat border closures between Spain and Italy. 

On Thursday (15 October), Italy decided not to renew the security checks with Spain, paving the way for a week of negotiations between Madrid and Rome to reach a final agreement. 

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday (16 October) that the US-Russia ‘diesel deal’ came as a surprise and could lead to further sanctions relief for Moscow.

“We cannot treat the agreements concerning diesel and coal as isolated cases … gas could be next. I am absolutely convinced of that,” Zelensky told reporters in Brussels, after meeting with EU leaders. 

“The risks I am talking about are clear: sanctions could be progressively eased,” he warned.

EU leaders are expected to “regret” the diesel deal in their summit conclusions, while discussions on a new package of sanctions against Russia are still underway.

“It is not a time to release sanctions on Russia,” said EU Council president Antonio Costa on Friday, alongside EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and Zelensky before the discussion with EU leaders.

“We will not lift any sanctions unless Russia ends the war,” confirmed von der Leyen, adding that Europe will keep working on “pressuring Russia”.

Europe has adopted 21 packages of sanctions on Russia since the beginning of the war, alongside the listing of thousands of individuals and entities, and is currently working on the 22nd.

But one Ukrainian senior diplomat told EUobserver that the coming months could be crucial to agree on more sanctions against Moscow, since February is seen as a possible deadline given the upcoming 2027 French presidential elections.

Russia’s economy has come under growing pressure from Western sanctions. Although a month-on-month decrease in exports was observed (six percent for fossil fuels, eight percent for crude oil), the US diesel deal could offer Moscow a potential lifeline. 

No concessions

The diesel deal is widely seen as a way to restart peace talks. At the same time, the United States is pushing Kyiv and Moscow toward a negotiated settlement, which puts Ukraine under growing pressure to come to the table, even though any deal could force it to make painful concessions.

Zelensky, however, has warned against any deal that would compromise Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.

“Putin plans to stick around much longer. He is building a Russia that looks like North Korea,” he wrote on X.

Instead, the Ukrainian president has turned to European “real leaders”, seeking to shore up their political and military support and strengthen Kyiv’s position in any future negotiations. 

And in the words of von der Leyen, Europe is already helping Ukraine to prepare for “winter-isation”, which for Zelensky should translate into more funds and defence support.

This week, the commission disembursed €2.9bn to Kyiv to purchase drones, air defence systems, missiles, radars, electronic warfare systems and ammunition, as part of the EU’s €90bn loan, backed by EU leaders last year. 

But Kyiv has warned it will need tens of billions more to continue fighting against Russia, as the war intensifies on the front lines and the number of attacks in Ukrainian cities increases.

Ukraine’s defence needs are estimated for 2026 around €23bn and Kyiv still needs to fund a hole of roughly €69.3bn for 2027.

“We will have to increase the funding once again,” German chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Thursday before meeting EU leaders in Brussels. 

Protect Russian frozen assets

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France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.

The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.

That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.

Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies. 

But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.

“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.

“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Made in Europe

The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November. 

Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.

But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.

To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities. 

From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.

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• In 2022, the Neptune missile sank the cruiser Moskva; in 2026, it is destroying aircraft at airfields.
• Ukraine has run out of Patriot missiles, while parts of Kyiv are without electricity following new air raids.
• The order to slow down Starlink came from the White House, Reuters reported.
• What is new in the “captured” part of Kharkiv region? Ukrainian soldiers capture a Russian soldier in its centre.
• Drones sank a ship off the Bulgarian coast, and Sofia turned to Nato.
• Maps of the day – Kharkiv region
• Videos of the day – a Russian drone destroyed a grocery store in Odesa while it was fully operational; a strange drone with a strange name

In 2022, the Neptune missile sank the cruiser Moskva; in 2026, it is destroying aircraft at airfields. On Thursday, the Ukrainian president released a report saying that a strike on the Borisoglebsk Russian military airfield in Voronezh region had destroyed four Su-34M strike aircraft on the ground and damaged two more.

Volodymyr Zelensky also released a satellite image, which is the lead photograph of Friday’s Ukraine Battlefield update.

The airfield lies around 340 km from the front line and was built to accommodate even the largest aircraft types in the Russian air force’s inventory: the Tu-160 and An-124.

In this war, however, it serves as a base from which smaller Su-34s take off for glide-bomb attacks. It is therefore a place from which otherwise almost invulnerable aircraft operate, bombing Ukrainian army positions directly on and near the front line.

Ukraine does not yet have fighter jets capable of shooting down enemy aircraft at the distances from which they release their bombs, while the Patriot system has no missiles of the type that have already shot down several Su-34s in mid-air. The destruction of four aircraft and at least damage to two more is therefore a major success.

Several aspects are noteworthy: the weapon used; the apparent capacity to react exceptionally quickly; the Russian military’s continuing reluctance to build protected aircraft shelters at airfields; as well as its carelessness during operations. Crucially, the impact on operations is easy to calculate in this case.

Zelensky confirmed that the successful attack was carried out using a Neptune missile. It is one of the Ukrainian arms industry’s most successful achievements.

It was originally designed to fight enemy ships. It is launched from ground-based launchers and flies close to the terrain on its way to the target. The manufacturer completed the first battery shortly before the invasion began.

Until it sank the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship in April 2022, it was not known whether the Ukrainians had made it operational. The sinking of the cruiser Moskva provided a clear answer.

Since then, the missile has been repeatedly upgraded. The aim was not only to extend its range, but also to enable it to strike ground targets. Both have been achieved, as the attack on Borisoglebsk demonstrates.

As almost always, local residents managed to record the moment of its arrival and impact on the target:

Ukrainian forces carried out a missile strike on Russia’s Borisoglebsk airbase tonight, with at least one massive explosion and post-strike fire seen. pic.twitter.com/aA1xxZlhCl

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) October 14, 2026

The photographs below most likely show the consequences. There are signs of fire at the aircraft stands marked one and six. The damaged aircraft probably stood there.

Two Su-34 wrecks are clearly visible at positions two and five, while at positions three and four, alongside a crane clearing debris, there is mainly a large burnt-out area and the outline of one Su-34.

Even the Russians do not keep so many aircraft together for long at an airfield relatively close to the front line during wartime. The Ukrainians therefore had a very short window between detecting the target and carrying out the attack. That they succeeded points to highly accurate intelligence and a very short response time.

Even so, it was very careless of the Russians to park at least four, but more likely as many as six, valuable combat-ready aircraft so close together, even for a short time.

Russian Z-bloggers criticised the fact that, despite repeated assurances that hardened shelters were being built, there are still none at Borisoglebsk airfield.

By 2022, Russia had built 147 aircraft, including prototypes. Exact production figures since the start of the invasion are not known, but according to Polish analyst Jaroslaw Wolski, Russia lost between a quarter and a third of its annual production on Thursday, which is estimated at between 18 and 24 aircraft. This is more likely an upper estimate, and average actual production over the entire period of the invasion is probably lower.

Meanwhile, the Oryx website has counted 44 Su-34s lost to date; with the additional six, the total has now reached 50.

Russia has therefore produced no more than around 200 aircraft of this type, a quarter of which it has lost in combat, while at least half of the remainder are unfit for combat as a result of wear and tear.

The Russian Z-channel Fighterbomber said on Friday that the annual flying time of a Russian air force fighter jet amounted to thousands of hours: “No, not hundreds, not one thousand, but thousands. Divide that by the number of days in a year and you will see how much each individual fighter jet works on average per day.”

It wrote this in connection with its claim that, although the Ukrainian air force was incapable of fighting the Russian one, it and Ukrainian drones were nevertheless “consuming the resources of all our fighter jets, which have essentially been continuously in the air for five years, taking turns with one another”.

Fighterbomber did not mention Su-34s in this context, but these aircraft bear the main burden of front-line missions, meaning they too are heavily used: “This inevitably leads to malfunctions and crashes, resulting in repairs that take an aircraft out of combat readiness, with another aircraft taking over its tasks …”.

Fighterbomber concluded that although “we have many aircraft, there are still too few of them”.

Since this year, Russia has been able to mount six glide bombs under each Su-34, rather than four. The loss of six aircraft — since even damaged aircraft cannot fight, at least temporarily — therefore means at least 36 fewer precision-guided bombs against Ukrainian positions each day.

This assumes, of course, that every aircraft flies only one mission per day. In practice, they fly more, making this a significant relief for soldiers on the front line.

Ukraine has run out of Patriot missiles, while parts of Kyiv are without electricity following new air raids. A shortage of the most advanced surface-to-air missiles, which alone can effectively shoot down Russian ballistic missiles, is nothing new. Ukrainian batteries have previously had nothing to fire, leaving them to watch Russian air raids helplessly.

CNN reported most recently that this had happened again. Russian missiles consequently damaged three Kyiv power plants again on Wednesday morning.

The destructive air raid was repeated on Friday morning. It led to emergency power cuts. “Power outages have been recorded in Kyiv, as well as in Kyiv, Volyn, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv regions. Work to restore supplies has already begun wherever the security situation permits,” NEC Ukrenergo said.

The NV website reported that 370,000 customer connections in Volyn region alone had been left without power.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the heating season officially began in Kyiv on Thursday. However, as NV wrote, this was not possible in two Kyiv districts because energy workers had not had time to deal with the consequences of the attacks.

At the same time, a dispute is under way between Volodymyr Zelensky and the capital’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko. According to the president, Kyiv’s leadership had “almost entirely” failed to meet the deadlines of the so-called Resilience Plan, which was intended to prepare the city for winter. Klitschko rejects this, but he had already come under criticism from the media in previous months.

The order to slow down Starlink came from the White House, Reuters reported. The respected news agency said, citing sources within the administration itself. However, it has no information on who specifically issued such an order.

The restriction concerns the military component of the system, called Starshield. Elon Musk also drew attention to this in a post, which essentially confirms the accuracy of the Reuters report.

No reliable information on whether the system was functioning was available on Friday.

What is new in the “captured” part of Kharkiv region? Ukrainian soldiers capture a Russian soldier in its centre. In the context of the entire war, this is an insignificant episode, but the Russian defence ministry still insists that it has captured 65 villages and 1,200 square km of territory in the north-eastern part of Kharkiv region, and has moreover encircled some Ukrainian units.

A video has appeared online from the village of Buzove — its location is highlighted in red on the map of the Ukrainian Petrenko account — where a group of Ukrainian soldiers captured a Russian hiding in bushes by the road. There was also a dead Russian soldier there.

For comparison, this is how Russian maps — specifically those of the state news agency Ria Novosti — depict the same territory. Buzove is not named on the map, but it lies roughly halfway between the village of Reznikove — marked by a black assault-rifle symbol in a white circle — and Ivanivka, which is a short distance to the left and below. According to the Russians, the village is 12 km in a straight line from the nearest Ukrainian positions.

Drones sank a ship off the Bulgarian coast, and Sofia turned to Nato. Drones attacked in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone as recently as last week. One of the vessels sank and all 10 sailors are presumed dead.

Earlier this week, the HS Dignity, flying the flag of Guinea-Bissau, was sunk 31 km off the Bulgarian coast. According to the BBC, 10 people were missing.

As many as 18 drones damaged the Ukrainian vessel Chelsea-3, which was sailing from Turkey to a Ukrainian port along the Black Sea coast to avoid the Russian military.

🛳️ Route of the vessel hit by drones off Bulgaria's coast overnight

Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said that the Chelsea 3 is Ukrainian-owned and sails under the Maltese flag.

The crew — seven Ukrainians and eight Azerbaijanis — was rescued.

An accelerated screen… pic.twitter.com/yIjgHZ0Lqr

— NEXTA (@nexta_tv) October 13, 2026

Video of rescue operations after the Chelsea-3 was hit:

Екипажът на моторен кораб CHELSEA 3 е спасен източно от Бяла pic.twitter.com/sSK7Nw7ABW

— Maritime.bg (@MaritimeBul) October 13, 2026

It is almost certain that Russia was behind the attacks. Even the government, which is otherwise sympathetic towards Russia, is convinced of this and has summoned the Russian ambassador. Sofia has also asked Nato to deploy aircraft to protect vessels in the Black Sea.

Videos of the day

A Russian drone struck an ordinary grocery supermarket in Odesa while it was fully operational.

Russian forces carried out a drone strike on a Ukrainian supermarket in Odessa this morning.

A Geran-4 slammed into a busy Tavria V supermarket in Mayaky, injuring multiple people and setting the building ablaze. pic.twitter.com/iuDmascrvV

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) October 15, 2026

The drone in this video not only looks unusual, but also has a highly unusual name — Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich. This design allows vertical take-off, after which the drone transitions to conventional flight, increasing its speed and range compared with ordinary FPV drones. According to the manufacturer, its range reaches 50 km.

Це — новий російський дрон-камікадзе «Князь Владимир Святославич». Був.

Ворогом цей безпілотник заявлений як «ударний для середніх дистанцій». Але до цілі він не долетів — один із підрозділів «Дронопаду» збив його перехоплювачем, який ми передали бійцям завдяки вашим донатам.… pic.twitter.com/UXN9lFLkTP

— Повернись живим (@BackAndAlive) October 15, 2026

The European Commission’s likely anti-asylum proposal to tackle sudden large arrivals may come before the end of the year, after warm endorsements by some 17 EU states during a breakfast on Friday (16 October) ahead of the second-day of the EU summit in Brussels.

Beyond the warm words, the discussions exposed a clear ambition among the 17 to give member states the power to close EU borders and temporarily and selectively suspend asylum applications, according to an EU diplomat.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the diplomat said there had been a lot of support for the so-called European emergency response framework, proposed by EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen during her State of the Union address last month.

Speculation on what exactly such a framework entails remains unclear, amid alarm among human rights defenders that the EU is seeking legal tools to curb asylum rights – echoing Polish temporary emergency measures that have suspended asylum registration along the Belarus border since March 2025.

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Europe is heading into an electoral moment without recent precedent. Four of its five most populous member states, Spain, France, Italy and Poland, are due to vote within the next 12 months – starting with Spain on 29 November.

If voters move further right, the combined effect could reshape the Union far more profoundly than any single national election.

Two shifts stand out. First, the firewall between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the hard-right is crumbling, even in Germany, its last bastion.

Hard-right parties sit in the governments of Italy, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia and Croatia, while Slovenia’s government relies on outside support from one.

Second, competition from the far-right is pushing established radical-right parties to harden their positions.

In Catalonia, Aliança Catalana is challenging Vox; in France, Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête, despite scoring single digits, is pressing on Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; in Italy, Roberto Vannacci’s National Future is challenging Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and in Poland, Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown is cannibalising the Confederation.

Under pressure, established conservatives tend to move towards these parties rather than hold the line, as Spain’s Partido Popular and France’s Les Républicains illustrate. Positions once on the margins become mainstream.

The implications go beyond immigration.

Le Pen and Vox leader Santiago Abascal advocate “national priority” in access to welfare and public services. Under pressure from the League and National Future, Meloni’s government has introduced a 30-percent cap on first-year classrooms for pupils without Italian citizenship, based on their birthplace or prior schooling.

A leaked AfD strategy paper reportedly goes further, proposing that national constitutions override EU law and reducing the Court of Justice to a forum for disputes between governments.

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Human rights NGOs in Europe are not doing well. Funding cuts, legal restrictions, administrative burdens and smear campaigns are taking their toll.

I see organisations drastically downsizing or closing altogether and staff burning out. If we are to reverse our fortunes, the traditionally legally-focused movement needs to rebalance its skill-set to include more communicators and organisers.

Traditionally, human rights NGOs have been staffed mainly by lawyers. This is understandable. Human rights are legal standards contained in national, European and international law. If your main tools for getting human rights implemented are advocacy and litigation, then you need legal experts. But advocacy is becoming less effective because decision makers increasingly see supporting human rights as politically risky.

And litigation as a tool is partly limited by increasing political interference with the courts in some countries, or because – again – politicians see potential political brownie points in not complying with (or see potential political costs in complying with) judgments that enforce human rights standards.

It’s not just that NGOs’ traditional tools are losing their power. It’s that legal training does not equip us with the tools do we need to reverse our fortunes.

Our main lever for restoring human rights and the organisations that promote them is public opinion. For as long as we live continue to live in democracies, pressure from voters can have an impact on decision makers. Which means we need communicators who can help the public realise how important human rights are to them.

David Attenborough pointed out a few years ago that “saving our planet is now a communications challenge. We know what to do, we just need the will”.

The same goes for human rights. 

But legal training does not make you good at communicating with folks outside your bubble.

‘Legal-ese’ is not the right lingo

I know from personal experience. I trod a path to human rights through a law degree, masters, doctorate and then academia. Human rights folks talk about them in a way that conveys a fraction of their value and power. If you’d asked me 15 years ago why human rights are important, I’d have said things like this: ‘they protect us from abuse by the government’, or ‘they’re minimum standards of protection the state can’t breach’, or ‘they exist to protect the vulnerable’.

These things are true. They’re also not very persuasive to people outside our base of support. Because the kinds of human rights breaches the movement foregrounds tend to affect ‘other people’. And lawyers are used to thinking about rights in the context of legal disputes.

So human rights get reduced to a shield that protects groups or institutions that most people don’t care about, don’t understand, or who live in other countries. 

Human rights are not just a passive defence. They are transformational. Human rights are tools. Tools we use to demand that our leaders use the powers and resources with which we’ve entrusted them to do what’s best for all of us. Tools that we use to create the lives we want to live and the communities we want to live in. This is how we need to talk about them, especially when it comes to civil and political rights.

People outside our base cannot be made to care about media freedom, the right to protest or democracy itself just on principle or because they’re enshrined in legal standards. To care about human rights, most people need to know what these things deliver.

Folks will see that protest is important when we explain how it allows people like them to come together and make their leaders listen to their concerns, whether it’s about climate change or better pay for teachers. I’ve seen it first-hand when testing messages in focus groups. 

Empathy, not stereotypes

The same goes for stimulating support for the rights of people from marginalised groups. Right now, most people have trouble caring because they been fed negative stereotypes that cause them to regard some people as ‘others’ and ‘outgroups’, meaning that they will tolerate lower standards of treatment for them.

Using legal arguments and evidencing rights violations by focusing on the harm being suffered doesn’t work because it does nothing to address the reason people don’t care. For that, we need to stimulate empathy and dissolve negative stereotypes through techniques like storytelling. Once people empathise and recognise our common humanity, they’re much more likely to support equal treatment. 

When we communicate in a way that allows our audience to see how human rights deliver things they find important to them, they don’t just start to support human rights as standards. They also start to support the organisations that promote them. That means they’re more likely to listen to them, stand up for them, get involved in their work and even donate. 

It’s not just about communicating better. We also need organisers who can help people come together to carry effective messages and make the strength of public support felt by our leaders. 

Folks with legal training are still essential.

If you’re going to make phones, you need engineers. But we don’t see the engineers being given the job of persuading folks to buy the phones, do we?

Unless they’ve had proper communications training. The human rights movement’s legalistic centre of gravity needs to shift to make room for knowledge and skills that can meet the moment.

In the short-term we could achieve this by retraining staff and joining forces with other progressive movements that know how to organise and mobilise, like environmental NGOs.

We could also tackle the issue upstream by working with universities that produce human rights graduates to develop more holistic curricula that cover communications and organising and not only law. 

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

Do you remember the Yellow Vests movement that shook France 2018? On TikTok, a young user has called for a national mobilisation on the seventeenth of October against the cost of living, and the video quickly went viral. So could the Yellow Vests make their big return?

“Please, give us a date, we’re ready to protest! We young people are struggling. We just can’t make a living anymore,” that’s what Justine, a TikToker from Normandy in France has posted a few weeks ago, while wearing a fluorescent yellow vest.

The reference to the 2018 Yellow Vests is unmistakable. The French movement, which began in protest at rising fuel prices, has been widely revived on social media in recent weeks, especially by younger users.

Our colleague Romane Lizée from StreetPress, a fellow member of the Sphera Network alongside Europod, spoke to some of them: young people reviving a protest movement they only knew from a distance.

Yves, a 24-year-old TikToker with over 80,000 followers, made a video called “Survival Guide for the Yellow Vests 2026”. He gives would-be protesters practical advice, such as bringing thick ski goggles or writing a lawyer’s phone number on a piece of paper.

So why is the movement resurfacing now? For many, the movement has come to stand for a general sense of being fed up, something they still feel today.

 “Eight years ago, France put on the yellow vest because petrol hit 1.50 euros a litre, and now we’re almost at three euros and nothing is happening!” That’s how Saïd, a 23-year-old delivery driver, sees it.

The economic context is indeed worse than it was eight years ago. The price of fuel is now almost 2.40 euros a litre.

Throughout September, a series of protests followed one another, called by different professions and for different reasons: climate action, firefighters, a public-sector strike, the law on sexual violence, and finally the student blockades.

High school students have been protesting for a few weeks now, blockading their schools to demand better conditions. We talked about this in a previous Briefed episode. You can find the link in the description.

Now, will the protest be as big and long-lasting as the one in 2018?

Online, a petition launched by the website 17octobregiletjaune, which calls for the protest, has gathered more than 21,000 signatures. Over a thousand actions across the country have been identified on a map by the same website: mostly protests in several cities, but also actions on roundabouts and at petrol stations.

Youth organisations, students’ unions and education staff have already answered the call. More importantly, the CGT, one of France’s main labour unions, has backed it, as have some political figures, like Marine Tondelier, the Green candidate for the presidential election. Still, the true extent of the movement is difficult to predict.

In other European countries, protests are also multiplying, especially among young people. In Spain, huge demonstrations for the right to housing have been taking place in several cities since mid-September. They went quite far: they pushed Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to call snap elections.

In Brussels, on October 9th, thousands of protesters, including rail workers, teachers, and university and secondary school students, marched against the federal government’s policies, in particular its socio-economic measures. Here again, precarity is a central grievance.

In Italy, on October 8th, students called for mobilisation, notably by camping in front of universities across the country to protest against the sharp rise in tuition fees and student rents.

The triggers behind these protests are not all the same, and the mobilisations take different forms from country to country. But the goal is broadly the same: to call for better living conditions and to defend basic social rights. And young people are particularly mobilised.

EU leaders met Thursday (15 October) for their first face-to-face talks on the 2028–2034 budget, killing the latest negotiation proposal put forward by Ireland.

Dublin, which holds the symbolic EU Council presidency, proposed cuts of up to €141bn from the long-term budget,  about eight percent less than the commission proposal. But it failed to make anybody happy, for different reasons. 

And now, EU Council president António Costa has been tasked to deliver a new compromise before EU leaders meet again on 26 November in Brussels, with the goal of striking a deal during the summit in December. 

An EU official said Costa deemed the deal in December as “essential,” urging EU capitals “to assume their responsibility”.

For Denmark, for example, it is important to have more funds for defence, borders, illegal migration, and competitiveness. “It will probably be as difficult as it was last time or even more difficult,” said Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen ahead of the meeting.

“We need unanimity in the Council. We are far from that unanimity,” also said German chancellor Friedrich Merz before meeting counterparts.

The EU is divided into two camps. The so-called Frugals (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden) want “several hundred billion” more to be cut, mostly from agriculture and cohesion funds, while 17 EU member states (self-named as Friends of Cohesion) criticise the savings. 

But time is of the essence to reach a deal this year, especially for French president Emmanuel Macron. France will hold presidential elections in the spring, and if Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, wins, reaching an EU deal would become far more difficult.

Le Pen has pledged that, if she comes to power, she will halve France’s contribution to the EU budget.

And Macron reportedly said in the room with EU leaders that from January onwards, there will be no political room for reaching an agreement.

‘Easier to give up what you don’t yet have’

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The European Commission says asylum seekers arriving at EU borders are now being screened, but it makes no mention of the independent rights monitors that EU law requires to oversee those procedures, even as spending on border surveillance surges.

“Screening of people arriving illegally and the border procedures are being carried out,” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, in a letter addressed to the 27 heads of state and government meeting at an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday (15 October).

An annex to her letter, obtained by EUobserver, highlights broad outstanding issues when it comes to implementing new EU-wide asylum laws that kicked into force this past June.

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The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.

The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).

And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.

Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.

He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday. 

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.

Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.

And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers. 

“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.

The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.

The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.

And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.

It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before. 

Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.

Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.

And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.

Slovak prime minister Robert Fico appears to have become Russia’s most prominent ally in the European Union, following the demise of Hungary’s pro-Kremlin leader.

Juraj Blanár, Slovakia’s foreign minister, announced controversial plans to revive a joint committee with Russia back in August – just a day before the anniversary of the Soviets occupying Czechoslovakia in 1968.

His announcement also came before Fico headed off to meet his counterparts at a summit in Brussels on Thursday (15 October).

And “so that there are no surprises, on the 25th [of October] there will … be a meeting of the joint economic commission with the Russian Federation,” Fico told the European affairs committee in Slovakia’s parliament on Wednesday.

The central European leader announced the closer ties with his aggressive neighbour immediately after planning a trip to Lviv in Ukraine early next month.

But if Fico does actually go to Lviv, just over the border from Poland, it would be the deepest he has travelled in the war-torn country so far.

And while he has not visited Kyiv in three years since returning to power, Fico has made plenty of time to go to Moscow during this time.

Many factors point to Slovakia now openly supporting the Kremlin, even as Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians intensify, killing dozens of people.

The Institute for European Security Studies (IESS), a Kyiv-based think tank, noted, in its analysis, that a recent statement by Slovak defence minister Robert Kaliňák did not consider Russia a threat, despite Russian intelligence services having been linked to attacks in Slovakia including, potentially, a drone attack on a manufacturer near Prešov.

The IESS also highlighted the renewed Slovak-Russian cooperation at the level of military attachés, with two Slovak military personnel sent to the Russian capital while a Russian officer went to Bratislava.

This swap of soldiers was promised by Fico to Putin when they met in the Kremlin on 9 May.

And to make matters worse, a Russian military attaché was captured on video handing cash to an associate of the Slovak fake news site Hlavné správy.

The Ukraine think-tank warned that Slovakia’s magnetism towards Russia should not be ignored.

“In the end, by lowering Nato’s guard and reopening the doors to Russian intelligence, Slovakia is doing exactly what Moscow needs: disabling the West’s defences from the inside out,” it said.

Pro-Kremlin all around

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Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels with two main requests for his meeting with EU leaders on Friday (16 October): more funds for Kyiv for defence and more sanctions against Russia. 

“All of us in Europe want this war to end. And for that to happen, strong signals are needed – more real pressure on Russia and more defence support for Ukraine,” he said on X.

“It is especially important now to act together to protect lives,” he added.

Zelensky’s plea comes days after US president Donald Trump announced a deal to bring Russian diesel to the US and global markets, raising questions about the consistency of Western efforts to restrict Russia’s energy revenues that are feeding the Kremlin war machine. 

EU leaders are expected to “regret” the Trump-Putin deal in their summit conclusions, where they also mention more financial, humanitarian and diplomatic support to Kyiv ahead of what many predict to be one of the most difficult winters for Ukraine.

Dutch PM Rob Jetten said the diesel deal was “not a good step”, adding that “Europe has to show that we are not only dependent on the US”.

But he also appealed directly to the US, calling for more support: “Do what is necessary to support the Ukrainians. They need not only sufficient weapons to defend Ukraine, but also the information they need to repel Russian attacks.”

Despite the diesel deal, Estonian PM Kristen Michal, whose country hosts a US military base, also said the US is still a “partner” of Europe in the war in Ukraine.

“We will see what happens in the midterm elections. But I will never give up trying to talk to and convince … our transatlantic partners that we are better off united than divided on this issue,” European Parliament president Roberta Metsola said during a press conference on Thursday after meeting EU leaders.

And in a warning to Moscow about Nato’s unity, US top military commander Alexus Grynkewich also said earlier this week in Warsaw that any “foolish” attack on the Nato alliance would be “utterly futile”.

Funding gap

In December 2025, EU leaders failed to agree to use over €210bn in Russian frozen funds sitting in Europe and instead decided to go for a €90bn loan, aimed at covering about two-thirds of Ukraine’s external financing needs. 

“The remaining third is the problem,” Tetiana Shevchuk, from the Kyiv-based Anti-Corruption Action Center, told EUobserver, referring to commitments by other countries like Canada and Japan coming only for 2026. “2027 is the real gap”.

The €90bn loan is split into €45bn for 2026 and 2027, but recent reports point to about a €23bn financial gap amid an expected Russian escalation ahead of the winter. 

Zelensky has asked Brussels to bring forward part of the loan to cover this gap in the defence ministry. But Brussels fears this advance “could unravel the compromise on gradual instalments and leave a hole later in 2027,” Shevchuk also said.

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The series continues as we report on developments following April’s historic election and on the steps taken since then by the Tisza government. This week, we cover the following topics:

• Another blow for Hungary’s richest man;
• New chief prosecutor nominee, plus a former chief prosecutor ready to testify on political pressure;
• Parliament has adopted the new child-protection law;
• A state secretary has unexpectedly left the government;
• Orbán to keep quiet on one of Hungary’s most important national holidays;
• Ukraine adopts the minority education law;
• More EU funds and money from the Norway Grants have become available.

Another blow for Lőrinc Mészáros

Last Friday (9 October), prime minister Péter Magyar and Dávid Vitézy, minister for transport and investments, announced that the state was suspending implementation of one of Hungary’s largest rail projects – the Budapest southern circular railway, and will launch a new public procurement procedure.

The works had been carried out by V-Híd, the most profitable company of Lőrinc Mészáros, who became Hungary’s richest man during Viktor Orbán’s premiership.

However, the European Court of Auditors uncovered serious public-procurement irregularities: V-Híd may have colluded with the company that drafted the project plans and thus already possessed information at the time of the tender that its competitors did not have. Because of this, the European Court of Auditors would withdraw EU funding from the project.

The Hungarian government does not want to forfeit the EU money and make Hungarian taxpayers foot the bill for the costs of the project, which is why it is terminating the contract with Mészáros’s company and launching a new tender.

The Hungarian state had already taken away from Mészáros the right to operate a motorway section, and later also terminated the 35-year motorway concession.

Previously, one of his food-industry companies had EU funding already granted to it withdrawn, while his energy company was excluded from a call for proposals financed from the repatriated RRF funds.

New chief prosecutor nominee, plus former chief prosecutor ready to testify

On Monday (12 October), president András Baka nominated a former chief prosecutor, Péter Fejes, for the post of chief prosecutor. His first nominee, Zoltán Szathmáry, was not voted through by the Tisza group in parliament after it emerged that his brother was implicated in the so-called gold convoy case, in which a Ukrainian cash shipment was stopped and confiscated by the Hungarian authorities.

Fejes was dismissed in 2012 from his position as chief prosecutor of Vas county by Péter Polt, the chief prosecutor serving the Orbán system, citing loss of confidence. Since then he has continued to work within the prosecution service and as a university lecturer, and he has no party affiliation. For the time being neither prime minister Magyar nor the Tisza group has stated whether they support Fejes’s nomination.

Since the change of government, another former chief prosecutor, Pál Fürcht, has frequently spoken to the media. Among other things, he has claimed that the gold convoy case was created for political purposes, and that the authorities raided the Ukrainian cash couriers on Orbán’s orders.

On Sunday (11 October), Magyar sharply criticised Fürcht in a Facebook post, reproaching him for having been a servant of the system himself. According to Magyar, Fürcht constructed a criminal case, on political orders, out of the notorious nightclub altercation for which the prime minister is currently under investigation on charges of theft.

It was likewise Fürcht who left former propaganda minister Antal Rogán out of the corruption case known as the Völner–Schadl affair.

In response to Magyar’s criticism, Fürcht said he was ready to make an official statement before any authority. In parliament on Monday, the prime minister was already referring to the former chief prosecutor as a future witness.

Parliament has adopted the new child-protection law

Child protection was one of the most important topics of the campaign and played a major role in Orbán’s downfall. Magyar kept the issue on the agenda even after his government took office; most recently, last Thursday, the prime minister and the state secretary responsible for the field, Szilvia Gyurkó, presented the report on the children’s home in Bicske.

This home had been run by a director who was decorated by Orbán and later convicted of paedophile crimes, together with his deputy, who helped cover up the abuses. The presidential pardon granted to the deputy shook the Orbán government and helped lead to its collapse.

On Tuesday (13 October), parliament adopted an amendment to the child-protection law, which takes a tougher stance against media content accessible to minors that propagates sexual violence, manipulation and exploitation, and would speed up the placement of babies abandoned in hospital.

The amendment removed those homophobic passages that the Orbán government forced into law in 2021, and which the Court of Justice of the European Union also ruled to be contrary to EU law.

Fidesz, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and the far-right Mi Hazánk did not vote for the amendment; Magyar called this a disgrace.

A state secretary unexpectedly leaves the government

On Tuesday, András Tótth, state secretary for energy at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy and minister István Kapitány’s most important aide, unexpectedly resigned.

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• Zelensky has lost patience; the US is acting as Putin’s ally.
• How Ukrainians attacked Russian targets without Starlink.
• If Musk did not switch off Starlink, who did? The main suspects.
• Ukrainian attacks on data centres hit Russia where it hurts.
• Why this type of attack will continue to escalate and not only in this war.
• Videos of the day: a hero robot returns without a wheel; attacks on ammunition depots.

Zelensky has lost patience; the US is Putin’s ally. Despite problems with Starlink, which Kyiv said cut connections with attack drones when they exceeded a certain speed, major Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory continued in recent hours. Long-range strikes over Russia are carried out by drones without Starlink.

These included an attack on the military airfield in Borisoglebsk, more than 300 km from the border, as well as on a refinery in Ryazan, which the local governor confirmed. The Ryazan refinery belongs to Rosneft and is one of the largest, with a capacity of around 17 million tonnes of oil a year.

This came after Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky told the Financial Times that he had had enough after Russian attacks during the so-called energy truce, and announced that refineries would once again become Ukrainian targets.

It was precisely a limitation of such Ukrainian strikes that US president Donald Trump had demanded, after last week concluding a controversial agreement with Moscow to buy Russian oil without asking for anything in return from the Russian side.

This was followed by steps that raised serious suspicions that Trump had begun acting in favour of Putin’s war against Ukraine.

The US threatened Ukraine with restricting supplies of weapons or critically important intelligence and, ultimately, as we examined on Wednesday in the Ukraine Battlefield update, Ukrainian soldiers began experiencing a serious problem with the full internet connection provided by the military version of Starlink, which Musk’s SpaceX developed for the Pentagon.

This is crucial to the Ukrainian army not only for attacks on Russian logistics at the front, but also in defending against more dangerous Russian jet-powered drones, which have terrorised Ukrainian cities in recent months.

Russia’s pro-Kremlin scene naturally noticed this as well. The Z-blogger Rybar called for the use of an “opportunity” in which Russian forces could inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian infrastructure.

“I think the crisis is entirely clear and understandable. The crisis lies in Trump’s position, which is trying to help Russia in every possible way,” expert Volodymyr Ohryzko commented on the situation.

We write below about what the company’s owner, Elon Musk, has said about these developments.

How Ukrainians attacked without Starlink. In the first of the Ukrainian attacks mentioned above, on the airfield in Borisoglebsk, Ukrainian Neptune missiles were used, according to the Ukrainian navy. Ukrainians said they destroyed as many as six Su-34M aircraft. They have their own navigation systems and do not need SpaceX services.

⚡️ BREAKING: Ukraine’s Navy claims to have struck SIX Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers in a Neptune missile attack on Borisoglebsk military airbase in Russia’s Voronezh region overnight. https://t.co/kMEuVbmrVX pic.twitter.com/fH8igvygd5

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 15, 2026

The attack on the refinery in Ryazan involved drones that are likewise not connected to Starlink, as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to both Starlink and Starshield services.

“The Ukrainian armed forces therefore rely on alternative means of communication and point-to-point navigation to strike targets in Russia. The speed restrictions under the Starshield service are unrelated to this and will not prevent the Ukrainian armed forces from attacking Russian oil refineries, data centres and other stationary targets in Russia,” the Institute for the Study of War said.

However, Ukrainians felt the problems mainly at the home front.

An unnamed Ukrainian officer compared it to nuclear strikes in comments to Politico. “All operations have been suspended. It will cost many of us our lives,” an experienced soldier commanding a medium-range unmanned aircraft unit in south-eastern Ukraine told the Brussels-based website.

They use Hornet drones to attack targets at distances of up to 150 km.

Ukrainian soldiers contacted by Politico said the restrictions had halted some medium-range drone attacks over Ukraine, disrupting strikes on Russian logistics and reducing support for Ukrainian units at the front.

The scale of the disruption is unclear, however, and it is not known whether the restriction remains in place.

If Musk did not switch off Starlink, who did? The main suspects. Several Ukrainian soldiers reported on Wednesday that they had had to suspend their operations because of restrictions on satellite connections with drones that exceeded 160 km/h.

According to former minister Mykhailo Fedorov, this capability was later restored. NV sources, by contrast, said the speed limit remained in place on Wednesday evening. The following day, operation of the system was fully restored, according to Ukraine’s defence ministry, while the circumstances of the outage are being investigated.

Importantly, Zelensky said it was not a technical problem but an apparent deliberate act. It is not yet certain who was behind it, although the main suspect is clear.

Musk claims that, because the military version of the Starshield satellite internet connection is military in nature, it is controlled by the US government, which also owns it.

“Any decisions on speed or usage restrictions are made by the US military and, ultimately, the US president (POTUS),” the world’s richest man wrote on his social network X. However, the White House, according to Axios sources, claims it had nothing to do with the restriction and wants Musk’s company to investigate the circumstances.

Republican senator Tom Tillis is also calling for this in Congress. “I do not expect defence secretary Hegseth to ensure transparency, and therefore we will ask the defence department’s inspector general to launch an investigation and report to Congress and the American people,” he wrote on X.

Starshield differs from the regular network in its greater resistance to jamming and its specialisation for military use.

Oleksandr “Serg Marco” Karpiuk, a well-known Ukrainian specialist in military aerial reconnaissance, wrote on Facebook that standard Starlink terminals currently have a preset speed limit of 22 m/s.

“To be able to fly at speeds above 22 m/s, Ukraine signed contracts for the Starshield system, which is managed by the Pentagon. This is a military system using Starlink terminals that offer greater functionality, although these accounts are substantially more expensive,” he explained. According to him, the Pentagon did two things within a single day: it restricted intelligence-sharing and changed the parameters of Starshield accounts.

“It was a decision by Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth, evidently on Trump’s orders,” Karpiuk believes, as quoted by Illia Ponomarenko in a post.

Pro-Kremlin propaganda has welcomed the latest developments.

The Russian daily Kommersant quoted a Musk post in which he wrote that it was “time for Zelensky to leave”. His words followed Trump once again pushing Ukraine to hold elections in which it would choose a new president.

Zelensky responded that they would be happy to organise elections if Russia observed a 60-day ceasefire.

Experts agree that it is unrealistic to organise a proper vote under the wartime conditions Ukraine faces.

Ukrainian attacks on data centres hit Russia where it hurts. Although it has not yet been confirmed that pro-Kremlin bots became less active after Ukrainian drones struck Russian servers, ordinary Russians felt the impact. Russia started such attacks in September, amid escalating air raids on Kyiv.

As many as around 100,000 households lost internet access at the time. Now, this tactic has been turned against Moscow.

Researchers studying Russian trolling did not observe any real decline in the activity of pro-Putin bots either, according to a BBC analysis. Far more interesting, however, are the real-world consequences of Ukrainian attacks on the data centres of Yandex, Russia’s Google, which have manifested themselves in a range of ways.

According to Politico sources, Ukrainians wanted to show Russians that it takes two to play this game. According to the Financial Times, they have already managed to seriously damage three of Yandex’s six data centres: in Sasovo, Kaluga and Vladimir.

The consequences of these attacks subsequently showed how vulnerable Russia’s centralised internet ecosystem is.

“Russia has become a victim of its own policies, which has led to the worst possible scenario,” Alena Epifanova, an expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations, told the FT.

The impact of the Ukrainian attack has affected the daily lives of Russians. Here overview of services that were affected to a greater or lesser extent, according to the British daily:

• problems accessing Yandex email;
• Yandex Taxi was taken offline;
• several websites — including a dating app and the Russian equivalent of McDonald’s — were inaccessible;
• saved files and documents could not be opened;
• bus timetables disappeared in some cities;
• residents of some Moscow apartment buildings could not get through electric gates;
• banking services were not fully operational.

All the affected data centres also have supercomputers used to train AI, which is playing an increasingly important role on the battlefield.

For example, one of Yandex’s three supercomputers — Chervonenkis — in Sasovo had long ranked among the world’s 100 most powerful supercomputers, and only in 2026 fell to 101st place, according to the BBC.

However, it has not been confirmed that Ukrainian attacks damaged any of them. According to the Russians, an attack on a similar Sberbank facility did not cause significant damage.

“If the supercomputers are damaged, replacing the loss will be difficult — they were powered by chips from the US company Nvidia, which Yandex imported through ‘complex and complicated schemes’ because of sanctions,” a former company employee told the BBC.

Given the current shortage of Nvidia chips, Yandex’s data centres may not be restored until 2028, according to the website.

Why this could escalate. Attacks on buildings that provide computing capacity are comparable, according to Politico, to strikes on a power plant supplying electricity, heat and fuel, on which both military and civilian functions depend.

That is also why this type of attack sits on the edge of international law.

“It may weaken the enemy’s military effort, but it can also completely paralyse ordinary life,” the Brussels-based website wrote. According to Politico, the cost of restoring data centres in Russia is particularly high because the necessary materials are scarce and their import is restricted by Western sanctions.

“Obtaining a large quantity of equipment to replace what has been destroyed will not be easy,” cyber specialist Oleg Shakirov told Politico.

For now, Ukrainian expert Yevhen Pronin is cautious in assessing the effectiveness of attacks on data centres. “For example, after the attack on Sberbank’s data centre — Russia’s largest bank and one of its key technology companies — its representatives said its systems were operating without disruption, and reports indicated that the centre itself was still under construction,” Pronin told Denník N.

However, a series of such strikes fundamentally changes the scale of the risk, he said. If attacks continue to hit large operational centres on which banks, state services and corporate services depend, the consequences could be far more serious.

“They range from widespread outages to data loss and disruption to critical digital infrastructure. We do not yet see a catastrophe for all of Russia, but rather the vulnerability of a system that is increasingly dependent on a few major technological hubs,” he added.

Attacks on data centres themselves are not a new feature of the Russia-Ukraine war.

At the start of Trump’s war against Iran, Amazon data centres in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were hit. This was followed by an attack on a data centre in Tehran, after which soldiers’ salary payments were interrupted and banks’ online services stopped working.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies examined at the time how data had become a new front line of warfare. Following a trip to Kyiv, its researcher Emily Harding concluded that “state-of-the-art software, flexible operational procedures, and the strategic migration of data to cloud storage both inside and outside the country have given Ukraine the advantage it needs to fight”.

The problems linked to Starlink only confirm this digital vulnerability of modern warfare.

Videos of the day

It returned even in critical condition. Ground robots are being deployed increasingly often at the Ukrainian front, saving more and more lives in the deadly zone where drones hunt people. In this case, one such robot returned from a demanding mission even without one wheel.

A Ukrainian logistics UGV returns from a combat mission despite sustaining critical damage pic.twitter.com/d8fT8sh21T

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 14, 2026

Attacks on ammunition depots. FPV drone operators from Artan, a special unit of Ukrainian military intelligence — apparently also thanks to Starlink — launched a series of attacks on field ammunition depots. Over several months, they reportedly struck 2,308 enemy targets.

Enemy tanks and self-propelled artillery systems probably accounted for a significant proportion of them.

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Europe’s trade deficit with China reached a record $34.8bn [€31bn] in September, as EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday (15 October) to discuss Europe’s competitiveness agenda and what they call “macroeconomic imbalances” — a euphemism to avoid mentioning China by name.

EU heads of state and government are expected to give a mandate to the EU Commission to propose a set of trade defence measures and tools to reduce the EU’s reliance on Chinese industry, based on a new Franco-German blueprint, as a united front spreads across the bloc. 

There was a move towards a “surprising unitary position” on Beijing among member states, said an EU diplomat, ahead of a two-day summit in Brussels which began on Thursday (15 October).

A joint letter and policy paper submitted by French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz to commission president Ursula von der Leyen last week was viewed by many EU diplomats as marking a decisive shift towards a more consolidated EU stance on trade relations with China. 

“For a long time, there were significant differences between these two countries on how to deal with China, how to address the economic situation,” parliament president Roberta Metsola told reporters on Thursday. 

The diplomat added that the commission’s trade diversification package, designed to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Chinese industrial inputs and curb Chinese exports, will be presented by the end of the year and will be based on the Franco-German paper. 

But the commission, for its part, has downplayed the prospect of rapid progress to EU-Chinese trade statistics. “It’s an issue which is not going to be solved in a couple of months,” said one official. 

‘Be ready for escalation’ but do nothing

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When European Union leaders meet in Brussels later on Thursday (15 October), migration will be high on the agenda. Amid political panic — real and manufactured — over the events in Ceuta this summer, the European Commission has come out with a five-point plan promising more border surveillance and policing, more dodgy deals with countries outside the EU, and more deportations.

It also includes an ominous plan to devise a new “emergency response instrument” that could allow for the total suspension of access to asylum, which is likely to result in summary mass deportations, in situations when third countries are blamed for ‘instrumentalising’ migration movements.

That the idea is even on the table is a measure of how far the EU’s approach to migration has degenerated.

There is a jarring disconnect between commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s insistence on European values and the rules-based order and the willingness to throw the right to asylum out the window. 

It is a short-sighted and dangerous hypocrisy that will harm women, men, and children at EU borders and potentially beyond if it encourages other states to adopt a similar approach.

If a 20-year-old man I interviewed in Ceuta in August were at the summit in Brussels, he might help guide the debate back to the realities of why people flee and seek safety, their needs and aspirations and hopefully toward a policy informed by shared humanity.

A Ceuta story

He told me he escaped from his village in Somalia in November 2024 when the Islamist armed group Al-Shabab attacked it. He went to Libya and spent six months detained in a smuggler’s warehouse in Kufra, where he said he witnessed many deaths from nightly beatings.  He escaped, reached Morocco, and after months of hardship there saw his chance to seek safety on 31 July, when he swam to Ceuta.

It may well be that instrumentalisation played a role, among many other factors, in the arrival of more than 72,000 people there during two days at the end of July.

For many, the decision to cross may have been opportunistic and fuelled by disinformation on social media. Yet that cannot justify violence, summary returns, degrading treatment, or denying access to asylum procedures, in Ceuta or elsewhere.

Among the thousands who have remained in Ceuta are asylum seekers from strife-torn Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Chad, and elsewhere. 

Suspending asylum completely would not only thwart their chances to find protection. It would rupture the EU’s commitment to the rules-based international order in a profound way.

Rupture of rights

The right to seek asylum is embedded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the related prohibition of refoulement — sending someone to a place where they face serious harm — is a red line through international human rights and refugee law.

The focus on deterrence and externalisation over the past decade – coinciding with the growing influence of the far-right in European politics – has arguably made this previously unthinkable option part of the conversation.

Both Greece (temporarily in 2020 and 2025) and Poland (continuously at its border with Belarus since March 2025) have suspended asylum without significant reaction from the commission or other member states.

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, fully enacted as of June, undermines the right to asylum in myriad ways. A new Return Regulation portends deportations to third countries despite the documented harm of these kinds of transfers.

The Crisis Regulation, part of the pact, already allows a member state to depart from normal border procedures and curtail important safeguards in a situation of mass arrivals and/or when a third country or hostile non-state actor instrumentalises migration. While the regulation causes concern about potential misuse and unjustified restrictions on access to asylum, it does not allow for wholesale suspension of the right.

I met the young man from Somalia at the height of the humanitarian and rights crisis in Ceuta.

A difficult situation was compounded by recriminations against Spain from other EU countries, exploitation by far-right groups, and neglect and hostility that led to people living on the streets, in the forests, and in makeshift huts on the beach in an apparent effort to compel them to go back to Morocco. It took Spain weeks to begin housing and registering people.

Spain did not invoke the Crisis regulation.  Rather than adding new measures, policymakers should be wrestling with why it didn’t use supposedly tailor-made EU legislation and addressing how mismanagement and a finger-pointing lack of cooperation among EU states create an endless loop of crises that feed xenophobia.

 EU leaders should keep sight of the people affected and basic principles at stake. They should reject approaches to migration that so clearly violate fundamental rights and normalise cruelty.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Ten years after the Brexit vote, more and more Britons are asking whether they should go back. According to a YouGov poll conducted earlier this month, 52% would vote to rejoin the EU in a referendum.

And the UK’s new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, seems to be keeping that door open.

But how realistic is that? Andy Burnham became Prime Minister this summer. And since then, he has been dropping hints here and there about a possible return to the EU. A few months ago, he was saying it was too early to even discuss it.

So what changed? Perhaps the international context, but also the realisation that the UK cannot get everything it wants while staying outside the Union.

On 20 November, EU leaders will have the opportunity to discuss the relationship with the UK during a bilateral summit. They will try to reach agreements on a number of issues that have stalled.

What are those topics? First, food. Today, agri-food products face checks and certification when they enter the EU, and that slows trade down. The solution on the table is for the UK to align its sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the EU’s. But the details still need to be agreed.

Second, people. Right now, a European who wants to work in the UK needs a visa. The two sides could agree on a scheme to make mobility easier, especially for young people.

Third, carbon. The British would like to link their carbon market to the EU’s, so that their exporters don’t have to pay extra for their emissions when they sell to Europe. In practice, that means avoiding the EU’s carbon border tax.

Last but not least, industry. And this is a big part of the discussion. As the EU moves towards giving priority to European products, the British fear being left out of this “European preference”.

Now, you might say: in all these cases, isn’t this a bit like being in the EU, without the drawbacks? That’s exactly what critics call cherry-picking.

At the heart of the problem is a simple question: where do you draw the line between being a member and being a partner? It’s the same debate the EU has with Switzerland, which wants to stay very close but not be part of the bloc.

Now, is a return to the EU a realistic scenario? The door is open, as Emmanuel Macron and others have put it.

The UK could apply, and it’s unlikely that any member state would block the process. But the European Commission has already warned: there would be no special treatment for the British.

On the positive side, the UK would start from a good position. It already applies a good part of EU legislation, and it meets the rule-of-law criteria.

But all these years after leaving the EU, the two sides are still negotiating. There are sticking points on free movement and on standards. And those disagreements would make any accession talks that much harder.

Let’s see what comes out of the summit on 20 November.

As EU leaders gather in Brussels on Thursday and Friday (15-16 October) to discuss, among other things, the issue of Europe’s southern border, countless Moroccan families cling to the hope they may see their children again after they entered the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in north Africa in July. 

“Ayoub left on 30 July at 2PM. Since that day, I haven’t heard anything from him, apart from the fact that he went to Ceuta,” his brother said.

Ayoub Elkhamlichi was 27 when he left the north of Morocco for the nearby border with Ceuta, a half-hour drive from his home. 

In the commotion that accompanied the rush of an estimated 72,000 mostly Moroccans into the enclave over 30 and 31 July 2026, 141 people were reported to have lost their lives while attempting the crossing. 

Those that have not been heard of since that deadly July remain innumerable. 

Among them is Ayoub, who had been working in a local konafa shop before leaving.

His brother Mohamed Ali laments that he’d forgotten his ID card, which will reduce the chances he’ll be identified if he’s ever found. 

“The border with Ceuta was opened, so everyone left Morocco, because the city of Tetouan offers few job opportunities,” Mohamed Ali told EUobserver, from his home in one of Morocco’s closest cities to the Spanish border. 

“Ayoub managed to find a job, but the pay was low. So he went to Ceuta,” he said. His family, meanwhile, “are in a state of anxiety and fear.”

It has been 11 weeks since Khaled’s dad Said has also seen his son, 26, who left for Ceuta from Tidass, a small Moroccan town, which Said said “has its problems.”

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