Ukraine says it has used its domestically developed FP-7 tactical ballistic missile in combat for the first time, in what would mark another significant milestone in the country’s rapidly expanding indigenous long-range strike program.

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced today that Ukraine had conducted the first combat use of the FP-7, a ground-launched ballistic missile developed by Ukrainian defense company Fire Point. He also said production of the weapon would follow.

Ukrainian tactical ballistic missile. FP-7. First combat use. Thank you for the result. Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine! pic.twitter.com/IxdjVg51c1

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 1, 2026

The claim has not been independently verified, and Ukrainian authorities have not disclosed the target, location, number of missiles involved, or other details surrounding the reported strike. A video has been published showing what’s said to be a nighttime launch of the missile.

The FP-7 is one of several increasingly ambitious weapons being developed by Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense company that has expanded rapidly since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The company began with drones and has subsequently moved into long-range strike missiles and ballistic missile technology.

Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh previously described the company’s development and manufacturing model in an interview with TWZ, detailing an effort to rapidly scale production while maintaining a dispersed industrial base inside Ukraine. The company’s better-known systems include the FP-1 and FP-2 long-range strike drones and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.

According to Ukrainian and company-released information, the FP-7 has a range of approximately 250 kilometers (155 miles) and a warhead weighing around 150 kilograms (331 pounds). Other published figures have put its velocity at approximately 1,500 meters per second (around 3,350 miles per hour). Rather than striking targets deep in the Russian rear areas, the missile is optimized for use against objectives such as logistics hubs, air defense sites, and drone bases. This makes it more of a shorter-range complement to the U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missile, rather than a direct replacement, although it comes without any restrictions on the kinds of targets that it can be used against.

Details from missile debris shown by Russia confirm Ukraine launched ATACMS at Voronezh region on November 18, marking the first use of U.S.-made missiles on Russian territory during Trump’s presidency. According to the Russian MoD, S-400 and Pantsir-S1 systems helped repel the… pic.twitter.com/8SeQCo9OEO

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

At the same time, those specifications should likewise be treated as reported figures rather than independently verified performance data. Actual range, payload and accuracy can vary according to missile configuration and mission profile.

The FP-7’s development is particularly notable because Fire Point is also using the basic missile architecture as the foundation for a very different weapon.

Fire Point has developed the FP-7.X, an anti-ballistic missile interceptor derived from the surface-to-surface FP-7.

A video showing a test launch of an FP-7.X surface-to-air missile:

Держави програють війни на полі бою значно рідше, ніж вони програють їх у інститутах, лабораторіях та на виробництві за десять років до їх початку.

Коли країна роками недофінансовує інженерну освіту, скорочує дослідження, втрачає виробничі компетенції або звикає покладатися на… pic.twitter.com/Ti1Ayn4INf

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 3, 2026

Fire Point’s expectation is that commonality between the two systems can shorten development and provide manufacturing efficiencies by allowing the company to draw upon work already conducted on the FP-7’s propulsion, airframe, guidance, and production processes.

The FP-7.X forms part of Project Freyja, a European effort to develop a comparatively inexpensive and potentially more numerous ballistic-missile-defense interceptor. Fire Point has also discussed an eventual production rate of thousands of interceptors annually, although such targets represent company ambitions rather than demonstrated production capacity.

Fire Point has said it is working with European and Ukrainian partners on the system, including work on the interceptor’s seeker. The company has described an initial interceptor using a blast-fragmentation approach, with more sophisticated hit-to-kill capability envisioned for later versions.

Earlier this year, Diehl Defense confirmed that it plans to launch production of the Flamingo cruise missile in Germany. Previously, Diehl had signed a technology agreement with Fire Point but had not disclosed any details. Potentially, that could open a path to Fire Point’s ballistic and cruise missiles helping to meet the growing demand for long-range fires capabilities among NATO’s European members.

A video of the Flamingo cruise missile in action:

As it stands, the baseline FP-7 is only one element of Fire Point’s ballistic missile ambitions.

The company is also developing the larger FP-9, which Fire Point has described as having a planned range of approximately 850 kilometers (528 miles). The larger missile requires substantially more solid propellant and has driven the company to establish new industrial capabilities for manufacturing large solid-rocket motors.

As with the FP-7, the available FP-9 performance figures are based primarily on statements from Fire Point and Ukrainian sources and should not be treated as independently established specifications.

The development of these weapons reflects Ukraine’s broader effort to expand domestic production of long-range strike systems. Kyiv has relied heavily on Western-supplied weapons during the war while simultaneously attempting to establish an indigenous capacity for drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

For Fire Point, that effort has produced an unusually broad portfolio in a relatively short period: long-range attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and, potentially, interceptors designed to defeat ballistic missiles.

The claimed combat debut would give Ukraine a fast, hard-to-intercept strike option for targets within the FP-7’s reported range, with its combination of kinetic energy and relatively heavy warhead making it particularly useful against hardened targets. If targeting and launch procedures can keep pace, its short flight time can also enable rapid-response strikes against more time-sensitive targets. More broadly, the FP-7 represents the culmination of years of Ukrainian efforts to close a major ballistic-missile gap with Russia and establish an indigenous capability.

The reported combat debut of the FP-7 also comes as the long-range strike campaign between Russia and Ukraine continues to intensify, with both sides increasingly seeking to hold targets deep behind the other’s front lines at risk. That dynamic will become particularly important as the two countries head into another winter, when strikes against energy, industrial, and military infrastructure ramp up significantly. At the same time, the FP-7’s reported range gives it a considerably more limited target set than Ukraine’s longer-range cruise missiles and drones, constraining where it can be employed and distinguishing it from systems designed for deep strikes hundreds of miles beyond the front.

Вітаємо FP7) pic.twitter.com/FxgCHVHMET

— Denys Shtilierman (@DenShtilierman) February 27, 2026

The significance of Zelensky’s announcement will ultimately depend heavily on whether the FP-7 can move from a claimed combat debut into sustained production and operational service.

Ukraine has not publicly disclosed the number of FP-7 missiles produced, current production rates, or when significant quantities could become available.

Using the FP-7 in combat for the first time would mark an important transition for Fire Point’s ballistic missile program, from development and testing toward operational employment. The company’s ability to manufacture the weapon at scale will become the next critical question.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine Claims First Combat Use Of FP-7 Ballistic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK

— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

The booster stage of a Chinese-made DF-15A (Dong Feng-15A) ballistic missile operated by Saudi Arabia fell in Raghwan District, Marib Governorate, northern Yemen. pic.twitter.com/dfSXMOiCzQ

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 14, 2026

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

العثور على بقايا صاروخ صيني من طراز DF-15A في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/af9mGNNxiA

— إيران بالعربية (@iraninarabic_ir) September 14, 2026

As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

The German Navy has demonstrated the launch of Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) LORA ballistic missile from an F125 frigate, with at least two missiles fired from the Sachsen-Anhalt during a test in the North Atlantic last night. The demonstration points to a potentially significant new long-range strike capability for Germany’s surface fleet, should it be adopted.

Video released by the German Ministry of Defense alongside the test shows two LORA launch canisters positioned on the frigate’s flight deck, followed by a missile launching from each container.

Die Fregatte „Sachsen-Anhalt" (Klasse 125) hat im Nordatlantik mindestens zwei ballistische Raketen vom Typ LORA (IAI) verschossen – gestartet aus Kanistern auf dem Flugdeck. Die Erprobung erfolgte im Rahmen der OPEX-Serie.

Video: Deutsche Marine pic.twitter.com/eV3yzjrcgg

— Clemens Speer (@clemens_speer) September 2, 2026

The launches were conducted as part of the Bundeswehr’s operational experimentation (OPEX) program in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Innovation Center in Erding. Reportedly, two German frigates were deployed to the waters between Ireland and Iceland for the test, and a warning was issued to maritime and air traffic 45 days beforehand.

The test marks a notable expansion of the weapons capabilities demonstrated by Germany’s F125 frigates and could provide a pathway toward a new long-range naval strike capability.

German Navy Inspector General Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack described the event in a statement distributed through the Bundeswehr’s official WhatsApp channel:

“With the successful launch of a ballistic missile last night in the North Atlantic, we have made naval history. I am extremely pleased with this achievement. The system can be successfully deployed by our units, and its potential range exceeds anything we have seen before. For the protection of Germany and our allies, this test marks a new chapter in deterrence and defense readiness at sea.”

IAI also confirmed the results of the test, stating that both missiles followed their planned trajectories and struck their targets with high precision.

The exact targets, engagement ranges, flight profiles, and missile configurations used during the test have not been disclosed.

There is no possibility that Sachsen-Anhalt will retain the launchers in their current location, since they mean the F125’s flight deck cannot be used, depriving it of a critical capability. Potentially, they could be installed elsewhere on the vessel, but, moreover, it is unclear if the current experiment will lead to a formal acquisition program.

At the same time, LORA is a substantially different weapon from the anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles normally associated with modern surface combatants.

Available for ship- and ground-launch, the missile is approximately 17 feet long, 25 inches in diameter, and weighs around 3,500 pounds. It follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory and has an officially stated range of approximately 60 to 270 miles. An air-launched derivative has also been developed.

A weapon capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away would give German surface combatants a long-range strike option extending far beyond the range of traditional naval guns and many shorter-range precision weapons.

Its quasi-ballistic flight profile also differentiates LORA from a conventional cruise missile. A ballistic-style trajectory allows the weapon to cover distance rapidly and presents an air-defense challenge different from that posed by a low-flying cruise missile. This type of missile also impacts its target with much greater kinetic energy, making it especially useful for striking more hardened target sets.

LORA uses a navigation architecture combining GNSS satellite navigation with an inertial navigation system and can achieve a circular error probable, or CEP, of approximately 33 feet. IAI also says LORA can be launched within minutes, including from unprepared positions, and can attack a target within its range in less than 10 minutes after a decision to launch.

Back in 2017, as you can read about here, IAI successfully test-fired LORA from a containerized launcher on the back of a truck sitting on the deck of a cargo ship. The missile successfully struck a target on land.

What is less clear is its ability to strike targets at sea.

A long-range anti-surface application would be particularly interesting for the German Navy, although the weapon, in its basic form, has no terminal seeker. This limits the missile to use against targets with a fixed location, rather than autonomously finding and tracking a maneuvering warship during the terminal phase of flight.

In a 2020 test, IAI demonstrated firing two LORA missiles from a ship before hitting separate floating targets at approximately 60 miles and 250 miles. However, striking a static floating target is different from an enemy warship that is maneuvering and potentially employing electronic warfare and air defenses.

Regardless, Germany has an even clearer requirement for land attack capabilities, which LORA is fully capable of fulfilling, as we will return to later.

As for Germany’s F125 frigates, these were designed primarily for long-duration deployments, maritime security, stabilization operations, and other missions requiring a persistent naval presence. Their overall lack of firepower is something we have examined in detail before now.

The latest test involving the Sachsen-Anhalt is in line with the Bundeswehr’s OPEX framework, which is intended to evaluate emerging technologies and operational concepts under realistic conditions before decisions are made about wider adoption.

There is precedent for such experimentation leading to operational capabilities. Israeli-developed systems, including IAI’s Blue Whale autonomous underwater vehicle, have previously been evaluated through German naval experimentation efforts and subsequently moved toward formal adoption.

As well as the four F125 hulls, Germany might look to incorporate LORA from the start on its future F127 multi-purpose frigates and/or its planned Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMV), uncrewed vessels that will serve as arsenal ship ‘wingmen,’ supporting conventional surface combatants.

It is worth noting that Germany has recently acquired various other Israeli-made missile and rocket systems. These include the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system — the largest-ever Israeli defense export deal — and the PULS multiple rocket launcher. A German purchase of the land-based version of LORA would also be an option, with the truck-mounted system also able to be launched from ships at sea.

Meanwhile, Germany is a major provider of weapons systems to Israel, among them its most powerful surface combatants and submarines.

The LORA test also reflects a broader European push toward longer-range precision fires.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ballistic and cruise missiles, while NATO countries have increasingly sought weapons capable of holding targets at greater distances at risk.

Germany has historically possessed comparatively limited deep-strike capability. The Bundeswehr is now working to expand its ability to conduct long-range precision engagement, both independently and within NATO structures. This includes planned procurement of land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range exceeding 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration.

Very deliberate NATO messaging right here – interesting to see the alliance using this kind of signalling https://t.co/BYvpzkq0Vq

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 2, 2026

A naval LORA capability could add another layer to that effort and would allow Germany to distribute long-range fires across surface combatants, complicating an adversary’s targeting problem while giving its naval forces a more meaningful role in high-end combat operations. With the security situation in Europe deteriorating, the potential deterrence factor that such a weapon would bring to Germany, and to NATO, should also not be underestimated.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Israeli LORA Ballistic Missiles Fired From German Frigate appeared first on TWZ.

Russia used a longer-range Iskander ballistic missile for the first time in an attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said on Thursday. Missiles fired from deeper inside Russia would present additional challenges to Ukraine’s new campaign to attack the systems before they launch.

“In one of the combined missile strikes on the capital this summer, the enemy first used the updated 9M723-2 ballistic missiles, also known by the code name ‘Iskander-1000,’” GUR stated. “The updated missile, due to the increased engine and, accordingly, the increased launcher, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 550 km (about 341 miles).”

According to GUR, the range of the previous Iskander variant, the 9M723-1, is 390 km, or about 242 miles.

In its statement about the new Iskander, GUR included photos of what appear to be recovered components of the weapon. However, the agency did not provide any specifics about what the components were, where they were found or when.

While GUR states that the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) was only recently fired at Ukraine, unconfirmed reports emerged in January that this weapon may have been introduced back then. Reports also began to appear last year that Russia was poised to start mass-producing a new version of the Iskander SRBM, with a range of about 600 miles and improved accuracy. Talk of the development of this new missile emerged after the termination by the United States of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. This had previously prohibited the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States from fielding any ground-launched conventional or nuclear-capable missile of any type that can hit targets between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,420 miles) away. Russia formally abandoned the treaty a short while after the U.S pulled out.

We have reached out to GUR for details.

A Telegram channel operated by Russian paratroopers lauded the development.

“Now, rearward facilities that were previously considered relatively safe are within range,” gloated the Paratrooper’s Diary. “The missile retains its ballistic trajectory, which means it can maneuver throughout its flight path, making interception more difficult for air defense systems.”

“According to preliminary data, the increase in the fuel compartment may have allowed for adjustments to the warhead mass, but the missile is still capable of carrying both cluster and high-explosive warheads with increased power,” the paratroopers continued. “The deployment of the ‘Iskander-1000’ indicates that the Russian defense industry is not only replenishing stockpiles but also scaling up a major modernization of missile weaponry.”

Reducing the size of the warhead and increasing fuel storage is a well proven way of extending the range of certain missiles without drastically chaining its outer mold line. Other improvements, such as new motors and guidance capabilities can also help in this regard.

Russia produces dozens of these weapons a month, noted missile expert Fabian Hoffmann.

“Recently, Ukrainian intelligence provided an updated estimate of Russian missile production capacity, stating that Russia produces around 60 9M723 ballistic missiles per month,” he pointed out in May.

“Based on recent employment trends, this figure is not entirely implausible (at least compared to when this number was first mentioned in 2024), though it should be treated as an upper-bound estimate,” Hoffmann added. “More realistically, Russia’s combined 9M723 and Kh-47M2 production capacity in mid-2026 may be between 600 and 800 units annually, with monthly production potentially fluctuating significantly depending on the availability of internationally sourced components. This would allow Russia to sustain an average employment rate of roughly 50 to 70 monthly ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine, with greater peaks possible if part of the production is stockpiled in a given month.”

To bolster its stocks of short-range ballistic missiles, Russia is receiving more KN-23 and KN-24 missiles from North Korea, which are loosely akin to the Iskander-M. Russia has also asked Pyongyang for an additional tranche of KN-30 missiles, also known as the Hwasong-11C, according to a separate GUR report issued today.

“The new KN-30 ballistic missiles, which are three times more powerful than the KN-23/24, were requested by Moscow from Pyongyang, but so far, the transfer of these missiles from North Korea to Russia has not been recorded,” GUR added.

The KN-30 is an enlarged derivative of the original Hwasong-11 and designed to carry larger warheads. North Korea has previously said it has tested subvariants of the Da/C type with 2.5-ton and 4.5-ton conventional high-explosive warheads, and that it can also be fitted with a nuclear warhead.

Ukraine has had to absorb a lot of damage because it ran out of Patriots months ago. However, President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said an unspecified number of additional interceptors would be delivered. Evidence has also emerged that a new supply of Patriots is being used against Russian missiles, including Iskanders. Still, the concern stands because of the precarious nature of Ukraine’s interceptor supply and Russia’s ability to make new and improved missiles.

On the night of August 27, Ukrainian air defenses shot down seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles.https://t.co/ROasoQ78WT

— Militarnyi (@militarnyi) August 27, 2026

As we noted earlier in this story, Ukraine has a new campaign, recently announced by Zelensky, to go after Russia’s ballistic missiles prior to launching to offset a dearth of interceptors. However, Russia’s ability to launch missiles another 100 or so miles further away from Ukraine will make them harder to find and hit.

“When our anti-ballistic missile stocks are at a minimum, there is another tactic,” Zelensky commented. “It is more difficult, and we developed it. It is hunting their nearby positions from which ballistic missiles are launched.”

Zelensky offered no details about how the campaign would be carried out. However, “Ukraine has already targeted Russian ballistic missile infrastructure in several operations this year” in Crimea and Rostov, Russia, with drones, Euromaidan Press reported.

Zelensky says Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M missile launcher on Russian territory near Ukraine's border. He called it another success and said operational details cannot be disclosed because of the mission's sensitivity, but confirmed the launcher was hit. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Ao0ooa8JYt

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) August 23, 2026

It is always preferable to shoot the archer not the arrow, but doing so reliably is very challenging as the Iranians proved again in Epic Fury. Despite a concerted campaign by the U.S. and Israel to go after Iranian missile launchers, the Islamic Republic was still able to fire off numerous volleys, creating a swath of destruction across the region.

For Ukraine, this kind of effort would have to mirror its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics using longer-range drones. Ukrainians told us they are hitting targets up to 250 km away in the occupied territories. However, that’s been aided in no small measure by the use of Space X Starlink systems.

Carrying out a similar campaign in Russia would be challenging, because Space X owner Elon Musk is reluctant to allow their use deep inside Russia. As we previously noted, Ukraine is asking Musk for permission to “use Starlink-equipped drones against ballistic missile launchers up to 200km inside Russia,” the Financial Times reported last week.

However, Zelensky recently said Musk ultimately refused to grant that permission.

GUR is calling for increased efforts to cut off the supply of foreign assistance Russia receives.

“To counter the aggressor’s plans, it is crucial to consolidate efforts aimed at limiting Russia’s program for the development, production, and modernization of ballistic weapons,” the directorate proffered.

The Ukrainian intelligence information about the new Iskander was part of a report on the amount of foreign components found on these missiles. The information is published on the directorate’s War & Sanctions portal, which identifies foreign assistance to Russia’s weapons programs.

“Only a quarter of the 140 components published today are manufactured by Russian enterprises,” GUR stated.

Almost half – 63 – were manufactured by American firms, GUR explained. The Iskanders also contained components from Switzerland, Belarus, Germany, Taiwan and China.

“In one of the most important components of the missile guidance system — the flight information processing unit obtained from the laser gyroscope — only 5 out of 43 components are manufactured in the Russian Federation,” GUR added. 

That foreign components would be found in Russian weapons is neither surprising nor new. TWZ has been chronicling this since the start of the war. These parts have been found in everything from helicopters to radars to cruise missiles. There was even a decoy drone found to be made completely of Chinese components.

These parts all found their way into Russian weapons despite international sanctions designed to prevent that from happening.

Russia isn’t the only country whose weapons – reliant on foreign components – have been used in attacks on Ukraine. A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) produced by North Korea and used against Ukraine by Russia in 2024 relied on more than 290 foreign-sourced components, many of them originating from U.S. manufacturers. This is the alarming result of a study by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a U.K.-based investigative organization.

China is also providing engines for Russia’s drones, including its jet-powered variants.

All this news about Russian missile supplies comes as President Vladimir Putin has threatened to escalate attacks on Ukraine over its strikes on Russian infrastructure and the faltering peace process. The Russian leader is also reportedly again mulling using tactical nuclear weapons to stop these attacks. That would be a world-changing escalation and TWZ cannot independently confirm those claims.

Though he hasn’t pulled the trigger on expanding attacks yet, Putin is clearly building the means to do so if he chooses.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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