A Autoridade do Turismo da Tailândia (TAT) garante que os principais destinos turísticos do país continuam acessíveis, embora recomende aos viajantes que confirmem previamente as condições locais e prevejam tempo adicional para as deslocações.
A primeira Conferência dos Observatórios Regionais de Turismo Sustentável vai reunir, a 14 de outubro, em Peniche, os sete observatórios regionais do país para discutir a monitorização da atividade turística, a sustentabilidade dos destinos e o papel dos dados na tomada de decisão.
O Real Hotels Group (RHG) reduziu em cerca de 21% as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa por quarto ocupado em 2025, para 7,94 kg de CO₂e, num ano em que o grupo atingiu mais de um milhão de clientes e um volume de negócios de 93,4 milhões de euros.
A AHM – Ace Hospitality Management, empresa do grupo Mercan Properties, reforçou a sua estrutura de marketing com a contratação de Tiago Veiga para o cargo de senior marketing director.
O HBX Group lançou a Bedsonline+, uma evolução da plataforma de reservas destinada a agentes de viagens que combina uma oferta mais alargada de produtos, tecnologia de inteligência artificial (IA) e novos serviços.
A percentagem de portugueses que afirma já ter viajado para um destino que não estava inicialmente nos seus planos por influência das redes sociais diminuiu de 49%, em 2024, para 38% em 2026, segundo um estudo divulgado pela eDreams.
No próximo dia 2 de novembro, os associados da APAVT vão eleger o próximo presidente da associação, abrindo um novo ciclo e encerrando um capítulo de quase 15 anos de liderança de Pedro Costa Ferreira. A tomada de posse terá lugar na nova sede da APAVT, o espaço onde recebeu o TNews para fazer o balanço do seu mandato. Mas o legado de Pedro Costa Ferreira vai muito além da nova sede. Ao longo destes quase 15 anos, a APAVT reforçou a sua estrutura financeira e, na leitura do ainda presidente, deixa uma associação “maior, com mais capacidade de intervenção e mais representatividade”. Nesta entrevista ao TNews, Pedro Costa Ferreira fala sobre as principais batalhas dos seus mandatos, da transformação da distribuição turística à relação com as companhias aéreas, passando pela saída da BTL e pelos desafios do aeroporto.
Leia o artigo de opinião de Helder Santos, chairman da Dynamic Hotels.
A Meliá Hotels International vai estrear a marca de luxo The Meliá Collection em Roma, em 2027, através de um acordo com o Gruppo Stay para a abertura de um hotel de 67 quartos no centro da capital italiana. A nova unidade será operada em regime de franquia e representa a terceira colaboração entre as duas empresas.
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On Wednesday (16 September) Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had a good day at the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that she would like to work with Mr Carney “on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the European Union", writes Dick Roche.
Prime Minister Carney was given a standing ovation by the Parliament’s Members. While it is not clear what ‘associate EU Membership’ means, the offer from the Commission President and the welcome by MEPs was a plus, of sorts, for Mr Carney in his battle with President Trump.
The relationship between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump was always destined to be a bumpy one. Days before President Trump was sworn in for his second term Justin Trudeau stepped down as Prime Minister of Canada. As Trudeau was leaving office the president-elect repeated comments that he had made during the 2024 US elections about Canada becoming the 51st US State.
On 1 February 2025, as the contest to replace Mr Trudeau as the Liberal Party leader was getting underway President Trump, announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and Canada: Canadian energy exports were subject to a 10% tariff. Trump explained the tariffs were intended to address the emergency related to fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration.
Nine days later Trump announced a blanket 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminium to “protect US industry and national security.” This hit Canada the biggest foreign supplier of steel and aluminium into the US market badly.
The pain for Canada did not stop there, on 26th March Trump announced his 25% tariff on all automobile imports into the US. Again, another bad hit on - most Canadian vehicle production is destined for the US market. The impact on Canadian auto producers was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the tariff applied only to non-US content vehicle imports from Canada.
The stream of tariff announcements from the US while hurting Canada played to Mark Carney’s advantage in the race for leadership of Canada’s Liberal Party. While a "political ingénue" never having held political office or been a Member of a Member of Canada’s Parliament Mr Carney brought deep economic experience to the contest. He won almost 87% of the votes cast in the leadership election.
Mr Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on 14th March 2025 - seven weeks into President Trump’s second term. Six weeks after his swearing in Mark Carney was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in the General Election of 28th April 2025.
From the outset Prime Minister Mark Carney invested considerable effort in improving relations with President Trump. The two leaders met in the White House on 6th May. The meeting, reportedly, went well.
Asked at the press briefing after the meeting about Trump’s suggestions that Canada should become the 51st US state, Carney responded humorously. He recalled that during the recent elections he had met the owners of Canada. They were not he said interested in ‘selling the property’, something that Mr Trump as a property man would understand. Smiling President Trump responded ‘never say never.’
At the G7 meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June President Trump and Mr Carney had another cordial meeting.
The cordiality did not last long. At the end of June the first payments on Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST) were due to be made. The DST legislation enacted during the Trudeau Government, hit US tech companies causing fury in the White House. Trump called the tax a "direct and blatant attack on our country" and announced all trade talks with Canada would cease immediately.
Within days Carney announced that his administration would rescind the DST and halt the collection of the tax to advance negotiations with the US.
There was another flashpoint in January when President Trump reacted to reports that Canada and China were pursuing a comprehensive free trade deal. Prime Minister Carney defused the situation by explaining the talks with China were focused on adjusting existing arrangements.
While Carney faced criticism for ‘climbing down’ on the DST issue and for being too eager to placate the White House on China, his approach got US-Canada trade talks back underway.
By August 2025 there was some optimism that a breakthrough trade talks was close. On August 18th President Trump announced that a tentative understanding had been reached and as a result he was prepared to push back on the late August deadline for US tariff increases.
The talks came to an abrupt halt three days later when Carney instructed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa.
That decision came as a surprise. Walking away risked incurring the wrath of President Trump. That was a risk that the Canadian PM had clearly calibrated.
When the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer sought to blame Canada for the breakdown Carney responded that it was the US United States that made last-minute demands which Canada considered unacceptable, including efforts to introduce provisions that would impact Canada's trade autonomy and sovereignty.
President Trump reacted immediately to Canada’s decision. Using a section of the Tariff Act 1930 that had never been used previously Trump imposed 50% tariffs across US$20 billion worth of Canadian products exported to the US.
Carney announced that Canada would hit US exports to Canada with “dollar for dollar” retaliatory measures. These would come into effect immediately after Labour Day 7th September –the day when the starting gun for US mid-term elections is ‘fired’ to get into full swing.
Asked at the press conference whether Canada was starting a trade war with the United States, Mr. Carney responded: “you’re at war when you get attacked—we got attacked.”
In a televised address, Carney acknowledged that the steps he was taking would come at a cost but argued that U.S. actions had left him with little alternative. He characterized the measures being taken by the United States as an attempt to hurt and divide Canadians. That, he suggested, was a miscalculation. Rather than weakening Canada, U.S. pressure would, he said, bring Canadians closer together.
All of indications suggest that Prime Minister Carney was correct in his assessment.
The leader of the Conservative Party Canada, Pierre Poilievre who previously accused Carney of being too willing to concede to Trump, strongly supported the decision to walk away from those trade talks.
Mr Poilievre was not alone, with one exception the Premiers of Canadian Provinces publicly supported Prime Minister Carney’s stance.
The Premier of Ontario Canada’s most populous province, Doug Ford, an open critic of the US President, encouraged PM Carney to respond to Trump “tariff for tariff, dollar for dollar.”
The Quebec Premier, Christine Fréchette, was particularly supportive of Carney’s refusal to make concessions to Trump on Quebec’s cultural protections.
Other Premiers have encouraged Carney to “fight back,” praised “team Canada,” criticised US tariff threats as unjustified, promised “full support,” and urged that Canada not accept a ‘subordinate economic relationship’ to the US.
The Premier of Alberta where a referendum on a range of questions including Alberta’s future within Canada is to be held on 19th October was the lone outrider, cautioning against celebrating retaliatory tariffs and expressed the hope that negotiations be resumed.
Public support in Canada for the position taken by Carney has been positive. Reuters referred to the tariff dispute encouraging a ‘rally around Canada’ effect that will likely dampen support for Alberta separation from Canada.
Ten days after the Canadian negotiating team abandoned the trade talks in Washington Carney’s Liberal Party received a very tangible indication of voter support when it won three by-elections for seats in the Canadian House of Commons including a seat in Quebec that had previously been held by a Conservative Party Member.
Opinion polls since the Canadian team walked away from the negotiations also show strong support for the position taken the Carney government.
An Ipsos poll taken on August 26-27 indicates support across party lines for Canada standing up to the US - even if it resulted in higher costs and job losses: 63% of those surveyed felt Canada was right to stand firm in the negotiations. Just 18 per cent said Canada should have made additional sacrifices to get a deal.
An Angus Reid Institute poll taken on 22 and 23 August immediately after the talks were ended found that 76% supported the line taken by the Canadian government.
A third poll by Abacus Data one of Canada’s most cited polling firms found that 60% approved of how the Carney government had handled the dispute while 18% disapproved.
In the US, unsurprisingly, positions on the trade war with Canada splits along party lines. Democrats overwhelmingly oppose the Trump’s position arguing that tariffs cost consumers and businesses.
On 9th September a group of nine Democrat Senators from states with close business ties with Canada issued a joint statement attacking President Trump’s “senseless trade war” with a key trading partner, primary export market and most enduring defence partner, pointing out that the President’s actions would force Canada to “diversify away from the US and deepen trade ties with other countries including China.”
Republicans generally, but not universally, support Trump’s position, arguing that Trump’s tariff stance is ‘putting America first.’ Concerns have been flagged in the Republican ranks that the tariffs will be an issue in the November mid-terms, particularly in competitive Senate and House races.
Senator Susan Collins of Maine, the US state most exposed to the tariff dispute with Canada, who is facing a tough re-election contest in November has labelled the tariffs on Canada ‘a mistake’ pointing out that Canadian retaliation could cost Maine up to $170 million in export losses. The Republican governor of Vermont has also been openly critical.
The position for President Trump is considerably less positive than that of Prime Minister Carney. The Canadian Prime Minister enjoys the public and political support that President Trump conspicuously lacks. As this week's appearance in the European Parliament demonstrated Mr Carney’s support is not confined to Canada; he has international support which, President Trump again conspicuously lacks.
At the moment there is no obvious ‘off ramp’ to facilitate a return to the negotiating table. Politically and temperamentally it will be harder for President Trump to pull back from the position he has taken in the tariff war than it will be for Mark Carney. Mr Carney has more political support for his position, at home and internationally than President Trump. He has also played an infinitely better game than Mr Trump. For the moment the ball is very much in Mark Carney’s court.
Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs and former Minister for the Environment.
A new report titled “The Hidden Cost of EU Regulation: Why Policy Design Matters for Growth, Competitiveness, and Investment,” published on 14 September, estimates that EU regulations could reduce GDP by €159 billion per year and threaten 419,000 jobs between 2026 and 2030.
Published by the European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC), the report examines the “hidden” costs of European policies. These include not only bureaucratic burdens but also regulatory uncertainty, poorly planned transitions, and overlapping obligations. According to the report, these factors can slow investment, limit innovation, and ultimately undermine the policies’ intended goals.
Europe risks imposing substantial economic costs on itself if a new generation of EU regulation is introduced without greater attention to competitiveness, proportionality and the cumulative burden on businesses, according to a new study from the Brussels-based European Policy Innovation Council (EPIC).
The report, estimates that five major areas of regulation currently facing European policymakers could, under its more restrictive scenarios, be associated with €159 billion in foregone EU GDP each year between 2026 and 2030.
It estimates an accompanying annual investment shortfall of approximately €36 billion, with around 419,000 jobs potentially at risk.
But the report's central argument is not that regulation itself is economically damaging. Rather, it contends that poorly sequenced, insufficiently differentiated or unpredictable regulation can impose costs which more carefully designed policies could avoid.
EPIC calculates that what it calls a "better regulation" approach could make a difference of approximately €125 billion in GDP each year, while supporting around €28 billion more annual investment and improving the projected employment outcome by some 241,000 jobs.
The analysis comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the EU, where improving competitiveness has moved rapidly up the political agenda following Mario Draghi's landmark report on the future of European competitiveness.
EPIC examined artificial intelligence regulation, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, biotechnology and novel food, and the forthcoming revision of the EU's Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).
The study identifies the TPD revision as potentially the biggest avoidable economic shock, but says smarter regulation could protect growth, investment and public health
EPIC estimates that a highly restrictive approach to the forthcoming TPD revision could be associated with an annual GDP loss of approximately €48 billion, including around €24 billion in lost tax revenues.
The same scenario would put roughly 120,000 jobs at risk and produce an estimated annual investment shortfall of about €11 billion.
By contrast, under EPIC's alternative scenario — based on a more differentiated regulatory treatment of products according to risk and greater emphasis on maintaining legal-market innovation — the organisation calculates an annual GDP gain of €32 billion.
The difference between the two regulatory approaches is therefore almost €80 billion in GDP each year, according to the modelling, alongside an improvement of more than 182,000 jobs and approximately €18 billion in investment.
These are significant numbers, but they require an important qualification.
They are scenario-based projections rather than forecasts of losses which have already occurred or inevitably will occur. EPIC itself stresses that its prospective figures are estimates based on alternative regulatory assumptions and should not be interpreted as guaranteed outcomes.
In the tobacco case in particular, the restrictive scenario assumes a major relocation of manufacturing outside the EU, with only part of wholesale and retail activity retained and some demand migrating into illicit channels. That is a substantial modelling assumption and is central to the scale of the estimated economic impact.
Nevertheless, the study raises a broader policy question which Brussels may find harder to dismiss: whether the economic consequences of the next TPD are being examined with the same intensity as its health objectives.
EPIC bases part of its TPD scenario on measures discussed in connection with the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control's COP11, held in 2025.
The report identifies proposals including flavour restrictions across tobacco and nicotine products, tighter sanctions, additional restrictions affecting newer nicotine and heated tobacco products and possible limitations on particular product components, including filters.
That debate exposed significant disagreements among EU member states.
According to the report, countries including Italy, Greece, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Czechia raised concerns about applying broadly similar restrictions to combustible cigarettes and alternative nicotine products despite differences between product categories.
Those disagreements became sufficiently pronounced that the EU was unable to maintain a common position during important parts of COP11, according to the EPIC analysis.
The significance for Brussels is that decisions taken at an FCTC Conference of the Parties do not automatically become EU law.
However, EPIC argues that COP priorities have historically influenced European tobacco policy and could feed into the Commission's forthcoming revision of the TPD.
The report points in particular to EU-funded tobacco-control initiatives which incorporate FCTC and COP priorities into their work and to a 2025 Council working document which raised a possible cigarette-filter ban.
EPIC therefore warns against what it sees as the potential importation of an international tobacco-control agenda into EU legislation without first undertaking sufficiently detailed economic, enforcement and proportionality assessments.
Another significant element in the study is illicit trade.
EPIC argues that restrictions which significantly reduce the availability of products for which consumer demand continues to exist can transfer trade away from regulated businesses rather than eliminate consumption.
The EC and EU agencies are simultaneously attempting to combat illegal tobacco and nicotine markets, yet, according to EPIC, some regulatory measures could make illegal supply comparatively more attractive.
According to the report, younger consumers are not necessarily insulated from such markets merely because products disappear from legal retail channels, pointing to concerns surrounding illicit e-cigarette distribution and sales through social media.
This is an issue with implications beyond the tobacco industry. Lost legal sales can mean lost VAT and excise revenues, while enforcement costs increase and legitimate retailers face competition from operators which pay neither tax nor compliance costs.
Importantly, EPIC does not present its report as a case for abandoning European health, environmental or consumer-protection objectives. Instead, it advocates what it describes as "Stability-by-Design".
The principle is relatively straightforward: policymakers should analyse economic effects, implementation capacity and differences between sectors and technologies before regulatory choices become politically fixed.
It calls for predictable rules, earlier stakeholder involvement, differentiated regulation where risks differ and implementation schedules which take account of infrastructure, supply chains and enforcement capabilities.
It also argues that regulations should increasingly be assessed collectively rather than individually.
Businesses do not experience the TPD, taxation measures, packaging requirements, environmental legislation and other compliance obligations separately. They experience their accumulated cost simultaneously.
For tobacco, this is particularly relevant because the TPD revision is taking place against the backdrop of parallel debates over tobacco excise taxation, packaging and sustainability rules.
The combined economic impact could therefore be greater than examining each initiative separately would suggest.
For the next regulatory wave, it calculates annual GDP impacts of around €48 billion from its restrictive TPD scenario, €24 billion from the AI framework, €42 billion from packaging regulation, €44 billion from CBAM and €1.6 billion from slower biotechnology and novel-food approvals.
The figures will inevitably be debated, particularly because economic models depend heavily on the assumptions placed into them.
But the policy issue raised by the report is harder to reduce to a dispute over individual numbers.
At a time when European leaders are repeatedly warning that the Union must close its productivity and investment gap with the US and China, EPIC is effectively asking whether Brussels subjects the economic consequences of regulation to the same level of scrutiny as the objectives regulation is intended to achieve.
Concerns about the water and energy demands of data centers have become prolific in recent weeks. But debates about their impact often overlook the rapid advances in cooling technology and cleaner energy that are already having an impact.
However, data centers’ resource consumption should be front and center of the AI conversion, as it is set to grow rapidly. By 2030, data centers’ water and energy consumption will double as AI demand leads to rapid construction of the infrastructure.
But data centers will not cause the world to run out of water or energy. Water- and energy-saving technologies already in use are reducing their impact, while Shanghai’s groundbreaking underwater data center demonstrates how innovative design can limit water, energy and land use.
Data centers have underpinned the internet since its founding. Apps, email, file storage and cloud services all run through them.
Modern AI workloads, however, have transformed their power demands beyond recognition. Today a single AI data center can match the electricity consumption of 100,000 homes, making them a significant drain on local energy grids, especially if a region is susceptible to shortages.
Data centers’ energy consumption is only rising as more are built across the world. In the US, data centers could increase from 4.4% to 12% of national electricity usage by 2028 — that is equivalent to adding eight New York Cities to the American grid.
Data centers also consume large amounts of water in two main ways. Water is used directly to cool servers and storage systems, which generate considerable heat, and indirectly to produce electricity at fossil fuel power plants where it is heated into steam to drive turbines.
In the UK, data centers have been estimated to use up to eight times as much water as average on hot summer days, underlining how their impact can rise when local resources are already under strain.
As the effects of climate change intensify, the location of data centers, and methods to reduce their water and energy consumption, are becoming ever more important.
Fortunately, resource-saving measures are already being implemented. Data centers on land use closed-loop cooling systems that recycle water rather than continually evaporating it. This can reduce freshwater use by up to 70% compared to traditional open evaporative methods.
China has also pioneered a revolutionary new type of data center in Shanghai: wind-powered, and underwater. The facility, which began full commercial operations in May 2026, uses seawater as a coolant instead of using refrigerated fresh water as land-based data centers do, reducing the electricity required to cool the computers.
It uses at least 30% less electricity than traditional data centers, and offshore wind turbines reduce reliance on fossil fuels and cut the data center’s carbon emissions. Innovative solutions such as these will go a long way to reducing data centers’ resource consumption.
AI is also part of the solution to data centers’ draw on resources. AI can optimise electricity grids and shift computing workloads towards periods when cleaner energy is more efficient, making energy use more effective overall. AI can also anticipate fluctuations in demand and adjust energy consumption accordingly, reducing waste.
It might sound obvious, but some areas are just better equipped to accommodate a data center than others. For example, facilities in hot or water-stressed regions will impose a heavier burden on resources than those supplied by cleaner energy with plentiful water and located in cooler climates.
AI’s growing demand for data centers will increase electricity and water consumption, that is true. But it does not mean the technology will exhaust regional or global supplies of either resource.
The AI boom and the infrastructure buildout accompanying it are well underway. To manage its impact, the industry needs to plan ahead. Cleaner energy, efficient cooling, and sites that have significant water and energy supplies will all limit the infrastructure’s drain on resources.
The political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has landed directly on the desk of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Republican Congresswoman Celeste Maloy has sent a letter to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), requesting an urgent review of the actions taken by former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Christian Schmidt and the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC) in the proceedings that led to Milorad Dodik’s removal from office as President of Republika Srpska, writes NewsEurope.
At the time, that removal was also supported by the United States under the Biden administration, although it remains unclear what external influences may have been at play and who actually made the decision. Dodik has long faced strong opposition from Bosnian movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood, in part because of his close ties with Israel.
The letter, dated 31 August 2026, and addressed to OFAC Director Bradley Smith, carries particular political significance because Maloy goes beyond simply asking for clarification. The congresswoman explicitly brings to the Treasury agency’s attention the possibility that the actions attributed to Schmidt and the CEC could fall within the scope of conduct subject to U.S. sanctions authorities.
In the letter, Maloy states that she understands that OFAC has received materials alleging that the actions of Schmidt and the Election Commission may constitute “interference with a democratic process” within the scope of existing U.S. sanctions authorities applicable to the Western Balkans. The congresswoman also makes a particularly significant reference to the Global Magnitsky sanctions program, noting that the alleged conduct could alternatively constitute sanctionable activity under that framework.
In formal terms, therefore, Maloy is directly calling on President Donald Trump’s administration to sanction Schmidt. The letter is addressed to OFAC and requests an expedited review of the materials already submitted to the agency. Politically, however, the significance of the initiative is clear: a Republican member of Congress is asking the U.S. administration to determine whether there are legal grounds for imposing U.S. sanctions on Schmidt and, potentially, on other officials involved. It is the first time such a step has been taken in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Maloy concludes by stating that she appreciates OFAC’s “expeditious review” of the matter and looks forward to learning the results of its investigation. This is therefore more than a simple political statement on Bosnia: it is a request to activate the administrative mechanism that can precede a decision on sanctions.
The initiative stems from the proceedings that ultimately led to Milorad Dodik losing his position. In February 2025, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Dodik for failing to comply with decisions of the High Representative. The ruling was subsequently upheld on appeal, resulting in a one-year prison sentence and a six-year ban on serving as President of Republika Srpska.
It is precisely the nature of this political and institutional process that Maloy is now indirectly calling into question. In her letter, she refers to Dodik as the “democratically elected President of Republika Srpska” and presents Schmidt’s actions as the subject of allegations of interference with the democratic process.
The development is politically significant because it reverses the perspective that for years characterized relations between Washington and the Bosnian Serb leadership: this time, it is not the actions of the Republika Srpska authorities that are being scrutinized. Instead, a U.S. government agency is being asked to examine the conduct of the former international High Representative and the institutions involved in the process that led to Dodik’s removal from office.
The decision on how to proceed now rests with the Trump administration.
A European Parliament compromise on reforming the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) has opened a politically sensitive dispute over whether entire industries should be excluded from sustainable investment — with fossil fuels offered a conditional transition route while tobacco remains outside.
The revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, better known as SFDR, is emerging as a key political battleground over the future boundaries of sustainable finance in the European Union.
Although formally concerned with disclosure requirements and the categorisation of financial products, the dispute now goes considerably further. At stake is a fundamental question: should entire sectors be excluded from sustainable and transition finance because of the nature of their business, or should companies be judged primarily on their actual environmental performance, investment plans and capacity to transition?
That distinction has potentially significant consequences for companies, investors and access to capital.
The file is currently under consideration in the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, ECON, where a compromise has been reached between political groups ahead of the committee vote.
Under the emerging agreement, sectoral exclusions remain within the proposed framework. Tobacco cultivation and production, as well as controversial weapons, remain outside the relevant sustainable investment categories.
Fossil-fuel companies, however, have been given a potential route into the proposed transition category where specified conditions are met.
An oil or gas company may potentially demonstrate that it is directing sufficient capital towards sustainable activities and implementing a credible emissions transition. A tobacco business, however substantial its environmental improvements, would remain excluded because of the sector in which it operates.
Crucially, however, the EPP’s decision not to challenge the tobacco exclusion should not be read as an endorsement of blanket sectoral exclusions.
Markus Ferber, the EPP’s ECON coordinator, has told EU Reporter that the decision was driven by parliamentary arithmetic and the need to assemble a stable majority for the overall compromise.
In other words, the EPP did not abandon its reservations about blanket exclusions because it had become convinced that such exclusions were the right policy. It accepted the compromise because, in Ferber’s assessment, there was no realistic parliamentary majority for an alternative amendment that would have created a performance-based pathway for tobacco.
It means the tobacco exclusion survives not because the EPP has embraced the principle behind it, but because the group concluded that challenging it would jeopardise the broader compromise.
Ferber made clear that his underlying policy position remains strongly performance-based.
“Per se, EPP does not like blanket sectoral exclusions, but unfortunately it is not only the EPP’s position that determines the final outcome of negotiations and we had to strike compromises with other political groups to achieve a stable majority,” he told EU Reporter.
Asked whether sustainable-finance rules should judge companies according to the sector in which they operate or according to their measurable environmental progress, Ferber was unequivocal.
“In my view, the objective should be to finance the transition,” he said. “Hence, environmental performance and credible transition plans should matter more than the sector.”
That comment goes to the heart of the controversy surrounding tobacco.
The sector remains excluded irrespective of whether individual companies reduce emissions, restructure production, invest in Taxonomy-aligned activities or adopt measurable transition plans.
Fossil-fuel companies, by contrast, are being offered a conditional route into the transition category.
Ferber’s most significant intervention concerns why the EPP did not attempt to overturn the tobacco exclusion through an alternative compromise amendment.
Asked directly why he was not tabling such an amendment, despite previously opposing blanket exclusions affecting tobacco, Ferber replied:
“We have assessed all options for a stable majority in the Parliament and were not convinced that tabling alternative compromises would yield such a majority.”
That answer makes the political calculus unusually clear.
The tobacco exclusion was not retained because Ferber or the EPP ECON leadership had positively embraced the underlying principle. It remained because the EPP judged that there were insufficient votes to replace it while preserving the wider agreement.
The distinction matters because it changes the interpretation of the compromise.
Rather than representing an ideological conversion by the EPP towards sector-based sustainable-finance rules, it represents a tactical concession made in the context of difficult parliamentary mathematics.
Ferber reinforced that point when discussing the wider negotiations.
“I am not enthusiastic about the compromise,” he said, “but it reflects what is politically possible in light of difficult majorities and a rapporteur that has pursued a hard-left line from the beginning.”
The Parliament’s lead rapporteur on the file is Dutch Renew Europe MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy.
Ferber’s description of Gerbrandy’s approach as “hard-left” is his own political characterisation, but his remarks underline how far the SFDR revision has moved beyond a purely technical debate over disclosure rules.
The EPP has repeatedly positioned itself as an opponent of unnecessary blanket exclusions and an advocate of competitiveness, regulatory simplification and performance-based rules.
A number of centre-right amendments tabled during the ECON process sought to remove or narrow the exclusion provisions.
The material submitted to EU Reporter notes that among the amendments tabled in committee, several concerning exclusions were proposed by EPP, ECR and other centre-right lawmakers.
Asked whether significant numbers of EPP members would have preferred the exclusions to be removed or narrowed, Ferber acknowledged that different views existed within the group.
“In a large and diverse political group, you always have different positions to reconcile,” he said.
He added that EPP shadow rapporteur Luděk Niedermayer had “checked back frequently to ensure that he has sufficient backing within our group.
Luděk Niedermayer said "There were different priorities from different political groups and differences are even above different MEPs from same group. The current text reflects the agreement reached as a compromise.
Asked how much room did the EPP have to negotiate changes to Article 7, and what
concessions did the Group obtain in return for accepting the final package? he said :
"As with every file, each political group has its own priorities. For the EPP, one of the key
priorities was Article 7, where we managed to secure a text that is acceptable to the Group
and which, in my view, better reflects the nature and purpose of the transition category than
the Commission proposal."
Ferber therefore rejects the suggestion that the final compromise amounts to Niedermayer departing from an agreed EPP line.
Asked directly whether there had been a disagreement between the two men over the treatment of tobacco and sectoral exclusions, he replied:
“No, our shadow rapporteur has faithfully defended the line agreed within our group, but it has always been clear that in compromise negotiations the EPP would not get 100% of its wishes. That is the nature of a compromise.”
Niedermayer said " Maintaining a limited set of exclusions helps preserve the credibility of products marketed as sustainable without extending blanket exclusions more broadly. Furthermore, energy and utility companies are more likely to follow a credible transition pathway than the sectors mentioned above. Consistency between SFDR and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818 under the Benchmark Regulation is also a strong argument for such an approach.
The tobacco issue exposes the central philosophical question running through the SFDR revision.
Under a blanket exclusion, the decisive question is: what does this company produce?
Under a performance-based model, the question becomes: what is this company actually doing to transition?
The distinction matters because an automatic exclusion can remove the regulatory benefit of environmental improvement.
A company that reduces emissions, changes production methods, invests heavily in renewable energy or directs substantial capital expenditure towards EU Taxonomy-aligned activities may still receive exactly the same treatment as one making no transition effort at all.
That is the fundamental criticism of blanket exclusions contained in the material examined by EU Reporter.
If an oil or gas company can potentially qualify for the transition category by demonstrating credible investment and emissions reductions, opponents of the tobacco exclusion ask why businesses in another lawful sector should not at least be permitted to make the same case.
Ferber’s own words strengthen that argument: environmental performance and credible transition plans, he says, should matter more than the sector itself.
Ferber nevertheless argued that there is a rationale for distinguishing between some industries.
“One can make an argument that energy companies engaged in fossil fuel projects today are likely to ultimately change their business model towards more sustainable projects, while a controversial weapons manufacturer is likely to still manufacture deadly weapons in the future,” he said.
“So, the transition case is weaker.”
That explanation addresses controversial weapons more directly than tobacco, however.
For tobacco, the unresolved policy question remains whether environmental transition should be assessed separately from the social and health characteristics of the product being manufactured.
That is precisely where the SFDR debate is becoming politically significant.
The issue is no longer merely whether tobacco is socially desirable. It is whether a sustainable-finance regulation should use sector identity as an automatic barrier to recognising environmental transition.
The controversy also reaches into the EPP’s wider political argument that the EU needs to move away from parts of the regulatory philosophy associated with the previous Commission and the European Green Deal.
Asked whether retaining blanket exclusions amounted to accepting part of that earlier approach, Ferber was sharply critical of the sustainable-finance framework as a whole.
“The whole sustainable finance framework is a legacy product from the previous two terms,” he said.
“In my personal view, it contains some fundamental flaws, that are difficult to change with targeted reviews of individual files.”
“We have done the best we could to fix some mistakes within the SFDR. That does not mean it is perfect. If I was given a blank slate, I would design the framework differently.”
The EPP remains sceptical of the principle behind some sectoral exclusions, yet has accepted a compromise that preserves them.
The explanation, according to its ECON coordinator, is not policy conversion but political necessity.
That is likely to become one of the most important distinctions in the debate as the file moves towards its committee vote and later parliamentary stages.
The controversy also raises questions of regulatory coherence.
The EU Taxonomy measures environmental sustainability using economic indicators including turnover, capital expenditure and operational expenditure associated with qualifying activities.
The SFDR compromise can operate differently by establishing a sectoral gateway before a company’s environmental performance is assessed.
The material examined by EU Reporter argues that this risks creating two different regulatory philosophies: the Taxonomy assesses measurable activity, while SFDR can exclude by sector identity.
That matters at a time when Brussels has promised simpler and more coherent regulation.
If transition finance is supposed to encourage companies to change behaviour, critics argue that the system needs to explain why measurable transition is sufficient for one sector but irrelevant for another.
The impact is not confined to multinational tobacco manufacturers.
European tobacco growers and processors have warned MEPs that exclusion from sustainable-finance frameworks could have consequences for agricultural communities and smaller businesses.
Ten thousands of family farms would be potentially affected, alongside thousands of SMEs, many of them located in economically vulnerable agricultural regions.
The broader economic figures advanced by industry organisations should be treated as industry estimates, but the principle being argued by growers is more straightforward.
They are not asking for tobacco automatically to be labelled sustainable.
They are asking to be allowed to demonstrate transition against objective criteria.
In that respect, the fossil-fuel derogation has become politically significant.
If Europe is prepared to recognise transition in one of the world’s most carbon-intensive sectors, tobacco industry stakeholders ask why no equivalent environmental-performance test should exist for their own.
Despite his reservations, Ferber told EU Reporter that he does not expect the compromise to be altered before the ECON vote.
“I do not anticipate any changes to the text that was agreed ahead of the vote,” he said.
The immediate political battle may therefore already have been settled.
But the wider argument is unlikely to disappear.
The SFDR revision was intended to simplify sustainable finance and make it clearer for investors.
Instead, it has exposed a fundamental policy choice over whether sustainable finance should reward measurable transition or exclude entire sectors in advance.
And in the case of tobacco, the EPP’s position is now particularly clear: the exclusion remains not because its ECON leadership endorses blanket sectoral exclusions, but because it concluded that Parliament did not contain the votes necessary to remove it without jeopardising the wider SFDR compromise.
That distinction is now stated in the introduction, given its own section, and repeated in the conclusion, so it becomes the central political takeaway rather than being buried inside the Ferber interview.
The German government has announced plans to terminate the agreement governing the activities of the Russian House in Berlin and to close Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn by September 18. The German Foreign Office has cited security concerns as the reason for the decision.
The announcement follows the discovery of an unidentified drone carrying explosives near Leipzig Airport. The device was reportedly found in an area close to transport aircraft used in connection with weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Moscow has rejected the allegations, describing them as unsupported by evidence.
Against the backdrop of this latest deterioration in diplomatic relations, three politicians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have spoken out in favor of keeping the Russian House open. They argue that the institution should primarily be regarded as a venue for cultural exchange rather than as an arena for political confrontation.
Ulrich Singer, chairman of the AfD parliamentary group in the Bavarian State Parliament, criticized the approach taken by Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In Singer’s view, sanctions are placing an additional burden on the German economy. He also considers the proposed closure of both the Russian House and the consulate in Bonn to be based on allegations of suspected subversive activity that are being used as a pretext.
Singer stressed that for decades the Russian House has provided opportunities for people to learn about the Russian language, culture and history. Any potential violations of the law, he argued, should be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted through the courts. Suspicions, Singer said, “cannot replace proceedings conducted under the rule of law,” while assessments made by foreign intelligence agencies “must not lead to political prejudgment.”
Precisely because relations between Germany and Russia are strained, Singer believes there should be more dialogue rather than less. In his assessment, dismantling cultural bridges would only deepen the breakdown in communication.
He also called for sanctions to be reviewed, arguing that they should not become an end in themselves. According to Singer, they impose costs on German companies and, when directed against individuals, must comply with the principles of legality, transparency and proportionality.
Singer additionally warned of possible reciprocal measures. Closing the Russian House could have consequences for German cultural institutions operating in Russia, particularly the Goethe-Institut. Commentators cited by klamm.de have noted that the two institutions are connected through a longstanding reciprocal arrangement.
Singer concluded that “the true strength of a state” does not lie in constant escalation but in its ability to prevent wars. In his words, peace is achieved not by closing doors, but by keeping them open.
Andreas Jurca, another AfD member of the Bavarian State Parliament, expressed a similar position. He argues that during a period of worsening relations between Berlin and Moscow, channels for cultural, social and humanitarian exchange are particularly important and should be preserved.
“If such places of encounter disappear, the distance between the two societies will continue to grow,” Jurca said.
He also maintained that allegations concerning possible intelligence activities should be based on evidence that can be verified and publicly scrutinized rather than solely on political assessments. New-facts.eu notes that Jurca’s statements, like those made by Sahra Wagenknecht, represent political assessments rather than the findings of official investigations.
AfD Bundestag member Rainer Rothfuß, who has previously organized so-called “peace trips” to Moscow, also criticized the planned measures. He described the proposed closure of the Russian House and the consulate in Bad Godesberg as “disastrous.”
Rothfuß claimed that “the government is carrying out an agenda dictated by globalists” and is taking steps that, in his view, “were avoided even during the Cold War.”
“Good and peaceful relations between Germany and Russia are in Germany’s interest,” Rothfuß said.
According to him, the AfD has defended this position for years. He also criticized mainstream media outlets, accusing them of contributing to the further “destruction” of German-Russian relations.
Klamm.de and new-facts.eu have also reported criticism voiced by Sahra Wagenknecht. She argues that Merz is intensifying tensions with Russia while failing to demonstrate the same determination in his approach toward Ukraine. In this context, she pointed to the arrests of Ukrainian citizens suspected of involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.
“Merz is bringing us ever closer to a war with Russia,” Wagenknecht wrote on her blog.
The future of the Russian House and the Russian consulate in Bonn now rests with the German government and the diplomatic process. Singer, Jurca and Rothfuß are calling for a clear distinction between suspected violations of the law—which, they argue, should be investigated and dealt with through the courts—and cultural channels, which they believe should remain open.
The German government, meanwhile, has linked the planned closures to national-security concerns following the incident near Leipzig. Moscow continues to reject the allegations.
An international sports camp bringing together nearly 100 young Ukrainian athletes from ten different sports has concluded in France.
The camp was held at the initiative and with the support of Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, in partnership with the Ukrainian side. The Kyiv City State Administration, “The Future for Children” Charitable Foundation with its Olympic Dreams project, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine with the nationwide multisport project “Path of Champions” also contributed to the organization of the camp.
This year, the camp brought together athletes representing ten sports: rhythmic gymnastics, volleyball, judo, sport climbing, boxing, basketball, athletics, rowing, taekwondo, and floorball.
The young Ukrainian athletes had the opportunity to train in safe conditions, take part in sports and team activities, relax, and discover France. The camp programme included a mountain hike, a trip to the seaside, a visit to an oceanarium, and attendance at a football match.
“For us, it is very important to see more and more people in different countries coming together to support Ukrainian sport, with France becoming a systemic partner. Camps like this give Ukrainian children an opportunity, at least for a while, to return to a normal childhood: to train in safe conditions, make new friends, and see a world without borders,” said Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.
: Anatoliy Boyko, Philippe Lamblin, Olena Hovorova, Vadym Omelchenko, Yasmina Merzi
An important highlight of the programme was the official reception for the camp participants at Paris City Hall on 21 August.
The meeting was attended by Vadym Omelchenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the French Republic; Yasmina Merzi, Deputy Mayor of Paris responsible for child welfare and protection; Olena Hovorova, Deputy Head of the Kyiv City State Administration, Adviser to the Office of the President of Ukraine and Olympic bronze medallist; Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League; and Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.
The meeting at Paris City Hall provided an opportunity to thank the French partners for their support of Ukrainian athletes and to discuss the importance of international sports cooperation amid the full-scale war.
The organizers and Ukrainian partners also express their gratitude to the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, the regional prefecture, the City of Lille, the management of Parc d’Olhain, as well as all French partners and patrons who contributed to the organization of the camp.
For Olympic Dreams, a project launched in 2022, participation in such international initiatives is part of its ongoing efforts to provide Ukrainian athletes with opportunities for safe training, athletic development, and international preparation during the full-scale war.
Photos by Roman Horbun
This year has proved that the era of the strongman is undoubtedly upon us. Littered throughout the highest offices across government and international organisations, they have proved time and again that due process is for suckers and that you, too, can bribe your way to the desired outcome.
Take Gianni Infantino who is seeking to sell off 20% of the world’s most cherished football tournament. He, like Trump, has dug in his heels, choosing to strategically dole out favours, and then use their power to pit people against each other, rather than following the rules. Having leveraged their positions to fulfil their agenda, no matter the cost, they deny anything they don’t wish to confront, deflect questions they don’t like, and gaslight anyone who dares to call them out.
Whilst Infantino and Trump have dominated headlines of late, the actions of the world’s health agency head have - despite years of alarm bells - received comparatively little scrutiny; a concern when you consider how instrumental effective healthcare is to our everyday lives.
Like Infantino, Dr Tedros wedges countries and leaders apart in order to defy institutional processes and push through his agenda. In 2025, Dr Tedros pared down his leadership team by nearly 30%. Most recently, the WHO’s top scientist, Dr Jeremy Farrar, was replaced with a highly “controversial” and apparent confidant of Dr Tedros. The pattern of replacing officials with faithful advisers is a classic move of the strongman and underlines how institutional structures can be leveraged to advance personal aims.
One of those aims appears to be purging WHO of those who challenge the opaque bureaucratic functions that Dr Tedros oversees. Dr Farrar’s surprise resignation was said to have been due to increasing frustrations with the WHO’s internal politics. Curiously, in an all-staff email, Dr Tedros reframed Dr Farrar’s departure as a retirement and, in communications with the press, the organisation refused to comment on
r’s relationship with (read: criticisms of) the WHO.
Now, Dr Tedros is allegedly bulldozing through the replacement of the WHO’s Regional Director for its South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), Saima Wazed. Ms Wazed has been on administrative leave for over a year following unfounded allegations made against her by Bangladesh’s Interim Government. As the nation roiled under an intense period of political unrest, Ms Wazed was falsely accused of absconding from the country when, in reality, she was stationed in New Delhi, acting in her capacity as the SEARO Regional Director. The WHO knew this but put her on administrative leave without pay anyways. In that time other, unfounded allegations bubbled up, including claims Ms Wazed requested reimbursement from WHO for personal travel to China, which, it would appear, was an entirely fabricated allegation.
The WHO’s handling of Ms Wazed’s leave has been deeply flawed and discussed at length by top-level jurists and a UN Special Rapporteur. Since the allegations were made, a new Bangladeshi government has been elected and two of WHO’s Officers-in-Charge have been appointed to “temporarily” oversee the SEARO. Still, no information about the veracity of the allegations against Ms Wazed have been made public despite the fact that WHO’s own guidelines explicitly say that administrative leave is not a punishment. If allegations are not verified in a reasonable timeframe, WHO has a duty to end the leave.
For her part, Ms Wazed has called for an investigation into Dr Tedros, alleging that he or his office leaked confidential documents, provided false or misleading information to Member States, and breached confidentiality requirements and the WHO’s Code of Conduct by directly engaging with the former government of Bangladesh.
While the WHO has the responsibility to investigate allegations against its staff, claims from a national authority should not automatically be treated as proven fact for a supposedly apolitical organisation. It has now been over a year since Ms Wazed was put on leave. This, combined with the absence of any apparent independent investigation into the allegations points to a fast and loose approach to proper administrative processes, one in which the attempt to hold Ms Wazed in administrative purgatory exists as a vehicle to quietly remove her from the organisation.
Just as Infantino is leveraging greater funding for African nations to gather support for his upcoming presidential bid, Dr Tedros is using what amounts to an uncosted holiday jaunt to the South Pacific to bring a forced-end to this saga. Reports suggest that the Director General is directing SEARO nations to do away with due processes and install Ms Wazed’s successor. For their trouble, fielty, and feigned ignorance to standard administrative practices, Dr Tedros is organising a regional meeting, spending at least €163k to fly in the SEARO directors and staff for a face-to-face meeting in Timor Leste. Despite years of cutting the WHO to the bone and a record budget shortfall, for Dr Tedros no expense is too great to push through his agenda.
Ultimately, this is a clear attempt by Dr Tedros to circumvent proper levels of scrutiny about this crucial decision, and to hide his undermining of the WHO’s standard procedures by sweetening the deal for other regional staff. Pulling directly from the Infantino playbook, Dr Tedros has escaped public outcry which would hold him responsible. But his treatment of Saima Wazed, what many would call an organised witch-hunt, should concern us all, as yet another international organisation sees the erosion of due processes.
While the country queues for petrol, import licences are being given to the network behind Mongolia’s largest corporate fraud. Mongolia spent August rationing petrol, as the country faces an ‘unprecedented’ fuel crisis. In response, the Government has made importing fuel more profitable, and has sped up the process for issuing new licences.[1]
By opening the gates, the government has allowed existing networks to exploit the crisis, including the one connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren, the disgraced Mongolian businessman reportedly as being allegedly responsible for the $1.1 bn fraud scheme operated through Lex Oil, the fuel importer that was run by his aunt.[2]
Mongolia is heavily reliant on foreign oil, primarily from Russia. To import it, businesses need an ‘all-types fuel import licence’, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, which decides through paperwork checks.[3] Foreign businesses cannot import directly — they must sell through a Mongolian-licensed entity.[4]
Some 164 companies hold an import licence. Of these, 34 have been granted since 2025.[5] The number of companies licensed to import fuel has more than doubled in under five years.[6]
They have also become considerably more valuable. Duty and excise on fuel have been zeroed, importers offered preferential loans and subsidised storage for reserves, and the customs service has been told to expedite clearance of petrol consignments.[7]
A number of companies granted all-types fuel import licences in 2025 and 2026 are connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren and the Lex Oil network behind his $1.1bn scheme. That scheme was executed through the very exploitation of import licences.
None of these importers are required to disclose the amount of oil they import. Only 11 of the 164 licence holders imported fuel in the first days of August. When asked which 11, and how much each imported, the Customs General Administration refused to answer, citing customs law.
Lex Oil’s network is growing
Since 2025, two former Lex Oil CEOs have taken positions in dormant companies that then received fuel licences. In one case, the licence was obtained the same day the shareholding was registered.
Following five years of inactivity,[8] Standard Oil Gas appointed a new Director, Erdenebat Indra, in December 2025. Indra ran Lex Oil from January 2019 until February 2024 – nearly the whole period in which the losses accrued.[9] Six weeks later, Standard Oil was granted an import licence. Indra became a shareholder that same day.[10]
The pattern was replicated by Indra’s successor at Lex Oil, Banzragch Batdavaa.[11] Batdavaa bought into Best Dragon, a company with no prior fuel operations, in July 2025. It was granted import permits just two months later.[12] Batdavaa remains in business with both Mongolian and offshore entities linked to the scheme,[13] amongst them two Dubai entities – Peak Solutions (co-managed with Jononbayar’s mother)[14], and his own APEXPP commodities.[15]
Two other companies, granted licences in the spring of 2025, were already owned by individuals in the network. Tod Oil received its first licence in April 2025, although the company was incorporated six years earlier by entities closely tied to Jononbayar.[16] Its founder, Tod Petroleum, was co-founded by Lex Oil and former VS Oil CEO Bataa Anarchuluu.[17] Bataa continues to operate within the network, serving as the Executive Director of the helicopter business linked to both the scheme and the son of former Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene.[18]
Another, Apex Petroleum, was incorporated in October 2024 – the month the $1.1bn provision was made public.[19] Three of the five founding shareholders had previously founded businesses with Jononbayar himself.[20] These three include Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (son of a licensed importer linked to the Government)[21] and Jononbayar’s rumoured mistress, Yalaltbayar Khongorzul.[22]
Three further entities — ABR Eco Trans, Petro Spark and Standard Energy and Oil — have links to Jononbayar’s network. ABR was incorporated in October 2024 and licensed to import fuel in April 2025.[23] It has since taken on the founder of BID Energy, Bold Luvsandagva, as its shareholder and executive director.[24] In February 2026, ABR moved into the same unit BID Energy had occupied until that December.[25] BID Energy is Indra's other licensed importer. It was granted import licences in 2024, 11 weeks after Indra left Lex Oil.[26] Indra bought into the company and is now its ultimate beneficial owner.[27]
Another, Petro Spark, was licensed on the same day as Apex Petroleum.[28] Its owner, Yadamsüren Dorjchanga, holds a network of businesses with Yondon Uuganbayar.[29] Uuganbayar bought shares in Jononbayar’s family’s meat business, Erdenet Makh Market, two weeks after the Lex Oil scheme was disclosed in October 2024.[30]
The seventh company, Standard Energy and Oil, was licensed in 2025.[31] In May 2026, it was taken over by N. Monsor.[32] Monsor is a reported close contact of Jononbayar.[33] He was director of a Mongolian company, Sky Professional Logistics,[34] when it received over $7.5 million from an offshore entity called Class Trading Limited,[35] and distributed it the same day among nine recipients. These included Jocondy, a company owned by Jononbayar’s aunt, the founder of Lex Oil.[36] Jocondy was reportedly directed by Jononbayar at the time.[37] It is reported that Jononbayar had previously made transfers into Class Trading.[38]
These are not the network's first import licences. Nine companies linked to Jononbayar, the first being Lex Oil itself in 2019, were granted import licences before 2025,[39] meaning at least 16 of the 164 importers are connected to his network.
New Licences, Existing Networks
Even outside that seven, what distinguishes a successful candidate is often the individual owner, as opposed to the company profile. One grantee, TES Petroleum Trade,[40] is owned by the reported son of Baagaa Battömör,[41] a sitting MP who had previously run both Mongolia’s tax and customs administrations.[42] Two licences went to companies owned separately by partners in an existing fuel business.[43] Four more went to Chinese-controlled businesses, two of them on the same day. None was set up as a fuel business, and three were still unregistered for fuel activity when they were licensed.[44]
Of the 34 companies granted import licences by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources in 2025 and 2026, 14 had been incorporated less than two years before the award.[45] Eight more of the organisations granted licences changed hands shortly before they were licensed.[46]
The Government’s Response
On 17 August, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources warned that importers who failed to keep filling stations supplied could lose their licences. The Minister admitted that some importers were holding stock and not selling it.
Revoking a licence removes a registration but has no bearing on the individuals behind the businesses. With fewer regulatory checks, and more demand than ever, the doors are being left open to actors who previously exploited Mongolia’s fuel import regulations.
Mongolia scored 31 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 124th of 182 countries, its worst score on record. In September 2025 the US State Department reported that businesses in Mongolia face "substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at every level", with officials across ministries and agencies routinely contravening existing law and regulation. Unless the country creates laws transparently and implements them predictably, it warned, "investors may find Mongolia too risky and opt for more competitive countries."[47]
The victim of Jononbayar’s fraud scheme, Trafigura, used to be one of the most important importers of oil into Mongolia.[48] The fraud orchestrated by the playboy,[49] which personally enriched both himself and his family,[50] put that to an end. Now, the individuals involved are being allowed back in to exploit the crisis at the expense of ordinary Mongolians.
The crisis was a chance to show that direction had changed. Instead, the Government zeroed duty, offered importers preferential loans and subsidised storage, and issued 34 new licences — leaving at least 16 of the 164 with one network. Now agents known to have exploited the same system previously, are being allowed in again.
Photo by Zbynek Burival on Unsplash
[1] Government’s announcement that fuel import licence applications should be processed quickly and the licences granted, reported: https://ikon.mn/n/3pep and https://sonin.mn/newsDetail/18284
[2] Lex-Oil LLC granted fuel import licence in 2019: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979. Owned through his aunt, Dorjgochoo Erdenetul.
[3] In order to gain these, an applicant must produce its registration documents, prove membership of the relevant professional association, and file its contract with the fuel supplier in original: https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail?lawId=208190
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss
[5] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://license.mn/ (official electronic licence system)
[6] 80 companies Eighty companies held a licence to import fuel into Mongolia on 1 January 2022, recorded in the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry's register of petroleum products special licences, 22 March 2022: https://mmhi.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ГТБ-тусгай-зөвшөөрлийн-жагсаалт-2022.03.22.pdf. 164 currently hold licences, per license.mn, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources official register, as of September 2026: https://license.mn/.
[7] Tax and lending measures: https://mmhi.gov.mn/2026/08/06/. Expedited customs clearance: E. Oyun-Erdene, GoGo.mn, 17 August 2026, https://cmsm.mongolcontent.mn/r/6k9g8
[8] Standard Oil Gas LLC’s fuel import licence expired in 2020, and it recorded no other activity in the intervening period: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954
[9] CEO of Lex Oil 2019-224: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979
[10] 6 February 2026: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954
[11] Batdavaa sat as Executive Director of Lex Oil from Feb-April 2014: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979
[12] Best Dragon, incorporated 2020, dormant until 2025 when ownership was transferred to Batdavaa. Fuel import licence granted 26 September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6574246
[13] B.Batdavaa is currently a shareholder of Diamond Oil and Energy alongside Oyunbileg Sainbileg https://opendatalab.mn/search/6552544. Sainbeleg is known to a key actor alongside Jononbayer, and remains director of one of the family’s companies, Zuunnaim Oil: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378
[14] Cedar Rose UAE corporate data accessed via Sayari, 21 August 2026: PEAK SOLUTION DMCC, commercial register DMCC194234, licence DMCC-855346, incorporated 5 August 2022;
[15] Offshore link reported in https://www.eureporter.co/world/mongolia/2026/08/13/the-helicopter-that-helped-topple-mongolias-prime-minister-linked-to-lex-oil-scheme/, Batdaava’s Linkedin states him as CEO of APEXPP Commodities: www.linkedin.com/in/batdavaa-banzragch-46120115a
[16] Tod Oil, incorporated 2019 by Tod Petroleum, granted licence 23 April 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6415636
[17] Tod Petroleum, founded Lex Oil and Bataa Anarchuluu https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. Bataa served as VS Oil CEO https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/6225578.
[18] Listed as UBO of Alpha Aurora Aviation: https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/8376344
[19] Apex Petroleum was incorporated 17 October 2024 (https://opendatalab.mn/search/7078633). Trafigura’s statement on losses 30 October 2024: https://www.trafigura.com/news-and-insights/press-releases/2024/statement-re-trafiguras-petroleum-products-business-in-mongolia/
[20] Three founders: Bayardalai Erdenezaya (founded Kem Tek with Jononbayar in 2016, and Commodity Trans with his mother in 2019); Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (registered at the same two businesses, alongside Diamond Oil and Energy), Yalaltbayar Khongorzul (co-founded Khongorfinance with Jononbayar in 2015),
[21] Reported to be the brother in-law and former campaign manager for the Minister of Economic Development: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/singile/40012
[22] Archived article: https://web.archive.org/web/20241113103634/https://www.reelnews.mn/a/1225 and X: https://x.com/miigaasbntv/status/1852208500715459004
[23] ABR Eco Trans LLC, incorporated 15 October 2024; wholesale permit 0016 from 20 March 2025 and all-types fuel import licence 0015 from 25 April 2025; https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609
[24] Luvsandagva registered as ABR shareholder and joint beneficial owner on 24 November 2025 and as executive director on 29 January 2026; he founded BID Energy on 13 December 2023 with Baterdene Lkhagvadulam and was its first executive director: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485
[25] BID Energy moved from Bayanzürkh, 3rd khoroo, 12th microdistrict, Tsendgüni 30b, unit 53 on 1 December 2025; ABR moved into that unit on 2 February 2026, from Tokio 24a, unit 134 in the same microdistrict: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609
[26] BID Energy LLC, import licence 0015 granted 24 April 2024; https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485. Indra was executive director of Lex Oil from January 2019 to February 2024: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979.
[27] Indra registered as BID Energy shareholder and executive director on 16 August 2024 and as sole ultimate beneficial owner on 1 December 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485
[28] Petro Spark LLC, incorporated 8 May 2024, sole shareholder and beneficial owner Yadamsüren Dorjchanga; import licence 19 May 2025, the same date as Apex Petroleum: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7025169
[29] Joint holdings with Yondon Uuganbayar: Mongolian Truck Union Group LLC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6840175; Novel Development Union LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6894402; and the Gobi Genetics, https://opendatalab.mn/search/3646203
[30] Uuganbayar owns Mon Beef Cattle: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8324328 . Mon Beef Cattle acquired Erdenet Makh Market LLC, from Dorjgochoo Erdenetuyaa 24 October 2024, days before the scheme was disclosed.
[31] Standard Energy and Oil, received wholesale permit in June, the import licence that September: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6754244
[32] Monsor became the director of Standard Energy and Oil on 5 May 2026. It was acquired the same day by an investment fund, then owned by Dorj Enkhtuya (renamed KK Real Estate private fund two days later): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6607829. Mansor was the previous manager of that fund, and founded it himself through another vehicle he still owns and manages, Ulaanbaatar Asset Management: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5493498 . He became the CEO of Standard Energy and Oil on the day it was taken over by KK Real Estate.
[33] Reported in https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193/ and in https://www.polit.mn/a/69636
[34] Monsor is reported to have run Sky Professional Logistics: https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193. Court records state the executive director of Sky Professional Logistics concluded a wagon-transport agreement with the head of Ulaanbaatar Railway on 28 July 2017, naming him as Н.Монсов: https://shuukh.mn/single_case/19024
[35] Reporting states that US$7,545,900 was transferred from Class Trading Limited to Sky Professional Logistics on 8 August 2017 https://gogo.mn/r/5292y. Class Trading Limited was incorporated in the Turks and Caicos Islands and registered a Hong Kong place of business on 13 May 2015: Hong Kong Companies Registry, Company Particulars, BRN 64752427.
[36] Jocondy was founded by Dorjgochoo Erdenetuul, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5247632. She is Jononbayar's maternal aunt and the owner of Lex Oil LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979 and https://zuv.mn/n/16a3.
[37] Reporting records US$612,400 paid to Jocondy and describes Jononbayar as its director at the time: https://gogo.mn/r/5292y and https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970
[38] Reported that Jononbayar sent $500,000 to Class Trading in 2014: https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970
[39] 2019: Lex Oil, 2019 https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979,Tod Petroleum, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. 2020: ICIC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5288193 VS Oil, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6225578, Zuunnaim Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378. 2022: Argal Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/6309011. 2023: Alpha Aviation Fuel https://opendatalab.mn/search/8403473. 2024: BID Energy https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 · Interasia Energy Mongolia, 2024 https://opendatalab.mn/search/6902987. Register of all 164 holders: https://opendatalab.mn/licences/15
[40] Tes Petroleum Trade, licenced 21 February 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6373135
[41] Paternity reported in: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/single/40012
[42] Battömör has sat in the State great Khural since 2016, he was deputy head, then head of the State Customs General Administration from 2008-11 and Head of the Tax General Administration from 2011-13: https://www.24tsag.mn/a/227052
[43] Greenjob, owned by Batsukh Baigalmaa, granted licence in October 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5645867; and Gobi Petroleum GPT, owned by Onurbat Ragchaa, granted a licence September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7121913. Together they are exclusive owners and directors of Green Oil Trade since incorporation in 2020: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6528716
[44] Tana Khiimori Oil - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025
: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7080033; Talnutgiin Ayalal - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5887488;
Achit Güür MS - received import licence 14 Jan 2026, Remains unregistered for any kind of fuel-related activity (registration codes are for freight, agriculture, tourism and motor vehicle sales): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6891802; Söüd Mont Forest - received import licence 11 December 2025, Registered for fuel wholesaling 6 December 2025, (previous registration codes are for motor vehicles, freight, automotive sales and machinery), https://opendatalab.mn/search/7058649.
[45] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://licence.mn/ (official electronic licence system)
[46] Data as of https://licence.mn/ checked against https://opendatalab.mn/search/[registration number]. “Changed hands” to mean change of shareholder, director or beneficial owner within twelve months on either side of grant.
[47] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/638719_2025-Mongolia-Investment-Climate-Statement.pdf
[48] Trafigura supplied around a third of the region’s oil products, particularly diesel: https://eulerpool.com/news/markets/trafigura-in-crisis-mongolian-oil-credit-causes-million-loss; deals undertaken through the scheme said to account for around 80% of Mongolia's imported oil products: https://eguur.mn/556936/
[49] Jononbayar known for “parties he threw for friends and contacts” per Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss; reported to have thrown some of the “most expensive parties in Mongolia” https://eguur.mn/556936/
[50] https://zuv.mn/n/16a3; https://itoim.mn/a/2024/07/22/news-break/ugg
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek and a wide-ranging interview with China’s Xinhua news agency to set out a closely connected vision of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy — combining deeper economic and technological cooperation with China with a broader commitment to multilateralism, Eurasian connectivity and reform of global institutions.
Speaking as leaders gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its SCO Plus format, Tokayev presented Kazakhstan as both a committed regional partner and an increasingly active “middle power” seeking to bridge geopolitical divisions.
His summit remarks were reinforced by an exclusive written interview with Xinhua, published on 1 September, in which the Kazakh leader described relations with China as being at an “unprecedentedly high level” and said Astana intended to continue strengthening what the two countries describe as an “eternal comprehensive strategic partnership”.
Taken together, the two interventions offer a clear picture of Kazakhstan’s current diplomatic strategy: maintain close relations with its major neighbours, promote trade routes linking Asia with Europe, embrace technological cooperation and at the same time argue for international relations based on dialogue rather than confrontation.
In his Xinhua interview, Tokayev stressed that Kazakhstan-China relations now extend well beyond traditional energy and commodity ties.
Cooperation encompasses trade, investment, transport, industrial production, agriculture, digitalisation, healthcare, science, education and culture, he said. China is now Kazakhstan’s largest foreign trading partner, while transport and logistics have assumed an increasingly strategic role.
Kazakhstan occupies a central geographical position between China and European markets, and Tokayev argued that the country was working with China to transform that location into a modern Eurasian transport and logistics network.
He specifically highlighted the Belt and Road Initiative, new railway construction, dry ports, logistics terminals and modernisation of border infrastructure.
Central to this strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, which links China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and onward towards European markets.
Tokayev described making the route more competitive as a shared priority, pointing to “smart customs”, digital documentation, interconnected information systems and automated border procedures as necessary elements in reducing transit times.
That message closely reflected his position at the SCO summit, where Kazakhstan again offered to help develop transport initiatives throughout the organisation and called attention to the potential integration of the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Corridor, North-South Corridor and routes connecting Central and South Asia.
For the European Union, which has increasingly sought alternative and resilient connections with Central Asia and China, the development of the Middle Corridor gives Kazakhstan an importance that extends considerably beyond the size of its domestic economy.
Tokayev also placed technology and artificial intelligence near the centre of the emerging Kazakhstan-China relationship.
China's position in AI, robotics, digital technology, new energy and advanced manufacturing complements Kazakhstan's own ambition to accelerate its digital transformation, he argued.
Kazakhstan has declared 2026 its Year of Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence, and Tokayev referred to meetings with leading Chinese technology companies during his recent participation in the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai.
He said there was mutual interest in projects involving the digital economy, intelligent manufacturing, e-commerce, research and skills development.
The subject moved seamlessly from the bilateral interview into Tokayev's multilateral message in Bishkek.
Addressing the SCO Plus meeting, he warned that global stability increasingly depends upon the responsible development of artificial intelligence and called for universal rules capable of encouraging innovation while preventing uncontrolled use and narrowing the digital divide.
Kazakhstan is also establishing an Asia-Pacific digital solutions centre in Almaty under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, which Tokayev said should help developing countries gain access to technological expertise.
In his Xinhua interview he went further, arguing that AI should ultimately serve humanity as a whole and that countries should have equitable access to technology, knowledge and computing resources. Kazakhstan was among the founding participants this year in a new international AI cooperation initiative launched in Shanghai.
Underlying both the interview and Tokayev's summit speech was a wider political argument.
The Kazakh president portrayed the SCO not simply as an economic or security grouping but as a potential model for cooperation between states with different political systems and interests.
In Bishkek, he said the organisation's principles of equality and consensus had become a “gold standard” for multilateral cooperation. He proposed that core SCO principles should ultimately be reflected in a UN General Assembly resolution linked to the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.
The formulation is consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing attempt to avoid being drawn exclusively into competing geopolitical camps.
Tokayev reiterated that Kazakhstan would maintain what he described as a balanced, constructive and peaceful foreign policy, while arguing that the international order should move away from the “cult of force and confrontation” towards collective responsibility and long-term cooperation.
In his interview with Xinhua, he similarly said Kazakhstan and China shared support for the central role of the United Nations, international law, mediation, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
One of the more significant elements of Tokayev's Bishkek intervention was his argument that responsible middle powers should have greater influence within global governance.
With tensions between major powers putting pressure on existing international institutions, Tokayev suggested countries such as Kazakhstan could facilitate dialogue between competing centres of power and help develop collective solutions.
“Kazakhstan is ready to actively contribute to this process,” he told the summit.
At the same time, he resisted suggestions that shortcomings within the United Nations justified weakening the organisation.
Despite criticism of the UN, Tokayev said there was no viable alternative to it. Kazakhstan's position, he argued, was that the UN should remain at the centre of the international system and that its Charter should continue to provide the universal foundation of international law.
The President called for closer interaction between the UN and regional organisations such as the SCO, stronger preventive diplomacy and greater emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes.
Tokayev also used the summit to promote another issue of growing importance to Central Asia: water.
Climate pressures, population growth and competing demands on shared water resources make the issue increasingly important to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states.
Tokayev proposed creating an International Water Organisation under UN auspices, arguing that although numerous UN bodies deal with water, no universal intergovernmental organisation currently has a comprehensive mandate.
He also proposed an SCO Water Problems Analysis Centre as a regional complement to such a global organisation.
The proposal fits into Kazakhstan's broader effort to move environmental and resource-security questions higher up the international agenda.
Perhaps the strongest thread connecting Tokayev's interview with his SCO appearance is Kazakhstan's determination to turn geography into diplomatic and economic influence.
Astana is simultaneously strengthening its relationship with Beijing, maintaining important relationships with Russia and other neighbours, developing transport corridors towards Europe, expanding cooperation with Western partners and presenting itself as an advocate of multilateral diplomacy.
Tokayev's description of relations with China therefore carries a wider meaning.
He quoted a Kazakh proverb in the Xinhua interview: “Those travelling the same road share a common destiny.”
Yet the message emerging from Bishkek suggests Kazakhstan sees that road not as one running exclusively eastwards towards China, but as part of a much larger network connecting East and West.
As competition between the world's major powers becomes more pronounced, Kazakhstan is attempting to position itself at the centre of those connections — geographically through trade and transport corridors, technologically through digital cooperation, and diplomatically through its advocacy of multilateralism.
For Europe, that makes developments in Kazakhstan-China relations increasingly relevant. The more successfully Kazakhstan develops the Middle Corridor and other east-west transport links, the more the country becomes not simply a Central Asian partner but a strategic gateway connecting European and Asian economies.
And that, ultimately, appears to be the common theme running through Tokayev's words both to Xinhua and to the leaders assembled at the SCO summit: Kazakhstan believes its future influence will come not from choosing between competing blocs, but from connecting them.
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