• In a new interview, White House press secretary Katie Zacharia didn't deny failing the bar exam.
• She also defended calling herself a lawyer.
• "The results are somewhat inconsequential because I knew I wouldn't need the bar in China," she said of the bar exam.

President Donald Trump's new White House press secretary Katie Zacharia is defending her self-description as a lawyer, while acknowledging that she took the bar exam and considered the results "inconsequential."

Zacharia's legal qualifications have faced growing scrutiny since her debut White House media briefing earlier this week, when shortly afterward she was asked which state she passed the bar exam in and replied: "When I moved to China."

In an interview Thursday with right-wing provocateur Jack Posobiec on Real America's Voice, she did not deny reports that she'd failed to pass the bar.

Zacharia, who moved to China after earning her law degree in 2011, told Posobiec she had already preregistered for the bar exam before moving to Beijing, where her husband was working at an American private equity firm.

"I didn't want to withdraw from that," Zacharia said of the bar exam. "And we knew we would be moving out to China, and I was obviously incredibly distracted and overwhelmed and excited for finally being married to someone who I had been long-distance from for at least a year."

Zacharia said she thought she'd take the bar and "see what happens."

"The results are somewhat inconsequential because I knew I wouldn't need the bar in China, and we left shortly thereafter," said Zacharia.

The Wall Street Journal reported late Wednesday that Zacharia failed California's bar exam after graduating from Pepperdine University in 2011.

A Business Insider review of records for all 50 states and the District of Columbia found no evidence that Zacharia had been admitted to practice law in the US.

In China, Zacharia said she took a job in the international practice division of the Zhong Lun law firm, where she said she worked on multimillion-dollar shareholder agreements and cross-border transactions. She said she was one of four associates under a senior partner.

"After moving to China, I didn't really think much of the bar results or consider that something that I needed to focus on," Zacharia told Posobiec, adding, "There's no Chinese bar. I had enough credentials, which was my law degree, to be able to do this practice."

"I had all the necessary requirements to do that, and I was able to do it effectively and well," she said.

She also said that she never retook the bar exam after returning to the US and having the first of four children with her husband within six years.

Zacharia said she consulted with people within the legal field "for a very long time" and was told it would be acceptable to call herself a lawyer "and provide legal analysis, not legal advice."

"They said absolutely, absolutely across the board — you can call yourself a lawyer, you have a JD, and to buffer that, you have international legal experience in transactional law," Zacharia said.

"It's unfortunate that people dub this as some kind of conspiracy," she said. "The truth is, I was very careful how I executed this, and I never came across as someone who was an attorney at law."

Zacharia's LinkedIn page says she served as general counsel for Fix California, a political advocacy group, between January 2024 and March 2025. In California, it is a misdemeanor to practice law or to advertise yourself as an attorney without a license.

At least two watchdog groups have filed a complaint about Zacharia with the State Bar of California this week.

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• Two watchdog groups asked the California state bar to investigate White House spox Katie Zacharia.
• She worked as a general counsel in California. The state bar has no record she was licensed there.
• Zacharia said she consulted with people in the field to see if she could label herself a lawyer.

A growing chorus is voicing concern about White House press secretary Katie Zacharia's self-described legal career.

Two watchdog groups Wednesday filed complaints with the State Bar of California, asking it to investigate whether she violated California law by calling herself a lawyer.

It is a misdemeanor in California to practice law or advertise yourself as an attorney if you don't have a license to do so.

Several law and legal-ethics professors told Business Insider that if Zacharia misrepresented herself as an attorney, or used a title like general counsel without having been admitted to the bar, that could land her in trouble with state bar officials should she try to join in the future.

Substack publication Popular Information this week reported that Zacharia hadn't been admitted to any state bar, and The Wall Street Journal reported that she failed California's bar exam after graduating from law school in 2011. After her graduation, she moved to China, where she worked for a law firm as an associate on an international practice team.

Zacharia Thursday defended calling herself a lawyer.

In an interview Thursday with right-wing activist Jack Posobiec, Zacharia said she considered her bar exam results "inconsequential" because of her impending move to China.

"After moving to China, I didn't really think much of the bar results or consider that something that I needed to focus on," she said.

She told Posobiec that she "consulted for a very long time with many people in the field" to see if she could label herself a lawyer and offer legal analysis, not "legal advice." She also said she wouldn't weigh in on legal matters as press secretary.

President Trump's new press secretary has repeatedly referred to herself as a lawyer. Her LinkedIn page says she worked as a general counsel in California, and on Tuesday, in a statement to Business Insider, she said she had "practiced international transaction law, with all the appropriate credentials."

Zacharia used her legal pedigree to give herself credibility in her White House role, the Campaign for Accountability said Wednesday in its complaint to the California bar.

"The public is entitled to rely on the representation that a person who calls herself a lawyer is in fact licensed to practice law," the group wrote.

White House Communications Director Steven Cheung said Thursday that Zacharia "is uniquely qualified and whip smart to help inform the American people about all the great things President Trump and his Administration have been doing, and she will do an incredible job as Press Secretary."

In an X post Wednesday, Cheung referred to the Campaign for Accountability as a "radical leftist-organization run by rabid numbskulls suffering from a severe case of Trump Derangement Syndrome."

"Nobody takes them seriously because they are deranged low lifes," his post said.

Watchdog group Democracy Defenders Fund also filed a complaint with the bar.

'Character and fitness'

There is no record that Zacharia has ever been licensed to practice law in her home state of California, a spokesperson for the state bar told Business Insider.

Zacharia earned her law degree at California's Pepperdine University in 2011, then moved to China, according to her LinkedIn page.

She later served as general counsel for Fix California, a political advocacy group, between January 2024 and March 2025, her LinkedIn page says. Richard Grenell, the founder of Fix California and a state department official in the Trump administration, didn't respond to requests for comment about Zacharia's work for the organization.

That résume entry could hurt her chances of admission to the bar in future, legal-ethics professors told Business Insider.

The bar admissions process in most states includes a step in which the bar evaluates prospective members' "character and fitness," according to Richard Zitrin, a legal-ethics professor at the University of San Francisco's law school.

Claiming to be a general counsel in California would cut against her if she didn't have a license to practice law at the time, Zitrin said.

Business Insider reviewed records for all 50 states and the District of Columbia and found no evidence that Zacharia had been admitted to any state bar in the US.

A law firm in China

Zacharia moved to China with her husband because of his job at an American private equity firm, the White House said.

In China, only Chinese nationals can become a member of the country's bar and practice law, experts in the Chinese legal system told Business Insider.

According to her LinkedIn page, Zacharia worked for Zhong Lun, a large law firm in Beijing, between 2011 and 2013. Asked by a reporter on Tuesday which state she passed the bar exam in, Zacharia responded, "When I moved to China."

Unlike the United States, where the bar admission process varies by state, China has a single unified bar exam process. It is available only to Chinese nationals and generally requires a degree from a Chinese university, according to Jacques deLisle, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania law school who studies the Chinese legal system.

"The odds that she is a member of the Chinese bar are essentially zero," he said. "Both because of the citizenship requirement and the education requirement."

It's possible for employees of international law firms to do some work on transactions without passing a bar exam, but the scope of the work they're permitted to do is limited, according to Taisu Zhang, a professor of Chinese law at Yale Law School. Those firms generally require employees to pass a bar exam within a few years, he said.

Law firms like Zhong Lun often hire recent foreign law school graduates to review contracts and advise on elements of US law for transactions, but they need to "stay within the edges" of their work so that they don't cross into practicing law, which is illegal in China, deLisle said.

"She was never a lawyer in China. It doesn't mean she didn't do law-related work, but she was never a lawyer in China," deLisle said.

Representatives for Zhong Lun didn't respond to Business Insider's requests for comment.

A federal judge referred Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner and one of his deputies to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution for alleged misconduct. In response, Krasner's office filed a motion seeking to force the Judge--Paul Diamond--from a case involving his office.

Yesterday, Judge Diamond rejected the Philly DA's motion with a terse and forcefully worded order.

Here, from the order, is some background:

In the last two years, the Third Circuit, this Court, and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court have condemned as dishonest repeated post-trial concessions of relief made by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. . . . The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was so concerned that it took the remarkable step of ordering all Philadelphia Common Pleas Judges to seek the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General's intervention whenever the DAO made a post-trial concession, so that the Attorney General could confirm the concession's honesty. . . .

The DAO's present post-trial concession is also remarkable: Here, four DAO supervisors credibly testified that the District Attorney himself and his lieutenant, Assistant District Attorney Matthew Stiegler, urged them to make false representations to this Court to "protect the office." According to "the Four," the District Attorney threatened them with "consequences" if they did not. Because these and related accusations, if true, could amount to criminal misconduct, I disqualified the District Attorney and Stiegler from participating further in this case and referred the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation. In the DAO's newly-filed Motions and the District Attorney's unsworn "Declaration"—all of which generate more heat than light—the DAO seeks my recusal from all matters in which the Office appears and asks me to reconsider my rulings in this case. I decline to do either.

And on the merits of the recusal request, here is what Judge Diamond had to say:

During the three-day hearing before me, the DAO failed to object to virtually all the rulings and actions it now challenges. That the Office chose to object only after the Court issued a decision unfavorable to the District Attorney and his lieutenant confirms that the DAO merely disagrees with those rulings. . . .

The Office challenges my noting that the District Attorney neither testified nor offered an affidavit in response to the Four's testimony—on which I based my disqualification order and DOJ referral. I do not credit the District Attorney's absurd suggestion that he did not know he could testify—especially after I twice asked DAO counsel if he wished to call any witnesses. Nor has the District Attorney explained why he did not offer a responsive affidavit, which would have required the declarant to tell the truth (under penalty of false swearing). The Office thus cannot truthfully dispute that the District Attorney chose not to give his version of events in Court under oath. The DAO's apparent belief that this tactical choice was reasonable hardly warrants recusal.

Finally, the DAO believes that I should have been leerier of Mason's testimony—the various corroborative documents notwithstanding—and more responsive to the uncorroborated, dubious testimony of Stiegler. Again, disagreement with my credibility determination is not a basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 ("[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."); Wecht, 484 F.3d at 220–21 (recusal not warranted despite the court's "skewed and unfair reading of the record"). The other arguments the DAO raises do not warrant discussion. Accordingly, I will deny as frivolous the Motion for Recusal.

And on the question of reconsideration:

The DAO does not discuss or even mention the burden and criteria a party seeking reconsideration must meet. Rather, as it did in seeking my recusal, the Office urges me to revisit my rulings because it disagrees with them. Once again, that disagreement does not warrant reconsideration. . . .

I will not discuss here every protest the Office makes to virtually all my rulings, my credibility determinations, and (once again) my reference to the District Attorney's silence in the face of damning testimony from his own employees and former employee. In his belated, unsworn "Declaration" the District Attorney attacks three of these witnesses as unworthy of belief.  This after-the-fact attempt to cram "evidence" into a closed record seems intended to persuade the media, not the Court. In any event, the evidence is unpersuasive and does not warrant reconsideration. . . .

Accordingly, I will again deny the DAO's frivolous Motion.

Judge Diamond's order concludes:

Four of the District Attorney's supervisors offered powerful, unrebutted testimony that their boss and Stiegler urged them to misrepresent to this Court. When the Four told the District Attorney that he had thus created a conflict compelling them to inform the Court and withdraw from this case, he threatened them with "consequences." There are few attorney transgressions more serious than lying to the Court, urging others to do so, or threatening them should they tell the Court the truth. . . . If this in fact occurred, it is all the more serious because it occurred after four Courts condemned the DAO's conduct in circumstances like those presented here. Disqualifying the District Attorney and Stiegler and referring them for investigation is thus reasonable and warranted. That the District Attorney chose not to testify but sought to "make his case" with an unsworn declaration—the credibility of which I am unable to assess—makes that investigation even more necessary. Although Mr. Krasner may yet have the opportunity to testify under oath in another forum, his intemperate filings provide no basis for recusal or reconsideration of my rulings.

The post Judge Refuses to Recuse in Case Involving Alleged Misconduct by Philly DA's Office appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Thanks to a 2005 DUI conviction in Pennsylvania, Edward Williams permanently lost the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But he did not realize that until a decade later, and his confusion on that point is understandable.

The federal law that stripped Williams of his Second Amendment rights is commonly described as applying to "felons," and Williams' offense was a misdemeanor. But although his sentence did not include any time behind bars, his crime theoretically could have sent him to prison for up to five years. That was enough to trigger 18 USC 922(g)(1), which covers anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."

When a lawyer alerted Williams to that wrinkle, which made his continued ownership of firearms a federal felony, he got rid of his guns. But he did not think that requirement was fair, reasonable, or constitutional, and this week a federal appeals court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recognized a historical tradition of disarming "physically dangerous individuals" whose possession of firearms would pose a threat to public safety. But it said Williams plainly does not fit into that category.

"The federal government spent nearly a decade trying to permanently disarm a peaceable man over a nonviolent misdemeanor—and it lost bigly," says Brandon Combs, president of the Firearms Policy Coalition, which supported Williams' lawsuit. "The government does not get to turn a nonviolent conviction into a lifetime ban on exercising a constitutionally protected right."

The 3rd Circuit's en banc decision in Williams v. Attorney General affirms a 2023 ruling by a federal judge who likewise concluded that disarming Williams was unconstitutional. It elaborates on the logic of Range v. Attorney General, a 2023 decision that restored the gun rights of a Pennsylvania man who had been convicted of food stamp fraud. In both cases, the 3rd Circuit held that applying Section 922(g)(1) to the plaintiffs was not "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation"—the Second Amendment test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

Writing for the majority in Williams' case, 3rd Circuit Judge Paul Matey acknowledges that the Supreme Court has described "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" as "presumptively lawful." But "those longstanding customs restricted the violently dangerous (within which some felons would be included), not felons writ large," he says. "Felons were restricted because they posed a physical danger, rather than for their offense of conviction."

Matey argues that "focusing on physical dangerousness corrects the erroneous argument" that "only law-abiding and responsible citizens can exercise the rights protected by the Second Amendment"—a claim that the Supreme Court rejected in the 2024 case United States v. Rahimi. "We find no history that supports disarming irresponsible people, where 'responsible' is defined by the whim of the sovereign or the will of the majority," he says, alluding to the danger of allowing legislators to whittle away at the Second Amendment by criminalizing an ever-widening range of conduct.

Matey emphasizes "the novelty of forever restricting all felons from possessing firearms for lawful purposes." The original restriction, which Congress approved in 1938 as part of the Federal Firearms Act, applied only to violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. In 1961, Congress expanded the ban to cover nonviolent crimes punishable by more than a year in prison.

Williams' 2005 DUI conviction qualified for two reasons. He had a prior DUI conviction, stemming from a 2000 arrest in State College. And when he was arrested again in Philadelphia four years later, his blood alcohol concentration was a whopping 0.223 percent. That made his second offense a first-degree misdemeanor, which carries a maximum prison sentence of five years.

Since then, Williams has stayed out of trouble. "He has done nothing violent, let alone dangerous, for over twenty years, and has held steady employment at the same job for over three decades," Matey notes. Williams drinks only occasionally, and a psychological evaluation found he "has a normal personality, without psychopathology and without addiction or violent tendencies."

The Justice Department nevertheless argued that Williams' continuing disarmament is consistent with the Bruen test, which requires historical analogs that are "relevantly similar" in motivation and scope. In making that case, the government relied mainly on early laws aimed at "habitual drunkards"—the same analogy that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected last June in United States v. Hemani, which involved the federal ban on gun possession by "unlawful" drug users.

Although the Justice Department "acknowledges it may proscribe Williams's possession of firearms only if he 'presently poses a physical danger if armed,'" Matey says, it "offers no evidence to establish this as the aim of the habitual drunkard laws." Those laws, the Supreme Court noted in Hemani, "did not seek to protect the public from violence so much as to protect habitual drunkards from themselves and their families from financial devastation."

Nor did the habitual drunkard laws permanently disarm people, as Section 922(g)(1) does. "Most statutes capped the commitment of habitual drunkards to the state inebriate asylum, prison, or hard labor to a few months or years," Matey notes. "Others provided for an indefinite period of incarceration, but had no indication that upon release individuals continued to forfeit their arms. Rather, once someone was 'safe' to 'go at large,' they were restored to the status of a full rights-bearing citizen."

Contrary to the considerations that the Supreme Court deemed relevant in Hemani, Matey says, the Justice Department "fails to show that Williams threatens to 'misuse[] a gun while intoxicated,' or that he 'poses a danger to himself or others as a result' of
alcohol abuse. In fact, much like those nineteenth-century drunkards released from custody and restored their rights, the record shows that Williams poses no present physical danger from the use of a firearm, or anything else."

The 3rd Circuit is one of three federal appeals courts that have allowed people with nonviolent felony records to argue that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. But such challenges have been blocked in six circuits, notwithstanding compelling historical evidence that the law reaches much farther than the Second Amendment allows. So far, the Supreme Court has declined to accept any of the many petitions asking it to resolve that circuit split.

The post The 3rd Circuit Upholds the Gun Rights of a Man Who Committed a Nonviolent Misdemeanor 2 Decades Ago appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The fifth Federal University March is taking place this Thursday, October 15, across Argentina. Participants are mobilizing toward the National Congress to demand compliance with the University Financing Law (No. 27.795), the restoration of salaries for both academic and non-academic staff, and the definitive rejection of the Javier Milei administration’s Emergency Decree (DNU) 70/23.

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Under the slogan Without funding, there is no science or education, the university community is calling for the immediate implementation of regulations that mandate the adjustment of operating funds, salaries, and scholarships in line with inflation. The protest was organized by the National Interuniversity Council (CIN), the Argentine University Federation (FUA), and the National Universities Trade Union Front.

Organizers report that academic and non-academic staff have seen their purchasing power decline by more than 32 percent so far this year. This action follows a judicial ruling that upheld injunctions and imposed financial penalties on the national government for failing to adjust funds and wages as required by law.

In the City of Buenos Aires, the main contingent—led by the University of Buenos Aires (UBA)—will gather at 1:00 p.m. at Plaza Houssay (at the intersection of Córdoba and Junín streets). Labor unions and social movements will begin assembling at 1:30 p.m. in the vicinity of the National Congress.

At 2:00 p.m., the march will proceed along Avenida Córdoba to Callao, then continue via Corrientes and Cerrito toward the parliamentary district. At 4:00 p.m., a joint statement from rectors, students, and labor unions will be read at Plaza del Congreso.

[AHORA] Estudiantes tomaron la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales en la previa de la Quinta Marcha Federal Universitaria.

Sumate a 'Diario de la noche' con @analiaargento, @eduardoprensa_ y @cotyvile 👉https://t.co/A3pv6QUv5q pic.twitter.com/H07gWnXj2U

— Argentina|12 (@argentina12ok) October 15, 2026

The text reads, “[NOW] Students took over the Faculty of Social Sciences ahead of the Fifth Federal University March.”

The protest coincides with a debate in the Chamber of Deputies regarding Emergency Decree (DNU) 70/23—a measure that has already been rejected by the Senate. The organizing groups aim to exert pressure to ensure the Lower House rejects the measure definitively.

The decree—viewed by the organizers as a cornerstone of the government’s ultraliberal agenda—impacts numerous sectors beyond education. Although the Supreme Court reversed its position, leaving the Land Law in effect following legal back-and-forth regarding its Article 154, universities have maintained their call to action due to the broad scope of the regulation.

Consequently, the day’s events bring together social, labor, political, and student organizations. The initiative also has the backing of the CGT, both branches of the CTA, ATE, and various scientific organizations—representing a coalition of workers and students united in defense of public education.

The protest movement spans the entire country. In Córdoba, the National University has suspended classes and is holding a march through the city center. In Santa Fe and Rosario, demonstrations are planned in response to disruptions in institutional operations, scholarship programs, and research activities. Higher education institutions across all provinces are staging strikes and protests.

This mobilization follows a series of strikes, open-air classes, and awareness-raising events. The organizers maintain that the implementation of Law 27.795 is essential to guarantee the continued operation of universities, sustain scientific research, and restore wages within the education sector.

🇦🇷 Argentine students have occupied the Education Secretariat to demand increased funding for public universities amid growing concerns about the future of higher education.

The student mobilization underscores the struggle to defend public education and secure the resources… pic.twitter.com/VGBlC1pZK0

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 9, 2026

Ronen Bar's defamation suit reveals the gravity of the prime minister's toxic rift with his security chiefs. Three years after Oct. 7, Netanyahu is still hunting for conspiracies

At least 320 people detained for ‘acts against nature’ after law criminalising homosexuality toughened, HRW reports

Mass arrests, forced HIV testing and barriers to legal representation are part of an escalating crackdown against LGBTQ+ people in Senegal, according to a new report.

More than 320 individuals have been arrested and detained on allegations of “acts against nature” since February, according to HIV Justice Network, an organisation quoted in the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report. Among these, at least 84 were charged with “voluntary HIV transmission”, solely on the basis of their HIV status.

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© Photograph: Jane Hahn/AP

© Photograph: Jane Hahn/AP

© Photograph: Jane Hahn/AP

by Gary D. Barnett, Lew Rockwell: “The more power a government has the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the more power is diffused, […]

Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies just clawed back millions for the state budget. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the State Property Fund have returned about $5.1 million to the state budget, the bureau says.

NABU and SAPO were created in 2015 after the Euromaidan revolution as independent bodies to fight high-level corruption, and their independence is a core condition for Ukraine's path to the EU. This recovery is the kind of concrete payoff that EU-backed reform was meant to produce.

Investigating one case, detectives and prosecutors found that the leadership of a regional branch of the State Property Fund had failed to act. Because of that inaction, the state risked losing millions of dollars.

To head off the loss, NABU and SAPO alerted the fund’s central leadership and gave it access to part of the investigation materials.

How the agencies turned a case into cash

The fix came from sharing what the investigation had uncovered. After working through the data, the State Property Fund took the necessary steps and secured the full budget amount, the bureau says.

NABU and SAPO continue to cooperate with other state bodies to protect the country’s economic interests and prevent corruption crimes, the bureau adds. The agencies framed the case as proof that enforcement, beyond investigation alone, can return money the state would otherwise lose.

Why these agencies matter beyond one case

The recovery lands at a fraught moment for the two institutions. Their independence has been under sustained pressure, and in July 2026 parliament briefly stripped it before mass protests and EU warnings forced a reversal.

In 2025, Brussels tied as much as 50 billion euros in aid and the pace of accession talks to the agencies’ autonomy, treating NABU and SAPO as pillars of the rule-of-law reforms Ukraine promised on its way into the bloc.

Housing Law 187, published this Wednesday in the Ordinary Official Gazette No. 86, expands property rights in Cuba and diversifies mechanisms for building, financing, and accessing housing, with measures aimed at protecting vulnerable individuals.

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The new regulation is part of the economic and social transformations approved in the country and will enter into force seven days after its publication. Its release coincides with the 66th anniversary of the Urban Reform Law—a pioneering measure in the sector—which aimed to transfer home ownership to the families living in them, prohibit evictions, and guarantee a home for every citizen.

At a press conference, Marvelis Velázquez Reyes, Director of Legal Housing Affairs at the Ministry of Construction, explained that individuals may own up to two homes. This provision extends to foreigners, who will have the same rights and responsibilities in this regard as Cuban citizens.

The official detailed that property owners may grant the use of their home free of charge via a loan agreement, transfer rooms or part of the built structure to an adjoining property owner, and transfer their residence to individuals or legal entities through donation, among other flexible options.

Administrative authorization is also no longer required to transfer—whether for a fee or free of charge—partial or total ownership of rooftop space for the purpose of expanding or constructing living areas, nor for the transfer of privately owned vacant lots.

📑🏘️🇨🇺| Nueva Ley de la Vivienda: más derechos y nuevas formas de gestión. 📌 Con esta normativa #Cuba cuenta con un marco jurídico integral que busca hacer efectivo el derecho a una vivienda adecuada.

Infórmese más aquí: https://t.co/lFERyUQyEw pic.twitter.com/jbedphlErt

— Adrián Fonseca Quesada (@AFCanalCaribe) October 14, 2026

The text reads, “New Housing Law: more rights and new management models. With this legislation, #Cuba has a comprehensive legal framework that seeks to make the right to adequate housing a reality.”

Key aspects of Law 187 include the elimination of housing confiscation due to emigration and the guarantee of inheritance rights. Furthermore, in purchase-and-sale agreements, the parties may agree on as many terms, clauses, and conditions as they wish, provided they do not violate legal provisions, social order, or the nature of the contract itself.

The regulations establish that the Municipal Administration Council may finance the cost—or a portion thereof—of housing built and allocated to vulnerable individuals unable to afford it. In this way, the law reinforces the protective approach toward sectors facing the greatest difficulty in accessing adequate housing.

Law 187 introduces real estate agencies and housing cooperatives as new, fully guaranteed management models. These modalities aim to diversify participation in the production, maintenance, and management of the housing stock, in line with the country’s economic transformations.

The regulation also reaffirms the State’s responsibility for developing construction programs designed to address the housing shortage. According to authorities, the law governs the production, quality, financing, distribution, access, use, maintenance, and transfer of housing.

The publication of Housing Law 187 is accompanied by General Regulations, as well as specific rules regarding horizontal property ownership and housing cooperatives.

🇨🇺 Cuba’s economy continues to navigate challenges while pursuing growth and development.

Despite external pressures and economic difficulties, the island is strengthening key sectors and pursuing new opportunities to boost production, investment, and social development.

📈… pic.twitter.com/n5bsOkG53V

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 8, 2026

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

The European Commission is assessing changes to Google’s search engine and app-store practices after imposing two substantial fines in July. Regulators must now decide whether the company’s response satisfies EU competition requirements or leaves it exposed to further enforcement.

The European Commission is continuing discussions with Google over the company’s response to €890 million in penalties imposed under the Digital Markets Act, as Brussels examines whether changes to its search engine and app-store practices are sufficient to address infringements of European competition rules.

Commission spokesman Thomas Regnier confirmed on Wednesday, 14 October, that officials remained in dialogue with the American technology company. The Commission is assessing the measures Google has introduced, taking account of feedback from businesses affected by its services before reaching a conclusion on compliance.

The review follows two decisions adopted on 23 July, when the European Commission found Google in breach of the Digital Markets Act. A €460 million fine concerned preferential treatment for Google’s own services in search results, while a separate €430 million penalty addressed restrictions preventing app developers from freely directing customers towards alternative purchasing channels.

Search rankings remain under examination

The first infringement concerns Google’s treatment of competing online services offering hotel reservations, shopping comparisons, transport information and sports results.

Regulators concluded that Google had placed its own services in more prominent positions, sometimes providing them with enhanced visual features and search functions unavailable to competing businesses.

The Digital Markets Act prohibits designated gatekeepers from giving their own products preferential treatment when ranking services that compete with those offered by other companies.

Google has already modified its European search results in response to the Commission’s decision. The changes include revised presentations of commercial information and greater prominence for independent comparison services.

As EU Today reported following the introduction of the revised search format, Google has argued that the measures could make searches less convenient and increase dependence on intermediary websites.

The company maintains that direct information previously available through its search engine may become harder for consumers to obtain.

For competitors, however, the question is whether Google’s adjustments provide genuine commercial opportunities or merely alter the appearance of search results without changing the underlying distribution of traffic.

Google Play fees face scrutiny

The second case concerns the Google Play application marketplace, where developers have historically depended on Google’s infrastructure to distribute software and sell subscriptions.

Under the DMA, developers must be able to inform customers about alternative offers and direct them towards purchasing arrangements outside the platform, including their own websites.

The Commission found that Google’s restrictions and fees had limited that freedom.

Although the company may charge for certain services associated with acquiring customers, the Commission concluded that the level and duration of its steering-related charges exceeded what the legislation permits.

Google has since adjusted its external-offers arrangements. European officials are examining whether those changes provide developers with a commercially workable alternative to transactions processed through Google Play.

The issue has consequences for subscription services, digital publishers and software companies seeking to maintain direct relationships with their customers.

A formal ability to direct consumers elsewhere is of limited benefit if the financial conditions make such transactions uneconomic.

Enforcement enters a more demanding phase

The Digital Markets Act was designed to address market practices that conventional competition investigations often took years to resolve.

Rather than requiring regulators to establish a new infringement through lengthy proceedings in every instance, the legislation imposes specific obligations on companies designated as gatekeepers.

The Commission’s DMA enforcement framework allows regulators to examine whether those obligations are being followed and to impose financial penalties when they are breached.

Google’s July fines represented an important enforcement decision. The current review concerns the company’s subsequent conduct and the practical effects of its compliance measures.

The continuation of discussions does not itself establish a fresh infringement. Further penalties would require an additional regulatory determination.

Google also faces broader obligations concerning the sharing of search data with competing providers, an issue addressed in a separate Commission decision issued in July.

These obligations concern access to anonymised information about searches, rankings and user interactions that competing search engines may need to improve their own services.

Taken together, the measures represent a substantial intervention in how Google’s European business operates.

Transatlantic tensions complicate the dispute

The proceedings have acquired a political dimension because most of the largest companies affected by the DMA are American.

President Donald Trump has criticised European penalties against US technology companies and threatened trade measures in response to what his administration regards as discriminatory regulation.

Brussels maintains that the legislation applies according to market position and commercial conduct, regardless of nationality.

European regulators must nevertheless enforce their decisions in an environment where competition policy has become entangled with wider trade relations between the United States and the European Union.

Google’s financial exposure extends beyond the €890 million imposed in July. Continued non-compliance could lead to further regulatory proceedings, while changes to the company’s services may also affect advertising revenue and its relationships with commercial partners.

The immediate assessment will concentrate on whether competing search services receive fair treatment and whether application developers can direct customers towards alternative transactions without unjustified restrictions.

The Commission has not announced a date for its final assessment. Its decision will help establish how far Europe’s digital competition legislation can change the conduct of companies whose platforms occupy central positions in online commerce.

The EU is shying away from triggering rules that would shield people and companies working at or with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague from US sanctions, preferring instead months-long diplomatic outreach.

The European Commission on Wednesday (14 October) told reporters in Brussels that it was doing everything to seek “practical solutions”, while hoping that its diplomacy will help the court, which prosecutes people for war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.

“We haven’t made any decisions yet. But we continue to discuss at every level,” said a commission spokesperson, when pressed on whether a little-known blocking statue, which would presumably damper the impact of the US sanctions, remains an option.

And an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday is expected to ask the US to reverse the decision, according to draft conclusions seen by EUobserver.

The EU’s little-known “blocking statute” would prevent EU companies and banks from complying with the sanctions. It was first used against US sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya.

The Trump administration had, last Friday, announced financial sanctions on the ICC as part of a larger assault to dismantle the court, after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, its former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif.

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Defense Minister Israel Katz has bragged that Israel was destroying “not one house at a time,” but “the entirety of those villages.”

Trump has attacked Iran twice, both times amid nuclear negotiations and alongside Israel. The war has made it more likely that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, and has undermined the cause of nuclear nonproliferation across the Middle East and beyond.

The Supreme Court’s decision to force Palestinian politician Sami Abu Shehadeh out of the upcoming Israeli elections is the latest sign that there is no place for Palestinian citizens of Israel in the ‘Jewish and democratic’ state.

After the Greens passed a motion declaring ‘Zionism is racism’, every establishment journalist is suddenly playing dumb about the most elementary of issues in international law

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“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.

Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah. 

Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.

Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead. 

Not an isolated attack

What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar. 

In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.

Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.

Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.

Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.

Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us. 

In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.

Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell. 

These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.

What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.

Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?

Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us. 

Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.

In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.

And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”

EU urged to act

I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible. 

Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.

If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence? 

This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.

For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.

I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.

The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.

I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible. 

For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it.