Twelve migrants, including an infant, have died in two separate incidents involving boats travelling from Turkey towards the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, prompting investigations into the circumstances of the deaths and the activities of suspected people smugglers.

The incidents occurred on Monday, 19 October, in the northeastern Aegean Sea. Six people died when a speedboat collided with a Greek coastguard vessel near Lesbos, while another six were killed after a separate boat overturned north of Samos.

The deaths coincided with the publication of new figures from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, showing that irregular crossings into the EU fell by almost one-third during the first nine months of 2026.

According to the latest border monitoring figures, approximately 91,000 irregular crossings were detected between January and September, although the eastern Mediterranean remained the busiest migration route into the Union.

Two incidents under investigation

According to information released by the Greek authorities, the first fatal incident occurred near Agrilia on Lesbos when a speedboat carrying migrants struck a coastguard patrol vessel before overturning.

Six people died, while eight survivors were taken to hospital. The authorities subsequently arrested a 37-year-old Turkish national, identifying him as the suspected operator of the migrant boat.

Greece’s Maritime Affairs Minister Vassilis Kikilias said the available evidence indicated that the speedboat had struck the left side of the coastguard vessel. The precise circumstances remain under investigation.

In the second incident, approximately four nautical miles north of Samos, a boat reportedly overturned after making a sudden manoeuvre while being pursued by the coastguard.

Five men and one woman died, while 14 people were rescued. An Iranian national was arrested on suspicion of involvement in migrant smuggling.

The arrests do not establish criminal responsibility, and the circumstances surrounding both incidents remain subject to investigation.

Greek authorities have attributed the dangers of the crossings to trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the Aegean islands. The government has reiterated its policy of pursuing smugglers and restricting unauthorised maritime arrivals.

Fewer crossings, continued fatalities

Frontex recorded approximately 31,800 detections along the eastern Mediterranean route during the first nine months of this year, representing a decline of around 15 per cent compared with the equivalent period in 2025.

Across the European Union’s external borders, the agency reported an even larger reduction, with overall detections down by almost one-third.

The Central Mediterranean route experienced a particularly substantial fall, while the Western Mediterranean recorded an increase, reflecting changes in departure points and migration patterns.

These figures count detected border crossings rather than individual migrants and do not necessarily capture every unauthorised arrival.

The latest data also have to be considered alongside exceptional developments elsewhere on Europe’s borders. In July, large-scale movements through Spain’s Ceuta enclave created additional pressures on Spanish authorities and raised questions about the application of the EU’s new asylum arrangements.

The eastern Mediterranean figures encompass several routes, including crossings from Libya towards Crete, movements through the Aegean islands and arrivals across the land border with Turkey.

Consequently, the total recorded for the wider region should not be interpreted solely as the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.

Greece remains central to European border policy

Greece has occupied a central position in EU migration policy since the 2015–2016 crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people arrived from Turkey, many travelling onwards through the Balkans.

The subsequent EU–Turkey migration arrangements were intended to reduce unauthorised crossings and establish procedures for returning certain migrants who did not qualify for protection.

Athens has also faced persistent criticism from human rights organisations concerning allegations of unlawful returns at sea and land borders. Greek authorities deny operating an unlawful pushback policy and maintain that their border operations respect domestic and international law.

The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in 2026, has introduced common procedures for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims and managing people who do not have permission to remain.

Its implementation has placed greater emphasis on border identification, biometric registration and cooperation between national authorities and Frontex.

However, the two disasters demonstrate the continued risks associated with maritime crossings, even during a period of declining arrivals.

Investigators must now establish precisely how both boats overturned, whether criminal offences were committed and what occurred during the encounters with coastguard vessels.

The findings will be relevant not only to the prosecutions of those arrested, but also to continuing scrutiny of maritime enforcement along one of the European Union’s principal external borders.

The two Ukrainian border guards had entered Moldova in a motorboat on Oct. 15 while attempting to detain a Ukrainian man crossing the Dniester River near Holosnita, along the Vinnytsia Oblast border.

Spain’s government has declared that the first phase of its emergency response to the Ceuta migration crisis has been completed, following the arrival of an estimated 80,000 migrants from Morocco at the end of July.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said on Friday, 16 October, that approximately 12,000 people had returned voluntarily to Morocco since August, while the authorities had expanded facilities to process asylum applications and return decisions.

Nevertheless, substantial administrative and humanitarian challenges remain in the Spanish enclave, particularly concerning people awaiting decisions on their legal status and unaccompanied minors. The situation has become an important test of the European Union’s revised migration and asylum legislation.

Unprecedented crossings at the African border

The crisis began on 30 July, when tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea following the circulation of misleading information on social media about access to Spanish territory.

According to an October briefing by the European Parliament’s Research Service, approximately 80,000 people crossed into the enclave during the incident, overwhelming local reception facilities and creating an emergency at one of the EU’s few land borders with Africa.

A subsequent European Parliament resolution referred to at least 141 deaths associated with the crossings, although the initial figure reported by Spanish authorities was lower. The exact number of people who crossed and the final death toll have remained subjects of uncertainty.

Most entrants returned to Morocco within days. However, thousands remained, leaving Spain responsible for assessing individual claims, arranging lawful returns and providing appropriate accommodation.

Ceuta’s geographical position complicates these procedures. Although the enclave is Spanish and forms part of the EU, travellers departing for mainland Spain remain subject to specific controls at its ports and airports.

Spain expands its processing capacity

During a visit to Ceuta on 16 October, Grande-Marlaska defended the government’s management of the emergency and announced that additional police resources would substantially increase administrative capacity.

The expanded temporary reception and processing facilities at El Tarajal are intended to handle at least 100 files daily, including applications for international protection and return procedures.

According to figures presented by the Interior Minister, approximately 1,200 applications for international protection had been formally submitted, with around 700 decisions already issued.

He also rejected allegations that the authorities had conducted concealed or involuntary returns, insisting that departures to Morocco had followed voluntary decisions or the appropriate legal procedures.

The minister said more than 500 expulsions had been executed through judicial or administrative decisions in recent months. These are distinct from the approximately 12,000 voluntary returns recorded since August.

The treatment of unaccompanied minors remains contentious. The European Parliament’s research briefing estimated that around 1,100 such minors were in Ceuta, including some who arrived before the July emergency.

Responsibility for their care has generated disagreement between the Spanish central government and Ceuta’s autonomous administration, particularly over guardianship, identification and the distribution of minors to other regions.

New EU asylum system faces a practical test

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began applying in June 2026, was designed to strengthen external border procedures while establishing clearer responsibilities for Member States.

Its provisions include identity and security screening, accelerated procedures for certain asylum applications and a solidarity mechanism allowing countries to support those facing disproportionate migration pressures.

Under the screening rules, the authorities generally have up to seven days to complete the initial checks required for people apprehended after irregular entry.

However, the Ceuta emergency demonstrates the difficulty of applying individual administrative procedures when arrivals occur in exceptionally large numbers within a short period.

The geographical concentration of arrivals means that adequate staffing, interpretation, legal assistance and reception facilities become essential to ensuring the system operates within its prescribed deadlines.

Spain requested assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum in August. The Commission subsequently announced €114.7 million in emergency assistance in September.

Political dispute over migration policy

The crisis has widened divisions between European governments over border enforcement and the regularisation of migrants already living within the EU.

Italy and several other Member States have questioned whether Spain’s separate regularisation programme could encourage further irregular migration. Madrid rejects the suggestion that the programme caused the Ceuta crossings.

The Spanish scheme covers only people who met the residence requirements by the end of 2025. Those who arrived during the July 2026 crisis are not eligible.

European Parliament members also adopted a resolution in September calling for stronger protection of the EU’s external borders and greater cooperation with Morocco. The resolution characterised the crisis as involving the possible instrumentalisation of migration, although Spain has said it has no evidence establishing Moroccan government involvement.

The continuing administrative backlog, the position of minors and the effectiveness of EU assistance will determine how quickly Ceuta can return to ordinary border operations.

Beyond Spain, the episode raises a practical question for Brussels: whether Europe’s new asylum framework can maintain border controls and individual legal safeguards simultaneously during an exceptionally large and sudden influx.

Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.

His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.

According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.

The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A divided European visa policy

The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.

The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.

National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.

In November 2025, the Commission introduced additional restrictions on multiple-entry visas, requiring Russian travellers covered by the new rules to apply again for subsequent visits.

The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.

Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.

Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.

Security concerns on the eastern border

Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.

European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.

Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.

These concerns were also evident in EU Today’s reporting on suspected security breaches in Europe, although the circumstances of individual incidents must be investigated rather than assumed to involve foreign intelligence services.

The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.

Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.

Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.

Political and legal complications

A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.

European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.

The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.

Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.

France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.

Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions and Schengen controls

The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.

EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.

Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.

Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.

The attackers attempted to set fire to satellite antennas and a control unit, Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius said.

Ukraine's State Border Guard Service spokesperson Andrii Demchenko has separately reported that equipment based in Belarus helps relay or amplify signals for Russian Shahed and Geran drones heading toward western Ukraine and Poland's border region.

The European Commission is preparing proposals to impose tighter visa restrictions on Russian citizens entering the Schengen area, with new measures expected to be presented in January 2027 following pressure from several member states concerned about Russia’s expanding hybrid operations across Europe.

Poland, Sweden and Estonia are among the countries demanding a tougher approach to Russian visitors, particularly former military personnel who fought in Ukraine. The proposals could affect hundreds of thousands of Russian nationals who continue to receive visas for travel to the European Union despite restrictions introduced following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to a report published on Sunday, EU officials are finalising plans to address vulnerabilities in the Schengen visa system, which governments increasingly regard as a potential entry point for individuals involved in intelligence operations, organised crime and acts of sabotage.

Swedish Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer said the Commission was working towards a January announcement, although Stockholm would prefer an earlier decision. He told Politico that vulnerabilities in the existing arrangements could be exploited by hostile actors.

The initiative is expected to feature in discussions surrounding the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 12 October, when ministers will examine Russia’s intensifying hybrid campaign against EU member states.

Schengen visas remain a security concern

Despite the deterioration in relations between Brussels and Moscow, Russian citizens continue to receive substantial numbers of Schengen visas. Approximately 478,000 tourist visas were reportedly issued to Russian nationals in 2025, including a significant proportion allowing multiple entries.

The figures have renewed questions about whether existing screening arrangements adequately reflect the security environment created by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In September 2022, the EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia, ending preferential treatment and introducing stricter application procedures, additional documentation requirements and more restrictive conditions for multiple-entry visas.

However, the decision did not amount to a general prohibition on Russian tourism. National authorities retained considerable discretion over applications, producing differences in how individual Schengen countries handle Russian visitors.

The Commission’s existing visa guidelines also preserve access for certain categories of travellers, including journalists, political dissidents, civil society representatives and people travelling for essential family reasons.

The new initiative would therefore concern not only the number of visas issued but also the extent to which national screening decisions can affect the security of other Schengen countries. Under the Schengen system, a visa issued by one participating state generally permits its holder to travel throughout the area.

Estonia calls for restrictions on former Russian soldiers

Estonia has taken a particularly forceful position, proposing an EU-wide entry ban targeting former members of the Russian armed forces who participated in the invasion of Ukraine. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna estimates that approximately 650,000 former Russian combatants could fall within the category of individuals requiring closer scrutiny.

Tallinn has advocated individual entry restrictions rather than relying exclusively on broader measures covering Russian nationals generally. Tsahkna warned that former soldiers, particularly those with combat experience and connections to Russian intelligence services, could present a serious security challenge if they entered European countries.

He suggested that Moscow could exploit former combatants to penetrate organised criminal networks or facilitate violent operations against European targets. These assessments remain security warnings rather than evidence that Russian veterans as a group are involved in such activities.

A coordinated European policy would also seek to prevent individuals refused entry by one member state from exploiting differences in national visa procedures elsewhere.

Restrictions on Russian diplomats also under consideration

The visa proposals form part of a wider effort to restrict the activities of Russian nationals whose presence in Europe may present security risks. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has previously indicated that member states are considering tighter controls on the movement of Russian diplomats within Schengen, alongside restrictions on visas for former combatants and a reduction in Russian tourism.

One proposal would prevent Russian diplomatic personnel from travelling beyond the member state in which they are accredited. Such restrictions would complicate cross-border activities by diplomatic officials suspected of conducting intelligence operations under official cover.

The issue has acquired greater urgency as European governments report an expanding pattern of Russian-linked sabotage, including suspected arson attacks, cyber operations and attempts to disrupt critical infrastructure.

Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner acknowledged that the initial decline in visa issuance to Russian nationals had levelled off. He urged member states to reduce the number of visas granted and to strengthen scrutiny of applicants.

January proposals will test EU consensus

The immediate question is whether member states can agree on common restrictions that go beyond the existing visa framework. An outright prohibition on Russian tourism would represent a significant departure from the current approach, under which national governments retain responsibility for individual visa decisions.

More narrowly targeted measures against former combatants could prove easier to justify on security grounds, although identifying eligible individuals would require reliable information and cooperation between national authorities. The Commission has yet to publish its proposals, and the precise legal instruments under consideration remain unclear.

Foreign ministers meeting on Monday will discuss Russia’s hybrid campaign and possible European responses. The Council’s published agenda places the issue in the context of Moscow’s continuing aggression against Ukraine.

Whether the Commission ultimately proposes new binding restrictions or stronger common guidelines, the central difficulty remains the same: a Schengen system built around common freedom of movement must accommodate increasingly different national assessments of the security risks associated with travel from Russia.

Three armed men accompanying at least 20 migrants from Belarus threatened Latvian soldiers and attempted to force the group across the frontier, according to Latvia’s National Armed Forces.

Hours later, masked intruders crossed into Latvia, damaged an electrical distribution unit and stole surveillance cameras before retreating into Belarus.

Latvia has reported an unusually aggressive incident on its border with Belarus in which armed, masked men threatened Latvian troops during an attempted migrant crossing, followed several hours later by an incursion targeting surveillance infrastructure.

The confrontation began on Monday evening when at least 20 people approached the Latvian border from Belarus accompanied by three masked men. Latvia’s National Armed Forces said the escorts were armed, issued threats to Latvian soldiers and actively drove the migrants towards the frontier. Latvian troops prevented the group from entering the country.

Several hours later, masked individuals crossed from Belarus into Latvian territory and targeted equipment used to monitor the border. Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said they damaged an electrical distribution cabinet and removed surveillance cameras before returning across the frontier ahead of the arrival of a Latvian border-guard unit. Latvian authorities have not publicly identified the intruders or established whether all of those involved in the second incident were the same men who had earlier accompanied the migrants.

Dombrava described the events as markedly more aggressive than previous episodes on the frontier. He warned that Belarus should understand that incidents of this kind could have “more serious consequences” for the country.

The episode comes amid sustained pressure on Latvia’s 172km border with Belarus. According to the Latvian State Border Guard’s latest figures, 21 people were prevented from crossing illegally from Belarus on Tuesday, taking the total number stopped at that frontier since the beginning of 2026 to 11,946.

Latvia has for several years treated irregular migration from Belarus not simply as an immigration issue but as a security operation. Riga accuses the Belarusian authorities of deliberately facilitating migrant movements towards the EU border as a means of exerting political pressure.

In January, the Latvian National Armed Forces published what it described as evidence of Belarusian state involvement in organising illegal crossings. The military said documented cases included migrants being transported in Belarusian military vehicles and Belarusian officials participating in operations to direct people towards Latvia. That earlier material does not, however, establish the identities or affiliation of those involved in this week’s armed confrontation.

Pressure on the frontier intensified during the summer. In July, Latvian soldiers used tear gas and fired a warning shot when a group attempting to enter from Belarus refused orders to withdraw and, according to Latvian authorities, threw logs towards security personnel.

The methods used to circumvent the fortified border have also become more elaborate. In August, border guards found Latvia’s first known tunnel used for an illegal crossing from Belarus after intercepting 15 people near Skrudaliena. A second tunnel was discovered nine days later near Krāslava after another 28 people crossed the frontier. The State Border Guard said both incidents formed part of the continuing pressure on Latvia’s eastern border.

Riga responded in August by launching Operation VILKATIS, bringing together border guards, police and the armed forces under a co-ordinated security operation. Surveillance drones and other military capabilities have been deployed to reinforce monitoring of the frontier.

On Tuesday, the same day Latvian authorities disclosed the latest confrontation, the government extended Operation VILKATIS until 31 December. The Cabinet described the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus as a hybrid threat and said additional resources would continue to be used along the eastern border.

The involvement of armed escorts changes the immediate security calculation for Latvian personnel. Previous incidents have largely centred on migrants, smugglers and attempts to bypass physical barriers. This week’s episode included direct threats against serving soldiers, followed by an unauthorised crossing and deliberate interference with border-monitoring equipment.

Latvia has not publicly attributed the operation to a particular Belarusian military, security or border agency. The account released by Riga therefore establishes an armed incident originating from Belarusian territory, but not yet who ordered or organised it. For Latvia, however, it adds another element to a border that is already being managed as part of the country’s wider response to hybrid threats on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank.

Main Image: By Saeima – https://www.flickr.com/photos/saeima/53117747287/, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=136391897

France will maintain controls on all its internal Schengen borders for another six months, adding to a growing network of national checks that has made temporary border control an increasingly persistent feature of Europe’s passport-free area.

France has notified the European Commission that it will extend controls at its internal Schengen borders from 1 November 2026 until 30 April 2027, maintaining checks with Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain and Italy as well as at relevant air and sea borders.

The notification, published in the Commission’s official register of temporary internal border controls, means the restrictions currently due to expire on 31 October will continue for another six months.

Paris cites a combination of security and migration concerns, including persistent jihadist threats, antisemitic attacks, organised migrant-smuggling networks and risks associated with irregular movements towards the Channel coast.

The French notification also refers to instability in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Somalia, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and security considerations surrounding the Paris Peace Forum on 10–11 November.

France is not alone.

Germany has extended controls on all of its land borders until 15 March 2027, citing irregular migration, migrant smuggling and pressure on its asylum system. Austria is maintaining controls on borders with Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia until the same date, while Poland has notified Brussels of checks on its borders with Germany and Lithuania through 30 March.

Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Italy also have temporary internal controls in force.

The expansion has created an increasingly complicated map inside an area established around the principle that people should normally be able to cross internal borders without routine checks.

EU Today has been following that change closely. In September, EU Today reported that Germany had extended checks on all nine of its land frontiers, while a subsequent examination found that temporary controls were spreading across the Schengen area.

The French extension takes that trend into spring 2027.

Under the Schengen Borders Code, governments retain the right to restore controls when they identify a serious threat to public policy or internal security. The Commission stresses that such action must remain exceptional, proportionate and limited to what is necessary.

The revised rules permit controls responding to a foreseeable threat for an initial period of up to six months, with extensions possible under defined conditions. Governments maintaining controls for extended periods must provide additional risk assessments and reporting.

There is therefore no legal contradiction between Schengen membership and temporary border checks. The political question concerns their frequency and duration.

In June, the European Commission had called for a gradual reduction in internal controls where conditions allowed. EU Today reported at the time that Brussels regarded the restoration of normal passport-free movement as possible in several countries.

The direction since then has largely been the opposite.

Migration remains one factor, but national notifications increasingly cite several threats simultaneously: terrorism, organised crime, Russian sabotage, war in Ukraine, Middle Eastern instability and pressure on asylum systems.

That makes it harder to identify a single event after which controls could simply be removed.

The system also creates practical consequences for cross-border regions. Millions of Europeans live in one Schengen state and work, study or conduct business in another. Selective checks can therefore cause delays even when passports are not examined systematically.

France’s controls are especially significant because of the number and economic importance of its neighbours. The extension covers land connections with six countries and internal air and sea routes.

It also comes as the EU operates new systems intended to strengthen the external Schengen frontier. Europe’s Entry/Exit System has introduced biometric registration for many non-EU travellers, while the migration and asylum pact has changed procedures for handling irregular arrivals.

The original political bargain behind Schengen was that stronger management of the common external frontier would support open internal borders.

The growing use of national internal controls shows that several governments remain unwilling to rely on that external system alone when confronted with migration, terrorism and wider security risks.

France’s latest notification is formally temporary. But by the time the new period expires on 30 April 2027, internal checks will have become a long-running feature of travel across several of Europe’s most important borders.