Zelenskyy’s urgent discussion with the US Secretary of State suggests that Washington cannot pursue accommodation with Moscow without confronting opposition in Congress, the requirements of American national security and Ukraine’s continuing dependence on US military support.

The telephone conversation between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, 20 October, has exposed an increasingly uncomfortable contradiction in American policy towards Russia. While President Donald Trump is easing economic pressure on Moscow and attempting to restrain Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, senior members of his administration are having to address the consequences for Ukraine’s defence.

Zelenskyy raised three immediate concerns: the availability of Patriot interceptor missiles, interruptions to American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic attacks, and restrictions affecting Starlink and Starshield satellite communications. He described the discussion as constructive, expressing appreciation for Rubio’s willingness to help.

The significance lies less in the diplomatic language than in the circumstances surrounding the call. Washington is attempting to obtain concessions from Moscow while several of its own decisions have weakened confidence in the security arrangements on which Kyiv depends. Rubio’s involvement suggests that these difficulties cannot simply be left unresolved while Trump’s envoys pursue another round of negotiations.

The political cost of concessions to Moscow

Trump’s recent decisions concerning Russian energy exports have brought an existing disagreement over Ukraine into American domestic politics.

The administration has facilitated Russian diesel exports and waived new sanctions under the Graham Act, legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia and its principal energy customers. Rubio has said the president will use a 60-day period to assess the economic consequences of implementing the measures.

For Trump, the immediate attraction is apparent. Rising fuel prices have become a political liability ahead of the 3 November congressional midterm elections. Increasing supplies on international markets offers the administration a potential means of relieving pressure on American consumers.

The difficulty is that concessions to Vladimir Putin carry their own electoral consequences. Moscow remains deeply unpopular among substantial sections of the American political establishment, including Republicans who regard support for Ukraine as a matter of American strategic interest.

That opposition is no longer confined to public criticism. Republican senators have joined Democrats in challenging decisions affecting Ukraine’s military capabilities, creating an additional problem for an administration already facing a difficult electoral environment.

Trump can justify Russian energy concessions as an attempt to protect American consumers. Explaining why Ukraine should simultaneously experience interruptions to critical defence systems is considerably more difficult.

Rubio and the machinery of American foreign policy

Rubio’s position within the administration is particularly important. As both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, he occupies two offices central to the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

His conversation with Zelenskyy took place during a diplomatic tour of Uzbekistan and India, demonstrating that the deterioration in relations with Kyiv required attention even while the administration was pursuing other international priorities.

It would be premature to interpret Rubio’s intervention as evidence of an independent foreign policy. There is no indication that he is acting against Trump’s instructions. The more plausible interpretation is that the administration recognises a need to contain the consequences of its recent decisions without requiring the president publicly to reverse his position.

The controversy surrounding Starshield is particularly revealing. Reuters reported that instructions to restrict the satellite service used by Ukrainian forces originated inside the White House. The officials cited did not identify who authorised the order, while the administration has denied Trump’s personal involvement.

Separately, Zelenskyy has reported failures to receive advance warnings of Russian ballistic attacks. The cause of those interruptions remains disputed.

These developments have already attracted congressional scrutiny. Republican Senator Thom Tillis and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen led a bipartisan request for an investigation, warning that failures in communications and intelligence-sharing may have endangered American personnel in Ukraine.

Congress cannot directly manage the administration’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, its powers over expenditure, legislation and oversight make sustained opposition politically consequential, particularly when members of the president’s own party are involved.

Ukraine needs military assistance, not diplomatic promises

The immediate requirements in Kyiv are considerably more specific than the objectives being discussed in Washington’s diplomatic negotiations.

Ukraine needs reliable satellite communications, uninterrupted intelligence concerning incoming missiles and sufficient Patriot interceptors to defend its cities and critical infrastructure. Delays in any of these areas have consequences that cannot be addressed through declarations about a future peace settlement.

The shortage of Patriot missiles is particularly serious. Zelenskyy has complained that American authorisation is delaying deliveries under arrangements financed by European governments. Washington’s commitments elsewhere, including the Middle East, add further pressure to American air-defence inventories.

Meanwhile, preparations for new negotiations in Oslo involving American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner continue. The involvement of European leaders may broaden the diplomatic discussion, but it does not resolve the central obstacle: Putin has offered no convincing indication that he is prepared to end the invasion on terms acceptable to Ukraine.

Proposals concerning Ukrainian elections, NATO membership or alternative negotiating arrangements remain subordinate to that problem. Without a ceasefire that can be enforced, even an agreement on the political framework for peace would leave fundamental questions of security unanswered.

The limits of presidential power

Trump retains substantial authority over American sanctions, military assistance and diplomatic engagement. Yet his ability to offer Moscow meaningful concessions is constrained by several factors beyond his immediate control.

Congress can challenge further attempts to weaken sanctions or restrict assistance. European governments maintain their own sanctions regimes and are not obliged to follow Washington’s approach. Ukraine retains considerable military capacity, including the ability to attack Russian energy facilities that contribute to financing the war.

Nor can the American president compel Putin to accept a settlement. If Russia calculates that continuing military operations offers greater advantages than negotiations, additional concessions from Washington may encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict rather than end it.

Rubio’s conversation with Zelenskyy therefore suggests that the administration is being forced to confront the practical consequences of its policy. An American president may seek improved relations with Moscow, but the institutional interests of the United States do not necessarily change with his personal diplomatic priorities.

For Kyiv, the question is whether those interests will translate into the continued supply of weapons, intelligence and communications support. Russia’s attacks will continue irrespective of the timetable established for American diplomatic initiatives.

EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.

European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.

The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.

In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.

Germany rejects the compromise

The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.

Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.

Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.

Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.

EU Today reported on the proposed €141 billion in reductions, including the implications for defence and competitiveness funding.

The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.

Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.

Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding

The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.

Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.

France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.

At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.

The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.

Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.

Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.

The demands of 17 EU governments seeking to protect farm and cohesion spending illustrate the growing tension between established programmes and the Union’s newer strategic priorities.

A timetable becoming difficult to defend

The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.

Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.

The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.

Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.

Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.

The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.

The Romans advised that to secure peace, you must prepare for war. The preparation was the point: weapons kept ready so they need not be used, readiness standing in for the fight. Their word for peace, pax, came from pacisci — to strike a bargain. Peace was a pactum, a deal, before it was anything […]

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