How are hip hop and Black Liberation connected? In this special Black August edition of Rattling the Bars, former political prisoner and Black Panther Mansa Musa sits down with artist, producer, and “Panther Cub” Mopreme Shakur on the rooftop of a hotel in the nation’s capital. Together, they explore Shakur’s memoir, This Thug’s Life, tracing the trajectory from the rise and fall of Black Power to the birth of hip hop through the eyes of the son of a Panther and the stepbrother of a legend.
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The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Mansa Musa:
Welcome to this district rather than your host Mansa Musa. Today we are joined by Mopreme Shakur, the son of the late great political prison with Tulu Shakur and the older stepbrother of the legendary rapper Tupac Shakur. Mopreme has recently published a memoir titled This Thug Life: A Poet Narrative Spanning the Rise of the Black Liberation Movement, The Birth of Hip-Hop in New York, and its expansion to the West Coast. Mopreme, thank you for joining
Mopreme Shakur:
Us. What’s happened, Kevin?
Mansa Musa:
Appreciate you though. I know they got you on Hustle and Bustle, and this is a good thing. What compelled you to write this particular memoir?
Mopreme Shakur:
Well, I am Mopreme Shakur, Thug Life Outlaw, Immortal. I am the son of Dr. Matou Shakur, stepson of Afeni Shakur, brother of Tupac Shakur, nephew of Asada Shakur. That’s my fam, as well as my sister Setua. A lot of people are familiar with the struggles and the triumphs of our family and the movement. A lot of sacrifices made, but a lot of comments is made too. And that’s often overlooked because it’s hard to ignore the struggle. My father was a political prisoner, served 37 years in federal prison. We fought hard to bring him home, but we were able to finally bring him home, but he was ill with cancer, and he passed away in 2023.
Mansa Musa:
Now you say Motulu Shakur ancestor served an astronomical amount of time, a political prisoner. But we just hold Shakur. When you say Shakul, that claim in and of itself is political in and of itself. Panther 21, organizing New York chapter, heavily organizing around goals, the aspirations, and the vision of the Black Panther Party. So let’s talk about the process of bringing this book to life. When did you first begin writing it one? Did you speak to other family members and close friends to piece together the memoir, the memories rather, or were you just drawing strictly on your own experience in growing up?
Mopreme Shakur:
I didn’t ask too many people much first because it’s my story. It ain’t their story, it’s my story. And a lot of times a lot of other people weren’t even there. But the process began after we lost pot and had me reflecting on a lot of things you did. And along with the loss of my brother, I was thinking about our accomplishments. I was locked up for a skid bid. I was doing something stupid, sitting there thinking about myself. And I also though about the rest of the family, the accomplishments we all have made, sacrifices. We all have made border movement, border family.
And so that’s when the process started, got my first 80 pages, and then life be life ain’t. Stop, start, stop, start. Eventually got my co-writer, Talia Shakur, she and I finally got a poser together because we didn’t want to self-publish. We felt like the story was important and it needed to have a farther reach. And so I wanted a book deal. So you got to have certain things in order to get that book deal. So that’s what we did. And as time went on, it became more urgent for me to get this done because I was becoming one of the last ones left Between family and crew, family and crew. It’s been painful, a lot of sacrifices. We just had the homegoing ceremony for Auntie Astata up in Harlem a few weeks ago. Pops past 2023. Been 10 years since The Lost of Fainting. Akti Falani, Baba Balao, Baba Saku.
And it’s like once they’re gone, you can’t ask them no questions no more. And I was like, oh, I started panicking on the music side too. Shaq G just passed away. Young Noble just passed away. Along with Pac, Fatal, Big Psych. Come on, man. Yeah. Come
Mansa Musa:
On, man. And you know what? And as you unpacking that, how important, and this just came about this space right here, how important is it for you to be able to control that narrative about your legacy? It is.
Mopreme Shakur:
Because
Mansa Musa:
You just outlined, okay, we hear pop. We hear a lot of things associated with the Shakur clan. We hear a lot of things associated with the movement. But then when you get in a space where you hear somebody say something that you know is misinformation, or if you not in a position to refute it, then it takes on life. So how is it important? Why do you think it’s important for you to be able to refute for safe? Because you give auticity to the information, whether a person agree with it or disagree with it, whether they like it or don’t like it, it’s coming out the baby’s mouth. It ain’t coming secondhand.
Mopreme Shakur:
Once you become a public figure, anybody could write about you. And that’s what a lot of people don’t know. Pac and I are public figures, of course, because of entertainment game, but our actual relatives are public figures because they end up in the damn news. And you got to preserve your own stories. You know what I mean? Because as Black and brown people disenfranchised poor people, what we are is rich and experience. Maybe poor and finance is what we are rich in life and life experience and pain. There’s a value to that. You got to turn pain to profit. Turn your pain to profit. And we’ve been enduring the pain and while other people here make the profit on it. You dig. So I’m out there in LA, I’m in Hollywood and all that, so I’ve learned the game. And it’s the power of the parent.
We had to get this down because I felt like my story is important because it’s at the crossroads of Black history and Black music history. Okay.
Mansa Musa:
Yeah.
Mopreme Shakur:
Black history and Black music history. We touch on both sides. And we’re disappearing. So we as my generation, the Obafamis, the Sunni Alis, our family, our connected family and the struggle and the revolution, we have the kids of it because it’s our elders that did a whole bunch of the work and sacrifice. So oh, the best we could do is preserve it and tell the story to our people because these stories are important. Members of our family and other brothers and sisters in a struggle are heroes, folk heroes, icons. But if no one knows the stories, they won’t see it that way.
Mansa Musa:
Okay. And this mark is the 60th year anniversary of the Black Panther Party and they dub most of the children of party members club. Panther
Mopreme Shakur:
Clubs.
Mansa Musa:
Panther club. So as a Panther club, and actually witnessed the struggle and see firsthand the repression that was being inflicted, seeing firsthand the torment your father went through because of his political view, seeing the fact that your aunt was forced in the exile for no reason of political views. Talk about what does the legacy mean to you? The party, your family’s legacy, but more important, how do you feel that the party made a contribution to social justice? If you can speak on that.
Mopreme Shakur:
The party made a significant impact to social justice. My father, the Black Panthers, the Young Lords, Lincoln Detox, Detoxification Clinic – A Lagun. And the Bronx. That work that they did was established patients’ rights as a human right. For that incident up in the Bronx is the reason why this country has patients’ rights to this day. You know what I’m saying? But no one will know that story unless we tell it because we’ve already been suppressed to a great degree as it is. So they want to suppress our stories. As we see what’s going on in this administration right here, you know what I’m saying? They’re messing with Harriet Tubman. Jack, what the hell Harry Tubman did to you? Why y’all leave Jackie Robinson look? You know what I’m saying? I’m like, whoa. So it is very important and significant that we try to do our best we can to preserve our stories because we help make this motherfucker too.
I don’t know. Can I curse on almost Man, you can
Mansa Musa:
Do what you do.
Mopreme Shakur:
Oh, shit. Okay. All right. I ain’t want to be rude. You know what I’m saying?
Mansa Musa:
No, no. Like I told you before, we don’t give you a voice. We turn the volume up on your voice. However you want to express your voice, we turn the volume up. Let’s talk about, because you made mention of this, and this is something I think that you can unpack as much as you want.Because you made an observation that you’re dealing with the struggle and the music. And so you dealing with two things issue. And most people, when they think of Shakur, they think of Tupac. They think of you. But now we at a crossroad where what role do this music play, hip-hop music play in raising people’s consciousness, elevating people’s perspective about struggle. But more importantly, how do you see the landscape, man?
Mopreme Shakur:
We truly cared about the people. In the midst of the entertainment was a vehicle to be able to reach the people. But people know Pac fans know he really cared about the people. Keep your head up. Brenda’s Got a Baby. Pop a song. Dear Mama. We’re addressing issues in our communities. You know what I mean? And people be feeling, they tell me all the time. They tell me all the time, man, thank you for making this song. Thank you for making that song. And because we were trying to talk about something. Us being popular in the general market helped because we were able to reach with more and more people. Being a movie star helped. We were able to reach more and more people with some of the messages that we were trying to deliver. Thug life, you know what I’m saying? That was our shit.
That was our contribution because it was actually, a lot of people got the message, a lot of people didn’t. My pops helped us by creating a thug code so it wasn’t just some ignorant shit. The hate you gave little infants fucks everyone. Because if you don’t take care of them babies, they will go into the monsters you fear today. That
Mansa Musa:
Was the acronym.
Mopreme Shakur:
The hate you gave little infants, fuck everyone. All these jackets they’d be wanting to put on us, we taking them and flipping them. We was taking them and flipping Pac’s second album stripping for my nigga. People have an issue with the word nigga. We flipped it, put an A on it. Never ignorant getting goals accomplished. Yeah,
Mansa Musa:
Yeah, yeah. You
Mopreme Shakur:
Did?
Mansa Musa:
Yeah,
Mopreme Shakur:
Man.
Mansa Musa:
Jon, you don’t hear that though, right? No, you don’t. Keep on that. And it makes sense though. And when people say. And the reason why I’m asking this is why we got the opportunity for somebody to myth bust. You know what I’m saying? About your family and the myth bust about who y’all are and what y’all thinking. Because when you come out like Latulu Shaku is a giant and an ancestor and we praise him for his contribution. We honor his work. And we know that he. Ella Baker say, “We who believe in freedom must not rest.” They not rest. They not resting in power. They’re not resting in peace. They not
Mopreme Shakur:
Resting,
Mansa Musa:
Period. Exactly.
Mopreme Shakur:
So
Mansa Musa:
That’s why it’s
Mopreme Shakur:
Important to you. Pac,
Mansa Musa:
Why you acting like this? Why are you so angry?
Mopreme Shakur:
Because we are not at rest. As long as our people still struggling, the struggle continues.
Mansa Musa:
Yeah, exactly. You know what I
Mopreme Shakur:
Mean?
Mansa Musa:
The
Mopreme Shakur:
Struggle continues.
Mansa Musa:
Talk about the underground railroad and third. Okay, the artistic foundation clearly influenced your musical career.
Mopreme Shakur:
We came from community organizers. You know what I’m saying? And we were trying to present our version for our generation. We started with the underground railroad because Pac was already with Digital Underground. And it made sense. Our crew be the underground railroad. We come from the underground, and for so many reasons it made sense for our ideology, it made sense. And then that morphed into 50 niggas. One good nigga, 50 representing the states, one good nigga in every state. We could accomplish anything
Mansa Musa:
And
Mopreme Shakur:
Stick together. Yeah, right there.
Mansa Musa:
You
Mopreme Shakur:
Did. That’s what Pac had too. We was real about it. And that morphed into Thug Life.
Mansa Musa:
Okay. You know
Mopreme Shakur:
What I mean? So
Mansa Musa:
It really had a political undertone.
Mopreme Shakur:
Exactly. That’s why we pulled my father in with it. He was a part. He made Thug Cole, which is we were getting some help from a sister Erica Ford up in New York. We had brothers behind the wall, comrades behind the wall pushing it, trying to explain it. But some of the people got the message and some of the people did. But then you
Mansa Musa:
Had like, well dude, you got opposition because you got the state. Exactly. You got the government. The last thing the government want is somebody that has that kind of influence to be able to speak truth to power and be able to galvanize people, galvanize people around. Because everybody was into hip hop. So this is why you have, just my belief, this is why you have the push on corporate America to create an image of gangster rap. But the more important part of the image, the more important part of the image is that it’s the image.
Mopreme Shakur:
It’s that whoever’s a leader. Whoever’s a leader in whatever kind of way, because they did it to Martin. They did it to Malcolm. They weren’t rappers. You know what I’m saying? Whoever’s a leader. Oh, they did it to Fred. They were trying to take out all our leaders using COINTELPRO. CONTELPRO, you know what I’m saying? They was doing that. They didn’t necessarily get rid of those methods as time went on. They just refined them. They’re
Mansa Musa:
Fine. Yeah, I agree.
Mopreme Shakur:
Dr. Robin DG Kelly, a historian, told me that, “Man, your father is one of the top five civil rights leaders in the country. Top five. Put him in the top five.” And that important, they wanted stifled. They wanted stifled. They didn’t want him to have the impact, so they locked him up. We were pleased. Actually, oddly enough, we were pleased when he got captured because we was hearing that he was saying he wasn’t going to be taken alive. So when he was captured, at least he was alive.
Mansa Musa:
And
Mopreme Shakur:
We could communicate through them years at Lompoc, that’s where he helped us put the thug code together. You
Mansa Musa:
Write about specific songs you and Tupac performed at concerts, but never officially released. Can you tell us about that and how your music resonated with incarcerated people?
Mopreme Shakur:
One of them that did get out is Papa Song. We got to do Papa Song because that was really about Matul. It was all a lack of a father in the household. So that’s what that was about. But there was many others that were supposed to be on the Thug Life album. Thug Life Project was a project that Pac recorded, spent the most time on almost three years recording Thug Life album. But they wouldn’t let certain songs through. They thought it was too hard at the time. They was killing crooked cops, you know what I mean? And so it almost didn’t come out. I had to tamper down the album in order for it to even come out.
Mansa Musa:
And I guess that’s the price. If you ain’t independent, that’s the price you have. If you trying to get your information out and be conversated. And
Mopreme Shakur:
It was a time where censorship was a big thing because they were doing it to live cool. They were doing it to ice tea. They were doing it to things face, facing them, doing it to us.
Mansa Musa:
Engage the public.
Mopreme Shakur:
They didn’t want that reality because we was calling it reality rap. They call it gangst rap. We call it reality rap. We the niggas that lived around that shit for real. We know somebody that happened to if it didnt happen to you. So the truth hurts. But give me one more, Musa. It’s getting hot out here, baby. No,
Mansa Musa:
This is the last one right here. What you want to tell our audience about your project, about the book, and how they can become more involved with your work.
Mopreme Shakur:
Well, thank you for that one. I’m here in lovely DC at the lovely Vice Royal Hotel. I hope you dig it. I think you will. It also has photos in it. So never before seen pics of me, my brother, my father, the family, like 24 pics in it. I try not to cheat the people. It’s that Barnes & Nobles, Amazon, thisthuglife.com, audiobook, ebook. I’m grinding, man. I’m South Side Jamaica Queens. All the way to the west side. There
Mansa Musa:
You have it. We got Mo Pre.
Mopreme Shakur:
Best Mo you’ll ever know. Best
Mansa Musa:
Mo you’ll ever know out here in the hat, son. They’ve been stomping the ground, trying to get the word out on his book. We ask that you really look at this interview because as Mo Pree put it out there. We’re in a struggle for our life and it’s only through us telling our story. He made this quote. Might not have a lot of money, but we got a lot of story. We got a lot of experience. And here go an example of someone that’s taking that experience and using it for the goodness, the betterment of mankind and humans by educating people on the struggle. Thanks, Mopree. Appreciate you, big bro. You
Mopreme Shakur:
Too, man. Power to the people. All power. Free all political
Mansa Musa:
Free.
Trends of public library book use since the pandemic and the rapid increase in population in NC cities are creating headaches for libraries.
Surging book demand leaves NC libraries struggling with long waitlists, pricey content is a story from Carolina Public Press, an award-winning independent newsroom. Our breakthrough journalism shines a light on the critical overlooked and under-reported issues facing North Carolina’s more than 11 million residents. Please consider making a contribution to support our journalism.
One of Hong Kong’s most unusual sights is the stone wall tree—a mature tree growing directly out of a masonry retaining wall.
These remarkable trees first appeared during the colonial era when thousands of stone retaining walls were built to stabilize Hong Kong's steep hillsides. Over time, seeds carried by birds and wind became lodged in cracks between the granite blocks. Dust, decaying leaves, and moisture accumulated in these crevices, creating tiny pockets of soil where the seeds could germinate.
Credit: Wikimedia Commons
On August 5th 2026, a small drone armed with explosives was found at Leipzig airport in Germany. The presence of explosive material marks this out from previous incidents at airports, as does the fact that authorities recovered the drone. But Europe’s new normal is for small drones to disrupt its airports and buzz around other critical infrastructure, including French nuclear submarine bases, Belgian nuclear power plants and German liquefied natural gas terminals. Some of these sightings are likely part of Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. Yet the drones are probably flown from inside European countries or from ships in the North and Baltic seas, and definitive attribution to Russia or any other actor remains elusive.
The countries along Europe’s eastern flank have another new normal to contend with. This entails the connected but different threat of military drones crossing into EU and NATO territory from Russia, Belarus and, because of the Russian aggression against it, Ukraine. The most egregious incursion so far took place in September 2025, when around 20 Russian military drones crossed into Poland’s airspace, leading it to invoke Article 4 of NATO’s Washington Treaty. That episode also prompted NATO to launch Operation Eastern Sentry to increase its vigilance at the border.
Unlike the small drones hovering over critical infrastructure, the origin of the military drones crossing into EU and NATO territory is no mystery. The attribution problem here relates to intention, as Russia can claim—sometimes plausibly, sometimes less so—that incursions at the eastern flank are accidents resulting from its war against Ukraine.
The eastern flank
Russia and Belarus are acting antagonistically towards European countries, while Ukraine is a partner nation and an EU candidate country. But incursions of military drones into EU and NATO territory come from all three countries. The term “eastern flank” thus refers to the EU’s 4,000km border with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as the Black Sea coast. The flank extends through nine countries: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
Almost a year on from the Poland incident, the member states that line the eastern flank face military drone incursions with alarming (and increasing) regularity. The end of July, for example, saw Romania shoot down three suspected Russian drones in as many days. This followed another incursion in the country in May when a drone crashed into the roof of a ten-storey building in Galati and exploded, starting a fire in one of the apartments. A 14-year-old and his mother were injured, and 70 residents were evacuated. The Romanian military had tracked the drone and deployed two F-16 fighter jets in response to the threat. But the jets were unable to fire at the target for “operational reasons and [because of] certain legal limitations”.
The incidents in Romania lay bare some of the difficulties for Europe in defending its eastern flank against military drones. Over the past year, NATO’s operation has swiftly been joined by a hotch-potch of national and EU projects, including the bloc’s ambitious and wide-ranging European Drone Defence Initiative. But as things stand, military drones still either fly unhindered into EU and NATO territory or are intercepted through the costliest means possible, namely missiles fired from fighter jets.
Police forces across the continent, meanwhile, are struggling to mount an effective response to the problem of the small drones over their critical infrastructure. And countries farther from the eastern flank tend not to make the link between this largely civil threat and the military threat in the east: when the EU first proposed its initiative, for example, western European states were unconvinced that the bloc should fund drone defences at the eastern flank.
But, as this paper argues, all European countries need to act to secure the eastern flank—both to defend EU and NATO territory against military drones and to inform Europe’s response to small drones flying over its critical infrastructure. National efforts at the flank are promising but will likely prove insufficient. The EU will therefore have to spread the costs of defending the eastern flank, as efforts there contribute to the defence of the entire continent against military drone attacks. That small drones flying over critical infrastructure are a problem everywhere should further incentivise all Europeans to speed up their work on drone defence. And as this paper shows, the EU and member states can apply lessons learned at the eastern flank across Europe and reuse technology battle-tested in the east to protect their critical infrastructure.
The two sides of Europe’s drone threat are different, but they still share important similarities: they involve the same tools—drones of one type or another—and some likely have the same perpetrator—Russia. Mapping just a selection of drone overflights of critical infrastructure and incursions at the eastern flank since August 2024 lays bare the extent of the dual drone threat Europe is facing. And every time an overflight of critical infrastructure or incursion at the eastern flank happens, wherever it comes from, Russia learns something about Europe’s ability to fight (or otherwise) against these systems.
Drones are regularly spotted over critical infrastructure across Europe. The German aviation agency reported 227 drone sightings by pilots in 2025. These numbers have been rising steadily since reporting began in 2020, and the 2026 numbers are well on track to surpass last year’s.[1] Such incidents are largely a civil matter, which means responsibility for recording, identifying and countering them falls on local authorities such as police forces.
The overflights near airports tend to grab the most attention for three reasons. First, drones pose an extreme risk to aircraft and have the potential to cause mass casualty events, with the incident in Leipzig perhaps the closest call so far. German newspaper Die Zeit reports that CCTV footage from the airport shows the drone flying towards an Antonov cargo plane parked on the runway, hitting one of the wings and then falling to the ground. It was later discovered on the tarmac by a bus driver, who alerted security. Had the explosives detonated, the consequences could have been catastrophic. But even without explosives, drones have the potential to cause an air disaster if they collide with a plane, particularly if it is taking off or landing. Second, drones near airports cause significant economic harm: Copenhagen airport had to close for four hours in September 2025, while more than 30 flights were cancelled in Munich following drone sightings in March 2025. Third, airport closures tangibly affect citizens, which is likely why they are such common targets in the first place.
But from a security standpoint, equally concerning are sightings over other critical infrastructure like energy hubs and military installations. Drones can, for instance, help hostile operators gather intelligence about the security arrangements at these installations. They could then use this to enable future sabotage or attacks.
Among these sites, drone activity around military installations could be highly consequential. In early 2025, the German ministry of defence logged six instances of drone overflights at Schwesing airbase, a Bundeswehr base where Ukrainian soldiers were trained to use Patriot air-defence missile systems. It is plausible that the drones carried signals-intelligence equipment that could identify soldiers’ mobile phones. Once it had identified the phones, Russia may have been able to locate them again months later at the Ukrainian front line—and with them, the valuable and increasingly scarce Patriot batteries. This is a direct concern for the Ukrainian defence effort. But it also points to a larger problem for Europe, as it illustrates the type of information Russia could be collecting about European armed forces.
It remains unproven where most of the drones used in overflights come from and who controls them. But it is probable that at least some of the drones flying over critical infrastructure are part of Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. For years, Russia has conducted attacks against military and civil infrastructure as well as government entities. Some attacks take place in the cyber-realm; some involve physical sabotage, like igniting air freight packages in Britain, Germany and Poland, and damaging submarine cables in the Baltic Sea. US intelligence also helped Germany foil a plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, the CEO of arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. Sweden, meanwhile, has faced attacks on its telecommunications network. And disinformation campaigns have targeted the whole of Europe for years, including in the aftermath of drone sightings and disruption.
German chancellor Friedrich Merz has noted that Russian agents may be behind at least some of the overflights; Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen said she could not “rule out in any way that it [was] Russia” behind the airport disruptions in Copenhagen; and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has argued that “the drone incidents across Europe clearly show that Russia is prepared to escalate this war and that it has never been just about Ukraine.” Moreover, in 2025 investigative journalists traced several drone flights back to Russian ships in the North and Baltic seas. Since then, a June 2026 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies has assessed it is “highly likely” Russia conducted a drone campaign against Europe, largely towards the end of 2025. This research also found that the source of some of these drones may have been Russian shadow fleet vessels.
The types of drones used in these operations have not been definitively identified. However, analyses of images as well as eye-witness accounts point to fixed-wing surveillance drones, as well as quadcopter systems. In at least one incident there were reports of a “mothership” drone, a larger fixed-wing system which carries smaller quadcopter drones. The Leipzig drone has been identified as a quadcopter, roughly the size of a microwave oven.
Quadcopter drones
Quadcopter drones are systems with four rotors, which enable them to take off and land vertically, without any type of runway. They are flown via handheld console or smartphone app. Quadcopters have been the typical model for hobbyist drones as they are easy to use and do not require additional equipment. They are also particularly good at hovering in one place and flying slowly, making them the ideal system to follow and surveil people.
Their main vulnerabilities are endurance and range limitations due to weight: unlike fixed-wing systems which can glide, quadcopters require a continuous power supply to fly, thus draining their batteries quickly. As batteries are also their heaviest part, their range is limited. And heavier systems require more power, which means they need larger and heavier batteries. As more civilian systems have entered the military drone space, quadcopters and other multicopters have multiplied on the battlefield.
Still, definitive proof of the types of drone used in overflights or where they come from will depend on police forces apprehending more of them. The fact that local authorities across Europe have been unable to do this could compound a feeling among the public of failure by the state and leave the information vacuum wide open. The lack of information also means it is impossible to distinguish between real sightings and false alarms—like the 2016 case of a drone sighting from an aeroplane which turned out most likely to have been a plastic bag.
European authorities should also be able to stop drones around their critical infrastructure regardless of who flies them. The context of the Russia-Ukraine war has turned the drone threat into a geopolitical problem, yet non-state actors pose their own threat. Given the availability of drones, drone terrorism is a rising security concern—and far-right groups in the US, for example, are reportedly looking into first-person view drones to target law enforcement. But to date no major terrorist attacks by drone have taken place, only some thwarted plans, which is surprising.
But Europe’s drone problem also has a military side, and the continent seems equally unprepared to counter it efficiently and effectively.
Alongside dealing with overflights, countries along the eastern flank must contend with military drones threatening EU and NATO territory from the east. Such incursions have taken place regularly since Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and have intensified since 2025.
Only two weeks after the full-scale invasion, a drone (most likely Ukrainian) flew undetected for hundreds of kilometres over Romania and Hungary, before crashing near Zagreb in Croatia. Russian drones came down in Romania in 2023, and in Poland and Lithuania in 2025.
But the number of incidents has grown significantly in 2026. Russian and (more frequently) Ukrainian drones have veered off course since the start of the year, coming down in Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and elsewhere. In May, people took shelter in Lithuania when a drone alert brought Vilnius to a standstill; and across the border in Latvia, both the defence minister and the prime minister lost their jobs over a political response to drone incursions that was deemed insufficient. When the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting over the Galati incident in June, Romania’s minister for foreign affairs noted that it was just one of more than 40 incursions into the country’s airspace in 2026 alone—a number which has grown significantly since then.
Initially such incidents appeared to be accidents, caused by guidance-systems failures, operating errors and interference by electronic countermeasures. But the September 2025 incident in which around 20 military drones entered Poland from different places raised concerns that some might be deliberate provocations. The increasing intensity since then has done nothing to alleviate those concerns. After one May incursion in Latvia, Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha said that Russian electronic warfare systems “deliberately diverted Ukrainian drones from their targets in Russia”—not going quite as far as to argue Russia was deliberately sending drones over NATO and EU territory, though this is a possible conclusion.
The drones that crashed in Poland were later identified as Russian Gerberas, an unarmed variant of what was originally the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition.
Gerans and Gerberas
Russia manufactures its own version of the Iranian Shaheds in the Geran and Gerbera variants.
These are “kamikaze drones”, or one-way loitering munitions, which explode upon reaching their target. Russia is using the drone in ever greater numbers in Ukraine: since 2025, almost 1000 drones have been used in single-night attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. The current Geran iteration, the Geran-3, is a turbo-engined variant that can fly up to 800km, but many different variants exist. When employed in large numbers, they can overwhelm Ukrainian defences. The Gerbera is a lesser-known variant which is generally used as a decoy, or to relay signals for other, armed drones. The average price tag of drones like these is around €10,000.
In response to the incursions, Poland scrambled F-16 fighter jets and several military helicopters. Other NATO states provided support with aerial assets, most notably Dutch F-35s. Together they shot down three of the drones, with the rest crashing on Polish territory, luckily not causing any casualties. Debris was later found in an area spanning hundreds of square kilometres.
While NATO has not disclosed the exact costs of the operation, the missiles the jets fired cost between several hundred thousand and a million euros, depending on the type. Flight hours of F-16s and the much more expensive F-35s run into the tens of thousands of euros. So a single, only partly successful, counter-drone operation cost European countries millions, while Russia likely forked out less than €250,000 to prompt that response.
Drones continue to cross into NATO and EU territory. Sometimes they are intercepted, but more often they simply crash into the ground, occasionally even going undetected until they do. Were European countries to face an attack involving even a fraction of the numbers Ukraine regularly faces, the consequences would likely be catastrophic—and preventing them would be prohibitively expensive. Once the war ends, and if and when Ukraine becomes an EU or NATO member, defences along the western Ukrainian border—with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania—can move to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia. In the meantime however, the EU, NATO and member states need to learn from Ukraine to secure the flank themselves.
Drones are a whole-of-Europe problem, which means all European countries need to invest in counter-drone capabilities. But starting at the eastern flank makes sense. Compared with the overflights of critical infrastructure, the flank is a more defined threat in a geographically bounded area. If the EU and member states can build an effective response here, it could inform efforts across the rest of the continent, both in terms of what can transfer to that different context and what cannot.
Europe’s eastern flank spans different climate zones and topography, urban and rural territory, and forests and agricultural land. Given this and the drone threat discussed above, drone defences will have to be multi-layered. The eastern flank will need a detector layer with several sensor options, a defensive layer with several different countermeasures (“multi-effector”), and the ability to engage several drones at the same time (“multi-shot”). All these systems would ideally feed their data into a common operating picture to create a comprehensive view of the eastern flank. This element will be crucial to detect attacks that may be happening at the same time but hundreds if not thousands of kilometres apart.
The detector layer will comprise various radar and sensor systems. These will have to be spaced along the eastern flank depending on the topography and the presence of buildings, forests, agriculture and similar criteria. Today the eastern flank is monitored primarily through NATO assets and national systems, which focus more on the threat from missiles and aircraft, rather than smaller and slower drones.
Radars offer long-range coverage but can struggle to track smaller drones. Their sensitivity is improving all the time but birds still cause false positives; and as drones can be made from an array of materials, it is possible to manufacture them with minimal, or unusual, radar signatures. Moreover, traditional active radar systems that send an electromagnetic pulse and capture its return signal can be too easy for adversaries to identify. To overcome this problem, passive radar systems that work by sensing changes in the electromagnetic spectrum as objects move through space are in development.
Electro-optical sensors would complement radar. These can identify drones based on visual and temperature identifiers, which helps operators establish what kind of drone they are dealing with. But they require a clear line of sight, making them less usable in urban or forest environments. Unless they are AI-enabled, electro-optical sensors also require human intervention in real-time to verify whether an image is showing a drone or not, and thus increase staffing requirements. Radio frequency scanning, meanwhile, identifies drones by monitoring common frequency bands, though its accuracy is limited.
Finally, Ukraine has had considerable success with acoustic sensors and has installed thousands across the country. But Ukrainian experiences have also shown that these sensors do not work equally well in all contexts: environments with lots of sounds, like forests, urban areas and agricultural land, can hinder their usefulness.
As with detection sensors, the defensive layer will have to incorporate several different features, from electronic countermeasures to kinetic solutions.
Electronic countermeasures include spoofing of positioning systems like GPS, and radio frequency jamming that blocks the connection between drone and operator. But these systems can be quite disruptive as they often interfere with all systems in range, making them less useful in urban contexts and near airports. Their effectiveness also often depends on continuous transmission, and they only work on drones that require a connection to the operator. This means they would be ineffective against autonomous, pre-programmed and tethered systems.
Electronic countermeasures have proven highly effective in Ukraine. But Russia has developed several workarounds to Ukraine’s efforts since the start of the war, and vice versa. Today Ukraine’s entire front line is GPS denied, so all drones operating there do so without relying on satellite guidance. Electronic countermeasures are also being circumvented by drones carrying with them up to 40km of fibre-optic cable through which signals are sent. This underlines the need for drone defences at the eastern flank to involve multiple systems.
Radio-frequency-based “cyber takeover” aims to take command of unwelcome drones and safely land them. This is a particularly desirable option as it preserves the drone for analysis. Yet it hinges on the cyber takeover’s ability to work on every drone system, including unknown ones.
Finally, Europe’s eastern flank will require a range of kinetic counter-drone tools—as a last resort for when electronic measures have failed to take down drones. These should include rifle-mounted systems, larger cannon-type systems, guided missiles and drones to fight drones. While generally effective, most kinetic solutions create the danger of collateral damage, as both projectile and drone come crashing down. During the Polish drone incursion in September 2025, the only property damage was caused by a missile that aimed to shoot down the drones.
Ukraine is now using interceptor drones, or drones that take out other drones. These include several systems, like drones with nets or those that ram hostile drones or blow up warheads that come near. (Incidentally, the existence of these systems has led to some confusion over the term “drone wall”, as some reports have suggested that it would be a wall made of drones, a misunderstanding helped along by the fact that a German firm had proposed such a project previously.)
Other countermeasures such as lasers, electromagnetic pulses, strong light and microwave weapons exist, but have not yet matured sufficiently and face similar limitations to those mentioned above, such as the need for line-of-sight or the risk of collateral damage.
Crucially, Europe needs a command-and-control node to collect data. For drone defence to be truly integrated and European, the goal should be for this data to feed into a common operating picture that covers the entire flank, from Nuorgam in northern Finland to Burgas in southern Bulgaria. How to respond to a given threat should remain a more local decision, but information-sharing will still be crucial to understand any attack situation. It is equally desirable for European countries to exchange information with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence. AI and automation may also prove useful, though it will be necessary to heed the lessons of over-reliance on technology and automation, for instance, from the October 7th attacks against Israel.
*
Building a multi-layered system of systems like this on the eastern flank may seem a daunting task, not to mention an expensive one. But as the alternative is for EU and NATO countries to continue spending tens of thousands of euros to shoot down a single drone, or not to detect or shoot it down at all, it is a task in which the EU and all European countries have a stake.
The work has already begun. The European Commission has been most vocal about its plans to build up an ambitious “drone wall”, now rebranded as the European Drone Defence Initiative. NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry in September 2025 and runs counter-drone trials with companies. At the national level, many border states are pursuing counter-drone efforts of varying ambition and scope. But the eastern flank remains a long way away from the defences described above, and the lack of coordination could undermine both the initiatives’ efficacy and their cost-efficiency.
By accident of the calendar, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union address took place just a day after the Poland incident in 2025. In her speech, she called for the EU to establish a “drone wall” that would be the “foundation of a credible European defence” and announced the “Eastern Flank Watch” to conduct real-time surveillance of the eastern border.
Von der Leyen offered more details in another speech at the European parliament a few weeks later, noting that using expensive fighter jets to take down cheap, mass-produced drones was “absolutely not sustainable”. Instead, the drone wall should be a system that performs “swift detection, swift interception, and when needed, swift neutralisation”. In October 2025, the informal European Council meeting in Copenhagen endorsed these projects.
Almost a year on, and the European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch are two of four EU readiness flagship efforts, alongside the European air and space shields. Yet the Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch are linked in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish between the two. The official commission communication notes, for example, that “anti-drone capabilities will form a core component of the Eastern Flank Watch flagship”. In any case, the projects aim to reach initial capacity by end of this year, and full capacity by end of 2027 and 2028, respectively.
While the intention of the EU’s effort is good, its stated scope sounds overly ambitious. For example, the October 2025 Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 notes that “the counter-drone network will be adaptable for civ-mil and dual use purposes and help deal with non-defence related threats or other hazards common to every EU border. This includes border protection, weaponisation of migration, protection of critical infrastructure and transnational organised crime.” Von der Leyen expressed similarly wide-ranging aspirations in her speech to parliament, and added guarding the southern flank to the mix as well as countering the Russian shadow fleet—all with the aid of autonomous systems.
Such an all-encompassing proposal appears set for failure, however, and likely only became so inflated in the first place to placate member states away from the eastern flank.
Today, NATO is the most active body in fighting drone incursions. After Poland invoked Article 4, the alliance launched Operation Eastern Sentry which increased vigilance along the eastern flank. In many instances when drones have been shot down, it was by fighter jets under NATO command.
NATO also plays a useful role in testing counter-drone technologies for member states to procure. The alliance is, for example, running exercises under its “Layered Counter-Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS) Initiative Crucible”. The first of these took place in Romania and focused on how various sensors, effectors and command-and-control systems could operate as a single, layered defence. Over 250 systems were involved, including radars, acoustic and radio-frequency detectors, electronic warfare tools, and kinetic and non-kinetic effectors. The exercise’s scenario involved drone swarms flown over the Black Sea and included representatives from Ukraine who advised on drone tactics and evolving threats.
Still, NATO’s approach remains primarily focused on fighter jets, as they are at the alliance’s disposal. Any longer-term, more cost-effective solution will depend on member state buy-in and member state efforts.
For the moment, national-level counter-drone efforts look most promising. Yet the level of development varies significantly along the eastern flank.
Poland’s plans seem most advanced. In January 2026, the Polish government announced the launch of an “anti-drone wall”, reportedly Europe’s largest counter-drone system. The project is estimated at €3.8bn and brings together a consortium of three companies: the state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, the Norwegian firm Kongsberg and the Polish company Advanced Protection Systems.
According to Poland’s defence minister, the system will include 18 anti-drone batteries, 52 firing platoons, 18 command platoons, and 703 military trucks and reconnaissance vehicles. The sensor layer will include short- and medium-range radars, passive electronic detection sensors and electro-optical systems. The defensive layer will be based on Kongsberg’s “Protector” family of weapons and include 35mm anti-aircraft guns, capable of firing programmable and high-velocity ammunition; 30mm cannons; 12.7mm multi-barrel heavy machine guns, intended for short-range threats; laser-guided rockets; and interceptor drones. It will also include non-kinetic defences, including electronic warfare capabilities. Deputy defence minister Cezary Tomczyk noted that different systems would be used in different contexts. Referring to the danger from debris, he said: “Some of this is for use only in extreme or war conditions. For example, these multi-barrel machine guns are difficult to use in peacetime, because everything that goes up must go down.”
The Polish initiative’s command-and-control layer integrates fire control, system management and tactical situational awareness, enabling real-time coordination of sensors and effectors. Initial operational capabilities are scheduled for delivery before the end of 2026, with the aim of it being fully operational by the end of 2027. For Poland, the drone wall is only one element of stronger fortifications on its borders with Belarus and the Russian Kaliningrad exclave.
In cooperation with the European Commission, Poland has also announced the creation of a “drone valley”, a hub of drone-related research and testing in the south-east of the country, in Rzeszow—a city that has become the hub for logistical support to Ukraine. Companies are increasingly entering the defence field, so such a hub will host some of the trade fairs and hackathons on counter-drone measures that are becoming more common in Europe.
Further north in the Baltic countries, in February 2025, a consortium of several companies led by the Estonian Defence Industry Cluster initiated the “Baltic drone wall”. The effort includes companies from Poland and Finland, but a request for funding from the EU was rejected in March 2025. Media sources report a multi-layered short-range drone countermeasure system, and efforts to build a common operational picture. But so far, nothing comprehensive has come to pass. Still, in June Estonia began deploying its first fixed drone detection and monitoring systems along its border with Russia. The systems are installed on three sections of the border between the Luhamaa crossing and the tri-border area where Estonia, Latvia, and Russia meet.
Finland’s government announced in April 2026 that it is allocating €44m to the Border Guard to procure drone detection systems, and fixed and mobile counter-drone technologies. It has also been working on drone detection along the border for several months.
As of summer 2026, Romania is experiencing the most frequent incursions. But it only recently began looking into counter-drone systems. The country is now investing heavily in its defences, specifically its aerial defences, which include counter-drone systems. These initiatives are in part financed by EU loans through the re-armament initiative SAFE. The country has also turned to NATO as well as allied countries to help it fight against drone incursions.
In Bulgaria, drone defences have not yet become a priority. The country is, however, looking into the acquisition of counter-drone systems, funded through the EU loan mechanism. Hungary and Slovakia were absent from initial EU drone defence discussions with the other eastern flank states. Slovakia joined later exchanges and has looked into the acquisition of counter-drone systems, but it does not appear to have a more comprehensive counter-drone initiative. In July, Slovakia hosted a NATO test of emerging capabilities which included counter-drone technology, though this was not its main focus.
It is positive that the EU, NATO and the eastern flank states are working on solutions. But too many initiatives exist, which risks duplicating conceptual work and creating uncertainty for companies that do not know who to work with. The further along individual projects are, the harder it will be to combine them and to facilitate the kind of information exchange needed for a common operating picture. To ensure coherence and interoperability, especially at the data-exchange level, more coordination needs to happen now.
The EU should view this as an opportunity to fulfil its ambitious goal. Although it should drop the aim to create a drone wall that can do just about everything, it can play the coordinating role of bringing the relevant actors together. To do so, the EU should focus on the following five priorities:
The EU is already organising virtual meetings between the involved states. It should now develop this coordinating role to share legal best practices and develop common rules regarding when and how military drones can be intercepted in a civilian setting. For example, one reason the drone flying into Romanian airspace in May was not intercepted was uncertainty over the legality of interception: “Ukraine is at war, but Romania is at peace”, a military representative said. All eastern flank states share the same situation. And the fact that many of the national efforts are funded with the help of the SAFE defence loan programme boosts the EU’s legitimacy in taking on this role.
Organisationally, national police forces deal with drones over critical infrastructure. And the EU is well-placed to help spread insights from counter-drone operations at the eastern flank farther west. Technologically, member states’ experiences at the eastern flank also hold several lessons for the rest of the continent: which systems work and in which environments, for example, and how different technologies can work together. Again, the EU can help to compile and share this valuable information, reducing the burden on member states to collect it themselves.
Countering drones flying over critical infrastructure will not require something quite as elaborate and unified as defences at the eastern flank:
Europeans face a dual drone threat over their critical infrastructure and at the eastern flank. They need to address both sides of this problem. While there is no wall to be built and no umbrella to open over the entire continent, insights from one side of the threat can inform the other.
The EU should start by turning its overly ambitious Drone Defence Initiative into something operable. To do so, it should focus on supporting existing national initiatives on the eastern flank and incentivising budding ones. It should also prioritise data-sharing and establishing a joint operating picture, and collecting information on which systems work in what context. The EU should then use this information to help all member states counter drones beyond the eastern flank.
This policy brief focused drone defence—a crucial skill for all European states as drones are without question a threat they will continue to encounter. Yet, with regard to the drone threat from Russia, a better option than to defend against overflights and incursions is to stop them from happening in the first place: no build-up of European defences can replace diplomatic, political and military efforts to end the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid attacks against European nations; even if better defences would contribute to deterrence by denial in the meantime.
Dr Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Paris office. Her areas of focus include German and European security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and AI on geopolitics and warfare.
[1] DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung, Drone Report, July 2026.
A casual snapshot with a prominent Alternative for Germany (AfD) politician has ignited a massive political firestorm in a small German town, leaving four volunteer firefighters facing potential expulsion from service.
The controversy centers on the market square of Egeln – a town of 3,000 residents in Saxony-Anhalt – where local volunteers chose to pose for a photograph with AfD lead candidate, Ulrich Siegmund.
For those readers unfamiliar with Siegmund, he is arguably public enemy number one in the country at the moment. With upcoming state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, much is at stake, with Siegmund’s AfD party is close to capturing an absolute majority of the vote. Due to the popularity of Siegmund in the state, Spiegel Magazine has now famously released a cover featuring the AfD politician while labeling him the “most dangerous man in Germany.” In the article, which describes Siegmund as good looking, polished, and excellent at connecting with voters, his photo is presented as if it were a police mugshot.
The magazine article comes almost at the same time as the incident with the firefighters, which was captured on video last week by “Weichreite TV.” According to the video footage, an active fire truck pulled up near an AfD information booth. The crew, still wearing portions of their official fire department uniforms, approached the politician.
The interaction began cordially, with Siegmund greeting the emergency responders warmly. Shaking their hands, the politician remarked, “Boys, call it a day, you deserve it. Thank you for your efforts.” Seeking to connect further, Siegmund later asked, “Is there anything else I can do for you?”
One of the volunteers responded, “We just wanted to take a look, we wanted to meet in person.”
The group then gathered in front of their department vehicle to take a commemorative photo with the AfD candidate.
Egeln’s long-standing mayor, Michael Stöhr, reacted with fury. The fact that Siegmund’s party is polling at 43 percent, which means nearly half of all voters support him, did not stop the enraged mayor from threatened to fire volunteer firefighters – a move that could leave his community vulnerable during peak wildfire season.
In a detailed, sharply worded Facebook statement, the independent politician expressed that he was “stunned” by the crew’s actions, arguing that their conduct inflicted “enormous damage” on the reputation of the volunteer fire service.
“As mayor of the municipality and head of the volunteer fire department, I expressly clarify that such behavior by members of our volunteer fire department in the line of duty cannot be tolerated,” Stöhr wrote. He further announced his intention to “evaluate the action internally and of course draw appropriate consequences.”
He even implied that taking a photograph with one politician could mean their political alignment could compromise their impartiality during emergency operations. Thus, he is implying these firefighters may refuse to put out a fire simply because they posed with an AfD politician.
“Our population must be able to rely on our fire department to provide assistance in an emergency, regardless of political opinion, religion, or origin. Should this be even remotely questioned by members of the volunteer fire department, then they have no business being in the fire department anymore.” Stöhr claimed.
Concluding his public statement, Stöhr stated that he could only “therefore, explicitly apologize to all volunteer helpers in the fire departments,” while stating “that something like this will not happen again in our local fire brigades of the Egelner Mulde municipality.”
The mayor’s strict disciplinary stance has triggered an intense wave of public criticism. Rather than garnering widespread community support, the Facebook post quickly became a lightning rod for controversy, accumulating nearly 8,500 comments.
The vast majority of online users expressed deep shock over how the volunteer first responders were being publicly treated by local leadership. In the wake of the uproar, several commentators have begun demanding the resignation of Mayor Stöhr, who has held his office for 16 years.
The post ‘Most dangerous man in Germany’ – Local mayor threatens to fire firefighters for posing with AfD politician appeared first on Remix News.
A teenage girl is in critical condition after a boat carrying ten illegal migrants struck her off Su Giudeu beach in Chia, Italy, yesterday afternoon. The boat was transporting migrants from North Africa.
The victim sustained severe injuries, including fractures and lacerations, after being caught by the boat’s propeller. The injuries led her to lose consciousness, but she was rescued by lifeguards before she could drown. Once they could drag her to shore, they began to administer first aid.
The horrifying incident happened at approximately 4:30 p.m. in the bathing area in front of Su Giudeu beach where the 118 air ambulance landed, according to TGR.
Due to the severity of her injuries, emergency medical personnel intubated the young woman on-site. She was then airlifted via air ambulance to Brotzu Hospital in Cagliari, where she was admitted in critical condition.
While it remains unclear exactly how the young woman became trapped by the engine propeller, boats carrying undocumented migrants have increasingly appeared directly on popular swimming beaches across Europe over recent years. Often, these vessels offload their passengers right in front of shocked beachgoers.
The risk of a serious accident during these landings is high. Smugglers are often desperate to quickly unload their cargo and escape, creating high-tension situations where they fail to notice swimmers. Additionally, after grueling journeys at sea, the arriving passengers are frequently eager to scramble ashore as fast as possible.
The post Italy: Young girl in critical condition after boat carrying illegal migrants strikes her with propeller appeared first on Remix News.
The eruption of the Siphon crater is pictured in a screenshot from a video by the State Forestry Corps of the Sicily Region, which is closely monitoring the volcano’s activity and safely accompanying numerous tourists on excursions.
By Gospa News Editorial Staff
POSTED ON AUGUST 17, 2026
A new surge in activity on Etna has triggered a renewed red alert for air traffic. The National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology, Etna Observatory, has issued a new VONA (Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation) warning of intense explosive activity.
This follows the August 15 earthquake on the mountain, which occurred just days after the more powerful one that caused extensive damage to the Campi Flegrei supercaldera, where a devastating resumption of volcanic activity is feared.
The bulletin highlights ashfall in the area southeast of the volcano, with an ash cloud constantly moving in the same direction. The phenomenon, constantly monitored by thermal and visible surveillance cameras, marks an increase in alertness compared to previous warnings, which were at code orange.
“Due to Etna’s eruptive activity and the associated emission of volcanic ash into the atmosphere, the areas corresponding to sectors B1 and B2 have been closed. Incoming flight activity is limited to five aircraft per hour until 2:00 PM today. No restrictions on departures.”
SAC (Catania Airport) announced this morning in a statement, urging “passengers to check the status of their flights with their airlines before traveling to the airport.”
Etna is making its voice heard again with a new and intense eruptive phase. According to the monitoring system of the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) – Etna Observatory in Catania, a sharp increase in volcanic activity was recorded at the summit craters throughout the day on August 16th.
The findings show a resumption of Strombolian activity at the Voragine crater, accompanied by an intensification of ash emission from the northeast crater. Forecast models indicate that the ash plumes generated by the explosions have dispersed in a southeasterly direction across the volcano’s summit area.
From a seismic perspective, technicians report a sharp increase in volcanic tremor, culminating in the mid-August earthquake (read below).
The extraordinary influx of people continues near Etna’s lava flow, which continues to be fed. Meanwhile, disruptions to air travel in Sicily continue due to the eruption and the resulting volcanic ash emission, but a thirty-year-old hiker has lost his life after being struck by lightning while on Etna.
According to initial reports, the hiker was a US citizen who had ventured into the restricted area to observe the volcano’s summit up close. At midday, when a violent thunderstorm struck the area where he was located, he was reportedly struck by an electrical discharge.
He was found in agony a few hours later. Despite emergency medical services, he was taken by helicopter by firefighters, but was already dead.
At 12:24 p.m. on August, 15, 2026, the earth shook in the province of Catania.
The National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) recorded a magnitude 3.9 earthquake with its epicenter near Linguaglossa. The hypocenter, located just 1 kilometer below the surface, amplified the perception of earthquake movement among the population.
The magnitude 3.9 earthquake felt in the late morning in the Catania area, with its epicenter 7 kilometers from Linguaglossa, was “triggered by the opening of the Pernicana fault linked to volcanic activity.” Salvo Cocina, head of the Sicilian Civil Protection Department, explained this on his social media channels.
Cocina also lists the initial damage reported: “The road to Piano Provenzana, in the Ragabo Clan dei Ragazzi area, is broken.” “The restaurants in the area have been evacuated as a precaution,” he adds. “There are no reports of further damage. Investigations are underway. Civil Protection, Forestry, the Municipality, and the Province are on site.”
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