Under heavy escort, the USS Abraham Lincoln transited the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait over the weekend, en route to Thailand for a highly publicized and much-needed liberty port call. Guided-missile cruiser USS Robert Smalls led the three-ship column, with guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. following astern of the supercarrier as she entered the South China Sea. Multiple Thai officials have confirmed the upcoming port visit since it was first reported by USA Today last week, with the flattop expected to pull into port at Laem Chabang in the coming days. Meanwhile, America’s other two deployed carrier groups are in the Middle East enforcing the ongoing blockade as the U.S. and Iran exchange fire for the first time since July.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.

Lincoln Enters The South China Sea, Again, En Route To Thailand For Liberty

Abraham Lincoln flipped her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on ahead of the transit, broadcasting the flattop’s position publicly for the first time since January 28, 2026, when the CSG made the transit in the opposite direction prior to Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln has now been deployed for 285 days without a liberty call, but that streak is set to end this week.

For friends and family, we anticipate an arrival back home in late September or early October, depending on how long the crew stays in Thailand and whether any other stops are made along the way. When all is said and done, Abraham Lincoln’s deployment will likely become the second-longest in the modern carrier era behind the historic 326 days logged by the USS Gerald R. Ford earlier this year.

While the composition of the Abraham Lincoln CSG has shifted over the nine-plus-month deployment, Frank E. Petersen Jr., a Flight IIA Technology Insertion (TI) Arleigh Burke class destroyer and one of the newest in the fleet, embarked the commander of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) throughout the six months of almost nonstop combat operations against Iran. The IAMD commander is responsible for coordinating the detection, response, and interception of inbound aerial threats, and Petersen Jr. is equipped with the world’s foremost integrated naval combat system – the Aegis Combat System Baseline 9 – which delivers quick reaction times, concentrated and networked firepower, and advanced electronic countermeasure capabilities for anti-air warfare.

The unannounced addition of Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Robert Smalls, which has historically served as the IAMD commander for the carriers forward-deployed out of Yokosuka, Japan, adds 122 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells packed with missiles for protection and firepower. The rationale for the additional Tico cruiser, an iconic class that will be completely retired over the coming years without a comparable replacement, is unclear. TWZ has not received an on-the-record response from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) or U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) public affairs explaining the redirection.

Robert Smalls was part of the George Washington CSG as recently as August 18, making the northwest-bound Malacca Strait transit with the strike group the week prior, before peeling off to escort the Abraham Lincoln back through.

U.S. Launches Another Round of Strikes Against Iran Today As Tensions Escalate

Ahead of publication on Tuesday, CENTCOM announced a fresh round of strikes against targets in Iran that began at noon Eastern Time. “The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members deployed to the region,” the command posted in a statement on social media.

George Washington, which is currently accompanied by a single destroyer, USS Shoup, relieved the Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East earlier this month. Other U.S. 5th Fleet ships are reportedly moving in and out of the CSG, but the situation is fluid and TWZ cannot confirm the current, complete composition of the group. It’s unknown which warship, if any, is currently serving as IAMD commander for the CSG, which chopped into the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) on or around August 19.

Also operating in the Middle East, the four-ship George H.W. Bush CSG is underway at an undisclosed location in the Arabian Sea. Alongside USS George H.W. Bush is Tico cruiser USS Princeton, the IAMD commander, and two Burke destroyers, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook.

The carriers are enforcing the ongoing blockade of Iran – and presumably participating in the latest round of airstrikes – although they are both officially on station to “support maritime security and stability in the Middle East,” according to DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform. CENTCOM forces have redirected 84 commercial vessels, disabled three using kinetic force, and boarded another two since the blockade resumed, as of September 1.

Over the weekend, the United States and Iran traded blows for the first time in over a month. CENTCOM opened the tit-for-tat exchange on Sunday by targeting rocket systems on Larak Island, located in the Strait of Hormuz on the Iranian side of the northern corridor, that are fitted to launch naval mines, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was observed making preparations to fire into the contested waterway.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told TWZ. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz,” he added. The IRGC retaliated by launching a salvo of ballistic missiles at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, a Jordanian installation the U.S. military operates from. Jordan’s military said it successfully intercepted eight missiles.

The preemptive strikes to prevent Iran from deploying additional mines came just days after CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said U.S. forces “successfully cleared” Iranian sea mines from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. Commercial traffic through the strait is slowly recovering but still well below pre-war levels.

Ongoing Maintenance Delays Stateside Impact Fleet Readiness

On the other side of the world, in the United States, three carriers are active: two are underway training while one is in homeport getting ready for an upcoming deployment. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which left Norfolk on August 21, transited south in the Atlantic Ocean and was last operating approximately 70 nautical miles off the coast of Florida, well into East Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command (TRACOM) Carrier Qualifications (CQ). After departing San Diego on August 10, USS Carl Vinson was spotted on satellite imagery off the California coast by ship-tracker MT Anderson, in the process of completing Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) and Final Evaluation Period (FEP) training.

USS Theodore Roosevelt, the next carrier slated to deploy from the continental U.S., is pierside at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, based on commercial satellite imagery. Speculation is rampant about where Theodore Roosevelt will deploy, but as the Navy has told us many times, “we do not discuss future operations or timelines.”

The balance of America’s carriers (excluding USS Nimitz, which will begin deactivation in 2027) is either in maintenance or scheduled to begin an availability in the future.

The next flattop that will re-enter service, USS Ronald Reagan, is expected to finish a roughly 17-month Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) soon. “The docking planned incremental availability for Ronald Reagan is on track for its scheduled completion at the end of August 2026,” Catherine Norton, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, told Stars and Stripes earlier this month. However, the ship has not gotten underway as of publication, even though yesterday was the end of the month, and it appears the DPIA will stretch into September. TWZ reached out to Puget Sound’s PAO but has not received a response yet. For the latest status of the other three carriers in current or upcoming maintenance, marked in red on the map above, check out our recent deep-dive here.

Current Big Deck Force Posture At A Glance

Overall carrier force posture is unchanged compared to our previous report on August 24. Three U.S. carriers are deployed (although one is on the tail end of her deployment and heading home to San Diego), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, two are working up in various states of readiness, four are in maintenance, and another, the USS Nimitz, is being used primarily for training before deactivating next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-deployed and at homeport, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Update as of September 2: The USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in Laem Chabang, Thailand, on Wednesday, local time. “Our arrival in Laem Chabang provides a well-deserved opportunity for our Sailors and Marines to rest and recharge. It also underscores the strong and enduring partnership and alliance between the United States and Thailand,” Rear Adm. Robert E. Loughran, commander, CSG-3, said in a statement released by the ship’s public affairs team. “What this strike group has accomplished is truly historic. I could not be prouder of the exceptional professionalism and expertise demonstrated by every member of this team during our operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,” he added.

Check out our full report on the carrier, which has been run very hard over the past nine months and has the scars to show for it, here.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: USS Abraham Lincoln Escorted To Thailand As The Middle East Heats Up appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy’s newest stated requirements for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) effort point toward a drone that sounds very much like an advanced uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), rather than a smaller and less capable autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ intended to economically augment crewed fighters. Overall, the new requirements serve as a tacit admission that the Navy is still looking for the kind of drone that it previously explored with extreme promise in the X-47B and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. The UCLASS requirements were abruptly shelved and replaced with an uncrewed carrier-based tanker effort, which resulted in the MQ-25 Stingray. This act was seen by some as one of the most controversial and puzzling procurement decisions in modern naval aviation history.

The traditional loyal wingman or CCA concept generally envisions uncrewed ‘fighter’ aircraft whose primary purpose is to complement crewed companions. This typically involves extending the crewed platform’s sensor reach, carrying additional weapons, and opening up a greatly expanded tactics playbook. An advanced UCAV, by contrast, is fundamentally an independent combat aircraft in its own right, designed to deliver weapons and other effects similar to what a crewed platform can provide without requiring a crew onboard or nearby. As such, it is more capable, survivable, and an overall ‘exquisite’ asset with a heavier payload, more capable of taking the place of a crewed aircraft in certain roles, rather than augmenting them, although there is nothing keeping them from working in a loyal wingman type role if required.

Yesterday, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) released a new Request for Information (RFI) that lays out an unusually demanding set of requirements for a CCA Increment 1 prototype. Among other things, the Navy wants an aircraft capable of operating from its aircraft carriers, carrying plentiful weapons, conducting strike missions in highly contested environments, and operating both independently and as part of a larger crewed-uncrewed team.

The combination of these requirements provides a much clearer picture of what the Navy wants its future carrier-based combat drones to be capable of.

Perhaps the most striking requirement concerns weapons carriage. The Navy says the Increment 1 CCA must have the ability to carry four externally mounted weapons weighing up to 2,500 pounds each throughout the target flight envelope and during carrier certification activities. That equates to a potential external weapons load of 10,000 pounds, although it should not necessarily be interpreted as the aircraft’s normal operational configuration. By way of comparison, a very heavily loaded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet might launch with close to 17,000 pounds of weapons and stores — though that is far from common.

Meanwhile, the kinds of drones that the U.S. Air Force is currently exploring under its own separate CCA Increment 1 effort, namely the General Atomics YFQ-42A Dark Merlin and Anduril YFQ-44A Fury, are air-to-air optimized. Their primary loadout is widely expected to be a pair of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, which is just a fraction of the Navy’s newly stated payload requirement.

The RFI NAVAIR put out yesterday also specifically asks respondents to address internal weapons carriage, with both capacity and survivability among the factors the Navy will consider. Internal stores carriage would offer obvious advantages in reducing an aircraft’s radar signature and preserving aerodynamic performance.

The Navy also wants the aircraft to have a substantial combat radius while carrying its required weapons load, as well as the ability to spend at least 30 minutes on station while retaining sufficient fuel reserves to return to the carrier.

For a CCA, carrier operations add another layer of complexity. The aircraft must be capable of catapult launches and arrested landings from both Ford and Nimitz class carriers, while operating within existing carrier deck, elevator, hangar, and support constraints.

Autonomy is similarly central to the concept. The Navy wants mission and flight autonomy that can support the aircraft from launch through recovery, along with the ability to incorporate third-party mission software. The prototype is also expected to demonstrate both individual and multi-aircraft autonomous operations. While crewed-uncrewed teaming is a fundamental part of the concept, the latest requirements make it clear that the aircraft will not depend on a crewed aircraft continuously supervising its actions.

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier- and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

In terms of the survivability requirement, the Navy specifically wants the aircraft to operate in highly contested environments and is asking industry to provide approaches for assessing and managing survivability during collaborative operations. The consideration of internal weapons carriage is another indication that signature reduction and survivability are important design considerations, pointing to a low-observable (stealthy) platform.

All of this begins to blur the distinction between the Navy’s Increment 1 CCA plan and a traditional survivable UCAV concept.

That does not necessarily mean the Navy is abandoning the CCA concept entirely in favor of resurrecting the carrier-based UCAV concept. Rather, it suggests that the distinction between the two becomes blurred as requirements overlap. There also remains the strong possibility (or more likely probability) that the Navy will seek to explore CCA designs closer to what the Air Force, as well as the U.S. Marine Corps, are pursuing. This could potentially include development of carrier-based versions of one or more of those designs under a future increment.

The new RFI is also consistent with the Navy’s broader Air Wing of the Future effort (AWOTF).

An earlier NAVAIR sources-sought notice released in July outlined an expansive vision for future carrier-based uncrewed aircraft covering missions including surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. That notice also pointed toward aircraft capable of attacking targets at least 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier without requiring aerial refueling, while leaving open the possibility of extending that reach with tankers.

Intriguingly, the new RFI does not include an explicit maximum range target, but based on the payload requirements alone, this would be very considerable, reflecting the Navy’s concerns about fighting a future conflict across the vast distances of the Pacific. Traditional advanced UCAVs usually have a combat radius measured in thousands of miles, not hundreds, far exceeding the reach of their crewed fighter counterparts.

Whatever the possible range target, the planned weapons load also points to a substantial airframe. Indeed, the deck-space requirement outlined in the RFI is relevant here. The CCA’s “spot factor” cannot exceed that of an existing fourth-generation fighter, meaning that it could potentially be as large as an F/A-18E/F.

Otherwise, however, the latest CCA Increment 1 RFI is considerably more concrete.

The Navy wants a first flight of a prototype within 24 months of a contract award and carrier certification during a three-year development effort. It also wants a path toward an affordability target of around $30 million per aircraft. This kind of price point would put it at the top end of the CCA concepts we have seen so far, and is fairly ambitious for a higher-end UCAV.

Navy officials said in 2024 that the CCA’s unit cost target was around $15 million, reflecting the idea that the aircraft would be sufficiently inexpensive to be expendable under some circumstances. The new RFI instead asks industry to outline a path toward an affordability target of $30 million per aircraft. That is still a fraction of the cost of a modern carrier-based fighter, but it suggests the Navy is willing to pay considerably more for an aircraft with substantially greater weapons capacity, range, autonomy, and survivability.

As to the companies that might respond to the RFI, in August of last year, the Navy confirmed that Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman were all on contract for “conceptual” CCA designs. At that time, the service also said Lockheed Martin had been hired to work on a common control architecture for the drones. Lockheed Martin is already the prime contractor for the control stations and associated software the service is integrating onto its carriers now to support the MQ-25.

The new RFI, however, marks a shift from the conceptual studies described last year toward a specific prototype effort. The Navy is seeking industry input as it shapes the acquisition strategy, with responses due September 18.

In the past, the Navy has said it is aiming for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed, although the precise balance is still to be determined and will certainly be informed by the lessons of Navy CCA Increment 1. Exactly how the CCA might fit in with the Navy’s sixth-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – is another intriguing prospect, but would clearly be optimized to work alongside that platform.

Now, back to the Navy’s earlier effort to develop a high-end, stealthy, carrier-based UCAV capability. Northrop Grumman built two X-47B demonstrators for that program, both of which underwent extensive flight testing, including carrier operations and aerial refueling. The aircraft flew from 2011 for around half a decade. As of 2022, both X-47Bs had been earmarked for eventual public display at museums.

The two X-47Bs had offered far more than a glimpse of what a carrier-based UCAV capability might look like, and the base design was set to evolve into an operational type. These were large, stealthy UCAVs with thousands of pounds of payload and endurance that far outstripped crewed naval fighter aircraft. The follow-on UCLASS program aimed to see the capabilities the X-47 demonstrated put into operation via a new aircraft procurement effort. However, it transformed into the radically different, less ambitious, tanker-focused Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s. This, as noted, led to the MQ-25 Stingray.

To this day, the cancellation of UCLASS remains a very sore spot and is widely seen as a nearsighted and even reckless decision. This mirrored earlier moves by the USAF, which had demonstrated how revolutionary UCAV capabilities could be, only to entirely walk away from the concept. In fact, that service went even further, appearing to erase those developments from recent memory. You can read all about this bizarre and troubling inflection point in American air power history and the glaring questions surrounding it in this past feature.

Fast forward to today, and the Navy is getting the MQ-25, which is primarily a tanker, but clearly, that was not the only mission set that influenced its exotic design. In fact, these Navy requirements could open the door for the Stingray platform to potentially fulfill at least parts of the Navy uncrewed combat drone role in a ‘cleaned-up,’ stealthier configuration, something we have explored in depth in the past.

Overall, the takeaway here is that the Navy’s latest CCA requirements raise the intriguing possibility that its earlier UCAV ambitions are resurfacing, this time under the CCA banner. This is happening as China is moving very quickly with its own stealthy UCAVs, a number of which are in testing, and one of which is very mature and is navalized for shipboard operations – the GJ-11 Sharp Sword. The GJ-11 sounds very similar to the Navy’s requirements wish list, including its ability to act independently and teamed with crewed counterparts, as well as its general size and need for survivability.

While an RFI only represents an early part of the contracting process, in practical terms, it looks like the Navy is asking whether industry can finally make good on the past promise of a U.S. Navy UCAV.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Navy Sounds Like It Now Wants The Air Combat Drone It Notoriously Passed Over A Decade Ago appeared first on TWZ.

For about a month, the United States had refrained from attacking Iranian targets as the Trump administration turned toward economic warfare against the Islamic Republic. However, that changed last night when U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) struck what it said were Iranian rocket launchers preparing to fire naval mines into the Strait of Hormuz. The problem is that mine-deploying rockets are not a common capability, so much so that the statement seemed bizarre at first glance. But it just turns out that Iran does claim to have such a system and that system would have a glaring application in the current state of play of the conflict. In fact, it would be absolutely critical to do exactly what CENTCOM did, blowing them up prior to launching, because if they didn’t, the final and very fragile energy lifeline between the Persian Gulf and the world could be severed at the worst possible time.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told us Sunday evening. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz.”

The U.S. strikes against the launchers on Sunday spurred Iran to respond with ballistic missile attacks on a Jordanian air base housing U.S. troops. Jordanian officials said all eight missiles were intercepted, and no casualties or damage was inflicted.

#JORDAN INTERCEPTS 8 MISSILES

Jordan's @ArmedForcesJO say air defense systems intercepted eight missiles that entered the Kingdom's airspace early Monday.

The military said the missiles were destroyed before posing a threat to civilians or property.

Details:

A…

— Dana Zureikat Daoud دانا زريقات (@DanaZkat) August 31, 2026

Hawkins did not specify what exact type of rocket launcher was struck or whether this was the first time CENTCOM had seen Iran use this type of system to launch sea mines.

Though CENTCOM won’t comment on what kind of system was attacked, Iran did tout just this kind of a system last year with exactly the kind of range needed to be a huge problem for the U.S. and its allies. This system uses a variant of the Fajr-5 rocket that is converted with a sea mine warhead.

You can see a video of that system below.

Video of the Iranian rocket deployed naval mine system which is claimed to be able to deploy hundreds of mines in the sea from the coast in an hour. pic.twitter.com/ba897On0nV

— Mehdi H. (@mhmiranusa) January 24, 2025

The clip shows the rockets being fired from a truck-mounted multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The video later cuts to nose cone-shaped mines that appear to float on the surface above the spent missile body, however, little is known about the Fajr-5 sea mine warhead conversion process that allows them to be delivered by rocket.

We also don’t know the full extent to which Iran has developed and/or fielded this particular capability, or whether it has other options for similarly deploying naval mines by rocket. Neither Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, nor the Ambrey maritime security firm has seen any indication that Tehran has used an MLRS to launch sea mines in the past.

At the same time, “the Fajr-5 is an Iranian calling card, a 333mm caliber rocket that can reportedly travel 75 km carrying between an estimated 90 to 170 kg warhead, depending on the payload,” Taleblu, an expert on Iranian weapons systems, told TWZ.

The Fajr-5 is an established design that traces its roots back to the 1990s and has been evolving since then. “The Fajr class was initially designed as unguided artillery rockets, though Iran claims to have developed a guided version,” Taleblu added.

In general terms, being able to seed naval mines via artillery rockets would offer several advantages for Iran, most immediately by offering an alternative to traditional maritime mine-laying platforms. The destruction of Iran’s naval forces was a top stated objective for the U.S. military during the opening phases of the conflict earlier this year. Iranian vessels, including ones capable of laying mines, were heavily targeted. Still, Iran has retained a large number of its smaller boats that can be used for seeding minefields.

Regardless of what boats they have left, mining the area that actually matters most would be impossible to do as any vessel approaching the southern coast of the Strait of Hormuz would be destroyed. It’s through these tight and complex littorals that a reduced flow of commercial vessels are still traveling, under the kinetic umbrella of the U.S. and its Gulf state allies. The Fajr-5, fired from Iranian controlled islands in the strait, has the range to land in these waterways, seeding mines without risking any boat crews or other platforms. If the rocket-delivered mines splash down, the de-mining process would have to begin, which can be arduous and last weeks, potentially shutting down all shipping.

With that in mind, Iran’s weapon is remarkably relevant to the situation, assuming it works. But even if it doesn’t, it could still pose a risk to mariners even if its efficacy is questionable.

Furthermore, being able to turn any launcher for Fajr-5s (and/or potentially ones for other types of artillery rockets) into a naval mine layer rather than having to rely on specialized systems would be a boon unto itself. Artillery rockets and launchers are something Iran had deep stockpiles of before the war with the United States and Israel started earlier this year. How many naval mine rockets Iran might have, and whether it might be possible to convert existing types to that configuration, are open questions.

Using a road-mobile launcher would also give Iranians a ‘shoot-and-scoot’ option for deploying naval mines where the launch could be exposed only for a short period of time. This, in turn, would create additional targeting challenges for U.S. forces. It is possible that, as it does elsewhere, Iran has constructed tunnels under Larak Island to hide these systems, as well. 

Overall, the “deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method,” a piece published by the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) think tank last year, which also highlighted Iran’s apparent demonstration of the Fajr-5-based capability, noted.

While the Fajr-5’s estimated payload capacity is “light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines,” the mines the rockets could deliver “are still heavier than diver-delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field,” the piece added. “Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area.”

“Though it’s a bit unconventional, using a rocket launcher again signals that the regime is sensitive to cost and risk, and is trying to deploy mines in a way that doesn’t put as much personnel at risk as by dropping them overboard,” Taleblu posited. “It was reported in the military exercise over a year ago that the regime had used an MLRS system like the Fajr to deploy these, but I haven’t seen significant video confirmation of this most recent round.”

With all this in mind, the point about “psychological impact” mentioned in the CIMSEC piece could be particularly relevant in this case. By launching the attacks on Larak Island, CENTCOM has in a way given credence to Iran having a real capability to launch mines via rocket into the Strait of Hormuz. That threat by itself could be enough to cause commercial ship crews, their corporate operators, and insurance companies to think twice about attempted transits.

This is exactly the issue that President Trump, among others, has repeatedly sought to downplay, including multiple times just within the past week.

“We’re taking them in,” Trump told Glenn Beck last week. “The mines are gone. You probably saw that, we put it out yesterday, all the mines. We got rid of the mines. But the strait, it’s functioning, it’s a functioning strait. Uh, yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait.”

“Last week, CENTCOM completed clearing sea mines from the strait’s international shipping routes,” Hawkins, the CENTCOM spokesman, told us yesterday. “U.S. forces are monitoring the area closely and remain prepared to protect the free flow of commerce through this essential waterway.”

“The U.S. military has achieved a major milestone in the Strait of Hormuz,” Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM’s commander, stated last week. “We have successfully cleared sea mines in the strait’s international shipping lanes that were laid months ago by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Internationally recognized transit routes in the strait are free of Iranian sea mines, thanks to the incredible work of the U.S. military.”

Update from CENTCOM Commander: pic.twitter.com/osPbltjJ1C

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 28, 2026

CENTCOM pushed back Monday on Iranian claims that an oil tanker was hit by mines in the command’s preferred transit route.

“CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE,” the command stated on X. “FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is yet another IRGC attempt to intimidate regional commercial shipping through disinformation.”

CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE.

FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is… pic.twitter.com/spkaogBx81

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 31, 2026

Still, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) — a group of international navies which provides timely information to the shipping industry — sees mines as an ongoing risk in the strait.

“Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels, with a modest uptick from recent lows, still far below baseline,” JMIC stated on Sunday. “Independent tracking data indicated suppression with single-digit numbers transiting in both directions. There remained a continued risk of drifting or uncharted mines in and near the TSS, with mine danger areas still active.”

JMIC Advisory Note Update 091

Released by UKMTO on behalf of the Joint Maritime Information Centre.

Click here to view the full advisory note https://t.co/jHInhBdVRt#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/T6VzzxSdPD

— UKMTO Operations Centre (@UK_MTO) August 30, 2026

The combination of ongoing dangers in the strait continues to result in reduced traffic, the global trade intelligence firm Kpler noted on X.

“Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO [International Maritime Organization] verified no additional attacks,” Kpler added. “Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, with two entering the Middle East Gulf and three exiting. Four were classified as shadow vessels and one as sanctioned.”

Strait crossings remain subdued

Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO verified no additional attacks. Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral… pic.twitter.com/BI9cFAaJRy

— Kpler (@Kpler) August 26, 2026

The latest flare-up in fighting came after the Trump administration last week unleashed the threat of harsh new sanctions to further isolate Iran. However, that failed to move Tehran to change its position on maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, its nuclear ambitions or support for proxies like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Monday morning, Trump told Fox News reporter Trey Yingst that he was going to retaliate for Iran launching ballistic missiles last night after the U.S. strike on Larak Island.

“We’re going to hit them hard,” Trump told the network. “There will be a response.”

President Trump says the United States will respond to the Iranian missile attack on U.S. forces overnight.

"We're going to hit them hard," President Trump told Fox News. "There will be a response." pic.twitter.com/sjLOLSxm4g

— Trey Yingst (@TreyYingst) August 31, 2026

Trump and his senior aides “have been considering waging limited strikes in the Strait of Hormuz to prevent Iran from reconstituting its radar and missile capabilities to attack ships,” Axios reported, according to three U.S. officials. 

“One U.S. official said the idea behind the plan is to reduce the risk of Iranian attacks on oil tankers, U.S. Navy ships and Air Force aircraft — to ‘mow the lawn,’ as this person put it.”

It is unclear if Iran has used rockets to mine the strait or how well this system works if it did. However, the fact the U.S. resumed hostilities just to attack sea-mine-launching rocket systems shows the level of concern they engendered and the options Iran may still have to threaten the strait.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.

The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.

DIU exposes details of russia’s 3M22 Zircon ballistic missile — including its components, production chain, 70 companies involved, key personnel, and foreign equipment used to manufacture the weapon: https://t.co/oOBqjUb8dS pic.twitter.com/VqRSSA41iV

— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) August 31, 2026

The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.

Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.

While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.

The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.

Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.

The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.

Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.

The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.

The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.

The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.

It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.

The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.

Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.

However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.

Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.

Just published my new OSINT investigation into Russia's secretive Zircon missile whose combat use has risen sharply in 2026.

Available evidence suggests that Zircon is not a hypersonic cruise missile but rather a quasi-ballistic system.

Link: https://t.co/8DoQePRpX3 pic.twitter.com/bIBS532FUB

— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) June 17, 2026

More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.

Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.

That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.

There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.

None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.

If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.

Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.

That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.

Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.

A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:

Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.

Ru MoD released a somewhat better Zircon launch footage. pic.twitter.com/bxHa6DsFG7

— krakek (@krakek1) December 3, 2024

At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.

There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.

The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.

One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.

But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.

Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:

The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.

By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.

The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.

Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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The first of Japan’s two new cruiser-sized Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is continuing to take shape, recently receiving its huge main integrated mast, giving the vessel a new and remarkably imposing silhouette. The four very large fixed arrays for the ship’s powerful AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar will eventually be integrated onto this structure. The ASEV’s stated primary mission is missile defense, but Japanese authorities plan to give the vessels additional counter-drone, anti-ship, and land attack capabilities in the future. Tomahawk cruise missiles are notably set to be added to the ship’s arsenal down the line.

The ASEVs are large surface combatants, set to be some 620 feet long, have a beam (the widest point of the hull) of some 82 feet, and a standard displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, Japan’s largest surface combatants today, its Maya class destroyers, are just over 557 feet long, have a beam of some 73 feet, and a standard displacement of around 8,200 tons. It is worth noting here that the size of new and advanced destroyers, often optimized for anti-air warfare missions, has been trending upward globally in recent years. This, in turn, has caused the line between destroyers and what have more historically been categorized as cruisers in certain cases.

The first ASEV was laid down at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI) shipyard in Nagasaki in July 2025. The second was laid down in February of this year at Japan Marine United Isogo shipyard, which is situated in Yokohama City near Tokyo, according to a past report from Naval News. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is currently aiming to have the first of these vessels in service before the end of the country’s 2027 Fiscal Year, which runs from April 2027 to March 2028. The second is expected to follow in the 2028 fiscal cycle, which extends into 2029.

Significant progress in the overall construction of the first ship has been made just this year. The addition of the main mast structure, installed on top of the main superstructure, as seen in pictures at the top of this story and below, has drawn particular attention in recent weeks.

Japanese are very fast with ship building.

March 26 and today. ASEV-class destroyer.

190 m hull, SPY-7 Aegis, 128cell Mk 41 VLS. SM-3 for ballistic missiles, SM-6, plus Japan’s long range Type 12 SSM. pic.twitter.com/RQZixtqWwe

— 信濃 Æýà (@Shinano_AEya) August 30, 2026

The especially large size of the ASEV’s integrated mast is driven by that of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar from Lockheed Martin. Each one of the radar’s four rectangular arrays is reportedly around 14 feet (nearly 4.3 meters) tall. This would put them in the same general size category as the arrays for Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) found on U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers. That being said, the pictures we have now raise the question of whether the AN/SPY-7(V)1 arrays are bigger than previously assessed. The AMDR is another notably large design heavily optimized for missile defense.

The size and location of the mast provide a centralized, elevated position for the AN/SPY-7(V)1’s large arrays, which will also require significant power generation capacity and thermal management to keep everything cool. This is a notable departure from the placement of the arrays on the main superstructure on existing Japanese destroyers, as well as the U.S. Arleigh Burke class, and offers an unobstructed, elevated line-of-sight to the horizon. Beyond the ballistic missile defense mission, this view farther out over the horizon would be important for tracking and engaging low-flying drones and cruise missiles, which might be targeting the ship itself. This is something we will come back to later on.

“With five times the tracking capability of the SPY-1, it [the AN/SPY-7(V)1] counters lofted trajectories and simultaneous multiple ballistic missile threats,” according to a machine translation of a section of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2026 defense policy white paper, which was released earlier this month.

The passive electronically-scanned array (PESA) AN/SPY-1 was the first radar to be paired with the Aegis Combat System, and both were first introduced in the 1970s. Variants of the SPY-1 are still found on a variety of U.S. and foreign Aegis-equipped warships, including Japan’s Kongo, Atago, and Maya class destroyers.

The AN/SPY-7(V)1 is also a derivative of the U.S. military’s static, land-based Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Japan also originally planned to employ the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on land at a pair of Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. However, that effort was subsequently cancelled, with the ASEV emerging to fill the resulting gap.

Additional versions of the AN/SPY-7 with much smaller arrays are also being integrated onto new F110 Bonifaz class frigates for the Spanish Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy’s forthcoming River class destroyers (also known as the Canadian Surface Combatant). The use of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on the ASEV could impact decisions regarding new radars for other future and existing Japanese warships. Raytheon is also pitching versions of its increasingly popular AN/SPY-6 family for use on a successor to the Kongo class and for refit on the Maya class, according to a recent report from Naval News.

When it comes to the ASEV, as already noted, the AN/SPY-7(V)1 is central to the ship’s main stated missile defense mission. As the name makes clear, the ship will also feature the Aegis Combat System. The vessel will be capable of “remote engagement and guidance against anti-air targets tracked by other vessels” via a “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC),” per the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual defense white paper.

The video below provides details about the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) developments, which are likely very similar to what Japan has planned for the ASEV.

In terms of armament, when the ASEVs first enter service, their main weaponry is expected to be a mix of variants of the Standard Missile-3 and -6 (SM-3 and SM-6). The SM-3 family is designed to engage ballistic missile threats during the mid-course portion of their flights while they are traveling outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. The SM-3 also has a demonstrated anti-satellite capability. The SM-6 is a multi-purpose missile that was originally designed with an anti-air focus. It can be used to target incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and also has at least a degree of capability for engaging hypersonic weapons. SM-6 can be used in a surface-to-surface mode, including against ships, as well. Japan is also a partner in the U.S.-led development of a new Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed specifically to intercept unpowered, but highly maneuverable hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

SM-3, SM-6, and future GPIs will be loaded into either of the ASEV’s two Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays, one at the bow end and another toward the stern. Each one of the ships will have a total of 128 VLS cells. For comparison, Japan’s Maya class destroyers, as well as the U.S. Navy’s Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke class destroyers, have 96 VLS cells apiece. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class cruisers each have 122 VLS cells, and 128 is also the number of VLSs currently expected to be found on the future Trump class battleships.

At the time of writing, Japanese authorities do not appear to have explicitly mentioned plans to arm the ASEVs with other missiles when they first enter service. That being said, any VLS array capable of accommodating SM-3s and SM-6s should be able to fire a variety of other weapons, including shorter-ranged SM-2s and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), which the ship could use for more localized air and missile defense, as well as protecting the ship itself.

Renderings and models of the ASEV do show the design also armed with a five-inch naval gun in a turret on the bow, along with two Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) and other automatic cannons for point defense.

As mentioned, while missile defense is the immediate focus for the ASEVs, there are already plans to significantly expand their capability to engage other ships and targets on land. Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new, extended-range version of the Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile are set to be added to the arsenal of these vessels in the 2032 timeframe, according to the latest official Japanese defense white paper.

Japanese authorities want the ASEVs to eventually be able to help fend off waves of enemy drones, too. High-energy laser-directed energy weapons are set to be integrated onto the ships down the line to help address those threats. The overall size and other general characteristics of the ships would leave the door open to the possible addition of high-power microwaves and other capabilities in the future.

TWZ has long noted that the ASEVs will bring huge new boosts in naval air and missile defense and long-strike capability to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The vessels also reflect a significant evolution in post-World War II Japanese doctrine, toward what officials currently frame as a “stand-off defense” construct that remains within the bounds of the country’s current pacifist constitution.

Just with SM-3, SM-6, and GPI, the ASEVs will offer an important addition to the air and missile defense bubbles around Japan’s home islands and outlying territories in the face of growing geopolitical friction with China and Russia, two countries that are increasingly cooperating militarily. The vessels will also add to Japan’s deterrent against long-standing and still evolving threats posed by the regime in North Korea, which has its own close ties to the Chinese and Russian governments. All three of these nations continue to expand their arsenals of ever-more capable ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Long-range one-way-attack drones are another growing part of the equation, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and fighting in the Middle East in recent years underscoring just how real a threat they pose.

With the addition of Tomahawks, the ASEVs, along with other Japanese warships, will gain the additional ability to threaten counterstrikes against targets on land (and potentially at sea) at least around 1,000 miles in any direction. As part of the broader stand-off defense strategy, the Japan Self Defense Forces is developing new land-based long-range strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, as well.

It is worth noting that with current plans to acquire only two ASEVs, these will be high-value but also low-density assets, which will have to be very deliberately deployed for maximum effect. They will also stand out as top-priority targets in any future conflict, and will need to be protected as such.

It is possible that the roles and missions of the ASEVs, just like their designs, could evolve further as time goes on. The threat ecosystem facing Japan will continue to evolve, likely more rapidly, in the coming years. The country is also expanding its naval capabilities in other ways, and with an eye toward more blue water operations. This includes expanded light carrier capabilities through refits of existing Izumo class ships. Anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, among large volumes of more traditional threats, could see the ASEVs used as escorts, even if experimentally. While just two hulls are barely enough to keep one on patrol to protect Japan, more could be built for expeditionary applications.

Regardless, the ASEVs are set to be a major addition to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s fleets that will have big ramifications. From the progress that is visible at the shipyard in Nagasaki, MHI looks to be well on track to deliver the first of these ships next year or two.

Special thanks to @kensakai9310 on X, who also goes by “Sakai,” for sharing recently taken pictures of the first ASEV under construction at MHI’s yard in Nagasaki with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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