Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

The booster stage of a Chinese-made DF-15A (Dong Feng-15A) ballistic missile operated by Saudi Arabia fell in Raghwan District, Marib Governorate, northern Yemen. pic.twitter.com/dfSXMOiCzQ

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 14, 2026

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

العثور على بقايا صاروخ صيني من طراز DF-15A في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/af9mGNNxiA

— إيران بالعربية (@iraninarabic_ir) September 14, 2026

As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Diesel fuel prices are already at record highs in Poland, but there are fears the situation on the Polish fuel market could become much worse. With the Saudi East-West pipeline now down after a series of drone strikes, not only prices are an issue but obtaining sufficient fuel supply could be the real worst-case scenario.

On Sept. 10, the East-West pipeline, which transports oil from Saudi Arabia’s oil fields to a port on the Red Sea, was hit with a wave of drone strikes from Iraq. The pipeline transmits 7 million barrels a day and was one of the most important ways to bypass the blocked Strait of Hormuz. There is still significant speculation of when the bombed out pumping station will reopen. A longer shutdown could have devastating consequences, as some experts predict. This oil supply accounts for approximately 4 percent of global oil flows and the question now remains whether repairs to the pumping station could just produce yet another round of drone strikes.

Polish drivers may also feel the consequences very soon. As Adam Sikorski, president of Unimot, points out, the market situation was already difficult before the escalation.

‘Diesel the most expensive ever! This may be just the beginning’

“The economy is inexorable. The published wholesale price of diesel fuel on Friday, including VAT, was already PLN 8.95 per liter ·(€2.07). At this level of wholesale price, the retail price above PLN 9 per liter may start appearing at other stations ” he told Polish media outlet Fakt.

Prices at stations are reacting with a delay because the fuel currently sold may have been purchased earlier, at lower prices.

How bad can it get?

An additional problem is the insufficient refining capacities in Europe and the shutdown of some plants in the Middle East. According to Sikorski, this leads to record refining profit margins.

“It is really very close to fuel in the country reaching PLN 10 per liter. And this is unfortunately not the most pessimistic scenario,” warns the president of Unimot.

The largest gas and oil company in Poland, Orlen, also commented on the situation. The company assures that it has a diversified portfolio of suppliers and its own resources, thanks to which it can respond to changes in the global market. The government may try to mitigate increases through tax changes, e.g. concerning VAT or excise duties.

Sikorski points out, however, that artificially lowering prices may increase demand in a situation of limited supply.

The most worrying scenario, however, is one in which the problem ceases to be the price itself.

“In an extreme scenario, I would no longer focus on price. The physical availability of fuels could become a much more serious problem,” warned the Unimot president.

The post How bad can the diesel crisis get in Poland? appeared first on Remix News.

Da deutsche Medien verschweigen, wie die EU derzeit versucht, die Macht in der Ukraine zu übernehmen und wie Selensky sich dagegen wehrt, erklären wir das in dieser Folge des Anti-Spiegel-Podcast ausführlich. Außerdem stehen nächstes Wochenende nicht nur in Deutschland wichtige Wahlen an, sondern auch in Russland wird das Parlament, die Duma, gewählt. Daher erklären wir, […]