Press TV – September 30, 2026 

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.

“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.

Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.

His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”

That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce decisive Iranian economic collapse.

The economy did not disappear under those campaigns; instead, Iran developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened Asian trade and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial systems.

The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly become economically empty within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.

Iran enters the current confrontation with a large domestic market, substantial productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships extending across neighboring countries and wider Eurasian markets.

The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with substantial manufacturing, agricultural and service activity supported by a large population and significant domestic consumption.

That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery and consumer goods, meaning Iranian production does not depend entirely upon continuous access to Western consumers.

Iran has also developed major industrial capabilities suited to its own resources and infrastructure, including steel, refining, petrochemicals, cement, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing.

These capabilities have continued developing despite restrictions on Western investment and technology, demonstrating that Iranian industrial activity does not depend upon permanent participation by Western companies.

Iran’s prolonged exposure to sanctions has produced accumulated technical and commercial knowledge, giving Iranian companies decades of experience managing restricted supply chains and unreliable access to foreign suppliers.

When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and cooperate with businesses from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.

Academic research has documented this process, showing that sanctions can simultaneously restrict foreign technology while encouraging domestic technological development and adaptation within affected Iranian industrial sectors.

The resulting knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience managing shortages, substitution and alternative sourcing.

Iranian manufacturers therefore do not design procurement systems around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely, making adaptation part of ordinary commercial planning.

Iran’s geography provides another economic advantage, because the country borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan while possessing coastlines reaching the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, while transportation corridors also connect Iran with Russia and wider Eurasian markets.

Financial sanctions can make transactions more difficult, but they cannot physically relocate Iran or eliminate its access to neighboring markets, suppliers, transportation routes and established regional trading relationships.

Iran has consequently developed commercial links involving Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China through years of sustained economic interaction.

The World Bank has documented Iran’s increasing trade orientation toward neighboring countries and China as sanctions restricted conventional international relationships, making this regional pivot an established economic feature.

China adds another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy while supplying machinery, manufactured products and industrial inputs required throughout Iran’s domestic economy.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission identifies China as Iran’s largest trading partner and estimates that China imported approximately 1.4 million barrels of Iranian crude daily during 2025.

Chinese independent refiners have continued purchasing Iranian crude through commercial arrangements designed to reduce their exposure to American financial restrictions and sanctions enforcement.

That relationship demonstrates why Iran does not require unrestricted access to every Western market when Chinese demand and extensive regional commerce provide alternative markets for Iranian commodities.

Iran’s energy resources provide enormous economic depth, with the World Bank ranking the country second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth globally in proven crude-oil reserves.

Those resources provide export potential while also supplying abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and numerous energy-intensive industrial activities.

Iran has consequently developed a substantial downstream economy converting hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than depending exclusively upon crude-oil exports.

The World Bank has noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions contributed to changes within Iran’s export structure.

Iran has also developed financial mechanisms outside conventional Western banking, including bilateral currency arrangements, exchange houses, barter, intermediary companies and indirect settlement channels supporting international commercial activity.

The World Bank has documented growing use of bilateral currency exchange, barter and indirect payment mechanisms as Iranian trade shifted increasingly toward neighboring countries and China.

These arrangements provide alternative methods for exchanging value when conventional dollar-based transactions become unavailable or prohibitively difficult.

Their existence helps explain why Washington increasingly targets third-country banks, intermediaries and commercial facilitators, because Iranian commerce extends through extensive international networks beyond domestic financial institutions.

Against this background, Bessent’s prediction assumes that eliminating a major source of oil revenue would effectively remove the broader economic foundations supporting Iran’s productive system and commercial institutions.

Iran’s economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.

The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing adaptation through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.

Economic contraction, however, is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, infrastructure, commercial institutions and domestic relationships sustaining millions of Iranian consumers and businesses.

American sanctions have repeatedly targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, yet Iran has retained its industrial base and redirected substantial trade toward neighboring countries.

Washington possesses powerful financial tools, but financial restrictions cannot physically eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, ports, borders or commercial relationships accumulated over decades.

The central question is therefore whether American pressure can erase the productive, geographical, resource and commercial foundations Iran has accumulated across nearly half a century of economic adaptation.

Nothing in Iran’s economic history demonstrates that those foundations can disappear within two weeks, particularly while the country retains domestic production, regional markets, energy resources and established commercial relationships.

Iran therefore enters the present confrontation with domestic capabilities, energy resources, industrial capacity, geographic advantages and international relationships capable of keeping its economy operating despite intensified American terrorism.

By Hala Farhat | Al Mayadeen | September 30, 2026

Iraq’s government has declared September 30 the final date for ending the US-led coalition’s military mission. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s office says October 1 will find the country “free of any foreign military presence,” closing a deployment that once reached about 170,000 US troops.

But withdrawal leaves intact much of the damage inflicted by the invasion and the 13 years of sanctions that preceded it, along with the financial arrangements through which Washington continues to exert influence.

The US left Iraq’s productive economy devastated, its institutions dismantled and reshaped, and its workforce left increasingly dependent on a state funded by oil. Access to that income remains vulnerable to US pressure.

The question after the troops leave is how much control Iraq will have over the economy they leave behind.

Thirteen years of sanctions

The erosion of Iraq’s economy began long before March 2003. The UN Security Council imposed sweeping sanctions after Saddam Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait in 1990. Drawing on internal UN records, Joy Gordon’s Invisible War describes one of the most comprehensive and devastating sanctions regimes ever imposed.

The embargo quickly collapsed incomes. Reconstructed World Bank estimates showed GDP per capita collapsing to a third in a single year,  going from about $3,527 in 1990 to $1,255 in 1991.

Public employees who had earned $150 to $200 a month before sanctions were earning $3 to $5 by 1996, according to a 1997 assessment. By 2000, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported salaries as low as $2 a month and unemployment around 50 percent.

Factories, power stations, and water plants could not recover without imported equipment and spare parts. Yet any member of the sanctions committee could hold an entire contract indefinitely, even over a single disputed item. Gordon documents Washington’s use of the “dual-use” designation to restrict goods as basic as water pipes. By August 2002, the UN counted 2,058 contracts worth about $5.2 billion that had been placed on hold, including $745 million in oil industry equipment.

The restrictions also placed Iraq’s oil income beyond Baghdad’s direct control. Under the Oil-for-Food program, buyers paid into a UN-administered escrow account. After deductions for compensation, administration, and weapons inspections, the proceeds could finance only approved purchases. Iraq exported roughly $65 billion in oil under the program but could not use that money as ordinary budget revenue for wages, maintenance, or local services.

The collapse pushed skilled workers out of their professions. A UN humanitarian survey of 1,157 degree holders employed by aid organizations found 725 in general-service or menial jobs, including doctors, engineers, and scientists working as drivers, clerks, and guards.

By the time US troops arrived, Iraq had endured years of falling wages, industrial decline, and lost expertise. The occupation’s first decisions deepened that damage.

Dismantling the state, contracting out reconstruction

On May 16, 2003, the occupation authority issued Order 1, barring senior Baath Party members from public employment and requiring the screening of senior staff in ministries, hospitals, and universities. A week later, Order 2 dissolved the Defense Ministry, army, Republican Guard, and intelligence bodies.

The International Center for Transitional Justice estimates that Order 2 alone left about 400,000 conscripts, officers, and officials without jobs. The World Bank counted more than 2 million unemployed Iraqis, nearly 30 percent of the labor force, around 2003–2004. Meanwhile, Iraq’s health minister estimated that roughly half the country’s prewar doctors had fled as kidnapping and assassination made their work increasingly dangerous.

The occupation then opened the weakened economy to foreign competition. Order 39 allowed wholly foreign-owned companies and guaranteed investors treatment no less favorable than Iraqi businesses, while excluding natural resource extraction. Other orders suspended tariffs, later replaced by a flat 5 percent levy, and capped income tax at 15 percent from 2004. The World Bank warned that rapid opening would cost jobs in a country whose private sector was too weak to employ displaced workers.

Reconstruction brought billions of dollars, but much of the spending flowed through foreign contractors. The United States spent more than $60 billion over roughly a decade, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). More than $25 billion went to training and equipping security forces after the occupation had dissolved Iraq’s existing military institutions.

SIGIR found that reconstruction began without adequate security, consultation with Iraqi ministries, or planning for long-term maintenance. Its final report estimated waste at $3 billion to $5 billion from the main reconstruction fund and as much as $8 billion overall. The largest early infrastructure contracts went mainly to US firms. A $1.8 billion award to Bechtel in January 2004 was open only to American bidders.

Iraq’s own money followed a similar path. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 established the Development Fund for Iraq to receive oil revenue, with the occupation authority directing spending until June 2004.

An Iraq Revenue Watch analysis of contracts paid from Iraqi funds found that US companies received 74 percent of their value. US and British companies together received 85 percent, while Iraqi firms received 2 percent. Audits found that 73 percent of the value of Development Fund contracts above $5 million had been awarded without competitive bidding.

Oversight was inadequate even to establish how some of that money had been used. A 2010 SIGIR audit found that the Defense Department had failed to establish required accounting controls for about $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion it received from the fund. It could not document spending of about $2.6 billion.

The result was a reconstruction process that directed vast sums abroad while leaving Iraq with damaged services, limited productive capacity, and institutions struggling to rebuild.

An oil-funded system of patronage

With factories closed or looted and no private industry to replace them, the state became the place where Iraqis look for work. An assessment by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, using World Bank data, says public employment accounts for nearly all formal jobs and 40 percent of all jobs. Salaries and pensions took about 90 trillion dinars, roughly $69 billion, more than 40 percent of the 2024 budget, and the World Bank says another half a million government jobs were added during the spending expansion that preceded 2025.

The private sector has not filled the gap. Estimates put imports at more than 90 percent of the goods in Iraqi shops, while manufacturing makes up only around 2 percent of GDP. The World Bank says nearly 29 percent of the population is aged 15 to 29, and that this large group is entering the labor market amid limited job creation, a preference for public-sector work, and a private sector too small to absorb them. Youth unemployment is about 32 percent, and only around 11 percent of women take part in the labor force.

The IMF’s 2025 assessment describes the same pattern, citing high unemployment, an excessive state footprint, corruption, a weak banking system, and an inefficient electricity sector, and it called the wage trajectory fiscally unsustainable. Analysts describe a cycle in which secure public wages raise the pay that educated workers expect, private firms struggle with unreliable power and weak finance, and young graduates keep turning to the state for jobs, which raises the demand for more public hiring.

Oil pays for all of it. The World Bank estimates that oil supplied about 88 percent of government revenue and 91 percent of exports in 2025.

The financial levers Washington keeps

Iraq’s oil income has passed through outside hands since 1996, first a UN escrow, then the occupation authority’s fund, and now the New York Fed.

The Development Fund’s accounts were opened at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where Iraqi oil revenue still flows. Buyers pay dollars into a Ministry of Finance account, and the Central Bank of Iraq converts part of the income into dinars for government spending. US jurisdiction over dollar clearing, correspondent banking, and physical cash shipments gives Washington substantial influence over Iraq’s access to its money.

In January 2020, after Iraq’s parliament called for foreign troops to leave, the Trump administration threatened to block access to the account. Iraqi officials said it then held about $35 billion and warned that losing access would disrupt salary payments and the exchange rate.

US restrictions introduced in November 2022 forced banks seeking dollars for international transfers to disclose the final beneficiaries and purposes of transactions through an electronic platform, with requests screened by the New York Fed. US and Iraqi accounts linked the measures to concerns about transfers to sanctioned Iranian actors.

Consequently, more than 80 percent of daily wire requests were initially blocked or returned. Transfers fell from $224.4 million on October 17, 2022, to $22.9 million on January 17, 2023. Demand shifted to the parallel market, where the dinar traded at about 1,588 to the dollar in February against a newly set official rate of 1,300. In a country dependent on imported food and consumer goods, restricted dollar access raised costs for ordinary households.

In April 2026, Washington applied pressure through physical cash, halting a shipment of about $500 million and suspending parts of security cooperation. Iraqi officials said the halt affected banknotes used for travel, medical treatment, education, and retail exchange, while electronic transfers for imports continued. Some shipments resumed in July. On September 26, Baghdad announced that Washington had agreed to continue them.

US sanctions have also reshaped access to Iraq’s oil fields. Russia’s Lukoil left West Qurna 2 after sanctions, and Chevron signed agreements to take over its development. During al-Zaidi’s July visit to Washington, Iraq signed dozens of agreements with companies including ExxonMobil, KBR, Halliburton, and Shell. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright cited more than $60 billion in commercial agreements, while al-Zaidi told The National that US companies would receive top priority. According to the Atlantic Council, Donald Trump framed the deals as American oil companies taking the place of US forces.

As US forces prepare to leave Iraq, they leave behind a trail of devastation. Decades of sanctions and occupation have weakened its productive economy, dismantled state institutions, and left livelihoods dependent on an oil-funded system of patronage. The consequences will endure long after the troops depart.

Washington retains substantial power over Iraq through its influence over dollar access and the financial channels that sustain the state. The withdrawal ends a military mission, while leaving Baghdad to contend with both the damage of US intervention and the control Washington continues to exercise.

Press TV – September 30, 2026

Iraqi anti-terror resistance group Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada has rejected any surrender of its weapons, with its spokesman stressing that resistance would continue despite pressure and that Iraqi resistance fighters would sustain their support for their fellow fighters in Lebanon.

Sheikh Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesman for the group, which is a subdivision of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) coalition, made the remarks to the Lebanese news website UNews.

“We have not retreated from the resistance, and there will be no surrender of weapons,” he said, the website reported on Tuesday.

“The resistance’s weapons in Iraq are at its disposal and Iraqi resistance would continue supporting the Lebanese resistance,” the official added.

“The pressure has not deterred us from continuing along this path and will not lead us to retreat even a single step in confronting the enemy.”

The statement came as the Iraqi government, headed by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, has, as a result of US pressure, been seeking to advance a plan to establish a state monopoly over weapons.

A day earlier, Haj Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, the security official of Kata’ib Hezbollah, another member of the PMU, also pointed to the upcoming prospect of expulsion of US-led forces from the Arab country, saying that, upon the occasion, the Iraqi people would celebrate the expulsion, associating the pending development to the efforts made by Iraqi resistance groups.

Al-Assaf further warned that if the restrictions imposed by the United States on Iranian aviation continued after October 1, the Iraqi people would take a clear position, adding that the possibility existed of closing border crossings with countries participating in the Washington’s efforts at targeting the Islamic Republic.

The withdrawal, agreed on two years ago, comes against the backdrop of the ongoing war between the United States and Iran that has also sometimes spilled over into Iraq.

The withdrawal, agreed on two years ago, comes against the backdrop of the ongoing war between the United States and Iran that has also sometimes spilled over into Iraq.

America has become an imperial power that aims to invade and dominate the weak countries. This tendency has created global insecurity and led America to lose wars. In terms of natural resources and firepower, America dominates like no other country. It has the largest and most flexible military, the most weapons, and the most devices […]

Al Mayadeen | September 29, 2026

Head of the Political Council of the Iraqi Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Sheikh Ali al-Asadi, criticized Baghdad’s decision to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing at Iraqi airports, stressing that it constitutes compliance with US pressure and warning that popular action could follow if the decision is not reversed.

Speaking to Al Mayadeen, al-Asadi said, “We regret the decision by the Iraqi authorities to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing in Iraq.” He described the decision as “submission to American bullying,” adding, “The Iraqi decision-maker must reconsider it; otherwise there will be popular pressure aimed at changing the decision.”

He said the issue extends beyond Iraqi airports, invoking longstanding ties between Iraq and Iran. “The issue goes beyond airports. There are close relations with Iran, and therefore we must not bow to an irresponsible decision by America,” he said. “Popular options will be the most pressing, and all possibilities are on the table.”

Sheikh al-Asadi attributed growing US influence in Iraq to weaknesses among domestic political actors. “The weakness of the domestic political actor has allowed the American occupation to impose its decisions in Iraq,” he said, adding, “The decision-maker can choose not to implement American decisions, as some countries do.”

He stressed that “the decision must be sovereign and independent politically, economically, and in terms of security,” defining sovereignty as “complete independence, with Iraq being the decision-maker in all aspects of life.

According to Sheikh al-Asadi, “There are personal and partisan interests behind the absence of independence in decision-making.” He also accused Iraq’s political class of adopting contradictory positions toward Washington, slamming duality in the political class: on the one hand, it agrees to American decisions, while on the other, it condemns them.

He added, “The Resistance’s positions have been clear from the beginning, while the Iraqi politicians have ambiguity and complications.”

Iraq’s main problem is corruption

Turning to the issue of weapons and the debate over their regulation, Sheikh al-Asadi said his movement had held discussions with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term “weapons confinement”. “We discussed the matter with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term ‘weapons confinement.’ We established that the term is harmful and changed it to ‘weapons regulation,’” he said. “Iraq’s biggest problem is corruption, not weapons,” he asserted.

“We are in favor of the Dawn Strike against corruption, but we want it to continue. There are clearly identified corrupt figures, and the law must be applied to them,” the Iraqi leader said. He also expressed deep distrust of Washington, saying, “We do not trust the Americans one iota, and they do not keep their word.” He added, “What happened with Iran is the biggest proof that the Americans do not keep their word. They struck Iran during negotiations, and this is proof of their treachery.”

US assassination unit, like Blackwater

Shikh al-Asadi said Iraq should remain free of US interference in its internal affairs. “Iraq must be free, and the American envoy must not interfere in economic, security, or political affairs,” he said. He added that his movement had information about US activities in Iraq, saying, “We have information about all the American movements and about the division they established, which includes Iraqis under their supervision.”

“We know where this division is located and what its duties will be in the coming phase, and all of this is being monitored,” Sheikh al-Asadi warned. He revealed that the goal behind the creation of this division is to carry out assassinations and create discord, saying, “It is like ‘Blackwater’ under another name.”

He added, “The American movement is suspicious, and they have security companies that entered to compensate for the American military withdrawal.”

Al-Nujaba rejects political participation under current system

Sheikh al-Asadi said Nujaba had no decision to participate in Iraq’s political process. “We in Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have no decision to engage in the political process, and we are not convinced by the way it is being managed,” he said.

On the issue of weapons, he told Al Mayadeen, “The conditions for handing over weapons are ending the American occupation and all foreign presence, including the Turkish presence.”

He added that the Peshmerga should fall under the command of Iraq’s commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and warned that “the separatist factions are one of Iraq’s problems, and whenever Resistance intervention is necessary, we will intervene in every inch of Iraqi territory.”

Sheikh al-Asadi further argued that the continuation of armed resistance was linked to the circumstances that justify it: “The resistance has its justifications for resistance, and when these justifications end, so does resistance,” reminding that the justifications do not end with the mere withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops in the country.

Iraq’s leadership must use its leverage

Al-Nujaba’s top official said Iraq’s political leadership must understand the country’s sources of strength and leverage and use them to advance its independence and sovereignty.

Speaking about Iraq’s leadership, Sheikh al-Asadi said he believed the current political figure in question “wants to serve the public interest and do the required work,” describing him as someone who is acting “based on his Shia identity, if I may put it that way.” However, he said the figure is “new to politics” and lacks advisors genuinely committed to helping him succeed.

“Unfortunately, he does not have advisors who are genuinely committed to making his experience successful. Rather, his advisors are concerned with making themselves successful,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.

He stressed that the advisors attempt to influence the political leadership based on what they receive from Washington, adding, “They do not want to help him become a successful figure who can lead during this stage and perhaps the next stage.”

“Whoever leads Iraq must understand what Iraq truly is and what the cards of strength and leverage in Iraq are,” he said. He questioned the interests of foreign powers in Iraq, asking, “Who needs Iraq? Does Europe not need Iraq? Does Turkey not need Iraq?”

Sheikh al-Asadi also pointed to the Development Road project, asking, “Doesn’t the Development Road that they are talking about need Iraq?”

“All of these are leverage cards a political actor can use to achieve what he wants,” he said. “He can even use the cards held by the Resistance factions as leverage. We are offering him this card and telling him: Use us for the sake of serving Iraq.”

Al-Asadi says US sought to persuade factions to give up weapons

According to Sheikh al-Asadi, several US allies had contacted his movement seeking a truce. “Many of America’s allies sent us messages asking for a truce, including the American chargé d’affaires who “tried to contact us through one of the politicians and asked to meet with us.”

He also said US officials had offered projects and incentives in exchange for abandoning strategic weapons. “The Americans offered projects and incentives on condition that we give up our strategic weapons that reach Israel, but we rejected them,” the Iraqi official said. He warned that US pressure would continue even if armed factions surrendered their weapons, saying, “American pressure does not stop at any point. Even if the factions hand over their weapons, they will move on to the Popular Mobilization Forces and then to the Defense Ministry.”

He concluded by highlighting that Washington had sought for years to alter the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces. “The main American project for years has sought to change the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces and dilute it, but the religious authority and some politicians rejected that,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.

The last of the US-led coalition forces are leaving Iraq. It’s a significant bonus for Iran. The withdrawal date, September 30, was also the date by which Baghdad had pledged to bring numerous powerful Iran-backed militias under state control. But this deadline looks certain to be missed. This effectively means that, at a moment when […]

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