Na Rússia, todos os partidos têm tempo igual de TV e rádio. No Brasil, só quatro candidatos aparecem; nove ficam de fora. Democracia de fachada.

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A máquina de propaganda dos Estados Unidos e dos regimes europeus, incluindo suas sucursais nas semicolônias, prega que a Rússia é uma autocracia, um regime antidemocrático. Como tal, suas eleições não são livres, mas sim controladas por Vladimir Putin e seus aliados.

Um bom exemplo dessa lavagem cerebral foi vista nas eleições recentes para a Duma Estatal, o parlamento russo. O Rússia Unida, partido de Putin, obteve uma votação recorde: elegeu 349 dos 450 deputados. Todo o aparato de propaganda da CIA que são os grandes jornais e agências de notícias ocidentais acusou Putin de manipular as eleições, que teriam sido fraudadas.

Mas basta fazer uma comparação com as eleições no Brasil para perceber que as eleições brasileiras são uma fraude e as eleições na Rússia são muito mais livres que no Brasil.

Na Rússia, todos os partidos registrados têm tempo de propaganda gratuita em rádio e televisão. A propaganda é veiculada nas emissoras públicas e estatais, com o tempo distribuído de forma igualitária entre todos os partidos. Sim, é garantido por lei que todos os partidos devem ter o mesmo tempo para apresentar suas propostas à audiência.

Essa é uma das principais vantagens da Rússia sobre o Brasil em relação às campanhas. É um sistema muito mais democrático. No Brasil, uma parte dos partidos, mesmo que estejam registrados no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), sequer tem direito de aparecer na TV e no rádio. Somente os partidos com um número mínimo de parlamentares no Congresso Nacional podem apresentar suas propostas ao grande público. Caso contrário, precisam se coligar com outros partidos. Os que não se aliam com os partidos que já têm vagas no parlamento ficam de fora da campanha de rádio e TV.

Ou seja, os partidos pequenos precisam submeter suas ideias e seus programas políticos, na prática abandonar sua independência, vendendo-se aos grandes partidos, para terem acesso ao tempo de TV e rádio. É um sistema eleitoral que visa acabar com os partidos pequenos, reduzir o número de partidos e concentrar o poder nos grandes partidos. Isso nem de longe é um sistema democrático e livre. Ele apaga parte das ideias políticas que existem na sociedade para que o eleitor só tenha acesso à outra parte, orientando assim o voto do eleitor. É uma das inúmeras facetas da fraude eleitoral.

Mas mesmo entre os partidos com tempo de rádio e TV esse tempo não é igualitário. Os partidos grandes e suas coligações (com as maiores bancadas na Câmara dos Deputados) têm direito a um tempo muito maior do que os menores. Nestas eleições presidenciais, a coligação de Lula recebeu 5 minutos e 31 segundos para fazer propaganda política dentro do bloco de propaganda eleitoral gratuita obrigatória diária. A coligação de Flávio Bolsonaro recebeu 4 minutos e 20 segundos, a de Ronaldo Caiado recebeu 2 minutos e 02 segundos e a de Augusto Cury recebeu 35 segundos. Além dos blocos, há as inserções de 30 segundos a 1 minuto distribuídas ao longo da programação diária. No 1º turno, Lula tem direito a 433 inserções, Bolsonaro a 339, Caiado a 159 e Cury a 47.

Apenas quatro candidatos tiveram tempo para apresentar suas propostas em TV e rádio. Os outros nove concorrentes ficaram de fora. De treze candidaturas, os eleitores não puderam conhecer nove delas, apenas quatro, através da propaganda nos meios de comunicação convencionais. Os quatro privilegiados, portanto, foram extremamente beneficiados pela legislação eleitoral antidemocrática. Mas mesmo entre esses quatro existe uma hierarquia, que privilegia uns e prejudica outros.

Há ainda os debates eleitorais. Na Rússia, pelo menos metade do tempo gratuito de rádio e TV deve ser dedicada a eventos conjuntos entre candidatos e partidos, como debates, mesas-redondas ou entrevistas coletivas. E todos têm direito de participar. Assim, além de apresentarem suas ideias na propaganda eleitoral, os partidos podem confrontar suas ideias, para que o eleitor possa compará-las.

Além de não terem direito de tempo de TV e rádio para fazer propaganda, no Brasil a maioria dos partidos e candidatos também não tem o direito de participar dos debates. Ao contrário da Rússia, a legislação eleitoral não obriga as emissoras a convidarem a todos. Apenas candidatos de partidos, coligações ou federações que tenham ao menos cinco parlamentares no Congresso Nacional devem ser obrigatoriamente convidados a participar dos debates organizados nos meios de comunicação. Isso significa que, nestas eleições presidenciais, menos da metade dos candidatos participaram dos debates. Os meios de comunicação podem convidar os outros candidatos, mas não são obrigados. E, assim, não os convidam. Afinal de contas, assim como o TSE, os grandes canais de TV e emissoras de rádio são controlados pelas classes dominantes e não interessa a eles que candidaturas que, de alguma maneira, questionam a dominação de classe, possam expor suas ideias. Ou mesmo que partidos que não incomodam as classes dominantes exponham suas ideias, pois quanto menos debate de ideias existir, mais embrutecido o povo fica, e mais fácil é manter o status quo.

Brazil’s alignment with Europe amid current geopolitical tensions poses a serious threat to Brazil’s traditional policy of neutrality.

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On September 30, all major Brazilian newspapers published a report stating that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) had allegedly warned European authorities about supposed simultaneous interference by the United States and Russia in Brazilian elections. The case raises questions that go far beyond the 2026 electoral dispute. The central issue is the accusation against Moscow, as well as the political and institutional circumstances in which it was presented.

Within Brazil’s intelligence system, Abin is institutionally linked to the Presidency of the Republic, while the Federal Police, another intelligence-related institution in the country, has stronger links to the Judiciary. Its function is to produce strategic information to assist the Brazilian government. Therefore, when representatives of Brazilian intelligence inform foreign authorities that Russia is interfering in the electoral process, it is inevitable to ask to what extent this assessment reflects the political position of the government that controls the agency.

The issue becomes even more significant because, according to the information released, the European delegation received an accusation concerning Russian interference without substantial details about its nature being made public. No agents, operations, funding mechanisms, propaganda structures, or specific campaigns attributed to Moscow have been identified, at least in the material made public so far. There is therefore an accusation, but its foundations remain largely unknown.

This creates a particularly convenient situation for certain political actors. Europe – which is hostile toward both Russia and Trump – receives information suggesting that Washington and Moscow are attempting to influence the Brazilian elections. This would allow Brussels – and especially France and Germany, currently Lula’s key “friends” – to potentially “support” Brazil in “counter-intelligence” efforts aimed at combating alleged US and Russian influence. In other words, the accusation of interference, even in the absence of evidence, could serve as a pretext to justify actual interference (by Europe).

There is also a broader political issue. A significant portion of the Brazilian left has consolidated in recent years an unfounded interpretation according to which Vladimir Putin belongs to a kind of “far-right international movement,” alongside Donald Trump and other Western conservative leaders. This interpretation places Russia, Trump, and the Brazilian right within the same international political camp, despite profound differences between their respective positions and interests.

Within this framework, associating Russia with a potential Flávio Bolsonaro candidacy becomes politically convenient. Flávio is identified with Trump, the Republican Party, and the American right. The existence of an alleged Russian connection would allow the Brazilian electoral dispute to be incorporated into a broader international narrative in which different conservative forces are presented as parts of the same network of influence.

However, it is absolutely obvious that Russia has no interest whatsoever in interfering in the Brazilian elections to favor either side. Furthermore, the majority of pro-Russia activists in Brazil identify with the left or remain neutral regarding both sides of national politics. The accusation appears to be made simply to please the European Union, given that Europeans prefer Lula to Flávio (as the latter is subordinate to Trump). The lack of details substantiating the accusations only reinforces this point.

The truly relevant question is different: why did an intelligence agency subordinate to the Presidency of the Republic present European authorities with an accusation against Russia without its foundations subsequently being clarified? And why is this happening precisely during preparations for the Brazilian elections and at a time of extraordinary deterioration in relations between Russia and Europe?

The answer to these questions matters because Brazil is operating in an increasingly polarized international environment. Russia occupies a central position within the BRICS and maintains strategic relations with Brazil, while Europe is going through a period of growing confrontation with Moscow. In this context, any official Brazilian information associating Russia with an electoral interference operation carries serious diplomatic consequences.

Moreover, tensions between Russia and Europe are increasing, and there is a real risk of conflict due to Europe’s continued provocations. Clearly, in such a context, it is not in Brazil’s interest to become part of either side of the crisis. But nothing could be more damaging to Brazil’s policy of neutrality than reporting a formal accusation against Russia to the European Union.

In theory, it is possible that the report was delivered to European authorities without prior communication to the Brazilian president – although this seems highly unlikely. If Lula wants to preserve Brazil’s neutrality, the appropriate course of action would be to publicly disavow Abin and apologize for the incident. The question, however, is whether he would actually be willing to do so, considering that the European Union is currently the Lula government’s main international “ally”.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the 80 year-old president of the world’s fifth largest country, is facing a tight race in a bid for his fourth presidential term in Brazil’s general elections on Sunday (4 October). The EU, which earlier this year concluded a landmark trade deal with the Mercosur bloc, which includes Brazil, will be watching the polls closely.

He holds a narrow poll lead over Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the country’s former president Jair, who is currently serving a 22 year prison sentence for staging a coup against Lula’s newly formed government in 2023.

The left-wing leader’s third term, won by with a slim 50.9 percent majority in 2022, distinguished itself for leading anti-deforestation policies and getting the EU-Mercosur trade partnership across its long-awaited finish line, 26 years after negotiations started.

Though Brussels suspended animal product imports from Brazil on 3 September, due to insufficient guarantees of antibiotic regulation compliance, “President von der Leyen commended President Lula’s role and political leadership in the negotiations leading up to the agreement,” the EU commission said in a statement.

The Mercosur deal marked a historic diversion of EU energies South of the Rio Grande river, at a time when Europe and Latin America were both being bombarded by tariff threats from Washington.

The Bolsonaros’ professed support of US president Donald Trump have critics worrying “this election could have major implications for the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy, its global influence,” wrote Dr. Christopher Sabatini, Latin America director at the Chatham house think tank.

Election interference by the US was discussed throughout Lula’s campaign, most notably with Meta disabling his Facebook ads just days before Brazilians went to cast their votes, state-run Agência Brasil reported on 25 September.

At a time when virtually every other democracy on the South American continent has pivoted to the right, a win for a Brazilian Trump enthusiast and supporter of environmental commodification would be a setback for the EU’s climate ambitions.

“A Flávio Bolsonaro government would represent a much stronger geopolitical alignment with Washington and the Trump administration. That could affect climate cooperation, deforestation policy, critical minerals and European access to Brazilian commodities and industrial partnerships,” said Eduardo Raguse, climate co-coordinator at NGO network Friends of the Earth Latin America.

Brazil’s climate observatory recorded its biggest annual fall in emissions in 15 years, with a 16.7 percent reduction in 2024 from the previous year, largely due to a drop in forest clearance in the Brazilian Amazon, which was halved over Lula’s third term.

But Lula has been simultaneously expanding Brazil’s national petrol company’s drilling area into the Amazon’s depths.

“Lula’s government has increasingly framed critical minerals as an issue of national sovereignty and industrial policy,” Raguse told EUobserver, since the Workers’ party leader has referred to Brazil’s petrol reserves as its “passport for the future.”

But along a global pivot to the right, a win for Bolsonaro’s heir or Lula’s renewed interest in fossil fuel politics would not stray too far from the EU’s current conservative climate script, and according to Socialist and Democrat MEP Leire Pajin, will mean little for EU trade.

“Whoever wins the election in Brazil, the EU-Mercosur relationship goes far beyond electoral cycles or trade,” the Spanish vice-president of the Euro-Latin American parliamentary assembly told EUobserver. “Governments may differ in priorities or pace, but the agreement transcends them.”