The Trump administration’s reported proposal to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine marks a reversal of Washington’s longstanding energy policy. Behind the promise of an economic incentive for peace lies a more consequential question: whether Europe is being asked to restore the very dependence on Moscow that it has spent four years dismantling.

The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.

According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.

The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.

There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.

From opposition to Russian gas to facilitating its return

The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.

During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.

The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.

Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.

Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.

The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.

American investors and the economics of peace

On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.

The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.

The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.

Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.

That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.

The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.

Europe’s legal and political obstacles

The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.

In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.

Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.

Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.

The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.

Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.

The consequences for European politics

The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.

The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.

A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.

This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.

A peace incentive that could restore Russian leverage

The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.

Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.

Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.

There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.

For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.

The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.

The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.

Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.

Irán y Pakistán están inmersos en la construcción de un orden financiero posestadounidense en la encrucijada entre Asia Occidental y Asia Meridional.

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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

Vayamos directamente al meollo de la cuestión: tras examinar minuciosamente el tablero de ajedrez, los dirigentes políticos y militares de Teherán ya han llegado a la conclusión de que un ataque conjunto de EE. UU. e Israel —cuya planificación avanza a un ritmo frenético— es inevitable.

Por eso se han posicionado ahora como una cobra enroscada, lista para atacar e inyectar su veneno mortal ante el primer indicio de una amenaza inminente del Sindicato de Epstein, incluso sin esperar a que se produzca un ataque real.

La ofensiva preventiva, ya delineada, será devastadora, se extenderá más allá de las bases estadounidenses en Asia Occidental a otros objetivos regionales e incluirá potencialmente la infraestructura energética del Golfo y los cables submarinos (en este caso, afectando principalmente al Golfo y a la India, mucho más que a EE. UU. y Europa).

Nos encontramos en territorio de peligro claro y presente: una maniobra militar estadounidense-israelí destinada a ejercer presión se interpretará sin duda en Teherán como el inicio de un ataque.

Así pues, la presión a favor de la guerra por parte del culto a la muerte y de Trump se encuentra ahora con un umbral iraní peligrosamente bajo. Las opciones de ataque del Pentágono abarcan desde las instalaciones nucleares iraníes hasta la infraestructura energética.

Huelga decir que el «sociópata en jefe» —que ya está en pánico ante la inminente debacle de las elecciones de mitad de mandato— es una presa fácil para el poderoso lobby sionista y los donantes a favor de la guerra. El peligro estratégico supremo es, pues, que esta presión incesante pueda generar una señal que Teherán interprete como un ataque inminente, incluso mientras Washington mantiene públicamente que no se producirá ningún ataque antes de las elecciones de mitad de mandato.

Yemen está llevando todo esto al siguiente nivel

Paralelamente, fuentes privilegiadas en Islamabad confirman el éxito de una prueba de misil paquistaní a Mach 7, con un alcance de varios miles de kilómetros. Esta nueva capacidad tiene todo lo necesario para alterar sustancialmente el equilibrio de poder en Asia Occidental, reforzando el alcance disuasorio de Pakistán y su capacidad para influir en todos los cálculos de seguridad regional, además de contribuir a la creciente interconexión de Pakistán con China, Irán y las petro-monarquías del Golfo.

Y ahora, otra exclusiva: personal de la inteligencia militar israelí, incluido un general de división, ha abandonado Riad después de que MbS, en un supuesto momento de lucidez, dijera «no» a la oferta de «asistencia» del culto a la muerte. Y, sin embargo, siguen allí más de 100 miembros del CENTCOM.

Es posible que la decisión de MbS le haya sido impuesta por Turquía y Pakistán —los otros dos signatarios de la Alianza de Defensa de La Meca—, que de repente se encontraron en la misma sala de guerra en Riad, codo con codo con agentes del culto a la muerte.

Ahora bien, aunque su partida puede haber eliminado un riesgo de escalada, los agentes estadounidenses siguen expuestos: cualquier ataque, venga de donde venga, que provoque bajas estadounidenses arrastrará inmediatamente a Washington a la guerra entre Arabia Saudí y Ansarallah.

La guerra entre Arabia Saudí y Ansarallah, de hecho, está alcanzando el siguiente nivel: la volatilidad. La mezcla tóxica de la interceptación de un misil de crucero sobre la provincia de Medina; las interceptaciones de drones en otras partes de Arabia Saudí; y los ataques con misiles de las Fuerzas Armadas yemeníes contra el complejo presidencial del gobierno títere de Adén es solo el principio.

Lo que ocurrió después de que Ansarallah atacara Najran —una de las provincias del sur de Arabia Saudí arrebatadas a Yemen en 1934 por los británicos— es algo que realmente llama la atención.

Un portavoz saudí acusó a Ansarallah de lanzar un misil de crucero contra Medina. La respuesta del emblemático portavoz de las Fuerzas Armadas yemeníes, el general Yahya Saree, fue contundente: «Hoy no hemos llevado a cabo ninguna operación militar dirigida contra territorio saudí. Por lo tanto, la afirmación del enemigo saudí de que Medina fue atacada es una invención absoluta y una grave falsedad».

Traducción: Yemen ataca una de sus antiguas provincias; los saudíes recurren a noticias totalmente falsas, inventándose un ataque contra una de las dos mezquitas sagradas —sin duda como preparación para una operación de bandera falsa—; luego, Yemen niega de inmediato haber atacado ningún (cursiva mía) territorio saudí.

Esto significa que Saná está declarando sutilmente, para que todo el mundo lo entienda, que ya no lleva a cabo operaciones en el extranjero (cursiva mía) en las tres provincias: Jizan, Najran y Asir. Ya están —psicológica y operativamente— preparando el terreno para recuperar su territorio robado.

Todo ello se plasma en este conciso análisis desde Yemen sobre la deconstrucción de la ostentosa Casa de Saud:

«Yemen está destrozando los pilares extremadamente frágiles de la economía no petrolera en la que los piratas del desierto depositaron todas sus esperanzas: imagen, inversiones (IED), escapismo e impunidad e invulnerabilidad frente al terrorismo en el extranjero».

Cómo Pakistán e Irán eluden al FMI

Ahora prestad atención a algo bastante sorprendente que ocurrió a mediados de semana en Bangkok, durante la reunión anual del FMI y el Banco Mundial —dignamente recibida por protestas callejeras tailandesas—.

El presidente del Banco Central de Irán, Abdolnaser Hemmati, se reunió con el presidente del Banco Central de Pakistán, Jameel Ahmad, al margen del principal ritual anual en alabanza del dólar estadounidense.

Pakistán se encuentra bajo las feroces garras del ajuste estructural del FMI y el Banco Mundial —y, además, amenazado con sanciones estadounidenses por comerciar con Irán—.

Así pues, que Pakistán e Irán estén discutiendo de facto la desdolarización justo en la guarida del león —el templo del dólar estadounidense— no tiene precio.

La infraestructura está en marcha desde 2023, a través de un acuerdo de intercambio de divisas que utiliza el rial y la rupia en lugar del dólar estadounidense. El trueque lo gestionan ambos bancos centrales, y los canales bancarios pasan por el Banco Melli en Irán y el Banco Mellat en Pakistán. Sus mercados fronterizos —al menos seis de ellos— están en pleno auge: rutas comerciales físicas que eluden por completo al dólar estadounidense.

Lo que se debatió en Bangkok a principios de esta semana es cómo ampliar todo este sistema: les importan un comino las sanciones secundarias de EE. UU. Sobre todo porque Teherán ofrece a Islamabad lo que el sistema estadounidense simplemente no puede ofrecer: soberanía, sin cambio de régimen, sin austeridad, sin sermones y, sobre todo, sin ajuste estructural.

Por no mencionar que Pakistán necesita urgentemente el gas iraní —y las rutas comerciales de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda impulsadas por China—.

Irán ha construido toda una economía que elude por completo al FMI —y capaz de sobrevivir a un tsunami de sanciones, a un bloqueo y a la guerra—.

Ahora, Irán y Pakistán están inmersos en la construcción de un orden financiero posestadounidense en la encrucijada entre Asia Occidental y Asia Meridional —con intercambios de divisas, comercio de trueque, mercados fronterizos en auge y canales bancarios adecuados—, lo que convierte las sanciones secundarias en una burla.

Por cierto, esto está ocurriendo justo cuando un inmenso tren iraní, cargado de petróleo crudo —y el primero de muchos— está listo para partir hacia… China a través de Asia Central, por la línea ferroviaria de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda construida por China.

La cobra enroscada puede estar lista para atacar. Pero a la cobra, desde tiempos inmemoriales, también le encanta hacer negocios.

Traducción: Geopolítica rugiente

Diplomats from Belgium, France and Poland were attacked by Israeli settlers during an olive-harvesting visit to the occupied West Bank, prompting calls for further European sanctions and an investigation by Israeli authorities.

The settlers attacked a delegation of European diplomats and Catholic representatives in the occupied West Bank on Saturday, 17th October, assaulting a French mayor and damaging a Belgian diplomatic vehicle during a visit intended to support Palestinian olive farmers.

The delegation included Belgium’s consul general, French and Polish diplomats and representatives of the Catholic Church. The incident occurred near the Palestinian village of Taybeh, where settlers confronted visitors accompanying local residents during the annual olive harvest.

Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot condemned the violence and announced that Brussels would press for additional European Union sanctions against those responsible. He also called on Israel to meet its obligations as the occupying power and protect Palestinians, journalists and foreign diplomatic representatives.

According to accounts of the incident, Bernard Baudoux, mayor of the French town of Aulnoye-Aymeries, was assaulted while attempting to enter a vehicle bearing diplomatic plates. The attack also involved members of a Catholic delegation, including Archbishop Vincent Dollmann of Cambrai.

Three people were reportedly injured. Belgian diplomatic personnel were confirmed to be safe.

Diplomatic incident draws Israeli condemnation

Israel’s military described the attack as a serious act of violence but said that the delegation’s visit had not been coordinated with the Israeli authorities and that soldiers had not been present when the confrontation occurred.

Israeli police subsequently opened an investigation.

Foreign Minister Gideon Saar publicly condemned the actions of the settlers and said his ministry was in contact with the ambassadors of the countries involved. The Israeli government’s response comes amid mounting international criticism of settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank.

The circumstances are particularly sensitive because the victims included accredited diplomatic representatives from three EU member states. The incident therefore extends beyond the continuing disputes over land ownership and Palestinian access to agricultural areas, raising questions about the protection of foreign officials carrying out recognised diplomatic activities.

For Belgium, the attack has reinforced an existing position in favour of stronger European measures against violent settlers and organisations supporting settlement expansion.

Prévot linked the violence to Israeli settlement policy, arguing that the attacks could not be considered separately from the broader circumstances of the occupation.

A growing dispute over European sanctions

The European Union has already introduced targeted restrictive measures against individuals and organisations associated with serious abuses against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

In May 2026, the Council of the EU imposed additional sanctions on three individuals and four organisations, including the Nachala Settlement Movement and the Amana cooperative association.

The measures were adopted under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and included asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds available to designated persons and travel restrictions on listed individuals.

The Council said the sanctioned organisations had supported or facilitated activities resulting in the displacement of Palestinian communities and the loss of property.

However, agreement on broader economic measures against Israel has proved substantially more difficult.

As EU Today previously reported, European governments have considered restrictions on trade involving Israeli settlements, while divisions between member states have complicated attempts to establish a common position.

The latest attack gives Belgium, France and Poland a direct diplomatic interest in the outcome of any further discussion. Whether this produces a new sanctions agreement will depend on negotiations between EU governments, rather than unilateral declarations by individual ministers.

Violence during the olive harvest

The incident occurred amid escalating attacks on Palestinian farmers during the annual olive harvest, an important source of income for communities across the West Bank.

Harvesting frequently involves access to agricultural land situated near Israeli settlements or in areas where Palestinians face movement restrictions. Local farmers have complained of intimidation, destruction of trees and attacks by settlers attempting to prevent them from reaching their property.

According to reporting from the area, the Palestinian Health Ministry said at least four people had been killed and more than 100 injured since this year’s harvest began.

The attack on the European delegation followed another serious incident involving American photojournalist Heidi Levine, who was assaulted while covering attacks on Palestinian olive harvesters.

The violence has attracted criticism from international organisations and foreign governments, including those maintaining close diplomatic relations with Israel.

Wider implications for EU–Israel relations

The diplomatic confrontation comes against a background of longstanding disagreement between Brussels and the Israeli government over settlement expansion and the legal status of the occupied territories.

The European Union does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and regards settlements established there as contrary to international law. Israel disputes the application of this legal interpretation to the territory.

The latest incident is unlikely, by itself, to determine the future of EU–Israel relations. It does, however, strengthen demands from governments already advocating targeted sanctions and more effective measures against settlement-related violence.

For Belgium, France and Poland, the immediate questions concern the safety of their diplomatic personnel, the Israeli investigation and whether the perpetrators will face prosecution.

For the EU collectively, the matter now extends to whether its existing sanctions framework can address continuing attacks against Palestinians and, increasingly, European representatives themselves.

"I think the President wants to take the 60-day period of time to sort of analyze what imposing both sanctions and tariffs will mean to the global economy and even to the U.S. economy," said Rubio.