Nine-year-old Ukrainian Anastasiia Kovtun won a silver medal at the international Romanian Junior Open 2026 tournament, held on October 16–18 in Bucharest. For the young athlete, it was the first international tournament of her career. Overall, Ukrainian squash players demonstrated strong results, winning in five age categories.

The competition took place at the Infinity Sport Arena sports complex under the auspices of the European Squash Federation (ESF). Romanian Junior Open is part of the international ESF Junior Circuit series and has Bronze status.

One of the main stories of the Ukrainian team’s performance was the success of 9-year-old Anastasiia Kovtun in the youngest age category, Girls U11.

Despite the competition in Bucharest marking Nastia’s debut at international level, she confidently advanced through the group stage. The Ukrainian successively defeated Romania’s Anna Oltean 3:0 (11:4, 11:9, 11:9), as well as two Bulgarian athletes — Ema Taneva 3:0 (11:3, 11:5, 11:5) and Gabriela Zarova 3:0 (11:8, 11:2, 11:2).

In the decisive match for the gold medal, Anastasiia faced another Ukrainian, Oleksandra Sinielnikova, who has considerable experience competing in international and Polish junior tournaments. The final ended with Sinielnikova winning 3:0 (11:3, 11:5, 11:5).

Thus, Oleksandra Sinielnikova became the Romanian Junior Open 2026 champion among girls under 11, while Anastasiia Kovtun claimed a silver medal at her very first international tournament.

Five gold medals for Ukrainian athletes

Other Ukrainian participants also performed successfully. Among boys under 11, another all-Ukrainian final took place.

Artem Kostiukov and Mark Hrabovskyi competed for the championship title. Both athletes won their groups, each recording three victories.

In the group stage, Kostiukov defeated two representatives of Romania and an athlete from Israel, while Hrabovskyi beat two Romanian squash players and a representative of Bulgaria. In the final, Artem Kostiukov emerged victorious 3:1 (11:7, 11:6, 7:11, 11:8).

It is worth noting that Artem Kostiukov continues his family’s sporting traditions.

His mother is the well-known Ukrainian squash player Anastasiia Kostiukova, a Ukrainian champion and multiple winner of national competitions, including the 2023 Ukrainian Cup.

In 2022, she became the first Ukrainian woman to win a squash match at the World Games and also took silver at the international PSA Saarland Squash Open tournament.

In the Girls U13 category, Varvara Sinielnikova took first place, demonstrating confident play throughout the tournament.

Viktoriia Syvoplias brought Ukraine another gold medal in the Girls U19 category. In the final, she defeated Bulgaria’s Emma Peteva in a tense five-game contest — 3:2 (7:11, 11:9, 11:5, 8:11, 11:8).

Nestor Saplashenko secured another victory for Ukraine in the Boys U15 category. In the final, he defeated Greece’s Konstantinos Christos Papatheodorou 3:1 (11:8, 11:7, 7:11, 11:9).

Ukrainian Oleksandra Orlenko also competed in the Girls U19 category, finishing the tournament in seventh place.

Ukrainian juniors confirm their high level on the European stage

At Romanian Junior Open 2026, Ukrainian athletes won five gold medals in the Girls U11, Girls U13, Girls U19, Boys U11 and Boys U15 categories.

Ukrainian juniors confirm their high level on the European stage

At Romanian Junior Open 2026, Ukrainian athletes won five gold medals in the Girls U11, Girls U13, Girls U19, Boys U11 and Boys U15 categories.

In addition, Ukrainians also claimed two silver medals thanks to the performances of Anastasiia Kovtun and Mark Hrabovskyi.

In addition, Ukrainians claimed two silver medals thanks to the performances of Anastasiia Kovtun and Mark Hrabovskyi.

For nine-year-old Anastasiia Kovtun, the silver medal in Bucharest marked an important first step in her international sporting career.

Already in her debut appearance, she managed to become one of the medalists at an official European tournament.

Belgium’s three regions have reached an agreement with the European Commission to strengthen measures against water pollution, improve wastewater treatment and increase protection against floods and droughts.

The joint statement, signed in Leuven on Monday, 19th October, sets out commitments for Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital Region, including action on industrial pollution, pesticides and persistent chemicals such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly known as PFAS.

The agreement was signed by European Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy Jessika Roswall, Flemish Environment Minister Jo Brouns, Walloon Environment Minister Yves Coppieters and Brussels State Secretary Ans Persoons.

According to the European Commission’s announcement, the agreement follows a detailed examination of Belgium’s implementation of European water legislation and identifies measures requiring greater attention from regional authorities.

European Commission seeks faster implementation

Belgium is the second EU Member State to complete a structured dialogue under a Commission initiative launched in November 2025.

The process is intended to improve implementation of existing environmental requirements rather than establish an entirely new legislative framework.

European water legislation already obliges Member States to assess the condition of their rivers and groundwater, control pollution and prepare management plans intended to improve water quality.

However, achieving the objectives of the EU’s Water Framework Directive remains difficult in several countries, particularly where pollution, agricultural activity and urban development place competing demands on water resources.

Belgium presents additional administrative complications because responsibility for environmental policy and water management is divided principally between three regional governments.

Watercourses also cross regional and international boundaries, requiring cooperation with neighbouring countries.

The Commission’s review examined Belgium’s third generation of river basin management plans and its second generation of flood risk management plans.

Technical discussions identified areas where implementation could be accelerated, particularly regarding pollution controls, water efficiency and coordination between public authorities.

Flanders to address industrial pollution

Under the agreement, Flanders will prioritise investment in water resilience and stronger action against industrial pollution.

The region intends to use its IMPULSE programme to support improvements in water management and pollution reduction.

Industrial discharges are among the issues specifically identified for closer scrutiny.

The joint statement calls for more systematic reviews of permits governing water abstraction and industrial wastewater discharges, particularly where existing activities place pressure on rivers and groundwater.

The agreement also highlights the need to tackle persistent chemical pollution.

PFAS have become a significant environmental concern because many of these substances degrade extremely slowly and can accumulate in water, soil and living organisms.

Certain PFAS compounds have been associated with adverse health effects, although the risks depend on the individual chemical, exposure level and duration.

The Commission’s commitments include stronger action on PFAS and pesticides, alongside improvements in monitoring and pollution prevention.

Agricultural pollution is another area requiring attention.

Fertilisers and pesticides can enter rivers and groundwater through runoff or infiltration, creating difficulties for water treatment and contributing to the deterioration of aquatic ecosystems.

The three regions have agreed to strengthen cooperation with farmers, retailers and researchers to support more sustainable agricultural practices, including expanding markets for organic products.

€300 million for river restoration in Wallonia

Wallonia has committed to continuing investment in river restoration and improved water resilience, with particular attention to the Vesdre basin.

The region intends to use a €300 million loan secured from the European Investment Bank in 2025 to support restoration work.

The Vesdre basin experienced severe flooding in July 2021, when widespread destruction across eastern Belgium exposed weaknesses in flood protection and the management of vulnerable river valleys.

Restoration measures can include improving river channels, reconnecting floodplains and using natural systems to retain water during periods of heavy rainfall.

The regional authorities also intend to support industrial companies investing in water-efficient production technologies and environmental innovation.

These measures are intended to reduce pressure on water resources while helping businesses adapt to changing environmental requirements.

Wallonia has additionally committed to supporting cleaner agricultural practices, consistent with the wider national objective of reducing pollution from fertilisers and pesticides.

Brussels focuses on wastewater treatment

The Brussels-Capital Region will concentrate on improving water governance and wastewater treatment.

Urban wastewater infrastructure is particularly important in densely populated areas, where drainage networks and treatment facilities must accommodate domestic sewage, commercial activity and rainfall.

Heavy precipitation can place additional pressure on combined sewer systems, potentially increasing the risk of untreated or insufficiently treated wastewater entering natural watercourses.

Improving treatment capacity and water management requires investment in infrastructure, monitoring and coordination between the authorities responsible for sanitation and environmental protection.

The Brussels commitments therefore form part of the wider European effort to modernise urban wastewater systems and improve the ecological condition of rivers passing through major cities.

Cross-border water management

The agreement also identifies the need for closer cooperation in the Scheldt and Meuse river basins.

Both river systems cross national boundaries, making their management dependent on coordination between Belgium and neighbouring countries.

Regional governments have committed to supporting the restoration of floodplains and the removal of barriers affecting shared watercourses where appropriate.

The measures are intended to improve the condition of aquatic ecosystems while strengthening natural protection against floods and droughts.

The Commission will support Belgium through initiatives under the European Water Resilience Strategy, including research, digital technologies, technical expertise and assistance in mobilising public and private investment.

However, the joint statement signed in Leuven does not itself establish a new binding regulatory regime or guarantee that all the investments identified will be financed.

Its importance will depend on whether the three regional governments translate their commitments into funded projects, revised permits and measurable improvements in water quality.

For the European Commission, Belgium’s agreement is also part of a wider programme of structured discussions with Member States on compliance with EU water legislation. Further national dialogues are expected as Brussels seeks to improve implementation across the Union.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has convened an emergency government meeting following two days of violent unrest in Milan and other northern cities, where demonstrators clashed with police, looted shops and damaged public property during protests over living costs and deteriorating public services.

Police brought 271 people to police headquarters following Sunday’s disturbances in Milan, including 220 minors. Of those detained, 32 were formally arrested and another 28 were reported to the judicial authorities, according to figures released on Monday, 19th October.

The violence has prompted the Italian government to consider further restrictions on those involved in violent demonstrations, potentially introducing additional powers directed at organised disorder and juvenile offenders.

Milan city centre hit by looting

The disturbances began during demonstrations on Saturday, 17th October, organised amid growing dissatisfaction over household expenses, public services and wider political grievances.

Although the protests initially included peaceful participants, groups of masked individuals subsequently confronted riot police in central Milan. Officers used tear gas and water cannon as demonstrators erected burning barricades and threw objects at security personnel.

The unrest continued on Sunday, when shops were attacked close to Piazza del Duomo, one of Milan’s principal commercial and tourist areas.

Among the premises targeted were branches of Decathlon, Arc’teryx and Vodafone. Television footage showed damaged shopfronts, overturned street furniture and burning rubbish containers.

According to police figures reported on Monday, 174 of those taken to police headquarters were subjected to preventive detention measures introduced under recent Italian security legislation.

Fourteen members of the security services were reported injured during Sunday’s disturbances, including ten police officers and four members of the municipal police.

The judicial authorities are examining the conduct of individuals suspected of taking part in attacks on businesses and confrontations with officers. Prosecutors have sought custodial measures against several adults accused of offences including devastation, looting and aggravated resistance.

The large proportion of minors among those detained has become a central issue in the political response.

Violence spreads across northern Italy

Milan was not the only city affected by disorder. Saturday’s demonstrations also produced confrontations in Turin, Bologna, Brescia and Bergamo.

Italian police reported arrests across the affected cities, while the scale and organisation of the disturbances have raised questions about whether different groups were acting independently or using demonstrations as opportunities for coordinated violence.

There is not yet sufficient publicly established evidence to attribute the disorder to a single organisation or political movement.

The clashes coincided with major protests in neighbouring France, where similar concerns over living costs and public administration have contributed to increasingly confrontational demonstrations.

Although the grievances overlap, the Italian and French movements have different political backgrounds and organisational structures.

Government considers emergency legislation

Following a meeting at Palazzo Chigi on Monday, Meloni’s government indicated that it was considering a legislative response, potentially through an emergency decree.

According to details of the government discussions, proposals under examination include additional measures against violent offences, changes to preventive policing and possible restrictions addressing road blockages.

Some measures could be drawn from security legislation already under consideration in the Italian Senate. Ministers have also discussed the need for more effective intervention against juvenile offenders.

The meeting included Deputy Prime Ministers Matteo Salvini and Antonio Tajani, Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto and senior officials from the police, Carabinieri and intelligence services.

The government has stressed that peaceful demonstrations must remain protected while arguing that violence and organised destruction require a stronger response.

No final legislative text had been adopted at the conclusion of Monday’s meeting. A decree could be considered by the Council of Ministers as early as Tuesday, although the precise content remains subject to further examination.

Dispute over responsibility for policing

The unrest has also produced a dispute between Milan’s municipal authorities and the national government.

Mayor Giuseppe Sala questioned the adequacy of the policing arrangements, arguing that the number of officers initially deployed was insufficient to control the disturbances.

Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi rejected that criticism, while senior government figures accused local political leaders of failing to condemn the violence unequivocally.

The disagreement reflects a wider question over how responsibility for anticipating and containing serious public disorder should be divided between local administrations and national security authorities.

Italy’s opposition has also challenged the government’s handling of the disturbances. Former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi criticised Meloni and Piantedosi over their failure to prevent the violence, calling for a change in leadership at the Interior Ministry.

The political argument is likely to intensify if the government proceeds with emergency legislation. Supporters of stronger police powers argue that the existing framework is insufficient to deal with rapidly organised disturbances, while opponents will scrutinise the proportionality of new restrictions and their effect on peaceful protest.

The immediate test for the government will be whether additional legal powers can improve public-order operations without replacing effective policing, intelligence gathering and judicial enforcement.

The European Parliament is preparing to vote on amendments to the as Brussels seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of minerals essential for defence equipment, electric vehicles, advanced electronics and industrial production.

The proposals, scheduled for debate in Strasbourg on Monday, 19 October, and a vote on Tuesday, would strengthen coordination over strategic supplies and revise the responsibilities of European companies that depend on vulnerable international supply chains.

At the centre of the discussions is a proposal to establish a European Critical Raw Materials Centre, which would coordinate purchasing arrangements, assess supply risks and support the development of strategic reserves.

The initiative comes amid increasing concern over China’s dominant position in the processing and supply of several materials regarded as indispensable to European industry.

Parliament considers stronger European coordination

According to the European Parliament’s October plenary briefing, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre would operate as an EU body responsible for several functions currently distributed between European institutions and national authorities.

These would include identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains, conducting risk assessments, coordinating contingency stocks and supporting joint purchasing arrangements.

The objective is to give European governments and manufacturers greater capacity to respond to interruptions in supplies of minerals and processed materials that cannot easily be replaced.

The legislative report has been prepared by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Dutch Social Democrat MEP Mohammed Chahim serving as rapporteur.

The committee examined amendments to the existing legislation during 2026, with its revised report submitted for plenary consideration on 9th October.

Tuesday’s vote is intended to establish Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council. It would not, by itself, constitute final adoption of the amended regulation.

China’s position creates supply risks

The European Union depends heavily on imported critical raw materials, particularly those required for batteries, permanent magnets, semiconductors and specialist industrial equipment.

China occupies a particularly important position in the refining and processing of rare earth elements, graphite and several other materials used in high-technology manufacturing.

The concentration of production creates vulnerabilities because disruption at a single stage of processing can affect manufacturers operating across multiple European countries.

According to the Council of the European Union’s assessment of strategic mineral supplies, China is the principal supplier to the EU for numerous materials, including gallium, germanium, magnesium and rare earth elements.

These substances are used in applications extending well beyond electric vehicles.

Permanent magnets are required for certain electric motors, wind turbines and defence systems, while other critical materials are used in radar, satellites, aircraft components and advanced electronic equipment.

Restrictions affecting their availability can therefore have consequences for European industrial output, defence procurement and the development of new technology.

The question for EU policymakers is not simply whether minerals can be obtained, but whether Europe has sufficient alternative sources and processing capacity to withstand restrictions imposed by a dominant supplier.

Existing targets remain difficult to achieve

The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force in May 2024 and established benchmarks intended to strengthen European production and diversify imports by 2030.

Under the existing framework, the EU aims to develop extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10 per cent of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials, where geological reserves allow.

The corresponding benchmarks are 40 per cent for processing and 25 per cent for recycling.

The legislation also seeks to prevent any single non-EU country from supplying more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of a particular strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage.

These are policy benchmarks rather than binding production quotas imposed on individual companies.

Their achievement depends on the development of mines, processing facilities and recycling operations, as well as the ability to attract investment.

New extraction projects frequently require lengthy environmental assessments, infrastructure development and extensive capital investment. Processing operations face additional challenges involving energy costs, technical expertise and commercial competitiveness.

Consequently, reducing import dependence involves more than identifying mineral deposits within European territory.

Greater obligations for manufacturers

The proposed amendments also address the responsibilities of major European companies using strategic raw materials.

Under provisions examined by the parliamentary committee, the European Commission would take a greater role in identifying large manufacturers whose operations depend on strategically important supplies.

These companies could face requirements to assess vulnerabilities in their supply chains, including the geographical location of extraction and processing operations and the ownership of relevant facilities.

The arrangements would be particularly significant for businesses producing batteries, aircraft, drones, satellites, advanced chips and other products considered strategically important.

Where significant risks are identified, companies could be expected to consider measures including diversification, improved material efficiency or maintaining stocks.

The proposals also seek to strengthen recycling and the recovery of valuable materials from existing products, reducing the quantity of newly extracted resources required by European industry.

Recycling alone cannot remove the need for imports, particularly where demand for new technologies is increasing, but it can provide an additional source of supply.

Supply security becomes an industrial priority

The legislation forms part of a wider effort to link European industrial policy with economic security.

Brussels has been seeking additional raw materials partnerships with third countries, while manufacturers remain concerned about the commercial cost of building alternative supply chains.

Recent EU discussions concerning cooperation with Vietnam illustrate the emphasis being placed on securing alternative access to minerals such as tungsten and rare earth elements.

However, diversifying supplies does not necessarily mean transferring extraction and processing to Europe. Partnerships with reliable external producers may remain essential, particularly for materials unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Union.

The proposed European centre would therefore have to balance internal production, international purchasing, strategic stocks and commercial demand.

The immediate legislative issue is whether the revised framework gives European institutions sufficient powers to coordinate these activities without placing disproportionate administrative obligations on businesses.

Tuesday’s parliamentary vote will determine the negotiating position MEPs take into discussions with EU governments over how those responsibilities should be distributed.

At least three people have died in severe flooding across eastern Spain after Storm Adam brought extraordinary rainfall to the Mediterranean coast, forcing thousands from their homes and leaving residents stranded on rooftops as emergency services struggled to reach inundated communities.

The worst flooding struck parts of Valencia and Alicante, where swollen rivers overwhelmed roads, flooded residential districts and disrupted transport. Authorities ordered residents of 145 municipalities to remain indoors as rescue operations continued on Monday, 19th October.

The disaster has revived memories of the October 2024 floods, which killed more than 230 people in the Valencia region and prompted widespread criticism of the authorities’ emergency warnings and response.

Thousands evacuated as rivers burst their banks

The coastal town of Oliva, in Valencia province, was among the worst affected areas. Approximately 2,000 people were evacuated from seven campsites as floodwaters spread through low-lying neighbourhoods, while residents elsewhere sought refuge on upper floors and rooftops.

According to reports from the Spanish news agency EFE, emergency crews were reinforced by Spain’s Military Emergencies Unit, whose personnel were deployed from their base at Bétera to assist local firefighters and rescue teams.

Helicopters were used to reach people trapped by the rising water. Roads became impassable, vehicles were swept away and several settlements were temporarily isolated as streams and drainage channels overflowed.

The scale of the rainfall was exceptional even for a region accustomed to intense autumn storms. In parts of Valencia and Alicante, precipitation approached 700 litres per square metre over approximately 48 hours, equivalent to 700 millimetres of rain.

Pego, in neighbouring Alicante province, recorded more than 600 millimetres within approximately 36 hours, placing considerable pressure on local waterways and drainage infrastructure.

Fatalities and emergency restrictions

Two women died during the weekend, including one swept away by floodwaters near Cabrera de Mar, north of Barcelona, and another whose body was recovered near Sagunto, in Valencia.

A third woman was found dead inside a flooded property in Oliva during rescue operations on Monday. Separately, a 64-year-old man died after suffering a heart attack at a flooded campsite in the same town, according to EFE’s account of the incident.

The regional authorities activated level-two emergency arrangements, enabling additional resources to be mobilised as local services confronted the consequences of prolonged rainfall.

At the height of the emergency, stay-at-home restrictions covered approximately 800,000 people. These measures were subsequently eased in many municipalities, although restrictions remained in force in particularly exposed districts.

Schools were closed in affected areas, roads were blocked and rail services disrupted. The situation remained particularly difficult where floodwaters had entered homes, commercial premises and tourist accommodation.

Renewed examination of emergency preparedness

Storm Adam has inevitably drawn comparisons with the disaster of October 2024, when catastrophic flooding in eastern Spain exposed serious weaknesses in emergency communication, evacuation procedures and coordination between public authorities.

That earlier disaster generated disputes over responsibility between regional and national institutions, particularly concerning the timing of warnings and the deployment of rescue resources.

The latest flooding places those questions back on the political agenda. Spain’s decentralised administrative structure gives regional governments substantial responsibility for civil protection, while the central government can provide military assistance and additional emergency resources.

The deployment of the Military Emergencies Unit demonstrates how rapidly local incidents can require national intervention when extreme rainfall affects several municipalities simultaneously.

The challenge extends beyond issuing weather warnings. Authorities must determine whether warnings reach vulnerable residents, whether evacuation routes remain accessible and whether emergency personnel can intervene before flooding becomes dangerous.

In communities close to rivers, floodplains and coastal drainage systems, these decisions become particularly consequential when rainfall accumulates over a short period.

European implications of repeated flooding

The disaster also raises questions about infrastructure investment and the application of European flood-risk legislation.

Under the EU’s Floods Directive, Member States are required to assess flood risks, prepare hazard maps and develop management plans designed to reduce the consequences for human health, economic activity and the environment.

Those obligations require national and regional authorities to identify vulnerable areas and consider preventive measures, including land-use planning, flood defences and emergency preparedness.

Extreme rainfall does not produce the same consequences everywhere. The effects depend partly on local geography, drainage capacity, urban development and the condition of waterways.

Meteorological warnings had also extended towards Catalonia as the weather system moved northwards, creating additional concern in areas where saturated ground could increase the risk of further flooding.

For the affected municipalities, the immediate priorities remain the completion of rescue operations, restoration of essential services and assessment of damage to homes, roads and businesses.

The longer-term examination will concern whether the emergency arrangements and infrastructure improvements undertaken since the 2024 disaster were sufficient to reduce the consequences of another major autumn storm.

Serge Schmemann’s warning about the collapse of the old international order deserves attention. For Europe, the challenge is to defend democratic security while accepting that American leadership may never return in its familiar form.

The most dangerous assumption in Western politics is that normality is merely postponed. Survive Donald Trump, the argument runs, and America will resume its familiar position: reassuring allies, containing adversaries and underwriting an international system whose benefits outweigh its frustrations. Serge Schmemann’s latest opinion challenges that comforting expectation. He is right to do so.

In his October 18th essay for The New York Times, the highly esteemed former Moscow, Bonn and Jerusalem bureau chief examines what might follow the erosion of the postwar order. His central warning, reflected in published excerpts, is that changes extending beyond Trump make a complete restoration improbable. That is a persuasive starting point for democratic strategy.

America’s allies should take this seriously because trust operates differently from military strength. Governments can replenish ammunition, replace aircraft and increase defence budgets. Confidence in a security guarantee is harder to rebuild. Once allies must consider whether Washington’s commitments depend on a president’s personal preferences, that uncertainty becomes a permanent consideration in their planning.

Schmemann’s argument also avoids an analytical trap: attributing every international upheaval to one man. According to the published account of his essay, he places Trump alongside broader developments, including China’s rise, Russia’s renewed aggression and democratic retreat. His alternative futures are scenarios, rather than predictions. Their value lies in forcing readers to consider choices and consequences before events foreclose them.

Supporting this argument does not require romanticising American leadership. Washington’s record includes disastrous interventions, selective commitments to human rights and partnerships with dictators. Those contradictions weakened its authority. Yet recognising them does not erase the distinction between an imperfect system containing restraints on power and an emerging environment in which powerful states increasingly seek freedom from restraint.

For smaller countries, that distinction is existential. Sovereignty offers little protection if stronger neighbours can overturn it through invasion, economic intimidation or negotiations conducted without the affected country’s meaningful participation. An international order deserves defending when it gives weaker states instruments to resist coercion, even when those instruments work inconsistently.

Ukraine makes the issue concrete. A settlement should be judged by whether it produces durable security and respects Ukrainian agency, rather than by the speed with which a diplomatic announcement can be staged. Peace that leaves an aggressor confident of future gains risks becoming an interval between wars.

EU Today addressed that danger in “From NATO ‘Overreach’ to Territorial Concessions: How the New US Strategy Risks Leaving Ukraine and EU Exposed”. Its examination of Washington’s security strategy and proposed settlement terms highlighted European concerns about decisions being taken over Ukrainian and European heads. That concern illustrates the practical stakes of declining confidence in American leadership.

Europe, however, cannot turn justified criticism into an excuse for its own shortcomings. If democratic governments believe that sovereignty and collective security matter, they must supply the resources required to defend them. Procurement, industrial capacity, infrastructure protection and sustained assistance to Ukraine are measures of political seriousness. Communiqués cannot substitute for delivery.

Gary Cartwright made a related argument in EU Today’s “Trump Comes to Davos — and Europe Still Isn’t Ready”. Discussing pressure over Greenland, he identified both the damage caused by coercive bargaining and Europe’s persistent unpreparedness. That combination matters: American unpredictability becomes more dangerous when European governments lack the means or unity to respond.

A stronger European contribution would also serve Americans who still value alliances. Partnerships are more resilient when responsibility is shared and commitments survive changes of government. Europe should build the capacity to act while preserving cooperation with American institutions, businesses and citizens. Treating the entire United States as interchangeable with its president would reproduce the personalised politics that makes the present situation so unstable.

Democratic renewal must begin at home, too. Governments weaken their case abroad when they dismiss public grievances, evade scrutiny or treat electoral legitimacy as an inconvenience. Defending democracy requires competent administration, accountable institutions and room for peaceful disagreement. Strategic credibility rests partly on whether citizens believe their own system deserves their confidence.

Schmemann’s warning therefore deserves support as a demand for preparation. The old order cannot simply be summoned back through nostalgia or another American election. Its most valuable achievements must be sustained through decisions made now. Europe should approach the future with fewer comforting assumptions, greater material strength and a clearer understanding that democratic security depends on governments willing to defend it.

Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.

His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.

According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.

The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A divided European visa policy

The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.

The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.

National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.

In November 2025, the Commission introduced additional restrictions on multiple-entry visas, requiring Russian travellers covered by the new rules to apply again for subsequent visits.

The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.

Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.

Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.

Security concerns on the eastern border

Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.

European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.

Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.

These concerns were also evident in EU Today’s reporting on suspected security breaches in Europe, although the circumstances of individual incidents must be investigated rather than assumed to involve foreign intelligence services.

The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.

Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.

Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.

Political and legal complications

A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.

European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.

The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.

Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.

France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.

Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions and Schengen controls

The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.

EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.

Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.

Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.

Five people have been arrested in Cyprus, Germany and Italy as part of a European investigation into an alleged €114 million VAT fraud operation involving the cross-border smartphone trade.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced on 16th October that three suspects had been detained in Cyprus, one in Germany and one in Italy following an investigation coordinated by its Munich office.

Investigators believe the suspects established and controlled a network of companies designed to exploit the tax treatment of goods traded between EU member states.

The alleged operation involved smartphone transactions through businesses and so-called missing traders operating in Germany, Albania and Sweden. Prosecutors estimate that the activities caused VAT losses of approximately €80 million in Sweden and €34 million in Germany.

According to the official announcement of the arrests, the operation forms part of a wider investigation known as Midas, which is examining organised cross-border tax fraud.

Searches across several countries

The arrests were accompanied by searches and seizures in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, conducted with the assistance of national police, financial investigators and tax authorities.

Prosecutors said 12 searches had been carried out at premises connected with the suspects and companies under investigation.

Assets of up to €80,000 were frozen, while investigators also seized or took action against bank accounts, vehicles and property.

The operation involved cooperation between Germany’s tax authorities, Cyprus’s financial intelligence and cybercrime units, the Greek financial police and Italy’s Guardia di Finanza.

The suspects are believed to have played leading roles in organising and controlling the alleged scheme, although prosecutors have not publicly established their individual criminal responsibility.

The investigation remains subject to proceedings before the competent German courts. All suspects are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

How the alleged fraud operated

The case concerns a form of tax evasion known as missing-trader intra-community fraud, commonly described as carousel VAT fraud.

Under the EU’s VAT system, qualifying business-to-business transactions involving goods transported between member states are generally exempt from VAT in the country of dispatch.

The purchaser accounts for VAT under the rules applicable in the destination country, while subsequent domestic sales normally involve VAT being charged to the buyer.

Fraudsters can exploit those arrangements by establishing companies that purchase goods through cross-border transactions before reselling them domestically.

A missing trader collects VAT from the purchaser but fails to remit it to the relevant tax authority. Other companies in the transaction chain may then seek deductions or refunds.

The same goods can pass through several businesses and, in some arrangements, move repeatedly between countries, allowing the fraud to be repeated.

Smartphones and electronic equipment are particularly attractive because they are relatively expensive, easily transported and can be traded in large volumes.

The complexity of the arrangements makes investigations difficult when businesses are established in several jurisdictions and transactions move rapidly between companies.

A wider European problem

The latest arrests follow another substantial VAT fraud operation announced earlier this month.

On 7th October, the EPPO reported that 62 suspects had been detained in a separate investigation involving alleged losses of at least €410 million.

That operation, known as Hermes, involved searches across eight countries and allegations concerning the sale of mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Although separate from Midas, the investigation illustrates the scale and organisation of suspected VAT fraud involving internationally traded consumer electronics.

According to the EPPO‘s 2025 annual report, prosecutors were handling 3,602 active investigations at the end of last year, with estimated potential damage exceeding €67 billion.

Of that amount, more than €45 billion related to suspected VAT and customs fraud.

Those figures concern estimated losses under investigation, rather than sums established by final court judgments or amounts that have already been recovered.

Protecting European tax revenues

The financial consequences extend beyond the immediate losses attributed to individual schemes.

VAT is a major source of revenue for national governments and forms part of the system used to calculate certain contributions to the EU budget.

Fraudulent transactions can also distort competition by allowing dishonest operators to offer prices that legitimate businesses cannot match.

The Commission’s 2025 VAT gap report estimated that EU countries failed to collect approximately €128 billion in expected VAT revenue in 2023.

That broader figure includes losses arising from several causes, including administrative errors and insolvency, and cannot be attributed entirely to criminal fraud.

The latest arrests also demonstrate the importance of cross-border investigative cooperation when suspected financial offences involve companies, transactions and assets located in different countries.

In the Midas investigation, prosecutors must now establish the precise roles of the suspects, prove the alleged transactions and determine whether criminal proceedings can result in convictions and financial recovery.

The arrests represent another stage in the investigation, not a judicial finding that the alleged €114 million fraud has been proved.

What began as a student protest over deteriorating schools has developed into a nationwide revolt against economic hardship, political paralysis and declining public services. With the 2027 presidential election approaching, the violence has exposed problems that neither the government nor its principal opponents have convincing plans to resolve.

France’s latest wave of unrest has developed into one of the most serious domestic crises of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency. More than 550,000 people participated in demonstrations on 17 October, according to official estimates, before violence spread through Paris and other major cities. Shops were looted, police confronted rioters, and the historic town hall in Limoges was largely destroyed by fire.

The scale of the destruction prompted emergency government consultations and a televised presidential address. Macron promised to prosecute those responsible, while stopping short of declaring a state of emergency. Yet the immediate security challenge conceals a more difficult political question: why have protests that began with relatively specific demands over education become a confrontation involving such different sections of French society?

From school protests to a national revolt

The movement originated among secondary-school students demanding better facilities, more teachers and improvements in educational standards. Their complaints subsequently attracted trade unions, workers, farmers and elements of the Gilets Jaunes, the Yellow Vest movement that challenged Macron’s government in 2018.

The resulting coalition has no coherent political programme. Students protesting overcrowded classrooms share demonstrations with workers concerned about purchasing power and motorists angered by fuel prices. Their interests are not necessarily compatible, but they reflect a common dissatisfaction with the government’s ability to deliver functioning public services while containing living costs.

This distinction matters. The presence of masked rioters and organised groups engaged in violence does not establish that the hundreds of thousands who demonstrated peacefully supported their actions. Equally, the destruction of public buildings, attacks on police and widespread looting raise legitimate questions about the state’s capacity to maintain public order.

The economic problem behind the protests

At the centre of the discontent lies a structural problem that successive French governments have struggled to confront: the distribution of public expenditure between an ageing population and the services required by younger generations.

A French government budget assessment published in October revealed that pension obligations accounted for approximately 32 per cent of the education ministry’s budget, including €28.5 billion in pension expenditure. These obligations restrict the resources available for other departmental priorities.

France nevertheless remains a substantial spender on education. According to official figures, expenditure reached €199.2 billion in 2025, equivalent to 6.7 per cent of GDP. However, after inflation, the annual increase was only 0.1 per cent.

The issue is therefore not simply how much France spends, but how efficiently resources are allocated and whether expenditure meets changing educational needs.

The OECD’s 2025 PISA assessment found that French pupils’ performance in mathematics and reading had declined compared with 2022. Results were among the country’s lowest recorded, although broadly comparable with the OECD average.

These figures give the student protests a significance extending beyond the immediate condition of classrooms. They raise questions about France’s longer-term economic competitiveness and its capacity to provide younger generations with opportunities comparable to those enjoyed by their predecessors.

The limits of Macron’s reform programme

Macron entered office in 2017 promising to modernise the French economy and overcome the traditional division between left and right. Nearly a decade later, his administration faces a fragmented parliament, constrained public finances and growing resistance to further structural reforms.

The suspension of his pension reform illustrated the difficulty. Raising the retirement age was intended to reduce pressure on the pension system, but parliamentary opposition forced the government to defer the measure until after the presidential election.

The underlying financial pressures have not disappeared. Nor can they be resolved easily through additional spending when public debt, borrowing costs and budgetary obligations already restrict the government’s room for manoeuvre.

This creates an uncomfortable political reality: the state is expected to provide better services, greater purchasing-power protection and stronger security, while the available resources remain limited.

Can the opposition benefit?

The unrest comes approximately six months before the presidential election, with Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Unbowed competing to establish themselves as alternatives to Macron’s political centre.

Le Pen has sought to combine support for economic grievances with demands for tougher policing. That position may attract voters concerned by the violence, but it also exposes tensions within a movement that previously supported the Yellow Vest protests.

Mélenchon faces a different difficulty. Supporting demonstrations against government policy is consistent with his political programme, but the involvement of violent groups risks shifting public attention from social demands towards questions of security.

A recent presidential opinion poll even suggested that Le Pen and Mélenchon could contest the final round, illustrating the weakening position of more conventional political alternatives.

Neither, however, can escape the fiscal constraints that have frustrated Macron’s government. A change of president would not automatically provide the resources required to expand public services, reform pensions and reduce the deficit simultaneously.

A wider problem for France and Europe

President Donald Trump has attributed the French unrest to immigration, although the movement’s documented origins lie principally in education, living costs and dissatisfaction with public services. Without established evidence about those responsible for individual acts of violence, broader claims about the demonstrators’ backgrounds remain speculative.

For the European Union, France’s instability carries consequences beyond its domestic political debate. France is central to European defence, fiscal negotiations and support for Ukraine. Sustained political paralysis would complicate its ability to negotiate and implement decisions requiring substantial public expenditure.

The immediate task for Macron’s government is to restore security without allowing the legitimate grievances of peaceful demonstrators to disappear from political consideration. The more difficult task will fall to whoever enters the Élysée in 2027.

France’s crisis is not simply a repetition of the Yellow Vest movement. It reflects a growing conflict over public resources, expectations of the state and the ability of established political institutions to reconcile competing demands.

The violence may subside, but the economic contradictions that brought such different groups onto the streets will remain. The presidential election will determine who inherits them, rather than whether they exist.