The maritime boundary agreement reached between Turkey and Libya, which was ratified by the Libyan parliament on Tuesday, “infringes on the sovereign rights of third states”, the European Union’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Wednesday, after she met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Brussels.

“I had an extensive discussion with my colleague Hakan Fidan on a range of issues. Good neighbourly relations and advancing the Cyprus settlement process are of high importance. I raised yesterday’s Libyan vote … and stressed that it infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states,” she said after the meeting.

Away from the matter of the eastern Mediterranean, she said that she had also spoken to Fidan about “Russia’s dangerous Black Sea escalation”, which has seen commercial vessels be targeted by missile fire, and that she had “emphasised the need to step up the pressure on Moscow to end the war”.

“The EU and Turkey both support a Black Sea freedom of navigation arrangement,” she said.

She said that she and Fidan had also “addressed developments in the south Caucasus and across the Middle East”, and on this front said that “Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and Yemen are textbook terror tactics and must end”, and that “in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is making shipping dangerous and expenses”.

“Freedom of navigation must be restored without tolls or fees,” she added.

Fidan made no statement after the meeting.

Greece, Cyprus believe islands are entitled to full EEZ

The maritime agreement was unanimously passed by Libya’s parliament on Tuesday, some seven years after it had initially been signed by the internationally recognised Libyan government and Turkey in 2019.

However, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus object to the deal, saying that Turkey and Libya do not share a maritime border because islands are each entitled to a full exclusive economic zone, and that therefore, the sea in question belongs to Cyprus and Crete. Turkey’s position is that islands are not entitled to a full EEZ.

Wednesday’s meeting came after European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had said that they “deeply regret” the Libyan parliament’s ratification of the deal, which, they said, “infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states”, “does not comply with the law of the sea”, and “is null and void”.

“We reaffirm our solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. We reiterate the EU’s well-known position against any outside interference in Libya,” they said.

On the other side of the argument, Turkey’s presidential press office director Burhanettin Duran described Tuesday’s vote as “an important advancement towards protecting the shared rights and interests of both nations in the eastern Mediterranean, establishing maritime jurisdiction areas on the basis of equity, and strengthening regional cooperation”.

“Under the leadership of our President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey will continue to safeguard its rights and interests within the Blue Homeland, while further developing its relations with friendly and brotherly Libya and promoting equitable resource sharing, peace, and stability in the eastern Mediterranean”.

The European Union has adopted a new Arctic strategy placing security at the centre of its northern policy, reflecting growing concern over Russian military activity, vulnerable submarine infrastructure and competition for control of emerging maritime routes.

Presented on Tuesday, 20 October, by the European Commission and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the strategy proposes a maritime security hub, expanded satellite surveillance, greater icebreaker capacity and improved military mobility across northern Europe.

The document marks a departure from the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy, which placed greater emphasis on climate change, environmental protection and scientific cooperation. The revised framework treats the region as an increasingly important component of European security and economic policy.

Russia’s military presence reshapes European priorities

Russia’s expanding military infrastructure in the High North is a principal concern behind the policy revision.

Moscow has reopened Soviet-era military installations, strengthened its northern forces and maintained substantial nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The region contains strategically important naval bases used by Russia’s Northern Fleet, including facilities supporting its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.

Russian operations in the Arctic also have implications for maritime access between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, an area increasingly important to NATO’s northern defence arrangements.

The EU intends to work more closely with NATO and its northern partners, including Norway, Iceland, Britain, Canada and the United States, while developing capabilities that complement existing military structures.

Kallas said the Arctic’s security environment had deteriorated significantly since 2021, with geopolitical competition increasingly affecting a region previously associated principally with environmental and economic cooperation.

The EU’s revised priorities reflect concerns extending beyond conventional military deployments, particularly the exposure of undersea communications networks and energy infrastructure to sabotage and disruption.

New maritime security hub and submarine cable protection

A central proposal involves establishing an EU Maritime Security Hub to improve information-sharing between member states and partner countries operating in Arctic waters.

The system would strengthen monitoring of maritime movements and support the identification of suspicious activity near critical infrastructure.

Brussels also proposes an Arctic Cable Hub, initially concentrating on the protection, monitoring and repair of submarine communications cables across the North Atlantic and Arctic.

Such infrastructure carries international data traffic and supports communications between Europe, Greenland and North America. Damage to cables could interrupt telecommunications, financial services and government networks.

The Commission’s new Arctic policy framework also supports the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable connecting Greenland directly with Europe, together with secure satellite communications through the EU’s IRIS² programme.

Further measures envisage expanded use of Copernicus satellite surveillance, improved maritime intelligence and closer monitoring of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These measures form part of a broader attempt to improve European surveillance capabilities without relying exclusively on military assets provided by individual NATO members.

Icebreakers, transport corridors and military mobility

The strategy also addresses Europe’s limited capacity to operate in extreme northern conditions.

The Commission wants to support additional icebreaker capabilities, which are essential for maintaining access to Arctic waters, conducting emergency operations and supporting scientific and logistical activity.

Russian icebreaker capabilities remain considerably more extensive than those available to most European countries, providing Moscow with operational advantages along the Northern Sea Route.

European investment would also support ports, railways, energy terminals and digital infrastructure capable of serving both civilian and security requirements.

The emphasis on dual-use infrastructure reflects the growing importance of military mobility across northern Europe, particularly following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Improved transport links could facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel while also supporting economic development in sparsely populated northern regions.

However, the Commission has not provided a comprehensive financial allocation for the proposed security measures, leaving important questions about funding, procurement and implementation.

Brussels retreats from Arctic drilling ban proposal

The revised strategy also introduces a significant change in the EU’s position on Arctic fossil fuel development.

In 2021, Brussels proposed pursuing an international legal commitment to prohibit further oil, gas and coal extraction in the Arctic.

The new strategy maintains the EU’s opposition to environmentally damaging fossil fuel development but no longer includes the explicit ambition to secure a multilateral legal prohibition.

The adjustment follows sustained disagreement with energy-producing countries and recognition that an international agreement would be difficult to achieve under current geopolitical conditions.

Norway has argued that continued exploration in parts of the Barents Sea remains important for European energy security, particularly as production from mature Norwegian fields is expected to decline.

EU Today previously reported on Brussels’ opposition to Norwegian Arctic drilling plans and the disagreements between environmental objectives and Europe’s long-term energy requirements.

The latest strategy does not represent an endorsement of new Arctic drilling. It does, however, acknowledge the limitations of the EU’s previous diplomatic approach.

Greenland and the northern economy

Greenland occupies a prominent position in the revised strategy because of its location, mineral resources and importance to transatlantic communications.

The Commission wants to expand cooperation on digital connectivity, critical raw materials, research and infrastructure investment, while recognising the responsibilities of Greenland’s own institutions and the Kingdom of Denmark.

Brussels also intends to strengthen scientific cooperation and support Arctic communities adapting to rapid environmental change.

The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, creating new commercial opportunities while imposing substantial costs on local populations and infrastructure.

The EU’s proposals therefore combine security measures with investment in transport networks, research facilities and economic diversification.

For Brussels, implementation will require agreement between member states with different geographical interests, defence capabilities and budgetary priorities. Cooperation with NATO will also require careful coordination to avoid duplicating existing military arrangements.

The Commission has established a significantly broader Arctic agenda than the one adopted five years ago. Its practical impact will depend on whether member states finance the surveillance systems, vessels and infrastructure that the new strategy envisages.