© Hazem Bader/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
O primeiro-ministro israelense, Benjamin Netanyahu, e seu principal oponente, Gadi Eisenkot, se opõem à criação de um Estado palestino independente. Isso significa que é improvável que as eleições da próxima semana tragam uma mudança drástica nas políticas que, há décadas, têm dificultado o processo de paz.
Três anos após os ataques de 7 de outubro — liderados pelo Hamas —, ambos mantêm uma postura linha-dura em relação a Gaza, afirmando que retomariam a guerra na região caso o grupo militante — cuja carta fundacional prega a destruição de Israel — não se desarme.
No entanto, eles divergem quanto aos assentamentos na Cisjordânia ocupada e, provavelmente, dependerão de diferentes parceiros de coalizão para formar um governo, o que poderia levar o país a seguir caminhos bastante distintos.
Confira, a seguir, as posições dos candidatos sobre o conflito com os palestinos:
Centenas de milhares de israelenses vivem na Cisjordânia, em territórios capturados por Israel na guerra de 1967. A prática é considerada ilegal pela quase totalidade dos países, com base no direito internacional — embora Israel conteste esse entendimento.
Sob a gestão de Netanyahu, houve uma rápida expansão dos assentamentos, incluindo a criação de pequenos postos avançados em áreas da Cisjordânia reservadas à administração civil da Autoridade Palestina — locais onde, segundo a própria legislação israelense, tais assentamentos são ilegais.
Os colonos têm atacado palestinos com frequência crescente, e críticos afirmam que o governo tem feito vista grossa para essa violência.
Eisenkot, em princípio, apoia a existência de assentamentos, mas defende que eles devem estar em conformidade com a lei israelense. Ele se opõe a assentamentos construídos sem autorização, defende a desativação de postos avançados em áreas onde são proibidos e comprometeu-se a impedir atos de violência cometidos por colonos contra palestinos.
Ele também se opõe à decisão do governo Netanyahu de realizar construções na área conhecida como E1 — um projeto que dividiria a Cisjordânia ao meio e a isolaria de Jerusalém Oriental. Segundo os próprios colonos, o objetivo dessa medida seria “enterrar” a possibilidade de um Estado palestino.
Em um reflexo de como a política israelense se deslocou para a direita, tanto Netanyahu quanto Eisenkot — assim como os líderes de praticamente todos os outros partidos de maioria judaica — opõem-se à criação de um futuro Estado palestino independente ao lado de Israel.
Essa posição representa, na prática, a rejeição da “solução de dois Estados”, que serviu de base para as negociações internacionais de paz ao longo de gerações. Tanto Netanyahu quanto Eisenkot afirmam que Israel deve manter o controle de segurança final sobre todo o território entre o rio Jordão e o mar Mediterrâneo.
Existem, contudo, diferenças na ênfase dada por cada um. A posição de Eisenkot sobre a limitação dos assentamentos na Cisjordânia preservaria territórios onde os palestinos exercem, atualmente, autogoverno civil. A coalizão de Netanyahu inclui partidos que defendem abertamente a anexação total, por parte de Israel, das terras palestinas ocupadas.
Três anos após o ataque ao sul de Israel — liderado pelo Hamas e que desencadeou uma invasão israelense à Faixa de Gaza — e um ano após um cessar-fogo mediado pelos EUA ter encerrado os principais combates na região, as tropas israelenses controlam, hoje, cerca de dois terços do enclave.
Quase a totalidade da população, composta por mais de 2 milhões de palestinos, vive no terço restante — principalmente em tendas ou edifícios danificados — e permanece sob o controle político absoluto do Hamas. As negociações mediadas pelos EUA ainda não conseguiram estabelecer termos para o desarmamento do Hamas, a retirada de Israel e o início da reconstrução sob supervisão internacional.
Tanto Eisenkot quanto Netanyahu afirmam que as tropas israelenses não se retirarão de Gaza enquanto o Hamas não for desarmado, e que Israel está preparado para retomar os combates, caso necessário, para alcançar esse objetivo.
Eisenkot sustenta que a permanência do Hamas no poder em Gaza representa um fracasso profundo. Ele afirma que, em até 18 meses após assumir o cargo, garantiria a substituição da administração do Hamas — seja por meio de um plano mediado pelos EUA ou por força militar.
A coalizão governista de Netanyahu inclui, atualmente, grupos nacionalistas judaicos de direita liderados pelos ativistas Itamar Ben-Gvir e Bezalel Smotrich — ambos defensores da anexação total das terras palestinas e alvos de sanções em diversos países ocidentais por promoverem a violência por parte de colonos.
Netanyahu conta, ainda, com o apoio de partidos ultraortodoxos que buscam a isenção do serviço militar para estudantes religiosos judeus.
Entre os partidos de oposição que poderiam ser atraídos por Eisenkot para compor uma futura coalizão — visando destituir Netanyahu — estão diversos grupos de direita; contudo, nenhum deles possui líderes tão radicais quanto Smotrich ou Ben-Gvir.
Os apoiadores de Eisenkot opõem-se, em sua maioria, à isenção do serviço militar para estudantes religiosos, o que, provavelmente, inviabiliza uma aliança com os partidos ultraortodoxos.
Para destituir Netanyahu, Eisenkot provavelmente precisará do apoio dos Democratas — grupo que inclui o que restou do Partido Trabalhista, de centro-esquerda, o qual dominou a política israelense por gerações, mas perdeu força à medida que o país se deslocou para a direita. Os Democratas são, atualmente, o único partido de destaque liderado por judeus que defende uma solução de dois Estados.
Tanto Eisenkot quanto Netanyahu afirmaram que não formariam um governo com partidos que representam, majoritariamente, cidadãos israelenses de ascendência palestina — os quais compõem cerca de um quinto da população.
Knesset, Likud: Entenda os principais termos da eleição de Israel
Trita Parsi puts the odds of a new round of US-Israeli war on Iran at 90% – and it could start as soon as this weekend. The US and Israeli militaries have plans for renewed strikes after the midterms, the New York Times reports; three aircraft carriers are en route to the region, and Netanyahu, trailing ahead of Tuesday’s elections, says he’s ordered Israel’s military and Mossad to topple Iran’s government. Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, tells Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra why Trump’s third round will be far worse than the first two.
Parsi argues that Trump, initially driven by hubris, is now out for revenge against a Tehran he believes is deliberately dragging out the war to destroy his presidency. He explains why time is on Iran’s side; how Washington is spinning the war of attrition in the Strait of Hormuz; why soaring gas prices make the war impossible to tune out; and why even European conservatives say the protests sweeping the continent are fueled by the war’s economic fallout. Parsi warns Netanyahu may see escalation as the Hail Mary pass he needs to lock in his legacy, and says that if Democrats take control of Congress, they’ll have the power to stop this – and will be complicit if they don’t.
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Rough transcript follows:
[Interviewer:]
It’s very difficult to see this war lead to a scenario in which the impact on the global economy is sufficiently insignificant for it not to translate to any political changes. If you look at the polls right now, the top issues motivating people in this election are inflation and gas prices. That’s all due to the Iran war. Nearly eight months ago, the US and Israel launched a very destructive war on Iran, killing the Supreme Leader and disrupting global oil markets. Trump wanted a quick knockout, but instead, he got a war he can’t contain, a stalemate that nobody seems able to break, and a deal to end it that looks further away than ever.
Somehow, this war has become background noise in the US, and the next round may already be on the calendar. The New York Times reports that the US and Israeli militaries have drawn up plans for renewed strikes on Iran after the midterms. This campaign would hit energy infrastructure, nuclear sites, and Iran’s missile and drone arsenal. They came close to doing this earlier this month before Trump pulled the plug at the last minute. Now, three aircraft carriers and thousands of Marines are on the way. Netanyahu, trailing in the polls ahead of next week’s elections in Israel, says he’s ordered the military to prepare for preemptive action and to topple the regime. Iran’s intelligence assessments suggest strikes could come even before Israel votes on Tuesday. The White House says nothing happens before the midterms. Meanwhile, the State Department has ordered non-emergency staff and their families out of Saudi Arabia, and the AFP cites a diplomatic source saying families of embassy staff in the UAE, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain have been ordered out as well.
Netanyahu is making big threats a week before elections. Trump says this time the fight will be neither quick nor limited, with no restraints. So what breaks this stalemate? Is escalation the only way out? And who can last longer, Iran or Washington? Joining us now to discuss all of this is Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute. Trita, welcome back to BT Live.
[Trita Parsi:]
Good to be with you.
[Interviewer:]
You are putting the odds of a new round of war at 90%. That’s quite high. The New York Times says the plans are drawn up and carriers are on their way. Why are you and the New York Times so confident? Some US planners think that three days of intense strikes will manage to break Iran’s economy and force concessions. Is that a serious theory?
[Trita Parsi:]
First of all, it’s kind of insulting to say that the New York Times and I are on the same page on this. I’m just kidding. But look, I’ve been warning about this for more than five weeks now that a third round was extremely likely because of a couple of factors. What we’re seeing now is more the motions necessary to bring about this disastrous third round being put in place. The signs and the logic as to why we were going in this direction were clear to me several weeks ago because Trump, at the end of the day, his psychology does not allow for him to lose. He is willing to sacrifice everything to win.
Earlier on, he thought that the MOU and a diplomatic deal could end the story in a way that made the war look worth it or at least acceptable. But he had a bad experience with the MOU. He got attacked for it by Democrats, Republicans, the pro-Israel crowd, everyone. He realized the political cost was very high. So now he thinks diplomacy won’t end it acceptably. Blockade won’t end it acceptably, even though they’re putting forward this mythology that they’re winning on the blockade. And the limited amount of war he’s had won’t do it. So now the only thing he hasn’t tried is this all-out war that he threatened several times but never did—taking out Iran’s oil infrastructure, energy infrastructure, desalination plants, critical infrastructure. He avoided that, knowing it would lead to massive retaliation by the Iranians against GCC infrastructure, which would throw the global economy into a depression. But now he doesn’t seem to care. The midterms are over, and he’s just looking to do something that brings this to an end on his terms.
There’s another element that makes matters worse now, which is last time he went in with hubris. He thought he could do this in four days. The Israelis had sold him that mythology. He had managed to do Venezuela quickly, so he was very confident. This time, it’s not hubris bringing him back; it’s vindictiveness. He’s very angry about the war’s outcome so far. He believes the Iranians deliberately dragged things out to destroy his presidency, and to a certain extent, they have. Now there’s this new element of revenge. So we may very well go towards a third disastrous round of war, not because of a flawed geopolitical miscalculation, but because of one man’s desire for vengeance.
[Interviewer:]
It’s truly tanking the global economy, putting tens of thousands of lives at risk because of vengeance. Trump has previously vetoed a major return to combat, including at the last minute earlier this month. He’s pulled back from major threats repeatedly. The White House says no strikes before midterms. Iran’s intelligence says it could come before Israel votes on Tuesday. Which clock is correct? If the Republicans lose Congress, can Democrats stop a possible escalation? Will they?
[Trita Parsi:]
Unfortunately, not to the extent that they should be. It’s perhaps a different political calculation before the midterms versus after. But with the MOU, there were Democrats who should have known better, who played a fantastic role in the JCPOA, who now returned a favor to the Republicans by doing bad faith attacks against the MOU. It contributed to the MOU collapsing. It’s not the only reason, but it contributed to Trump’s conception that a deal with Iran is not a win because of the high political price, a conception every previous American president has had. It’s interesting that Trump didn’t have it. It’s part of why he was willing to strike a deal with Iran, willing to strike a deal with North Korea because he was immune to the idea of a political cost for such an agreement. But that’s changed, and the Democrats contributed to it.
After the midterms, it will be critical for Democrats to do everything they can, from using the power of the purse to other means, to put an end to this war. Once they’re in control of the House and particularly if they also control the Senate, they’re no longer bystanders. They’re complicit if this is allowed to continue because they will have the power to stop it.
[Interviewer:]
There’s so much damage incurred from this war, obviously not as much as the Iranian side, but it still stands to be seen just how deep that damage can go. Iranian officials are now talking about expanding targets to data centers and undersea internet cables. Iran analysts floated hitting Saudi refineries like Aramco to spike oil prices. A top adviser to Ghalibaf called the idea of that 72-hour war a fantasy. What does the next round look like from Iran’s side? How much more can they escalate? Why do you think Iran has decided to wait out Trump rather than cut any more deals?
[Trita Parsi:]
I spoke to a senior advisor to a European president who’s no longer in office, not particularly unsympathetic to Trump. I asked him about the protests around Europe, not just in France, but in many other countries. How much of that is driven by the economic consequences of this war? To my surprise, he said overwhelmingly, a lot of it has to do with the economic consequences of this war. The focus is often on immigration, but it’s not the driving force. Even someone from the right, more on the anti-immigrant side, said what we’re seeing in Europe is largely driven by the economic consequences of this war. The global repercussions so far, in the first two rounds, are going to be benign compared to the third round, which will become overwhelming.
The other part of your question, if you could repeat?
[Interviewer:]
I was wondering why Iran has decided to wait out Trump rather than cut any more deals.
[Trita Parsi:]
That’s a very good question. In this war of attrition, the Iranians have been comfortable—not in the sense that they’re not hurting, but because they believe time is on their side. The Trump administration is putting forward a different story, saying they’re winning. They won the battle of Hormuz, more volume is coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, and they’re winning the war of attrition. Yet, it’s the US and Israel about to start this war, which tells you something about who actually is winning that war of attrition. The administration has been successful not because of their brilliance but because of the lack of brilliance in the media and analytical core. They said focus only on the volume of oil coming out, not the cost or oil prices. The impression was that the war of attrition is being won by the American side, and if anyone wanted to escalate, it would have been the Iranians. But reality seems to be the opposite.
Israel goes to vote on October 27th. If Netanyahu loses, he’ll be a caretaker, and technically, it would be hard for him to launch a war. Some analysts think he could use the threat of an imminent strike to force his rivals into a unity government. Are these threats about Iran or about keeping his job, or is that essentially the same?
[Trita Parsi:]
I think they’re pretty much one and the same. I’m not convinced that being a caretaker would make it more difficult for him to start. There will be resistance from within the security establishment, but the resistance may be higher because they’re worried he’ll start this war to impact the elections or force their postponement. The chief of staff of the army has publicly said this. Once the elections are over, and it’s in the process of forming a coalition, I’m not convinced he won’t have the ability to start a war, and certainly not convinced he wouldn’t want to. If he feels he’s about to lose the coalition, this would be his last chance for his legacy to do what his secretary of defense said is the Israeli objective: bomb Iran back to the stone age, shift the balance of power in the region so dramatically that Israel will no longer have a problem with Iran providing any deterrence against Israel. That has been the Israeli objective, and the Israelis are so openly talking about it, yet it almost never translates to any real conversation in Washington.
[Interviewer:]
Lastly, before we let you go, this war has really fallen off the front page. It’s become so normalized, like background noise. Do you think there’s a risk that opposition to this war fades because it’s becoming a kind of forever war that people just tune out, or is it too damaging to the global economy to stay a forever war?
[Trita Parsi:]
Part of the reason the US could have forever wars was because the political cost of ending the war was higher than the political cost of continuing a losing war, which was because the cost of continuing the war was relatively low. In Afghanistan, it was not good, but as long as casualties were low, the anger never reached a critical mass. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had no significant impact on the economy or oil markets in the manner that this war has had. It’s difficult to see this war lead to a scenario where the impact on the global economy is insignificant enough not to translate to political changes. If you look at the polls, the top issues motivating people in this election are inflation and gas prices, all due to the Iran war. Corruption ranks even higher, but both sides believe the other is corrupt, whereas with the Iran war, there’s no debate about who started it and why. The risk of escalation is far greater than the opportunities for de-escalation, which does not lend itself to an endless, low-intensity war that just continues. It could be a long war with highs and lows, still costly, but not just simmering in the background.
[Interviewer:]
Real quick, put a number on it. You believe there’s going to be another round starting this weekend. Since you like percentages, put a percentage on it.
[Trita Parsi:]
I put it at 90%. It could only change if Trump changes his mind. He’s been on the point of approving something and changed his mind seven times. We can’t have a situation like this continue without him agreeing at some point. That’s why the odds are the way they are. He’s not going to constantly back off last minute. At some point, he’s going to say yes, go through with it, and all of us are going to pay the price for it.
[Interviewer:]
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, always appreciate your analysis. Thank you so much for joining us.
[Trita Parsi:]
Thank you so much. Appreciate it.
© Amit Elkayam for The New York Times
En octubre de 2023, cuando el shock inicial por el ataque de Hamás iba dando paso a la interiorización de que había sido el mayor fiasco de seguridad en las siete décadas de historia del Estado de Israel, casi nadie pensaba que Benjamín Netanyahu seguiría como primer ministro tres años más tarde. Tampoco que un país acostumbrado a coaliciones amplias y a adelantos electorales (ninguno fue tanto a las urnas entre 1996 y los últimos comicios, en 2022, cada 2,4 años) completaría la legislatura justo esta vez. Y, menos aún, ambas combinadas: que, tras cuatro años de polémicas y guerras, Netanyahu llegaría a la recta final de las elecciones —que se celebran el martes— con menos apoyo y popularidad, pero con probabilidades de mantenerse en el poder. “No me rendiré”, reza uno de los carteles electorales con su rostro.
© Ariel Schalit (AP Photo/Ariel Schalit)
Desde la ventana del pequeño Ayuntamiento de Deir Balut son visibles los cubículos prefabricados en los que viven los colonos instalados en las tierras de este pueblo palestino del norte de Cisjordania y también las obras de la nueva carretera que Israel construye para unir varios asentamientos de la zona.
© Ammar Awad (REUTERS)
President Donald Trump warned Thursday that the United States may launch further strikes against Iran, as Washington and Israel prepare for a possible new offensive following the November midterm elections.
The post Trump Signals More Iran Strikes — ‘We May Do It a Little Bit Further’ appeared first on Breitbart.
Days before Israel’s legislative elections, scheduled for October 27, Israeli forces escalated military activities across the West Bank. Observers speculate that the Israeli government may carry through with its threat to escalate its assaults on Palestinians in the occupied territory.
These speculations are apparently based on the results of the early polls, which showed the bloc of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a tight race with its competitors and facing a likely political deadlock.
On Tuesday, October 20, the Israeli military announced a 24-hour military drill across the West Bank that involved gunfire, explosions, and increased movements of soldiers, aircraft, and military vehicles.
Concurrently, security measures against Palestinians and their supporters have been further tightened. On Tuesday, October 21, the Israeli forces briefly detained 80 US, British, and Israeli volunteers assisting Palestinians harvesting olives west of the southern West Bank governorate of Bethlehem.
The detainees included the New York Democratic congressional nominee Brad Lander, a group of rabbis, and Israel’s former deputy attorney general.
Commenting on the incident, Lander wrote in a post on X:
“I’ve been detained by the IDF, along with a group of rabbis & volunteers. We were simply harvesting olives in a grove near Nehalim in the West Bank.”
“The occupation is a crime under international law. Harvesting olives isn’t a crime under any law I know,” the congressional candidate continued, although he calls himself a “liberal Zionist.”
The Israeli military stated that the mass detention of activists was carried out because they did not submit requests to the relevant authorities in advance for necessary coordination “to ensure the security of the area and maintain public order.”
The incident occurred amid an unprecedented escalation of settler violence in the West Bank, particularly during the olive harvest season.
The last couple of weeks saw horrific settler attacks carried out under the protection of the Israeli forces. Those attacks caused injuries not only to Palestinians, but also international activists, journalists, and diplomats from other countries.
Damage to Palestinian agricultural lands and the looting of crops has also been reported over the same period.
On Friday, October 16, veteran Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine (63) was beaten by a crowd of masked Israeli settlers, while covering the olive harvest in Abu Falah village northeast of Ramallah, although she was wearing a helmet and a protective vest clearly labeled “PRESS” on both sides.
One day later, a delegation of European diplomats was attacked by a group of masked colonists in the village of Taybeh, east of Ramallah, during a visit to the area to support Palestinian farmers harvesting olives.
The Israeli forces also intensified military raids in different parts of the West Bank in recent days, detaining Palestinian traffic police for hours.
Many believe the incident aimed to break the morale of the Palestinian people by exposing the helplessness of the Palestinian security apparatus in the face of Israel as an occupying power.
Meanwhile, others viewed it as a provocation of the Palestinian Authority and its security forces, in a bid to push them for an armed confrontation with the Israeli forces. A scenario that the Israeli government has already laid the groundwork for as per recent statements from Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz.
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