Beijing has opened an anti-dumping investigation into a chemical imported from the European Union days before EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič travels to China for talks covering trade imbalances, market access and strategic raw materials.

China has opened a new anti-dumping investigation into imports from the European Union less than a week before EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is due in Beijing for talks on the increasingly difficult trade relationship between the two sides.

China’s Ministry of Commerce announced on Saturday, 3 October, that it was beginning an investigation into p-nitrotoluene, also known as 4-nitrotoluene, imported from the EU.

According to the official notice opening the investigation, the case follows an application submitted on 14 September by Chinese producers Jiangsu Huaihe Chemical and Hubei Dongfang Chemical. The investigation will examine alleged dumping between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026, while the assessment of possible damage to Chinese industry will cover January 2022 to June 2026.

P-nitrotoluene is used in the production of dyes, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, pigments and other chemical products.

In isolation, the investigation concerns a relatively specialised industrial product. Its timing, however, places it inside a much wider argument over the future of EU-China trade.

Šefčovič is expected in China on 8 and 9 October for the second high-level meeting under the EU-China trade and investment consultation mechanism established earlier this year.

The European Commission confirmed in September that the meeting would address Chinese exports to the EU, European access to the Chinese market and restrictions affecting rare-earth supplies. Brussels said it expected the October talks to produce the first concrete results from work undertaken since the mechanism was established. The Commission outlined the agenda following a September call between Šefčovič and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

EU Today reported in September that Šefčovič had warned China that the EU could consider tougher measures if the negotiations failed to produce tangible progress by October.

The deadline followed talks between Šefčovič and Wang in Brussels in June. At the time, the two sides agreed to establish working groups dealing with trade and investment balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

EU Today examined those negotiations in detail as Brussels sought progress on rare earths, market access and the widening trade imbalance.

The numbers remain a central part of the European argument.

According to Eurostat’s figures for EU-China trade in 2025, the EU imported €559.4 billion in goods from China while exporting €199.6 billion, leaving a trade deficit of €359.8 billion. EU exports to China fell by 6.5 per cent compared with 2024, while imports increased by 6.4 per cent.

Brussels argues that the imbalance cannot be viewed separately from questions of industrial subsidies, excess manufacturing capacity and barriers encountered by European companies seeking access to the Chinese market.

Beijing rejects the suggestion that the growth of Chinese exports is principally the result of unfair state support and has criticised the EU’s expanding use of trade-defence instruments.

The confrontation now covers a growing range of industries.

The EU has imposed additional duties on Chinese electric vehicles following an anti-subsidy investigation, while disputes have extended to medical devices, public procurement and agricultural products. China, meanwhile, has launched investigations affecting European products including brandy, pork, dairy goods and chemicals.

Rare earths have become particularly important.

European industry remains heavily dependent on Chinese supplies and processing capacity for materials used in permanent magnets, electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics and defence equipment.

Eurostat reported in June that China supplied 46.8 per cent of EU rare-earth imports by weight in 2025. The concentration is greater in some processing stages and manufactured components.

EU Today has followed the issue closely, including the Commission’s preparations for possible renewed Chinese rare-earth restrictions and the EU Today Research Desk’s assessment of Europe’s exposure to Chinese rare-earth supply chains.

Following the June negotiations, Šefčovič said China had given assurances that export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets should not interrupt European supply chains. He nevertheless sought improvements to the licensing system faced by EU companies. The Commissioner said at the time that Beijing would be expected to demonstrate tangible progress by October.

That point has now arrived.

Neither Brussels nor Beijing has indicated that the broader commercial relationship is heading towards disengagement. China remains the EU’s largest source of imported goods and the European market remains commercially important to Chinese exporters.

But both sides are increasingly prepared to use trade-defence measures when negotiations fail to resolve disputes.

Saturday’s anti-dumping investigation consequently adds another issue to Šefčovič’s agenda days before he arrives in Beijing — and provides an early indication of the atmosphere surrounding the October talks.

China has warned that it will respond if the European Union introduces new trade restrictions targeting Chinese companies or products, as France and Germany push for stronger European instruments to address what they regard as unfair commercial practices.

China’s Ministry of Commerce issued the warning after reports that several EU governments were discussing a mechanism modelled partly on Section 301 of US trade law, which allows Washington to investigate foreign trade practices and impose countermeasures.

Beijing described such an approach as protectionist and unilateral and warned that it could damage continuing negotiations between China and the EU.

“If the European side insists on introducing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese companies or products,” the ministry said, China would “resolutely respond” to defend the interests of its industries.

The warning comes as Europe’s trade relationship with China is moving further up the political agenda.

According to the European Commission’s latest EU-China trade figures, EU exports to China were worth €199.5 billion in 2025 while imports reached €559.5 billion.

The goods deficit stood at €359.9 billion, compared with €312.2 billion in 2024.

China remained the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its fourth-largest export market.

Brussels argues that the scale of the imbalance is connected not only to competitiveness but also to state support, market-access restrictions and other structural differences between the two economies.

China disputes that assessment and has repeatedly accused the EU of using industrial and security arguments to justify protectionism.

The argument is already visible in several industries.

The EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles after an investigation concluded that state subsidies were giving Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in the European market.

Brussels has subsequently widened its attention to other parts of the automotive industry. Earlier this month, EU Today reported that the EU was considering restrictions affecting Chinese hybrid cars as policymakers looked for ways to contain the growing trade imbalance.

The automotive dispute is important because Europe is simultaneously trying to attract Chinese manufacturing investment.

France and Spain addressed that question during President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Madrid.

Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed on the need for greater European unity in responding to Chinese competition. They also discussed whether Chinese investors entering strategically important European industries should be required to provide stronger commitments on issues such as technology transfer.

Macron said that companies on both sides of the Pyrenees needed protection when they faced unfair competition and argued that “the only response that works is European.”

France has generally favoured stronger European trade defences.

Germany has traditionally approached the issue more cautiously because major German manufacturers have substantial commercial exposure to China. Increasing competition from Chinese producers, particularly in industrial sectors where German companies were once dominant, has altered the debate.

Reports that Berlin and Paris are now working together on a stronger trade instrument therefore suggest a potentially important shift.

The two countries are said to be considering a European mechanism inspired by the American Section 301 process, although no final proposal has yet been adopted by the European Commission.

EU trade law already provides several instruments.

Brussels can impose anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties following investigations, use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to examine state-backed investment and procurement, and deploy the Anti-Coercion Instrument where another country uses economic pressure against the EU or a member state.

The discussion now concerns whether those instruments are sufficient when governments believe a problem extends across industries rather than affecting an individual product.

The debate comes only weeks after EU Today reported that Brussels was preparing additional pressure on Chinese hybrid-car imports, demonstrating how quickly EU-China trade disputes are expanding beyond the original electric-vehicle case.

At the same time, Brussels and Beijing have established a Trade and Investment Consultations mechanism, with workstreams covering trade balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

China’s Commerce Ministry has warned that introducing tougher measures while those talks continue would damage trust.

That leaves the EU facing two parallel choices: continue negotiations intended to narrow the trade dispute while also developing stronger instruments in case those negotiations fail.

France and Germany are increasingly arguing that Europe needs greater leverage.

Beijing’s response is that using that leverage against Chinese companies would bring countermeasures.

The next stage will depend on whether the Franco-German proposal develops into a formal EU initiative. If it does, the dispute will move beyond duties on particular products towards a broader argument over how Europe intends to manage its economic relationship with China.