The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.

The world is becoming more dangerous.

We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7

— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026

Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw

— James Cartlidge MP (@jcartlidgemp) October 6, 2026

The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.

Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.

For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.

While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.

Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.

Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.

Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.

The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.

The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.

Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.

2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.

— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026

Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.

Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.

That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.

The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.

That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.

Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK

— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025

For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.

The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.

A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.

Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.

The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.

There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.

Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.

That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.

The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.

The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.

With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.

The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Glaring Holes In UK Air Defense Take Center Stage In New “Britannia Shield” Proposal appeared first on TWZ.

A French Navy Mistral class amphibious assault ship has been photographed carrying Naval Group’s new Rampart modular launcher, a system designed to allow a single weapon station to employ different types of rockets, missiles, and other effectors against a wide range of threats.

The imagery, captured off Toulon during training on September 21, reveals the launcher installed on the ship’s forward starboard sponson. While the specific identity of the vessel is unclear, this represents the first publicly observed evidence that Rampart has moved into shipboard testing.

https://t.co/l9f8uOi1w3 pic.twitter.com/9efp3C8glH

— PEtienne (@_PEtienne_) September 22, 2026

French Navy Mistral-class amphibious assault ship and French Navy Suffren (Barracuda)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine off Toulon, France – September 21, 2026.@WarshipCam pic.twitter.com/6xYm6E5J9R

— G.GYSSELSSHIPCOLLECTION (@GGYSSELSSHIPS) September 22, 2026

Naval Group announced in June that the first at-sea firing campaign for Rampart was planned for October aboard a Mistral class ship during the French Navy’s Wildfire counter-drone exercise.

What makes Rampart unusual is its modular architecture. Rather than being built around one missile or rocket, the system uses interchangeable launch modules that can accommodate different weapons. This allows a ship to carry large numbers of relatively inexpensive guided rockets for counter-drone work while retaining the option of using larger and more capable short-range missiles against more challenging targets.

Because the launch modules are interchangeable, the mix can theoretically be changed as the mission or threat environment changes.

The approach is aimed squarely at a problem that has become increasingly important for naval forces: defending expensive ships against potentially large numbers of inexpensive uncrewed systems and missiles without relying exclusively on high-cost interceptors.

Rampart was previously known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS). Naval Group unveiled the concept in 2023 as a self-funded development effort and formally presented the Rampart earlier this year.

The launcher uses four interchangeable ammunition modules. Depending on the configuration, Naval Group says that the system can accommodate up to 80 Thales 68mm laser-guided rockets or 48 NATO-standard 70mm laser-guided rockets. Other configurations can carry smaller numbers of short-range missiles (four to six per module, depending on type) or other effectors, including decoys.

The system has already been demonstrated with guided rockets. A January 2026 test involved a Thales 68mm guided rocket, followed by a series of firings at the Canjuers range in southern France in May. Those trials, seen in the video below, included engagements against targets at roughly two miles and a five-rocket salvo.

The relatively small guided rockets are particularly relevant to counter-drone operations. They offer a way of engaging aerial targets with a weapon substantially smaller than a conventional surface-to-air missile, while still providing precision guidance.

As well as rockets, Naval Group has been working with Thales on the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Also known as Martlet, the LMM is intended to tackle a range of challenging airborne and surface targets, as you can read about here.

The company has also explored integration of loitering munitions and other missiles, while a separate agreement with the UAE-based EDGE Group covers trials of the SkyKnight surface-to-air missile.

The company has also pursued integration of Poland’s Piorun short-range air-defense missile. This may well be with a view to a potential Polish purchase of Rampart to arm its forthcoming frigates, which you can read about here.

This means the launcher is effectively being developed as an open weapons-integration platform, rather than as a dedicated launcher for one or a small set of particular munitions.

That openness could make Rampart attractive to a wide range of navies. Instead of requiring customers to adopt a completely new missile family, the launcher can potentially be configured around weapons already in their inventories or sourced from their domestic defense industries. A country could therefore buy the common Rampart launcher while retaining control over the effectors it wants to integrate, whether those are guided rockets, short-range missiles, loitering munitions or other systems. At the same time, when it comes to air threats, this is very much a point defense system for close-in engagements, and a last line of defense to complement longer-range and more capable systems.

Naval Group has described the system as capable of operating either autonomously or as part of a ship’s combat system, with a stabilized turret and integrated fire-control equipment.

That integration will be particularly important during the upcoming sea trials. A launcher that works against stationary or land-based targets still has to contend with ship motion, vibration, sea spray, sensor integration, and the compressed timelines involved in defending a moving vessel.

France operates three Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which serve as major aviation, command, and amphibious warfare platforms. Their size and mission make them high-value assets that could face a broad range of aerial threats during operations. Another two vessels were built to the same design for Russia, before being placed under embargo, and then sold to the Egyptian Navy.

Naval Group’s choice of a Mistral for the initial at-sea campaign provides an opportunity to test Rampart under realistic operational conditions while integrating it with an existing French naval combat system.

In its basic form, each Mistral is armed with a pair of Simbad launchers, each of which is fitted with two Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles. In terms of guns, each of the vessels is armed with two 30mm and two 20mm cannons, two 7.62mm M134 Miniguns, and four 12.7mm machine guns. Adding even a single Rampart launcher provides considerably more options against aerial targets across a wide range of threats — depending on the effectors that are included.

Recent U.S. and allied operations in the Middle East have highlighted the problem of large-scale missile and drone attacks causing forces to expend substantial numbers of interceptors, raising concerns about both magazine depth and the cost of using high-end missiles against lower-cost threats. Directed-energy weapons could eventually provide a way out of that cost-exchange problem, but shipboard laser systems remain in the early stages of operational development. Navies cannot simply wait for them to mature, creating an immediate requirement for lower-cost, high-capacity kinetic options. Rampart’s large guided-rocket capacity and ability to mix different effectors are aimed at exactly that gap.

If Rampart can reliably engage drones with inexpensive guided rockets while retaining the ability to employ more capable missiles from the same launcher, it could offer navies an additional defensive layer between conventional guns and high-end surface-to-air missile systems.

Critically, new effectors could potentially also be integrated as they become available, allowing the system to evolve without replacing the entire turret.

Reflecting the urgency of the requirement, Naval Group’s development path for Rampart has been relatively rapid.

Naval Group has also demonstrated a ground-based Rampart, mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. This configuration is intended for mobile air defense missions as well as protection of fixed sites, giving the system a role beyond ship self-defense. The truck-mounted version could provide a rapidly relocatable launcher for counter-drone and short-range air-defense missions, while retaining the same basic modular architecture and ability to employ different effectors.

Sur le stand John Cockerill, un châssis Zetros équipé du Rampart (ex lanceur modulaire polyvalent, ou LMP) de Naval Group. Avantage : un seul système de lancement pour des armements divers (roquettes, missiles, grenades, leurres, drones…) pic.twitter.com/6v4R93HGsj

— Vincent Lamigeon (@VincentLamigeon) June 16, 2026

The photographs from Toulon indicate that the Rampart concept is now moving from the range to the French fleet, albeit on an experimental basis. The forthcoming sea campaign will be an important milestone and should provide a better idea of how this system works at sea.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

 

The post France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine has unveiled a new domestically developed surface-to-air missile system designed to turn a diverse collection of air-to-air missiles into a flexible ground-based air defense capability. Called Shershen, Ukrainian for hornet, the system combines a locally-developed command-and-control architecture, a dedicated surveillance radar, and multiple launchers that can employ both Ukrainian and Western missiles.

The system was displayed at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, by the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI). The example shown is reportedly the second operational prototype and is described as being close to its production configuration.

At the ongoing MSPO-2026 defense and industrial exhibition in Poland, the launcher of the Ukrainian Shershen air defense system, developed by Radionix, has been presented for the first time, along with the R-120K surface-to-air guided missile specially developed for it (second… pic.twitter.com/5RfZWHWuxl

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) September 9, 2026

The appearance of Shershen comes as Ukraine continues to develop an increasingly diverse family of indigenous air defense systems, while simultaneously adapting older missiles and foreign-supplied weapons to address a severe shortage of interceptors.

That effort has produced some distinctly unconventional combinations. Ukraine’s so-called FrankenSAM programs have paired existing Soviet-era launchers and radars with Western missiles, while other systems have adapted Soviet R-73 air-to-air missiles for ground launch. The United Kingdom and Denmark have also worked with Ukraine on the containerized Gravehawk system, another concept built around repurposed air-to-air missiles.

Shershen takes that philosophy a step further by making missile interchangeability a central feature of the system.

The Shershen battery consists of a Perun command-and-control vehicle, an Athena radar, and four Borei launchers.

According to the developer, the system’s architecture is deliberately open. This allows it to use different missiles from different manufacturers and also permits the integration of third-party surveillance and guidance radars.

The company says Shershen can currently employ the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo), R-73 (AA-11 Archer), AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-132 ASRAAM, while compatibility with the R-60 is also being explored. These weapons come with a mix of semi-active radar or infrared homing seeker heads.

Air-to-air missiles are already available in considerable variety across Ukraine’s arsenal and those of its foreign partners. Being able to employ several types from a common ground-based system provides much more flexibility than a conventional SAM designed around one dedicated interceptor.

It also offers a way to exploit missiles that were never originally intended to be fired from the ground. That means Shershen’s launcher and fire-control system are meant to be interceptor agnostic, at least to a certain degree.

Shershen’s Athena radar is reported to be capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 85 kilometers (53 miles).

In terms of the engagement envelope, Shershen is claimed to be capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones at ranges of up to 25 kilometers (16 miles) and altitudes of up to 10,000 meters (32,800 feet). Clearly, these figures will vary widely depending on the type of interceptor.

When employing radar-guided missiles, the system’s engagement architecture can reportedly guide as many as six missiles simultaneously.

The advertised performance figures have not been independently verified, and it remains unclear what target types and engagement conditions were used to establish them.

Україна представила складові мультикаліберного зенітного ракетного комплексу «Шершень» на міжнародній виставці MSPO 2026 у польському місті Кельце.

Міжнародний консорціум компаній Shershen Group, який створює ЗРК в інтересах України представив, показав командний пункт,… pic.twitter.com/9wAS7ewxzg

— Мілітарний (@mil_in_ua) September 10, 2026

The developer says the second prototype has completed initial testing, including successful interceptions at a test range.

One of the Borei launchers displayed at MSPO were armed with an R-120K, a new Ukrainian missile equipped with a radar seeker and is intended to be capable of both air-to-air and surface-to-air employment.

The R-120K remains under development, however. Work is reportedly continuing on its rocket motor, meaning that its eventual performance and production status remain uncertain. Still, having the option of including the R-120K on the Shershen system in the future is significant.

Rather than relying indefinitely on stocks of Soviet and Western air-to-air missiles, Ukraine could eventually have a domestically produced interceptor specifically tailored to its growing family of ground-based air-defense systems. That will become increasingly important as stocks of legacy missiles are depleted. Earlier this year, it was reported that Ukrainian F-16s were running low on their air-to-air missiles, which include the same AIM-9s that are used in some FrankenSAM systems, as well as being compatible with Shershen. But even before that, it was clear that Western-supplied missile stocks in Ukraine across the board were diminishing, in some cases drastically, with critical interceptors like the AMRAAM and Patriot being badly affected.

Ukraine’s need for additional surface-to-air missiles has become increasingly acute during the full-scale war, especially as Russian drone and missile barrages have stepped up.

The shortage has encouraged Ukraine to pursue a combination of indigenous development and unconventional adaptations.

The FrankenSAM initiative, conducted with U.S. support, demonstrated how existing Ukrainian systems could be combined with foreign missiles to rapidly create additional air-defense capacity. Ukraine has also fielded modified Osa systems armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles rather than their original 9M33 interceptors. Other R-73-based concepts have even been demonstrated aboard Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels.

Shershen appears to reflect the next logical step in that evolution: rather than creating a one-off FrankenSAM combination, build an architecture from the outset that can accept multiple missiles. Additionally, with so many different ground-based air defense systems now being fielded, it comes with the significant advantage of a standardized launcher and control interface that can accommodate a range of interceptors.

At the same time, Ukraine is pursuing substantially more ambitious indigenous SAM projects.

Earlier this year, a previously secretive Ukrainian missile identified as the Koral made what appeared to be its first public appearance. The program dates back to at least 2021, when Ukraine’s Luch design bureau presented a concept for a medium-range surface-to-air missile.

Koral is intended to provide a much longer-range capability, potentially filling some of the gap left by Ukraine’s aging Soviet systems and supplementing the Western-supplied Patriot and SAMP/T.

Shershen, by contrast, is clearly focused on the short-range layer.

Together, the programs illustrate the breadth of Ukraine’s emerging domestic air-defense effort: from relatively inexpensive systems built around repurposed air-to-air missiles to new, purpose-designed interceptors intended to replace or augment Soviet-era systems.

Ukraine’s experience with FrankenSAM has demonstrated the value of getting unconventional air defense combinations into service quickly.

Once fielded, Shershen, with its architecture capable of accepting different Soviet-origin and Western-made interceptors, and eventually a Ukrainian one, gives Ukraine another way to stretch its missile inventory and enhance its air defense capabilities.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s New Shershen SAM Can Fire A Wild Mix Of Adapted Air-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Air Force is seeking an anti-aircraft gun system to help defend its air bases around the world from drones and cruise missiles. The Request for Information (RFI) about these systems, posted on the government’s contracting website on Thursday, is part of a larger Air Force effort to play a greater role in air base defense via ground-based air defenses (GBADs), a capacity traditionally performed by the Army. As a result, the Air Force currently has no such systems. Now it is interested in changing that.

The request comes as the war against Iran exposed gaps in how the U.S. can provide effective, sustained air defenses for its foreign installations and amid concerns about a future fight against a peer competitor like China or Russia.

“The Government is conducting market research to identify potential industry sources capable of providing solutions for a Ground-Based, Medium-Caliber Gun Weapon System that fires affordable munitions, enables defense against air and missile threats with an initial focus on subsonic cruise missiles (CM) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to provide persistent defense in support of [the] United States Air Force,” the RFI notes.

The RFI doesn’t stipulate what it considers a medium-caliber round; however, according to the Army, the list includes 20mm, 25mm, 30x113mm, 30x173mm and 40mm shells.

“To effectively assess and compare air defense weapon system performance, there are 15 critical baseline operational and technical parameters that must be analyzed in unison,” the RFI explains.

“These key metrics begin with the system’s Salvo Probability of Kill (Pk) evaluated against both Cruise Missiles (CM) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Groups 1-5 at maximum range and altitude, ensuring robust lethality against diverse modern threats,” the RFI notes.

A salvo probability of kill measures how effectively a salvo, as opposed to a single shot, defeats a target. 

The following chart displays the weight, normal operating altitude and speed of the five drone group classifications.

The Air Force wants this system to be “rapidly deployable, maintaining a lightweight, modular, and transportable footprint that can be swiftly projected into austere theater environments to meet emergent threats.” The RFI does not provide further details of how the Air Force is looking to transport these systems; however, the service relies on its fleets of C-130 Hercules, C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft to move equipment. The size and weight of the systems determines which kind of aircraft can transport it.

These systems could also be moved by truck or ship or on their own if self-propelled, but those options also incur a cost in terms of the timeliness of delivery, and can be impossible for rapid global deployments.

A key point of evaluation will be the overall cost of the munitions. The Air Force wants to ensure that the shell’s velocity and terminal effects “are maximized without driving the cost-per-engagement to unsustainable levels or exceeding the physical constraints of the host platform,” the RFI states. We’ll discuss these factors in more detail later in this story.

The service is also looking for the integration of “the right mix of radar, electro-optical, infrared, or radio-frequency sensors—to ensure reliable target acquisition and tracking across varying weather conditions, environments, and countermeasure scenarios.”

As we noted at the top of this story, the Air Force is seeking to improve its organic ability to defend its bases. This has become “an increasingly high priority” for the service, Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink told Congress on May 20.

“The Air Force is developing organic air and missile defense capabilities, including Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) to defend our air bases in all theatres [sic],” Meink stated in his written testimony. “The fielding of the Air Base Air Defense Systems (ABADS) missile defense capability, including kinetic defenses, at overseas main operation bases contributes to joint layered defense but does not reduce the need for increased joint investment in air and missile defense. We will continue to work judiciously for the development and procurement of these critical defensive capabilities.”

In its Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, the Air Force is seeking about $1.4 billion for a missile defense variant of the Air Base Air Defense Systems (ABADS), according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. In addition, the Air Force also requested $51.8 million in procurement funds for its Small Unmanned Air Defense Systems (SUADS) in Fiscal Year 2026, according to the Air Force Fiscal Year 2026 budget justification book. 

The war against Iran and the Ukraine war have, in particular, illustrated the challenges of defending against drones and cruise missiles.

Iran launched thousands of these weapons against U.S. air bases and a wide range of critical infrastructure targets in Bahrain, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It also launched hundreds of ballistic missiles.

Taken in concert, these attacks have resulted in the deaths of at least nine U.S. troops, more than 760 injuries and the destruction of aircraft, radars and other critical equipment as well as widespread damage to the Middle Eastern nations Iran has targeted.

Concerns about the tremendous expenditure of U.S. interceptors exacerbating the stress on America’s magazine depth of these high-end defensive weapons are an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years.

There are two facets to potential use of gun systems for base defense. The first is that in complex air defense environments, it provides an inner, last line of defense against incoming threats. If the outer layers fail to take down the target or that target is not considered a priority over others, a hard-kill gun system offers a predictable and relatively reliable fallback. The gun system would become even more important if interceptor stocks run low, even temporarily, and those weapons need to be rationed for higher-end threats. With the outer defensive rings collapsing, the inner becomes far more important.

For small drones, that interceptors would not be effective with anyway, the gun system can take them down in localized air defense scenarios. Then there is also defending bases in lower threat areas where there are not additional layers of SAM systems. A gun system can provide a core aerial defense against lower-end, lower-density drone and cruise missile threats without costing huge sums of money or requiring a huge logistical footprint.

Beyond that, there is a direct cost comparison argument, but again, that is in a vacuum and a gun system cannot take the place of a multi-layered air defense system without inviting huge risk. Still, the engagement cost comparison is worth mentioning.

High-end, expensive, difficult-to-manufacture air defense weapons, like Patriot PAC-3 MSE, are clearly inefficient against drones. For instance, a mass-produced Iranian Shahed-136 can cost about $35,000 to $50,000, while a Patriot PAC-3 can run about $5 million and takes years to procure. By comparison, the cost-per-engagement efficiency of gun-based air defense systems, designed to defend against drones and subsonic cruise missiles, is far greater. One example of how this plays out is the cost of firing the Army’s Centurion Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) system. It is a ground-based version of the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) used on various U.S. and foreign warships, and is armed with a six-barrel 20mm Vulcan Gatling-type cannon firing M940 rounds. Those self-destructing rounds currently have a price tag of $80.70, according to the Army’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget request. This means a two-second burst from a Centurion, at a rate of fire of 4,500 rounds per minute, would cost just over $12,100.

Again, this is not a strict apples-to-apples comparison, but it can become a bigger factor during prolonged conflicts when high-end weapons stocks begin to run short. It’s also worth noting that drone interceptors are a rapidly growing capability set that are a lower-cost option for swatting down one-way attack drones and even some cruise missiles. Systems like Coyote have been in service for years with the Pentagon and have been protecting bases overseas with strong results. Even cheaper systems are emerging out of lessons learned in Ukraine. All of these systems have their own advantages and disadvantages, but pairing them with a new gun system would likely have synergistic effects. Overall, deploying densely layered short-range air defenses is becoming increasingly important in its own right, at least in high-threat areas.

Ukraine has a great deal of experience with the costs and prioritization of air defense capabilities. The country faces daily attacks by Russian missiles and drones, which is causing mounting casualties and destruction. This ceaseless bombardment has almost completely depleted Ukraine’s supply of Patriot interceptors, leaving it largely defenseless against ballistic missiles. As we noted yesterday, Ukraine is also running short of air-to-air missiles its Air Force F-16s use to swat down drones.

However, Ukraine has also relied heavily on a wide array of gun-based air defense systems, including the German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAG). Based on the chassis of the Leopard 1 main battle tank, Gepards feature twin radar-aimed 35mm automatic cannons, mounted on a single turret. The German variant sports an S-band search radar and a Ku-band tracking radar. These radars are critical to the Gepard’s ability to locate, track, and engage targets at night and amid poor weather conditions.

The success of the Gepards in Ukraine have helped spur new global interest in SPAAGs.

The following video shows a Gepard blasting an Iranian-made Shahed-136 out of the sky.

A video reportedly showing two Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions being shot down by the Ukrainians with a German-delivered Flakpanzer Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) during last night's attack in Odesa Oblast, southern Ukraine.… pic.twitter.com/OhH7vTultm

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) September 7, 2023

The Air Force force is also looking at directed energy weapons like lasers for force protection and especially for defending bases overseas. While gaining traction across the services due in large measure to the much lower cost of delivering effects, these systems are still works in progress. Gun-based air defenses, on the other hand, are mature and proven, and modern precision-guided, programmable ammunition makes them even more efficient and effective.

Beyond the cost, high-end air defense systems — including their component sensors — though portable, are generally fixed to a specific location. That makes them vulnerable to attack. This has been the case in both the war against Iran and Ukraine. The same concerns hold true of aircraft. Both conflicts have shown aircraft vulnerability to drones when parked out in the open. Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web attack on Russian strategic bombers last year in particular shed light on this issue, which we have been sounding the alarm on for a long time.

For years now, U.S. military officials have often pushed back on the utility and cost-effectiveness of investing more in the physical hardening of bases and other critical facilities, especially shelters to shield aircraft from drones and other threats. However, that is beginning to change. In February, the Pentagon released new guidance about hardening, which “does not mean enclosing an entire facility, but selectively introducing obstacles that disrupt predictable aerial access,” the document explains. “Even modest obstacles can deter low-cost, consumer-grade drones and force higher-risk flight profiles.”

In addition to these challenges, the Air Force is also facing the headwinds of an overall lack of U.S. short-range air defense capabilities, a concern we have been highlighting for years. Currently, there are three gun-based SHORAD systems being fielded by the U.S. military. These include the aforementioned Centurion C-RAM systems.

The Army also uses the Sgt. Stout, an air defense system based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. The Sgt. Stout has a turret that can be fitted with up to two four-round launchers for Stingers. Those launchers can also be swapped out for ones that can be loaded with a pair of millimeter-wave radar-guided AGM-114L Hellfire missiles. The turret also has a 30mm XM914 automatic cannon, which can fire proximity-fuzed airbursting rounds against drones and other aerial threats, and a 7.62x51mm M240B machine gun.

The Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) is armed with 30mm cannons and M240C coaxial machine guns in remote weapon stations (RWS). The RWS on one of the two vehicles is also configured to fire Stinger missiles for a spectrum of ground-based air defense scenarios.

The Army may have additional gun-based systems on the way. In July, the service put out a request for information to companies that can provide a new gun-based air defense option, using a 50mm cannon system to track and defeat Group 1, 2 and 3 drones.

A few weeks later, Northrop Grumman introduced its Raid Hunter 50mm GBAD system, which it said “combines proven Chain Gun® technology, precision‑guided 50mm ammunition and a networked, interoperable system controller to deliver powerful protection against high-volume, mixed-threat aerial raids. It is designed to defeat a range of aerial threats including high‑priority cruise missile threats, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and other advanced threats.”

We’re introducing Raid Hunter, our newly named 50mm gun-based air defense system designed to defeat mass, mixed aerial raids with cost-effective interceptors and deep magazine effectors which can be delivered to the warfighter at scale. Learn more: https://t.co/gnOzpo0RA3 pic.twitter.com/oTqORTG9Q4

— Northrop Grumman (@NGCNews) August 11, 2026

There are foreign options should the Air Force want to go that route. For instance, German arms maker Rheinmetall makes the popular Skyranger 35 gun system, which is a turret that can fit on a wide array of armor hulls.

The Skyranger 35 “is equipped with a KDG 35/1000 revolver cannon in 35 mm x 228 caliber with a firing rate of 1,000 rounds per minute,” according to Rheinmetall, which began delivering these to Ukraine in January. “It has an effective range of up to 4,000 meters and a high degree of commonality with the Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk 3. Thanks to AHEAD technology, the Skyranger 35 is airburst-capable. In the future, it will also be possible to equip it with modern guided missiles.”

Skyranger 35s mounted on Cold War-era Leopard 1 tanks have just emerged on the battlefield for Ukraine.

You can see a video of that system below.

It seems that Ukraine's 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment which belongs to the Ground Forces has taken delivery of the first Skyranger 35 SPAAGs mounted on a Leopard 1 chassis made by @RheinmetallAG.

A contract for the delivery of the Skyranger 35 SPAAGs was signed in H2 of… pic.twitter.com/VRWhGx1LCa

— GAU (@deaidua) September 3, 2026

Skyshield is the fixed placement cousin of this system and has been bought by a number of nations.

This is just one example of a large number of potential offerings that could fit the USAF’s interests, from both domestic and foreign origins.

As we discussed earlier in this story, the U.S. is already facing a challenge defending against Iranian threats. A war with China would be more devastating and, when it comes to the Air Force protecting its bases, require far more robust defenses. At the same time, the Air Force is still very early in the process of taking on more responsibility for protecting its assets.

Parties have until 5 p.m. Oct. 9 to submit their proposals to the Air Force for a gun-based air defense system. With limited options and the service pushing to address its growing desire for organic air defenses, it will be interesting to see who comes forward and what systems they offer. We will provide more details about this effort when they become available.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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