Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.

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Em 7 de outubro de 2023 iniciou-se, a partir de Gaza, uma memorável operação militar, na qual aproximadamente 4 mil homens armados das unidades de elite dos vários movimentos da resistência palestina local (Jihad Islâmica Palestina, FPLP, FDLP, Comitês de Resistência Popular, etc., liderados pelo Hamas) lançaram-se como um copo transbordando sobre os assentamentos sionistas dos arredores.

A ação era, simultaneamente, resposta à intensificação das expropriações de famílias palestinas na Cisjordânia, à pressão crescente sobre a Mesquita Al-Aqsa e à política de apaziguamento dos países árabes, e visava através da captura de militares (ativos e reservas) israelenses forçar a entidade sionista a uma guerra de atrito que pudesse conduzir a um desgaste significativo de Israel, internamente e externamente, e a uma reproposição da questão do Estado Palestino.

Ao que tudo indica, uma das expectativas da liderança do Hamas era de que o Hezbollah e o Irã e, talvez, as organizações militares da Cisjordânia se engajariam, também, brevemente e de forma sustentada, no conflito com Israel. Por uma série de motivos – totalmente diferentes para cada um dos atores – isso não aconteceu, exceto no caso do Hezbollah, e de forma limitada até a invasão terrestre do Líbano e, no caso do Irã, também de forma limitada durante a Guerra dos 12 Dias.

O evento levou a transformações cataclísmicas no Oriente Médio que podemos já descrever e a um panorama que, talvez, seja desconcertante para muitos que previram um cenário de vitória total sionista.

Não é nossa pretensão fazer uma descrição minuciosa dos processos que foram iniciados a partir da Guerra de Gaza, de modo que apenas tentaremos resumir cada um dos cenários em seus principais eventos e panorama atual.

Quanto à Gaza em si, a sua população foi vítima de limpeza étnica. Os números de mortes, se somarmos todas as causas, talvez chegue a 200 mil, ou seja, 10% da população a Faixa de Gaza. Uma parte significativa da liderança do Hamas, por sua vez, foi assassinada durante a guerra. Israel, porém, foi derrotada no conflito, considerando que não conseguiu alcançar os seus objetivos de destruir o Hamas, ocupar permanentemente toda a Faixa de Gaza e deslocar a população palestina. Os danos materiais e sociais para Israel, por sua vez, foram imensos. 60 bilhões de dólares em perdas econômicas gerais, aumento das tensões sociais internas e destruição total – talvez irreversível – da imagem internacional de Israel. Ademais, incapaz de derrotar o Hamas, Israel foi obrigada a aceitar um acordo de paz imposto pelos EUA. Enquanto isso, o Hamas segue com aproximadamente 12 mil soldados ativos e mais 15 mil recrutas jovens em treinamento, de modo que em breve retornará a aproximadamente o mesmo nível de força que antes de 7 de outubro de 2023.

Na frente libanesa, o conflito levou ao deslocamento de mais de 1 milhão de libaneses de suas casas, ao assassinato de Hassan Nasrallah, líder do Hezbollah, e de alguns outros líderes do movimento, à desestabilização política do Líbano, e envolveu a invasão por terra do país por parte do Estado de Israel, que, porém, não conseguiu também alcançar seus objetivos de forçar o governo libanês a desarmar o Hezbollah. O Hezbollah, por sua vez, que foi degradado de forma significativa entre 2023 e 2024 por tentar operar como forças armadas regulares, retornou à guerra de insurgência e com o aumento no uso de drones e novas ferramentas tecnológicas, bloqueou o avanço de Israel em 2026.

Quanto à Síria, testemunhamos o colapso do governo de Bashar Al-Assad e a tomada do país pelas milícias terroristas ligadas à Al-Qaeda, ao ISIS e outros grupos extremistas, os quais levaram à presidência Ahmed Sharrah. Israel se aproveitou do momento para destruir a maior parte do hardware militar sírio e ocupar uma faixa de segurança no entorno das Colinas de Golã, estabelecendo uma tênue aliança com as tribos e milícias druzas da região. A Queda de Assad impôs dificuldade para a logística do Hezbollah, que contava com a Síria para o trânsito de equipamento vindo do Irã. Se Israel esperava ter passagem livre pela Síria, porém, a situação é tornada mais complexa pelo fato de que a região é disputada, enquanto área de influência, com a Turquia, de modo que as tensões entre ambos países segue aumentando.

Os cenários palestino, libanês e sírio permitiam dizer, no início de 2025, por exemplo, que Israel estaria avançando significativamente em seus objetivos delineados no Plano Oded Yinon de desestabilizar e fragmentar os países vizinhos para facilitar a construção da Grande Israel. Teríamos aqui, naquele momento, a derrocada da estratégia do Crescente Xiita e do projeto geopolítico de Qassem Soleimani. Quando acrescentamos os cenários iraquiano e iraniano, bem como o contexto geral do Oriente Médio, a situação muda significativamente.

Porque no espaço entre a Guerra dos 12 Dias e a Guerra do Irã vimos o colapso do poder regional dos EUA no Oriente Médio, a ascensão do Irã a principal pretendente à hegemonia regional e o recuo de Israel para uma posição mais defensiva e de retaguarda.

Sinais de que o projeto israelense era mais frágil do que parecia à primeira vista apareceram já no conflito com o Irã em 2025. Incapaz de derrotar o Irã, que fustigava as defesas e infraestruturas israelenses com enxames de drones e mísseis, Israel teve que apelar por ajuda aos EUA, que realizaram um ataque aéreo majoritariamente simbólico contra instalações nucleares vazias no Irã. Isso não passou despercebido.

A nova rodada de conflito em 2026, iniciando-se no final de fevereiro, apesar de iniciar com o assassinato do Aiatolá Ali Khamenei, levou à eliminação de boa parte das bases dos EUA no Oriente Médio, ao bloqueio do Estreito de Ormuz, à destruição das capacidades antiaéreas israelenses, à evacuação das tropas estadunidenses no Iraque e à destruição do mito da superioridade militar incontestável dos EUA.

De fato, a incapacidade dos EUA de alcançar seus objetivos políticos militarmente no Oriente Médio (após o fracasso da tentativa de revolução colorida de janeiro), mesmo usando 2 porta-aviões (1 dos quais pode ter sido seriamente danificado nas operações), sua incapacidade de proteger seus aliados árabes, a própria incapacidade dos aliados árabes de defenderem a si mesmos, o esgotamento parcial dos estoques de mísseis dos inimigos do Irã, e a capacidade iraniana de rapidamente repor sua liderança e de agir militarmente de forma descentralizada, bem como sua demonstração de que sua capacidade industrial-militar permanecia ativa, mudaram o mapa geopolítico no Oriente Médio.

Em alguma medida, hoje, é o Irã quem dá as cartas. A evacuação do Iraque pelos EUA reabre o país para a penetração da influência iraniana, o que põe em risco até mesmo o domínio da Síria por Ahmed Sharrah.

Para contornar o controle iraniano de Ormuz, os sauditas têm experimentado com usar o Mar Vermelho e rotas terrestres. Se esses esforços fossem bem-sucedidos, a importância de Ormuz diminuiria e, com isso, o poder de barganha do Irã. O problema é que, exatamente quando isso começou a acontecer, o Ansarullah iemenita entrou no tabuleiro, iniciando uma operação militar em larga escala para derrotar os rebeldes apoiados por Riad. A resposta saudita aos avanços houthis levou ao fechamento parcial do Estreito de Bab-el-Mandeb e a ataques não apenas contra as instalações da ARAMCO, mas até mesmo contra poços de petróleo sauditas.

Se retornamos ao panorama geopolítico israelense, enfim, o país se encontra ainda com um problema palestino em Gaza, o Hezbollah ativo no Líbano, sem poder avançar na Síria por causa da ameaça turca e com suas capacidades militares defensivas bastante reduzidas.

Longe da “Pax Judaica” e da “Grande Israel” estamos vendo o reposicionamento dos atores geopolíticos e o ator na posição mais vantajosa é, hoje, o Irã. As negociações recentes entre Israel e os países árabes sunitas não muda significativamente o cenário.

3 anos depois da Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa, portanto, não nos é possível dizer se os objetivos de Ismail Hanyeh e Yahya Sinwar foram alcançados, mas é impossível negar que a ousadia do Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.

Saudi Arabia is looking at ways to expand its oil pipeline capacity to destinations outside the Persian Gulf to 10 million barrels a day within two to three years, said Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

On October 7, 2023, a memorable military operation began from Gaza, in which approximately 4,000 armed men from the elite units of the various local Palestinian resistance movements (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, Popular Resistance Committees, etc., led by Hamas) poured like an overflowing glass over the Zionist settlements in the surrounding areas.

The action was simultaneously a response to the intensification of expropriations of Palestinian families in the West Bank, the growing pressure on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the appeasement policy of the Arab countries. It aimed, through the capture of Israeli military personnel (active and reservists), to force the Zionist entity into a war of attrition that could lead to significant exhaustion of Israel, internally and externally, and to a reassertion of the Palestinian State question.

Apparently, one of the expectations of the Hamas leadership was that Hezbollah and Iran, and perhaps the military organizations of the West Bank, would also engage, briefly and sustainably, in the conflict with Israel. For a series of reasons – entirely different for each of the actors – this did not happen, except in the case of Hezbollah, and only in a limited way until the ground invasion of Lebanon, and in the case of Iran, also in a limited way during the 12-Day War.

The event led to cataclysmic transformations in the Middle East that we can already describe, and to a panorama that may be disconcerting for many who predicted a scenario of total Zionist victory.

It is not our intention to provide a detailed description of the processes that were initiated by the Gaza War, so we will only attempt to summarize each of the scenarios in their main events and current panorama.

As for Gaza itself, its population was the victim of ethnic cleansing. The death toll, if we add all causes, may reach 200,000, that is, 10% of the population of the Gaza Strip. A significant part of the Hamas leadership, in turn, was assassinated during the war. Israel, however, was defeated in the conflict, considering that it failed to achieve its objectives of destroying Hamas, permanently occupying the entire Gaza Strip, and displacing the Palestinian population. The material and social damage to Israel, in turn, was immense. 60 billion dollars in general economic losses, increased internal social tensions, and total – perhaps irreversible – destruction of Israel’s international image. Furthermore, unable to defeat Hamas, Israel was forced to accept a peace agreement imposed by the US. Meanwhile, Hamas continues with approximately 12,000 active fighters and another 15,000 young recruits in training, so that it will soon return to approximately the same level of strength as before October 7, 2023.

On the Lebanese front, the conflict led to the displacement of more than 1 million Lebanese from their homes, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, and some other leaders of the movement, the political destabilization of Lebanon, and involved the ground invasion of the country by the State of Israel, which, however, also failed to achieve its objectives of forcing the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah, in turn, which was significantly degraded between 2023 and 2024 for trying to operate as regular armed forces, returned to insurgency warfare and, with the increased use of drones and new technological tools, blocked Israel’s advance in 2026.

As for Syria, we witnessed the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s government and the takeover of the country by terrorist militias linked to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other extremist groups, which led Ahmed Sharrah to the presidency. Israel took advantage of the moment to destroy most of Syria’s military hardware and occupy a security belt around the Golan Heights, establishing a tenuous alliance with the Druze tribes and militias of the region. The fall of Assad imposed difficulties on Hezbollah’s logistics, which relied on Syria for the transit of equipment coming from Iran. If Israel expected free passage through Syria, however, the situation is made more complex by the fact that the region is disputed, as an area of influence, with Turkey, so that tensions between both countries continue to increase.

The Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian scenarios allowed one to say, in early 2025, for example, that Israel would be advancing significantly in its objectives outlined in the Oded Yinon Plan of destabilizing and fragmenting neighboring countries to facilitate the construction of Greater Israel. We would have here, at that moment, the collapse of the Shiite Crescent strategy and of Qassem Soleimani’s geopolitical project. When we add the Iraqi and Iranian scenarios, as well as the general context of the Middle East, the situation changes significantly.

Because in the space between the 12-Day War and the Iran War, we saw the collapse of US regional power in the Middle East, the rise of Iran as the main contender for regional hegemony, and Israel’s retreat to a more defensive and rear-guard position.

Signs that the Israeli project was more fragile than it seemed at first glance appeared already in the conflict with Iran in 2025. Unable to defeat Iran, which was pounding Israeli defenses and infrastructure with swarms of drones and missiles, Israel had to appeal for help from the US, which carried out a largely symbolic airstrike against empty nuclear facilities in Iran. This did not go unnoticed.

The new round of conflict in 2026, beginning at the end of February, despite starting with the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, led to the elimination of a good part of US bases in the Middle East, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the destruction of Israeli air defense capabilities, the evacuation of US troops in Iraq, and the destruction of the myth of the US’s incontestable military superiority.

In fact, the inability of the US to achieve its political objectives militarily in the Middle East (after the failure of the January color revolution attempt), even using 2 aircraft carriers (1 of which may have been seriously damaged in operations), its inability to protect its Arab allies, the Arab allies’ own inability to defend themselves, the partial depletion of the missile stockpiles of Iran’s enemies, and Iran’s capacity to quickly replenish its leadership and to act militarily in a decentralized manner, as well as its demonstration that its industrial-military capacity remained active, changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East.

To some extent, today, it is Iran that calls the shots. The evacuation of Iraq by the US reopens the country to the penetration of Iranian influence, which puts at risk even Ahmed Sharrah’s domination of Syria.

To circumvent Iranian control of Hormuz, the Saudis have been experimenting with using the Red Sea and land routes. If these efforts were successful, the importance of Hormuz would diminish and, with it, Iran’s bargaining power. The problem is that, exactly when this began to happen, the Yemeni Ansarullah entered the board, initiating a large-scale military operation to defeat the rebels supported by Riyadh. The Saudi response to the Houthi advances led to the partial closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and attacks not only against ARAMCO facilities, but even against Saudi oil wells.

If we return to the Israeli geopolitical panorama, finally, the country still finds itself with a Palestinian problem in Gaza, Hezbollah active in Lebanon, unable to advance in Syria because of the Turkish threat, and with its defensive military capabilities considerably reduced.

Far from the “Pax Judaica” and “Greater Israel,” we are seeing the repositioning of geopolitical actors, and the actor in the most advantageous position is, today, Iran. The recent negotiations between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries do not significantly change the scenario.

3 years after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, therefore, it is not possible for us to say whether the objectives of Ismail Hanyeh and Yahya Sinwar were achieved, but it is impossible to deny that Hamas’s boldness completely changed the map of the Middle East, prevented the Palestinian cause from falling into oblivion, and hindered the normalization of relations between Israel and Muslim countries.

Attacks on tankers sailing through the Strait of Hormuz hit their highest last week of any week since the Iran war began, according to maritime security sources tracking incidents, amid a bigger export push by Gulf producers.

By John J. MEARSHEIMER

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Trump administration and its supporters – including the Wall Street Journal editorial page – are working overtime these days to spin the news around the Iran war to make it appear that the US is winning and Tehran had better submit to Washington’s demands before it is wrecked, maybe even “annihilated.” Indeed, Trump is preparing the option of bringing the military hammer down on Iran after the midterm elections if Tehran has not surrendered by then.

In effect, Trump and his supporters are waging a “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran in the mainstream media.

This campaign is sure to fail. If anything, it reflects the Trump administration’s desperation. The president started a war the United States was bound to lose, and there is little he can do now to change that basic fact.

Trump’s propaganda campaign has two dimensions – one economic and the other military.

First, the administration argues that Iran is being economically strangled by the US naval blockade coupled with Operation Economic Outcast, the strategy announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on 24 August 2026. At the same time, it maintains that oil is once again flowing out of the Gulf at rates not far below those that prevailed on 27 February 2026. The implications are obvious: the economic punishment being inflicted on Iran will force it to capitulate soon, while the US economy – and the international community more generally – is well on its way to recovery.

Second, the US is now building up its military forces for a massive military strike after the mid-term elections, when Trump will be free of electoral constraints. This growing threat of a devastating US attack, coupled with the economic pain being inflicted on Iran, is designed to get Tehran to quit now, before its situation becomes even worse.

There are huge problems with this strategy. It sounds persuasive when the mainstream media dutifully purveys it, but it falls apart when one looks closely at what is actually happening.

Consider the military dimension. The headlines say the US is sending 10,000 additional troops and a third aircraft carrier – the USS Theodore Roosevelt – to the Persian Gulf region, creating the impression that Iran will soon be confronting three American carriers. Moreover, the additional troops – on top of the roughly 50,000 US troops already in the region – are portrayed as evidence that Trump is seriously considering putting boots on the ground.

The aircraft carrier story, however, is quite different from what the headlines suggest. The Roosevelt is reportedly being sent to replace the USS George Washington, while the supposed third carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush, has already left the Middle East and is now in Thailand. Thus, there is presently only one carrier in the region. Indeed, this is the first time during the war that the US has only one carrier in the Middle East, and it is difficult to imagine that there will be more than two – if even that many – after the midterm elections.

The larger problem is that the Iran war is severely straining the US Navy. Its senior leaders warn that the current operational tempo is not sustainable indefinitely. Carriers and other warships are being rotated through extremely long deployments, which cause significant maintenance and readiness problems that will have to be addressed at some point. This problem is compounded by the fact that US ships have lost access to nearby logistics facilities and increasingly depend on a supply chain that reaches back to Diego Garcia, which is about 2,500 miles from the Persian Gulf.

But even if three carriers are available to strike Iran, what could they accomplish in a renewed air campaign that the US and Israel could not accomplish together during the failed 40-day bombing campaign between 28 February and 8 April 2026? Some might argue that the US could finally destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure. The problem, however, is that Iran retains a second-strike capability and could retaliate by wreaking havoc on the oil infrastructure of the GCC states. One shudders to think what the consequences would be for the international economy.

On top of all this, the US faces a serious shortage of high-end weaponry, which is one of the main reasons it ended the 40-day bombing campaign and has shied away in recent weeks from engaging in tit-for-tat bombing exchanges with Iran. One would think that the shortage of critical munitions – both for striking Iran and defending against Iranian retaliation – would limit the scope and intensity of any renewed strategic bombing campaign, thereby reducing its chances of success.

Regarding ground forces, simply counting the number of U.S. military personnel in the Middle East is misleading when assessing the possibility of putting boots on the ground. What matters most in a ground war is the number of troops in actual ground-combat formations. I estimate that, of the roughly 50,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed in the region, about 5,000 belong to such formations: roughly 2,200 Marines and sailors in the 11th MEU, 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne, and possibly another 800 Army personnel in Kuwait associated with Task Force Spartan. Of the roughly 10,000 additional personnel now being sent to the region, another 2,200 belong to the 13th MEU. Most of the remainder are sailors assigned to the Theodore Roosevelt carrier and its supporting warships. Thus, given present deployment plans, I estimate that by late November the United States will have just under 7,500 personnel in ground-combat formations in the Gulf region—roughly 4,400 in the two MEUs and 2,800 Army personnel.

There is no way a ground force that small provides a promising option against a country with Iran’s population and geography. Even tripling that number to roughly 23,000—which is highly unlikely—would not fundamentally alter the problem. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey estimates that securing the Strait of Hormuz would require roughly 150,000 troops and three to six months of fighting. For comparison, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 with roughly 190,000 military personnel, and that force proved insufficient to hold much of the territory Russia initially captured. Iran has more than twice the population Ukraine had at the beginning of the Russian invasion, and its geography is considerably more forbidding for an invading army.

Simply put, the United States has not assembled anything remotely resembling the ground force required for a large-scale invasion of Iran. Indeed, from Tehran’s perspective, an American decision to launch such an offensive with anything resembling the forces presently available would present Iran with an opportunity to fight the United States under exceptionally favorable circumstances.

At the risk of beating a dead horse, two further points are in order. First, given how unpopular the Iran war is with the American public, there would almost certainly be a huge uproar if large numbers of US soldiers began coming home in body bags. Second, how are the Marines, who are aboard amphibious assault ships, supposed to land on Iranian territory if the missile and drone threat from Iran is forcing the US Navy to keep those large and vulnerable ships far from the Iranian coast?

Let’s turn to the economic dimension. There is no question that the US is doing great damage to Iran’s economy and inflicting enormous hardship on the Iranian people. But that has been true for a long time. The key question is whether that punishment can coerce Iran into surrendering to American demands.

There is no evidence that Iran is caving in to American pressure, and there are three reasons to doubt that it will. First, it is exceedingly difficult to find a case in the historical record in which an economic blockade by itself caused the target state to surrender. Second, Iran sees the US and Israel as existential threats to Iran – hardly surprising given the genocidal language Trump has used when talking about Iran – and states that believe their survival is at stake are exceptionally difficult to coerce. Third, Iran has a formidable escalation option if the economic pain becomes too great: it can attack the oil and gas infrastructure of the Gulf states and Israel, as well as their highly vulnerable desalination plants.

In short, it is difficult to see economic pressure alone forcing Iran to accept Trump’s terms. That is probably one reason the United States is once again talking about using military force. But, as I argued above, that option holds little promise of producing a favorable outcome.

Finally, there is no question that more oil is flowing out of the Gulf today than was the case in early September. But both Iran and the Houthis are working hard to reverse that trend. Iran is attacking US-escorted tankers on a daily basis, while the Houthis are targeting vital oil infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, despite the increased flow of oil out of the Gulf, gasoline prices remain very high, and a host of other economic problems show no signs of easing anytime soon, including high diesel prices, persistent inflation, elevated mortgage rates, and dangerously high bond yields across much of the West.

All of this is to say that the Trump administration has powerful economic incentives to shut this war down as soon as possible. Indeed, it would hardly be surprising if there were a growing sense of desperation behind closed doors among Trump and his advisers.

This, of course, helps explain why the Trump administration and its allies are waging a media campaign designed to persuade Iran that its days are numbered and that it had better concede to American demands before it is too late. The facts, however, tell a different story. The success of this strategy therefore depends on Trump being able to bamboozle the Iranians into believing that Godzilla is closing in on them. There is little reason to think Tehran will be hoodwinked.

Original article:  mearsheimer.substack.com

Periodo di massimo rischio: dal 30 settembre al 3 novembre. L’Asia occidentale sta per andare a fuoco.

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Il sociopatico presidente degli Stati Uniti ha completamente ignorato la soluzione cinese per porre fine alla crisi con l’Iran, presentata di persona alla Casa Bianca dal presidente Xi Jinping lo scorso giovedì.

In sostanza, Xi ha detto a Trump che la via d’uscita è proprio davanti a lui: tornare al gatto morto ucciso a ripetizione, il memorandum d’intesa (MoU), firmato e poi fatto saltare in aria da Trump. La Cina, ha affermato Xi, è pronta a sostenere pienamente questo ritorno alla diplomazia.

Come prevedibile, il sociopatico ha respinto non solo l’offerta di Xi, ma anche la proposta iraniana di sette giorni, passo dopo passo, per un ritorno ai negoziati, presentata dal ministro degli Esteri Araghchi a New York.

In realtà, questa combinazione dovrebbe essere vista come la proposta Cina-Iran: un insieme di termini definitivi, perfezionati da Araghchi e Wang Yi in due incontri successivi, al BRICS di Nuova Delhi e poi a Pechino.

Trump non solo ha respinto l’offerta di pace, ma si è anche vantato – tra le risate generali del mondo – del “controllo totale” degli Stati Uniti sullo “Stretto di Trump”.

Il gesto di Trump ha profondamente irritato sia Wang Yi che il presidente Xi. Nella cultura asiatica, questo si traduce nella peggiore forma di umiliazione: il rifiuto di una raccomandazione formulata ufficialmente dai più alti livelli di governo.

Aspettatevi quindi una reazione cinese feroce come un filo di seta imbevuto di veleno. Pechino sosterrà Teheran con ancora maggiore veemenza, in più di un modo.

Dal canto suo, il Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Islamiche (IRGC) ha risposto rafforzando ulteriormente i controlli sullo Stretto di Hormuz. Nel giro di 48 ore, l’Iran ha incendiato non meno di 19 petroliere che tentavano di attraversare lo stretto senza seguire le procedure della Marina delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie/PGSA, comprese le relative tariffe.

Ciò ha generato una battuta virale in tutto il Medio Oriente: qualcuno dica a Trump chi è il vero capo nello Stretto.

Teheran ha giocato le sue carte diplomatiche a New York con estrema finezza. Non solo ha costretto il neo-Crasso/neo-Caligola/Dito d’Oro a respingere pubblicamente un’offerta di pace, ma lo ha anche indotto a preannunciare un nuovo attacco terroristico simile a quello contro l’Iran dopo le elezioni di metà mandato; ora è impresso nella mente di tutto il pianeta che a questo sociopatico non importa nulla della valanga di crisi economiche, energetiche e alimentari globali che si sta abbattendo su di loro. In realtà, è lui il responsabile.

A tutto ciò si aggiunge la performance impeccabile del Presidente Pezeshkian, non solo sul podio delle Nazioni Unite, ma anche nell’incontro con i vertici dei think tank statunitensi e i direttori dei principali quotidiani in un hotel di New York. Pezeshkian ha vinto la guerra mediatica proprio nel covo del nemico: un’impresa memorabile.

Trump chiude la porta che Teheran ha aperto, ma il tempo continua a scorrere.

Il blocco di Hormuz sta cedendo a ritmo incalzante. Gran parte del petrolio transita attraverso petroliere saudite e irachene, con tonnellate di petro-yuan che cambiano di mano. Il contrabbando è dilagante persino nel corridoio omanita, teoricamente controllato dagli Stati Uniti, con petrolio iraniano che finisce sia su petroliere clandestine degli sceicchi petroliferi che su petroliere ufficiali.

In fatto di contrabbando e strategie di sopravvivenza, dopo 47 anni di sanzioni, nessuno batte i persiani. È proprio questo che mantiene fedeli i clienti del settore energetico, come Cina, Sud-est asiatico e persino Corea del Sud.

Questo mercoledì scade il termine di 45 giorni fissato da Teheran il 16 agosto per la fine del blocco navale di Trump. Altrimenti… Il 30 settembre è anche la data limite fissata dagli iracheni per il ritiro definitivo degli Stati Uniti dall’Iraq.

E tutto ciò coincide con la recente scadenza di 4-5 giorni fissata da Mohsen Rezaee, segretario del Consiglio Supremo per la Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC) e numero due di fatto in Iran, entro la quale gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero porre fine al blocco. Tale scadenza cade lunedì, ovvero oggi.

In sintesi: mentre Washington chiudeva la porta aperta da Teheran, il tempo a disposizione di Teheran continuava a scorrere. Il nostro canale Transition Protocol ha confermato che i vertici politici e del Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Islamiche hanno già deciso il da farsi.

Manterranno la posizione fino a mercoledì. E se non si troverà una via d’uscita alle condizioni che il presidente Xi ha presentato a Trump nello Studio Ovale, Teheran è pronta a intraprendere 5 passi cruciali:

1. Estendere il campo di battaglia oltre Hormuz fino all’Oceano Indiano. 2. Riservarsi il diritto di colpire qualsiasi nave da guerra americana che imponga il blocco. 3. Collaborare con Ansarallah per estendere il blocco fino a Bab al-Mandab. 4. Agire preventivamente contro qualsiasi rafforzamento militare ritenuto minaccioso. 5. Limitare l’aviazione di qualsiasi nazione che aderisca al blocco aereo.

Senza remore. Letteralmente.

Quindi, al momento abbiamo un inquietante avvertimento sull’Oceano Indiano; una minaccia confermata a tutti i centri di dispiegamento statunitensi in caso di attacco da parte di Washington; e una dichiarazione di dottrina di guerra preventiva.

Ciò che ancora non abbiamo è un ordine di colpire direttamente le navi statunitensi.

Sul fronte aeronautico, l’Iran punterà sulla reciprocità, non sui missili.

La posizione della leadership iraniana in merito alle sanzioni secondarie statunitensi contro praticamente qualsiasi aeroporto del mondo che accolga voli iraniani è piuttosto chiara:

“Se i nostri aerei non riescono a decollare, neanche i vostri riusciranno a farlo.”

Questa affermazione è stata fatta dal consigliere della Guida Suprema Mohammad Mokhber. Sabato, Mohsen Rezaee ha dichiarato che l’Iran non risponderà militarmente al divieto; sta negoziando con gli Stati interessati; e dispone di “molteplici opzioni non militari” per alcuni aeroporti.

A parte le grandi potenze Cina e Russia, diversi stati – tra cui Turchia, Malesia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Tagikistan e Kazakistan – stanno completamente ignorando l’assedio aereo imperiale alla Persia.

Poi c’è il caso straordinario dell’Iraq.

La Resistenza irachena ha inizialmente annunciato l’intenzione di colpire gli aeroporti del Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo. Successivamente, diversi religiosi di alto rango a Najaf e Karbala hanno protestato in modo coordinato, minando la legittimità del governo fantoccio di Baghdad.

Enormi proteste hanno travolto anche Bassora, la capitale irachena ricca di petrolio, con tribù beduine sciite armate fino ai denti (le ricordo con affetto, dai primi anni 2000). Uno dei loro sceicchi ha dato a Baghdad 48 ore di tempo per ritirare la sua complicità con l’assedio statunitense all’Iran. Quindi, alla fine, potrebbe esserci un’esenzione per i voli tra l’Iran e Najaf, fondamentalmente per il trasporto di pellegrini.

L’orologio dell’Iran e l’orologio degli Stati Uniti: la finestra del rischio supremo

Ora passiamo al fronte del Mar Rosso.

Quella misera “coalizione dei volenterosi” – i capi di stato maggiore di Arabia Saudita, Turchia e Pakistan, riuniti a Riyadh venerdì scorso come membri della Mecca Defense Alliance – è passata dal bla bla bla a un possibile tentativo di accordi operativi, pur non annunciando attacchi congiunti contro lo Yemen.

Ansarallah non è certo terrorizzata. Hanno lanciato droni verso Riyadh e missili verso Khamis Mushait, definendo le loro operazioni una “prova generale” per un’escalation su vasta scala.

Aspettate solo la tempesta yemenita in arrivo.

Lo Yemen è in preda alla rabbia dopo che i sauditi hanno bombardato un mercato affollato a Taiz, uccidendo e ferendo almeno 50 persone, tra cui donne e bambini, secondo un bilancio preliminare. Questo deve aver avuto un contributo diretto da parte dell’intelligence e dei servizi di intelligence, sorveglianza e ricognizione (ISR) del CENTCOM e del culto della morte.

Secondo fonti yemenite a Sana’a, Ansarallah potrebbe essere sul punto di imporre un embargo aereo all’Arabia Saudita. Riyadh sta già precipitando in una situazione critica, con Google e i satelliti occidentali costretti a censurare le prove della distruzione di infrastrutture e siti petroliferi a Riyadh, Jizan, Abha e Najran.

Pertanto, rimane alta la probabilità di azioni significative da parte dell’Iran e/o di Ansarallah contro le risorse navali statunitensi, le rotte marittime più ampie o la tangenziale saudita verso Yanbu, fino alla fine di questa settimana.

Tuttavia, l’esito più probabile rimane una situazione di stallo estremamente militarizzata in cui Teheran, il 30 settembre, si limiterà a lanciare segnali anziché colpire.

Fatto accertato: il periodo compreso tra l’orologio iraniano e quello di Washington – dal 30 settembre al 3 novembre – è ormai la Finestra di Massimo Rischio.

Veri poli della civiltà araba contro stupidi pastori di cammelli

E questo ci porta a una rivelazione chiave da parte di una fonte interna alla riunione di alto livello tra Cina, Pakistan e Iran. La fonte ha confermato che, dopo la visita di Xi negli Stati Uniti, Wang Yi e il ministro degli Esteri pakistano Ishaq Dar hanno avuto una conversazione diretta e top secret.

Pechino ha rinunciato a Washington e ora sta giocando di nuovo le sue carte attraverso Islamabad, incaricando apertamente i più alti livelli di governo di contenere la crisi. Ai pakistani è stato affidato il compito di intervenire a nome di Pechino e Teheran sia con Trump che con Mohammed bin Salman prima che la situazione raggiunga un punto critico questa settimana.

Ciò che si deduce è che certamente il Pakistan – nessuno sa nulla della Turchia – non sosterrà l’Arabia Saudita nella sua presunta, massiccia offensiva pianificata contro lo Yemen.

Ciò è stato confermato da un’altra fonte autorevole a Islamabad; il governo pakistano ha certamente fatto i suoi calcoli: aiutare a salvare l’irrecuperabile Casa dei Saud seppellirà il ruolo del Pakistan come mediatore tra Iran e Stati Uniti, rendendolo morto come il gatto morto del Memorandum d’intesa di Islamabad.

Non basta mai ricordare che per secoli Baghdad, Damasco, Il Cairo e Sana’a hanno rappresentato i veri poli civilizzazionali degli arabi sufi cosmopoliti. Niente a che vedere con gli stupidi pastori di cammelli che compongono la ripugnante Casa dei Saud.

E questo si collega ai due imperativi categorici principali del gruppo Epstein.

Vogliono la distruzione della Persia – il genocidio nucleare annunciato sul podio dell’ONU dal sociopatico Presidente degli Stati Uniti. A questo dovrebbe aggiungersi la distruzione dell’Asse della Resistenza Araba – in Libano, Iraq e Yemen. E poi anche la distruzione degli stupidi sceicchi petroliferi del CCG, perché rimarrebbero troppo ricchi, influenti e potenzialmente imprevedibili anche dopo la fine dell’Asse della Resistenza.

Ecco che il leader del culto della morte in Medio Oriente vola “segretamente” su un aereo privato ad Abu Dhabi domenica per incontrare MbZ. Ha trascorso l’intera giornata negli Emirati. Non c’è stata alcuna fuga di notizie sull’incontro. Questo è accaduto subito dopo che il leader del culto della morte ha nuovamente demonizzato l’Iran all’ONU.

È ormai chiaro che Yemen e Persia formano un tutt’uno – i due fronti privilegiati del teatro di guerra in Medio Oriente. Prestate attenzione alle conseguenze di questo incontro “segreto” tra il culto della morte e i sionisti arabi. Il Medio Oriente sta per essere travolto dalle fiamme.

Período de máximo riesgo: del 30 de septiembre al 3 de noviembre. Asia Occidental está a punto de estallar.

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El presidente sociópata de Estados Unidos hizo caso omiso por completo de la solución china para poner fin al drama iraní, presentada en persona en la Casa Blanca por el presidente Xi Jinping el pasado jueves.

En esencia, Xi le dijo a Trump que la salida está justo frente a él: volver al «gato muerto» asesinado en serie, el memorando de entendimiento (MoU), firmado y luego destrozado por Trump. China, dijo Xi, está lista para apoyar plenamente este regreso a la diplomacia.

Como era de esperarse, el sociópata rechazó no solo la oferta de Xi, sino también la propuesta iraní de siete días, paso a paso, para volver a las negociaciones, presentada por el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Araghchi en Nueva York.

En realidad, esta combinación debería considerarse como la propuesta China-Irán: un conjunto de Términos Finales, cuidadosamente ajustados por Araghchi y Wang Yi en dos reuniones sucesivas, primero en la cumbre del BRICS en Nueva Delhi y luego en Pekín.

Trump no solo rechazó la oferta de paz, sino que se jactó —ante las carcajadas del mundo entero— de que Estados Unidos tiene «control total» del «Estrecho de Trump».

El desaire de Trump ha molestado profundamente tanto a Wang Yi como al presidente Xi. En la cultura asiática, eso se traduce en la peor forma de perder prestigio: el rechazo de una recomendación formulada oficialmente por el más alto nivel del gobierno.

Así que cabe esperar que la respuesta china sea tan virulenta como un trozo de seda empapado en veneno. Pekín apoyará a Teherán ahora con aún más ferocidad, en más de un sentido.

El Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (IRGC), por su parte, respondió cerrando aún más el estrecho de Ormuz. En cuestión de 48 horas, Irán incendió nada menos que 19 petroleros que intentaban cruzar sin seguir los procedimientos de la Armada del IRGC y la PGSA, cuotas incluidas.

Eso generó un chiste que se volvió viral en toda Asia Occidental: que alguien le diga a Trump quién manda en el estrecho.

Teherán jugó sus cartas diplomáticas en Nueva York con extrema delicadeza. No solo obligaron al neo-Craso/neo-Calígula/Goldfinger a rechazar públicamente una oferta de paz, sino que lo convencieron de que anunciara un “Remix del bombardeo a Irán” después de las elecciones de mitad de período; ahora todo el planeta tiene claro que al sociópata le importa un comino la avalancha superpuesta de crisis globales económicas, de combustible y de alimentos. De hecho, él es su autor.

A esto se suma una actuación impecable del presidente Pezeshkian, no solo en el podio de la ONU, sino también en la reunión con los directores de los centros de estudios estadounidenses y los editores de los principales periódicos en un hotel de Nueva York. Pezeshkian ganó la guerra mediática justo en la guarida del enemigo: esa es una hazaña para la historia.

Trump cierra la puerta que Teherán abrió, pero el reloj sigue corriendo

El bloqueo de Ormuz tiene tantas fugas como si no hubiera un mañana. Gran parte del tráfico pasa por petroleros saudíes e iraquíes, con toneladas de petro-yuanes cambiando de manos.

El contrabando es rampante incluso en el corredor de Omán, teóricamente controlado por Estados Unidos, donde el petróleo iraní se traslada tanto a petroleros oficiales como a los de los jeques petroleros en la sombra.

Nadie supera a los persas en lo que respecta a estrategias de contrabando y supervivencia tras 47 años de sanciones. Todo eso mantiene a bordo a los clientes de energía: China, el sudeste asiático e incluso Corea del Sur.

Este miércoles se cumple el plazo de 45 días establecido por Teherán el 16 de agosto para que termine el bloqueo naval de Trump. O de lo contrario. El 30 de septiembre también es, casualmente, la fecha límite establecida por los iraquíes para que Estados Unidos se retire definitivamente de Irak.

Y todo eso se superpone con la reciente fecha límite de 4 a 5 días fijada por Mohsen Rezaee, secretario del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional (SNSC) y número dos de facto en Irán, para que los estadounidenses pongan fin al bloqueo. Esa fecha cae en lunes, hoy.

En resumen: mientras Washington cerraba la puerta que Teherán había abierto, el reloj de Teherán siguió corriendo. Se confirmó a nuestro canal Transition Protocol que los altos mandos políticos y del Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (IRGC) ya han decidido qué vendrá después.

Mantendrán el rumbo hasta este miércoles. Y si no hay un camino hacia una resolución en los términos que el presidente Xi le expuso a Trump en el Despacho Oval, Teherán está listo para tomar cinco medidas cruciales:

1).Ampliar el campo de batalla más allá de Ormuz hasta el Océano Índico. 2.) Reservarse el derecho de atacar a cualquier buque de la Armada estadounidense que imponga el bloqueo. 3.) Colaborar con Ansarallah para extender el bloqueo hasta Bab al-Mandab. 4.) Actuar de manera preventiva contra las concentraciones militares que considere amenazantes. 5.) Restringir la aviación de cualquier nación que se sume al bloqueo aéreo.

Sin límites. Literalmente.

Así que, por el momento, tenemos una ominosa advertencia sobre el Océano Índico; una amenaza confirmada contra todos los centros de despliegue de EE. UU. si Washington ataca; y una doctrina de ataque preventivo declarada.

Lo que aún no tenemos es una orden para atacar directamente a los buques estadounidenses.

En el frente aéreo, Irán apostará por la reciprocidad; no por misiles.

La postura de los líderes iraníes respecto a las sanciones secundarias de EE. UU. contra prácticamente cualquier aeropuerto del mundo que reciba vuelos iraníes es bastante clara:

Si nuestros aviones no despegan, entonces los suyos tampoco lo harán».

Así lo expresó el asesor del Líder Supremo, Mohammad Mokhber. El sábado, Mohsen Rezaee dijo que Irán no responderá a la prohibición de manera militar; que está negociando con los Estados involucrados; y que cuenta con «múltiples opciones no militares» para algunos aeropuertos.

Además de las grandes potencias, China y Rusia, varios países —entre ellos Turquía, Malasia, Vietnam, Uzbekistán, Tayikistán y Kazajistán— están ignorando por completo el asedio aéreo imperialista contra Persia.

Luego está el caso extraordinario de Irak.

La Resistencia iraquí fue la primera en dar un paso al frente para declarar que atacaría los aeropuertos del CCG. Luego, varios clérigos de alto rango en Nayaf y Karbala protestaron al unísono y le quitaron la legitimidad al gobierno títere de Bagdad.

Enormes protestas también sacudieron a Basora —la capital de la riqueza petrolera de Irak, donde habitan tribus beduinas chiitas armadas hasta los dientes (las recuerdo con cariño, de principios de la década de 2000)—.

Uno de sus jeques le dio a Bagdad 48 horas para poner fin a su complicidad con el asedio de Estados Unidos contra Irán. Así que, al final, podría haber una excepción para los vuelos entre Irán y Nayaf —que básicamente transportan peregrinos—.

El reloj de Irán y el reloj de EE. UU.: la Ventana de Riesgo Supremo

Ahora, pasemos al frente del Mar Rojo.

Esa insignificante «coalición de los dispuestos» —los jefes de Estado Mayor de Arabia Saudita, Turquía y Pakistán, reunidos en Riad el viernes pasado como miembros de la Alianza de Defensa de La Meca— pasó de las palabras vacías a tal vez un intento de acuerdos operativos, aunque no anunciaron ataques conjuntos contra Yemen.

Ansarallah no está precisamente temblando de miedo. Lanzaron drones hacia Riad y misiles hacia Khamis Mushait, calificando sus operaciones de «ensayo» para una escalada a gran escala.

Solo hay que esperar la próxima tormenta yemení.

Yemen hierve de rabia después de que los saudíes bombardearan un mercado abarrotado en Taiz, matando e hiriendo al menos a 50 personas, entre ellas mujeres y niños, según un recuento preliminar. Esto tuvo que haber contado con información directa de inteligencia y ISR (Inteligencia, Vigilancia y Reconocimiento) del CENTCOM y del «culto de la muerte».

Según fuentes yemeníes en Saná, Ansarallah podría estar a punto de imponer un embargo aéreo a Arabia Saudita. Riad ya se está sumiendo en un «agujero negro», lo que incluye obligar a Google y a los satélites occidentales a censurar la evidencia de la infraestructura petrolera destruida y los sitios en Riad, Jizan, Abha y Najran.

Por lo tanto, sigue siendo alta la probabilidad de que Irán y/o Ansarallah emprendan acciones significativas contra los activos navales de EE. UU., las rutas marítimas más amplias o el desvío saudí hacia Yanbu, hasta el final de esta semana.

Sin embargo, el resultado más probable sigue siendo un estancamiento ultrarmado en el que Teherán envíe señales en lugar de lanzar ataques el 30 de septiembre.

Hecho comprobado: el lapso entre el reloj de Irán y el de Washington —del 30 de septiembre al 3 de noviembre— es ahora la Ventana de Riesgo Supremo.

Los verdaderos polos de la civilización árabe frente a los pastores de camellos ignorantes

Y eso nos lleva a una revelación clave de una fuente con acceso a la sala de la alianza de alto nivel entre China, Pakistán e Irán.

La fuente confirmó que, tras la visita de Xi a EE. UU., Wang Yi y el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Pakistán, Ishaq Dar, mantuvieron una conversación directa y de alto secreto.

Pekín se dio por vencido con respecto a Washington y ahora está volviendo a jugar su carta a través de Islamabad, encargando abiertamente a los más altos niveles del gobierno que contengan la crisis.

A los pakistaníes se les ha encomendado intervenir en nombre de Pekín y Teherán tanto ante Trump como ante MbS antes de que la escalada alcance una etapa crítica esta semana.

Lo que esto implica es que, sin duda, Pakistán —nadie sabe qué pasará con Turquía— no apoyará a Arabia Saudita en su supuesta ofensiva masiva planeada contra Yemen.

Esto lo confirmó otra fuente de alto nivel en Islamabad; el gobierno pakistaní ciertamente ha hecho sus cálculos y sabe que ayudar a salvar a la insalvable Casa de Saud enterrará el papel de Pakistán como mediador entre Irán y EE. UU.: quedará tan muerto como el memorando de entendimiento de Islamabad, que ya no sirve para nada.

Nunca está de más recordar que, durante siglos, Bagdad, Damasco, El Cairo y Saná constituyeron los verdaderos polos civilizatorios de los árabes sufíes cosmopolitas.

Nada que ver con los estúpidos pastores de camellos que componen la espantosa Casa de Saud.

Y eso se relaciona con los dos imperativos categóricos principales del Sindicato de Epstein.

Quieren la destrucción de Persia —el genocidio nuclear anunciado desde la tribuna de la ONU por el sociópata presidente de los Estados Unidos—. Eso debería ir acompañado de la destrucción del Eje Árabe de Resistencia —en el Líbano, Irak y Yemen—.

Y luego, también la destrucción de los estúpidos jeques petroleros del CCG, porque seguirían siendo demasiado ricos, influyentes y posiblemente impredecibles una vez que el Eje de Resistencia haya dejado de existir.

Entra en escena el líder del culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental, quien el domingo voló «en secreto» en un avión privado a Abu Dabi para reunirse con MbZ.

Pasó todo el día en los Emiratos. No hubo ninguna filtración sobre la reunión. Esto ocurrió justo después de que el líder del culto a la muerte demonizara una vez más a Irán en la ONU.

Ahora está claro que Yemen y Persia vienen en un mismo paquete: los dos frentes privilegiados del escenario de Asia Occidental.

Presten atención a las consecuencias de esta reunión «secreta» entre el culto a la muerte y los sionistas árabes. Asia Occidental está a punto de arder hasta llegar a los cielos.

Traducción:  Observatoriode trabajador@s en lucha

On Sunday, NBC News reported that Marines were injured during an Iranian cruise missile attack while transiting the Strait of Hormuz on Sept. 14. The network’s sources said the Marines were not on a U.S. Navy ship, but they did not identify which vessel they were on. However, a former Royal Mail vessel that at one point was being converted into a floating armory stands out as a strong possibility.

While much remains unclear about the Sept. 14 incident, there was only one vessel known to have been struck that day, according to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and a maritime security official we spoke with. The ship was eventually identified by several maritime media outlets as the M/V St. Helena. Again, the St. Helena’s involvement remains unconfirmed, but the ship’s interesting background is of particular note.

“Eight U.S. Marines were injured two weeks ago when an Iranian cruise missile attacked the ship they were operating on in the Strait of Hormuz,” NBC reported, citing three U.S. officials. “The Marines were not seriously injured, but they sustained smoke inhalation and possibly traumatic brain injuries, as they had symptoms of concussions, such as headaches, the officials said.”

“The Marines, seven of them enlisted and one officer, all returned to duty soon after the Sept. 14 attack, the U.S. officials said,” according to the network. “The officials said the Marines were operating as part of a battalion landing team during the Iranian anti-ship cruise missile attack.”

TWZ cannot independently confirm that Marines were on board the St. Helena or that they were injured. We reached out to the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for more information. The Pentagon referred us to CENTCOM, and CENTCOM declined comment.

The incident took place amid an uneasy truce between Iran and the U.S. broken up by sporadic Iranian attacks on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the U.S. military is enforcing a blockade on Iranian ships, during which it has struck several for trying to bypass that effort as well as in retaliation for Iranian attacks on shipping. Negotiations between Washington and Iran have ebbed and flowed, and U.S. President Donald Trump is once again mulling a choice between continuing talks or renewing large-scale attacks.

As we noted earlier in this piece, after the vessel was struck, several maritime industry trade publications identified it as the St. Helena.

“Iran has attacked a historic former British Royal Mail passenger ship in the Strait of Hormuz,” TradeWinds News reported on Sept. 15, a day after the incident. “Maritime security sources identify the 6,800-gt St Helena (built 1989) as the latest vessel to be hit by an ‘unknown projectile’ in the war-torn waterway. The attack was reported late on Monday, according to UK Maritime Trade Operations, which cited a ‘verified source’ for the incident without identifying the vessel.”

“UKMTO has received a time late report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz,” the organization reported on Sept. 15, citing an incident that took place a day earlier. “A verified source has reported that a vessel has been struck by an unknown projectile.”

“There is no reported damage or environmental impact,” UKMTO added. “Authorities are investigating.”

UKMTO WARNING 135-26

Click here to view the full product https://t.co/VWOyM2oLdj#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/Dfppt86s9b

— UKMTO Operations Centre (@UK_MTO) September 15, 2026

According to Lloyd’s List, the ship was being operated by the Ambrey maritime security firm at the time it was struck. Ambrey declined to comment. 

Shipping expert Sal Mercogliano and open-source investigator Tom Bike were among those suggesting the St. Helena could have been the vessel at the heart of the NBC report.

So piecing together the evidence it appears that the US may have converted St Helena into a armed merchant cruiser.

The Marines looked at putting Armed Guards on board commercial ships three years ago as reported by @USNINews.

Add modular/containerized weapon systems,… https://t.co/48lJ1BDMfs

— Sal Mercogliano (WGOW Shipping) (@mercoglianos) September 28, 2026

Exactly what the St. Helena was doing at the time it was struck is unclear; however, the ship has had a very unusual past.

The vessel entered into service in 1990 and “sailed between Cape Town, South Africa and Saint Helena and Ascension Islands, carrying both passengers and cargo, some of which was Royal Mail, earning her the rare RMS designation,” according to Cruise Arabia and Africa.

The St. Helena was Britain’s last working postal ship, according to Maritime Executive. After it was retired in 2018 because it was no longer needed for that function, things got really interesting.

Two different organizations took over the vessel, including, as we noted earlier in this story, a company that was planning to use it as a floating armory in the Middle East.

“Renamed MNG Tahiti, the 103-meter (340-foot) ship is being readied by her new owner MNG Maritime to become a floating armory working in the Gulf of Oman,” Maritime Executive wrote on April 22, 2018. “She will deliver security guards and weapons to vessels sailing through the region and is expected to be operational in her new role in the next few months.”

It is unclear what happened to that plan. However, two years later, an off-road racing series called Extreme E said that it “secured exclusive use of the former Royal Mail ship in 2018.” After that, the ship underwent “an extensive refurbishment process, which has included total overhaul of steelwork, engines, generators, propellers, interior and cabin space, and more, making it not only fit for purpose, but also as efficient as possible ahead of its new mission.” 

The ship was “specifically designed to transport all the infrastructure and equipment the Extreme E needs for their race weekends,” the organization stated. The plan was to have the ship serve “as its freight and logistics hub due to her versatility and ability to carry and unload a mixture of cargo, like all 10 of the championship’s ODYSSEY 21’s [electric off-road racecar], as well as team members and guests. This was also fit with a Science Laboratory so research can be conducted enroute to the race locations.”

Both the St. Helena and MNG Tahiti have the same international shipping identification number of IMO 8716306, according to the MarineTraffic website.

On Sept. 17, 2024, the St. Helena was put up for sale, according to Horizon Ship Brokers. The current ownership is unclear. We reached out to Horizon Ship Brokers for more details.

Last year, the saga of the St. Helena took a new turn. A company called Terra Nova Expeditions chartered the vessel for Antarctic cruises, but those plans were scrubbed last month because the vessel was stuck in the Persian Gulf and was no longer available for the Antarctic sailing season.

It was last tracked via its transponder near Dubai nearly two months ago, according to MarineTraffic.

While we can’t confirm that Marines were onboard when St. Helena was hit, Marines have been training for this exact mission set. USNI News reported in 2023 that a “force of 100 Marines, newly trained by Navy personnel,” stood ready “to respond, if ordered, to provide armed security aboard foreign commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.”

Those Marines were members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked on the three-ship Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), USNI added at the time.

It is unclear if those plans are still in place and if Marines in the region have actually been ordered to provide armed security for foreign vessels sailing through or near the strait. Regardless, Marines could be quickly trained to take on this mission set and have drilled for ship boarding and searches for years, especially special operations and specially-tasked units. CENTCOM declined to comment when we asked if there are U.S. personnel embarking on commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

At the same time, it is possible that the unique attributes of St. Helena made it a convenient host ship for sea base operations for U.S. forces in the region specifically for this crisis. Adapting commercial vessels for exactly this purpose has a long history around the Strait of Hormuz, as it was a central facet of the Tanker Wars during the 1980s, that saw U.S. forces operate from barges in the region. Today, commercial vessels remarkably similar to St. Helena operate in similar roles, especially in support of special operations and interdiction operations.

Once again, we have no idea what the ship’s mission was at the time of the incident and if Marines were simply helping it transit safely out of the Persian Gulf or something more, but the attack did expose the fact that individual Marines are more involved with activities in this tumultuous body of water than it may seem.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com.

The post Claims Swirl Around U.S. Marines Injured Aboard Mystery Vessel Attacked In The Strait Of Hormuz appeared first on TWZ.

The latest flare-up of fighting between the U.S. and Iran has seen American forces strike two Iranian oil tankers in retaliation for Tehran’s attacks on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. This new “tanker-for-tanker” targeting policy, first reported by Axios, marks a change from previous incidents where ships were only attacked for running the ongoing U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The two nations have resumed hostilities after a month-long pause in kinetic strikes against each other. The two Iranian tankers were struck in a round of attacks U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it carried out Tuesday in response to “recent attempted attacks by the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members.”

Iran, claiming several civilians were killed in the U.S. strikes, quickly followed those attacks by launching missile and drone barrages against U.S. facilities in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait.

The new U.S. “tanker-for-tanker” policy of carrying out retaliation strikes on Iran’s fleet of oil transport vessels, was approved by Trump, Axios noted. The policy was designed to “further deter Iranian attacks on tankers that move through the strait.

“The Iranian government tankers were anchored off Iran’s coast north of the U.S. naval blockade line,” the outlet stated, citing anonymous U.S. officials. “U.S. drones launched missiles that hit their engine rooms.”

The attacks on the Iranian tankers were “part of a plan Trump and his senior aides have been considering in recent days to prevent Iran from rebuilding the radar and missile capabilities it needs to attack ships crossing the strait,” the outlet stated. “One U.S. official said the idea is to reduce the risk of Iranian attacks on oil tankers, U.S. Navy ships and Air Force aircraft — to ‘mow the lawn,’ as this person put it. A U.S. official told Axios on Tuesday that the new strikes degraded Iran’s attack capabilities in the strait and ‘bought at least a month’ of lowered threat levels for commercial ships.”

CENTCOM released a video after the conclusion of its Sept. 1 strikes that included what appears to be strikes on two separate vessels. One can be seen at about the 39-second mark of the video and another about 10 seconds later.  It’s not exactly clear from the video what kind of munitions were used, however, you can read more about how CENTCOM disabled ships trying to run the blockade here.

A CENTCOM spokesman declined to say if those ships were struck under a new policy and referred that question to “policymakers.” We have reached out to the White House for comment.

CENTCOM:

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces successfully completed a wave of strikes against Iranian military targets Sept. 1.

U.S. forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets including air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine… pic.twitter.com/gbX4zP50oA

— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 1, 2026

The CENTCOM statement about those strikes makes no mention of oil tankers.

“U.S. forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets including air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine laying capabilities, and communications sites,” the command stated on X. “The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members.”

Talking to Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, who runs the Lt. Dan podcast, President Donald Trump on Wednesday claimed that more than two dozen Iranian ships were destroyed in the U.S. attack; however he did not specify what kind or how.

“We now control the Strait of Hormuz. We control it,” Trump claimed. “Last night we took out 28 boats, 28 ships. We control it, they get nothing, and we took out ships.”

We reached out to the White House for clarification about what kind of ships Trump says were destroyed.

Trump on Iran:

We now control the Strait of Hormuz. We control it.

Last night we took out 28 boats, 28 ships. We control it, they get nothing, and we took out ships. pic.twitter.com/IsIavFSxC9

— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 2, 2026

Trump also took to Truth Social to suggest the Strait be named in his honor.

“Now that we have it under U.S.A. control, should we change the name Hormuz Strait to TRUMP STRAIT??? Like America itself, it would be ‘hotter’ than ever before!” the president proclaimed.

TRUMP: Suggests renaming Hormuz Strait “Trump Strait,” says it is under U.S. control pic.twitter.com/HCQx6YBYZO

— Trump Truths (@trumptruthsbot) September 2, 2026

Iran has struck several ships in recent days, including two on Sunday that were transporting Saudi Arabian crude oil.

The Saudi Arabian-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC) Sidr “was struck by unknown projectiles about 16.6 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman at about [11:52 PM local time Sunday],” Reuters reported, citing the Marisks ​maritime security firm. “Minutes later, the ​Liberian-flagged VLCC Senegal ⁠Prosperity was reportedly struck by three unknown projectiles approximately 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Marisks said. All crew aboard were ​reported safe.”

The Saudis condemned the attack on the Sidr.

#Statement | The Foreign Ministry expresses the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s condemnation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s targeting of the Saudi tanker (Sidr) while it was transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and resulted in fatalities among the tanker’s crew. pic.twitter.com/0EqcXkNzCf

— Foreign Ministry (@KSAmofaEN) September 2, 2026

On Wednesday, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also claimed without providing proof that two ships were struck by mines in the Strait. However, the Ambrey maritime security firm pushed back on that.

“There is no meaningful evidence showing that any vessel has been hit by a ship mine,” Joshua Hutchinson, a former Royal Marine Commando who serves as the Managing Director of Intelligence and Risk (and Chief Commercial Officer) at Ambrey, told us.

The IRGC announced that two oil tankers struck mines and came to a halt after catching fire. The IRGC also warned that harsher penalties await shipping companies that choose to follow US provocations instead of complying with Iran's maritime regulations

— IRNA News Agency ☫ (@IrnaEnglish) September 2, 2026

However, as we previously reported, concern over Iran’s continuing ability to mine the Strait of Hormuz sparked the U.S. to resume attacking Iran on Sunday. CENTCOM told us it struck Iranian rocket launchers preparing to fire naval mines into the Strait of Hormuz. While the command did not provide recordings of that attack, Iran has previously introduced a system using what are said to be Fajr-5 rockets to launch mines, representing a dangerous new threat to shipping, which you can read more about in our initial report here.

“Strait of Hormuz transits remain contested and high risk, however, daily in- and outbound transits continue,” Ambrey stated in its latest security assessment. “Iran continues to seek control over Strait of Hormuz transits, while the US facilitates transits along the Omani coastline. Transits through the Transit Separation Scheme are not advised, despite the recent statement of the TSS having been cleared of mines.”

The alternatives “continue to be a northern route in coordination with Iranian authorities and a southern route facilitated by US forces,” Ambrey added. “On 24 August, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control updated their guidance in relation to US sanctions against Iran, expressly highlighting the risk of non-compliance if coordinating with Iranian authorities ‘including by accepting insurance or other services or responding to information demands for guarantees of safe passage, even if there is no associated payment or other exchange of value for these services.’” 

The U.S.-facilitated route “remains available to international shipping, with a layer of military support against attempted attacks against transiting vessels,” Ambrey noted. “However, Iran has continued to interfere with shipping on this route via VHF threats as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and missile launches.” 

The renewed strife on the Strait has oil prices rising again. The per barrel price for Brent Crude was up to more than $95 on Wednesday, according to OilPrices.com. It had been $87.50 before the U.S. renewed attacks last week.

The Latest

Iran claimed that at least five people were killed and several others injured while attending a wedding reception during the CENTCOM strikes. Iranians called the incident a “war crime.”

“The truth of this unlawful war of choice – and the true face of the war crime – is in Sirik, where a wedding ceremony was brutally bombed as part of America’s desperate struggle to conceal its failure, not in AI-generated videos portraying American officials as triumphant heroes,” Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei stated on X. 

The truth of this unlawful war of choice – and the true face of the war crime – is in Sirik, where a wedding ceremony was brutally bombed as part of America’s desperate struggle to conceal its failure, not in AI-generated videos portraying American officials as triumphant heroes.… pic.twitter.com/7GlHxE9oP1

— Esmaeil Baqaei (@IRIMFA_SPOX) September 2, 2026

TWZ cannot independently confirm that; however, remnants of an AGM-84H/K Standoff Land Attack Missile–Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) were reportedly found near the building where the wedding took place, according to open-source investigators.

“Weapon remnants said to have been recovered from tonight’s strike on a wedding ceremony in Kuhestak, Iran, have been identified by @Easybakeovensz [weapons technical analyst Trevor Ball] as SLAM-ER components,” New York Times Visual Investigations journalist Christiaan Triebert stated on X. “Manufacturer Boeing touts this cruise missile as the ‘most accurate’ weapon in the U.S. Navy’s inventory.”

Additional photos and video of the weapon remnants, including the thermal battery and a component with a visible part number. Some unidentified, may not be exclusive to SLAM-ER. Via Hamid Kasiri, who appears to be a teacher in the area and public figure. pic.twitter.com/n5e9dfv0d6

— Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc) September 2, 2026

The wedding took place about 430 feet from an Iranian communications tower, CNN Visual Investigations Reporter Thomas Bordeaux noted on X. The tower was the likely target.

Geolocation of a building in a residential area in Kuhestak, Iran, said to have been struck by the US while it was hosting a wedding. The building is 430 feet from a comms tower, which was also struck.

Building: 26.80297, 57.02492
Tower: 26.80231, 57.02377
cc: @GeoConfirmed pic.twitter.com/QLzMGczb7W

— Thomas Bordeaux (@ThomasBordeaux7) September 1, 2026

CENTCOM spokesman, Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, told us the command “is aware of the reports, which originated from Iranian state media, and we are looking into them.”

“The U.S. military never targets civilians, unlike the IRGC,” he added.

Hawkins also pushed back on Iranian claims that the IRGC killed a large number of U.S. troops in an attack on Camp Titin, a small U.S. Marine base on the Gulf of Aqaba coast.

“Not true, it’s an outright lie,” Hawkins told us when we asked about the Iranian claims of inflicting casualties on U.S. forces during their recent retaliation strikes. “All American personnel are accounted for.”

Iran’s IRGC says it launched a heavy barrage of ballistic missiles at Camp Titin, a base used by U.S. Marines near Aqaba in southern Jordan, in retaliation for the U.S. attack on a wedding ceremony in Sirik.

➤ The IRGC described the strike as the second wave of its… pic.twitter.com/HCyic7dpVm

— Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) September 1, 2026

Iran also claimed to have launched attacks on US facilities in Erbil province in northern Iraq, Sheikh Isa Airbase, which hosts US forces, in Bahrain, Prince Hassan airbase in Jordan and the headquarters and residence of the American commander of the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait.

BREAKING | Iran Strikes U.S. Base in Kuwait

Iran’s IRGC claims it launched a combined missile and drone attack on U.S. facilities at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait.

The IRGC says the U.S. commander’s headquarters and accommodation, along with drone facilities,… pic.twitter.com/TMo13TVbWp

— IRAN IRGCC (@IranIRGCC) September 2, 2026

Jordanian officials said their air defenses shot down 10 Iranian ballistic missiles and three fell safely on unpopulated areas.

#Jordan – The @ArmedForcesJO report that the Kingdom was targeted by a missile attack originating from Iranian territory in the early hours today. Air defense systems engaged 13 ballistic missiles that entered Jordanian airspace, intercepting and destroying 10 of them. The… https://t.co/3zCIEjrIxH

— Dana Zureikat Daoud دانا زريقات (@DanaZkat) September 1, 2026

Iran’s military used Kheiber Shekan medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) “extensively in strikes on the U.S. naval hub in Bahrain and other American bases during the six-month war with the U.S. and Israel,” USA TODAY reported, citing “the Iranian government and confirmed in USA TODAY interviews with former U.S. military and intelligence officials and weapons analysts.”

“Some of those analysts believe Iran used [these] missiles in the July 17 strikes on the U.S. Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Al-Azraq, Jordan that killed three American service members,” the outlet added. Iran itself has also made that claim, “according to official government statements obtained by USA TODAY.”

On Aug. 31, an Iranian state-run outlet claimed Tehran used Kheibar Shekan missiles to hit Muwaffaq Salti − and the King Hussein air base in Jordan − in response to U.S. military attack on Iran’s Larak Island the previous night, USA TODAY proferred.

The Kheibar Shekan is a two-stage, solid-propellant, truck-launched MRBM that Iran first unveiled on Feb. 9, 2022. A third generation of the Fateh family of ballistic missiles, Iran claims it has a maximum range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). These missiles provide high terminal maneuverability and/or high speeds specifically intended to reduce their vulnerability to missile defense interceptors.

6/ DoD says its defenses work virtually all the time and its forces ‘remain fully operational.’ But experts – including former CIA, Army, DIA and Marine intelligence officials – told me say enough missiles are getting through to do real damage. Full story: https://t.co/7ykaUnEHEG

— Josh Meyer (@JoshMeyerDC) September 1, 2026

Russia “has been secretly helping Iran develop advanced supersonic cruise missiles in one of the most significant known transfers of strategic military technology from Moscow to Tehran,” Financial Times (FT) reported.

“The multiyear covert program, codenamed C430L, has enlisted some of Russia’s most experienced missile specialists to help Iran develop a new class of weapon capable of threatening US aircraft carriers and other warships in the Middle East,” the publication added. “An FT investigation uncovered the program, which began in 2023 and continued into the US-Israeli war against Iran, through leaked Russian correspondence, travel records and analysis of military patents.

The main purpose of C430L “is to help Iran to develop a ramjet propulsion system, an engine that allows a cruise missile to sustain flight at several times the speed of sound,” FT added. “Missile and military experts said the technology was almost certainly intended for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.”

“This is the transfer of a highly strategically sensitive military technology from Russia that the Iranians have wanted to acquire for decades,” said Fabian Hinz, an expert on Iranian missiles and senior analyst with Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based weapons-tracing organization. “A program like this would require political clearance from the very top in Russia.”

The weapon system, or at least the impetus for it is, is possibly P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26). Russia has been using these against Ukraine since the early days of the all-out war and has exported the weapon in various configruations.

NEW: Russia has been secretly helping Iran develop advanced supersonic cruise missiles in one of the most significant known transfers of strategic military technology from Moscow to Tehran.

with @MilesMJohnson @charles_clover https://t.co/01SxsOypLq

— max seddon (@maxseddon) September 1, 2026

After numerous Iranian attacks on Bahrain, the U.S. evacuated ships and troops and no return date is on the horizon, according to the Chief of Naval Operations.

“We’re not getting back in there anytime soon,” Adm. Daryl Caudle said during a recent worldwide town hall meeting with sailors. “I just want to be completely honest with that. But we’re working real hard to develop a scheme of maneuver in order for you to get your things.”

JUST IN: US NAVY COMMANDER SAYS US FORCES WILL NOT RETURN TO BAHRAIN BASE pic.twitter.com/xqNQhNLQWe

— Sulaiman Ahmed (@ShaykhSulaiman) September 1, 2026

Iranian hackers have “targeted not only U.S. water systems but also America’s telecommunications, energy and other infrastructure in recent weeks,” NBC News reported, citing four people with access to government and industry information about cyberthreats.

The attempted cyberattacks “have focused on automated systems connected to the internet and so far have not been successful, the sources said,” according to the network. “But they underscore Iran’s readiness to retaliate against the U.S. beyond its interests in the Middle East. The U.S. and Israel have launched airstrikes on Iranian bridges, fuel depots and other infrastructure since the war began in February.”

A Telegram channel that presents itself as a voice for Iranian cyber operations “declared Sunday that it would target energy, water and telecommunications sectors in the U.S., saying its earlier warnings to halt attacks on Iran had gone unheeded,” NBC continued.

“Soon, the United States will witness unexpected and critical events in the energy, water, and telecommunications industries,” the group, APT IRAN, said on Telegram.

Iranian hackers have targeted not only US water systems but also telecommunications, energy and other infrastructure in recent weeks, NBC News reported on Wednesday, citing four people with access to government and industry cyberthreat information.

The attempted cyberattacks… pic.twitter.com/nqrTXrooRb

— Iran International English (@IranIntl_En) September 2, 2026

That’s it for now. We’ll update this story with new details when they emerge.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Iranian Oil Tankers In The Cross Hairs Of New U.S. Campaign appeared first on TWZ.

“The Strait of Hormuz cannot be separated from the broader regional conflict,” Rezaei said.

The post Iran links Hormuz Strait reopening to end of Mideast wars appeared first on BOL News.