The Mediterranean’s own odyssey: An ecological treasure feels the strain




This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Adriana Abdenur, a Brazilian policy expert and co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy, and Jorge Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico and professor at Sciences Po, to explore debates about development and ideas of strategic autonomy across Latin America.
Jorge explains why China’s role is varied across the region, arguing that Mexico and much of Central America remain deeply constrained by their economic ties to the US. Adriana discusses Brazil’s long tradition of strategic autonomy, describing how policymakers engage with China as both an economic partner and a source of ideas on development, technology and global governance.
Together, Mark, Adriana and Jorge explore how intensifying US-China competition is reshaping the region’s choices. Can Latin American countries balance relations with both powers? Is China a model, a market or simply another partner in a multipolar world? And what does strategic autonomy look like in an increasingly coercive geopolitical environment?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 31st 2026.
Bookshelf
Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option, by Carlos Ominami, Jorge Heine and Carlos Fortín
Manifesto Antropófago (Cannibal Manifesto), by Oswald de Andrade

Reluctance among German decision-makers has long stopped Berlin taking a tougher economic approach towards China. When France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Spain recently pressed the European Commission for tougher measures and faster trade defence action against China, Germany not only declined to join, it even called for stronger industrial ties with Beijing.
Yet, one thing Berlin should not worry about is voters’ disapproval should it pursue a more hawkish China policy. ECFR polling data find that Germans are the most China-sceptical out of 15 European countries surveyed. No fewer than 60% of Christian Democrat and Social Democrat supporters regard the country as an adversary or rival. In contrast, elsewhere in Europe, majorities still see China as either a “necessary partner” or even an ally. In Italy and Spain, 56% and 65% of people hold this view respectively. (Closest to the sceptical Germans are the French public; President Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly hawkish political posture vis-à-vis Beijing may have found an audience willing to listen.)
The China shock has hit Germany particularly hard: its manufacturing sector lost around 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025 and it continues to shed 10,000 jobs each month. The car industry is paying the highest costs, being squeezed out of a market increasingly dominated by Chinese manufacturers at home and abroad.
The mood in the European Council is shifting, and with Germany’s acquiescence. When EU leaders met in June 2026, they backed a stronger trade defence toolbox of existing measures against China. This included instruments such as the Industrial Accelerator Act’s “Buy European” provisions and limits on high-risk Chinese technology. Despite its past hesitations, Germany no longer acts as a spoiler on firmer EU action, and it has cautiously supported this new direction. Nevertheless, the combination of growing public scepticism towards China, mounting pressure on German industry and appetite for a more assertive policy on the European level creates a political mandate that German decision-makers could yet seize.
The German public’s views on the energy transition should also prove encouraging for their leaders. Voters want to see investment in renewables: 57% back what would amount to the growing electrification of the economy. Across the countries polled by ECFR, 61% of respondents say they support prioritising renewables and the clean tech sector.
This public support should help persuade leaders, including in Germany, that they can take action to limit emerging dependencies on China. They can accelerate the energy transition while de-risking the clean tech sector through providing support for domestic European industries, from wind to batteries.
For Berlin, and capitals across Europe, it is safer to move ahead rather than delay. Chinese economic policy is already doing irreparable damage to European industry—but European policymakers still need to protect an increasingly electrified economy from weaponisation by China. If they fail to do so, governments will almost certainly pay the price at the ballot box. Those that pursue electrification and economic de-risking as a single package are most likely to reap the political rewards.

At the end of July, Hamas agreed to a Board of Peace (BoP) roadmap to implement Phase 2 of the three-stage ceasefire agreement. At its core is Hamas’s willingness to decommission its weapons. This would have been unthinkable only a few years ago and offers a realistic pathway for ending the Islamist group’s governance and security control over the devastated Strip.
This process will only begin once Israel has fully complied with its Phase 1 obligations, which it has yet to do. More fundamentally, it will require Israel to accept a process to end its military presence in Gaza and ultimately engage in negotiations towards Palestinian self-determination. Netanyahu and his hardline government have rejected the roadmap out of hand and are now the main threat to the ceasefire deal.
Having been largely sidelined, Europe now has a role to play in ensuring the deal succeeds.
Announced in September 2025, Trump’s 20-point plan aims to end the war in Gaza in three phases. The first phase conditioned the full cessation of hostilities and emergency relief on the release of Israeli hostages held by Palestinian groups. The second phase aims to remove Hamas from power and begin reconstruction—the roadmap Hamas agreed to in July outlines how this stage will work. The final phase would end with Israel’s full withdrawal from Gaza, the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the launch of a “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”.
So far, the plan has significantly reduced violence, secured the return of all Israeli hostages held by Palestinian factions and prompted a partial redeployment of Israeli military forces. However, in violation of the agreement, Israel has continued to strike civilians and militants in Gaza, and impede the entry of humanitarian aid. The Israeli military has also advanced beyond the Yellow Line, to which it was supposed to withdraw in the first phase.
At the same time, Israel has continued to demolish Palestinian homes and infrastructure in the 70% of Gaza that remains under its control. Israel may now be seeking to create a new de facto border with Gaza and effectively annex a large chunk of the territory, potentially preparing for the return of Israeli settlements there in the future.
Once Phase 1 is complete, Palestinian factions will begin handing over their heavy weapons to the Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a transitional body created as part of the 20-point plan to replace Hamas governance and security control in the Strip. This will include the full alphabet soup of Palestinian armed groups—many of which are more hardline than Hamas—as well as Israeli-backed militias.
Heavy weapons will effectively be placed under lock and key, monitored by the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), which will deploy as a buffer between Israeli forces and NCAG-controlled areas. BoP officials have said Palestinian weapons could ultimately be dismantled and melted down. This would replicate how Northern Ireland’s decommissioning process dealt with weapons held by paramilitary groups. Tunnels and weapons production facilities would also be put out of action.
Small arms like AK-47s will instead be regulated by NCAG through a system of permits. NCAG will also establish a new police force made up of newly trained recruits and members of the Hamas-run civil police vetted and approved by the BoP.
Critically, the roadmap links the decommissioning process “to an Israeli withdrawal, in phases, from the areas under its control in Gaza”. According to previous understandings, Israel would withdraw to a new “Red Line” by the end of Phase 2, and from there to a “Black Line” along Gaza’s perimeter, where it would retain a narrow buffer zone until “Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.”
While the contours of Phase 2 are now clear, the final operational details still need to be hammered out between the sides during follow-up talks. Questions also remain over the lack of funding for the NCAG and the status of the ISF, which to date has only around 200 pledged troops from Morocco, though smaller numbers may also come from countries including Kosovo and Uganda. Meanwhile, the new Palestinian police force has yet to begin training in Egypt.
Europe is right to avoid directly funding the BoP. But it has considerable expertise in disarmament and security-sector reform, including through the EU’s EUPOL COPPS mission, which was established to assist the PA police in the West Bank. Europeans should offer critical personnel and technical expertise to support both the decommissioning process and the training of the new Palestinian police force.
The biggest obstacle remains Israel’s opposition to any transitional political process that would eventually force it out of the Strip and into talks on Palestinian self-determination
The biggest obstacle remains Israel’s opposition to any transitional political process that would eventually force it out of the Strip and into talks on Palestinian self-determination. The Israeli government has instead vowed to remain in Gaza and continue its military attacks. It has also opposed NCAG taking over until Hamas fully disarms, and demanded the right to veto troop contributions to the ISF from “hostile” countries such as Turkey and Qatar.
BoP officials now appear to be altering parts of the laboriously negotiated deal (and its own press release) to accommodate Israel’s hardline stance. They now state that Israeli withdrawal beyond the Yellow Line would begin only once the decommissioning process is complete. This appears to contradict the original text and Nikolay Mladenov, the BoP’s high representative, who initially said the two would move forward “in lockstep”. The accompanying Explanatory Note also reinforces this interpretation, outlining “a step-by-step process linking withdrawal phases to verified decommissioning steps.”
Such manoeuvring risks undermining Hamas support for the agreement. Moreover, by conditioning all further Israeli withdrawals on Gaza’s full demilitarisation, the BoP is in effect giving Israel a veto over the process itself, allowing it to deepen its control over the eastern half of Gaza. Given the near impossibility of removing every single Palestinian weapon, as many are held by families, clans, criminal networks and jihadi groups, Israel could argue indefinitely that the conditions for its withdrawal have not been met.
But even BoP efforts to placate Israel have failed to satisfy prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He continues to demand that the deal be re-negotiated, insisting that no Israeli redeployment will take place, even to the original Yellow Line, until Hamas has fully disarmed.
Having secured Hamas’s unprecedented agreement to decommission its weapons, the BoP now needs to show the political will to implement its own deal. US officials have already warned Israel that US president Donald Trump would be “very, very disappointed” if Netanyahu derailed it. Although the prime minister’s far-right coalition limits his room for manoeuvre, Netanyahu has invested heavily in portraying his close relationship with Trump as a political asset—which means he cannot easily afford a public rupture with him.
Mladenov has won wide international praise for brokering the deal. Rather than modifying the terms he himself negotiated and risk the diplomatic gains already achieved, he should use his current political capital and Trump’s momentary re-engagement to insist that Israel implements rather than rewrites the agreement. If necessary, he should be prepared to call out Israeli obstruction, just as he previously cast Hamas as the main obstacle. Europe can further strengthen his hand by also highlighting Israel’s non-compliance with its obligations, as the Arab and Turkish mediators have done. The EU should also resume discussions on suspending the Association Agreement with Israel unless it complies.
Sustained diplomatic engagement before Israel’s October elections should aim to shift the terms of the domestic debate. The Israeli opposition has also been critical of the deal, accusing Netanyahu of weakness by allowing Hamas to survive, and is unlikely to chart a radical new course on Gaza if it wins. Nevertheless, opposition figures have also acknowledged that Israel’s battlefield gains need to be converted into lasting diplomatic achievements. Europe should use the political framework established by the Gaza roadmap to reinforce this logic and demonstrate how military gains can be converted into a sustainable political settlement.
Ultimately, success will depend on whether both sides conclude that diplomacy offers greater rewards than renewed war. Hamas is unlikely to complete decommissioning unless it believes that concessions today will lead to genuine political gains tomorrow towards Palestinian liberation. Equally, Israel will only embrace a durable ceasefire if it sees political transformation within Hamas that locks it into credible peace negotiations as a means of strengthening its long-term security. This makes Phase 3 every bit as important as Phase 2.
Without a credible pathway towards Palestinian self-determination, decommissioning risks becoming an end in itself rather than the foundation of a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. Equally, a future Israeli government will need to view full implementation of the Gaza agreement not as a concession to Hamas, but as the indispensable stepping stone towards normalisation with Saudi Arabia and deeper integration with the Arab and Islamic world. Europe should therefore work with its Arab partners to ensure that the Gaza deal is tied to a regional package. That would allow a future Israeli government to present withdrawal from Gaza and acceptance of a political process leading to a two-state solution not as unilateral compromises, but as part of a US-brokered grand bargain that underpins Israeli integration and security in the region.
Brussels (enr) – Local and regional leaders raised concerns that the next multiannual EU budget risks undermining investment in affordable homes needed to alleviate Europe’s deepening housing crisis.
“Europe’s housing challenge is not simply about building more housing units,” said Kata Tüttő, President of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), an EU advisory body home to democratically elected regional and local representatives from all 27 Member States.
At a gathering in Brussels on Thursday, they demanded the EU “move from political ambition to concrete investment and delivery,” arguing that failing to invest now will only put affordable housing further out of reach for millions of Europeans.
As negotiations over the EU’s next long-term financial framework gather pace, cities and regions fear that affordable housing could become a casualty of competing spending priorities as several EU member states seek to cut the European Commission’s proposed €2 trillion budget for 2028-2034.
Tüttő called on the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s lending arm, to “mobilise the scale of investment” that cities and regions need to “make communities liveable” by providing essential infrastructure. She cited public transport, as well as energy and water infrastructure, as key examples.
Italian MEP Irene Tinagli, Chair of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis (HOUS), said addressing the housing crisis “requires investment, better coordination across all levels of government and a shared commitment from European institutions, Member States, regions and cities”.
The CoR and EIB on Thursday agreed on closer cooperation in key areas including social infrastructure, housing, and energy. The European Investment Bank’s president, Nadia Calviño, said “investing into resilient cities and regions, into cohesion and housing” was a strategic priority.
According to EIB figures, the world’s largest multilateral development bank provided a record €5 billion in financing for housing projects across Europe in 2025. The EIB is targeting an increase to €6 billion this year, Calviño confirmed.
The investments are a contribution to the European Commission’s Affordable Housing Plan, which was launched in December and aims to boost housing supply, mobilise public and private investment, and support Member States and regions in expanding social and affordable housing.
According to the Commission’s estimates, however, the EU needs to build 2 million homes each year to meet current demand, which amounts to an investment of approximately €153 billion per year.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Brussels (enr) – The European Union’s migration commissioner has renewed his call for Germany to gradually end controls at its internal borders, pointing to falling numbers of irregular arrivals and the bloc’s new asylum rules.
It was now time to gradually abolish internal border controls, Magnus Brunner told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in Brussels.
The Austrian commissioner said the EU’s external borders were better protected and that irregular crossings had fallen sharply. Frontex recorded about one-third fewer irregular crossings at the EU’s external borders in the first half of 2026 than in the same period last year.
The EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum also took effect on June 12. Brunner said member states had begun implementing the rules and that the bloc was already seeing progress.
He welcomed steps by individual countries to ease controls. Checks on the border between Germany and Luxembourg on the Trier motorway have been lifted, he said. He also cited the suspension of controls between Austria and Slovenia.
Germany has had checks at its land borders since September 2024. Former Interior Minister Nancy Faeser ordered them, and her successor, Alexander Dobrindt, intensified them in May 2025. Dobrindt has repeatedly extended the measures, which are currently due to remain in place until September.
Brunner also defended the EU’s new Entry/Exit System, known as EES. The digital system records the entry and departure of travellers from outside the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
He acknowledged that the system had caused problems at some airports, including in Greece and Portugal, but said: “The system itself works very, very well.”
The system has faced criticism over long queues. The Airports Council International Europe has reported waiting times of up to five hours and missed connecting flights.
Brunner said professional truck drivers from the Western Balkans faced a particular problem because they can currently stay in the EU for no more than 90 days in any 180-day period. He proposed that EU member states and Western Balkan countries negotiate long-term visas on a bilateral basis.
Brussels (enr) – European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman David McAllister has urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to support German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s proposal for an associate membership for Ukraine as it moves towards joining the European Union.
The proposal is an opportunity that Ukraine should seize, the German centre-right lawmaker told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in early June. Claims that it would amount to “membership light” or second-class membership were incorrect, he said.
Instead, it would allow Ukraine to become more closely integrated into the EU step by step before full membership, making the benefits of the bloc more visible to its people. One possibility would be for Ukraine to participate in the European Parliament as an observer, McAllister said.
Zelenskyy has expressed opposition to the idea, arguing that it would be unfair for Ukraine to be present in the EU but have no say in its decisions. In a letter to EU leaders, he called for the bloc to move faster and not keep Ukraine in a waiting room until full membership.
Merz said earlier that rapid full EU accession for Ukraine, which is fighting Russia’s invasion, is not realistic. For the interim period, he has proposed allowing Ukraine to attend EU summits and ministerial meetings without voting rights.
His ideas also include an associate member of the European Commission without a portfolio or voting rights, associate members of the European Parliament and an associate judge at the European Court of Justice.
McAllister said EU enlargement was high on the bloc’s agenda and that the Western Balkans were at the heart of Europe. A stable region was an investment in peace and security, he said.
The CDU politician called for each candidate country to be assessed individually and on its merits rather than treating the Western Balkans as a single group. Montenegro was a clear frontrunner, he said, while North Macedonia’s accession path remained blocked by a political dispute with Bulgaria.
Eight other European countries are officially recognised as EU candidate countries alongside Ukraine: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye.

Luxembourg (enr) – The European Investment Bank (EIB) is on course to meet, and potentially exceed, its target of allocating five percent of its financing in the European Union to security and defence projects this year, EIB President Nadia Calviño said.
That would amount to around 4.5 billion euros, according to the EU’s lending arm.
“Tt’s clear that we need more investment in the area of security and defence in Europe,” Calviño told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in Luxembourg in June. “For the coming years, we are ready to do more to finance Europe’s security and defence capabilities,” the Spanish former economy minister added.
The EIB significantly increased its support for the sector last year in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the broader deterioration in the geopolitical situation. Financing for security and defence projects rose to more than 4 billion euros in 2025, four times the previous year’s level and almost five percent of all EIB Group financing in the EU.
“The shift of policy in security and defence has been a turning point for the EIB Group,” Calviño said.
Within only a few years, the bank had expanded its eligibility rules to include purely military projects. It now supports companies and investment funds active across the security and defence sector.
The EIB has gradually eased its financing rules since 2024. It can now provide funding for military equipment, infrastructure, services and technology. Weapons and ammunition remain excluded.
The Luxembourg-based EIB is the EU’s long-term lending institution. Its owners are the bloc’s member states, and its investments are generally intended to support the European Union’s political objectives.
The enr spoke with Calviño on the sidelines of the EIB’s annual Board of Governors meeting, as well as a meeting of EU ministers responsible for economic affairs, finance and the EU budget.

Gdańsk/Brussels (European Newsroom) – Ukrainian cities and regions risk being left out in deciding how billions in reconstruction funds are being used unless they are given a robust role in the planning, governance and implementation of reconstruction support, a joint statement by the European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine warned.
Meeting on the sidelines of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) 2026 in Gdańsk, Poland, the alliance called for a “localisation marker” in donor planning tools and ring-fenced funding with direct local access.
Antje Grotheer, President of the State Parliament in Bremen, Germany, and chair of the European Committee of the Regions’ (CoR) Working Group on Ukraine, argued that local and regional authorities should have a greater voice in donor discussions and reconstruction planning. She stressed that Ukraine’s decentralisation reforms have been key to maintaining resilience during the war.
“We feel there is an increasing need for stronger coordination of support that targets municipalities and regions,” Grotheer said.
Oleksii Riabykin, Deputy Minister for Rebuilding and Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, said his country is already moving from emergency reconstruction to building resilient communities. Experience gained by Ukrainian cities, towns and villages during the war can help strengthen resilience across in Europe, he said.
The joint statement released Wednesday stressed that over 70 percent of EU law is implemented at local level, but most reconstruction funding for Ukraine is still channeled through national governments, leaving municipalities to compete over the leftovers. At the URC 2026 in Gdańsk, the CoR and its alliance partners demanded a structural fix.
The alliance also encouraged Ukrainian regions to exploit existing EU programmes and platforms. It underscored the contribution of neighbouring EU countries to both Ukraine’s military efforts and its reconstruction, arguing that they should receive targeted support.
EU member states that share a border with Ukraine are Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
The alliance brings together EU and Ukrainian local and regional authorities and was co-founded by the CoR, an EU advisory body, in June 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its goal is to coordinate an effective reconstruction of Ukraine that involves local and regional authorities rather than centralising the implementation of funds to the state.
The URC was also established after Russia’s full-scale invasion, building on the foundations of the annual Ukraine Reform Conference established in 2017 by supporters of Ukraine, including the European Union.
The URC 2026 takes place on June 25 and 26 and focuses on the sectors most impacted by Russia’s attacks, such as energy, critical infrastructure, and logistics. The lead-up to the conference was overshadowed by escalating dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had named an army unit after Ukrainian underground fighters from World War II who are also blamed for massacres of tens of thousands of Poles and Jews in what is now western Ukraine. In response, Poland’s right-wing conservative President Karol Nawrocki stripped Zelensky of a high Polish order of merit.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Migration policy is high on the European Union’s agenda. But one month after the bloc’s new rules – known as the Pact on Migration and Asylum – came into force, is the EU beginning to see the desired results?
For Magnus Brunner, European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, the answer was yes. In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr) published on Thursday, he said that member states have begun implementing the rules and that illegal border crossings into the EU already dropped by 37% in the first half of 2026 compared to the previous year.
In light of these figures and the new rules, the Austrian politician said it is now time to “gradually” abolish internal border controls between EU member states, such as ongoing controls in Germany and Austria. He argued that the EU’s external borders were now better protected and reiterated that the number of irregular border crossings had fallen dramatically.
Journalists also quizzed Brunner about the Entry/Exit System, a new digital entry and exit procedure for people who are not from the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland. While admitting concerns from member states and critics that the system is still causing trouble in some member states, he said that it is generally performing as expected.
A major issue, however, remains for professional truck drivers from countries in the Western Balkans, who need to enter the EU to deliver goods. Currently, they can only stay in the EU for a maximum of 90 days within any 180-day period. As a solution, Brunner proposed to EU member states and Western Balkan countries to negotiate long-term visas bilaterally.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa, APA, and CTK, on behalf of the entire network.
Read some of their coverage here:


More impressions from the interview. Photos: Michael Brandt/dpa/European Newsroom
The European Newsroom (enr) welcomed a group of journalists from the United States to its offices in Brussels as part of their two-week exchange programme with the RIAS Berlin Kommission.
The visitors came from New York, Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., Missouri, Georgia, North Carolina, and Arizona and represented various media outlets such as Semafor, WCVB, NPR, CNN, KTVI/KPLR, WSOC Charlotte, Spectrum News, ABC, The Dispatch, and CBS.
What followed was a lively exchange about the state of journalism, news coverage and press freedom in the United States and Europe, how to get information from crucial sources, as well as the similarities and differences between the daily press briefings in the White House and the European Commission.
Tim Kohnen presented the European Newsroom’s work as a Brussels-based network of European news agencies. He was accompanied by Katharina Redanz and Niklas Treppner from the German press agency dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH, who gave more insight on how to report on EU affairs as a correspondent in Brussels.
The RIAS Berlin Commission organises exchange programmes several times per year, primarily for radio and television journalists from the US and Germany. It is dedicated to improving German-American understanding in broadcast journalism, for example through immersive study trips and newsroom visits.
This time around, the journey took the journalists to Munich, Dresden, Berlin, Cologne, and Brussels. They were accompanied by Christoph Jumpelt, RIAS Executive Director.
Ireland will take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 2026.
In a background briefing for the European Newsroom (enr) at the Permanent Representation of Ireland to the European Union in Brussels, journalists got an early glimpse of what the presidency will be working on in the months ahead.
Correspondents from several European Newsroom member agencies spoke with Eoin Flavin (Spokesperson Coreper II ) and Peadar Ó hÚbáin (Spokesperson Coreper I).
They engaged in a lively Q&A on a range of topics – from competitiveness, security, and defence to EU enlargement, support for Ukraine and online safety.
The talk brought together journalists from enr partner agencies dpa (Germany), CTK (Czech Republic), APA (Austria), and UKRINFORM (Ukraine).


More impressions from the briefing. Photos: Tim Kohnen/European Newsroom
In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr), the President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Nadia Calviño, told journalists that the bank is on track to meet and possibly exceed this year’s target of allocating 5 percent of its EU financing to security and defence. According to the EIB, this amounts to around €4.5 billion.
According to EIB figures, the world’s largest multilateral development bank already quadrupled its financing for security and defence projects last year to €4 billion, reflecting Europe’s response to an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.
The enr spoke with Calviño on the sidelines of the EIB’s annual Board of Governors meeting, as well as a meeting of EU ministers responsible for economic affairs, finance and the EU budget , in Luxembourg on Friday.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH and ANSA on behalf of the entire network.
Read some of their coverage here:
dpa (Germany): EU development bank continues to expand defence investment
ANSA (Italy): Calvino (EIB), ‘on track to exceed 5% target for defense financing’
In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr), the leading German foreign policy politician in the European Parliament, David McAllister, urged Ukraine to accept a recent proposal by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for an “associate membership” in the EU.
McAllister, who sits with the European People’s Party (EPP) and chairs the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), told the enr he is in favour of enhanced, step-by-step integration of Ukraine into the EU in order to make the benefits of the EU visible to the Ukrainian people. One example was for Ukraine to enter the European Parliament as an observer.
Kyiv had previously rejected the idea of an “associate membership”. In a letter to EU leaders, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote that it would be unfair for Ukraine to have a presence in the EU but remain without a voice. Instead, he urged the EU to move faster and not keep Ukraine in a waiting room.
Ukraine is not the only country in line for EU membership. Eight other European nations are currently also recognised candidates to join the bloc: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye.
McAllister told the enr that enlargement policy is at the top of the EU agenda and that the Western Balkan countries are at the heart of Europe. As such, a stable region is an investment in peace and security, he said.
At the same time, the German politician advocated for an individual approach to each country in the region based on merit, rather than grouping them together as one. He explained that the countries of the Western Balkans are individually at very different stages of progress. As an example, he pointed out that Montenegro is a clear frontrunner, while North Macedonia’s EU path remains blocked due to a political deadlock with Bulgaria.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa (Germany), CTK (Czech Republic), and Tanjug (Serbia) on the behalf of the entire network.
Read some of the coverage from our network here:

What is disinformation? What principles drive the spread of fake content online? And what role does artificial intelligence play in this context?
On May 27, the European Newsroom continued its series of webinars with one of the most highly relevant topics for journalists and media professionals: the surge in disinformation and fake news on social media and other online platforms. The webinar aimed to strengthen participants’ ability to identify misleading content quickly and apply verification techniques in their daily reporting.
The systematic, interest-driven dissemination of disinformation poses significant challenges for mass-media audiences and users of digital information ecosystems. This includes false and divisive narratives that influence public opinion, AI-generated images that cause irritation and outrage as well as manipulated content in high-reach social media channels. Against this backdrop, the fundamental principles of journalistic due diligence have gained considerable importance.
Julian Bohne, Verification Specialist at dpa-Custom Content in Hamburg, equipped participants with tools, tips and techniques to identify and debunk such material in the digital space. Starting with the basics, he demonstrated how manipulated content is created and explained the principles behind its dissemination. The key message: verification, source criticism and contextualisation are more crucial than ever for distinguishing authentic content from manipulated material.
To put theory into practice, he used examples from the daily editorial work of Germany’s largest news agency, dpa, to demonstrate fundamental verification methods and tools. Throughout the webinar, participants tried their hands in analysing and verifying images and videos, determining whether and why they were fabricated or AI-generated.
Participants came from several European Newsroom agencies, including ANSA (Italy), AMNA (Greece), BTA (Bulgaria), PAP (Poland), EFE (Spain), and FENA (Bosnia and Herzegovina).